PEOPLE OF MI V LEONARD LAMONT STEWART
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice:
Opinion
Justices:
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED JUNE 28, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 124055
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
WEAVER, J.
This case is one of statutory interpretation.
MCL
791.234(10),
a
prisoner
certificate of cooperation.
may
apply
for
a
Under
judicial
If the prisoner is found to
have cooperated with law enforcement, then the prisoner is
eligible for parole 2.5 years sooner than otherwise.
questions
presented
cooperation
determination
must
constitutes
whether
are:
occur,
that
and
actions
when
when
cooperation
“cooperation”
defendant’s
(1)
under
met
a
has
court
prisoner’s
may
occurred;
MCL
that
the
The
make
(2)
791.234(10),
standard;
and
a
what
and
(3)
whether this case should be remanded to the circuit court
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant
has cooperated within the meaning of the statute.
We hold that a prisoner’s cooperation may occur at any
time before the prisoner is released on parole.
But the
cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for
judicial
statute
determination
imposes
no
of
limits
cooperation.
on
when
a
Similarly,
court
may
the
make
a
determination that cooperation occurred.
Cooperation means that a prisoner engages in conduct
where the prisoner is working with law enforcement for a
common purpose, provides useful or relevant information to
law enforcement, or establishes that although the prisoner
provided law enforcement any information he or she had, and
it turned out not to be relevant or useful, the prisoner
never had any relevant or useful information to provide.
A
prisoner who had relevant or useful information to provide
and chose not to provide this information, however, cannot
be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.
Under
burden
of
these
standards,
initially
defendant
showing,
by
did
affidavit
that he had cooperated with law enforcement.
not
or
meet
his
otherwise,
Accordingly,
defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
To the extent that People v Matelic, 249 Mich App 1;
641 NW2d 252 (2001), and People v Cardenas, 263 Mich App
2
511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), conflict with this opinion, they
are overruled.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s
motion for judicial certification of cooperation.
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The police intercepted a package of cocaine at the
Saginaw office of United Parcel Service.
The police set up
surveillance
the
at
the
house
to
which
package
was
addressed and had a police officer deliver the package.
David Harrell, a codefendant, signed for the package.
short
time
Harrell
later,
told
the
police
police
officers
that
raided
defendant
the
asked
A
house.
him
if
defendant could have packages delivered to Harrell’s house,
and that three or four packages had been delivered in 1994.
Harrell stated that defendant had come to the house earlier
with Bryant Fields, and that defendant had said that Fields
would be picking the package up.
During the raid, Fields
came to the house to pick up the package.
When the police
arrested Fields, they found two rocks of cocaine wrapped in
$50
and
a
green
pager.
Fields
stated
that
the
pager
belonged to the man for whom he was picking up the package;
Harrell
said
that
defendant carried.
the
pager
looked
like
the
one
that
During the raid, the pager went off
three times, displaying defendant’s home phone number.
3
The
package originated in Pomona, California, and there were
several calls made from defendant’s home phone to Pomona.
Following
possession
a
with
jury
trial,
intent
to
defendant
deliver
was
over
convicted
650
grams
of
of
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to commit
possession
with
intent
to
cocaine, MCL 750.157a(a).
convicted
and
sentenced
deliver
over
650
grams
of
At the time that defendant was
in
1995,
MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(i)
provided that an individual found guilty of possessing with
the
intent
receive
a
Further,
to
deliver
mandatory
there
was
over
650
sentence
no
grams
of
possibility
of
cocaine
life
of
would
imprisonment.
parole
for
an
individual sentenced to a mandatory life sentence “for a
major
controlled
791.234(4).1
consecutive
substance
offense
.
.
.
.”
MCL
Consequently, defendant was sentenced to two
life
sentences
without
the
possibility
of
parole.
In 1998, three years after defendant was sentenced,
the
Legislature
revised
the
statutes.
The
revisions
removed the mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted
of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of
cocaine and replaced that punishment with “life or any term
1
The substance of MCL 791.234(4) is now contained in
MCL 791.234(6).
4
of
years
but
not
333.7401(2)(a)(i).
less
The
than
revisions
20
further
years.”
