Attorney Grievance v. Kimmel and Silverman
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Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Robert Silverm an and Craig Kimm el, Misc. Docket AG No. 20 and 21, September Term, 2007. ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE - MAR YLAND RULE S OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (MRPC) 5.1 (RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTNERS, MANAGERS, AND SUPERVISING LAWYERS) and 1.4 (CO MMU NICAT ION) - INDEFINITE SUSPENSION, WITH RIGHT TO APPLY FOR REINSTATEM ENT NO SO ONER TH AN 90 DAYS, IS APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR FOUNDING PARTNERS OF PENNSYLVANIA-BASED LAW FIRM WHO, IN ESTABLISHING AN OFFICE IN MA RYLA ND TO EXTE ND TH EIR AUTOMOBILE WARRANTY AND LEMON LAW PRACTICE, HIRED A RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED MA RYLAND ATT ORNEY AS THE SOLE STAFF MEMBER OF THE NEW OFFICE AND THEN FAILED TO SUPERVISE HER ADEQUATELY, RESULTING IN THE DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF THE CASES OF 47 O F THE F IRM S MARYLAND CLIENTS, AND FAILED TO COMMUNICATE IN A TIMELY FASHION WITH ONE CLIENT AFTER THE ASSOCIATE RESIGNED. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 20 September Term, 2007 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. CRAIG KIMMEL Misc. Docket AG No. 21 September Term, 2007 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ROBERT SILVERMAN Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Eldridge, John C. (Retired, specially assigned) Raker, Irma S. (Retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Battaglia and Eldridge, JJ., Dissent Filed: September 2, 2008 These attorney disciplinary actions examine alleged shortfalls by partners in a law firm in supervisio n of a relative ly-inexperienced associate and client communication that followed the establishment by their out-of-state law f irm of a beachhead office in Maryland. To extend its au tomobile warranty and lemon law civil p ractice into the Maryland m arket, Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. ( K& S ) hired a you ng Ma ryland attorney to open a branch of the Pennsylvania-based firm in Owings Mills, Maryland. When matters ultim ately went to Hades in a han dbasket with the assoc iate s handling of the firm s practice in the Maryland office, the Attorney Grievance Commission of M aryland (the C ommissio n ) asserted its disciplinary authority over K&S's founding partners Robert Silverman and Craig Kimmel ( Responden ts ),1 pursuant to Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 8.5 (a)(2)(i) and (iii).2 Respo ndents conce de the C omm ission s author ity to act in th e matte r. Through Bar Counsel, the Commission charged Respondents with failure to supervise 1 Neither Silverman nor Kimmel is admitted to the practice of law in Maryland. 2 MRP C Rule 8 .5 (Disciplina ry Authority) prov ides, in relevan t part: (a) (2) A lawyer not admitted to practice in this State is also subject to the disciplinary authority of this State if the lawyer (i) provides or offers to provide any legal services in this State, or . . . (iii) has an obligation to supervise or control another lawyer practicing law in this State whose conduct constitutes a violation of these Rules. Unless otherwise provided, all Rule references in this opinio n are to the Maryland Rules of Profes sional Conduct (M RPC) (200 7, 2008 Repl. V ol.). adequate ly the M arylan d ass ocia te em ploye d by the firm , in violation of MRPC 5.1. 3 The Commission also charged Respondents, in the aftermath of the associate s hasty resignation, with failure to properly communicate with a Maryland client of the firm, in violation of MRPC 1.4. 4 The matters w ere assigne d by this Cou rt to Judge K athleen Gallogly Cox of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County for an evidentiary hearing on the charges and rendition 3 MRPC 5.1 (Responsibility of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers) provides: (a) A partner in a law firm , and a law yer w ho in dividually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm , shall make rea sonable ef forts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Maryland Lawyers Rules o f Prof essiona l Cond uct. (b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Profession al Condu ct. 4 MRPC 1 .4 (Communication) provides: (a) A law yer shall: (1) promptly info rm the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the exten t reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regard ing the r eprese ntation. of findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law. The hearing was conducted on 21 and 25 Febru ary 2008 . Judge Cox f iled her w ritten op inion o n 26 M arch 20 08. I. Overview Respon dents founded Kimmel & Silverm an, P.C., in A mbler, Pen nsylvania in 1991. The firm s prac tice focuse s almost ex clusively on the prosecutio n of mo tor vehicle w arranty and lemon law civil claims. Both founders were admitted to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1989, and later admitted to the New York B ar. In addition , Silverman was adm itted to practice in New Jersey and Kimm el in Mass achusetts. A s noted earlie r, neither is adm itted to the practice of law in Ma ryland. On the day of the initial employment interview in June 2004, K&S hired Maryland attorney Robin Katz to establish a Maryland office for the firm. She became the sole K&S employee in the Maryland office and remained so for 12-and-one-half months of her 13month tenure w ith the fir m. Katz s first purported supervisor was Robert Rapkin, a managing attorney in the K&S home office in Ambler, Pennsylvania.5 Katz spe nt her first mo nth of em ployment in orientation in the Am bler office. S he was ta ught the firm s method for preparing and evaluating cases, introduced to the firm s computerized case management system, and assisted in modifying the firm s basic pleading s forms fo r use in M aryland. Later, in response to what became a growin g backlo g in the Maryland office n ear the end of K atz s 5 Rapkin was not admitted to practice law in Maryland. time with th e firm, Kimm el assume d direct sup ervisory respon sibility over her, bu t to little avail, as we shall explain. During the latter half of her time with K&S, Katz failed to respond to motions compelling discovery in 47 cases filed by her on behalf of K&S s Maryland clients. As a result, those cases were dism issed with prejudice. Sh e resigned a bruptly from th e firm in August 2005. She consented to disbarment in Maryland as the sanction fo r her misco nduct. II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law In her written opinion, Judge Cox made the following factual findings, based on a clear and convincing evidentiary standard: From the ince ption o f the firm , K&S handled case s in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Some time after 2000, K&S expanded into other jurisd ictions, to include New York and Mass achuse tts. K&S handles Lemon Law cases as a high volume practice. The applicable fee shifting statutes provide an incentive to automotive manufacturers to settle, as does the desire to promote customer satisfaction. In the experience of both Kimmel and Silverman, approximately 99% of their cases settle, if handled properly. K&S is organized in various teams that are supervise d by one of the partners or a s enio r atto rney. The firm relies extensively on paralegals and its own mechanical experts to man age hig h volum e attorne y caseloa ds. In 2004, K&S decided to expand into Maryland. Although Kimmel and Silverman considered associating with a Maryland practitioner with experience in the Lemon Law field, they were unable to find a suitable candidate. Therefore they decided to hire and train an attorney to start up their Maryland practice . Robin Katz responded to a web s ite job posting by K&S. After forwarding her resume and a cover letter, she received a call from K&S and was scheduled for an interview with Robert Rapkin. Rapkin b egan w ith the firm in approximately 2001. He manages his own caseload and has supe rvisory respon sibility over one of the "teams" of lawyers, paralega ls, and other support staff within the firm. Katz was first a dmitted to pra ctice in M aryland in December 1996. From 1996 through 2003, Katz handled social security disability cases for Health Management Associates ( HMA ) in a non-adversarial administrative law setting. Katz was hired in 2003 by Health Education Resource Organization ("HERO") as a staff attorney. Katz remained at HERO for approx imately nin e mon ths. When Katz interviewed at K&S in June 2004, she had no civil trial experience. How ever Katz had h igh volume w ork experience, and she had handled uncontested administrative and masters hearings. Rapkin conducted an interview and followed up with reference checks, including contact with administrative judges before w hom K atz had tried c ases. Katz was described as competen t, well organized, and capable of handling a large caseload. Her former employer at HMA described her as someone capable of managing her own office. Rapkin knew that Katz had no jury trial experience, although he was unaware that she also had n ot handled contested m atters. Rapkin also knew that Katz had managed a caseload of 200 to 300 social security cases. Overall, he thought Katz appeared to be a nice and competent individual who was capable of handling the job. Katz received and accepted an offer from K&S on the same day as her interview. She spent the next month in the K&S home office in A mbler, Pen nsylvania, wh ere she w as trained to handle Lemo n Law cases. During that time, R apkin took Katz with him to a couple of depositions and arbitrations. He also assisted her to develop Maryland forms for basic pleadings. She was trained on the firm method for preparing and evaluating cases. Katz met most of the K&S lawyers and staff, and she spent time with both Kimmel and Silverman. K&S utilizes "Time Matters," which is a computerized calendaring/database system. K&S policy requires that time sensitive matters be entered into Time Matters when they are received, at which time the due dates for deadlines and responses are calendared. The Time Matters system sends automated reminders of deadlines to the responsible lawyers and paralegals. Addition ally, it enables supe rvising attorn eys to monitor to ensure that case deadlines are met. Lisa Graham, who serves as the K&S Office Manager, along with IT staff, trained Katz on the use of Time Matters during her orientation at the Ambler, Penns ylvania, o ffice. Katz acknowledges that she was trained on the Tim e Matters s ystem. She de scribed it as a tickler or calendaring system. She wa s well aware of her respon sibility to inpu t matters she rec eived in to the ca lendarin g system. After the month training period, K atz returned to Maryland. Katz made arrangements to procure office space and open an office in Owings Mills. Katz was the only person in the office. She share d equipment and so me com mon spa ce with other unrelated entities. Add ition ally, she had the shared use of a receptionist to answer a nd transfe r calls. Katz was resp onsible for her all of he r own clerical w ork. Katz understoo d that she w ould not h ave a para legal in Maryland at the outset. She knew , however, that she would have access to paralegal assistance through Pennsylvania. She was led to believe that K&S would hire a paralegal for the Maryland office once it h ad a suf ficient c aseload . K&S had begun to accept Maryland cases while Katz was still training in Pennsylvania. It was her belief that there existed approxim ately fifty Maryland cases by the time she opened the office in Maryland. Katz immediately started drafting Maryland complain ts based upon Pennsylvan ia forms tha t she adapte d to Marylan d law. Testimony and exhibits clearly reflect that K&S operates a volume practice in a