Thompson v. State

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HEADNOTE: Thom pson v. Sta te, No. 126, September Term, 2008 EVIDENCE; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EVIDENCE OF UNCHARGED CRIMINAL CONDUCT ENGAGED IN BY A DEFENDANT WHEN THE DEFE NDA NT W AS A JU VENIL E: The admissibility of other crimes evidence allegedly committed by the defendant when the defendant was a juvenile, but never presented in a juvenile court proceeding, is governed by Maryland Rule 5-404(b) rather than by CJ Section 3-8A-23. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MARYLAND RULE 4-204; AMENDMENT TO CHA RGIN G DO CUM ENT: An am endmen t to a chargin g docum ent that chan ges only the date of the alleged offense and/or the location at which the offense allegedly occurred does not change the character of the offense. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 126 September Term, 2008 KARL LYMONT THOMPSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Eldridge, Jo hn C. (Re tired, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Murphy, J. Bell, C.J., Gre ene and E ldridge, JJ., Dis sent. ________________________________________ Filed: February 17, 2010 In the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, a jury convicted Karl Lymont Thompson, Petitioner, of second-degree rape and related offenses. The State s evidence, which included the victim s testimony, was sufficient to establish that Petitioner committed the rape in 1986 and committed a third-degree sex offense in 1983. Petitioner does not argue to the contrary. He does argue , however, that he is entitled to a new trial. After the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Petitioner s convictions in Thom pson v . State, 181 Md. App. 74, 955 A.2d 8 02 (2008), he filed a pe tition for writ of certiorari in which he presented this Court w ith two qu estions: I. MAY EVIDENCE OF THE [PETITIONER S] UNCHARGED JUVENILE CONDUCT BE ADMITTED IN A CRIM INAL PROSECUTION GIVEN THAT JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND THE EVIDENCE THEREIN ARE INADMISSIBLE? II. DOES AMENDING THE INDICTMENT TO CHARGE T H AT A CRIME OCCURRED DURI NG A DIFFERENT TIME-FRAME AND AT A DIFFERENT LOCATION CHANGE THE CHARACTER OF THE SEXUAL OFFENSE WHEN MULTIPLE OFFENSES ARE ALLEGED? We granted the petition. 406 Md. 744, 962 A.d 371 (2008). For the reasons that follow, we answ er yes to the first question and no to the second. W e shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. Background The record shows that Petitioner was 40 years of age when the conduct at issue was reported to a law enforcement officer. The Court of Special Appeals provided the following factual bac kground : On May 10 , 2005, [the victim] then thirty-one years of age and a resident of San Diego, California, spoke by telephone with Detective Edward Scott Jones of the Baltimore City Police Departm ent, informing him that, beg inning in 1978, when she was approximately five years old, until 1986, when she was thirteen, she had b een sexu ally abused by her uncle, [Petitioner], on numero us occasio ns. She stated that she had not previou sly reported any of these incid ents beca use s he had been t old b y a mental health counselor that it was too late to do so. *** At trial, the court permitted [the victim] to testify about five specific instances of sexual abuse. The first of the five incidents occurred in the summer of 1978, at the Lynview home, w hen [the v ictim] was approxim ately five years old and appellant wa s fourteen years old. Because of appellant s juvenile status at that time, the State never charged appellant with any crimes associated with this incident. The second incident took place during a school vacation in 1983, when [the victim] was ten years old and appellant was nineteen and an adult. The third and fourth incidents happened during the summers of 1984 and 1985 at her grandparents Hampstead home, when [the victim] was about eleven years of age and appellant was twenty. The charges stemming from these incidents were dismissed during trial for lack of jurisdiction. The fifth incident occurred in November 1986, when [the victim] was thirteen and was staying at the Goodnow Road apartment of appellant, who was then twenty-two. *** With respect to the 1986 incident, [the victim] testified that it occurred w hile she was visiting appellant at his apartment on Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, during her Thanksgiving school break. Appellant was then living at that addres s with his girlfriend, Stephanie Perry. [The victim] recalled that one evening, before appellant left for work, he provided her with a shirt to sleep in an d told her sh e could sh are a bed w ith Ms. Perr y. She then recounted how later that night, when appellant 2 returned home, he got into bed with her and Ms. Perry and how she later awoke to find his penis inside of [her], while Ms. Perry slep t. *** Over appella nt s obje ction, the circuit court permitted [the victim] to testify that she had been sexually abused by appellant as early as 1978, at her grandparents Lynview home, when she was [a]pproximately five and appellant was fourteen years old. Although appellant was never charged, either as a juvenile or an adult, with any offenses stemming from this incident, the court ruled that such testimony was admissible un der Maryland Ru le 5-404(b). It reasoned that becaus e the . . . testimon y would inv olve acts by the same Defendant against the same victim . . . and the acts [were] of the [same] general nature, the evidence was admissible as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, common scheme, plan and absence of mistake or accident. [The victim] then testified as follows: I woke up to [appellant] touching me between my legs with h is hands an d with his penis. It hurt. I started to whimper a little bit and I said to h im that I n eed to g o to the b athroo m. I didn t need to go to the bathroom. I just wanted to remove myself from the room. I went into the [] bathr oom a nd . . . s[a ]t on the toilet. I remember . . . my feet didn t touch the floor. And I left the bathroom, [] I went [] into my aunt s room . . . a different bedroom and I just laid on her floor. And then he came into the room a fter and asked w hy I didn t come back. I didn t answer and he climbed into my aun t s bed. Thomp son v. State , 181 Md. App. 73, 78-81, 955 A.2d 802, 806-807 (2008). (Footnotes omitted). 3 Discussion I. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that the Circuit Court erred in admitting into evidence the victim s testimony about the uncharged 1978 incident, which occurred when [Petitioner] was 14 years old. The Circuit Court ruled that evidence of the 1978 incident was admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b), which provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. It is clear that the ruling at issue did not violate Md. Rule 5-404(b), which codified the sexual propensity exception to the general rule excluding other crimes evidence. As this Court stated in Vogel v. State, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989), the sexual propensity exception is applicable to evidence of prior illicit sexual acts [which] are similar to the offense for which the accused is being tried and involve the same victim. Id. at 466, 554 A.2d at 1234. Before Md. Rule 5-404(b) was adopted, this Court stated: The primary policy consideration underlying the rule against other crimes evidence is that this type of evidence will prejudice the jury against the accused because of the jury s tendency to infer that the accused is a bad man who should be punished regardless of his guilt of the charged 4 crime, or to infer that he committed the charged crime due to a criminal disposition. Yet, in the area of sex crimes, particularly child molestation, courts have been likely to admit proof of prior acts to show a party s conformity with past conduct. Professor McLain suggests that this relaxation of the general prohibition is probably because the character evidence is believed to have greater probative value in those circumstances. In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim. Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State offers evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type by the accused against the same victim, the law of evidence already has concluded that, in general, the probative value, as substantive evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged, outweighs the inherent prejudicial effect. The discretion exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair prejudice against probative value is concerned with special features in the particular case. Acuna v. State, 332 Md. 65, 75, 629 A.2d 1233, 1238 (1993) (Citations omitted). The record shows that the Circuit Court (1) was not clearly erroneous in finding that the sexual offenses committed by Petitioner against the very same victim in 1978 had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and had special probative value, and (2) did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence on the ground that its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair bad actor prejudice against Petitioner. Petitioner argues that Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings 5 Article (CJ § 3-8A-23) prohibits the State from introducing evidence of criminal acts,1 or wrongs that were committed by an adult defendant when he or she was a juvenile. That statute, in pertinent part, provides: § 3-8A-23. Effect of proceedings under [the Juvenile Causes Act] subtitle. (b) Adjudication and disposition not admissible as evidence. An adjudication and disposition of a child pursuant to this subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the child: (1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction; or (2) In any adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging delinquency; or (3) In any civil proceeding not conducted under this subtitle. (c) Evidence given in proceeding under this subtitle inadmissible in criminal proceeding. Evidence given in a proceeding under this subtitle is not admissible against the child in any other proceeding in another court, except in a criminal proceeding where the child is charged with perjury and the evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise admissible. 