MCL
provided
that
such an offender would be eligible for parole after either
twenty years (if the offender “has another conviction for a
serious crime”) or after 17.5 years’ imprisonment (if the
offender “does not have another conviction for a serious
crime . . . .”).
also
created
MCL
MCL 791.234(6).
791.234(10),
These same amendments
which
permits
an
offender
convicted of possession with intent to distribute over 650
grams
of
cocaine
to
be
eligible
for
parole
2.5
years
earlier if the offender is found to have “cooperated with
law enforcement . . . .”
Under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), defendant was found to be
eligible
for
parole
after
17.5
years’
imprisonment.
Defendant subsequently petitioned to be certified as having
cooperated with law enforcement under MCL 791.234(10).
trial court denied defendant’s request, stating:
The Defendant states that he had no relevant
or
useful
information
to
provide
to
law
enforcement officers previously.
Additionally,
he states that he is “ready and willing to
proffer any relevant or useful information that
he may have, without undue haste.[”]
He,
however, fails to allege how he will have any
relevant
or
useful
information
for
law
enforcement officials approximately eight years
after his arrest. The Court finds that due to a
lack of facts, it cannot enter an order of
cooperation.
5
The
Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of
Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to
appeal.
Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2003 (Docket
No. 243562).
This
Court
then
granted
defendant
leave
to
appeal,
asking the parties to address the following:
(1) What constitutes “cooperation” for the
purpose of MCL 791.234(10), and did defendant’s
actions satisfy that requirement?
(2) Does MCL
791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when
cooperation must occur? (3) Does MCL 791.234(10)
contain a temporal limitation on when a court may
make a determination that cooperation occurred?
(4) Was People v Matelic, 294 Mich App 1 (2001),
properly decided?[2] (5) Should this case be
remanded to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an
evidentiary
hearing
to
determine
whether
defendant has cooperated within the meaning of
MCL 791.234(10)? [People v Stewart, 470 Mich 879
(2004).]
II. Standard of Review
This
case
791.234(10).
involves
We
the
review
interpretation
questions
of
of
MCL
statutory
interpretation de novo.
People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304;
651 NW2d 906 (2002).
The primary goal in construing a
statute
is
Legislature.”
“to
give
effect
to
the
intent
of
the
In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396,
2
This issue is now irrelevant because People v Matelic
was largely overruled by a conflict panel in People v
Cardenas, 263 Mich App 511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), convened
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J) after the order granting leave to
appeal was entered.
6
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
We begin by examining the plain
language of the statute.
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325,
330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).
III. Analysis
The statute at issue, MCL 791.234(10), provides:
If the sentencing judge, or his or her
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner described in subsection (6)
sentenced to imprisonment for life for violating
or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) of
the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL
333.7401, has cooperated with law enforcement,
the prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of
the parole board and may be released on parole as
provided in subsection (6), 2-1/2 years earlier
than the time otherwise indicated in subsection
(6).
The
prisoner
is
considered
to
have
cooperated with law enforcement if the court
determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide. The
court shall not make a determination that the
prisoner failed or refused to cooperate with law
enforcement
on
grounds
that
the
defendant
exercised his or her constitutional right to
trial by jury. If the court determines at
sentencing that the defendant cooperated with law
enforcement,
the
court
shall
include
its
determination in the judgment of sentence.
A
The
limits
occur
first
MCL
and
issue
791.234(10)
when
a
we
must
imposes
court
may
address
on
make
is
when
a
what
temporal
cooperation
must
determination
that
cooperation occurred.
We agree with the conflict panel in People v Cardenas
that the only temporal limitation the statute places on a
prisoner’s cooperation is that the cooperation must occur
7
before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of
cooperation.
Other than that limitation, the cooperation
may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on
parole.
Specifically,
we
agree
with
the
following
reasoning set out by Judge Wilder in his partial dissent in
Matelic and adopted by the Cardenas conflict panel:
“Giving the phrases ‘has cooperated’ and
‘have cooperated’ their plain meaning, then, it
is clear that the Legislature intended that the
prisoner’s cooperation must have occurred at some
time before the prisoner’s application for parole
release under MCL 791.234(10).
