DOROTHEA GAGLIARDI v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

DOROTHEA GAGLIARDI,

Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR, and RUSSELL GUBA,

M.D.,

Respondents.

________________________________________________________________

February 28, 2014

Submitted February 4, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Espinosa and Koblitz.

On appeal from Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 281,511.

Dorothea Gagliardi, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Andrew J. Walko, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Russell Guba, M.D. has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Dorothea Gagliardi appeals from the September 20, 2012 final decision of the Board of Review, decided after we granted its application for a remand for a new hearing, which was then conducted. After the second hearing, the Board upheld the decision of the Appeal Tribunal that found Gagliardi "voluntarily quit work without good cause attributable to such work." We affirm.

Gagliardi was employed as a part-time secretary by Russell Guba, M.D. from November 16, 1999 through April 5, 2010. She left work in March 2010 to have cataract surgery. She decided not to return to work following her surgery after a meeting with her employer. She claimed that Dr. Guba referred to her prior employer as a "hippie hospital," and threw files in her direction. She also claimed that his wife, who worked in the office, accused her of stealing a patient's $10 co-pay. The appeals examiner, who heard testimony from Dr. Guba, his wife and Gagliardi, found Gagliardi incredible and her allegations unfounded. He determined that her work conditions "did not even remotely establish a condition of employment so severe as to justify her leaving work for no work at all."

Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). We also give due regard to the agency's credibility findings. Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). Unless the agency's action "was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.

N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) states in pertinent part:

An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

 
(a) For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks[1] in employment . . . .

"Mere dissatisfaction with working conditions which are not shown to be abnormal or do not affect health, does not constitute good cause for leaving work voluntarily." Domenico v. Bd. of Review., 192 N.J. Super. 284, 288 (App. Div. 1983) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The decision to quit "must be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary, trifling and whimsical ones." Ibid. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause" as a work-related reason "so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment."

The Board did not act in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable fashion in finding that no such compelling reason required Gagliardi to leave her employment.

1[] The statute was amended in 2010 after this matter, extending the period from six to eight weeks. L. 2010, c. 37, 2.