SHERIFF'S OFFICER CHARLES RUDOLPH v. COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

SHERIFF'S OFFICER CHARLES RUDOLPH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF GLOUCESTER, BOARD OF

CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS, and its

Agents, Servants, Employees

and/or Representatives,

Defendants-Respondents.

June 9, 2014

Submitted April 29, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Higbee.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County, Docket No. L-1643-12.

Alterman & Associates, attorneys for appellant (Jessica L. Arndt, on the briefs).

Brown & Connery, LLP, attorneys for respondents (William M. Tambussi, Christopher A. Orlando, and Michael J. Watson, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Charles Rudolph, a Sheriff's Officer employed by defendant, County of Gloucester, Board of Chosen Freeholders, appeals the February 22, 2013 dismissal with prejudice of his complaint challenging minor disciplinary action against him, which resulted in a two-day suspension without pay. We affirm.

The complaint "for declaratory judgment and action in lieu of prerogative writ," alleged that the disciplinary hearing was "unfair and prejudicial," "prejudicial, arbitrary and capricious," and that the disciplinary action taken against him was "legally defective and unwarranted." Plaintiff sought judgment declaring the suspension null and void, reinstating him, awarding counsel fees and costs, "and [granting] any other relief to which" he might be entitled. Plaintiff was charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6). The deputy county administrator conducted the disciplinary hearing on October 18, 2012, finding not only that plaintiff had engaged in the conduct, but that the two-day suspension previously imposed by the Sheriff should be upheld.

In response to the complaint, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Rule 4:6-2(e), or in the alternative, for summary judgment, asserting that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. As grounds, defendant claimed the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the employer and the Gloucester County Sheriff's Association, PBA Local No. 122, to which plaintiff belongs, mandated that he pursue a grievance process, culminating in arbitration, if he was dissatisfied with the minor disciplinary action taken against him.

We agree with Judge Richard J. Geiger, J.S.C., that plaintiff's only recourse, in light of the plain language of the CBA, was to proceed to arbitration. The judge dismissed the complaint with prejudice, as plaintiff had no cause of action against defendant. See Rule 4:6-2(e).

In rendering his decision, Judge Geiger first placed the issue in the proper context that arbitration has long been a favored method of dispute resolution pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1, particularly as relates to labor disputes, citing to County College of Morris Staff Association v. County College of Morris, 100 N.J. 383 (1985). The judge proceeded to identify the procedure found in the CBA that union members were to follow when aggrieved by employer action. This type of minor disciplinary event clearly fell within the scope of the CBA, and was an occurrence "that should be resolved by way of grievance, hearings, alternative dispute mechanisms ending in binding arbitration, rather than ending up here in Superior Court." Although not expressly stated by Judge Geiger, it is implicit in his analysis that discovery would not have advanced plaintiff's cause of action because the plain, uncontroverted language of the CBA controlled.

Plaintiff raises the following issues for our consideration:

POINT I: The manner in which discipline is handled has been held to be negotiable.

POINT II: The Collective Bargaining Agreement is silent as to whether minor discipline is arbit[r]able.

POINT III: Appellant is entitled to a De Novo hearing on his incident of minor discipline pursuant to applicable case law, as the CBA at issue is not clear and is unambiguous [sic].

These points do not warrant much discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

In our review of the trial court decision, we employ the same standard as did Judge Geiger, and search the complaint "in depth and with liberality" to determine if a cause of action can be gleaned from the pleadings, asking if discovery would advance plaintiff's cause of action. See Rezem Family Assocs., LP v. Borough of Millstone, 423 N.J. Super. 103, 113-14 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 366, 368 (2011); see also Scheidt v. DRS Techs., Inc., 424 N.J. Super. 188, 193 (App. Div. 2012).

Despite plaintiff's assertions to the contrary, the minor disciplinary action taken by the Sheriff, a two-day suspension, and the ensuing disciplinary hearing conducted at plaintiff's request, was mandated by the CBA, in accord with Article III(B). Plaintiff's challenge to the outcome of the hearing is a "grievance" included in Article III(B)(1) of the CBA. The final step in that grievance process is, as Judge Geiger pointed out, arbitration, as called for by Article III(D). Arbitration clauses in government workers' CBAs are enforceable, N.J.S.A. 2A:24-1, and arbitration is a favored means of dispute resolution for all labor conflicts. See Cnty. Coll. of Morris, supra, 100 N.J. at 390.

In sum, the proceedings that addressed plaintiff's violation of the relevant standards of conduct were authorized by the CBA, and his subsequent appeals equally governed by that irrevocable agreement. Therefore, his Law Division complaint was properly dismissed.

Affirmed.