ABDULLAH LEGREE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

ABDULLAH LEGREE,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_________________________________

June 10, 2014

Submitted September 18, 2013 Decided

Before Judges Fuentes and Haas.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Abdullah Legree, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Shirley P. Dickstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

At all times relevant to this appeal, appellant Abdullah Legree was an inmate at East Jersey State Prison serving a twenty-year sentence for drug related offenses. He appeals from a final disciplinary determination by the Department of Corrections (DOC) finding he committed prohibited act .256 by refusing to obey an order, engaged in conduct disruptive to the security of the prison, *.306, and interfered with the taking of a count in violation of .502 and N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1. Appellant was sanctioned to ten days detention, 275 days of administrative segregation, and 275 days loss of commutation time.1

Appellant raises the following arguments in support of this appeal.

POINT ONE

THE FINAL DECISION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE VACATED IN AS MUCH AS APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR DISCIPLINARY HEARING PREJUDICIAL ENOUGH TO WARRANT REVERSAL, AND VIOLATIVE OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION AND THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

POINT TWO

THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EQUAL PROTECTION AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS AT HIS DISCIPLINARY HEARING.

We reject these arguments and affirm. These are the facts found by the hearing officer and subsequently adopted by the DOC through its internal administrative appellate review process. On September 19, 2011, a Senior Corrections Officer was conducting a standard prisoner count and ordered appellant to stand up to be formally identified. Appellant, who was lying in bed with his head turned away from the Officer, refused to comply. The Officer repeated the command causing the same result from appellant. When the Officer repeated his order a third time, appellant handed the Officer his prisoner identification card with his face still concealed, and said: "You know who the fuck I am. I've been here long enough."

On these facts, the hearing officer found appellant's conduct disrupted the prisoner count and clearly established he violated a legitimate order given by an officer in the performance of his duty. Appellant was served with written notice of these charges. He was also given counsel substitute. He declined the opportunity to call witnesses.

As an appellate court, our role in reviewing a final decision of a State administrative agency is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We must determine whether the administrative action was "'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ramirez v. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 18, 23 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). Appellant has the burden of proof in this respect. In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006).

The DOC has "broad discretionary powers" to promulgate regulations designed to maintain the security and order inside correctional facilities. Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J. 239, 252 (1987). As we have previously noted, "[p]risons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment." Russo v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 324 N.J. Super. 576, 584 (App. Div. 1999).

Prison disciplinary hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full spectrum of rights due to a criminal defendant does not apply. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Inmates are nonetheless entitled to certain limited due process protections. Id. at 525. These protections include written notice of the charges at least twenty-four hours prior to the hearing; an impartial tribunal, which may consist of personnel from the central office staff; a limited right to call witnesses; the assistance of counsel substitute; and a right to a written statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the sanctions imposed. Id. at 525-33.

To find an inmate guilty, a disciplinary hearing officer must have substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act. N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.15(a). DOC regulations define "substantial evidence" as evidence "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." In re Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 35 N.J. 358, 376 (1961) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

We have carefully considered appellant's arguments in light of the applicable law and conclude that none have sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in this written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

1 In imposing these sanctions, the DOC merged the disciplinary offense of refusing to obey an order with the offense of interference with the taking of a count.