PEOPLE OF MI V DANNY LEE KNOX JR
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice
Maura D. Corrigan
Opinion
Justices
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 123970
DANNY LEE KNOX, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
The defendant was charged in the death of his fourmonth-old son, Xavier Knox, and convicted of first-degree
felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), with first-degree child
abuse, MCL 750.136b(2), as the predicate.
He was sentenced
to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
We
must determine whether the admission of evidence regarding
defendant’s past anger directed at the child’s mother, the
child’s
prior
injuries,
and
the
mother’s
good
character
were plain errors affecting defendant’s substantial rights.
The Court of Appeals, in a divided decision, affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
We reverse the conviction of
defendant and remand for a new trial.
I
On July 22, 1998, defendant was in the apartment of
LaToya Kelley, the mother of his son.
The couple argued
during the evening, and Kelley later fed Xavier a bottle of
formula
and
put
him
to
bed.
Defendant
Xavier seemed fine at that time.
testified
that
After Xavier went to
sleep, Kelley left the apartment around 9:30 p.m. to visit
a friend and neighbor.
According to defendant, he checked
on Xavier at around 9:45 p.m. and then sent Kelley’s twoyear-old child to the bathroom.
When defendant returned to
the bedroom, he noticed Xavier making gurgling noises and
saw that his eyes had rolled back into his head.
Xavier
would not respond, so defendant ran to the balcony to call
out for Kelley and then telephoned Kelley’s mother to tell
her that something was wrong with the baby.
Defendant took
his son to a neighbor, who in turn called 911.
Emergency
personnel arrived at the apartment around 10:15 p.m., at
which point Xavier still had a heartbeat.
By 10:25 p.m.,
the child’s heartbeat had stopped.
Medical experts determined that the boy had died from
being severely shaken and from his head coming into contact
with
an
object
several
times.
The
boy
suffered
from
retinal hemorrhaging, subdural and subarachnoid hematoma,
2
and
three
distinct
skull
fractures
contacts with an unknown object.
from
three
separate
The experts opined that
Xavier’s injuries were not accidental, that the child most
likely
lost
consciousness
within
one
or
two
minutes
of
being injured, and that it would have been impossible for
Xavier to consume formula after being injured.
An expert
also opined that Xavier’s respiratory problems could have
stabilized
collapsed.
prior
for
an
hour
or
more
before
his
heart
rate
There was also evidence that he had suffered
abusive
injuries,
including
recently
sustained
factures to the right arm and left leg, as well as healed
rib fractures that were between three- and six-weeks-old.
Defendant’s first trial resulted in a deadlocked jury.
At
his
second
trial,
defendant
denied
killing
or
ever
abusing his son and argued that it was Kelley who must have
abused
Xavier
before
leaving
the
apartment.
Kelley
testified that she and defendant had many arguments, with
defendant becoming increasingly angry, shouting and kicking
physical objects.
her.
On one occasion, he allegedly shoved
Kelley also testified that she told defendant to get
help for his anger and urged him to take anger-management
classes.
parenting
Defendant
classes,
Kelley’s urging.
claimed
but
that
admitted
these
that
he
were,
took
in
fact,
them
at
Kelley admitted that she, too, had a
temper and that she had thrown items and torn a shower
3
curtain in anger. The prosecutor, however, also elicited
testimony from her about how she had cared for her eleven
brothers and sisters from the age of eight, and how she
loved
children
children.
in
general
and
treasured
her
own
two
Kelley’s parents and friends testified that she
had a caring nature and loved her children.
Defendant did not object at trial to the testimony
regarding his angry confrontations with Kelley, the prior
injuries sustained by his son, or the testimony regarding
Kelley’s
good
character.
After
the
defendant, defendant appealed of right.1
the
prosecutor
of
misconduct
in
jury
convicted
Defendant accused
presenting
the
evidence
regarding defendant’s prior acts, Xavier’s prior injuries,
and Kelley’s good character, and accused his trial counsel
of ineffective assistance in failing to object.
also
questioned
the
propriety
of
his
Defendant
felony-murder
conviction where the acts comprising the predicate felony
also comprised the murder.
