HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO LLC V TOWNSHIP OF MARION
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice
Maura D. Corrigan
Opinion
Justices
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED APRIL 14, 2004
HIGHLAND-HOWELL DEVELOPMENT CO, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 122843
TOWNSHIP OF MARION,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
The Tax Tribunal Act, MCL 205.701 et seq., defines the
exclusive
Tribunal
relating
and
as
original
review
to
of
jurisdiction
a
assessment,
final
of
the
decision
valuation,
Michigan
“of
an
rates,
Tax
agency
special
assessments, allocation, or equalization under property tax
laws.”
count
MCL 205.731(a).
alleging
that
Plaintiff’s complaint contained a
defendant
breached
a
promise
to
construct a sewer line through plaintiff’s property.
The
issue
has
before
us
is
whether
the
circuit
court
jurisdiction to hear this claim or whether it lies within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.
We affirm
the Court of Appeals holding that plaintiff’s claim for
breach of promise falls outside the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tax Tribunal.
I. FACTS
PROCEEDINGS
AND
Count I of plaintiff’s first amended complaint sought
damages
for
an
alleged
breach
of
promise
and
for
the
adoption of “a special assessment roll which allocated a
disproportionate
improvements
share
to
of
the
Plaintiff’s
cost
of
the
property.”
sewer
Plaintiff’s
complaint alleged that defendant promised to construct a
sewer line through certain property and plaintiff relied on
that
promise
in
making
several
decisions,
including
purchasing the property and declining sewer service from
the city of Howell.
Count II of the complaint challenged
the validity of the special assessment.
Defendant’s motion for summary disposition argued that
plaintiff’s
2.116(C)(4)
claim
should
because
it
be
dismissed
was
within
pursuant
the
to
MCR
exclusive
jurisdiction of the Michigan Tax Tribunal, as well as under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) because count I failed to state a claim
upon
which
relief
could
be
granted.
The
trial
court
granted defendant’s C(4) motion and dismissed both counts.
2
Plaintiff
appealed
the
dismissal
of
count
I.
The
Court of Appeals considered the scope of the Tax Tribunal’s
exclusive jurisdiction and concluded that because count I
of plaintiff’s complaint fell outside the Tax Tribunal’s
jurisdiction,
disposition
the
trial
pursuant
to
court’s
MCR
grant
2.116(C)(4)
of
was
summary
premature.1
Defendant sought leave to appeal, claiming that the Court
of Appeals erred.2
We granted defendant’s application for
leave.3
II. STANDARD
OF
REVIEW
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary
disposition
on
jurisdictional
205.731.
the
basis
provisions
of
of
its
the
interpretation
Tax
Tribunal
of
the
Act,
MCL
The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction in this
case turns on the interpretation of the provisions of a
statute.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed
1
Unpublished opinion per curiam issued November 19,
2002 (Docket No. 231937).
2
The trial court did not rule on defendant’s MCR
2.116(C)(8) motion, having instead ruled in favor of
defendant on its C(4) motion.
However, the Court of
Appeals examined defendant’s C(8) motion because it
“present[ed] an alternate basis for affirming the trial
court’s decision.”
Slip op at 3.
The Court of Appeals
held that summary disposition pursuant to defendant’s C(8)
motion likewise would have been premature, but defendant
did not appeal that decision to this Court. Defendant only
appealed the C(4) jurisdictional issue.
3
468 Mich 942 (2003).
3
de novo.
American Federation of State, Co & Municipal
Employees
v
Detroit,
468
Mich
(2003).
Likewise, this Court reviews the grant or denial
of summary disposition de novo.
III.
We
must
determine
388,
398;
662
NW2d
695
Id.
ANALYSIS
whether
plaintiff’s
claim
for
damages resulting from defendant’s alleged breached promise
to
construct
a
sewer
line
is
within
the
original
and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as delineated
in
the
Tax
Tribunal
Act,
MCL
205.731.
We
follow
the
analysis employed by the Court of Appeals to determine the
scope of the Tax Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction.
