PEOPLE OF MI V JAMAL S ALLEN
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 30, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 119427
JAMAL S. ALLEN
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
Defendant
was
convicted
by
premeditated murder, MCL 750.316.
life imprisonment was imposed.
a
jury
of
first-degree
The mandatory sentence of
The Court of Appeals affirmed
the defendant’s conviction and sentence.
We do likewise,
rejecting the defendant’s claim that the trial court committed
a structural constitutional error when, after instructing the
jury that it must find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt, it failed to give a further instruction defining
reasonable doubt.
For the reasons explained below, we hold
that the concept of reasonable doubt is within the common
understanding of jurors.
It is sufficient that a jury is
instructed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in
order to convict a defendant. A court’s failure to define the
phrase “reasonable doubt” is not a plain error requiring
reversal of a defendant’s conviction.
I
Mary Morgan died from strangulation and blunt force head
injury. The defendant was charged with first-degree murder in
connection with Ms. Morgan’s death. At the jury trial on that
charge, witnesses testified that Ms. Morgan sought refuge in
the witnesses’ home, but that the defendant followed Morgan
into the home.
There, the defendant hit Ms. Morgan.
She
fought back. The witnesses said they forced Ms. Morgan out of
the home, whereupon defendant pursued her.
What occurred
after that was a matter of some dispute at the trial.
Police,
who had been called, found Ms. Morgan on a nearby street lying
on her back.
She had no vital signs.
The prosecutor contended that the defendant followed Ms.
Morgan,
continued
to
beat
her,
and
then
strangled
her.
Although the defendant admitted in his testimony that he hit
Ms. Morgan while in the witnesses’ home, he denied that he
strangled
her
after
leaving
there.
Additionally,
the
defendant interposed an intoxication defense.
Trial was held in the Wayne Circuit Court.
At the
conclusion of proofs, the jury was instructed as follows
2
regarding the prosecutor’s burden of proof:
[E]very crime is made up of parts called
elements. The prosecution must prove each element
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant is not required to prove his
innocence or to do anything.
If you find the
prosecution has not proven every element beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant
not guilty.1
The defendant did not object, nor did he request that further
instruction defining reasonable doubt be given.
The
jury
was
instructed
second-degree murder.
on
first-degree
murder
and
Additionally, the jury was instructed
on the defense of intoxication.
The jury returned a verdict
of guilty of first-degree murder.
The court then imposed the
mandatory term of life in prison.
The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
issued a divided unpublished per curiam opinion affirming the
conviction.
The majority stated the trial judge was not
required to define the phrase reasonable doubt. Additionally,
the
jury
had
been
repeatedly
told
that
to
convict
1
the
Preliminary instructions that were given to the jury
were accurate:
During arguments of counsel you will hear a
great deal about reasonable doubt.
A reasonable
doubt is exactly what it infers.
A reasonable
doubt is a fair, honest doubt growing out of the
evidence or lack of evidence in this case; or
growing out of any reasonable or legitimate
inferences drawn from the evidence or lack of
evidence. It is not merely an imaginary doubt or a
flimsy, fanciful doubt. But, rather, it is a fair,
honest doubt based upon reason and common sense.
3
defendant required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The
dissenting judge opined that the failure to provide any
definition of reasonable doubt was a clear error that required
reversal.
II
Defendant asks us to review a claim of error that he did
not
preserve
at
trial.
We
thus
apply
the
principles
articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999):
To avoid forfeiture under the plain error
rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must
have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear
or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected
substantial
rights.
The
third
requirement
generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e.,
that the error affected the outcome of the lower
court proceedings. It is the defendant rather than
the government who bears the burden of persuasion
with respect to prejudice. . . . Reversal is
warranted only when the plain, forfeited error
resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent
defendant or when an error seriously affected the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s
innocence. [Citations and internal quotation marks
omitted.]
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude defendant has not
demonstrated that a plain error occurred.
The
right
to
a
jury
prosecution is fundamental.
trial
in
a
criminal
felony
Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145,
149; 88 S Ct 1444; 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968).
The fundamental
nature of the right to a jury trial is reflected in both the
federal and state constitutions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963,
4
art 1, § 20.
Interrelated with the right to a jury trial is
the requirement that the prosecutor prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Sullivan v Louisiana, 508 US 275, 279; 113
S Ct 2078; 124 L Ed 2d 182 (1993).
The requirement of burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is important because it
ensures a reliable determination of guilt.
erroneous
definition
of
reasonable
In Sullivan, an
doubt
constitute a “structural” error in the trial.2
error
necessarily
renders
unfair
or
was
held
to
A structural
unreliable
the
determination of guilt or innocence and defies harmless error
analysis.
People v Duncan, 462 Mich 47, 50; 610 NW2d 551
(2000). An erroneous definition of reasonable doubt in a jury
instruction violates the jury trial guarantee.
supra.
Sullivan,
A decision rendered on the basis of an erroneous
definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a true
“verdict” within the meaning of the constitutional guarantee
of a jury trial.
