PEOPLE OF MI V JOSEPH CARL WEEDER
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
Chief Justice
Maura D. Corrigan
Opinion
Justices
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
FILED FEBRUARY 4, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 120107
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
_______________________________
PER CURIAM
This
case
presents
the
question
whether
a
driver
charged with second-degree murder following an auto-related
death
must
Following
receive
People
v
a
negligent
McIntosh,
400
homicide
Mich
1;
(1977), the Court of Appeals answered yes.
McIntosh
instruction.
252
NW2d
779
We overrule
and remand to the Court of Appeals for further
review.
Defendant
seeks
to
appeal
the
Court
of
Appeals
affirmance of two convictions for operating a vehicle while
under
the
influence
of
intoxicating
liquor
and
thereby
causing death, MCL 257.625(4); two convictions for first
degree
fleeing
conviction
for
and
eluding,
operating
a
MCL
motor
750.479a(5);
vehicle
while
suspended, subsequent offense, MCL 257.904(3)(b).
was
also
convicted
on
two
counts
and
of
one
license
Defendant
involuntary
manslaughter, MCL 750.321, which convictions the Court of
Appeals
reversed.
The
prosecutor
seeks
to
appeal
the
reversal of the involuntary manslaughter convictions.
The
significant
entitled
question
to
an
presented
instruction
is
defendant
was
negligent
on
whether
homicide,
MCL
750.324, as the Court of Appeals concluded.
Because the
Court of Appeals relied on People v McIntosh, supra, which
we believe does not properly construe MCL 750.325, we vacate
the
Court
of
Appeals
reversal
of
defendant's
involuntary
manslaughter convictions and remand the case to that Court
for further consideration in light of this opinion.
We are
not persuaded that the questions presented by defendant in
his application merit further review; therefore, except as
discussed below, defendant's application is denied.
I
While intoxicated, defendant fled from a police officer
who was attempting to effectuate a traffic stop.
Defendant
fled at high speeds, at times through residential areas,
failed to stop at a stop sign and a traffic signal, almost
2
struck two vehicles, and eventually struck another vehicle,
killing its two occupants.
Defendant was charged with two
counts of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; two counts of
operating under the influence and causing death; two counts
of first-degree fleeing and eluding; and operating a motor
vehicle
with
a
suspended
license,
second
or
subsequent
offense.
In connection with the second-degree murder charge,
defendant
requested
jury
instructions
on
involuntary
manslaughter and negligent homicide, MCL 750.324.
The trial
court instructed on involuntary manslaughter as defendant
requested,
but
refused
to
instruct
on
negligent
homicide
because the court did not view the evidence in the case as
supporting that instruction.
of
two
counts
of
The jury convicted defendant
involuntary
manslaughter
rather
than
second-degree murder, and otherwise convicted defendant as
charged.
The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant's lead issue
on appeal that he was denied a fair trial because of the
trial
court's
refusal
to
instruct
on
negligent
The Court found McIntosh, to be dispositive.1
homicide.
The Court
1
The Court of Appeals quoted the following from People
v McIntosh:
“[I]f the jurors are or should be permitted
to consider manslaughter committed with a motor
3
reversed
defendant's
manslaughter
convictions
and
ordered
that they be replaced with negligent homicide convictions,
while giving the prosecutor the option of retrying defendant
on the manslaughter charges.
The Court rejected the rest of
defendant's claims on appeal.
II
In this appeal we are concerned with the construction
of MCL 750.325, which reads:
The crime of negligent homicide shall be
deemed to be included within every crime of
manslaughter charged to have been committed in
the operation of any vehicle, and in any case
where a defendant is charged with manslaughter
committed in the operation of any vehicle, if the
jury shall find the defendant not guilty of the
crime of manslaughter, it may render a verdict of
guilty of negligent homicide.
The proper construction of a statute is an issue that
we review de novo.
NW2d 906 (2002).
ascertain
and
Legislature."
275
(2002).
People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 651
Our goal in construing a statute is "to
give
effect
to
the
intent
of
the
People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d
If
the
statute's
language
is
clear
and
unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its
plain
meaning
and
we
enforce
the
statute
as
written.
People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).
vehicle, then, pursuant to MCLA 750.325; MSA
28.557, they also should be permitted to consider
negligent homicide.”
[Unpublished opinion per
curiam, issued July 31, 2001 (Docket No. 217454),
quoting McIntosh, at 7].
4
In
other
words,
when
statutory
language
is
unambiguous,
judicial construction is not required or permitted because
the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it
plainly expressed.
Id.
III
We find MCL 750.325 clear and unambiguous.
The statute
plainly deems the crime of negligent homicide (MCL 750.324)
to be included within every crime of manslaughter charged to
have
been
committed
in
the
operation
of
any
vehicle.
Further, the statute clearly and unambiguously allows for
the conviction of negligent homicide in any case in which a
defendant
is
charged
with
operation of any vehicle.
word "charged."
defendant
must
manslaughter
committed
in
the
The Legislature twice uses the
Accordingly, for the statute to apply, a
be
charged
with
manslaughter
committed
in
connection with the operation of a vehicle.