1 This Court has stated that "[t]he raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child does not commit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a criminal. In re Darryl D., 308 Md. 475, 481, 520 A.2d 712, 715 (1987) (quoting Matter of Davis, 17 Md. App. 98, 104, 299 A.2d 856, 860 (1973)); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 673-74, 814 A.2d 557, 563 (2003) ( [T]he keystone of Maryland's disposition of juvenile delinquents is that the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of the child [is] of no consequence, such that delinquency adjudication is seen as the opportunity for the State to provide needed rehabilitative intervention. (quoting Victor B., 336 Md. [85] at 91-92, 646 A.2d [1012] at 1015)). Accordingly, [j]uvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals. Victor B., 336 Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017. 6 According to Petitioner, because Md. Rule 5-404(b) must be read in light of the policy underlying the Juvenile Causes Act, evidence of unadjudicated juvenile acts allegedly committed by an adult defendant is inadmissible as a matter of law in subsequent criminal proceedings. Trial judges do not have discretion to admit evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law. The issue of whether CJ § 3-8A-23 trumps Md. Rule 5-404(b) presents a question of law.2 The State argues that the Circuit Court was correct in its conclusion that the admissibility of the evidence at issue was controlled by Md. Rule 5-404(b) because the statutory prohibition in CJ § 3-8A-23 does not apply to evidence that was never presented in a juvenile proceeding. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with that argument. So do we. To resolve a question of law that is controlled by a statute, this Court must identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue. Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004) (quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003)). While this Court must be guided by the plain language of the applicable statute, we must read statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the purpose, aim, or 2 See State v. Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), and Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 792 A.2d 736 (2008) (stating that a trial judge does not have discretion to admit evidence that must be excluded as a matter of law) (quoting Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 82-83, 919 A.2d 1177, 1186 (2007)). 7 policy of the enacting body. Serio, 384 Md. at 390, 863 A.2d at 962 (quoting Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; citing Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 349, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001)). Having applied these principles to the issue before us, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that the purpose and plain language of § 3-8A-23 does not provide a basis for extending its application to the uncharged juvenile misconduct in this case. Thomp son v. State , 181 Md. App. 74, 87, 955 A.2d 802, 810 (2008 ). A court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute; nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). Juvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 96, 64 6 A.2d 1012 , 1017 (1994). If the General Assembly intended to exclude evidence of other crimes allegedly committed by an adult defendant when the defendant was a juvenile, but never presented in a juvenile court proceeding, the General Assembly would certainly have placed that restriction in CJ § 3-8A-23. We therefore conclude that the admissibility of the evidence at issue is contro lled by M d. Rule 5-404 (b). Our conclusion is consistent with the holding of State v. Shedrick, 574 N.E.2d 8 1065 (Ohio 1991), in which the Supreme Court of Ohio was presented with two conflicting interpretations of a statute that, prior to July 1, 1992,3 provided: "The judgment rendered by the court under this chapter shall not impose any of the civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction of a crime in that the child is not a criminal by reason of the adjudication, nor shall any child be charged or convicted of a crime in any court except as provided by this chapter. The disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in court is not admissible as evidence against th e child in any o ther case or proce eding in any other court, except that the judgment rendered and the disposition of the child may be considered by any co urt only as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation. The disposition or evidence shall not opera te to d isqu alify a child in any future civil service examination, appointment, or applica tion." R.C. 2 151.35 8(H) (E mpha sis supp lied). In the Com mon Ple as Court o f Summ it County, Oh io, a jury convicte d Dona ld Shedrick of the aggravated murder and rape of a thirteen year old girl, Lori E., whose body was discovered on December 15, 1988. The State s case against Shedrick included 3 The Ohio legislature amended R.C. 2151.358(H), effective July 31, 1992. That statute now provides: Evidence of a judgment rendered and the disposition of a child under that judgment is not admissible to impeach the credibility of the child in any action or proceeding. Otherwise, the disposition of a child under the judgment rendered or any evidence given in court is admissible as evidence for or against a child in any action or proceeding in any court in accordance with the Rules of Evidence and also may be considered by any court as to the matter of sentence or to the granting of probation. 9 evidence that, in 1987, he raped a thirteen year old girl, Christine Y. Shedrick noted an appeal to the Court of Appeals of the N inth Appellate District, and presen ted that Court with two assignm ents of error: ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I The trial co urt erred in ad mitted evide nce of prio r acts of the defendant when such evidence and such acts had been the sub ject of a prior juv enile co urt adju dication . *** ASSIGN MEN T OF ER ROR II The trial court erred in allowing the admission of prior acts of the defendant to prove identity, plan, scheme or design . A divided three-judge panel of the intermediate appellate court held that neither assignm ent wa s well taken, and tha t the judg ment o f the trial court sh ould be affirm ed. That panel, however, (1) acknowledged that the majority s disposition of the first assignment of error was in conflict with the judgment upon the same question by the Court of Appea ls of the Eig hth App ellate District, (2 ) conclude d that this con flict should be resolved by the Supreme Court of Ohio, and (3) therefore entered a JOURNAL ENTR Y that inclu ded the fo llowing p rovisions: The question of law upon which the conflict of opinion exists is whether a person who testified in a juv enile court proceeding is precluded by R.C. 2151.358(h) from testifying on the same subject in any other case or proceeding in any other court. 10 Therefore, the record of State v. Shedrick . . . is hereby certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio for review and final determination. While holding that a remand was necessary to determine whether the evidence of the 1987 rape should have been excluded on the ground that the witnesses who testified about that crime (Christine Y., Christine s mother, and a detective who investigated the 1987 case) had p reviously testified against Shedrick in juven ile court, the Supreme C ourt of Ohio (1) explained what constitutes evidence given in [juvenile] court, and (2) rejected Shedrick s argument that the evidence of the 1987 rape should have been exclud ed und er Rule 404(B ) of the O hio Ru les of E videnc e. On the issu e of wh at does -- an d does no t -- constitute e vidence g iven in [juvenile] co urt, the Sup reme Co urt stated: When evidence is given in the form of testimony, it is the essential subject matter of the testimony which constitutes the evidence and not the precise words used. The transcript is not the "evidence," but only a record of the evidence. Therefore, where a witness has testified in a juvenile proceeding, R.C. 2151.358(H) prohibits that witness from giving essentially the same testimony in any other criminal case or criminal proceeding. Accord ingly we hold that, under R.C. 215 1.358(H), testim ony, docum ents, or e xhibits, p resented as evidence against a juvenile in a juvenile proceeding, are inadmissible against the juvenile in any other criminal case or criminal proceeding except ones in which the same underlying alleged crime is being adjudicated. *** Our interpretation of R.C. 2151.358(H) does not end the inquiry necessary to decide this case. Appellant argues that the 11 "spirit" of R.C. 2151.358(H) precludes the use of any evidence which formed the basis of prior juve nile disp osition. . . . Appellant argues that even if he pled guilty to the allegations of a juvenile complaint, any evidence which could have been used agains t him is in admiss ible in a s ubseq uent ca se. . . . We do not agree. This argument is also resolved by the language of R.C . 