PEOPLE OF MI V MOBILE LUNDY
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee
v
No.
120825
MOBILE LUNDY,
Defendant-Appellee,
Cross-Appellant.
____________________________________
PER CURIAM
A jury convicted defendant of first-degree felony murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(b).1
The Court of Appeals determined that
there was insufficient evidence of the underlying felony of
1
MCL 750.316(1) provides:
A person who commits any of the following is
guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished
by imprisonment for life:
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate . . . larceny of any kind
. . . .
larceny and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry
of a conviction of second-degree murder and resentencing.2
Finding the evidence of larceny sufficient, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s
first-degree felony-murder conviction.
I
This case arose out of the robbery and stabbing death of
Reginald May.
The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant and
his girlfriend, Debra Hart, were alone with the victim in an
apartment when defendant saw he had some money, stabbed him to
death, and took the money.
Defendant testified that he, Hart, the victim, and two
others had been drinking beer and vodka and smoking crack
cocaine.
He said he went to use the bathroom when the two
others left to get more crack cocaine.
Defendant indicated
that, when he came out of the bathroom, Hart said the victim
had been bothering her.
He explained that he stabbed the
victim to protect Hart and himself from the victim during a
struggle.3
Defendant said that the victim’s money was not
related to the stabbing, that he did not see the victim with
2
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued October 9, 2001
(Docket No. 220100).
3
The medical examiner testified that the victim had been
stabbed nine times.
2
money before the altercation, and that Hart took the money
from the victim after the stabbing as they were leaving the
apartment.
However, defendant acknowledged during cross
examination that he had made a prior inconsistent statement to
the effect that he had seen the victim with money before the
stabbing.
After considering all the evidence, the jury returned a
verdict of first-degree felony murder.
II
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the basis
that defendant’s prior inconsistent statement, that he had
seen the victim with money before the stabbing, had been
improperly considered as substantive evidence, rather than
just for impeachment purposes.
In reaching this conclusion
the Court of Appeals relied upon People v Jenkins, 450 Mich
249, 260-261; 537 NW2d 828 (1995).
Judge Zahra dissented, indicating that he believed the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
III
The prosecution has applied to this Court for leave to
appeal.
Defendant has filed a cross-appeal regarding other
issues that the Court of Appeals rejected.
The prosecution contends, and we agree, that the Court of
Appeals erred in applying People v Jenkins to defendant’s
3
prior inconsistent statement.
Jenkins stands for the general
proposition that prior unsworn statements of a witness are
mere hearsay and are generally inadmissible as substantive
evidence. However, Jenkins is inapplicable because it related
to impeachment of a prosecution witness with an inconsistent
statement, whereas this case concerns defendant’s out-of-court
statement.
Admissions by a party are specifically excluded
from hearsay and, thus, are admissible as both impeachment and
substantive evidence under MRE 801(d)(2).4
Thus, properly
understood, Jenkins only applies to nonparty witnesses.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, this Court analyzes the evidence presented in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential
elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992)
mod 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
The element in dispute here is
whether the defendant, at the time he stabbed the victim, was
committing or attempting to commit a larceny or helping Hart
4
MRE 801(d) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if—
(2) . . . The statement is offered against a party and is
(A) the party’s own statement . . . .
4
commit a larceny.5
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution,
including
defendant’s
prior
inconsistent
statement that he had seen the victim with money before the
stabbing, we hold that the evidence of the underlying larceny
was sufficient.
As Judge Zahra indicated, from the evidence
the jury could conclude that defendant or Hart knew that the
victim had money and decided to seize the moment to rob and
murder the victim.
Slip op at 1.
The jury was free to
discount testimony suggesting that defendant or Hart formed
the intent to take the money only after the stabbing.6
It is for these reasons that we reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s first-degree
5
The trial court correctly instructed the jury that, in
order to find defendant guilty, it had to find that, at the
time defendant did the act that caused the victim’s death, he
was committing, or attempting to commit, or helping someone
else commit the crime of larceny.
6
[A]ppellate courts are not juries, and even
when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
they must not interfere with the jury's role:
[An appellate court] must remember that the
jury is the sole judge of the facts. It is the
function of the jury alone to listen to testimony,
weigh the evidence and decide the questions of
fact. . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and
hear witnesses and are in a much better position to
decide the weight and credibility to be given to
their testimony. [Wolfe, supra at 514-515].
5
felony-murder conviction.
With regard to the defendant's
cross-appeal, we deny leave to appeal.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
6
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