PEOPLE OF MI V JACK CHAVIS
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice
Justices
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 8, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No.
120112
JACK CHAVIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
WEAVER, J.
After waiving his right to a jury trial, defendant was
convicted in a bench trial of violating MCL 750.411a(1), which
makes it a crime to intentionally make “a false report of the
commission of a crime to a member of the Michigan state
police, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a police officer of a
city or village, or any other peace officer of this state
knowing the report is false . . . .”1
The issue presented is
whether defendant may be convicted of filing a false report
pursuant to this statute, where defendant provided false
details concerning the crime.
We hold that defendant may be
convicted pursuant to the statute, and, therefore, we reverse
the Court of Appeals reversal of defendant’s conviction.
FACTS
On April 14, 1998, defendant called 911 and reported that
he had been carjacked.
the call.
Officer Robert Sanchez responded to
He testified that he and his partner met defendant
at South Fort and Francis streets in the city of Detroit and
that defendant informed them that he had been carjacked by
four unknown black males.
Defendant informed Officer Sanchez
that he was carjacked in the area of South Fort and Outer
Drive and that the carjackers kicked him out of the car at
South Fort and Francis.
Defendant indicated to the officer
that one of the men had put a gun to defendant’s head and two
of the other men had jumped into the car with baseball bats
and that he had been beaten with a baseball bat.
He informed
the officer that the men had stolen his wallet, a gold
necklace, and a gold ring.
Officer Sanchez and his partner
made a report of the carjacking.
Defendant’s car, a Honda
Civic CRS, was found about an hour later being driven by
1
Defendant was sentenced to thirty days in jail and the
remainder of one year on probation.
2
William Bonner.
After a brief chase, Mr. Bonner crashed the
car into a tree and was arrested.
Officer Sanchez testified that he informed defendant that
he did not believe that defendant was actually carjacked.
explained
that
his
assessment
was
based
on
He
defendant’s
demeanor, which he described as defensive and hostile, and the
fact that defendant did not live in the area and gave no
explanation for why he was in the area.
Officer Sanchez also
testified that he did not observe any physical injury to
defendant and that defendant did not request any kind of
medical attention.
Detective Sergeant Randell Schnotala testified that at
the time of the incident, he was assigned to the carjacking
task force working out of Detroit Police headquarters. He was
assigned
to
speaking
suspicious
investigate
with
of
Mr.
the
the
reported
Bonner,
carjacking.
After
Schnotala
became
Detective
truthfulness
of
the
report
filed
by
defendant and made several attempts to contact defendant to
discuss the incident.
A few days later, defendant telephoned
Detective Schnotala and agreed to meet the detective at police
headquarters.
Detective
Schnotala
testified
that
he
immediately
informed defendant that defendant was not under arrest, that
defendant did not have to speak with him, and that defendant
could leave at any time.
Detective Schnotala explained that
3
he had some questions and concerns about the report that had
been filed.
the
report
He testified that defendant then told him that
was
not
true
“beginning
with
the
location.”
Detective Schnotala stated that defendant informed him that
defendant was a crack cocaine user and that he had given a
false location because he did not want the police to know why
he was in the area.
Detective Schnotala testified that
[a]t that time I told him we could reduce this to
writing, take care of matters, get him on his way.
He could go about the business of getting his car
back, but that he would be charged with filing a
false police report. At this time he became very
agitated with me and refused to talk any more about
the incident and stormed out of my office.
Detective Schnotala explained that he informed defendant that
he would be charged with filing a false police report because
defendant said that the report he had filed was not true.
Defendant testified that he was in southwest Detroit on
April 14, 1998, to purchase crack cocaine.
He spotted the
supplier from whom he had purchased crack cocaine earlier in
the
day
and
let
the
supplier
get
into
defendant’s
car.
Defendant informed the supplier that he wanted $20 worth of
crack cocaine, and they drove to a house.2
The supplier went
into the house to get the crack cocaine.
Defendant stated
that when the supplier left the house, the supplier returned
to the car.
As
the supplier was again sitting in the
2
On cross-examination, defendant stated that he did not
drive the supplier to the house—they were already there.
4
passenger seat showing defendant the crack cocaine, defendant
heard the hatchback of his car open.
Two men entered the car.
Defendant testified that the supplier pulled the keys out of
the ignition and that one of the men in the back pointed a gun
at defendant, demanding that defendant give them everything
defendant had.
Defendant stated that he told them that the
gunman would have to kill defendant because defendant “had a
lot of gold on.”
