Suter v. Stuckey
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Judith Suter v. Darryl A. Stuckey No. 9, September Term, 2007. APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW - DOMESTIC VIOLENCE - PROTECTIVE ORDER: Family Law § 4-507 provides for a right of appeal from the entry of a protective order from the District Court to the Circuit Court and the appeal shall be heard de novo. APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW: The right to appeal may be lost by acquiescence in or consent to a final judgment. Accordingly, absent fraud or coercion, no appeal lies from a consent judgment. APPEALS - RIGHT OF REVIEW - ESTOPPEL, WAIVER, OR AGREEMENT - TRIAL DE NOVO: Absent fraud or coercion, a party may not appeal a protective order entered by consent pursuant to the Domestic Violence Protection Act. In the Circu it Court for P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Case No. CADV06-10916 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 9 September Term, 2007 JUDITH SUTER v. DARRYL A. STUCKEY Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned) Cathell, Dale, R. (Retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: November 14, 2007 This case arises out of a final protective order issued by the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince George s County, at the request of Judith Suter, petitioner. We granted certiorari to consider the following question: In a domestic violence protective order proceeding originating in the District C ourt, is a respondent estopped from appealing to the circuit court a protective order entered by consent? Suter v. Stuckey, 398 Md. 314 , 920 A.2d 105 8 (2007). I. Judith Suter filed a petition for a temporary protective order ( TPO ) in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Prince G eorge s County, on April 13, 2006. In the petition for protection from dom estic violence , Ms . Suter indica ted th at Darryl Stuckey, the re sponden t, punched her, slapped her, detained her against her will and pointed his gun in [her] face and threaten[ed] to shoot her. Petitioner described the triggering events as follows: On April 5 , 2006, Darryl Stuckey started an argument with me because I didn t take his phone calls. The argument lead into him slapping in my face, then punching me. He took me by my neck and threw me around the room. He then reached for his gun that was under the mattress and pointed it in my face, threatening to shoot me. He then hit me with the gun on the side of my head . I ran to ca ll 911 fr om the cordles s phon e. He had removed all the cordless phones o ut of the ho use. I ran into h is office to call 911 and we started f ighting aga in. I punche d him in his face and started throwing stuff at him to protect myself . . . I finally dialed 911. They picked up and asked me questions. He then started taking things out of the house. He took all my keys and my handbag out of the house. He took my laptop and hid that. T he polic e came and ask ed both of us q uestion s. My fiancé and I and my daughter have been living together for over a year. We w ere plannin g on a w edding in S t. Kitts on July 15, 2006. I was afraid of my life and my daughter s. The police arrested him because there was evidence of abuse on my face. They released him around 2:30 am that morning. On April 12, 2006, he came up to my place of employment and started an argu men t. He took my house keys and my car keys and told me not to come home. I am now homeless and carless. I took the gun out of the house on Monday and gave it to the police yesterday when I called them. . . . The gun had bullets in it. He stole my cell phone, my handb ag, my ca mera, m y coat and other w ork file s. . . . Ms. Suter requested a wide spectrum of relief. In additio n to asking for the cou rt to order Stuckey to ref rain from a busing, threa tening, hara ssing, contac ting or attempting to contact her, she asked that Stuckey be ordered to stay away from her residence, her daughter s school an d her place of work . Ms. Sute r asked also that Stucke y be ordered to attend counseling and to pay emergency family maintenance. Finally, Ms. Suter asked that she be awarde d use and possessio n of the family car. That same day, the Court issued the TPO, essentially granting the relief requested by Ms. Suter and scheduling a final protective order hear ing on A pril 20, 2006. Five days later, the court entered a final protective order by consent pursuant to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-506(c) of the Family Law Article.1 1 Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. V ol.), § 4-506(c) of the Family Law Article reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) If the respo ndent app ears befor e the court a t a protective order hearing or has been served with an interim or temporary (contin ued...) -2- On May 17, 20 06, respon dent Dar ryl Stuckey noted an appea l to the Circuit Court for Prince George s County. Respondent based his appeal partly on Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-5 07(b) of th e Family Law Article,2 which provides f or a de no vo appea l in the Circuit Court from a District Court grant or denial of relief based on a petition for a final protective order. Section 4-507(b) reads as follows: (1) If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person eligible for relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court for the county where the District Court is located. (2) An appeal taken under this subsection to the circuit court shall be heard d e novo in the cir cuit cou rt. . . . Stuckey also base d his appeal o n M aryland Rule 7-10 2 (a) (2007 ), which go verns app eals from the D istrict Court to th e Circuit C ourt. 3 1 (...continued) protective order, or the court otherwise has personal jurisdiction over the respondent, the judge: (i) may proceed with the final protective order hearing; and (ii) if the judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order, the judge may grant a final protective order to protect a ny perso n eligibl e for rel ief from abuse. 2 Unless otherwise noted, hereinafter references to § 4-507 will be to Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §4-507 of the Family Law Article. 3 Maryland Rule 7-102 (2007) reads as follows: (a) De Novo. Except as provided in section (b) of this Rule, an appeal shall be tried de novo in all civil and criminal actions. (contin ued...) -3- In the Circuit C ourt, Ms. S uter filed a m otion to dism iss the appe al, arguing the appeal was time-barred and Stuckey was estopped from appealing a consent jud gment. Following a hearing, the Circuit Co urt granted th e motion to dismiss and affirmed the Final Protective Order. Suter filed a motion for a new trial and/or motion to amend judgment on August 22, 2006, which was denied. Stuckey requested a n in banc re view of th e Circuit C ourt ruling, pu rsuant to M d. Rule 2-551.4 Respon dent again argued tha t § 4-507(b) a nd Md . Rule 7-10 2 (a) entitled h im to a 3 (...continued) (b) On the Record. An appeal sha ll be heard on the record made in the District Court in the following cases: (1) a civil action in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000 ex clusive of in terest, costs, and attorney s fees if attorney s fees a re recovera ble by law or c ontract; (2) any matte r arising und er § 4-401 (7)(ii) of the C ourts Article; (3) any civil or criminal action in which the parties so agree; (4) an appeal from an order or judgment of direct criminal contempt if the sentence imposed by the District Court was less than 90 days imprisonment; and (5) an appeal by the State from a judgment quashing or dismissing a charging d ocumen t or granting a motion to dismiss in a criminal case. 4 Maryland Rule 2-551 (2007), in relevant part, reads as follows: (a) Gene rally. When r eview by a c ourt in banc is permitted by the Maryland Constitution, a party may have a judgment or determination of any point or question review ed by a court in banc by filing a notice f or in ba nc revie w. Issues are reserved for in ba nc re view by making an objection in the manner set forth in Rules 2-517 and 2-520. Upon the filing of the notice, the Circuit Administrative Judge shall designate three judges of the (contin ued...) -4- de novo hearing in the Circuit Court. Ms. Suter argu ed that no appeal lies from a consent judgmen t. The panel ruled that based o n statutes go verning ap peals from the District Court to the Circuit Court in domestic violence protective order cases, Stuckey was entitled to a de novo appeal. In its written opinion and order, the panel first found the cases cited by Ms. Suter not applicable because those cases involved [a]ppeals from the Circuit Court to the Co urt of Special Appeals which are on the record appeals, not de novo appeals. The panel reasoned as follow s: The instant case is distinguishable in the respect that this is a domestic violence case in the District Court being appealed to the Circuit Court. Without the use of specu lation or facts not in the record it is impossible to determine what benefit the party may have gained. There was no case law presented nor any discovered through th e Court s re search that Fry [v. Coyote 4 (...continued) circuit, other than the judge who tried the action, to sit in banc. ... (g) Dism issal. The panel, on its own initiative or on motion of any party, shall dismiss an in banc review if (1) in banc review is not permitted by the Maryland Constitution, (2) the notice for in banc review was prematurely filed or not timely filed, or (3) the case has become moot, and the panel may dismiss if the memorandum of the party seeking review was not timely filed. (h) Further Review. Any party who seeks and obtains review under this Rule has no further right of appeal. The decision of the panel doe s not preclu de an app eal to the Co urt of Special Appea ls by an opposing party who is otherwise entitled to appea l. -5- Portfolio, 128 Md. App. 607, 739 