CAM CONSTRUCTION V LAKE EDGEWOOD CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MARCH 12, 2002
CAM CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 116751
LAKE EDGEWOOD
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________________
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH
CAVANAGH, J.
We granted leave to consider whether a party may appeal
an adverse summary disposition judgment on one count of a
multicount action after accepting a case evaluation rendered
under MCR 2.403.
The plain language of MCR 2.403(M)(1)
provides that a party’s acceptance of a case evaluation
disposes
of
“all
claims
in
the
action.”
We
conclude,
therefore, that, upon acceptance of a case evaluation under
MCR 2.403, a party may not subsequently appeal an adverse
summary
disposition
on
one
count
in
the
action.
I.
Facts and Proceedings
In August 1998, plaintiff CAM Construction filed a four
count complaint against defendant Lake Edgewood Condominium
Association for damages stemming from defendant’s failure to
pay plaintiff for services rendered and breach of contract.
In counts I, II, and III, plaintiff alleged that defendant
owed $9,110 for services rendered pursuant to an agreement
between the parties.
In count IV, plaintiff alleged that
defendant reneged on a separate contract, worth $183,450, by
preventing plaintiff from performing roof construction work
for defendant.
Defendant moved for summary disposition on count IV,
claiming the contract was void under the statute of frauds.
MCL 566.132(1)(a).
The circuit court granted defendant’s
motion in December 1998 and plaintiff did not appeal that
decision.
The case was then submitted to case evaluation, for which
both parties submitted mediation summaries.1
The summaries
briefly referred to the dismissal of count IV2; however, the
1
At the time this case arose, the term “mediation” was used
to define the process.
The current term that defines the
process, “case evaluation,” was adopted in 2000.
2
Plaintiff’s mediation summary stated the following about
count IV:
Rather, CAM had agreed with Lake Edgewood to
2
parties debate whether it was only the remaining counts the
case evaluation panel discussed.3
The panel recommended
defendant pay plaintiff $5,400, which both parties accepted.
Defendant then asked for an order dismissing the entire case
with prejudice under MCR 2.403(M)(1), which states:
If all the parties accept the panel’s
evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance
with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award
is paid within 28 days after notification of the
acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss
the action with prejudice.
The judgment or
dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and
interest to the date it is entered.
Plaintiff responded that it had reserved its right to
appeal the summary disposition on count IV.
Arguing that the
case evaluation summaries had focused on the claims in counts
perform roofing repairs under the warranty work
stated above, and Lake Edgewood, in essence,
breached this agreement and did not allow CAM to
perform this work (this allegation has been
dismissed by the Court, due to there being no
signed agreement for services which were allegedly
to have occurred over a three year period.)
Defendant’s mediation summary stated the following about
count IV:
The Complaint also included a claim for breach
of a December 1997 agreement for roof construction
work. By order dated December 17, 1998, this Court
dismissed that claim.
3
Plaintiff asserts that the case evaluation panel did not
discuss count IV. Defendant states that because the decision
was made outside the lawyer’s presence, no one can be sure
whether the panel discussed count IV.
3
I-III, plaintiff asserted that the $5,400 case evaluation
award covered only that portion of the case.
The circuit court agreed with plaintiff and ordered the
parties to:
Craft a judgment here that preserves the
appellate issue on the issue that I decided and
otherwise dismisses the case and shows this to be a
final order in the–the final order in this case.[4]
Plaintiff, thereafter, appealed the summary disposition
on count IV.
The
Court
of
Appeals
dismissed
the
appeal
in
following order:
[T]he claim of appeal is dismissed because
appellant is not an aggrieved party. Under Reddam
v Consumer Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich App 754; 452
NW2d 908 (1990), a party cannot appeal an earlier
order entered after a subsequent acceptance of the
4
This judgment stated:
Plaintiff having brought this action, with its
breach
of
contract
count
dismissed
through
Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Disposition
prior to Mediation, the cause being mediated as to
the remaining issues, the parties having mutually
accepted mediation on those issues, the amount of
the award having been paid within 28 days after
notification of the acceptances, and the Court,
being otherwise advised in the premises:
It is ordered that this matter is hereby
dismissed, with prejudice, relative to the counts
of the Complaint, which survived Defendant’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, with no interest,
costs, or attorney fees awarded to either party.