Defendant testified that the gunman then put down the gun
and began choking him from behind until he passed out and that
the supplier was hitting defendant.
When defendant “came to
[he] was half in [his] car and half out.”
Defendant further
explained that when he “came to,” his jewelry, his watch, his
necklace, his rings, and his wallet had been taken. He stated
that he observed four men walking down the road and ran after
them.
He testified that the men surrounded him and began
attacking him, one of them beating him with a pool cue and
another hitting him in the jaw.3
He stated that he received
a cut on his head and felt like he had broken his hand during
the attack after being hit with the pool cue.
Defendant
testified that when he asked them to give him his keys so that
he could go home, they told him to move away from his car.
Two or three of the men jumped into his car and drove off.
3
Defendant denied that he had stated that one of the men
had a baseball bat.
5
Defendant testified that he then ran to Fort Street,
entered a restaurant, and called the police.
He stated that
he told police that he was at the gas station and that he had
just left his sister’s house when he was carjacked and made to
drive to the gas station.
Defendant stated that he had lied
about the location because he did not want anyone to know that
he was
buying crack cocaine.
He stated that he showed the
cut to the officer and indicated that his hand felt like it
might be broken.
However, when the officers asked if he
wanted an ambulance, he declined. Defendant acknowledged that
when he spoke with Detective Schnotala, he did not give the
detective
any
specific
details
or
provide
any
written
statement about what had actually occurred.
At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found
defendant guilty of the charge.
The trial court stated:
This is somewhat of an interesting case in the
sense that he’s charged with filing a false report
of a felony.
And without going into a lot of detail as far
as fact finding goes, I do believe from all the
evidence and the testimony that the defendant, Mr.
Chavis, was carjacked. I believe that his car was
taken from him with the use of force, and that he
didn’t voluntarily turn it over or surrender it.
And that’s essentially what happened.
However, in this case, because of, and I
believe some of the defendant’s testimony, too. I
believe his testimony about using crack. I believe
his testimony about going around looking for crack
and having contact with various incendiary people
in terms of seeking out some crack cocaine.
6
And I do also believe and find that the
defendant did tell, did lie to the police about how
it happened, where it happened, and some other
miscellaneous details.
So on the one hand I believe that the
defendant did make some false statements and give
some false facts [sic] about the crime itself. And
I do believe that in essence the defendant was the
victim of a carjacking.
And when the defendant told the police officer
those false facts, he knew that they were false and
deliberately made those false statements.
And for that reason, I’m going to find the
defendant guilty of the charge.
I find that the elements of the offense have
been made out.
Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction.
246 Mich App 741; 635 NW2d 67 (2001).
The Court
of Appeals explained:
Here, the statute proscribes the intentional
making of “a false report of the commission of a
crime.”
MCL 750.411a(1) (emphasis added).
The
plain language of the statute provides that those
who make police reports falsely claiming that a
crime has been committed are guilty of making a
report of a false crime. See, e.g., People v Lay,
336 Mich 77; 57 NW2d 453 (1953) (the defendant was
convicted, under the predecessor of § 411a, of
making a “fictitious report of the commission of
any crime” after falsely telling the police that he
had put poison in a bottle of home-delivered milk).1
To construe the statute to encompass false
information concerning the details of an actual
crime would be a significant departure from the
plain language of the statute. Because the false
information reported by defendant in the present
case did not pertain to whether a crime occurred,
the conviction for filing a false report of the
commission of a crime cannot be sustained.2
Accordingly, we reverse defendant’s conviction and
sentence.
7
___________________________________________________
1
Our research has unveiled no Michigan cases
where a defendant was convicted of the crime of
making a false report of the commission of a crime
for lying about details other than whether a crime
had actually been committed.
Our research of
federal and foreign states’ case law has not
unveiled any cases where a defendant was convicted
of this type of crime for lying about details other
than whether a crime had actually been committed.
See, e.g., Smith v Arkansas, 1999 WL 200671
[unpublished opinion] (Ark App, 1999) (false report
that husband broke into home); People v Trimble,
181 Ill App 3d 355; 537 NE2d 363 (1989) (defendant
falsely told police his car was stolen); State v
Matilla, 339 NW2d 54, 55 (Minn, 1983) (defendant
falsely reported being burglarized); State v
Kachanis, 119 RI 439, 440; 379 A2d 915 (1977)
(defendant falsely reported his car stolen).
2
The trial court’s finding that a carjacking
actually occurred is unchallenged on appeal.
___________________________________________________
[246 Mich App 743-744.]