A.2d 91 4 (1999)] and its brethre n could be app lied to th is matter . The in banc panel found Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,5 controlling and dispo sitive. Section 12-401 sta tes, in pertinent part, as follows: (f) . . . In a civil case in which the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000 exclusive of interest, costs, and attorney s fees if attorney s fees are recoverable by law or contract, in any matter arising under § 4-401(7)(ii) of this article, and in any case in which the parti es so ag ree, an appeal shall be heard on the record made in the District Court. In every other case, including a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, and an appeal in a municipal infraction or Code violation case, an appea l shall be tried de n ovo. The in banc panel concluded that the case sub judice was an example of every other case that would be tried de novo under the section because appeals from a domestic violence protective order are not noted in the companion exceptions. The panel concluded also that Md. Rule 7-102 and § 4-507 support the finding that Stuckey was entitled to a de novo appeal. The panel reversed the Circuit Court and remanded the case for a trial de novo. This Court g ranted M s. Suter s petition fo r writ of certiora ri. Suter v. Stuckey, 398 Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2 007). 5 Unless otherwise noted, subsequent reference s herein to S ec. 12-401 shall be to Maryland Code (1 976, 200 6 Repl. V ol.), § 12-401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. -6- II. We address first the threshold question of wheth er this ca se is mo ot. A case is moot when there is no longer an existing c ontroversy when the ca se comes befo re the Court or when there is n o longe r an eff ective re medy the Court c ould gr ant. Human Resources, v. Roth, 398 Md. 137, 143, 919 A.2d 1217, 12 21 (2007 ); Attorney Gen. v. A. A. County School Bus, 286 Md. 324, 327, 407 A.2d 749, 752 (1979). The protective order at issue here expired under its own terms on April 18, 2007. Section 4-506(g)(1) of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol), provides that all relief granted in a final protective order shall be effective for the period stated in the order, n ot to exc eed 12 month s. 6 Section 4-507 allows an extension or modification of the protective order only during the term of the protective order. Now that th e ord er ha s exp ired, the C ourt may n ot modif y it. Even were we to agr ee with resp ondent, the re is no poss ible relief that c ould be granted. This appeal is the refore mo ot. 6 Final protective orders must expire, absent modification by the circuit court, within twelve months of their entry. Section 4-506(g)of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.) reads as follows: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection , all relief granted in a final protectiv e order sha ll be effective for the period stated in the order, not to exceed 12 months. (2) A subsequent circuit court order pertaining to any of the provisions included in the final protective o rder shall supersede those p rovision s in the f inal pro tective o rder. -7- Ord inarily, our inquiry would end here. Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221 (2007); see also State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 553 A.2d 672, 677 (198 9); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 306 Md. 556, 562, 510 A.2d 56 2, 565 (19 86); State v. Ficker, 266 Md. 500, 50607, 295 A.2d 231 (1972) ( Appellate courts do not sit to give opinions on abstract propositions or moot q uestions, and appeals w hich presen t nothing else for decision are dismissed as a matter of course. ). Under certain circumstances, however, this Court has found it appropriate to address the merits of a moot case. Roth, 398 Md. at 143, 919 A.2d at 1221. If a c ase implicates a matter of important public policy and is likely to recur but evade review, this cou rt may con sider the merits o f a mo ot case. Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996) ( This Court in rare instances, however, may address the merits of a moot case if we are convinced that the case presents unreso lved issues in matters of important p ublic concern th at, if decided , will establish a rule for futu re condu ct. ); Lloyd v. Superviso rs of Elections, 206 Md. 3 6, 43, 111 A .2d 379, 38 2 (1954) ( [I]f the pub lic interest clearly will be hurt if the qu estion is not im mediately decided, if the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, or a duty of government, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision, then the Court may find justification for deciding the issues raised by a question which has become moot, particularly if all these factors concur with sufficient -8- weight. ). See also S. Pac. Termina l Co. v. Interstate Comm erce Comm n, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S. Ct. 279, 28 3, 55 L. Ed. 310 (1 911). Ms. Suter urges this Court to consider the merits of this case, despite its having now become moot, because an important public policy is implicated and the very limited nature of protective orders means that this problem will continue to evade review. We agree that this case is one of those rare cases that presents an unresolved issue of important public concern. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to address this issue because it implicates an importa nt publ ic policy, it is likely to rec ur, and o n recur rence it w ill evade review . We have recognized protection from domestic violence as a significant important public policy concern to trigger review of moot cases. See, e.g., Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen, 365 Md. 12 2, 125, 775 A.2d 1249, 1251 (20 01); Coburn, 342 Md. at 250, 674 A.2d at 954. There were 23,813 domestic violence cases filed in Maryland District Court in fisca l year 200 6. M ARYLAND J UDICIARY, A NNUAL S TATISTIC AL A BSTRACT: F ISCAL Y EAR 2006, Table DC-8.13, District Court: Domestic Violence Cases Filed and Terminated, 5 Year Comparative Data: Fiscal Years 2002-2006 411 (2 006), available at http://www.courts.state.md.us/publications/annualreport/reports/2006/2006_annual_repor t.pdf. A large number of these end in consent judgments. In addition to being prevalent, such judgments will evade review because they expire under their own terms within, at most, a year. For these reasons we will consider the merits of the matter before us. -9- III. Ms. Suter argu es that appeals from domestic violence protective orders entered by consent in the District Cou rt should be governed by this Court s long-standing jurisprudence providing that no appeal shall lie from a consent order. Ms. Suter argues that to allow a de novo appeal from a consent order in the domestic violence context would be contrary to the intent of Ma ryland s Protec tion from D omestic V iolence A ct.7 Ms. Suter cites to both the protective purpose of the Act and the Legislature s grant of concu rrent jurisdiction and full equitable powers to the District C ourt as evidence that the Legislature intended that protective orders entered by consent in the District Court should be treated with the same finality as the same orders entered by consent in the Circuit Court. Ms. Suter notes also that permitting a de novo appeal would disturb the bargain struck between the parties because one of the ben efits ba rgained for wa s the ces sation o f litigatio n. Ms. Suter then posits that disrupting freely made bargains w ould be contrary to the protective function the L egislature intended to serve in pas sing the Pro tection from Dome stic Violenc e Act. Stuckey presents three bases f or his position . First, he argue s that he is entitled to appeal to the Circuit Court pursuant to § 4-507(b)(1) . That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 7 The 198 0 Protection from Domestic V iolence A ct, 1980 M d. Laws , Chap. 88 7, is now codified at Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Rep. Vol.), §§ 4-501 et seq. of the Family Law Article. -10- If a District Court judge grants or denies relief under a petition filed under this subtitle , a res pondent, any p erson eligible for relief, or a petitioner may appeal to the circuit court for the county w here the District C ourt is lo cated. Section 4-507(b)(2) provides that an appeal taken under § 4-507(b)(1) to the Circuit C ourt shall be heard de nov o. Second , he relies also u pon § 12 -401. Fina lly, he relies upon Rule 7-102(a), which provides that except as provided in Section (b) of this Rule, an appeal sha ll be tried d e novo in all civil and crim inal case s. Stuckey maintains th at the Legis lature provid ed that any appeal from the District Court to the Circuit Court is to be de novo, and it is irreleva nt whethe r the order en tered in the District Cou rt was by consent. H e argues tha t the plain lang uage of th e statute shou ld control, and that if appeals from consent judgments are to be excluded , the Legislatu re should amen d the sta tute to pr eclude them e xplicitly. IV. It is a well-settled principle of the common law that no appeal lies from a consent decree.8 This Court first recognized the principle in 1848 in the case of Williams v. Williams when it stated where a decree is made by consent of counsel, there lies no appeal or 8 For the purposes of this analysis, the terms judgment, order and decree are functionally interchan geable . See Black s Law Dictionary 858 (8th Ed. 20 04) ( The term judgment includes an equitable decree and any order from which an appeal lies (citation omitted)); Id. at 441 ( consent decree. . . . also termed consent order. ) -11- reheari ng. 9 Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill. 302, 305, 32 Md. 231, 234 (1848) (quoting Bradish v. Gee, 27 Eng. Rep. 15 2, Ambl. 229 (17 54)). The rule was th e same in th e chance ry courts of Engla nd, wh ere the is sue of consen t decree s arose. See, e.g., Wo