COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF MI V GOVERNOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion
Chief Justice:
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED NOVEMBER 8, 2005
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
o. 125665
N
v
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM.
This
exercised
case
in
Legislature’s
involves
Executive
the
authority
Order
allocation
of
No.
of
2001-9,
general
the
to
sales
Governor,
reduce
taxes
to
the
the
Comprehensive Transportation Fund (CTF) by $12,750,000 for
the fiscal year ending September 30, 2002, and to transfer
those revenues to the state’s general fund.
Appellants
claim that the general sales tax revenues allocated to the
CTF
are
“constitutionally
dedicated”
funds
within
the
meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9, and therefore immune to
the Governor’s power to balance the budget, Const 1963, art
5, § 20.
The Court of Appeals concluded that art 9, § 9, which
it found to be ambiguous, does not dedicate any portion of
the
general
sales
tax
revenues
for
comprehensive
transportation purposes.
260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340
(2004).
the
We
agree
with
Court
of
Appeals
that
the
revenues at issue are not constitutionally dedicated and
that
the
Governor
had
the
authority
to
reduce
the
Legislature’s allocation of general sales tax revenues to
the CTF in EO 2001-9.
We disagree, however, that art 9, §
9 is ambiguous. In affirming the Court of Appeals, we rely
on the plain meaning of the constitutional provision.
2
I. Facts and Procedural History
To alleviate a budget shortfall for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2002, the Governor implemented
EO
2001-9. The order transferred $12,750,000 in general sales
tax revenues from the
Plaintiffs
injunction
from
CTF to the general fund.
sought
the
and
Ingham
obtained
Circuit
a
Court
preliminary
to
enjoin
the
transfer. Plaintiffs maintained that the general sales tax
revenues
allocated
to
the
CTF
were
“constitutionally
dedicated” within the meaning of Const 1963, art 9, § 9 and
immune to the Governor’s power to reduce the expenditure
and balance the budget under Const 1963, art 5, § 20.
In
a
reversed.
published
decision,
the
Court
of
Appeals
260 Mich App 299; 677 NW2d 340 (2004).
The
Court of Appeals found the language of the constitutional
provision
ambiguous,
and
development
of
§
art
9,
examined
9
in
the
determining
historical
whether
the
allocation to the CTF was “constitutionally dedicated.” We
granted oral argument on the application.
471 Mich 887
(2004).
II. Standard of Review
Constitutional issues are reviewed de novo.
v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445, 455; 684 NW2d 765 (2004).
3
Wayne Co
Our
first
inquiry,
when
interpreting
constitutional
provisions, “is to determine the text’s original meaning to
the ratifiers, the people, at the time of ratification.”
Id. at 468.
This is accomplished by “applying each term’s
plain meaning at the time of ratification.”
469.
Id. at 468-
See also Silver Creek Drain Dist v Extrusions Div,
Inc, 468 Mich 367, 375; 663 NW2d 436 (2003).
III. Analysis
The Governor’s authority to reduce state expenditures
is found in art 5, § 20, which states:
No appropriation shall be a mandate to
spend.
The governor, with the approval of the
appropriating committees of the house and senate,
shall
reduce
expenditures
authorized
by
appropriations whenever it appears that actual
revenues for a fiscal period will fall below the
revenue estimates on which appropriations for
that
period
were
based.
Reductions
in
expenditures shall be made in accordance with
procedures prescribed by law.
The governor may
not reduce expenditures of the legislative and
judicial branches or from funds constitutionally
dedicated for specific purposes.
[Emphasis
added.]
The disputed issue in this case is whether the general
sales tax revenues that the Legislature allocated to the
CTF are “constitutionally dedicated for specific purposes,”
and
therefore
immune
reduce expenditures.
from
the
Governor’s
authority
to
The answer to this question is found
in art 9, § 9, which states, in relevant part:
4
All specific taxes, except general sales and
use taxes and regulatory fees, imposed directly
or indirectly on fuels sold or used to propel
motor vehicles upon highways and to propel
aircraft and on registered motor vehicles and
aircraft shall, after the payment of necessary
collection expenses, be used exclusively for
transportation purposes as set forth in this
section.
* * *
Amount used for transportation purposes.
