TWP OF BINGHAM V RLTD RAILROAD CORPORATION
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Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
C hief Justice
Justices
Maura D. Cor rigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
Opinion
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED APRIL 18, 2001
THE TOWNSHIP OF BINGHAM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 115602
RLTD RAILROAD CORPORATION and
LEELANAU TRAILS ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
This is a dispute between a township and proponents of a
“rails to trails” recreational pathway that passes through the
township.
The Court of Appeals has twice found that the
township’s zoning ordinance is preempted by laws that govern
such pathways.
We reverse the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to circuit court for further
proceedings.
I
This case concerns a former rail line that, roughly
speaking, extends from Traverse City to Suttons Bay.
The
right of way in Leelanau County is about one hundred feet wide
and about fifteen miles long.1
Until the late 1970s, the
Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad provided freight service along
this corridor.2
“Abandonment” of a rail line is a term that has a
specific meaning under federal and state transportation law.3
In common parlance, however, one may say that this rail line
has been abandoned since the early 1990s, when a tourist
railroad ceased operation.4
At the time this litigation arose, the owner of the
corridor was RLTD Railroad Corporation, which was in the
process of selling the property (on land contract) to the
Leelanau Trails Association, Inc.
The association’s intent
was to construct and maintain a “rails to trails” recreational
pathway for hikers, runners, bicyclists, and others.
From the materials at hand, it appears that the sale has
been completed.
The record is less clear regarding the
present status of the pathway, but we gather that it has been
1
At oral argument, counsel for the township explained
that the pathway is slated to be joined with a similar tract
in Grand Traverse County, creating a renamed trail of greater
length.
2
We are told that passenger service ended in 1948.
3
See RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d
808, 810-811 (CA 6, 1999).
4
For several years in the early 1990s, the tourist line
carried sightseers back and forth.
2
at least partially open to the public for several years.
The
project
had
opponents.
Some
lived
Township, through which the rail line passed.
in
Bingham
Backers of the
project apparently had indicated that as many as sixty or
seventy thousand persons might use the pathway each year, and
opponents were concerned about the potential effect of such
traffic.
In September 1995, RLTD filed a petition with the Surface
Transportation
Board,5
stretch of track.
seeking
to
formally
abandon
this
The association filed on the same day a
statement of its willingness to assume control of the line.6
However, the eventual result of those proceedings was a
determination that the federal board lacked jurisdiction.
RLTD R Corp v Surface Transportation Bd, 166 F3d 808 (CA 6,
1999).
While the federal matter was under way, Bingham Township
filed
a
February
association.
1996
complaint
against
RLTD
and
the
The township alleged a dispute regarding the
extent of its zoning authority over the project, and asked for
a declaration of rights and a preliminary injunction against
the project.
Jointly represented, the defendants moved for summary
5
Actually, the petition was filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which no longer exists. The matter was
transferred to the Surface Transportation Board. See RLTD,
n 3 supra at 810 and 811, n 2.
6
In February 1995, the Michigan Department of
Transportation and the Michigan Department of Natural
Resources had declined to purchase the former rail corridor.
3
disposition.
MCR 2.116(C)(8), (10).
In their motion, the
defendants stated that the township’s zoning ordinance is
preempted by federal law.
The defendants’ supporting brief
also mentions state law, but the focus of the brief is
likewise on federal law.
The circuit court denied the request for preliminary
injunction and granted the defendants’ motion for summary
disposition.7
The court found that the township’s zoning
ordinance was preempted, though the court noted “certain
important caveats”---matters pertaining to public health and
safety are subject to the authority of local government.
In its ruling, the circuit court noted the Michigan
trailways act, which is Part 721 of the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act.8
13A.72101 et seq.
assumption
MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA
However, the court’s opinion reflected the
that
the
proceedings
before
the
Surface
Transportation Board would lead to federal oversight of the
project.
Several days later, the township filed a motion to
clarify.
judgment
In response, the circuit court entered a final
declaring
that
“the
Defendants’
proposed
trail
construction and operation is not subject to Plaintiff’s
7
The court discussed the differing standards for
granting motions under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10), but did
not explicitly state the paragraph under which the motion was
being granted.
8
MCL 324.101 et seq.; MSA 13A.101 et seq.
4
zoning code or master plan . . . .”9
After the township filed its claim of appeal in the Court
of Appeals, the Surface Transportation Board ruled that it was
without jurisdiction.
appeal.