number-driven environment. Th e overt emphas is on attorney numbers and expectations is pervasive in comm unicatio ns, and seems essentia l in the fir m cultu re. Starting in early Septem ber, K& S gave K atz a wee kly benchmark for complaints to be filed. She was initially expected to put ten ca ses a wee k in suit, although that number increased in January 2005 to fifteen cases per week. In addition to the filing expectations, a specific revenue target of $10,000 per week in attorneys fees from settlem ents was e stablished. T his was confirmed to K atz in a Novem ber 23, 2004 e-m ail from Rapk in, who initially sup ervised her wo rk. Katz's ability to meet her revenue e xpectations was the subject of a series of e- mail exch anges, all of which emphasized the importance of this objective. In a particularly blunt exchange on November 29, 2004 from Rapkin, with copies to Silverman, Kimm el and the O ffice M anager, K atz was told : This is not what I want to see. The report you gave me says you settled 1 case in the last 2 weeks, and you have 224 cases. Let me make it clear, first and for emost, you m ust make your number. The number you have is not set for fun, it has a very imp ortant purp ose. You r numbe r is the most important way we judge how to give raises, whether we can fund support staff for your office, and as a practical matter if all your cases come up for trial at the same time b/c they are not settled you won't be able to handle them all. Therefore, no excus es, don't call, no need to talk, just get on it and only call me with good positive news of settlements, or demands you are going to make . The revenue quota was also documented in a memorandum outlining perform ance exp ectations fo r Katz in order for her to have a positive employment review. A s stated in the Memorandum: You have already been told our expectations of how much income we expect you to bring to the firm each w eek, on a consistent basis. Every weekly number is based upon 52 weeks a year. Each lawyer shall make certain that when he or she is on vacation or holiday, the settlements for the weeks before and after are not forgotten The attorney must make up the missing wee k/da ys settlements so the average income per week is still exp ected. . . . Your weekly number starting the week of 01/03/05 is $10,000.00. So there is no confusion, we expect you to consistently bring to the firm $10,000.00 in attorney fee and cost receivables each week in o rder to have a positive rev iew in June. It is clear that Katz did not consistently meet her performance benchmarks. No adverse action was initiated by K&S. However the performance measures were a regular point of emp hasis. In January 2005, Kimmel assumed supervisory responsibility over Katz. T he em phasis o n her nu mbers remain ed. On February 8, 2005 and April 12, 2005, Silverman emailed Katz expressing concern that she was not settling cases with manufacturers other than Ford and Chrysler. On May 10, 2005, Kimmel follow ed up on this topic and instructed Katz: "To break the backlog, I've decided to help you along." Kimmel directed Katz to send at least ten substantive letters three days per week to opposing counsel, and that unless Kimmel agreed in advance, this was "to be done without fail as in structed ." As Kimm el described : I do not want form letters or correspondence that clearly shows the file has not been reviewed. Each letter should have sub stantial detail and/or a demand that applies accurately to that particular case. While you may disagree with this routine, watch what happens as a result. You will blow through your numbers, be better prepared for arbitrations and be in more freq uent conta ct with clients. As a consequence, we can add another attorney and at least one paralegal. I w ant YO U to head up MD and make it a well-oiled machine, but allowing all manufacturers but two to largely ignore you while waiting for trial is NO T the way. Do what I ask and you will reap ALL the rewards of that labor, in ways you will find very benef icial. Katz dutifully started sending out thirty letters per week, with copies forwarded to Kimmel three times per week. This continued from June 1, 2005 through the end of Katz's employment, except during vacation periods. On June 3, 2005 Kimmel again e- mailed Katz questioning the fees generated in her settlements, which w ere almost always $2,500 per case. In response to Katz's claim that most settlements were pre-suit, and fees wo uld be large r in other case s, Kimm el comm ented: I for example, review every file every month, and it takes me about 30-60 minutes to update myself. Each month, between .5 and 1.0 are added to the file for that alone. Then there are issues that come up, protracted discussions, consultations with the experts and client, etc. No two cases are identical and so I expect that settlement of fees would be similar across the board, but not identical as they have b een. At the time, Katz had between 200 and 300 cases that would need su ch mo nthly revie w to fo llow th is directiv e. The issue of paralegal support for Katz was also a subject of continuing discussion. As early as September 23, 2004, Kimmel indicated that he agreed with Ka tz that the firm needed a "full time professional paralegal down there." It is clear that Katz could and did ava il herself of paralegal suppo rt from the Pennsylvania office. This was not always a smooth process. In one e-mail exch ange in O ctober 200 4, Katz no ted instances where discovery mailed directly to Pennsylvania in Maryland cases was forward ed to her to handle just before res ponses were due. Part of the problem at that time was that the firm was using its Pennsylvania address on filings, so pleading were mailed there. Althoug h this part of th e difficulty was corrected, the coordination for support from Pennsylvania to Maryland was not always smooth. In late Decem ber, Katz in quired of the Office Manager whether there was any news about hiring a paralegal for Maryland. In response, she was r eminded of the nee d to file fifteen comp laints pe r week . Once again on January 3, 2005, Katz asked Silverman where the firm stood on hiring a paralegal. In particular, she noted she was receiving five to ten sets of discovery each week, and that she had a number of motions hearings set. While she acknowledged the assistance she was r eceiving in Pennsylvan ia to draft complain ts, she noted th e need to a rrange serv ice, file affidavits of service, subpoena records, and commu nicate with clients. There was at least one other occasion in April 2005 when Katz noted a pro blem filing tim ely discovery responses because the assigned paralegal was leaving on vacation. Whether the problem was caused by delays by Katz in forwarding the docume nts to Pennsylvania, or by the paralegal that had not advised Katz of the upcomin g vacation , was not en tirely clear. It is clear that Katz's workload steadily increased over her tenure with K&S. By September 27, 2004, she had 127 cases, with 45 in suit. Barely a week later, on October 2, 2004 she reported that she had 194 cases. By November 8, 2004, she had 203 cases, with approximately 100 in suit. As of December 6, 2004, the numb er had gro wn to 23 9 cases, w ith 125 in su it. During the period from September 2004 through August 2005, Katz filed 461 suits in Maryland. She was assigned over 500 total ma tters. Katz did not have an unusual caseload for a K&S attor ney, when evaluated based solely on the number of cases. More senior attor neys have up to 1,000 or more cases assigned to them. It also is not unusual at K&S to manage discovery w ith the assis tance o f parale gals in o ther off ices. Katz also noted the growth in her workload in other areas. While the practice of th e firm is to m ove aggr essively toward settlement, and to settle most cases early, Katz had a volume of cases in suit with active discovery. Unlike the practice in some other jurisdictions, M aryland did not require early arbitration, so cases did not get pushed as easily towards settlement. Therefo re, in addition to discovery, K atz began to handle a steady array of motions and cou rt appearances. In one e-mail in late April 2005 that discussed calendar matters that were scheduled in the next six weeks, Katz noted six motions hearings in a week period, together with multiple mediations. Add ition ally, she had matters in jurisdictions throughout the state. Katz managed to meet various competing demands with one glaring omission. She failed to enter deadlines into Time Matters in forty-seven cases. These were all Nissan or T oyota cases that were aggressively litigated by the law firm of Piper Rudn ick.[ 6 ] The disco very filed in those cases wa s relatively routine. Howe ver Katz did not access, or even attempt to access, paraleg al assista nce w ith respo nses in th ose cas es. Although Katz was assigned a specific paralegal in the Pennsylvan ia office to work w ith in her early months with the firm, that system evolved. By the fall of 2004, K&S paralegals were assigned to specific manufacturers, so discovery was referred by lawyers to the paralegals in charge of that manufacturer. Although there was a K&S paralegal to assist with Nissan and Toyota matters, Katz seemed unaware of that assignme nt. Since Katz sought no assistance in these cases, and discovery and motions were never logged into Time Matters, no alerts w ere gen erated w hen res ponse s were delinqu ent. When timely responses were not filed, a series of Motions for Sanctions seeking dismissal were filed. Katz did not respond to those Motions. R ather, she undertook to p repare discovery responses. In twenty-eight cases, the Motions for Sanctions were treate d as Mo tions to Compel, and a deadline was set to file belated discovery responses. In eighteen of those matters, no discovery was ever filed. In the remaining ten, answers were filed outside the extended deadline. Renewed Motions for Sanctions were filed, and all but three of those were not even answered. The first case dismissal occurred in May 2005. Ultimately, dismissals with prejudice were entered in all forty-sev en case s. Katz was overwhelmed by January 2005. While she claimed to use her b est judgment in juggling competing demands, that judgm ent was se riously flawed. Rather than prioritize the overdu e discovery an d motion re sponses, K atz continued to focus on putting cases in suit and pushing for settlements, as those were the objective criteria being measured within the firm. By that time, Katz was also out of the office a lot with court appearances and depositions. Katz demonstrated no appreciation of the risk she ran by ignoring the motions or 6 Piper Rudnick is pre sently known as D LA Piper. overdue discovery. Sh e seemed genuinely unaware that matters could o r wou ld be dis missed becau se of th e disco very lapse s. Katz acknowledged that she was afraid to disclose her lapses to Kimmel and Silverman. Katz felt the partners were not pleased with her and that her job was on the line. W hile this assessment was not c ompletely acc urate, it impacted her decisions. Since the discovery and motions in the dismissed cases were never logged in to Time Matters, the problem c ould not be detected through the firm's computerized system. However Katz also a cted affirm atively to cover up her difficulties. In June and July 2005, Katz forwarded Kimmel copies of at least ten (10) le tters she purp ortedly sent to opposing counsel in cases that she k new had alre ady been dismiss ed. The Iweala case was the first dismissed case that came to light. In Iweala, Katz was given an extension to file discovery in an Order entered in re sponse to a n initial Mo tion to Com pel. Although Katz mailed responses within that extended deadline, they were un executed . In response to a renew ed Mo tion to Comp el, which also went unanswered, the Iweala matter was dismiss ed with prejud ice on M ay 24, 20 05. On June 