2151.3 58(H ). The language is unambiguous in its prohibition against "any evidence given in [juvenile] court." The statute does not exclude evidence that might have been g iven in juvenile cou rt. *** Because of the discrepancy between the facts represented by state's counsel at oral argument and the facts suggested by the record, we must remand the case to the trial court for a disposition in accorda nce with the law as we have set it forth. If C.Y., her mother, or [the officer who investigated the 1987 case] testified at the juvenile proceeding, then R.C. 2151.358(H) bars the testimony of those w itnesses in th is case to the extent that such testimony is essentially the same as that previously given. O n the other hand, if any one of these three witnesses did not testify at th e juvenile proceeding or if their testimony in the instant case was not essentially the same, then such testimony would be admissib le in the instant case. Finally, if evidence was admitted in this case in violation of R.C. 2151.358(H), the trial court must determine whether the effect was prejudicial and whether a new trial is warranted for Shedrick. Id. at 1068-69. (Emp hasis supplied; footnote om itted).4 4 Upon remand to the trial court, the State stipulated that (1) the testimony of Christine, her mother, and the investigating officer was presented to the jury, and (2) that testimony was inadmissible under R.C. 2151.358(H) because it was similar to the testimony presented by those witnesse s in the juvenile proceeding that preceded the jury trial. The trial court found, however, that the admission of that evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that decision was affirmed in State v. Shedrick, 610 12 As to Shedrick s argument that evidence of the 1987 rape should have been excluded under Rule 404(B) of the Ohio Rules of Evidence, the Supreme Court stated: In the case before us the identity of the perpetrator is at issue because Shedrick denies that [he committed the crime]...We conclu de the s imilarities betwe en the tw o crime s is suff icient. The evidence of the first rape tends to show the identity of the perpetrator of the second . Therefore, evidence of Shedrick s prior rape of C.Y. meets the requirements for admission set by Evid. R. 404(B) and R.C. 2945.59 [notwithstanding that the defendant w as a juvenile]. Id. at 1070 . Our conclusion is also consistent with the holdings of State v. Collier, 892 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994), and People v. Whittington, 74 Cal. App. 3d 8 06 (1977). In Collier, while affirm ing a murd er convictio n, the Cou rt of App eals of M issouri held th at a statute similar to § 3-8A-23 did not prohibit the State from introducing evidence of the defendant s uncharged juvenile misconduct. The Collier Court stated: Although the defendant was a minor when the above incidents of burglary and robbery occurred, it appears that he was n ever su bjected to juven ile proce edings for any o f them . Nor we re the questio ns on cros s-examin ation design ed to elicit statements made to juvenile au thorities or matters pertaining to any juvenile proceedings. Id. at 691. In Whittington, the Court o f Appe al of Califo rnia, First Ap pellate District, N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio App. 1992). Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court denied Shedrick s petition for writ of certiora ri. Shedrick v . Ohio, 508 U.S. 923, 113 S.Ct. 2374 (1993 ). 13 Division Two, affirmed a rape conviction based in part upon evidence of another rape allegedly committed by the defendant while he was a juvenile, on the ground that the evidence at issue clearly raises a reasonable and strong inference that defendant . . . was also the perpetrator of the instant crime. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 816. In support of that conclusion, the Whittington Court stated : Here both offenses: 1) occurred at about the same time, 5 p.m. a nd 7 p.m ., and in th e same genera l vicinity, i.e., several blocks from o ne another and fro m defendan t s residence at 15 Middle Street; 2) began near an apartment house w hen defe ndant app roached th e victim on a public street; 3) includ ed defen dant s attem pt to initiate a frien dly conversation with the victim; 4) occurred in a garbage collection area near the street; 5) were initiated by the defendant s sudden seizure of victims with his hand clamped over the mou th; 6) oste nsib ly were fo r the purp ose o f rob bery, as each vic tim was as ked for m oney; 7) occu rred while b oth defendant and his victims were only partially disrobed; he removed only his pants and each victim, only her pantyhose; 8) were consummated in a short period of time; 9) defendant told the victims not to worry because he was not diseased and that he had not had sexual relations for a long time; 10) defendant engaged the victims in conversation after consummation of the crime; 11) neither victim sustained any physical injury other than the accomplishment of the sexual act; 12) each victim was a young attractive Caucasian woman; and 13) d efendan t offered th e identical alibi d efense h is presence at Walton s residence within walking distance of each incide nt. Id. at 815- 16. For the reas ons stated a bove, w e hold that C J § 3-8A -23 simply do es not app ly to the testimony presented by the State in the case at bar, which was clearly admissible under 14 Md. Rule 5-404(b), and which had never been given in a juvenile proceeding.5 II. The indictment that the Circuit Court amended on its own initiative, in pertinent part, 6 asserted: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY State of Maryland -vs- Karl Thompson Defendant(s) Date of O ffense: 05/01/86 - 08/31/86 Location : 5429 Lynview Avenue Comp lainant: [The victim s na me] INDICTMENT The Jurors of the State of Maryland for the body of the City of Baltimore , do on their o wn oath present that a foresaid DEFENDA NT(S), late of said City, heretofore on or about the date(s) of offense set forth above, at the location(s) set forth above, 5 Our holding is not inconsistent with State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). That case presented the issue of whether an adult defendant could be crossexamined abo ut whether he had -- when he w as a juvenile -- committed acts that had resulted in de linquency ad judications. T he prosec utor in that cas e conced ed that a delinquency adjudication w as not a conviction fo r purposes of Te nnessee s impeachment by conviction rule, but argued that the defendant could be questioned about the conduct that resulted in the delinquency adjudications. The trial court accepted that argument, but the appellate court did not. In the case at bar, Petitioner was not questio ned ab out con duct tha t had be en the s ubject o f a juve nile delin quenc y procee ding. 6 The statutes cited in the indictmen t, which were in eff ect in 1986, were transferred to the Criminal Law Article (CL) by Chapter 26, Acts of 2002. Second degree rape is proscribed by CL § 3-304. Sexual offense in the third degree is proscribed by CL § 3-307. Sexual offense in the fourth degree is proscribed by CL § 3-308. Assault in the second degree is prosc ribed b y CL § 3 -203. 15 in the C ity of Balt imore, S tate of M aryland, feloniously d id COMM IT the CRIME of RAPE in the 2 nd DEGREE, as defined in Article 27, Sections 461 and 463 of the Annotated Code of Marylan d, upon the aforesaid Complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the pea ce, gov ernme nt and d ignity of th e State. SECOND COUNT And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the said da te(s), at sa id place , at the C ity aforesa id, feloniously d id commit the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the 3 rd DEGREE, in violation of Article 27, Sections 461 and 464B of the Annotated Code of M aryland, upon the aforesaid complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and agains t the pea ce, gov ernme nt and d ignity of th e State. THIRD COUNT And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that th e aforesaid DEFE NDA NT(S), late of said C ity, on said date(s), a t the said place, a t the City af oresaid , unlawfully did com mit the crime of SEXUAL OFFENSE in the 4 th DEGREE, in violation of Article 27, Section 461 and 464C of the Annotated Code of Marylan d, upon aforesaid Complainant; contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly, in such case made and provided, and against the peace , govern ment a nd dign ity of the S tate. FOURTH COUNT And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do further present that the aforesaid DEFENDANT(S), late of said City, on the said da te(s), at the said pla ce, at the City afor esaid, unlawfully did ASSAULT [the victim] in the SECOND DEGREE in violation of Article 27, S ection 12A ; contrary to the fo rm of the A ct of Asse mbly in such cas e made a nd provid ed and ag ainst the pea ce, govern ment, 16 and dig nity of the State. The verdict sheet pertaining to this indictment contains the following questions and answers: VERDICT SHEET 1. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOM PSON, did commit the crime of Rape in the Seco nd Degree ag ainst [the victim]? Not Guilty _______ G uilty yes 2. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOM PSON[, d]id commit the crime of Sexual Offense in the Third Degree against [the victim]? Not Guilty _______ G uilty yes 3. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOM PSON[, d]id commit the crime of Sexual Offe nse in the Fourth D egree against [the victim]? Not Guilty _______ G uilty yes 4. Do you find that on or about November, 1986 at Goodnow Road in Baltimore City, State of Maryland, the Defendant, KARL THOM PSON[, d]id commit the crime of Assault in the Secon d Degree aga inst [the victim]? GUILTY The record show s that the Circuit Court ruled as fo llows at the close of the State s 17 case: [O]n m y own initiative, I m ake this am endmen t finding it would not be a chang e in the c haracte r of the o ffense s. I would note that the character of the offense described by [the victim] . . . was substantially the same as that described in her written stateme nt [to D etective Worts ] of M ay 11th[ , 2005,] which the Court has had an opportunity to review, and that her in-c ourt testim ony . . . diff ered fro m the in dictme nts . . . only with resp ect to Than ksgiving a nd the loca tion. I will moreover note that the defense has been aware of the location variance since before trial, because it was told to me prior to trial that her testimony with respect to the 1986 events [would be] that they occurred at [the] Goodnow Road [location] and not at the Lynview Avenu e location. W hile it is unclear w hy the State has not m ade [a] m otion [to am end the ind ictment] bef ore . . . it should co me as no surprise to the defense th at the indictm ents were to be amended. I will also note that the Court is not [making] any . . . substantiative changes with respect to [the] indictments. . . . [C]hanging the date of the offense in the indictm ent con stitutes a m atter of f orm an d not su bstance . . . and it may be amended in the Court s discretion without changing the character of the offense. From our review of the record, the victim never stated that the 1986 offenses occurred at the Lynview Avenue address. Although the victim was unable to provide Detective Wortz with the exact address, she stated that the 1986 offenses occurred at the studio apa rtment type of thing wh ere Petitioner was living at that time. Prio r to the date of his indictments, Petitioner wa s arrested on a warran t issued by a District Court Commissioner, who was presented with an Application for Statement of Charges that included th e followin g: APPLICATION FOR STATEMENT OF CHARGES 18 I, [Detective Jones], apply for a statement of charges and a summons or warrant which may lead to the arrest of the named Defendant because on or about 1 Jan.79 - 31 Dec. 86 at 5429 Lynview Ave. Baltimore Md. 21215 and 5105 Goodnow Rd. Baltimore Md. 21206, the above named Defendant Did sexu ally abuse and rape [the victim] F/B/31 DOB 07/29/1973 from the time she was 6 to the tim e she w as 13 yea rs of ag e. The Statement of Charges filed pursuant to this Application mistakenly asserted that all of the offenses occurred at the Lynview Avenue address, and this clerical mistake was n ot corre cted w hen the indictm ents w ere filed . According to Petitioner, he is entitled to a new trial on the ground that this ruling violated Md. Rule 4-202, which provides: On motion of a party or on its own initiative, the court at any time before verdict may permit a charging document to be amended except that if the amendment changes the character of the offenses charged, the consent of the parties is required. If amendment of a charging document reasonably so requires, the court shall grant the defendant an extension of time or continuance. Petitioner argues that, even though the amendments at issue changed only the period of time within which the crimes occurred and the location at which the crimes occurred, th ose amen dments ch anged th e character o f the offe nses charg ed. Wh ile rejecting this argument, the Court of Special Appeals stated: Matters relating to the charac ter of the offense are those facts that must be proved to make the act complained of a crime. Tapscott v . State, 106 Md. App. 109, 134, 664 A.2d 42 (1995). Consequently, the only change to an indictment that requires the consent of the parties is one that would alter the elements of the crime charged. And, thus, [a]n indictment 19 may be corrected without the defendant's consent if the amendment does not alter any of the elements of the offense and results in no prejudice. Tapscott, 106 Md. App. at 134[, 664 A .2d at 54 ]. *** We have repeatedly held that the date that an indictment alleges that the criminal conduct occurred may be amended in the court s discretion without changing the character of the offense. Manu el [v. State], 85 M d. App . [1,] 18-19 [, 581 A .2d 128 7, 1295 (1991 )]. See . . . Tucker v. State, 5 Md. App. 32, 35, 245 A.2d 109[, 111] (1967) (declaring that [i]t is well-established that the State is not confined in its proof to the date alleged in the charging docume nt ). Thus, th e circuit cour t did not abu se its discretio n in am ending the date stated in the indic tment. Nor does the amendment changing the location of the conduct c harged fro m one ad dress to ano ther within Baltimore City change the c haracter of the offen se charged. In Makins v. State, 6 Md. App. 466, 470, 252 A.2d 15, 17 (1969), we held that the trial court did not err in permitting the State to amend an indictment to reflect the correct address at which the alleged daytime housebreaking occurred. We explained: The incident as drawn clearly charged the appellant with the crime of daytime housebreaking with intent to steal the personal goods of another. Each of the elements of that crime was alleged, without regard to the particular apartment number specified, and none of the essential elements of the offense were changed by the amendment. Id. (Internal citation omitted). The same reasoning applies here. The indictment set forth the elements of the offense charged without regard to the particular house address, and therefore, none of the essential elements of the offense were changed by the am endm ent of th e addre ss. Thomp son v. State , 181 Md. App. at 98-100, 955 A.2d at 817. We agree with that analysis. 20 In Makins, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon Corbin v . State, 237 M d. 486, 206A.2d 809 (1965), in which this Court stated: As to w hat constitute s substance and wh at is merely form al in an indictment, it may be said that all facts which must be proved to make the act complained of a crime are matters of substance, and that all else -- including the order of arrangement and precise words, unless they alone will convey the proper m eaning -- is fo rmal. Id. at 489- 90, 206 A.2d a t 811. An amendment that constitutes merely a matter of form does n ot chan ge the c haracte r of the o ffense . Johnson v. State, 358 Md. 384, 388, 749 A.2d 769, 771 (2000 ). In State v. Mulkey, 316 Md. 475, 560 A.2d 24 (1989), while holding that the exact date of the offense is not an essential element, and is not constitutionally required to be set forth [in an indictment,] this Co urt cited with approval sev eral decisions of the Co urt of Special Appeals that support the notion that the time of an offense stated in an indictment need not be precise. Id. at 482, 5 60 A.2 d at 27. In Busch v. S tate, 289 M d. 669, 426 A.2d 95 4 (1981), w hile holding that the State should not have b een permitted to substitute the w ords resist arrest by a police officer for resist and hinder a police officer, this Court stated: Because the charging document as amended contained a specific reference to an arrest, it charged the offense of resisting arrest. The amendment here substituted the offense of resisting arrest for the originally charged offense of resisting, obstructing , or hindering an office r in the perfo rmance o f his 21 duties. The charge as amended required proof of an arrest while the original charge did not. Thus, the basic description of the offense charged was changed. Because the amendment changed the character of the offense originally charged, it was not a matter of form. The petitioner did not consent to the amendment, and it is, therefore, impermissible. Id. at 679, 4 26 A.2 d at 959 . In Johnson, supra, while holding that the State should not have been permitted to substitute cocaine for marijuana in a criminal information charging violations of the M aryland Controlled Dan gerous Substance s Act, this Court stated: [A]s in Thanos [v. State, 282 Md. 709 , 387 A.2d 296 (1978)] and in Brown [v. State, 285 Md. 105 , 400 A.2d 113 3 (1979)], the descriptio n of the sp ecific act alleg ed was sig nificantly changed by the amendment. The information initially accused the defendant of possessing marijuana, whereas the amended information charged an entirely different act, possessing crack cocaine. It follows that, under Thanos and Brown, the amendment did change the character of the offense charged. 