The Court of Appeals treated defendant’s first issue
as a purely evidentiary one and, in a divided decision,
1
Defendant first sought a remand for an evidentiary
hearing on the effectiveness of the assistance of his trial
counsel on the basis of counsel’s failure to challenge the
prosecutor’s submission of this evidence.
The Court of
Appeals denied defendant’s motion because it was not
persuaded that a remand was necessary at that time.
Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2001 (Docket No.
226944).
4
affirmed defendant’s conviction.2
In ruling that defendant
was not entitled to relief, the majority relied heavily on
this Court’s decision in People v Hine, 467 Mich 242; 650
NW2d
659
(2002),
and
the
majority’s
belief
that
this
decision compelled a finding that there was no showing by
the
defendant
rights.
of
plain
error
affecting
his
substantial
The majority found the evidence of defendant’s
angry behavior against Kelley sufficiently similar to the
alleged abuse of the child to be either admissible or not
harmful in admission.
It found the evidence of the past
abuse of defendant’s son probative of whether the injuries
the boy suffered were inflicted intentionally.
It found
the admission of the evidence of Kelley’s good character
improper under MRE 608 and 609, as well as MRE 404, but saw
no showing of plain error affecting defendant’s substantial
rights because the prosecutor had a reasonable likelihood
of convicting defendant by demonstrating that defendant was
alone with the boy when the fatal injuries were sustained.
The
dissenting
judge
disagreed
with
the
majority’s
assessment of the effect of Hine, stating that Hine was
consistent
with
precedent,
and
that
application
precedent required a reversal in this case.
of
that
The dissenting
judge opined that the evidence of defendant’s past anger
2
256 Mich App 175; 662 NW2d 482 (2003).
5
and abuse served the improper purpose of demonstrating that
defendant must have abused his son, resulting in the boy’s
death,
because
defendant
had
a
bad
character.
The
dissenter agreed that the evidence of past abuse of the
child was admissible under MRE 404(b), but stated that the
prosecutor put this evidence to improper use by indicating
to
the
jury
that
intentionally
the
caused,
prior
but
injuries
were
were
caused
not
by
just
defendant.
Finally, the dissenting judge opined that admission of the
evidence
regarding
undermined
dissenter
Kelley’s
defendant’s
argued
determinative
and
that
good
character
credibility
these
required
plain
the
and
prejudicially
defense.
errors
reversal
were
of
The
outcome-
defendant’s
conviction and a remand for a new trial.
Although we agree with the Court of Appeals majority’s
assessment that this matter should be analyzed from the
standpoint of whether admission of the contested evidence
discussed
above
defendant’s
constituted
substantial
plain
rights,
we
error
agree
affecting
with
the
dissenting judge that plain error requiring reversal did,
in fact, occur.
II
In
order
to
preserve
the
issue
of
the
improper
admission of evidence for appeal, a party generally must
object at the time of admission.
6
Because defendant did not
object to the admission of the challenged evidence in this
case,
he
must
demonstrate
plain
error
affecting
his
substantial rights, meaning that he was actually innocent
or
that
the
error
seriously
affected
the
fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings
independent of his innocence.
People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
III
MRE 404(b) provides in part:
(1) Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for
other
purposes,
such
as
proof
of
motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan,
or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same
is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs,
or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or
subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.
In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74-75; 508 NW2d
114 (1993), this Court articulated the factors that must be
present for other acts evidence to be admissible.
First,
the prosecutor must offer the "prior bad acts" evidence
under
theory.
something
other
than
a
character
or
propensity
Second, "the evidence must be relevant under MRE
402, as enforced through MRE 104(b)[.]"
Id.
Third, the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially
outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403.
7
Finally, the
trial
court,
upon
request,
may
provide
a
limiting
instruction under MRE 105.
In People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 385; 582 NW2d 785
(1998), this Court explained that the prosecution bears the
initial
burden
of
establishing
the
relevance
of
the
evidence to prove a fact within one of the exceptions to
the general exclusionary rule of MRE 404(b).