29,2005, the Iweala dismissal came to the attention of K& S, and the O ffice M anager im mediately communicated with Ka tz seeking a n explana tion. K atz characterized the dismissal as inappro priate, as she c laimed to have timely filed discovery. Katz also represented that a Motion to Reopen had bee n filed. Tha t Motion w as not actua lly docke ted until July 6, 200 5. Silverman contacted Katz when he learned of the problem, and was initially assured that she believed the matter could be reinstated. When Katz later acknowledged that she had made a mistake and the case could not be reinstated, Silverman did not take any further action. Silverman was unaware of any other problems at that time, and felt Katz was generally doing a good job. He believed that Iweala was an isolated mistake, that good lawyers occasionally make mistakes, and that they should move forwa rd. In mid-July, other concerns regarding discovery came to light at K&S. Th e Office M anager e-mailed Katz on July 19, 2005, asking w hy they had rece ived Orders ruling on Motions to Compel. Again, Katz downplayed the extent of her difficulties, claiming that discovery had already been se nt in some and the rest would be done that day. As she claimed, "Nissan loves to file these things, even thoug h the discovery deadline is months away. The reason the rogs aren't getting in is because I've been so limited in time in following up with the clients. These are all files that are here, so I didn't have Tracey working helping me with them. No partner response to these conce rns occ urred. Katz was scheduled for a one-we ek vacat ion in late July. She returned to two bins of mail and other matters that had piled up in her absen ce. By that poin t she was totally overwhelmed. She described h erself as depressed, crying all the time, and she had lost twenty pou nds. Altho ugh the firm finally hired a paralegal for the Maryland office during July, Katz had the added responsibility to train the person. Katz submitted her resignation by e-mail on August 10, 2005, and left imm edia tely. While the f irm a sked her to stay for a period to h elp with transition , she ref used, ci ting hea lth conc erns. Silverman drove to the Maryland o ffice and met w ith Katz on the day sh e resigned. T his was his first visit to the Maryland office. He described Katz as looking like a beaten dog. He was immediately concerned by stacks of docume nts in her office that were not filed. When he looked in file cabinets, he found other loose papers. K&S mobilized attorneys and paralegals to assist in assessing the problem. Th e firm immedia tely hired three Maryland lawyers, and Katz's cases were a ll reassig ned w ithin a tw o to fou r week period . K&S undertook to resolve client problems that came to light that we re create d by Ka tz's inactio n. Clients were contacted and advised of the status and outcomes in their cases. Silverman quickly made fair settlement offers, including payment of fees to consult with counsel, for former clients who asserted claims. Charles Carter was one client whose case was dismissed as a result of inaction by Katz, who failed to desig nate expe rts in a timely mann er. Carter attempted to contact the K&S Maryland office six tim es in late July and early August to check on the status of his case and to o btain a scheduling ord er. He was unaware of Katz's resignation until some later point in time when he received a voice mail message. Carter also sent letters to K& S's home office on August 23, September 10, September 28 and December 31, 2005 and February 6, 2006 seeking a status update and Schedu ling Orde r. Carter also se nt e-mails to the home office . The first responsive communication Carter received was a letter dated F ebruary 7, 200 6, advising h im of the dismiss al of his case. Carter's case was eventually resolved to his satisfaction, including payment of his damages and fees to enable him to consult with counsel. Silverman negotiated the settlement reasonab ly and effi cien tly. However Silverman did not become involved until Carter hired counsel after learning of the dismiss al. During Katz's tenure with K& S, she wa s the only attorney barred in Maryland. Lawyers and paralegals within the firm were available to assist her, but her commu nications w ith them were exclusively by e-mail and telephone . Rapkin d id visit the Maryland office on three or four occasions, mostly with the office manager when she interviewed potential paralegal candidates. Neither G raham no r Rapkin noted anything unusual in those visits. Neither Kimm el nor Silverman visited the Maryland office prior to Katz's resignation. T hey were unaw are of concerns with Katz's representation. Kimmel noted he received no client complaints, which is the more typical sign of overload. Kimmel also emp hasized t hat resou rces wer e alw ays available to assist, if Katz had only asked. Kimmel and Silverman were aware of Katz's request for staff support. However, they felt Katz appeared to be doing an adequate job and they were unaware of the growing problems. Although they claimed h er numb ers didn't dictate the staffing response, it seems clear they we re not push ing to address Katz's staffing request. When the crisis hit in August, they were able to hire three lawyers almost immediately. Maryland remains staffed now with two lawyers and one paralegal with attorney caseloads around 2 00, which are significa ntly lower than other K&S office s. Based on these fa ctual finding s, the hearing judge con cluded tha t Respondents violated MRPC 5.1. In reaching this conclusion, she considered the only two Maryland cases directly addressing MRPC 5.1, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 706 A.2d 1045 (1998), and Attorney Grievance Commission v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 753 A.2d 17 (2002), an d two cas es from o ther jurisdiction s dealing w ith rules violatio ns involv ing supervision of othe r lawyers , In the Matter of James L. Farmer, 950 P.2d 713 (K an. 1997), and Davis & Goldberg v. Alabama State Bar, 676 S o.2d 30 6 (Ala. 1 996). Judge Cox determined that the degree of supervision K&S s founding partners provided Katz, directly or th rough R apkin, did n ot accoun t adequately fo r their thresho ld knowledge that Katz lacked experience in the field of automotive warranty and lemon law claims generally or handling contested c ases in Maryland s circuit courts (where most of the cases would be initiated). Additionally, the Pennsylvan ia attorneys did not ascertain whether distinguishing elements of warranty and lemon law in Maryland, versus Pennsylvania, necessitated an adjustm ent to the firm s standard p olicies and p rocedures for hand ling its bread-and-butter cases. Moreover, the hearing judge concluded that the supervision given was insufficient because it substituted a computerized case management system for hands-on, on-site review of how cases assigned to Katz were being handled. The procedures for identifying pending deadlines lacked adequate safeguards against an attorney avoiding altogether use of the computerized system. Finally, the supervising attorneys failed to mentor the employee, ne w to their firm , in how to f ulfill the ethical duties owed each client in the context of a high-volume practice emphasizing fee-generation as the primary measure of attorney success. Respond ents also were found to have violated MRPC Rule 1.4 because the firm failed to resp ond in a timely fashion to Carter s direct inquiries to the Ambler office regarding the status of his Maryland case. Mitigating these breaches, according to the hearing judge, was the effective response of the firm when the partners learned of the profes sional a nd ethic al failing s in the M aryland o ffice. III. Exceptions Petitioner filed no exceptions to Judge C ox s findin gs and co nclusions. R esponde nts filed specific exceptions to four of h er findings of fact. Fu rthermore, th ey asserted that, on de novo r eview , this Court should set aside all of the hearing judge s recommended conclu sions o f law a nd dism iss the ch arges. First, Respondents take exception to the hearing judge s finding that Katz was responsible for all of her own clerical work. Second, they dispute the finding that Kimmel directed Katz to send at least ten substantive demand letters three days per week to opposing counsel, and that unless Kimmel agreed in advance, this was to be done without fail as instructed. Third, they contend that the evidence is not clear and convincing that [a]lthough there was a K&S paralegal to assist with N issan and T oyota matters, K atz seemed unaware of that assign ment. Fin ally, Respond ents take ex ception to the finding that [K&S s] Maryland [office] remains staf fed now with two lawyers and one parale gal with attorney caseloads around 200, which are significantly lower than other K&S offices. Although Respondents concede that this latter finding is facially accurate, they resist an inverse inference drawn from the finding that Katz s assigned caseload was excessive during her em ploymen t. As to Judge Cox s proposed Conclusions of Law, Respondents argue that because MRPC 5.1 requires only a reasonable effort at supervision and does not require a supervising attorney to act as guarantor of an employee s ethical behavior, the Conclusions of Law with regard to MRPC 5.1 should be overruled. As to the charge of violating MRPC 1.4, Respondents contend that the duty to communicate with a client is personal to the specific attorney handling the client s matter and a breach of that duty may not be visited upon the m vicario usly. IV. Standard of Review The hearing court s findings o f fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless clearly erro neous . Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Brisbon, 385 Md. 667, 674, 870 A.2d 586, 590 (2005 ). Deference is accorded the hearing judge s findings because, having seen first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses, the hearing judge is in the best po sition to assess their credibil ity. Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 398, 842 A.2d 42, 48 (2004). Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) requires that Bar Counsel meet its burden of proving the averments . . . by clear and convincing evidence , pursuan t to Maryland Rule 16-757(b). Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Guid a, 391 Md. 33, 50-51, 891 A.2d. 1085, 1095 (2006). In a disciplinary proceeding, howev er, evidence offered in the charged attorney s defense or in mitig ation of sa nctio ns ne ed only be show n by a preponderance of the evidence. Attorney Grievan ce Com m n v. G arfield, 369 Md. 85, 98, 797 A.2d 757, 765 (2002). The proposed conclusions of law made by the hearing judge, such as whether the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct were violated, are considered de novo by this Court. Md. Rule 16759(b)(1); Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Kreamer, 404 Md. 282, 292, 946 A.2d 5 00, 506 (2008 ). V. Ana lysis We first consider Respondents exception to the finding that Katz performed all her own clerical work. Respondents contend that the evide nce in the re cord is insufficien t to support a statement regarding K atz s clerical responsibilities over the entire course of her tenure with the firm. They point instead to evidenc e showin g that Katz had the support of paralegals located in the Ambler, Pennsylvania, office. We overrule this exception. The threshold of clear and convincing evidence does not demand unanswerable evidence. Mooney, 359 M d. at 79, 753 A .2d at 29. A lthough p aralegals loc ated in Pennsylvan ia were available to help process case filings, the undispute d evidenc e was tha t, for all but two weeks of Katz s tenure in the Owings Mills office, no other employee worked in that office. To obtain the assistance of the Pennsylvania paralegals, Katz was required to photoco py, package, and forward the relevan t documents to them . Moreover, Katz was not only accountable for her responsibilities as an attorney, but also for the quotidian tasks that ordinarily would belong to support staff. The record indicates that solely she was responsible for opening and sorting all mail, prioritizing all phone messages, and making all photocopies. Katz even was required to record and report how many pieces of paper she used each month. Although the term clerical work fairly may include some of the professional tasks that K atz could have assigned to the Pennsylvania paralegals, the available support of the legal specialists did not embrace the day-to-day clerical duties necessary to the basic functioning of the Mar yland of fice, all o f whic h were perfor med b y Katz. See Attorney Grievance v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 350, 872 A.2d 693, 698 (2005) (noting that the employee answered the telephone and performed other clerical duties before she became the office paralegal). The hearing judge s finding that Katz performed all her own clerical work is a fair and reasonab le characterization of certain of Katz s duties as the sole employee resident in the Marylan d offic e. The second exception noted is to the hearing judge s finding that Kimmel directed Katz to send at least ten substantive demand letters three days per week to opposin g counse l, and that unless Kimmel agreed in advance, this was to be done without fail as instructed . This ex ception also is ov erruled . Respon dents argue that because a standard format demand letter was pro vided to and used by Katz, each letter required only a modicum of effort and time and therefore was not a substantial task. Substantive is not always a synonym for substantial. Substantive is defined as being a totally independent en tity; real, rather than a pparent; firm , permane nt, enduring; essential. W EBSTER S N INTH N EW C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY 1176 (1989). In the special context of the law, an additional sense of substantive is defined as creating and defining rights and duties. Id. Therefore, the letters Katz w as required to produce were substantive if each w as an indep endent, pe rmanent, and enduring record, or if th e contents were calculated to marshal and advocate essential facts related to the rights and duties of the firm s c lients. Obv ious ly, the dema nd letters w ere created to form a permanent and enduring record. More significantly, the record reveals that Kimmel explicitly condemned K atz for her failure to go beyond form letters ( I do not want form letters or correspondence that clearly shows the file has not been reviewed. Each letter should have substantial detail and/or a demand that applies accurately to that particular case. ). Kimmel commented on Katz s record of settling almost every case for $2500: No two cases are identical and so I expect that settlement of fees would . . . not be identical as they have been. Kimmel apparently viewed each case as a totally independent entity. He expected that each letter would reflect that individuality through 1) diverse amounts recovered in attorney s fees and 2) language evidencing the particulars of each situation. In other words, he directed her to make each letter essential and real, rather than apparent. Each letter was related to the asserted rights of the respective clients. Clearly, Responden ts present argument to the co ntrary notwit hstand ing, Kim mel esta blished a benc hmark of ten s ubstan tive letter s. Regarding the notion that the individualization of the form letter req uired on ly a modicum of effort in each case, Kimmel suggested in an email that Katz spend between 30 and 60 minutes working with each file, as was his practice with his caseload. Like the definition of substantive, the primary senses of the meanings of substantial relate to a thing s essential content; however, the third s ense defin ition of sub stantial is con siderable in amount or numbers. Id. Kimmel required Katz to submit to him copies of 30 demand letters each week. Each may have taken only a modicum of tim e to generate physi cally, but Kimmel encouraged Katz to emulate his own professional habit and spend 30 to 60 minutes to update herself on each case file. Assum ing that Kim mel s billing h abits are not excessive, Katz s emulation of him wo uld require u pdating he rself on at least the 30 cases targeted for each week s dem and letters, constituting between 1 5 and 30 hou rs per week of her time a considerable amount of billable time. The record is clear and convincing that Kimmel expected substantive letters in a substantial number of cases. Respon dents take excep tion to the he aring judge s finding th at Katz seemed unaw are of the availability of one or more Pennsylvania-based paralegals to assist with cases directed to the veh icle ma nufac turers N issan an d Toyota . It was stipulated that Katz knew she had paralegal assistance for responding to interrogato ries and do cument re quests and that specific paralegals dealt with specific manufacturers. Respondents cite the following testimonial excerpt, claiming that it indicates that the evidence presented of Katz s awareness of the availability of the assigned paralegal for c laims again st Nissan w as not distinc tly remem bered a nd the d etails the reof na rrated e xactly and in due o rder. I don t remember [ whether I was given a Nissan or Toyota paralegal]. I remember there was a different one for General Motors, one fo r Ford, one for Ch rysler. Rest of them I don t remember. I think they were batched. I may have had one for Nissan at the time and maybe someone else. I don t remember exactly. I remember the three big ones I had a separate paralegal for each one. Later in her testim ony, when Katz was asked whether Tracey Christy would have been the Nissan paralegal, Katz testified that she remembered Tracey and that T racey cou ld have been th e Nissa n parale gal. This Court relies on the impressions of the hearing judge in matters of witness cred ibility. Stolarz, 379 Md at 398, 842 A.2d at 47. It is appropriate for the hearing judge to pick and choose which evidence to rely upon from a conflicting array when determining findings of fac t. Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51, 891 A.2d at 1096. Judge Cox s finding is that Katz seemed unaware of a designated paralegal for N issan claims . Katz distinc tly remembered at least three other paralegals assigned for three other moto r compan ies. Yet, her testimony is that she could only guess that Tracey Christy could have been the Nissan-sp ecific paralegal. In this case, Katz s inability to remember clearly is the tipping point of Judge Cox s fin ding that K atz seem ed unaw are of a spe cific Nissan -centric paralegal. Katz s inability to recall the pa ralegal with clarity is evidence that, at least in comparison to her clear awareness of other manufacturer-specific paralegals, she seemed unawa re of the sp ecific assignment of a paralegal to aid in handling claims against Nissan. We overrule the exception. Respon dents assert that it is clear error for the hearing judge to have found that [K&S s] Maryland [ office] rem ains staffed with two lawyers and one parale gal, with attorney case loads around 200, which are significantly lower than other K&S offices, even though the statement is facially correct. Respondents take exception not because the statement is unsupported, but because this accurate and supported finding of fact may suggest, in comparison, that Katz s caseload was excessive during her employment. Respon dents explain the seemingly reduced case load in Maryland post-Katz as due to the unusually high number of appea ls . . . pursued [in this jurisdictio n] based o n certain rulings of federal and state trial judges. During Katz s tenure with K&S, cases were filed and processed in Maryland essentially under the same rules of law and procedure as such cases presently are filed and processed. If, in 2008, the appellate process in Maryland requires additional attorneys and staff, then perhaps Katz s workload was not analyzed carefully, assigned prudently, or managed profession ally in 2005. In f act, the hearin g judge allu ded to this very explanation when she noted the reduce d worklo ad in the current Maryland office. Differences between Maryland practice and the firm s experience in other states impacted proper sup ervision in this case. In any case, the pertinent findings are conceded as accurate. We require no further persua sion to o verrule the exc eption. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Granger, 374 Md. 438, 453, 823 A.2d 611, 620 (2003) (overruling an exception to a hearing judge s accu rate statement). We now turn to Respondents s contentions that the conclusions of law by the hearing judge should be set aside. We decline to do so. Rather, we adopt her conclusions and resolve that Re spond ents vio lated M RPC 5.1 and 1.4. A. M RPC 5.1 As basic com ponents o f a reason able effort to have in place measures giving reasonab le assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, partners must establish policies and procedures that, inter alia, are designed to . . . identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters . . . and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are properly supervised. 7 MRPC 5.1(a); MRPC 5.1, Comment 2. Other measures may be necessary to fulfill supervisory obligations, depending on the structure and nature of the law practice. MRPC 5.1, Comment 2. 7 Informal The other basic components of what may constitute a reasonable effort, illustrated in MRPC 5.1, Comment 2, are the supervisor s responsibility to detect and resolv e conflicts of inter est and to acc ount fo r client fu nds an d prop erty. supervision and periodic review ordinarily suffice when the f irm is small and the a ttorn eys experienced, but other or different circumstances may indicate the need for more elaborate supervisory measures. MRP C Rule 5 .1, Comm ent 3. Partne rs should b e responsib le for the ethical atmosphere of [the] firm and its influence on the conduct of all its mem bers. See MRPC 5.1, Comment 2. Partners should not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm inevitab ly will con form to the Ru les. Id. Our Rules require that a firm s executive lawyers design and implement supervisory procedures that anticipate the ethical demands specific to the practice they lead. Proper design of a firm s internal policies and procedures is accomplished when the partners and managers in the firm are responsive to circumstances that indicate a heightened need for more elabora te sup ervision . Id. To meet this obligation, the Rules contemplate that partners and managing attorneys must adapt the level of su pervision to a given attorney s experie nce an d relativ e to the a ssigned tasks an d the fir m s na ture and culture. In the present case, numerous warning or alert indicators should have informed the partners and managing attorneys of K&S of the need for more heightened supervision than was given Katz. First, the out-of-state law firm determined to establish a beachhead office in Maryland. Much was at stake, including the firm s professional reputation and the wellbeing of th e Marylan d citi zens they a lread y had agre ed to repr esen t. Th e exe cutiv e atto rneys at K&S had a resp onsibility to establish and maintain the new office on solid principles of professional conduct. Among the foundational responsibilities when opening and operating a branch office in a new and unfamiliar jurisdiction is to address adequately practice distinctions between the existing office and the beachhead location. In this case, neither the founding partners nor the Maryland attorney they hired to manage the Maryland office ever had filed a case in a Maryland circuit court before the Owings Mills office opened its doors. In the opening