Section 31 of the Tax Tribunal Act provides:
The
tribunal’s
jurisdiction shall be:
exclusive
and
original
(a) A proceeding for direct review of a
final decision, finding, ruling, determination,
or order of an agency relating to assessment,
valuation,
rates,
special
assessments,
allocation, or equalization, under property tax
laws.
(b)
A
proceeding
for
refund
or
redetermination of a tax under the property tax
laws.
The language of the statute limits the Tax Tribunal’s
exclusive jurisdiction to matters “relating to assessment,
valuation,
rates,
special
assessments,
equalization, under property tax laws.”
allocation,
or
Plaintiff’s claims
for breaches of promise or contract are not within the
4
scope of the statutory provision, and therefore are within
the circuit court’s jurisdiction.4
In 1982, this Court examined the scope of the Tax
Tribunal’s exclusive jurisdiction in two cases: Wikman v
Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982), and Romulus City
Treasurer v Wayne Co Drain Comm’r, 413 Mich 728; 322 NW2d
152 (1982).
In Wikman, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in
the circuit court, alleging that the special assessments
imposed on them had been determined in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.
This Court ruled, inter alia, that the
challenge
to
special
exclusive
jurisdiction
the
of
assessments
the
Tax
was
within
the
Tribunal
because
the
action was one “seeking direct review of the governmental
unit’s
decision
concerning
public improvement.”
a
special
assessment
for
a
Wikman at 626.
Unlike the direct challenge to the special assessment
in Wikman, the plaintiffs in Romulus City Treasurer filed a
constructive fraud claim in the circuit court, challenging
the
drain
special
4
commissioner’s
assessments.
use
This
of
Court
funds
held
collected
through
that
circuit
the
Paragraph 9 of plaintiff’s first amended complaint
alleges that the special assessment roll allocated a
“disproportionate” share of the cost of improvements to
plaintiff’s property.
This allegation is within the Tax
Tribunal’s exclusive and original jurisdiction pursuant to
Wikman v Novi, 413 Mich 617; 322 NW2d 103 (1982).
5
court
had
question
jurisdiction
was
whether
administrative
therefore,
costs
this
to
the
with
hear
the
case
because
drain
commissioner
special
assessment
question
was
outside
could
funds
the
the
pay
and,
exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal.
In reaching the decision in Romulus City Treasurer,
this
Court
noted
that
MCL
205.721
designates
the
Tax
Tribunal as a “’quasi-judicial agency’” comprised of seven
members; only two must be attorneys with experience either
in property tax matters or in the discharge of a judicial
or quasi-judicial office.
Romulus City Treasurer at 737.
In addition,
[o]ne member must be a certified assessor; one,
an
experienced
professional
real
estate
appraiser; and one, a certified public accountant
with experience in state-local tax matters.
Not
more than three of the seven members are to be
members of any one professional discipline and
persons who are not members of any of the
enumerated disciplines are required to have
experience in state or local tax matters.
The expertise of the tribunal members can be
seen to relate primarily to questions concerning
the factual underpinnings of taxes. [Id.]
This Court also noted that the Tax Tribunal’s membership is
qualified
to
resolve
disputes
concerning
assessments,
valuations, rates, allocation, and equalization, as well as
to
determine
whether
special
according to the benefits received.
6
assessments
Id.
are
levied
While the Tax Tribunal’s membership is particularly
competent to resolve disputes related to the basis for and
amounts
of
taxes,
its
membership
is
not
resolve common-law tort or contract claims.
qualified
to
Clearly, this
supports our conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
the
Tax
Tribunal’s
exclusive
jurisdiction
to
encompass
matters outside the realm of those tax matters specified in
the statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
While
we
express
no
opinion
on
whether
plaintiff’s
claim can withstand a summary disposition motion on the
basis of MCR 2.116(C)(8), we do find that, except for the
allegations
contained
in
paragraph
9,
count
I
of
plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleged issues of law
outside
the
Common-law
exclusive
tort
and
jurisdiction
contract
of
claims
the
are
Tax
not
Tribunal.
within
the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Tax Tribunal, as
defined by MCL 205.731.
We affirm the ruling of the Court
of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
7
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