This is the final judgment in this matter.
4
the
mediation award.5
Plaintiff applied to this Court for leave to appeal.
II.
We
review
de
Standard of Review
novo
decisions
on
summary
disposition
motions. Sewell v Southfield Pub Schs, 456 Mich 670, 674; 576
NW2d 153 (1998).
Similarly, interpretation of a court rule,
like a matter of statutory interpretation, is a question of
law that this Court reviews de novo.
Marketos v American
Employers Ins Co, 465 Mich 407, 413; 633 NW2d 371 (2001).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff contends that it can appeal an earlier partial
summary disposition ruling where the parties have subsequently
accepted a case evaluation award.
We reject plaintiff’s
contention because it is contrary to the plain language of MCR
2.403(M)(1).
In Grievance Administrator v Underwood, 462 Mich 188,
193-194; 612 NW2d 116 (2000), we articulated the proper mode
5
Initially, the Court of Appeals issued an order dismissing
the appeal because there was no docket entry showing that the
trial court had dismissed count IV of the complaint.
Unpublished order, entered October 19, 1999 (Docket No.
221987).
Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which
contended that the trial court made a clerical error.
Defendant answered, arguing that dismissal was proper because
no appeal lies from an earlier partial summary disposition
ruling where the parties have subsequently accepted a
mediation award. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and
dismissed the appeal. Unpublished order, entered January 13,
2000 (Docket No. 221987).
5
of interpreting a court rule:
When called on to construe a court rule, this
Court applies the legal principles that govern the
construction and application of statutes. McAuley
v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d
282 (1998). Accordingly, we begin with the plain
language of the court rule. When that language is
unambiguous, we must enforce the meaning expressed,
without
further
judicial
construction
or
interpretation.
See Tryc v Michigan Veterans’
Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996).
Similarly, common words must be understood to have
their everyday, plain meaning. See MCL 8.3a; MSA
2.212(1); see also Perez v Keeler Brass Co, 461
Mich 602, 609; 608 NW2d 45 (2000).
MCR
2.403(M)(1)
provides
that,
upon
both
parties’
acceptance of a case evaluation, the judgment entered pursuant
to that evaluation “shall be deemed to dispose of all claims
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and interest
. . . .”
The plain meaning of the words at issue is as
follows:
A “claim” is defined as:
1. The aggregate of operative facts giving
rise to a right enforceable by a court . . . . 2.
The assertion of an existing right; any right to
payment or to an equitable remedy, even if
contingent or provisional . . . . 3. A demand for
money or property to which one asserts a right
. . . . [Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).]
An “action” is defined as:
1. The process of doing something; conduct or
behavior. 2. A thing done . . . . 3. A civil or
criminal judicial proceeding. [Id.]
Thus, according to the plain meaning of these words, a claim
6
consists of facts giving rise to a right asserted in a
judicial proceeding, which is an action.
In other words, the
action encompasses the claims asserted.
The language of MCR 2.403(M)(1) could not be more clear
that accepting a case evaluation means that all claims in the
action, even those summarily disposed, are dismissed.6
Thus,
allowing bifurcation of the claims within such actions, as
plaintiff suggests, would be directly contrary to the language
of the rule.
We, therefore, reject plaintiff’s position
because
contrary
language
it
is
that
upon
the
to
the
court
parties’
rule’s
acceptance
unambiguous
of
a
case
evaluation all claims in the action be disposed.
Plaintiff
cites
numerous
decisions
of
the
Court
of
Appeals as supporting its position that it may except a claim
from an action submitted to case evaluation under MCR 2.403.
In Reddam, the Court of Appeals examined the former, less
explicit version, of MCR 2.403,7 and explained that acceptance
6
This conclusion is mirrored in MCR 2.403(A)(1), which
explains that it is the civil action, not the claims within
the civil action, that is submitted to case evaluation:
A court may submit to case evaluation any
civil action in which the relief sought is
primarily money damages . . . .