forays into its emerging Maryland practice, K&S filed cases in the venue closest to the Owings Mills offic e, as was d one with r egard to its Pennsylvania office for Pen nsylv ania case s, un awa re that in M arylan d ord inarily a case must be filed either in the county where the motor vehicle was purchased or where the purchaser resides. Ficker, 349 Md. at 18-19, 706 A.2d at 1047 (concluding that the difficulties of handling a high-volume caseload were worsened by the need to be in multiple jurisdictions across the State). Several distinctions between Maryland and Pennsylvania practices profoundly influence the handling of automotive warranty claims. Basic familiarity with Maryland law and practice would have highlighted differe nces in fee-sh ifting an d early settl emen t provisi ons. An understanding of Maryland procedure would have highlighted differences in venue, choice of forum based on dollar amount of the claim, challenges to expert witnesses, and the desirability of perhaps establishing relationships with credible Maryland experts. To protect prospective Maryland clients from the harm of incompetent representation, these differences should have been researched, appreciated, and resolved during the design of supervisory procedures for the new office, not in the midst of ongoing litigation. K&S might have adopted any number of strategies to overcome its lack of experience in Maryland practice, such as processing a few test cases before increasing dramatically the Maryland workload or hiring seasoned attorneys to be of couns el. Respondents postulated at oral argument that an asserted lack of problems encountered by K&S in opening branch offices in other states was evidence that relying on the same procedures for establishing the Maryland practice was not flawed. The record, however, is silent regarding evidence supporting that premise. No evidence was before the hearing judge (and theref ore is not be fore this Co urt) as to whe ther the bea chhead o ffices in other jurisdictions experienced similar practical challenges (or encountered no problems) such as those faced in Maryland. Neither does the record reflect the qualifications of the K&S attorneys engaged or dispatched to represent the firm s clie nts in its initial forays into other ju risdiction s, an ess ential pr emise in any fair c ompa rison to t he pres ent case . Next, a relatively low level of experience of an attorney should indicate that m ore elaborate supervision is in order. A ccording to Comm ent 3 to MR PC 5.1 , a small firm of experienced lawyers falls at a place on the supervisory intensity spectrum where informal supervision and periodic review ordinarily are sufficient. The facts of this case, however, stand in stark con trast to the exa mple in the Comm ent. In contra st to the setting o f a small firm, we have in this c ase a firm w ith offices in five states and where the firm s experienced attorne ys carry caseloads of 1,000 clients or more. In this business model and practice setting, a relatively inexperienced attorney was stationed alone in an office physically remote from the critical mass of the firm and directed to begin filing numerous cases as rapidly as possible. Katz had no experience in the practice of automobile warranty or lemon law. She also was a novice in other critical areas, such as circuit court pleadings and practice, jury trials, and contested litigation generally. Supervisory procedures should have been designed deliberately to address the attorney s inexperience and to counterbalance her physical distance from the ready availability of steadying interaction with peers and managers. In Maryland, su pervising attorneys are obligated to determine w hether the employee s skill level is c omm ensura te with th e respo nsibilities assigne d. Ficker, 349 Md. at 28, 706 A.2d at 1052. T his Court h eld in Ficker that if a partner expected a newly hired a ttorney to jump immedia tely into a particular field of p ractice, the sup ervisor wa s obliged to determine whether the supervised attorney was trained sufficiently or experienced enough to provide competent repr esentati on in th at area. Id. [The supervising attorney] had no right merely to assume such competence. Id. The supervised attorney in Ficker was an admitted novice in this area of law, which, according to Ficker, constituted 98% of his practice. Id. Likewise, Katz was an admitted novice in the field of automotive warranty and lemon law, which constituted virtually the entirety of the K&S practice. Like the employer in Ficker, Respon dents we re obligated to determine if Katz, in fa ct, was traine d and exp erienced su fficiently to act a s the managing attorney o f K& S s M aryland o ffice. T hey had n o basis to assum e such c ompe tence. Respon dents intended for Katz to jump immediately into litigating and settling lemon law cases. K&S already was accepting Maryland cases during Katz s orientation period. The day she left the mon th-long orien tation in Pennsylvania, Katz had over 50 cases to file in Maryland. After only the one-mo nth orientatio n, the partne rs authorized her to set up and manage the branch office in Maryland, where she received virtua lly no hands-on supervision. A one-month orientation, it appears with the benefit of hindsight, does not necessarily establish as a fact that her training and experience were sufficient to provide comp etent rep resenta tion of th e firm s Marylan d clients . Respondents acknowledge that supervision of a Maryland attorney requires a determination of competency. They assert in their memorandum to this Court that a fair reading of Ficker supports the proposition that, if a super vising attorne y . . . gives, and is available to give, instruction to associates determined to be capa ble of providing competent representation, the supervising attorney is acting reasonably. (Emphasis added.) The hiring attorney failed to discover that Katz had no experience in contested litigation and that she lacked an understanding of the possibility of sanctions o r dismissal fo r failure to resp ond to motions to compel discovery. Resp ondents failed to determ ine if Katz, in fact, was competent to perform the responsibilities they assigned to her. Moreover, in the areas where K&S did determ ine the limits of Katz s expertise, Respondents made no attempt to design the supervision to overcome her weaknesses. Next, a higher level of supervision may be indicated when an employee is new to the firm, at least until the employee s reliability is demonstrated. Zucke rman , 386 Md. at 350, 872 A.2d at 699. In Zuckerman, the respondent conducted a high-volume prac tice in relatively small-dollar p ersonal injury ca ses in Baltim ore City for twenty-two years. Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 349-52, 872 A.2d at 698-700. Within two or three days of hiring a paralegal, he delegated to her the auth ority to write checks on his trust account so that he could concen trate on trying cases. Id. The employee was the niece of his previous office manager, who h ad retire d. Id. Previously, the young woman worked for Zuckerman for about six months, performing clerical dutie s and an swerin g the ph one. Id. Upon being given control of the checkbook, she devise d a schem e to steal mo ney from the trust accoun t. Id. This Court found that t he ac t of giving a new emp loyee with no histor y of re liabi lity responsibility for the checkbook without overs ight was a failure to m ake reason able efforts to ens ure em ployee co mplian ce with the law yer s prof essiona l obligat ions. Id. Respon dents had less history with Katz than Zuckerman had with the paralegal he hired. Zuckerman failed to supervise properly a new employee when h e entrusted h er with the ability to write che cks after on ly a few days at the new jo b. Id. Likewise, K&S failed to supervise Katz adequately. Respondents entrusted a new employee with the full burden of the Maryland practice, but did not design supervisory strategies to account for the firm s institutional unfamiliarity with her reliability, including her work habits, health, or character. Although K&S contacted at least one of the references Katz provided, it hired Katz on the day of her sole interview. It is n ot reasonab le supervisio n to assum e that all of an employee s relevant character and work traits are revealed in the initial interview or will be disclosed fully by individuals selected by the prospective employee as references. Furthermore, when Katz s performance was evaluated during her tenure at K&S, her supervisor did not come to the Maryland office. Instead, Katz selected case files and brought them to Pennsylvania for review. Lawyers with direct supervisory responsibility mus t mak e eff orts t o ensure that a ttorn eys under their stewardsh ip are com plying actually with their ethical and professional obligations. MRPC 5.1(b). The artist s-portfolio or writing sample approac h to case review invites employees to put only their best work before the superv isor. Properly de signed pro cedures fo r supervising new em ployees shou ld include mechanisms for review that are not dependent solely on employee self-disclosure. Physical isolation of a n attorney from peers and supervisor s also indicates a heightened need to adapt supe rvisory strategies to ensure compliance with the Rules, even in an internet-oriented society. In this case, Respondents essentially relied on an isolated, inexperienced attorney to supervise herself. Katz was told by Kimmel, I want Y OU to head up MD and make it a well-oiled machine . . . . See Ficker, 399 Md. at 450, 924 A.2d at 1108 - 09 (sanctioning attorney for failing to have in place a system whereby cases w ere immedia tely assigned to a particular attorney within his office when the cases first came in, and instead, allowing particular attorneys to assign themselves, which practice fostered an environment where rules . . . were almost inherently violated ). Instead, the supervising attorney must info rm himse lf [or herself] of the status of his employees efforts and follow up to ascer tain wh ether de legated tasks are being a ccom plished . Mooney, 359 Md. at 90, 753 A.2d at 35; Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 352, 872 A.2d at 700 (sanctioning an attorney for supervisory shortfalls for failure to follow-up on delegated task, as well as entrusting highlevel responsibility to a new employee). Katz s supervisors did not inform themselves through periodic audits or on-site visits. Her supervisors depended, to a great degree, on her self-disclosures to determine if delegated tasks were completed. Reques ts for help, however generalized, especially from a physically remote staff attor ney, warrant investigation to determine whether the employee s perception that her failures are attributable to objective factors is accurate o r whether increased su pervision, support, and guidance might avert or reform performance shortfalls. The record shows that Katz repeatedly brought to her supervisor s attention her d esire for on -site staff sup port in the Maryland office. Her requests did not foster an investigation by her supervisors to see if client obligatio ns in Ma ryland were g oing unf ulfilled. Instead , the respons e was to encourage her to adhere to the existing proc edures, a nd ironic ally, to create more work. Her complain ts that the workload in Maryland already was overwhelming resulted in verbal and written remind ers of h er quot as. Respon dents point out that other attorneys within the firm , even those with larger caseloads, handled discovery adequately by adhering to the firm s established procedures. The fact that other lawyers might have handled Katz's workload more efficiently is not persuasive. The Comm ents to M RPC R ule 5.1 clearly co ntemplate th e need to individuate supervision based on the nature of the practice and the experie nce of the attor ney. See generally Davis, 