Similarly, the
phrase ‘had no relevant or useful information to
provide’, when given its plain meaning and
considered in relation to the present perfect
tense clause ‘have cooperated,’ expresses the
Legislature’s intent that the prisoner must have
lacked
information
before
the
prisoner’s
application for treatment under MCL 791.234(10),
in order to be found as a matter of law to have
cooperated.”
[Cardenas, supra at 518, quoting
Matelic, supra at 31-32.]
We conclude also that the statute imposes no limits on
when
a
court
occurred.
may
make
a
determination
that
cooperation
The statute refers to the sentencing judge or
that judge’s successor in office making the determination
of cooperation:
If the sentencing judge, or his or her
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner . . . has cooperated with law
enforcement . . . . [MCL 791.234(10).]
The statutory language that a successor judge may make
a finding of cooperation indicates that there may be cases
where
such
a
finding
can
and
8
would
be
made
after
sentencing.
Under the language of the statute, a judge may
make the determination that a prisoner has cooperated at
any time before an order of parole is entered.
B
The
next
question
to
consider
is
what
constitutes
“cooperation” for the purpose of MCL 791.234(10).
i
The statute specifically provides: “The prisoner is
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the
court determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide.” MCL 791.234(10)
(emphasis
added).
indicates
that
relevant
or
This
defendant
useful
use
of
must
the
past
tense,
no
time
have
at
information,
not
“had,”
any
that
merely
had
any
information he once had is no longer relevant or useful.
We hold that a prisoner who has provided to law enforcement
information
relevant
that
can
enforcement
be
if
was
found
considered
that
to
to
prisoner
be
have
never
useful information to provide.
provided
any
information
information
to
provide
or
who
and
neither
useful
cooperated
had
any
nor
with
law
relevant
or
But a prisoner who never
had
chose
relevant
not
to
or
useful
provide
this
information when it was still relevant or useful cannot be
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.
9
Defendant
cooperated
because
information
defendant
alleges
to
that
he
never
provide.
stated
he
that
should
had
any
Before
he
had
be
found
useful
or
sentencing,
nothing
to
say
to
have
relevant
in
1995,
about
the
offense, that he was being framed, and that he knew the
police “let the perpetrators get away scott free.”
petitioning
years
for
after
the
his
certification
conviction,
of
When
cooperation,
defendant
eight
advised
trial
the
court that at the time he was sentenced he “had no useful
or
relevant
appeal
to
information
this
Court,
to
provide.”
defendant
In
also
his
brief
on
that
he
asserted
“answered the questions the police asked of him, but was
not able to tell the police anything about drugs and drug
sales for he knew nothing about those things.”
defendant
never
provided
any
information
Because
to
law
enforcement, he cannot be considered to have cooperated.
Further,
innocence,
despite
defendant
defendant’s
was
convicted
protestations
of
of
possession
with
intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and conspiracy
to commit possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams
of cocaine.
prisoners
We note that MCL 791.234(10) applies only to
who
have
been
conspiring
to
violate
prohibits
manufacturing,
convicted
MCL
of
violating
333.7401(2)(a)(i),
creating,
delivering,
or
which
or
possessing with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a
10
schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance that is in an amount
of 650 grams or more.
It may be presumed that a prisoner
convicted of one of these crimes would have the following
relevant or useful information for law enforcement: where
the prisoner got the drug, how he or she processed it, how
he or she intended to deliver it, and to whom he or she
intended
to
deliver
it.
On
the
basis
of
defendant’s
convictions, and the facts surrounding them, we conclude
that defendant did have relevant or useful information that
he could have given to law enforcement at the time of his
arrest or conviction.
Defendant could have disclosed to the police the name
of the person who shipped the cocaine to him, the names of
the other people involved in the drug ring, and how he was
planning
to
distribute
the
drugs.
At
the
time
of
defendant’s arrest or conviction, this information would
have
been
relevant
or
useful.
Because
defendant
had
relevant or useful information to provide and chose not to
provide this information, defendant cannot be considered to
have cooperated with law enforcement.
ii
Cooperation
can
also
include
providing
relevant information to law enforcement.
states
that
“[t]he
prisoner
is
useful
or
MCL 791.234(10)
considered
to
have
cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on
11
the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful
information to provide.”