This decision was later upheld on
RLTD, supra.10
In February 1998, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the circuit court.
NW2d 731 (1998).
228 Mich App 154, 155; 576
The Court of Appeals explained its decision
by noting the Legislature’s strong interest in this sort of
recreational project:
The Legislature has repeatedly exercised its
authority over the development of rail-trails. For
example, in the State Transportation Preservation
Act of 1976, the Legislature expressly stated that
“[t]he preservation of abandoned railroad rights of
way for future rail use and their interim use as
public trails is declared to be a public purpose.”
MCL 474.51(3); MSA 22.180(21)(3). The Legislature
later adopted the Michigan trailways act, MCL
324.72102; MSA 13A.72102, in which it again stated
that the acquisition, development, and maintenance
of Michigan trailways is in the best interest of
the state and is declared to be a public purpose.3
Recently, the Legislature passed an appropriations
bill for the Michigan Department of Transportation
identifying certain rail lines, including the one
at issue here, as “essential corridors” to the
state’s transportation infrastructure.
1995 PA
9
Consistent with its earlier ruling, the court added
that “the Defendants’ proposed trail is subject to other
reasonable regulation in the interest of public health, safety
and welfare.”
10
Perhaps believing that the federal decision undercut
the basis of circuit court’s ruling, the township amended its
zoning ordinance in early 1997. RLTD and the association say
in this Court that setback requirements and other features of
the amended ordinance would have the effect of destroying the
corridor by carving it into small segments. The township says
that its ordinance has been amended again, and would create no
such problem.
5
133, § 708.
In light of the state’s repeated expression of
intent to establish and maintain such trailways, we
find that giving local authorities the power to
impose their individual zoning schemes over these
interjurisdictional transportation corridors would
frustrate the Legislature’s intent to preserve
essential rail corridors and to allow for rail
trail transformations. Indeed, if every governing
body along a transportation corridor had the right
to exercise its individual zoning authority on the
rail-trail, construction and maintenance of such
transportation
corridors
would
be
virtually
impossible. In this conflict between state law and
plaintiff’s effort to zone the property in
question,
we
hold
that
plaintiff’s
zoning
ordinances are preempted. [228 Mich App 158-159.]
___________________________________________________
3
MCL 324.72102; MSA 13A.72102 provides:
The legislature finds and declares that a
statewide system of trailways will provide for
public enjoyment, health, and fitness; encourage
constructive leisure-time activities; protect open
space, cultural and historical resources, and
habitat for wildlife and plants; enhance the local
and state economies; link communities, parks, and
natural resources; create opportunities for rural
urban exchange, agricultural education, and the
marketing of farm products; and preserve corridors
for possible future use for other public purposes.
Therefore, the planning, acquisition, development,
operation, and maintenance of Michigan trailways is
in the best interest of the state and is declared
to be a public purpose.
__________________________________________________
In a footnote, the Court of Appeals agreed with Judge Rodgers
that the township does retain some authority with regard to
issues of health and safety.11
11
We
agree
with
the
circuit
court
that
defendants and users of the trailway are subject to
reasonable local regulation which is in the
interest of public health, safety, and welfare.
See MCL 324.72103(1)(b); MSA 13A.72103(1)(b) (To
qualify as a Michigan trailway, “[t]he design and
6
When the township applied to this Court for leave to
appeal, we remanded the case to the Court of Appeals “to
determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the
Michigan trailways act, MCL 324.72101 et seq.; MSA 13A.72101
et seq., . . . apply to the land corridor in question.”12
460
Mich 868 (1999).
On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed. 237 Mich
App 538; 603 NW2d 795 (1999).
trailways act does apply.
It found that the Michigan
237 Mich App 543-546.
From there,
the Court explained that the trailways act preempts local
zoning control of a “Michigan trailway.”
552.
237 Mich App 546
In that fashion, the Court reached this conclusion:
The MTA anticipates a process in which a
trailway becomes a designated “Michigan trailway.”
maintenance of the trailway and its related
facilities [must] meet generally accepted standards
of public safety”).
These regulations may, for
example, provide for the enforcement of criminal
and civil laws, construction and maintenance of
fencing, and limitation of noise. We further note
that
the
Michigan
Trailways
Act
repeatedly
emphasizes the Legislature’s desire that the public
purpose in a statewide system of trailways be
balanced
with
the
interests
of
surrounding
landowners
and
residents.