676 So. 2d at 307 (imposing unmanageable case loads and creating a corporate culture focusing on new rather than existing clients results in sanction against supervising attorney). Katz opened 461 new cases ove r the course of her 13 -month employment at K&S. She actively managed 15 to 20 cases per week. All toll, she was responsible for over 500 matters. He r weekly ben chmarks were to g enerate $1 0,000 in settlements and file at least fifteen complaints. She was scheduled to appear in a number of different co urts, slated to appear at a number of settlement negotiation s, and expe cted to run the office. Unsurprisingly to us, she announced to her direct supervisor that she needed help. Help came in the form of communications intended to mo tivate her to work harder. Presumably, those missives and exhortations were co nsistent with K& S s standard practices. No one came to the Maryland office to help catch up on filing or to check on the situation until significant lapses occurred and major damage control efforts were required. To help with the backlog, her supervisor demanded that she create at least 30 demand letters each week and forw ard the letters f or his perso nal review . After direc ting Katz to write 30 demand letters each week, Kimmel promised, While you may disagree with this routine, watch wha t happens as a result. Yo u will blow through your numbers, be better prepared for arbitrations and be in more frequent contact with clients. As a consequence, we can ad d anoth er attorn ey and at le ast one paraleg al. Katz was promised local support pros pect ively, but onl y if she ge nerated more w ork. Her assessment that she need ed help now was n ot given adequ ate ana lysis or cred ence b y her direc t or ultim ate sup ervisors . Fina lly, in some cases, a law firm s culture inherently engenders a need for s pecific supervision regarding how to balance the lawyer s obligations to clients within the business model of the firm. Th is was the c ase at K& S. The firm culture at K &S stron gly emphasized the number of filings, case turnaround, and revenue generated as the significant measures of associate success; not rare criteria, in and of themselves, but which, in an admittedly high-volume business model, carry added responsibilities for the supervision of associates. Comment 2 to MRPC 5.1 urges partners to be accountable for the impact o f corporate culture on employee decision-making. Employees new to such a culture require assistance from sup ervisors in en suring that ethics and professionalism are not lost in the focus on income and p rofit goals. R esponde nts failed to su pervise w ith the appro priate balance in mind. Katz s first su pervisor w rote in an em ail to her, wh ich he cop ied to Silverman, Kimmel, and the office manager, [F]irst and foremost, you must make your number . . . . Therefore, no excuses, don t call, no need to talk , just get on it and only call me with go od pos itive new s of settle ments, o r dema nds you a re goin g to ma ke. Respon dents provided no guidance in balancing ethical considerations with the pressure to file and settle cas es to ge nerate s pecific revenu e benc hmark s. Thus, numerous indicators alerted Respondents to the need for a heightened level of supervision, but Respondents failed to design and implement policies and procedures that reasonab ly would ensure compliance with the Maryland Rules under the specif ic circumstances of this case. In addition, Respondents neglected other basic c ompon ents of a reasonable supervision effort required under our view of MRPC 5.1. Foremost among these failures was failing to supervise the identific ation of pendin g dead lines. See MRPC 5.1, Comment 2. K&S had in place an adequate system for tracking deadlines once the deadline was identified; however, the procedure for initially identifying and entering the deadline into the system was defeated too easily by the sole employee in the physically remote office. Many incoming pleadings, motions, and inquiries were mailed directly to the Maryland office, where Katz was responsible for opening and sorting the notices and entering the relevant data into the computer system. She had singular power to override the firm s d eadline identific ation syste m simp ly by ignorin g it. Ficker indicates that the nature of some firms requires an automated file tracking system to manage deadlines, but it does not follow that the mere acquisition and the placing in service of a computerized system constitutes full satisfaction with appropriate supervision obligations. Obviously, if the computer system had been used faithfully by Katz , it would have alerted her, an d the out-of -state home office as well, th at deadlines were slipp ing in Maryland. The sup ervising attorn ey may not assu me that the a ssociate attorn ey necessarily is complying with office p rocedures. Partners and owners must put in place some failsafe to ensu re that the emp loyed attor neys a re no t avo iding the com pute r system, especially where the computer system is the sole wellspring of accou ntability. Even in r esponse to Kimmel s supervisor y tactic of requirin g Katz to p rove that sh e was pro ducing the requisite quantity and quality of demand letters, Katz was able to fabric ate demand letters in cases that had been dismissed. K immel s and the firm s procedures provided no cross-check agains t dema nd letter s written for cas es that w ent unid entified in the co mpute r system. Related to Respondents failure to provide a system for identifying deadlines that could not be circumvented so easily is the responsibility supervisors have under our Rules to ascerta in whe ther dele gated ta sks are p erform ed actu ally. Zucke rman , 386 Md. at 352, 872 A.2d at 700; Mooney, 359 Md. at 90, 753 A.2d at 35 (holding that the supervisin g attorney fell short when he did not ascertain if an employee performed responsibilities in a competent manner). In Zuckerman, we sanctioned a Maryland attorney for improper supervision when he assigned a non-lawyer employee8 to balance the firm s checkbook, but did not follow up to see that the d elegated task was perf ormed in f act. As a resu lt of his failure to follow up on the delegated task, the attorney did not discover for an additional month that mo ney was embe zzled f rom his client tru st accou nt. In the present case, Respondents delegated the entry of pending deadlines to Katz, but did not asce rtain whether the task w as perform ed actually and competently. The actual performance of the task could be procrastinated indefinitely or withheld deliberately, at least by an employee in a one-p erson office with the d egree of freedom from comprehensive oversig ht cede d to Ka tz. Respondents assert that no reasonable supervision could have avoided the conduct. Yet, Kimmel testified that the moment he set foot in Katz s office for the first time, over one year after she was hired, he knew that something severely was amiss. He observed that paperwork was piled in her office and that Katz looked like a beaten dog. If, before then, Kimmel had supervised more clos ely the openin g of the ne w branc h in Ma ryland, he likely would have discovered the problems much sooner. Whether an employee s ethical breaches 8 MRPC 5.3(a) provides that a partner in a law firm shall make reasonab le efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving re ason able assu ranc e tha t the p erso n's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer. MRPC 5.3(b) provides that a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the non-lawyer shall make reasonab le efforts to ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the la wyer. Like MRPC 5.1, the Rule governing the supervision of a nonlawyer employee obligates the partners of a firm and the non-law yer s direct supe rvisor to employ reasonable efforts to ensure the person s conduct meets the standard of the lawyer s professional responsibility. Because under MRPC 5.1 both the supervising attorney and the supervised attorney have sworn an oath to abide by the same written code of professional conduct, the Rule directs attention to the code itself. The Rule governing the conduct of non-law yer employees a lso points to th e written co de, but doe s so by holding both the law yer and th e non-l awyer to the law yer s prof essiona l obligat ions. are due to the e mployee s su b-standard perform ance or th e deliberate circumvention of standard procedures, proper supervision must include mechanisms to determine whether the delegated tasks are being performed.9 Respon dents stress th at help was available to Katz, if she had been honest about the status of the cases. Comment 3 to MRPC Rule 5.1, however, counsels explicitly that [T]he partners may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules." Respondents were not free to assume that the assoc iate inevitably would disclose her mishandled cases or conform with procedures for entering deadlines into the firm s computerized case management system. B. M RPC 1.4 Finally, we con sider the cha rged violatio n of M RPC 1 .4. Respon dents asserte dly were ob ligated to com municate directly with Carter, a Maryland client who contacted the Pennsylvania office, after Ka tz s departur e, with que stions regard ing the status o f his Maryland case. Respondents argue that this charge should be dismissed because the requirement of communication applies to the individual attorney handling the client s matter and therefore is not a responsibility for which they can be vicariously responsible in a grievance proceeding. They point out that neither of them was counsel of record for Carter. Respon dents furth er contend that becaus e neither is licen sed to practic e in Maryland, it would have been an ethical breach for either to contact a Maryland client directly. Carter hired K &S, not Katz. Carter s numerous post-Apocalyptic inquiries to the 9 It seems appropos here to recall the simple admonition attributed to former President Rona ld W. R eagan , Trust , but ver ify. firm s home of fice placed a duty on the f irm to respo nd in a timely fashion, especially where K&S had notice that the Maryland office had become dysfunctional and triage was required. The onus was on Respondents, when Katz resigned, to ensure that a response was made promptly to inquiries submitted to the firm by affected clients. To conclude otherwise would mean that a firm would have no responsibility to respond to its clients if a matter became unassigned, for any reason, to a specific atto rney w ithin the firm. In this case, Carter s initially assigned K&S attorney had left the firm. The purpose of the Ru le would be thwarted if the firm Carter hired was not obligated to respond to his inquiries in such circumstances. Respondents, as the firm s manag ers, are acco untable fo r this actionab le dela y. VI. Sanction Under M aryland law, th e purpose of disciplina ry proceeding s is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and the public's confidence in the legal p rofession. W e protect the p ublic through sanctions against offending attorneys in two ways: through deterrence of the type of conduct which will not be tolerated , and by removing those unfit to continue in the practice of law from the rolls of those authorized to practice in this State. The pub lic is protected when sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations . . . . Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 75, 930 A.2d 328, 347-48 (2007 ). Respondents urge, at most, a reprimand for any failure to supervise in violation of MRPC 5.1 and dismissal of the charge of failed communication with a client in violation of M RPC 1.4. Ba r Coun sel reco mmen ds an in definite suspen sion. Indefinite suspension was the sanction imposed in Ficker and Mooney where the respective attorneys violated MRPC 5.1 regarding proper supervision of junior lawyers.10 In Ficker, the attorney-proprietor of the law practice had been w arned prev iously to install administrative and supervisory processes in his office that would foster the client focus protected by the Rule. In the 1998 disciplinary action (of the multiple ones mounted against 10 It can be slippery business, in trying to calibrate temporal limits for a suspension sanction, to extrapolate prior cases for comparability to the case at hand. For example, the dissenting opinion h ere seems to suggest that Atty. Griev. Comm'n v. Hines, 366 Md. 277, 783 A.2d 656 (20 01), and Atty. Griev. Comm'n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 706 A .2d 1045 (1998 ), are more apt barometers for calculating the minimum time before Respondents here may apply for reinstatement than is Atty. Griev. Comm'n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 753 A.2d 17 (2000). Dissent slip op. at 1-2. That, however, is not necessarily a fair inference to draw. It is apparent from the hearing judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the present case that R esponde nts were "trie d" for allege dly violating MRPC 5.1(a) and (b) (see Part II, A., Page 14 of the hearing judg e's findings a nd conclu sions). The responde nt in Hines, on the other hand, was found to have violated MRPC 5.1(c), which holds accounta ble a partner or supervising lawyer for ordering/ratifying misconduct or failing to ta ke reason able remedial action, actually knowing of the existence of a junior attorney's misconduct, at a time when the ill consequences could have been avoided. Hines, 366 Md. at 279-80, 783 A.2d at 657. Hines also w as found to have vio lated MR PC 1.7 (c onflicts of in terest) in his represe ntation. Id. In the Ficker case of greatest relevance here (Ficker ha s been a fre quent flyer in disciplinary matters w ith at least three reported disciplinary cases 319 Md. 305, 572 A.2d 501 (1990); 349 Md. 13, 706 A.2d 1045 (1998); and 399 Md. 445, 924 A.2d 1105 (2 007); and two priva te reprimand s in 1998 and 2002, respectively), the respondent violated MRPC 5.1 with regard to two complainants, but there also were a host of oth er violations a s well, including multiple violations of MRPC 1.1, 1.3, and 8.4(d), spread acr oss eights complainants. Ficker, 349 Md. at 42-43, 706 A.2d at 1059. Thus, the indefinite suspension in Ficker with a right to reapply for reinstatement no sooner than 120 days after the effective date of suspension is difficult to lay at the feet of the two 5.1 violations alone. To be sure , Mooney also involved a host of violations (MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 5.3, 7.1, 8.1, and 8.4), including a single coun t of violating M RPC 5 .1 with rega rd to one complainant out of the four complainants whose matters were joined for disciplinary prosecution. Mooney, 359 Md. at 63-72, 753 A.2d 20-25. Caution is the watchword when drawing conclusions that a former case supports a more apt time limitation than another case. On balance, and compared to the facts of the present case (adjusting for the relative volumes and va riety of R ules vio lated), Mooney, we think, is a better barometer here than Hines or Ficker. him over the years), he was suspende d indefinitely, bu t allowed to apply for reinstatement after 120 days.11 Ficker, 349 M d. at 44, 706 A.2d at 10 60. The su spension im posed in Mooney also was in definite. He was eligible to apply for reinstatement no sooner than 90 days after the effective date of the s uspen sion. Mooney, 359 M d. at 90, 7 53 A.2 d at 35. In the present c ase, though the superv isory procedu res in effect at K&S were not as loose or flawed as those in the other cases where attorneys were sanctioned for failed supervision, the harm suffered by the K&S clients was egregious and flowed from the shortcomings identifie d earlier in this op inion. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sapero, 400 Md. 4 61, 490 , 929 A .2d 483 , 500 (2007) (holding a reprimand appropriate where violations were not egregious and clients not harmed). Indefinite suspension is in keeping with the sanction that would be imposed on a Maryland attorney who acted as Respon dents acted. Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Decho witz, 358 Md. 184, 193, 747 A.2d 657, 661 (2000) (reasoning , in the contex t of imposing a Maryland sanction in a reciprocal disciplinary action, that the sanction will depend on the unique facts and circumstances of each case, but with a view toward consistent dispositions for similar misconduct) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Sabghir, 350 M d. 67, 83 , 710 A .2d 926 , 934 (1 998)). Mitigating factors that may influence consideration of the appropriate sanction include a respondent s prior grievance history, the likelihood the misconduct will be repeated, and rem orse. Seiden, 373 Md. at 422, 818 A.2d at 1115. In regard to mitigation here, the hearing judge noted the unusual circumstances and extraordinary pressures Respon dents faced in the aftermath of Katz's abrupt resignation and their sudden realization 11 In the fifth instance of disciplining Ficker for lax management of a high-volume practice , he wa s not allo wed to seek re instatem ent for o ne year. Ficker , 399 Md. 445, 924 A.2d 1105 (2 007). of the scope of the problems she left behind. Judge Cox noted with approval the damage control efforts of Respondents. They re-staffed the Maryland office, covered a busy court calender, sought client contact, prevented further lapses, and settled cases that could not be salvag ed. In the end, only one client filed a complaint about failed commun ication: Carter. He, ho weve r, was f ully satisfie d with t he settle ment p rovide d by Res ponde nts. Despite intense and effective damage control efforts undertaken immediately upon discovery of the employee s misconduct in Zuckerman, the attorney was suspended inde finit ely. Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 349-52, 872 A.2d at 698-700 (noting that the attorney reported the loss imme diately, coopera ted with police, testified to aid in the conviction of the dishonest employee, and restored promptly the stolen funds). Moreover, we are not unmindful of the influence of our disposition here on any reciprocal discipline that may be imposed by other jurisdictions. Md. Rule 16-773 (governing Maryland s reciprocal discipline for misco nduct by M aryland attorne ys in other jurisdictions); Md. Rule 16-760 (c) (3) (requiring a Maryland respondent promptly to notify the disciplinary authority in each jurisdiction in which the respon dent is admitted to practice of d isciplinary action imposed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland). The sanction we impose generally guides other jurisdictions where Respondents are admitted to the practice of law in determining an appropriate disciplinary respon se. See Dec howitz, 358 Md. at 192, 747 A.2d at 661 ( [T]his Court is duty-bound to assess fo r itself the prop riety of the sanc tion imposed by the other jurisdiction. ). We conclude that indefinite suspension is the appropriate base sanction in this case . Because of R espo ndents i nten se, im med iate, and largely effective recovery efforts,12 however, we ultimately conclude that they may apply for reinstatement no sooner than 90 days. We are persuaded that Respondents understand where they erred and are unlikely to repe at his tory. 13 We are unaware of prior disciplinary actions against either Respo ndent. 12 The dissent states that this description mischaracterizes the hearing judge's findings and conclusions with rega rd to Responde nts' recovery initiatives after learning fully of Katz's misconduct. Dissen t, slip op. at 4-5. We beg to diffe r. The hearing judge found that K&S mobilized attorneys and paraleg als to assist in assessing the p roblem. T he fi rm im med iately hired three Maryland lawyers, and K atz's cases w ere all reassign ed within a two to four week period. K&S undertoo k to resolve client problems that came to light that were c reated by Ka tz's inaction. Clients were contacted and advised of the status and outcome s in their cases. Silverman quickly made fair settlement offers, including payment of fees to consult with counsel, for former clients who asserted the claims. As to Carter, the only former Maryland client of K&S to complain to the Attorney Grievance Commission, the hearing judge found that, although K&S was slow to return his calls and other communications follow ing Ka tz's resign ation (h ence th e MR PC 1.4 violation), "Carter's case was eve ntually resolved to his satisfactio n, including payment of his damages and fees to enable him to consult with counsel. Silverman negotiated the settleme nt reaso nably an d effic iently." 13 The dissent takes exception to this declaration. Dissent slip op. at 4. The dissent grounds its view on the narrow basis that there are no "factual findings [presumably by the hearing judge] in support" of that declaration. We respond in two ways: (1) as noted infra in the Majority opinion, it was found by Judge Cox that, once the situation in the Maryland office was revealed undeniably, K&S immediately took the supervisory and management action that was necessary to staff the Maryland office properly, re-assign Katz's cases, and contact the Maryland clients to apprise them of the true status of their cases and off er fair settlements (including p aying fees fo r counsel) to clients who made claims; and, (2) at the time of the evidentiary hearing before Judge Cox, K&S maintained two lawyers and a paralegal in residence in its Maryland office. W e submit that actions speak louder than (contin ued...) 13 (...continued) words, as the adage goes. Moreover, Respon dents were cooperative throughout the investigation and evidentiary hearing of the cases. Judge Cox openly acknowledged this at the commencement of the hearing, after various stipulations by the parties were offered, when she remarked, "I think everyon e's been incredib ly coope rative so far." Fina lly, although each member of the Court certa inly is free to choose to believe or not a respondent's representation , Respon dents, in the p art of their Ex ceptions dire cted to possible sanctions, stated: Respondents, even before Petitioner instituted proceedings, and throughout these proceedings, have expressed deep regret over the harm caused to their clients' cases, and have demonstrated this remorse by making the ir former clients whole, at considerable expense. .... Respon dents have taken even greater measures to ensure that the situation from which these proceedings arose never again occurs, and have an a biding and continuing interest in providing Maryland consumers able and ethical representation. Indeed, this situation has never occurred before, and will not occur again. The dissent points, in support o f its disbelief of Respondents' penitent state of mind and refo rmation, to K &S's website. D issen t, slip op. a t 4. A ccor ding to the dissent's interpretation of that website, as it appeared on 29 July 2008, K&S maintains only two "managing attorneys " for the nine jur isdiction s in wh ich the f irm ma intains a practice . Id. That website, visite d on 1 A ugust 2008, contained no reliable basis for the conclusion reached by the dissent. The only portion of the K&S website that discusses the designation of "managing a ttorn ey" is the attorneys' biographies link. Of the sixteen attorney biographies on that link, the professional biographies of only two contain any reference to being a managing attorney, one specifically described as the "[m]anaging attorney for the Maryland office" and the other described generically as a "managing attorney," but without association with any of th e three ju risdiction s in wh ich she is admit ted to pr actice. Given the obvious marketing purpose o f the web site and its non-exhaustive content, it is unreasonable to infer from this context that K& S only mainta ins two m anaging a ttorneys, one fo r its sole Maryland (contin ued...) The purpose of protecting Maryland citizens does not seem well-served by a greater minim um sit- out pe riod. The casual read er may qu estion th e sense of a req uireme nt that atto rneys, not admitted to practice la w in Maryland and evincing n o desire to become so admitted, are obliged to petition the C ourt of A ppeals of M aryland for re instatemen t. This misperception evaporates on a more fulsome consideration of the relevant rule. Maryland Rule 16-701(j) defines reinstatement as the termination of a suspension or exclusion from any privilege associated with the practice of law in the State. Under Maryland Rule 16760(k), when an out-of-state attorney is suspended by the Court of Appeals for misconduct sanctionab le under the MRPC, the Clerk of this Court places the name of the attorney on a list maintained in that Cou rt of non-admitted attorneys who are excluded from exercising in any manner the privilege of practicing law in the State. Thus, reinstatement does not implicate, in this case, actual admission to the Maryland Bar; rather, it is required to remove Respondents names from the list of attorneys that enjoy no privileges associated with the practice of law within the State, including supervising othe r law yers. See Md. Rule 16781(k)(3) (describing duties of the clerk in rega rds to attorneys n ot admitted to practice on reinstatement). This too likely will have a bearing on reciprocal discipline elsewhere, if an y. Thus, Respon dents shall b e indefinitely sus pended, w ith the right to apply for reinstatement no soon er than 90 days after the effective date of the suspension. The effective date of the suspension shall be 30 days after the filing of the Court s mandate in this case. