STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SEAN A. HASANOEDDIN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SEAN A. HASANOEDDIN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

February 27, 2014

Submitted February 5, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Simonelli and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 11-04-0483.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Jenny M. Hsu, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

After the trial court denied his motion to suppress evidence in connection with Middlesex County Indictment No. 11-04-0483, defendant Sean Hasanoeddin pled guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) (Suboxone), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1). In accordance with the negotiated plea, the judge sentenced defendant to "time served"1 and three years of probation. Appropriate fines and penalties were also assessed. We affirm.

Officer Paul Stentella of the Carteret Police Department was the only witness to testify at the suppression hearing. Officer Stentella stated that, on January 4, 2011, he was on patrol in an apartment complex. He described the complex as a "high drug area." The officer explained that the apartment management had posted "no trespassing signs" in an attempt to stop "[p]eople hanging out that don't belong there."

At approximately 1:14 p.m., Officer Stentella observed a woman and a man walking toward one of the apartment buildings. The couple then split up. Officer Stentella approached the woman and recognized her as Jennifer Carpenter, a person he knew from prior police contacts. The officer knew that Carpenter's "old address was . . . a couple blocks away, not inside the apartment complex." Officer Stentella asked Carpenter whether she now lived in the complex. Carpenter told him that she did not live there, but that she and her boyfriend were visiting a friend who did. Carpenter also told Officer Stentella that her boyfriend was at the bus stop "waiting to go back to the Bronx."

Officer Stentella went to the bus stop. When he arrived, he saw the man, later identified as defendant, who had been walking with Carpenter. Officer Stentella asked defendant "what his name was [and] what he was doing there[.]" In response, defendant told the officer his name, provided his identification, and stated that he and Carpenter had been visiting a friend in one of the apartments.

While defendant was waiting for the bus, Officer Stentella "conducted a warrants check with headquarters" and found that defendant had an outstanding warrant "out of New York[.]" Defendant was then arrested and handcuffed. Another officer searched defendant and found "a tightly folded white piece of paper" in defendant's right front pocket. The paper contained "an orangish, whitish powder[,]" which was later determined to be Suboxone, a CDS.

After hearing oral argument, Judge Michael Toto issued a thorough written decision denying defendant's motion to suppress the CDS. The judge found that Officer Stentella conducted a permissible field inquiry when he approached defendant at the bus stop and asked for his name and his reason for being in the apartment complex. The judge stated that the officer "did not show any force or authority that would make the defendant feel that he was not free to leave" and that "defendant does not allege any facts that demonstrate that he was [improperly] detained." Because the officer conducted a field inquiry, rather than an investigatory stop, Judge Toto concluded that the officer did not need to have an "articulable reasonable suspicion" that defendant had engaged in criminal activity before speaking to him. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE INITIAL INTERACTION BETWEEN THE OFFICER AND DEFENDANT WAS NOT A FIELD INQUIRY, BUT RATHER, AN INVESTIGATORY STOP, THAT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE REQUISITE REASONABLE SUSPICION. THEREFORE, THE ULTIMATE SEIZURE OF THE SUBOXONE FROM DEFENDANT'S PERSON BY THE OFFICER WAS [THE] FRUIT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOP.

We reject this contention and affirm.

Our review of a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J.1, 15 (2009). In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we must uphold the judge's factual findings, "'so long as those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (quoting Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15). Additionally, we defer to a trial judge's findings that are "'substantially influenced by [the trial judge's] opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson, supra, 200 N.J. at 15). We do not, however, defer to a trial judge's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Ibid.

Defendant contends that Officer Stentella "conducted an investigatory stop when he approached defendant, asked him authoritative questions and requested his New York issued identification, which the officer then used to check for warrants." He asserts that the officer's actions constituted an investigatory stop, rather than a field inquiry. Because the officer could not point to any specific facts which would give rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaged in criminal activity, defendant argues that the stop was unconstitutional. We disagree.

Under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, "[a] warrantless search is presumed invalid unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664 (2000) (citing State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 230 (1981)). The same is true of the warrantless seizure of a person or property. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 904-06 (1968) (seizure of a person); cf. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 216-17 (1990) (seizure of property).

The seizure of a person occurs in a police encounter if the facts objectively indicate that "'the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.'" State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 166 (1994) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 402 (1991)). In applying that test, our courts implement the constitutional guarantee to protect the "reasonable expectations of citizens to be 'secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects . . . .'" Id. at 165 (quoting N.J. Const. art. I, 7).

The Supreme Court has defined a field inquiry as "the least intrusive" form of police encounter, occurring "when a police officer approaches an individual and asks 'if [the person] is willing to answer some questions.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)). "A field inquiry is permissible so long as the questions '[are] not harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 510). During such an inquiry, "the individual approached 'need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 24 (2010) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001)).

In contrast to a field inquiry, an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop, is characterized by a detention in which the person approached by a police officer would not reasonably feel free to leave, even though the encounter falls short of a formal arrest. State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 355-56 (2002); see also Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 904. The Terry exception to the warrant requirement permits a police officer to detain an individual for a brief period, if that stop is "based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,' give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). Under this well-established standard, "[a]n investigatory stop is valid only if the officer has a 'particularized suspicion' based upon an objective observation that the person stopped has been [engaged] or is about to engage in criminal wrongdoing." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).

Applying these principles here, we discern no basis for disturbing Judge Toto's determination that the search was valid. Officer Stentella conducted a field inquiry, rather than a full Terry stop. Thus, it was not necessary that Officer Stentella have a reasonable suspicion that defendant had engaged in criminal activity before speaking to him. The officer approached defendant at a bus stop. While defendant was waiting for his bus, the officer merely asked him for his name and his reason for having been in the apartment complex, which were obviously permissible inquiries. Pineiro, supra, 181 N.J. at 20. Defendant voluntarily complied. Once the warrant check indicated that defendant had an outstanding warrant, the officer had probable cause to arrest him and the search that revealed that defendant had Suboxone was conducted incident to that arrest. Under those circumstances, the judge correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress.

1 The judgment of conviction states that defendant had 336 days of jail credit at the time of sentencing.