On April 30, 2002, this Court granted the prosecutor’s
application for leave to appeal.
STANDARD
OF
466 Mich 860 (2002).
REVIEW
This case concerns an issue of statutory interpretation.
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149, 156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).
ANALYSIS
MCL 750.411a(1) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2), a person
who intentionally makes a false report of the
commission of a crime to a member of the Michigan
state police, a sheriff or deputy sheriff, a police
8
officer of a city or village, or any other peace
officer of this state knowing the report is false
is guilty of a crime as follows:
(a) If the report is a false report of a
misdemeanor, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor
punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93
days or a fine of not more than $100.00, or both.
(b) If the report is a false report of a
felony, the person is guilty of a felony punishable
by imprisonment for not more than 4 years or a fine
of not more than $2,000.00, or both. [Emphasis
added.]
When interpreting a statute, our goal is to ascertain and
give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002).
reviewing the plain language of the statute.
is
clear
and
unambiguous,
no
further
People v
We begin by
If the language
construction
necessary, and the statute is enforced as written.
is
Id.;
Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare Sys, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d
686 (2001).
The issue in the present case centers on whether lying
about details concerning a crime constitutes “a false report
of the commission of a crime . . . .”4
MCL 750.411a(1).
The
Court of Appeals and the dissent construed this language to
mean that only “those who make police reports falsely claiming
that a crime has been committed are guilty of making a report
of a false crime.”
246 Mich App 743.
4
We disagree with this
Defendant admitted to the police officer that he had
lied.
Accordingly, there is no dispute about whether
defendant’s statements were made intentionally and knowingly.
9
interpretation
and
find
it
inconsistent
with
the
plain
language of the statute.
As placed in the statute, the word “false” modifies the
word “report,” not the word “crime,” as the Court of Appeals
and the dissent’s interpretations suggest.
The word “false”
is defined as
1. Not true or correct; erroneous; wrong: a false
statement.
2.
Uttering or declaring what is
untrue; lying: a false witness. 3. Not faithful
or loyal; treacherous; hypocritical: a false
friend.
4.
Tending to deceive or mislead;
deceptive: a false impression. 5. Not genuine;
counterfeit . . . . [Random House Webster’s College
Dictionary (1997).]
The word “report” is defined as “1.
A detailed account of an
event, situation, etc. usu. based on observation or inquiry.
2.
A statement or announcement. . . .”
Id.
It is not
disputed that defendant made untrue and misleading statements
when
he
provided
officers.5
his
original
account
of
events
to
the
First, defendant clearly acknowledged that he had
lied about where the carjacking occurred and what he was doing
at the time the carjacking occurred.
Second, he informed
police that he did not know any of the perpetrators when, in
fact, he knew one of them from his previous purchase of crack
cocaine.
Third, although defendant stated that he had been
5
While the false statements in the present case occurred
in defendant’s initial communications with the police, we note
that the definition of “report” does not require that the
statements always be made at the outset of an investigation.
The definition could cover subsequent communications as well.
10
beaten with a pool cue or baseball bat, resulting in a cut to
his head and an injury to his hand, the officer stated that he
observed no physical injuries on defendant and that defendant
did not request any medical attention.
Thus, in describing
what had occurred, defendant made a false report.
Our inquiry does not end there, however.
Following the
phrase “false report” in the statute are the words “of the
commission of a crime.”
Defendant’s false report must be “of
the commission of a crime.”
“Commission” is defined as “the
act of committing or perpetrating a crime . . . .”
Id.
Replacing the word “commission” with its definition, the
statute
prohibits
making
a
false
committing or perpetrating” a crime.
report
of
“the
act
of
One who provides false
details about the crime has made a false report of “the act of
committing or perpetrating” a crime. Thus, the plain language
of the statute is not limited to only those situations where
no crime has been committed; it also applies where one reports
false details about the crime.6
Because defendant reported
6
The dissent criticizes our opinion as failing to
provide guidance to the bench and bar and suggests that it
will inhibit victims from reporting crimes for fear they will
be convicted for insignificant misstatements. We would remind
the dissent that the statute requires a person to
intentionally make a false report of the commission of a
crime. This intent requirement should obviate many of the
“problems” that the dissent asserts our opinion will create.
The dissent also criticizes our opinion as allowing the
prosecutor “unfettered discretion,” post at 7, in determining
when to bring charges under the statute. It is invariably the
(continued...)
11
false details about the crime, he can be convicted under the
statute.7
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court
of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s conviction.