Here, however,
defendant was not charged with manslaughter.
Defendant was
charged
with
second-degree
murder.
It
follows
that
MCL
750.325 does not apply in this case.2
To
the
extent
our
conclusion
McIntosh, we overrule that case.
is
inconsistent
with
McIntosh concluded that
because the jury had been given instructions on manslaughter
2
We recognize that we reach the same result reached in
People v Jordan, 347 Mich 347; 79 NW2d 873 (1956), which
was overruled in McIntosh, supra.
5
as a lesser offense of murder, the jury should also have
been
The
instructed
McIntosh
on
Court
negligent
reached
homicide
this
under
conclusion
MCL
by
750.325.
concluding
that the "better view" of MCL 750.325 "is that manslaughter
committed with a motor vehicle does not have to be formally
pled in an information charging murder in order for the jury
to
consider
offense."
negligent
400
Mich
homicide
7.
In
as
a
light
possible
of
the
lesser
clear
and
unambiguous use of the word “charged” in the statute, it was
unnecessary
thought
was
for
the
the
McIntosh
“better
Court
consider
However,
view.”
to
we
what
agree
it
with
McIntosh to the extent that it held that a defendant charged
with the crime of murder is entitled to an instruction on
manslaughter if there is the necessary evidentiary support
for the instruction.
Although not based on McIntosh, our
decision in People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527; 664 NW2d 685
(2003), arrived at the same result.
IV
This is not the end of the analysis, however.
The
result reached in McIntosh will still obtain if negligent
homicide,
MCL
750.324,
is
an
inferior,
or
necessarily
included lesser, offense of the charged offense of second
degree murder, and if there is the necessary evidentiary
support for an instruction on negligent homicide.
People v
Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002); MCL 768.32(1).
6
The Court of Appeals did not reach these issues because it
relied
on
Appeals
remand
McIntosh.
reversal
this
defendant's
Accordingly,
of
case
the
to
in
vacate
manslaughter
that
argument
we
Court
light
of
the
Court
convictions,
of
this
we
reconsideration
for
and
of
opinion
and
the
principles established in Cornell. If, on remand, the Court
of
Appeals
concludes
that
an
instruction
on
negligent
homicide was warranted in this case, it must additionally
consider,
pursuant
to
Cornell,
whether
the
trial
court
committed error requiring reversal in failing to give the
instruction.3
V
The
foregoing
cross-appeal.
considered
In
the
discussion
addition
issues
in
resolves
to
that
defendant's
the
prosecutor's
appeal,
appeal.
we
have
Except
as
discussed below, we conclude that defendant's arguments lack
merit for the reasons stated by the Court of Appeals.
If on remand the Court of Appeals affirms defendant's
convictions
for
involuntary
manslaughter,
it
must
also
consider defendant's challenge to his sentences of 15 to 22½
3
The circuit court considered defendant's request for
an instruction on negligent homicide, but determined that
the evidence did not support such an instruction. We note
that an appellate court must find substantial evidence in
support of a requested instruction that was not given in
order to reverse. See Cornell, supra at 365-366.
7
years, which the Court did not consider in light of its
reversal of the manslaughter convictions.
Further, because
the Court rejected defendant's supplemental argument for a
new
trial
(based
on
new
evidence
involving
a
witness's
testimony in a subsequent civil proceeding), in part because
it reversed defendant's manslaughter convictions, this issue
should be reconsidered on remand if the Court of Appeals
affirms defendant's manslaughter convictions.
VI
The
Court
of
Appeals
manslaughter
convictions
remanded
the
to
defendant's
opinion.
Court
manslaughter
is
of
decision
reversing
vacated,
Appeals
and
for
convictions
defendant's
this
matter
is
reconsideration
of
consistent
with
this
Defendant's remaining convictions and sentences
are affirmed, except as otherwise indicated in this opinion.
MCR 7.302(G)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
8
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee/
Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 120107
JOSEPH CARL WEEDER,
Defendant-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee.
_______________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting).
I would not decide this case by an opinion per curiam.
Because
this
case
offers
the
opportunity
to
address
a
jurisprudentially significant issue, I prefer to grant leave to
appeal so that we might avail ourselves of full briefing and
argument by the parties.
Preferences
aside,
however,
I
Appeals
reconsideration
of
whether
there
necessary
was
the
would
defendant’s
negligent homicide instruction.
limit
the
argument
evidentiary
to
Court
the
support
of
issue
for
the
The majority once again extends
the obiter dictum from People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d
127
(2002).
I
remain
committed
to
the
view
that,
when
requested, a jury may be instructed on offenses inferior to the
charged
offense
evidence.
(2003)
such
an
instruction
is
supported
by
the
People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 549; 664 NW2d 685
(CAVANAGH,
previously
if
J.,
determined
concurring).
that
the
Because
evidence
did
the
not
trial
court
support
a
negligent
homicide
instruction,
the
only
relevant
whether such a determination was erroneous.
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly
inquiry
is
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