The clear implication is that a
prisoner is also considered to have cooperated with law
enforcement if the prisoner has provided relevant or useful
information.
he
or
she
possesses
The prisoner bears the burden of proving that
has
provided
about
a
all
crime;
the
the
information
prisoner
he
cannot
or
she
pick
and
choose what information he or she is prepared to disclose.
We note that the statute does not limit the relevant
or useful information to information about the crime for
which the prisoner was convicted.
If a prisoner who was
convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650
grams of cocaine had relevant or useful information on a
murder, providing that information to law enforcement could
be cooperation.
Defendant
alleges
that
he
should
be
found
to
have
cooperated because he is willing to provide relevant and
useful
information
to
law
enforcement
in
the
future.
Defendant’s statement in his petition for certification of
cooperation that he was “ready and willing to proffer any
relevant or useful information that he may have, without
undue haste,” is an offer of future cooperation.
But, as
we stated in part III(A) of this opinion, a prisoner’s
cooperation
must
certification
of
have
occurred
cooperation
12
before
is
the
filed.
petition
It
is
for
not
sufficient for defendant to allege that he would be willing
to cooperate in the future.
iii
Finally, defendant alleges that on the basis of his
conduct before and following his arrest, he should be found
to have cooperated with law enforcement.
“Cooperate” is
defined as “to work together; 1) to act or work together
with one another or others for a common purpose.” Webster’s
New World Dictionary, Second College Edition.
Considered
in light of the statute, cooperation would include conduct
such as participating in a controlled drug buy or a sting
operation, or engaging in some other conduct to work with
law enforcement toward a common goal.3
would
determine,
on
the
basis
of
the
The trial judge
evidence
in
each
individual case, whether the prisoner had cooperated within
the meaning of MCL 791.234(10).
Defendant
cooperated
asserts
with
law
that
he
should
enforcement
on
be
found
the
basis
to
of
following conduct:
3
The discussion of whether conduct, rather
than
providing
information,
can
constitute
cooperation under MCL 791.234(10)is not dicta,
because the defendant in this case alleged that
on the basis of certain conduct on his part he
should be found to have cooperated with law
enforcement.
13
have
the
[D]efendant did not endeavor to hide or
destroy
evidence
after
his
co-defendants[’]
arrest; and he did not tamper with or intimidate
witnesses.
Defendant did not flee to avoid
prosecution prior to his arrest nor during the
interval
between
his
release
on
bond
and
subsequent conviction.
At all times Defendant
was
polite
and
courteous
to
investigating
officers and officers of the court. [Defendant’s
August 6, 2002, brief in support of motion for
certification of cooperation, p 6.]
But defendant’s alleged conduct does not constitute
cooperation under the statute.
Defendant’s actions in not
hiding or destroying evidence, not intimidating witnesses,
not fleeing to avoid prosecution, and being courteous to
the investigating officers did not amount to working with
law enforcement for a common purpose.
Defendant refrained
from impeding law enforcement personnel in their purpose,
but did nothing to work toward that purpose with the law
enforcement personnel.
C
The
final
question
concerns
when
a
prisoner
is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the
prisoner
has
cooperated
within
the
meaning
of
MCL
791.234(10).
We agree with the Cardenas conflict panel that the
prisoner has the burden of initially showing, by affidavit
or otherwise, that he or she has already cooperated with
law enforcement or that he or she provided any information
he or she had to law enforcement, but at no time before
14
filing the motion did he or she have any relevant or useful
information to provide.
The sentencing court would then
have
conduct
the
discretion
to
such
a
hearing
after
reviewing the evidence, in the event it concludes that a
genuine and material factual issue exists regarding whether
the prisoner cooperated.
Here, we have already found that defendant’s alleged
conduct did not constitute cooperation; defendant has not
alleged
that
he
has
provided
any
useful
or
relevant
information; and we have concluded that defendant cannot be
considered
to
have
cooperated
because
he
previously
had
useful or relevant information that he did not provide to
the police.