358 Md. at 390, 749 A.2d at 772. In the case at bar, however, the amendments did not substitu te a diff erent of fense f or any of the off enses c harged in the ind ictmen t. Althou gh Peti tioner d id not fil e a dem and fo r a bill of particul ars, 7 the record 7 Since October 1, 2002, CL §3-317(b) has provided that, [i]n a case in which the general form of [charging document] described in subsection (a) of this section is used, the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegations against the defendant. From July 1, 1977 to October 1, 2002, Article 27, § 461B(b) provided that a defendant who is charged with rape or a sexual offense is entitled to a bill of particulars specifically setting forth the allegation against him. 22 shows that he received a copy of the Application for Statement of Charges when he was arrested. The record also shows that, prior to trial, Petitioner s trial counsel was provided with a copy of the victim s statement to Detective Wortz. Because the discovery provided by the State made it clear that the 1986 incident occurred in November of that year at the Goodnow Road address, Petitioner is not entitled to a new trial on the ground that he w as unf airly prejud iced by th e amen dmen ts at issue . JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; PETITIONER TO PAY THE CO STS. 23 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 126 September Term, 2008 KARL LYMONT THOMPSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Eldridge, Jo hn C. (Re tired, Specially Assigned) JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Greene, J., which Bell, C.J., and Eldridge, J., Join. Filed: February 17, 2010 I respectfully dissent. Although I agree with the majority s conclusion that the amendm ent of the c harges did not change the character of the offenses charged, I disagree with the majority s conclusion that the evidence of Thompson s uncharged juvenile conduct was properly adm itted into evide nce during his criminal p rosecu tion for other cr imes. I would hold that ev idence, of s uch acts, is not admissible to the extent that evidence of adjudicated acts committed by a juvenile is not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings under the Juvenile Causes Act, Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-8A-01 et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. I. Karl Thompson, the petitioner, was charged in the Circuit C ourt for B altimore C ity with multiple sexual offenses allegedly committed against Kassandra Timm between the years 1983 an d 1986. A t Thomp son s trial, ove r defense c ounsel s ob jection, the court permitted the prosecutor to present evidence of uncharged sexual offenses that Thompson allegedly committed against Ms. Timm in the summer of 1978, when Ms. Timm was age five and Thompson was age 14. The Circuit Court reasoned that evidence of the 1978 incident was admissible u nder M d. Rule 5-4 04(b) to pro ve motive , opportun ity, intent, or common scheme. Ms. Timm testified that Thomp son sexua lly abused her a t her grandp arents hom e in 1978. Sh e stated, in pertin ent part: I woke u p to [Tho mpson] to uching m e betwee n my legs w ith his hands and with his penis. It hurt. I started to w himper a little b it and I said to him that I need to go to the bathroom. I didn t need to go to the bathroo m. I just wan ted to remo ve myself from the room. I went into the bathroom and . . . sat on the to ilet. I remember . . . my feet didn t touch the floor. And I left the bathroom, I went into my aunt s room . . . a different bedroom and I just laid on her floor. And then he came into the room afte r and aske d wh y I didn t come back. I didn t answ er and h e climb ed into m y aunt s b ed . . . . Ms. Timm a lso testified ab out four inc idents that occurred after 1978. Regarding an incident that occurred in 1983, she testified: My mother a nd I d rove to M aryland . . . to visit. The whole family was there, I remember a very full house . . . we slept in [Thompson s] room . . . . And there were a lot of other people in the ro om . . . . Everyone was going to sleep and [Thompson] kept saying my mother s name, Linda, are you asleep? . . . And when she stopped answer[ ing] he cam e and he, h e touched me with h is hands between my legs. He molested me . . . . I mean he was touching me in my vagina with his hands. H e was inse rting his fingers between my legs. Ms. Timm testified that, in 1986, during her Thanksgiving school break, she visited Thompson at his apartment in Baltimore. Ms. Timm stated that before Thompson left for work one da y, Thompson told her that she could sleep in his bed with his girlfriend, Stephanie Perry. Ms. Timm sta ted that she a woke th at night to find [Thom pson s] pe nis inside o f [her] . On July 11, 2006 , the jury rendere d several gu ilty verdicts. With respect t o the incident occurring in 1983, the jury found Thompson guilty of third-degree and fourth-degree sex offenses; the jury also found the petitioner guilty of second-degree rape, third-degree and 2 fourth-degree sexual offenses, as well as second-degree assault, for the incident in 1986. The court sentenced Thompson to 20 years incarceration. Thompson appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the judgments entered below . Thomp son v. State , 181 Md. A pp. 74, 955 A.2d 802 (2008). The intermediate appellate court held that the 1978 incident was admissible into evidence pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-404(b). In so holding, the Court of Special Appeals rejected Thompson s argument that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle applies to unadjudic ated acts. Th e intermed iate appellate c ourt noted th at interpreting § 3-8A-23 to bar the admissibility of u nadjudica ted condu ct in subseq uent crimin al proceed ings conf licts with the basic ca nnon of statutory constru ction that a c ourt may neith er add no r delete langua ge of a statute . Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 86-87, 955 A.2d at 810 (quoting Price v. State, 378 Md. 378 , 387, 835 A.2d 1 221 (2003)). II. In Maryland, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts committed by a defendant is generally not admissible in criminal proceedings. Title 5 of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, Rule 5-40 4(b) thus pr ovides: Evidence of other crim es, wrong s, or acts is not a dmissible to prove the charac ter of a perso n in order to show ac tion in conform ity therew ith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as pro of of mo tive, opportu nity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence o f mistake o r accident. 3 The General Assem bly has deemed certain acts to b e exempt from Rule 5-404(b) s purview altogether. Under the Juvenile Causes Act, §§ 3-8A-01 et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, prior adjudications or dispositions of juveniles, as well as any evidence introduced therein, may not generally be admitted into evidence in subsequent criminal pro ceedings. T he applicab le provision reads, in pertin ent part: § 3-8A-23. Effect of proceedings under subtitle. (b) Adjudication and disposition not admissible as evidence. An adjudication and disposition of a c hild pursua nt to this subtitle are not admissible as evidence against the child: (1) In any criminal proceeding prior to conviction; or (2) In any adjudicatory hearing on a petition alleging delinquency; or (3) In any civil proceeding not conducted under this subtitle. (c) Evidence given in proceeding under this subtitle inadmissib le in criminal proceeding. Evidence given in a proceeding under this su btitle is not admiss ible against th e child in any other proceeding in another court, except in a criminal proceeding where the child is charged with perjury and the evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise admissible. Section 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article is one part of a comprehensive Juvenile C auses Ac t, an act that estab lishes a sep arate system of courts, procedure and method of treatment for juveniles. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). We have explained that "[t]he raison d'etre of the Juvenile Causes Act is that a child do es not com mit a crime when he commits a delinquent act and therefore is not a criminal. In re Darryl D., 308 Md. 475, 481, 520 A.2d 712, 715 (1987) (quoting Matter 4 of Davis, 17 Md . App. 98, 1 04, 299 A .2d 856, 86 0 (1973)); see also Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 673-74, 814 A.2d 557, 563 (2003) ( [T]he keystone of Maryland's disposition of juvenile delinquents is that the moral responsibility or blameworthiness of the child [is] of no consequence, such that delinquen cy adjudication is seen as the o pportunity for th e State to provide needed rehabilitative intervention. (quoting Victor B., 336 Md. at 91-92, 646 A.2d at 1015)). Accordingly, [j]uvenile proceedings are governed by a separate, pervasive scheme of specific statutes and rules developed by the Maryland General Assembly and the Court of Appeals. Victor B., 336 Md. at 96, 646 A.2d at 1017. Section 3-8A-02 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article lists the purposes of the relevant subtitle of the Juvenile Causes Act. Those purposes are: (1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts:[1] (i) Pu blic s afet y and the p rotection of th e com mun ity; (ii) Accountability of the child to the victim and the community for offenses committed; and (iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive mem bers of so ciety; (2) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent responsible for the child s behavior and accountable to the victi m an d the com mun ity; 1 The Juvenile Causes Act defines a delinquent act as an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult ; a delinquent child as a child who has committed a delinquent act and requires guidance, treatment, or rehabilitation ; and a child as an individual under the age of 18 years. § 3-8A-01(l),(m),(d) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 5 (3) To hold parents of children found to be delinquent or in need of supervision responsible, where possible, for remedying the circumstances that required the court's intervention; (4) To provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; a nd to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation c onsistent w ith the c hild's best interests an d the protec tion of the p ublic interest; (5) To conserve and strengthen th e child's fam ily ties and to separate a child from his p arents only w hen nece ssary for his welfare or in the in teres t of p ublic saf ety; (6) If necessary to remove a child from his home, to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents; (7) T o pro vide to ch ildre n in S tate c are a nd custo dy: (i) A safe, humane, and caring environment; and (ii) Access to required services; and (8) To provide judicial procedures for carrying out the provisions of this subtitle. § 3-8A-02 (a) of the C ourts & Ju dicial Proce edings A rticle. This section also states that th is subtitle, of which § 3-8A-2 3 is a part, sha ll be liberally constru ed to effe ctuate these purpo ses. § 3-8A-02(b) of the Courts & Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle; see also In re Leslie M., 305 Md. 477, 482, 505 A.2d 504, 507 (1986) (rejecting a restrictive reading of former Maryland Rule 916 du e to th e lib eral s tatut ory co nstru ction req uired by the Juvenile Causes Act). 6 In the case sub judice, Thompson contends that the Circuit Court erred in admitting into eviden ce testim ony con cerning the unc harged 1978 in cident, which occurred when Thompson was 14 years o ld. Accord ing to Tho mpson, M d. Rule 5-4 04(b) mu st be read in light of the polic y underlying the Ju venile Ca uses Act, and that, under such a construction, evidence of unadjudicated juvenile acts is not admissible in subsequent criminal proceedings as a matter of law. The State argues to the contra ry, maintaining th at the Circu it Court acted within its discretion in admitting into evidence the acts committed by Thompson when he was a juvenile. The majority concludes that § 3-8A-23 does not apply to testimony presented by the State in the prosecution of Thompson for criminal offenses because the evidence was admissible under Md. Rule 5-404(b) and had never been given in a juvenile proceeding. I disagree with that holding p rimarily becaus e of the statu tory mandate that § 3-8A-23 should be co nstru ed lib erall y. First, the determination of whether there exists an exception to Md. R ule 5-404 (b) is a matter of law not within the trial judg e s discr etion. Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898. Similarly, the determination of whether an act is exem pt from the purview of Rule 5-404(b) is a question s of law a nd not a matter o f discre tion. See Figgins v. Cochrane, 403 Md. 392, 792 A.2d 736 (2008) (explaining that we review the determination of whether evidence must be excluded as a matter of law) (quoting Hall v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67 , 82-83, 919 A.2d 1177, 1186 (20 07)). 7 Because the determination that the existence of an exemption to Md. Rule 5-404(b) is a legal determination, we should consider whether the trial judge erred in admitting in to evidence testimo ny abou t the alleg ed sexu al assau lt by Thom pson in 1978. As explained, Thompson argues that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts and Proceedings Article provides the applicable evidentiary exe mption. W e should th erefore inte rpret the lang uage of th at statute to determ ine wh ether it d oes, in fact, apply to the testimony at issue in this case. In considering the Juven ile Causes A ct, we con strue this statuto ry language lib erally to effectuate the purposes of the Act. § 3-8A-02(b) of the Courts and Proceedings Article. With that requirement in mind, our goal is to identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue. Serio v. Baltimo re Coun ty, 384 Md. 373, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004) (quoting Drew v. First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003)). T he statute s pla in languag e is the best so urce of leg islative intent, and that language guides ou r understan ding of this intent, but we do not read the plain language of a statute in a vacu um. Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962 (citing Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Derry v. S tate, 358 Md. 325, 336, 748 A.2 d 478, 48 3-84 (200 0)). We sh ould instead read the statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. Serio, 384 Md. at 373, 863 A.2d at 962 (quoting Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; citing Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 369 Md. 335, 350, 800 A .2d 707, 715 (200 2); In re Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001)). As we have stated, 8 when we pursu e the contex t of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed . . . . We may and often must consider other external manifestations or persuasive evidence, including a bill s title and function paragraphs . . . and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language befo re us in a given case. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 116, 753 A.2d 41, 49 (2000) (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987)). With these rules gu iding my a nalysis, I in terpret th e statute a t han d dif fere ntly than the majority. In my view , if Thom pson s juv enile cond uct had be en adjudic ated in a juvenile proceeding, § 3-8A-2 3 of the Ju venile Causes Act would have precluded admission of the adjudication into evidence, as well as any evidence given in the juvenile proceeding from admission in the criminal proceedings below. Indeed, it is clear that the Legislature intended for juvenile adjudications of delinquent acts to be wholly separate from the criminal justice system. § 3-8A-23(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article ( An adjudication of a child pursuant to this subtitle is not a criminal conviction for any purpose and does not impose any of the civ il disabilities ordin arily imposed b y a criminal con viction. ); see also Md. Code C.J. § 3-8A-01 (l) (defining a delinquen t act as an act th at would be a crime if committed by an adult ); In re Alexander, 16 Md. App. 416, 420, 297 A.2d 301, 303 (1972) ( We ho ld that it was th e plain legislative inten t that a finding of delinquen cy in a juvenile court sh ould no t be equ ated in a ny way w ith a con viction f or crim e. ). 9 The fact that § 3-8A-23 of the Juvenile Causes Act uses the terms adjudicate and dispo sition, however, does not mean that unadjudicated conduct is excluded from the prohibition s purview. Construing § 3-8A-23 to apply only to juvenile adjudications is inconsisten t with the leg islative purpo se or goal underl ying the Ju venile C auses A ct, see Williams, 359 Md. at 116, 753 A.2d at 49, and it contradicts the basic cannon of statu tory interpretation that a court should avoid a construction of [a] statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense, Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 573, 911 A.2d 427, 432 (2006 ) (quoting Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006)). For a juvenile to be found involved and adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding the State must prov e, beyond a re asonable d oubt, the conduct giving rise to the juvenile act. Md. Code (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 3-8A-18(c) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. Under Rule 5-404(b), however, the State is only required to prove the conduct classified as a crime, wrong, or bad act by a lesser standard, clear and convincing evidence. Faulkner, 314 M d. at 634 , 552 A .2d at 89 8. Consid ering the lower standard of proof under 5-404(b), it would be unreasonable to construe the Juvenile Causes Act as merely precluding the admission of adjudicated juvenile conduct in a subsequent criminal proceeding. Under such a construction , the State cou ld decline to have a