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
6
(...continued)
case that the prosecutor always has great discretion in
deciding whether to file charges. Such executive branch power
is an established part of our constitutional structure. Any
apprehension that the prosecutor may abuse this power should
be tempered, in part, by the knowledge that there are
significant
systemic
protections
afforded
defendants,
including the defendant’s right to a preliminary examination
and right to a jury trial.
Moreover, there are other
protections against the misuse of power that spring from
daily scrutiny by the media as well as from periodic
elections, which call all office holders to account to their
constituents.
7
Our interpretation and application of the statute is
consistent with one of the purposes of the statute, which is
to avoid distracting the police and misusing police resources.
12
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 120112
JACK CHAVIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
The majority stretches the statutory phrase "false report
of the commission of a crime" in MCL 750.411a(1) to mean a
report of false details concerning the commission of a crime.
This interpretation goes beyond the plain meaning of the words
the Legislature used.
I agree with the Court of Appeals that "[b]ecause the
false information reported by defendant in the present case
did not pertain to whether a crime occurred, the conviction
for filing a false police report cannot be sustained."
Mich App 741, 743; 635 NW2d 67 (2000).
246
To the extent that
this statute is ambiguous, traditional judicial construction
favors
my
interpretation.
Parenthetically,
the
majority
ignores the inherent question that it raises: how significant
must a falsehood be to trigger criminal liability under the
statute?
I
The
majority holds that "the plain language of the
statute is not limited to only those situations where no crime
has been committed; it also applies where one reports false
details about the crime."
Ante at 12. It arrives at this
conclusion by defining the words "report" and "commission."
These words, it concludes, refer to a "detailed account" of
"the act of committing a crime."
The
majority's
interpretation
does
not
accurately
construe the plain meaning of the statute's words because it
glosses over the meaning of "the commission of a crime."
The
only facts that establish "the act of committing a crime" are
those that satisfy the elements of a criminal statute.
It
follows then that one violates the statute only in falsely
alleging
facts that comprise the elements of a criminal
statute. Extraneous details do not pertain to whether a crime
has been committed.
An example clarifies the point.
crime to burn a dwelling house.
MCL 750.72 makes it a
The facts establishing the
commission of that crime are limited to those showing (1)
wilful or malicious (2) burning (3) of a dwelling house, its
2
contents, or any building within its curtilage.
A false
report that the perpetrator wore black clothes while setting
the fire when, in fact, he wore white does not constitute the
report
of
a
false
crime,
commission of a crime.
i.e.,
a
false
report
of
the
Rather, it constitutes facts not
essential to the crime.
The majority's interpretation of MCL 750.411a(1) would
render criminal the report of black clothes in my example.
It
effectively reads the limiting phrase "of the commission"
right
out
of
the
statute.
Doing
so
ignores
the
well
established canon of avoiding an interpretation that renders
part of a statute nugatory or mere surplusage.
Koontz v
Ameritech Services, Inc, 466 Mich 304, 312; 645 NW2d 34
(2002).
For the reasons stated, I interpret MCL 750.411a to
prohibit only the reporting of a false crime, meaning the
false reporting of facts that establish the commission of a
crime.
Unlike the majority's analysis, this interpretation
comports with the plain language of the statute and the "fair
import" of the words used.
MCL 750.2.
This Court made a proper statutory interpretation in
People v Lay, 336 Mich 77; 57 NW2d 453 (1953).
There, it
construed the statute from which MCL 750.411a(1) was drawn.
It
affirmed
the
defendant's
conviction
after
he
falsely
reported to the police that he had poisoned a bottle of home
3
delivered
milk.
The
Court
held
that
the
defendant's
conviction was proper because he alleged a crime that had not
been committed.
He alleged facts that were false and that
satisfied the statutory elements of the crime.
Here, unlike in Lay, the state charged defendant for
falsely
reporting
where
in
Detroit
occurred and why he was in that area.
the
carjacking
crime
The carjacking statute,
MCL 750.529a, requires a showing that a person, (1) by force
or threat of force, (2) took a motor vehicle (3) in the
presence of the lawful possessor of it.
Defendant did not
falsely report any of the facts establishing the elements of
the carjacking.
In the words of the trial court, "Mr. Chavis
[] was carjacked. [H]is car was taken from him with the use of
force, and . . . he didn't voluntarily turn it over or
surrender it."
Because
defendant
truthfully
reported
these,
the
essential aspects of the crime, he should not be chargeable
under
MCL
750.411a.
The
false
statements
he
made
were
immaterial to the commission of the crime of carjacking.
Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals reversal of
defendant's conviction.
II
When
reasonable
but
differing
interpretations
statute exist, the statute is ambiguous.
396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
of
a
In re MCI, 460 Mich
Hence, because the majority's
4
reading of the statute is arguably reasonable, as is mine, the
incompatibility of our interpretations renders this statute
ambiguous.
After
ambiguity
is
interpretation.
MCL
judicial
resolved
construction,
in
a
manner
the
part
however,
that
the
favors
my
750.411a(1)
consideration here.
is
of
the
statute
under
It reads "a person who intentionally
makes a false report of the commission of a crime to a member
of the Michigan state police . . . or any other peace officer
of this state knowing the report is false is guilty of a crime
. . . ."
The two subsections under subsection 1 clarify its
meaning.1
misdemeanor
Subsection
itself
a
(1)(a)
makes
misdemeanor
a
false
report
and
lists
the
of
a
penalty.
Subsection (1)(b) makes a false report of a felony itself a
felony and lists a far greater penalty than does subsection
(1)(a).
If the majority's interpretation of subsection 1 were
correct, a report falsifying nonessential details of a crime
would draw a much greater penalty if the crime were a felony
than if it were a misdemeanor.
However, the details might be
the same for each crime, e.g., the perpetrator wore black. It
1
2A Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction (6 ed,
2000), § 47:06, pp 226-227 ("[I]t is an elementary rule of
construction that all sections of an act relating to the same
subject matter should be considered together unless to do so
would be plainly contrary to the legislative intent.").
5
is
not
readily
distinguished
apparent
in
terms
why
of
the
Legislature
criminal
severity
would
and
have
penalty
between a report of false details of a felony and a report of
the same false details of a misdemeanor.
It is obvious, however, why the Legislature would have
distinguished
in
terms
of
criminal
severity
and
penalty
between a report of a false misdemeanor and a report of a
false felony.
There, the reports would be different.
One of
the crimes would be more serious, hence a false report of it
would deserve a more severe penalty.
Therefore,
any
ambiguity
in
"false
report
of
the
commission of a crime" is best resolved to mean that the
report to be criminalized is the report of a false crime.
III
I note that the majority fails to deliver any guidance to
the bench and bar about how to apply its interpretation of
this statute.
Specifically, it fails to address how material
a falsified detail must be in order to trigger criminal
liability under the statute.
Did the Legislature intend to
criminalize the intentional falsification of even the most
insignificant detail of a reported crime?
This would be
permitted under the majority's interpretation.
If some false
details should be made crimes and others not, where does one
draw the line?
of
charges
Without guidance on this issue, the bringing
under
this
statute
6
becomes
a
matter
of
the
prosecutor's
unfettered
discretion,
raising
other
legal
problems.2
The interpretation of the statute that I propose, by
contrast with the majority's, limits this offense to the
falsification
interpretation
intent,
it
of
not
certain
only
establishes
identifiable
comports
clear
with
information.
the
My
Legislature's
boundaries
of
which
falsifications are criminal, thus providing comprehensible
guidance to our courts and our citizens.
Additionally, my interpretation avoids another problem
that looms in the majority's broad reading of the statute:
that it may inhibit victims from reporting crimes for fear
that they may be convicted themselves for an insignificant
misstatement of fact to law enforcement officers.
2
The majority takes issue with my reference to the
dangers of the prosecution exercising unfettered discretion.
The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise
when it made its decision in the case of United States v
Armstrong, 517 US 456, 464; 116 S Ct 1480; 134 L Ed 2d 687
(1996), quoting Oyler v Boles, 368 US 448, 456; 82 S Ct 501;
7 L Ed 2d 446 (1962).
There, it found that unfettered
discretion in the prosecution can result in a violation of the
constitutional right to due process of law. More to the point
in this case, my concern is that the majority's expansive
interpretation of MCL 750.411a allows too easily for the
statute's selective enforcement.
It thereby increases the
possibility that the statute will be used as a coercive tool
in violation of the constitutional constraints that govern
prosecutors.
While
the
majority
enumerates
current
protections from prosecutorial abuse, I am unconvinced that
the existence of these protections excuses this Court's
failure to provide the guidance that could afford more
immediate and certain protection.
7
III
Accordingly, I would affirm the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals. This Court should interpret MCL 750.411a(1)
to
criminalize
only
the
false
reporting
establish the commission of a crime.
of
facts
that
As defendant made no
such false statement, the Court of Appeals reached the correct
conclusion in reversing his conviction.
Marilyn Kelly
8
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