Defendant has not met his burden of initially
showing that he has cooperated with law enforcement and,
therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s
motion for judicial certification of cooperation.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
15
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 124055
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
MARKMAN, J. (concurring).
I agree with the majority that defendant has not met
his burden of establishing that he has cooperated with law
enforcement, and, thus, I agree with its affirmance of the
trial
court’s
order
denying
certification of cooperation.
defendant’s
motion
for
I write separately to set
forth two areas of concern.
First, I disagree with the majority that “a prisoner
who
never
provided
any
information
.
.
.
cannot
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.”
at 9.
it
is
be
Ante
While this may be reasonable as a matter of policy,
simply
Legislature.
inconsistent
with
the
direction
of
the
MCL 791.234(10) states that a “prisoner is
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the
court determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide.”
The majority
appends
the
to
the
Legislature's
requirement
that
a
prisoner
definition
must
information to law enforcement.
the statute that is not there.
have
further
provided
some
It thus adds language to
While I can conceive of few
instances in which a silent prisoner will ever be able to
satisfy
disagree
his
burdens
under
the
majority's
with
the
statute,
I
substitution
nonetheless
of
its
own
definition of “cooperation” for that of the Legislature.
Second,
I
would
not
address,
in
dictum,
as
the
majority does, whether “cooperation” under MCL 791.234(10)
“include[s] conduct such as participating in a controlled
drug buy or a sting operation,” and whether “cooperation”
pertains to providing information about crimes unrelated to
the crime for which the prisoner has been convicted.
at 12-13.1
Ante
Perhaps precisely because it is dictum, and
1
I am puzzled by the majority’s assertion that its
discussion of these matters does not constitute dictum.
Ante at 13 n 3.
The prosecutor has not argued that
defendant did not “cooperate” by failing to participate in
a controlled drug buy, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. And the prosecutor has not argued that defendant
did not “cooperate” by failing to provide information about
an unrelated crime, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. That defendant has asserted one form of conduct
as “cooperation”-- namely, his failure to resist the
police, an absurd argument correctly rejected by the
majority-- does not properly allow the majority to decide
whether
every
other
conceivable
form
of
“conduct”
constitutes “cooperation.”
2
because these matters have not been briefed by the parties,
I
find
the
majority’s
discussion
to
be
cursory
and
insufficiently respectful of the fact that there may be
alternative, plausible understandings of MCL 791.234(10).
Again, the majority sets forth a reasonable policy, but it
fails to adequately explain why such policy is compelled by
the statute.
I would avoid this dictum, and await a case
in which these issues can be explored more thoroughly, and
in a more relevant setting.
Stephen J. Markman
3
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 124055
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
KELLY, J. (concurring in result only).
I
concur
certificate
that
of
defendant
cooperation.
did
not
However,
qualify
I
for
disagree
a
with
several crucial aspects of the majority’s interpretation of
MCL 791.234(10).
The majority opinion creates the requirement that, to
be
eligible
for
credit
for
cooperation
under
MCL
791.234(10), a prisoner must provide law enforcement with
all the information he has about a crime.
not contain this requirement.
Legislature
did
not
intend
The statute does
Moreover, I believe that the
that
the
statute
should
be
interpreted to include it.
One might reflect that a prisoner providing less than
all
the
information
he
possesses
about
a
crime
nonetheless be very helpful to law enforcement.
could
That may
explain why the Legislature chose to confer the benefit of
early
parole
eligibility
using
such
general
terms.
It
permitted the benefits to be conferred if the prisoner is
shown to have "cooperated with law enforcement," and it
refrained from indicating what constitutes cooperation and
how much cooperation is enough.
Moreover,
the
Legislature
chose
not
to
limit
the
statute's benefit to prisoners who provide information that
is relevant and useful.
prisoner
may
be
found
Rather, it specified that the
to
have
cooperated
with
law
enforcement even if the court determines that he had no
relevant
or
791.234(10).
useful
The
information
Legislature
to
provide.
pointedly
left
it
MCL
to
the
discretion of the judge to determine how much cooperation
is
sufficient
to
earn
the
benefit
of
early
parole
eligibility.
For these reasons, I concur only in the result of
Justice Weaver's majority opinion.
Marilyn Kelly
2
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