DONNA MOYER v. JEFFREY BROGDENAnnotate this Case
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO. A-0
DONNA MOYER, a/k/a
February 10, 2014
Submitted February 4, 2014 Decided
Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket No. FM-03-788-08.
Donna Moyer, appellant pro se.
Archer & Greiner, attorneys for respondent (Michael A. Weinberg, on the brief).
Plaintiff appeals from post-judgment orders that required her to reimburse defendant for health insurance costs plaintiff incurred following their divorce, awarded counsel fees to defendant, and denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. We affirm.
The parties entered into a dual judgment of divorce with stipulations of settlement in December 2008. Paragraph 3 of their stipulations provided that each party would be responsible for "all health coverage for himself or herself." Paragraph 18 provided,
In the event either of the parties breaches a provision of this Judgment resulting in the offended party having to bring the subject of the breach before a Court of competent jurisdiction in order to enforce the terms of this Judgment, the party breaching this Judgment shall be responsible for reasonable counsel fees and costs of the offended party.
In May 2012, plaintiff filed a motion seeking various forms of relief. Defendant filed a cross-motion seeking, in part, an order requiring plaintiff to reimburse him
for the $11,639.10 debt Defendant has incurred for excess premiums paid for Plaintiff's continued health insurance coverage after the entry of the parties' Dual Final Judgment of Divorce With Stipulations of Settlement dated December 1, 2008.
Defendant's certification in support of his motion stated he executed an affidavit in or about March 2010, confirming that plaintiff was no longer eligible for coverage under his health insurance and provided a copy of that affidavit. He stated he was later notified that he had to repay his employer the sum of $11,639.10 for excess premiums paid for plaintiff's insurance coverage after their divorce, and provided supporting documentation. He certified further that plaintiff continued to use his health insurance coverage after their divorce and included copies of explanation of benefit forms that reflected her usage of his coverage after March 2010.
Plaintiff did not file a response to the cross-motion. At oral argument and now on appeal, she states she had her own insurance, that it was not her responsibility to cancel defendant's coverage for her, and that any error was made by the insurance companies. The court entered an order that, in part, required plaintiff to reimburse defendant $11,639.10 and to pay $1500 toward defendant's counsel fees.
Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. In her certification and accompanying documentation, she showed she had acquired health insurance following the divorce. However, she also acknowledged that she had received chiropractic services in September 2010 and in January 2011 from the Sandov Chiropractic Group. She stated,
It is my belief that since I had treated with the Sandov Chiropractic Group during the marriage, that they had my prior insurance information on file and never updated same. Again, this could have been avoided had Defendant simply removed me from his insurance as he was provided to do so under the parties' Final Judgment of Divorce.
Notably, plaintiff did not assert or prove that she updated her insurance information with the health care provider so the appropriate insurance company would be billed for the services she admits receiving.
We conclude that the trial court's decision to order plaintiff to reimburse defendant for $11,639.10 in health coverage costs, award defendant $1500 in counsel fees, and deny plaintiff's motion for reconsideration are amply supported by the record and applicable legal principles. Plaintiff's arguments to the contrary lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).