“Relevance is
a relationship between the evidence and a material fact at
issue that must be demonstrated by reasonable inferences
that make a material fact at issue more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”
supra at 387.
evidence
is
Crawford,
Where the only relevance of the proposed
to
show
the
defendant’s
character
or
the
defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, the evidence
must be excluded.
In People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43; 614
NW2d
888
(2000),
this
Court
specifically
examined
the
exception in MRE 404(b) for evidence showing a “scheme,
plan, or system.”
We clarified that “evidence of similar
misconduct is logically relevant to show that the charged
act occurred where the uncharged misconduct and the charged
offense are sufficiently similar to support an inference
that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or
system.”
Sabin,
supra
“[l]ogical
relevance
is
at
63.
not
We
limited
8
cautioned
to
both
that
circumstances
in
which the charged and uncharged acts are part of a single
continuing
conception
of
plot,”
and
that
“[g]eneral
similarity between the charged and uncharged acts does not,
however, by itself, establish a plan, scheme, or system
used to commit the acts.”
Id. at 64.
These decisions continue to form the foundation for a
proper analysis of MRE 404(b).
The case upon which the
instant Court of Appeals majority placed so much emphasis,
Hine,
focused
particular
very
specifically
application
of
the
and
“scheme,
narrowly
plan,
or
on
system”
principles discussed in Sabin to the facts presented.
Court
concluded
in
Hine
improperly
imposed
a
similarity
between
the
that
the
standard
observed
that
the
of
proffered
defendant and the charged acts.
particular
Court
of
a
high
other
a
This
Appeals
had
degree
of
acts
of
the
Specifically, this Court
type
of
assaults
on
the
defendant’s former girlfriends were sufficiently similar to
the method or system that could have caused the marks on
the child victim to be admissible in that case.
court,
therefore,
determining
that
did
the
not
assaults
abuse
by
its
the
The trial
discretion
defendant
on
in
his
former girlfriends and the charged offenses regarding the
9
child victim shared sufficient common features to permit
the inference of a plan, scheme, or system.3
Contrary to the Court of Appeals majority’s conclusion
that Hine “presents a formidable obstacle to reversing on
the basis of a trial court’s error in admitting prior-badacts evidence” and has “reduced the value parties opposing
prior-bad-acts
evidence
once
derived
from
the
first
and
third prongs of the VanderVleit test,” 256 Mich App 188189,
Hine
evidence
merely
that
is
applied
the
probative
of
rule
that
prior
bad
acts
something
other
than
the
defendant’s character or propensity to commit the charged
crime is admissible.
Hine neither announced new law nor
did it signify a retreat from the VanderVliet principles;
rather, it simply rejected an interpretation of Sabin that
would
3
have
required
an
impermissibly
high
level
of
This Court commented in Hine, supra, on the odd
circumstance that the Court of Appeals chose to recite the
facts from defendant’s point of view. We observed that it
was not appropriate for an appellate court to discount the
evidence presented to the trial court in support of the
prosecution’s theory. Id. at 251. As the dissenting judge
in the instant case recognized, our concern in Hine was
that the Court of Appeals had based its analysis on the
erroneous conclusion that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support the conviction.
The Court of
Appeals
majority’s
apparent
interpretation
of
this
criticism found in Hine as the establishment of a new
appellate standard of review for trial court rulings on
relevancy under MRE 404(b) is not warranted. Rather, this
Court in Hine simply stated the unremarkable principle
that, when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a conviction, the evidence must be considered in
the light most favorable to the prosecution.
10
similarity between the proffered other acts evidence and
the charged acts.
IV
With this understanding of the continued validity of
this Court’s MRE 404(b) jurisprudence, we now examine the
propriety
of
the
admitted
reputation evidence.
prior
acts,
injury,
and
We conclude that the admission of
this evidence was erroneous and raises sufficient concern
about the fairness of the trial and the integrity of the
jury’s
verdict
to
require
the
reversal
of
defendant’s
conviction and a remand for a new trial.
The
evidence
of
defendant’s
past
demonstrations
of
anger were not relevant to any material fact at issue and
did
not
meet
admissibility.
defendant’s
the
requirements
set
forth
in
Sabin
for
Unlike the acts at issue in Hine, none of
alleged
manifestations
of
anger
had
any
similarity to the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death.