The balance, if any, of the specific taxes,
except general sales and use taxes and regulatory
fees, imposed directly or indirectly on fuels
sold or used to propel motor vehicles upon
highways and on registered motor vehicles, after
the payment of necessary collection expenses;
. . . and not more than 25 percent of the general
sales taxes, imposed directly or indirectly on
fuel sold to propel motor vehicles upon highways,
on the sale of motor vehicles, and on the sale of
the parts and accessories of motor vehicles . . .
shall be used exclusively for the transportation
purposes of comprehensive transportation purposes
as defined by law. [Emphasis added.] [1]
While
require
construing
effort,
the
the
wording
provision’s
of
art
meaning
9,
is
§
9
might
clear.
The
provision limits the amount of general sales taxes that the
Legislature can allocate to comprehensive transportation to
1
The manner in which any funds allocated under this
provision to “comprehensive transportation purposes” will
be distributed is set forth in the General Sales Tax Act,
MCL 205.51 et seq.
For fiscal year 2001-2002, MCL
205.75(4) apportioned only 27.9 percent of the 25 percent
of revenues to the CTF.
The balance of the general sales
tax revenues described in art 9, § 9 was directed to the
state general fund.
5
“not more than 25 percent of the general sales taxes . . .
.”
In doing so, it places a ceiling on the amount of
general sales tax revenues that can be used “exclusively
for . . . comprehensive transportation purposes . . . ,”
but
does not dedicate any specific amount of general sales
taxes to be used for comprehensive transportation purposes.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from art 9, § 9 is
that
the
general
sales
tax
revenues
described
in
that
provision are not constitutionally dedicated funds.
When
mistakenly
subject
construing
found
to
art
that
9,
the
§
9,
the
Court
constitutional
alternative
of
Appeals
provision
interpretations,
and
was
then
unnecessarily considered its history and purpose and the
circumstances under which it was written and later amended.
See 260 Mich App 307-311.
As described above, the Court
should have looked no further than the plain language of
art 9, § 9 to determine that the general sales tax revenues
allocated
by
the
constitutionally
give
the
Legislature
dedicated
words
of
funds.
our
to
the
Our
CTF
were
obligation
Constitution
a
not
is
to
reasonable
interpretation consistent with the plain meaning understood
by the ratifiers.
Hathcock, 471 Mich at 468-469.
Text
that may require reasonable effort to parse is not for that
reason ambiguous.
6
IV
In sum, we conclude that art 9, § 9 is unambiguous,
and we agree with the Court of Appeals that, with respect
to
the
reduction
of
the
general
sales
tax
revenues
allocated to the CTF by EO 2001-9, the executive order was
a
lawful
exercise
of
the
Governor’s
constitutional
authority under art 5, § 20.
We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals resolution of
this
issue
respects,
in
favor
leave
to
of
appeal
the
is
defendants.
denied
In
because
all
we
other
are
not
persuaded that the remaining questions should be reviewed
by this Court.
for
entry
of
This case is remanded to the trial court
a
judgment
in
favor
of
defendants
on
the
merits.
Clifford W. Taylor
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
CAVANAGH, J.
I concur in the result only.
Michael F. Cavanagh
7
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY ROAD ASSOCIATION OF
MICHIGAN and CHIPPEWA COUNTY
ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, CAPITAL AREA
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, and
SUBURBAN MOBILITY AUTHORITY FOR
REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 125665
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR,
STATE TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY, SECRETARY OF STATE, and
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
WEAVER, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result of the
opinion per curiam because I agree that the revenues at
issue
are
Governor
not
had
constitutionally
the
authority
to
dedicated
reduce
the
and
that
the
Legislature’s
allocation
of
Comprehensive
general
sales
Transportation
tax
Fund.
revenues
As
to
noted
by
the
the
majority opinion, Const 1963, art 9, § 9 places a ceiling
on the amount of general sales tax revenues that can be
used for comprehensive transportation purposes, but it does
not
dedicate
revenues
any
to
purposes.
be
specific
used
amount
for
of
general
comprehensive
sales
tax
transportation
I also agree with the majority that art 9, § 9
is not ambiguous.