juvenile s conduct adjudicated before the juvenile reached age 18, but then introduce that same conduct in a criminal proceedin g after the juv enile has turn ed age 18 or older. Th e State wo uld then on ly need to prove the juvenile conduct by clear and convincing evidence, a lesser standard than 10 the Legislature has expre ssly require d for es tablishin g a juve nile delin quent a ct. See § 3-8A18(c)(i) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings A rticle (adopting the standard of reason able doubt to prove that a juvenile committed a delinquent act); In re Wins hip, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1075, 25 L. Ed.2d 368 (1970) (acknow ledging that reasonable doubt is a constitutional safeguard applicable to the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proce eding). This interpretation of § 3-8A-23 is untenable. Such an interpretation would allow the State to use Rule 5-404(b) as a way of keeping juveniles out of the juvenile justice system, thereby allowing th e State to defeat the Legislature s intent in creating a separate system for the adjudication of juveniles. The explicit purposes underlying the Juvenile Causes Act include rehabilitating a nd protectin g juveniles, developing juveniles competency and character, holding parents accountable, and strengthening family ties. § 3-8A-02(a) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. We, therefore, should liberally construe the provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act, including § 3-8A -23, to e ffectu ate these purpo ses. § 3-8A-02(b) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. The juvenile justice system cannot achieve any of these purposes if the State diverts juveniles from that system when they commit delin quent ac ts. A ccor ding ly, we shou ld construe § 3-8A-23 in a way that ensures that the State w ill direct juveniles to the juven ile justice system when appropriate. By construing the statute to make in admissible, in a criminal court, evidence of unadjudicated delinquent acts to the same extent as adjudicated delinquent acts, we would ensure that the State cannot bring these acts to the attention of a criminal court when the appropriate venue 11 was the juvenile justice system. Any other interpretation would permit a subversion of the juvenile justices s ystem an d thereb y eviscera te the Ju venile C auses A ct. Second, the majority s and the State s interpretation of § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article contradicts another basic cannon of statutory interpretation: that [w]hen construing a provision th at is part of a sin gle statutory scheme, the legislative intent must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part. Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405, 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988). Each provision of the Juvenile Causes Act therefore must be h armonize d both w ith its immediate context and with the larger context of the entire Juvenile Causes Act. Jones, 311 Md. at 40 5, 535 A .2d at 475 (1 988). With the Juvenile Causes Act, the Le gislature set fo rth a statutory sche me that dicta tes that juvenile acts should be consid ered by particu lar courts. Fo r example , the Legisla ture has decided that the Juvenile Court lacks original jurisdiction in some circumstances. § 3-8A03(d) of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article. In addition, the Legislature has identified certain circumstances wh ere the Juvenile Court may waive jurisdiction in favor of a criminal court. § 3-8A-06 of the Courts & Ju dicial Proceedings A rticle. The Legislature has also created a procedure by which a criminal co urt may transfe r some cas es to the Juven ile Court, after considerin g a variety of sp ecified fac tors. § 3-8A -03(d)(1),(4) ,(5) of the C ourts & Judicial Proceed ings Article; see also Md. Code (1974, 2008 Repl. Vol.), § 4-202 of the Criminal Procedures Article (prov iding facto rs the crimina l court mus t consider in transferring cases to the Juvenile Court). These provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act set 12 forth the limited circumstances w here juvenile conduc t may come before a criminal cou rt, and we should construe § 3-8A-23 to prohibit the State from creating an additional method for doing so. Indeed, we hav e previous ly said that the lower courts must adhere to the waiver and jurisdiction provisions of the Juvenile Causes Act in regard to delinquent acts committed by individuals who ha ve subseq uently reached adulthood. In In re Appeals No. 1022 & No. 1081, 278 Md. 174, 176, 359 A.2d 556, 558 (1976), the Juvenile Court had determined that waiver was not w arranted in regard to a case involving an adult who had committed a delinquent act wh ile still a juv enile. The court then dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the adult, pursuant to the statute that is now codified as § 3-8A-07(e) of the Courts and Proceedings Act. Id. On app eal, we agree d with the J uvenile Court and rejected the S tate s argument that waiver was mandatory in such a case. In re App eals, 278 Md. 174, 178-79, 359 A.2d 5 56, 559 -60. W e held instead that a waiver hearing must be conducted before a criminal court may consider a delinquent act, even if the person who committed the act subseque ntly reache d adulth ood. In re App eals, 278 Md. at 178-79, 359 A.2d at 559-60. In other words, absent a waiver hearing and determination that jurisdiction over an adult who allegedly committed a delinquent act as a juve nile should be waived, a criminal court cannot consider the alleged delinquent act. Relying on In re App eals, recently the Court of Special Appea ls reached the same conclusion in a similar case. In re Saifu K., ___ Md. ___ (2009) (No. 2196, September Term, 2007) (filed August 27, 2009) (rejecting the State s argument 13 that the Juvenile Court was required to waive its jurisdiction when the defendant had allegedly committed a delinquent act at age 14, but a petition was not served on him until he had reached age 21). In the case sub judice, I would sim ilarly construe § 3-8A -23 to ensure that criminal courts do not consider delinquent acts absent adherence to the waiver and jurisdiction pro cedures o f the Juven ile Causes A ct. Third, we should liberally construe § 3-8A-2 3 of the C ourts & Judicial Proceedings Article reasonably with reference to its purpose, aim, [and] policy. In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992). As the foregoing makes clear, the General Assembly s aim, in enac ting the Juvenile Causes Act, was for juvenile acts, in most instances, to be wholly separate from the criminal justice system . Moreo ver, the we llestablished purpose underlying the Juvenile Causes Act is to rehabilitate juvenile offenders. See, e,g., In re Julianna B., 179 Md. App. 512, 574, 947 A.2d 126-27 (2008) ( [The appellate courts] hav e repeated ly noted that the L egislature intended the juvenile justice system to be guided generally by principles of protection and rehabilitation of the individual rather than a societal goal of retribution and punishment. ) (quoting Smith v. Sta te, 399 Md. 565, 580, 924 A.2d 1175 (2007)), vacated on other grounds, 407 Md. 657, 967 A.2d 776 (2009); Lopez-Sa nchez v. Sta te, 155 Md. App. 580, 598, 843 A.2d 915 (2004) ( The General Assemb ly enacted the Juvenile Causes Act . . . to advance its purpose of rehabilitating the juveniles who have transgressed . . . . ). That § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article effectively prevents a prosecutor from using a juvenile s adjudicated 14 delinquent acts against him in a later criminal proceeding is indeed evident of the General Assembly s broad policy of distinguishing be tween juvenile transgressions and th ose acts that should be brought before the criminal justice system. From the exclusio n of charg ed juvenile conduct in subsequent criminal proceedings pursuant to § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, it necessarily follows that the Legisla ture intende d to grant the same pro tections to uncharged juvenile co nduct. It is plainly inconsis tent with the under lying policy and o verall schem e of the Juv enile Causes Act to admit as evidence , in a criminal case, the unadjudicated delinquent acts of a juvenile when those same acts, if determined by the Juvenile C ourt to have been delin quent, would not have been admitted as evidence in a criminal case. Accordingly, there is no sound justification for distinguishing between the unadjudicated delinquent acts of a juvenile offender and the adjudicated delinquent acts of a juvenile offender for purposes of the admissibility of evidence in a criminal case. Both acts are not a dmissible into evidence in a criminal case. Therefore, I would hold that, under Maryland law, juvenile acts are not legislatively deemed to be crimes, wrongs, or acts within the meaning of Rule 5-404(b), because the Gene ral Assem bly has determ ined that the a cts are irrelevant in a criminal prosecution. In holding that evidence of unadjudicated juvenile co nduct is inad missible in subsequent criminal proceedings to the extent that adjudicated conduct is precluded pursuant to § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, such a holding would be 15 consistent with the concerns expressed by the court in State v. Dixon, 656 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983). In Dixon, the Criminal Court of App eals of Tennessee rejected the prosecution s argument that bad acts of a juvenile were distinguishable from juven ile adjudications. Dixon, 656 S.W .2d at 52. A lthough the court found that the admission of juvenile acts was harmless error, it noted that allowing the juvenile bad acts into evidence would enable the S tate to circumvent Federal Rule of Evide nce 609(d). 