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 13 (...continued) office and one who manage s the remain ing eight jurisd ictions. The d issent, from a wholly unreliable and non-comprehensive source, overreaches in its zeal to justify disbelieving Respondents' representations in the record of these cases. SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY T H E C L E R K O F T H I S C O U RT , INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-515 (C), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE C O M M I S S IO N JOINTLY AN D SEVERALLY AGAINST CRAIG KIMMEL AND ROBERT SILVERMAN. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 20 September Term, 2007 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. CRAIG KIMMEL Misc. Docket AG No. 21 September Term, 2007 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ROBERT SILVERMAN Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Eldr idge (Retired , Spe cially Assigned) Raker (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J., which Eldridge, J. joins. Filed: September 2, 2008 I respectfully diss ent. I agree with the conclusions that Silverman and Kimmel, Respondents herein, violated MRPC 5.1 ( Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers ) as well as 1.4 ( Comm unication ) and that ind efinite suspe nsion is the proper sanction. What I disagree with is permitting the Respondents to apply for reinstatement in only 90 days, because of what the majority characterizes as mitigating factors. Respondents conduct demonstrably was more egregious than that of other lawyers upon whom we have imposed greater sanctions, and, moreover, the aggravating factors in the present case mand ate a mo re subs tantial sa nction. This Court has addressed very few 5.1 violations and in each of the cases in which a lawyer was sanctioned for supervisory dereliction, the breadth of the systemic failure constituting the Rule violation was exponentially less than in the present case. In Attorney Grievance v. Hines, 366 M d. 277, 2 95, 783 A.2d 656, 666 (2001), we concluded that indefinite suspension from the p ractice of law , with the right to ap ply for readm ission six months from the d ate of his suspension was the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rule governing conflicts of interest as well as Rule 5.1, when an associate at Hines office represented Hines w ife in a suit to recover money the wife loaned to a corporation of which Hines was a p artial ow ner; on e matte r was im plicated . A flawed system of litigation management in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 32, 44-45, 706 A.2d 1045, 1054, 1060 (1998), along with a prior reprim and, yielded an indefinite suspension from the practice of law, with the right to reapply for admission after 120 days subject to specific monetary and supervisory requirements;1 the most serious of Ficker s violations 1 As a condition to Ficker s reapplication, Ficker was ordere d by this Court to pay all costs assess ed by this Co urt and obtain a monitor, acceptable to Bar Counsel, who will agree, at Ficker s expense, to oversee Ficker s practice of law for a period of at least two (contin ued...) arose out of his practice of assigning too many cases to too few lawyers, mostly at the last minute . Significantly, when Ficker was again sanctioned for c areless man agemen t in Attorney Grievance v. Ficker, 399 M d. 445, 4 47, 455 -56, 92 4 A.2d 1105, 1 106, 1111 (2007), the sanction imposed was indefinite suspension from the practice of law, with the right to reapply for admission no earlier than one year form the effective date of the suspension. In the case in which we meted out the same sanction as the majority does here, Attorney Grievance v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 95, 753 A.2d 17, 37-38 (2000), we considered an instance where an associate was not assigned a case until the day before trial and, thus, appeared at trial unprepa red, reflective of a systemic f ailure to prov ide case files in a timely manner and to ensure that the associate was aware o f her responsibilities. Moon ey s supervisory failure, however, was not on the same level as the systemic neglect of supervisory duties in the present case, in which forty-seven cases were dism issed with prejudice and a massive meltdown in an active litigation practice ensued. The results of Kimmel and Silverman s lapses in judgment were much harsher than in any case reviewed. The hearing judge in the present case clearly flagged the distinction between the harm attributed to Kimmel and Silverman s conduct and that sanctioned in other cases, when she wrote: the harm caused by the lapses of practice within the firm is perhaps more egregious than any of the other cases cited. Forty-seven cases were dismissed based upon the failures of an associate under the supervision of Kimmel and Silverman. The most noteworthy of these lapses is that Kimmel and Silverman never set foot in the Maryland office to determine whether the practice met ethical standards until Katz quit, even though 1 (...continued) years and to provide to Bar Counsel monthly reports for one year and quarterly reports for the second year. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ficker, 349 Md. 13, 44-45, 706 A.2d 1045, 1060 (1998). 2 their name was rooted on the door. They also demonstrated considerable lack of judgment and care when they hired a lawyer with absolutely no experience in contested litigation or lemon law, did n ot provide e ven a day s w orth of app renticeship in the Maryland office, failed to more closely monitor Katz and failed to tailor the practice to Maryland where, as the hearing co urt wrote, [ t]he inability to file all cases in one jurisdiction, the aggressive approach to some of the discov ery litigation, venue and expert challenges, and the lack of early arbitration all differed from the stan dard practice in other states wh ere the firm practice d, leadin g to an in creased work load fo r Katz. It is also significant that Kimmel and Silverman dismissed Katz s consistent pattern of requests for on site assistance. In fact, the he aring judge s findings d emonstra te that the firm culture was on e where requests fo r supervisory instruction and other assistance were either responded to h arshly or dem eaned. In re sponse to a plea for ass istance in late November of 2004, one of the membe rs of the firm emailed K atz, with cop ies sent to bo th Kimmel and Silverman, stating no excuses, don t call, no need to talk, just get on it and only call me w ith good positive news of settle ments, o r dema nds your [sic] go ing to m ake. The hearing judge also found that in December of 2004 another exchange occurred between Katz and the Office Manager after another Katz inquiry, with the followin g result: K atz inquired of the Office Manager wh ether there was any news about hiring a paralegal for Maryland. In response, she was reminded of the nee d to file fifte en com plaints p er wee k. The majority, how ever, relies on ly on perceive d mitigating factors to support the decision to permit Respondents to reapply for admission after only 90 days. Without any factual finding s in sup port, the majority p osits tha t, Respondents understand where they erred and are un likely to repeat histo ry, although a review of Kim mel and Silverma n s website, http://www.lemo nlaw.com (last visited July 29, 2008 ), reflects that they have only two manag ing attorneys for offices in eight states as well as the District of Columbia. 3 Two attorneys supervising what is occurring in a high-volume practice over nine jurisdictions, including Maryland, does not reflect understanding of the need for supervision and increased care. Add ition ally, the majority s discussion of the Respondents recovery efforts as intense, immedia te, and largely effective is a mischaracterization of the he aring court s findings. Far from efforts that were intense, immediate, and largely effective, in the one effort documented, K immel and Silverm an failed for six months after Katz res igned to respond to Charles Carter, a client of the firm whose lawsuit was dismissed for lack of prosecution: Carter also sent letters to K&S s home office on August 23, September 10, September 28[,] December 31, 2005 and February 6, 2006 seeking a status update and Scheduling Order. Carter also sent e-mails to the home office. The first responsive commu nication C arter received was a letter dated Febru ary 7, 200 6, advis ing him of the d ismissa l of his c ase. Although Carter was eventually compensated, it is clear, as the hearing judge found, that Silverman did not become involved until Carter hired counsel after learning of the dismiss al. The fate o f the forty-six other clien ts whose c ases were dismissed w ith prejudice due to Kimmel and Silverman s inadequate supervision and who, un like Carter, presuma bly did not ob tain outside counsel after their d ismissals, has n ot been ad equately addressed. The aggravatin g factors cle arly outweigh any perceive d, albeit not real, mitigating factors. Forty-seven dismissals resulted from Responden t s lack of supervision. Kimmel and Silverm an also have h ad sub stantial e xperien ce in the practice of law , because both were admitted to the Pennsylvania bar in 1989 so that they clearly understand the complexities of a litigation practice, but did not supervise a novice. Finally, Respo ndents established their footho ld in lemon law case s nearly seven teen years ago , certainly 4 sufficient time to develop the level of supervision adequa te enough to ensu re that the firm has in effect m easures giv ing reason able assurance that all lawyers in the firm co nform to the Maryland Law yers Rules of Professiona l Conduct. Rule 5 .1(a). Katz was disbarred by consent for her actions. Justice and our conc ern for the p ublic welfare dictate that the lawyers who ensured her d ownfa ll should receive at least an indefin ite suspe nsion f or a per iod mu ch long er than 9 0 days. Accord ingly, I dissent. Judge Eldridge authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissenting opinion. 5
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