See,
e.g.,
MCL
324.72103(1)(j);
MSA
13A.72103(1)(j),
MCL
324.72103(3); MSA 13A.72103(3).
We strongly
encourage the parties to work together to meet
these common goals. [228 Mich App 159, n 4.]
12
Our order also directed the Court of Appeals “to
determine whether and how the regulatory provisions of the
. . . State Transportation Preservation Act, MCL 474.51 et
seq.; MSA 22.180(21) et seq., apply to the land corridor in
question.” On remand, the Court of Appeals found that the
STPA did not apply because the land is not owned by the
Department of Transportation. 237 Mich App 542-543. Neither
side has appealed that determination, and so the applicability
of this act is no longer at issue.
7
During this process, local zoning cannot be
permitted to frustrate the Legislature’s clearly
expressed intent to encourage the development of
such interjurisdictional trailways.
Accordingly,
we conclude, as we did in our original opinion,
that “[i]n this conflict between state law and
plaintiff’s effort to zone the property in question
. . . plaintiff’s zoning ordinances are preempted.”
Bingham Twp, supra [228 Mich App] 159. [237 Mich
App 552-553.]
For a second time, the township applied to this Court,
and we granted leave to appeal.
462 Mich 902 (2000).
In our
order, we invited briefing on “the issue of whether and how
the
Michigan
13A.72101
et
trailways
act,
seq.,
local
or
MCL
324.72101
zoning
et
seq.;
ordinances
apply
MSA
to
abandoned railroad corridors.”
II
As indicated, the circuit court did not state whether it
granted the defendants’ motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10).
However, “summary disposition under
either MCR 2.116(C)(8) or (10) will always present an issue of
law for our determination . . . .” and thus “[w]e review a
trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition de
novo.”
Straus v Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533; 592 NW2d 53
(1999).
This
case
also
presents
a
question
of
interpretation, which we likewise decide de novo.
statutory
Kent Co
Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v Kent Co Sheriff, 463 Mich 353, 357,
n 8; 617 NW2d 533 (2000); Howell Twp v Rooto Corp, 463 Mich
347, 352, n 10; 617 NW2d 533 (2000).
8
III
As stated above, the holding of the Court of Appeals that
the township’s zoning authority is preempted is grounded in
its determination that the Michigan trailways act applies to
the disputed trail.
In turn, that determination was reached after reference
to the statutory definitions of a “trailway”:
“Trailway” means a land corridor that features
a broad trail capable of accommodating a variety of
public recreation uses.
[MCL 324.72101(f); MSA
13A.72101(f).]
and “Michigan trailway”:
“Michigan
trailway”
means
a
trailway
designated by the commission[13] pursuant to section
72103. [MCL 324.72101(e); MSA 13A.72101(e).]
The Legislature has, in this definition, clearly provided
that a Michigan trailway is a trailway designated by the
Commission of Natural Resources under MCL 324.72103; MSA
13A.72103.
That provision outlines both a process that
includes a public hearing14 and a wide variety of substantive
requirements for a proposed trailway.15
237 Mich App 543-545.
13
“[T]he commission” is the Commission
Resources. MCL 324.301(a); MSA 13A.301(a).
14
of
Natural
MCL 324.72103(2); MSA 13A.72103(2).
15
Upon petition by any person or on its own
motion, the commission may designate a trailway in
this state as a “Michigan trailway.” The petition
or motion shall propose permitted uses of the
trailway.
The commission shall not designate a
trailway as a Michigan trailway unless it meets, or
will meet when completed, all of the following
requirements:
9
(a) The land on which the trailway is located
is owned by the state or a governmental agency, or
otherwise is under the long-term control of the
state or a governmental agency through a lease,
easement, or other arrangement.
If the land is
owned by a governmental agency, the commission
shall obtain the consent of the governmental agency
before designating the land as part of a Michigan
trailway.
(b) The design and maintenance of the trailway
and its related facilities meet generally accepted
standards of public safety.
(c) The trailway meets appropriate standards
for its designated recreation uses.
(d) The trailway is available for designated
recreation uses on a nondiscriminatory basis.
(e) The trailway is a multiuse trail suitable
for
use
by
pedestrians,
by
people
with
disabilities, and by other users, as appropriate.