The evidence showed that defendant had damaged walls and
doors and, on one occasion, had shoved Kelley during an
argument.
Nothing about the evidence offered demonstrated
any prior acts by defendant that were similar to the acts
that
were
Further,
determined
no
evidence
to
have
suggested
caused
Xavier’s
that
defendant
injuries.
was
ever
angry with his son or that he redirected his anger with
Kelley to either Xavier or Kelley’s other child.
11
No one
testified to ever seeing defendant harm his son.
The fact
that defendant took classes (either for parenting or for
anger management) showed that he was trying to deal with
Kelley’s perception that he had an anger problem, not that
he had committed prior acts similar to those inflicted on
Xavier.
Under these circumstances, the evidence of defendant’s
past
anger
could
only
serve
the
improper
purpose
of
demonstrating that he had the bad character or propensity
to harm his son.
defendant’s
The prosecutor specifically argued that
anger-management
problem
was
explanation for what happened to Xavier.
a
plausible
As the dissenting
judge below correctly noted, the prosecutor did not use the
evidence of defendant’s anger for any other reason except
to
make
an
impermissible
propensity
argument.
In
this
case, in which defendant’s abuse of his son was implied
from defendant having been the last adult to be alone with
his son, the improper admission of the evidence was highly
prejudicial.
The trial court committed plain error when it
admitted this evidence.
Turning to the evidence of Xavier’s prior injuries, we
agree
with
both
the
Court
of
Appeals
majority
and
the
dissent that the signs of past physical abuse of the child
were relevant to prove that his subsequent fatal injuries
were not inflicted accidentally.
12
We concur, however, with
the dissent that the trial court committed error requiring
reversal in permitting the prosecutor to use this evidence
for an improper purpose.
The prosecutor introduced the
evidence of prior injury not only to show that the earlier
events were abusive, but also to convince the jury that
defendant
had
caused
those
prior
injuries,
despite
the
absence of any evidence that defendant had committed the
past abuse.
As the Court of Appeals dissent correctly noted, “this
was a close credibility contest with little hard evidence
and
the
prosecutor
improperly
sought
to
establish
[defendant’s] bad character rather than risk an acquittal
as a result of the slim evidence of his guilt.”
App 208.
to
256 Mich
The trial court committed plain error in failing
prevent
the
prosecutor
from
improperly
both
the
using
the
evidence of prior abuse.
Finally,
we
agree
with
Court
of
Appeals
majority and dissent that it was plain error to permit the
introduction
character.
of
the
evidence
regarding
Kelley’s
good
We agree with the dissent that this evidence
improperly undermined defendant’s credibility.
The prosecution presented this evidence as part of its
case-in-chief.
Eight witnesses testified positively about
Kelley’s background and parenting skills.
was
logically
irrelevant
to
13
the
This evidence
prosecution’s
case-in-
chief, was improper character evidence under MRE 404(a),
and did not serve one of the noncharacter purposes listed
in MRE 404(b).
Character evidence related to witnesses is
governed under MRE 404(a)(4) by MRE 607, 608, and 609.
MRE
608(a) limits opinion and reputation evidence to character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness after the character of
the witness has been attacked.
MRE 608(b) then allows the
trial court to admit evidence of specific witness conduct
to support the witness’s credibility.
In this case, the
evidence of Kelley’s character had nothing to do with her
truthfulness
or
untruthfulness.
The
evidence
was
improperly introduced to demonstrate that Kelley acted in
conformity with her alleged good character, in contrast to
defendant
acting
in
conformity
with
his
alleged
bad
character.
The
good
improper
character,
defendant’s
admission
like
anger
the
problems
of
the
admission
and
the
evidence
of
the
improper
of
Kelley’s
evidence
use
of
of
the
evidence regarding Xavier’s prior injuries, created far too
great a risk of affecting the outcome of the case, given
the absence of any direct evidence that defendant committed
the acts that resulted in Xavier’s death.
14
Consequently, we
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand
this case to the circuit court for a new trial.4
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
4
In light of this reversal, we need not address
defendant’s second argument, questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence for a felony-murder conviction.
15
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