I write separately because I cannot join some of the
principles
articulated
of
constitutional
and
applied
interpretation,
in
the
opinion
as
per
they
are
curiam,
including the standard of review section of the opinion,
which relies on cases in which I concurred in part and
dissented in part.
See Wayne Co v Hathcock, 471 Mich 445,
485; 684 NW2d 765 (2004) (Weaver, J. concurring in part and
dissenting
in
part),
and
Silver
Creek
Drain
Dist
v
Extrusions Div, Inc, 468 Mich 367, 382; 663 NW2d 436 (2003)
(Weaver, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In
each of these cases, I disagreed with the method by which
the majority attempted to carry out our mandate that we
2
interpret
a
constitutional
provision
according
to
the
“common understanding” that the people would give it.1
Further, although I agree that the Court of Appeals
was wrong to conclude that art 9, § 9 is ambiguous, I would
not
be
unduly
critical
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
for
considering the history and purpose of the amendment.
at
6.
A
court
may
“also
consider
the
Ante
circumstances
surrounding the adoption of a constitutional provision and
the
purpose
sought
to
be
accomplished
by
it”
when
common understanding of the provision is questioned.
the
Wayne
Co, supra at 487 (citing Traverse City School Dist, supra
1
As described by Justice Cooley, the rule of “common
understanding” means:
“A constitution is made for the people and
by the people. The interpretation that should be
given it is that which reasonable minds, the
great mass of the people themselves, would give
it. ‘For as the Constitution does not derive its
force from the convention which framed, but from
the people who ratified it, the intent to be
arrived at is that of the people, and it is not
to be supposed that they have looked for any dark
or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but
rather that they have accepted them in the sense
most obvious to the common understanding, and
ratified the instrument in the belief that that
was
the
sense
designed
to
be
conveyed.’”
[Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General,
384 Mich 390, 405; 185 NW2d 9 (1971), quoting
Cooley’s Const Lim 81 (emphasis in Traverse City
School Dist).]
3
at 405).
Moreover, when interpreting a constitution, “the
technical rules of statutory construction do not apply.”
Traverse City School Dist, supra at 405.
For
these
reasons,
I
concur
in
the
result
of
the
opinion per curiam.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
4
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY ROAD ASSOICATION OF MICHIGAN
and CHIPPEWA COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
MICHIGAN PUBLIC TRANSIT ASSOCIATION,
ANN ARBOR TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY,
CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, and SUBURBAN MOBILITY
AUTHORITY FOR REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION,
Intervening Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 125665
GOVERNOR OF MICHIGAN, DIRECTOR OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSORTATION, DIRECTOR
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, STATE BUDGET DIRECTOR, STATE
TREASURER, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
SECRETARY OF STATE, and STATE OF
MICHIGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (concurring in the result only).
I
concur
with
the
majority
that
general
sales
tax
revenues are not constitutionally dedicated funds for the
reasons
stated
Governor
has
in
the
the
Court
authority
to
of
Appeals
reduce
the
opinion.
The
Legislature’s
allocation
of
general
sales
tax
revenues
to
the
Comprehensive Transportation Fund.
I
write
separately
because,
unlike
the
majority
on
this Court, I agree with the Court of Appeals that Const
1963, art 9, § 9 is ambiguous.
It is ambiguous because it
reasonably
possible
has
“several
meanings
or
interpretations.”1
The
Court
of
Appeals
panel
accurately
explains
the
nature of the ambiguity:
[The
section]
unequivocally
exempts
all
general sales taxes from the restrictions imposed
on
specific
taxes
but
then
simultaneously
subjects up to twenty-five percent of general
sales taxes to the very same restrictions.” [260
Mich App 299, 306; 677 NW2d 340 (2004) (emphasis
in original).]
When
interpreting
an
ambiguous
constitutional
provision, it is proper for a court to consider its history
and purpose.
looked
The Court of Appeals did not err when it
outside
the
text
to
the
section’s
history
and
purpose to determine which of the text’s several possible
meanings was intended.
The majority’s criticism of this
approach is misplaced.
For these reasons, I concur only in the result of the
majority opinion.
Marilyn Kelly
1
This is the first definition of “ambiguous” found in
the Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001).
2
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