(f) The trailway is, or has potential to be, a
segment of a statewide network of trailways, or it
attracts a substantial share of its users from
beyond the local area.
(g) The trailway is marked with an official
Michigan trailway sign and logo at major access
points.
(h) The trailway is not directly attached to a
roadway, except at roadway crossings.
(i) Where feasible, the trailway offers
adequate support facilities for the public,
including
parking,
sanitary
facilities,
and
emergency telephones, that are accessible to people
with disabilities and are at reasonable frequency
along the trailway.
(j) Potential negative impacts of trailway
development on owners or residents of adjacent
property
are
minimized
through
all
of
the
following:
(i) Adequate enforcement of trailway rules and
regulations.
10
As counsel for RLTD and the association conceded at oral
argument, the former rail line has never been designated a
“Michigan trailway.”
Indeed, no such petition has ever been
filed.16
Notwithstanding the lack of designation, the Court of
Appeals found the statute applicable on the ground that the
statutory
language
contemplated
an
reveals
ongoing
that
process
“the
by
Legislature
which
has
trailways
are
developed and eventually obtain ‘Michigan trailway’ status.”
237 Mich App 545.
The Court noted that the Legislature
permitted a “Michigan trailway” designation to be applied if
the
trailway
requirements
“meets
set
or
forth
will
in
MCL
meet
when
completed”
the
324.72103(1)(a)-(k);
MSA
13A.72103(1)(a)-(k).
The Court of Appeals is correct that the Legislature has
anticipated
that
the
requirements
for
designation
as
a
(ii) Continuation of access for trailway
crossings for agricultural and other purposes.
(iii) Construction and maintenance of fencing,
where necessary, by the owner or operator of the
trailway.
(iv) Other means as considered appropriate by
the commission.
(k) Other conditions by the commission.
324.72103(1); MSA 13A.72103(1).]
16
[MCL
Counsel explained, from his clients’ perspective, the
reasons for not filing.
They related to perceived
difficulties in gaining the support of other townships for the
formation of a “Michigan trailway management council,” MCL
324.72106; MSA 13A.72106, and the prospects for achieving
governmental control of the pathway, as required by MCL
324.72103(1)(a); MSA 13A.72103(1)(a).
11
“Michigan trailway” might not be met all at once, and that
they need not have been met at time of the petition or even at
the time of designation.
However, that sort of flexible
approach---a legislative recognition that fulfillment of the
requirements can be a long process---does not mean that the
Legislature made the statute applicable to pathways that lack
the designation.
opposite.
Indeed, the legislation anticipates the
By permitting designation before the statutory
requirements are met and before the trailway is completed, the
Legislature removed any need to offer special protection to
undesignated trailways.
The Court of Appeals said that, though the corridor had
not yet received the “Michigan trailway” designation, “it is
making progress toward this goal, and thus it is appropriate
to apply the regulatory provisions contained in the [statute]
to the trailway.”
237 Mich App 546.
legislation provides.
That is not what the
The Legislature has made the “Michigan
trailway” designation broadly available---even to incomplete
trailways that will later meet statutory requirements---and we
find in the language of the statute no basis for applying the
statute to a trailway that has not received the designation.17
17
In summary, the association has neither applied for nor
achieved trailway designation; no government entity has yet
accepted or indicated a willingness to accept the property
proposed for the trailway, a precondition upon which
designation depends; there is no apparent support among the
relevant jurisdictions for the formation of the necessary
“trailway management council”;
there have been no public
hearings to determine the extent to which the proposed
trailway can satisfy such statutory requirements as those
relating to public safety, designated recreation uses, and
12
Because the statute is not applicable, there is no need
to determine whether it preempts the zoning authority of the
township.
Neither
must
we
address
alternative
theories
advanced by the parties and the amici curiae in support of
their respective views of local zoning authority over this
former rail corridor.
For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court
of Appeals and the circuit court, and we remand this case to
the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN , C.J., and CAVANAGH , WEAVER , KELLY , TAYLOR , YOUNG , and
MARKMAN , JJ., concurred.
adequate support facilities; there have been no public
hearings to determine how the proposed trailway can best
minimize any adverse impact upon adjoining property owners and
agriculture; and the Commission of Natural Resources has had
no opportunity to determine whether there are any “other
conditions” that ought to be satisfied in the course of
designating the trailway.
13
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