7
Before March 31, 1990, MCR 2.403 (M)(1) provided:
If all the parties
evaluation, judgment will
7
accept the panel’s
be entered in that
of a case evaluation is essentially a consent judgment, but
that the parties may show they submitted less than all claims
of an action to case evaluation.
The entry of a judgment pursuant to the
acceptance of a mediation evaluation is, in
essence, a consent judgment.
See Pelshaw v
Barnett, 170 Mich App 280, 286; 427 NW2d 616
(1988), modified on other grounds 431 Mich 910; 433
NW2d 77 (1988).
Furthermore, one may not appeal
from a consent judgment, order or decree. Dybata v
Kistler, 140 Mich App 65, 68; 362 NW2d 891 (1985).
Finally, we agree with defendant that the mediation
rule, MCR 2.403, envisions the submission of an
entire civil action to mediation where monetary
damages are involved and that the mediators shall
evaluate the total valuation of the case. That is,
absent a showing that less than all issues were
submitted to mediation, a mediation award covers
the entire matter and acceptance of that mediation
award settles the entire matter.
Accordingly,
plaintiff’s acceptance of the mediation award
settled all claims, including those which had been
dismissed by partial summary disposition. [Reddam
at 756-757.]
These principles were followed in subsequent Court of
Appeals cases that construed the current version of MCR
2.403(M)(1). See Joan Automotive Industries, Inc v Check, 214
Mich App 383, 386-390; 543 NW2d 15 (1995), Bush v Mobil Oil
Corp, 223 Mich App 222, 227; 565 NW2d 921 (1997), and Auto
Club Ins Ass’n v State Farm Ins Cos, 221 Mich App 154, 166;
561 NW2d 445 (1997).
These decisions improperly allow a party to make a
amount, which includes all fees,
interest to the date of judgment.
8
costs,
and
showing that “less than all issues were submitted” to case
evaluation.
Allowing
the
parties
involved
in
the
case
evaluation process to make such a showing has no basis in the
court rule.
Even if Reddam permitted such an approach under
the less detailed language of former MCR 2.403(M), there
plainly is no warrant for proceeding in that manner under the
language of the current version of MCR 2.403(M)(1):
If all the parties accept the panel’s
evaluation, judgment will be entered in accordance
with the evaluation, unless the amount of the award
is paid within 28 days after notification of the
acceptances, in which case the court shall dismiss
the action with prejudice.
The judgment or
dismissal shall be deemed to dispose of all claims
in the action and includes all fees, costs, and
interest to the date it is entered. [Emphasis
added.]
As we have explained, this unambiguous language evidences our
desire to avoid bifurcation of civil actions submitted to case
evaluation.
To the extent that Reddam and its progeny have
been read to suggest that parties may except claims from case
evaluation under the current rule, these cases are overruled.
If all parties accept the panel’s evaluation, the case is
over.
In the present case, both parties accepted the panel’s
case evaluation, and defendant sent the required check within
twenty-eight days.
In those circumstances, the circuit court
should have granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, without
9
condition or reservation.
Thus, because the circuit court
should have dismissed this case in its entirety, the Court of
Appeals did not err when it dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of
appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal order of the
Court of Appeals.
MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and WEAVER , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and MARKMAN , JJ.,
concurred with CAVANAGH , J.
10
S T A T E
O F
M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT
CAM CONSTRUCTION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 116751
LAKE EDGEWOOD
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________________
KELLY, J. (dissenting).
I believe that the judge's statements on the record make
clear that he intended plaintiff's appellate rights respecting
count IV be preserved in the final order.
It is obvious to
me, also, that both the judge and plaintiff reasonably relied
on the interpretation of MCR 2.403(M)(1) made by Reddam8 and
its progeny.
Therefore, it is unjust to apply a more strict
reading of the court rule to this plaintiff's appeal. I would
remand to the Court of Appeals for review of the summary
disposition ruling on its merits.
8
Reddam v Consumers Mortgage Corp, 182 Mich App 754; 452
NW2d 908 (1990).
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