2 Dixon, 656 S.W.2d at 52. Like § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) limits the admissibility of juvenile adjudications as evidence in subsequent proceedings. I agree that allowing evidence of uncharg ed juvenile conduct would open the door for some p rosecutors to elude the ju venile cou rt system by choo sing to not charge juvenile acts in order to admit evidence of the acts in a later criminal court proce eding. Th is would enable some prosecutors to bypass the clear prohibition against the admission of juvenile adjudication s and dispo sitions in subs equent criminal proceedings, as well as the clear prohibition against the admission of evidence given in juvenile proceedings, contained 2 Tennessee adopted Federal Rule of Evidence 609(d) in State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Tenn. 1981). That Rule provides: Juvenile adjucations. Evidence of juvenile adjucations is generally not admissible under this rule. The court may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence. 16 in § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article and would undermine the State s policy of protecting juveniles. The State is correct in pointing out that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article does not expressly mention unadjudic ated juven ile acts; how ever, both the State and the majority place less significance on the purpose of the Juvenile Causes Act and § 3-8A-2 3 s functio n within it. Th e Juvenile C auses Ac t created M aryland s juven ile court system and process for dealing with ju venile o ffend ers. Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md. App. at 600, 843 A.2d at 927 ( The separate system of courts created by the Juvenile Causes Act to address the problems of juvenile offenders are governed by their own procedures, as set forth in CJ se ction 3- 8A-0 1, et seq. ). Section 3-8A-23 is a subsection w ithin the Juve nile Causes Act entitled Effect of proceedings und er subtitle that specifically addresses the effect of juvenile adjudications and proceedings3 arising under the Juvenile C auses A ct. 3 The term proceeding is undefined in the Juvenile Causes Act. We recently explained: Black's Law Dictionary defines a proceeding as: 1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. . . . BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY[]1241 [(8th ed. 2004)]; see also WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 902 (3d ed. 2005) (providing the legal definition of proceeding as [l]itigation or [t]he act of instituting or conducting litigation ); EDWIN E. BRYANT, THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3 (1894) ( Proceeding is a word much used to (continued...) 17 That § 3-8A-23 does not explicitly reference unadjudicated juvenile conduct does not change the clear legislative policy of prote cting or insu lating juven iles from the criminal justice system unless or until waived from the juvenile processes. Moreover, this Court s focus should not be only on the language of the statute bu t on the und erlying legislative in tent to separate juveniles and juvenile acts from the criminal justice system. After ho lding that the 1 978 incide nt was pro perly admitted in to evidenc e and that § 3-8A-23 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article did not inclu de unadju dicated juv enile acts, the intermediate appellate court noted that it declin e[d] to c onstrue . . . § 3-8A-23 so that it prohibits the introduction of the very evidence that the Court of Appeals has declared to be of special relevance in a sex crime involving the same perpetrator, victim, and criminal condu ct. Thompson, 181 Md. App. at 87, 955 A.2d at 810. The majority adop ts this position. I do not find that concern compelling or consistent with the underlying policy of the Juvenile C auses Ac t. Maryland c ourts recognize a special sexual propensity exception to Rule 5-404(b). Adopted by this Court in Vogel v. Sta te, 315 Md. 458, 554 A.2d 1231 (1989), the sexual propensity ex ception allow s prosecuto rs in sex crim e cases to admit into 3 (...continued) express the business done in courts. ). Kramer v. Liberty Property, 408 Md. 1, 21, 968 A.2d 120, 132 (2009). As I construe the scope of the term proceeding within the meaning of the Juvenile Causes Act, my focus is upon acts that were adjudicated in the context of juvenile proceedings, as well as acts that could have been adjudicated if juvenile proceedings had been initiated. 18 evidence prior illicit sexua l acts [whic h] are similar to the offen se for wh ich the accu sed is being tried and involve the same victim. Vogel, 315 Md. at 466 , 554 A.2d at 123 4. In Acuna v. State, 332 M d. 65, 629 A.2d 1233 (1993), this Court elaborated on the sexual propensity ex ception statin g that: The primary policy consideration unde rlying the rule against other crime s evidence is that this type of eviden ce will prejudice the jury against the accused beca use of the jury s tendency to infer that the accused is a bad man who should be punished regardless of his guilt of the charged crime, or to infer that he comm itted the charged crime due to a criminal dispos ition. Yet, in th e area o f sex cr imes, particularly child molestation, courts have been likely to admit proof of prior acts to show a party s conformity with past conduct. Professor McLa in suggests tha t this relaxation of the general prohibition is probably because the character evidence is believed to have greater probat ive valu e in thos e circum stances . In sex crimes cases the special relevance of the other crimes evidence that may be admissible is a criminal propensity particularized to similar sex crimes perpetrated on the same victim. Thus, in a sex offense prosecution, when the State offers evidence of prior sexual criminal acts of the same type by the accused against the same victim, the law of evidence already has concluded that, in general, the probative value, as substantive evidence that the defendant committed the crime charged, outweighs the inheren t prejudicial effect. The discretion exercised by the trial judge in weighing unfair prejudice against probative value is con cerned w ith special fea tures in the particular case. Acuna, 332 Md. at 75, 629 A.2d a t 123 8 (citatio ns om itted ). Th e se xual propensity exception is based on the notion that evidence of prior sexual misconduct against the same 19 victim has a special probative value, it is asserted, sufficient enough th at it generally outweighs the inherent bad actor prejudice of other crimes evidence. As discussed above, the State of Maryland s policy of protecting or insulating juveniles from the criminal justice system absent a waiver is evident from the J uvenile Causes Act. In light of that policy, juvenile acts are not legislatively deemed crimes, wrongs, or acts w ithin the mea ning of R ule 5-404 (b) and are therefore n ot relevant in subsequent criminal pro ceedings. B ecause I w ould hold that juv enile acts are not within the purview of Rule 5-404(b), I w ould conc lude that the sexual pro pensity exce ption to Ru le 5-404(b) does not justify the admissibility of evidence of juvenile acts in subsequent criminal proceedings. In other words, a juvenile act does not constitute a criminal act within the meaning of the sexual propensity exception. III. The Circuit Court s admission into evidenc e testimony with regard to Th ompson s juvenile act w as not harm less error. An error is deem ed harmle ss when a reviewin g court, upon an independent review of the record, can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in no wa y influenced the verdict. Dorsey v . State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). In the instant case, the State presented the 19 78 incident to the court as the first of five instances of sexual miscon duct be tween Thom pson a nd M s. Timm . The jury convicted Thompson on charges arising from two of th e five incidents. Specifically, the jury heard evidence that Thompson was a sexual predator when he was 14 years old. In addition, the 20 jury heard that Thompson demonstrated that same deviant be havior tow ard the sam e victim when Thomp son beca me an ad ult. It is highly unlikely that the jury separated Thomp son s alleged juvenile acts fro m his cr iminal a cts. Thus, I do not believe that this Court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of eviden ce that Tho mpson s exually assaulted Ms. Timm when Thompson was a juvenile in no way influenced the jury s verdict. Therefore, the Court s hould rev erse the judg ment of th e Court of Special Appeals and remand th e case for p urposes o f a new tria l. Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge authorize me to state that they join in this dissenting opinion. 21

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