Id.
III
That
a
constitutionally
defective
reasonable
doubt
instruction violates the constitutional guarantee of a jury
trial does not necessarily imply that a failure to define
2
In Sullivan, the instructions included a definition of
reasonable doubt as a “grave uncertainty” and “moral
certainty.” State v Sullivan, 596 So 2d 177, 186, n 3 (La,
1992). Such instructions were found to be erroneous in Cage
v Louisiana, 498 US 39; 111 S Ct 328; 112 L Ed 2d 339 (1990).
5
reasonable doubt at all constitutes such a violation.3
well
over
“reasonable
a
century,
doubt”
is
this
not
comprehension of jurors.
an
Court
has
arcane
recognized
phrase
For
that
beyond
the
Hamilton v People, 29 Mich 173
(1874), People v Cox, 70 Mich 247; 38 NW 235 (1888), People v
Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886), and People v
Trudell, 220 Mich 166, 172; 189 NW 910 (1922).
In Hamilton at 194, this Court stated:
If a jury cannot understand their duty when
told they must not convict when they have a
reasonable doubt of the prisoner’s guilt, or of any
fact essential to prove it, they can very seldom
get any help from such subtleties as require a
trained mind to distinguish. Jurors are presumed
to have common sense, and to understand common
English.
But they are not presumed to have
professional, or any high degree of technical or
linguistic training.
In Stubenvoll at 334, this Court said:
We do not think that the phrase “reasonable
doubt” is of such unknown or uncommon signification
that an exposition by a trial judge is called for.
Language that is within the comprehension of
persons of ordinary intelligence can seldom be made
plainer by further definition or refining.
All
persons who possess the qualifications of jurors
know that a “doubt” is a fluctuation or uncertainty
of mind arising from defect of knowledge or of
evidence, and that a doubt of the guilt of the
accused, honestly entertained, is a “reasonable
doubt.”
3
As Justice Rehnquist noted in a concurring opinion in
Sullivan, “[a] trial in which a deficient reasonable-doubt
instruction is given seems to me to be quite different from
one in which no reasonable-doubt instruction is given at all.”
Sullivan, 508 US 284.
6
Therefore,
giving
an
affirmatively
misleading
definition
differs substantially from merely declining to elaborate on
the meaning of a commonly understand phrase. If a trial court
gives a deficient definition of reasonable doubt, it cannot be
presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, whereas, if the trial court instructs on the
need to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without more, it
can be presumed that the jury has, in fact, found guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, omitting a definition of reasonable doubt in
a jury instruction does not violate due process.
Victor v
Nebraska, 511 US 1, 7; 114 S Ct 1239; 127 L Ed 2d 583 (1994).4
The failure to define reasonable doubt is not a structural
error, or any error for that matter, because it is not
necessary to define this commonly understood phrase.
v Spears, 241 Mich 67, 71; 216 NW 398.
People
The jury here was
adequately instructed that the prosecutor had the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime
with which the defendant was charged.
occurred
because
protection.5
defendant
was
not
No structural error
deprived
of
a
basic
The instructions that were given allowed the
4
“[T]he Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from
defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a
matter of course.” Victor, supra at 5.
5
“It is not a case where the trial judge gave a wrong
and harmful definition of the term, but where he did not give
any.” Trudell, supra at 171-172.
7
jury to determine reliably the defendant’s guilt or innocence.
We hold that a defendant is not entitled to reversal of
a jury conviction because of the unchallenged omission of a
definition of “reasonable doubt.”
We affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred.
8
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 119427
JAMAL S. ALLEN
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________________
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).
I
concur
with
the
result
in
this
case,
affirming
defendant’s conviction and sentence and rejecting defendant’s
claim
that
the
trial
court
committed
a
structural
constitutional error when it failed to define reasonable
doubt.
result,
However, I write separately because in reaching this
the
majority
applies
the
plain
error
principle
articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d
130 (1999).
In Carines, I joined Justice Kelly’s partial dissent,
which stated that “a contemporaneous objection to an erroneous
jury instruction is not required to preserve the issue for
appeal.”
460 Mich 778.
Justice Kelly also stated:
Defendant’s
conviction
should
only
“be
affirmed if the reviewing court is satisfied that
the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 482; 581 NW2d 229
(1998).
Given that “erroneous jury instructions
regarding essential elements [are] reviewed for
harmless
error
by
utilizing
a
‘prejudice’
standard,” this Court must assess whether a
properly instructed jury might have reached a
different result, had the error not occurred.
[People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217, 228, 230, 238; 524
NW2d 217 (1994) (opinion of Brickley, J.).] [Id.]
I agree with the majority that defendant is not entitled
to reversal of his jury conviction because of the omission of
a definition of “reasonable doubt” because I do not believe
that a jury would have found any differently even if the trial
judge would have defined reasonable doubt. Because I disagree
with the principle articulated in Carines that is applied
here, I am unable to join the majority opinion.
KELLY , J., concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
2
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