od v. Griffith, 35 Eng. Rep. 590, 1 Mer. 35 (1815); Bradish v. Gee, 27 Eng. R ep. 152; Downing v. Cage, 21 Eng. Rep 961, 1 Eq . Ca. Abr. 165 (1699); and DANIELL S C HANCERY P RACTICE 1110-11 (8th British ed., 1901). W e have ha d many opp ortunities to rea ffirm the basic princ iple that a judgmen t, if it was consented to, cannot be app ealed. See Bryant v. Social Services, 387 Md. 30, 42, 874 A .2d 457, 46 3 (2005); Long v. S tate, 371 Md. 72, 86, 807 A.2d 1, 9 (2002); Dietz v. Dietz, 351 Md. 683 , 690, 720 A.2d 2 98, 302 (1998); Osztreicher v. Juanteguy, 338 Md. 528, 534, 659 A.2d 1278, 1281 (1995); Chernick v. Chernik , 327 Md. 470, 481, 610 A.2d 770, 775 (199 2); Globe American v. Chung, 322 Md. 713, 716-17, 589 A.2d 956, 957 9 Apparently, the first recognition of this principle in Maryland o ccurred in the High Court of Chancery in 1824 in Ringgold s Case, 1 Bl. 5, 9, 12 (Md. Ch. 1824) (summarizing English treatment of the subject : at common law, no writ of error will lie from a judgment by default or by consent; so in equity the decree or order appealed from must have been adverse, and not made by the express or tacit consent of the appellant: as when a party thinks proper not merely to declin e opposition to measures which the Court would enforce, but, by himself or his counsel, consents to a de cree or order, there lies no appeal from it, even though he gave no s uch autho rity to his solicitor; his remedy being against his counsel; nor can any appeal be made generally available from a decree by default, or, as it would seem, from a decree taking the b ill pro confesso. (citations omitted)). In 1848 the High Court of Cha ncer y, while considering an appeal from a consent decree allowing the sale for forfeiture of a mortgage, found that if a judgment settled the questions of right between the parties the appeal should be entertained, no matter whether the decision was adverse, or by consent or default. Chesapeake Bank v. McClellan, 1 Md. Ch. 254, 255 (Md. Ch. 184 8). This Court disapproved Chesapeake Bank v. McClellan in Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, saying the rule in Chesapeake is not the law as annou nced by this co urt in case of consent in e quity cases. Emersonian Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209 , 214, 103 A. 423 , 424 (1918). -12- (1991); Banegura v. Taylor, 312 Md. 609, 615, 541 A.2d 969, 972 (1988 ); WSSC v. Riverdale Fire Co., 308 M d. 556, 560, 520 A.2d 13 19, 1321 (1987); Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. 65, 68, 427 A.2d 1002, 1004 (19 81); Long v. Runyeon, 285 Md. 425, 429-430, 403 A.2d 785, 788 (1979); Suburban Dev. Corp. v. Perryman, 281 Md. 168, 171, 377 A.2d 1164, 1165 (1977); Lohss an d Sprenk le v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118-19, 321 A.2d 53 4, 538 (1974); First Federated Co m. v. Comm r, 272 Md. 329, 332, 322 A.2d 539, 542 (1974); Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. 612, 630, 217 A.2d 531, 541 (1966 ); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24, 166 A. 599, 601 (19 33); Emersonion Apartments v. Taylor, 132 Md. 209, 214,103 A. 423, 42 4 (1918); Gable v. Williams, 59 Md. 46, 1882 WL 4508, *2 (1882); Williams v. Williams, 7 Gill. 302.10 The rule that there is no right to appeal from a consent decree is a subset of the broader principle s und erlyin g the right to ap peal . The avai labil ity of appeal is limited to parties who a re aggr ieved b y the final judgm ent. Thom pson v . State, 395 Md. 240, 248-9, 909 A.2d 1035, 1041 (2006) (citing Adm r, Motor Vehicle Adm. v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 664, 299 A.2d 1, 3 (1973)). A party cannot be aggrieved by a judgment to which he or she acquiesced. See Dietz, 351 M d. at 689 -90, 72 0 A.2d at 301- 02. The right to appeal may be 10 The rule is otherwise if there wa s no actual consent. If there was no actual consent because the judgment was coerced, exceeded the scope of consent, or was not within the jurisdiction of the court, or for any other reason consent was not effective, an appeal will be entertained. See, e.g ., Bryant v. Social Services, 387 Md. 30, 41-42, 874 A.2d 457, 463 (2005); Chernik v . Chernik , 327 Md. 470, 477, 610 A.2d 770, 773 (1992); Long v. Runeyon, 285 Md. 42 5, 429-30 , 403 A.2d 785, 788 (1979); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Schloss, 165 Md. 18, 24-25, 166 A . 599, 601-02 (193 3). -13- lost by acquiescence in, or recognition of, the validity of the decision below from which the appeal is taken or by otherwise taking a position which is inconsistent with the right of appea l. Rocks v. Brosius, 241 Md. at 630, 217 A.2d at 541. The rationale for this general rule has been variously characterized as an estoppel , a waiver of the right to appeal, an acceptance of benefits of the court determination creating mootness , and an acquiescence in the jud gmen t. Franzen v. Dubinok, 290 Md. at 68, 427 A.2d at 1004 (1981). The nature of a consent jud gment pre cludes app eal. Conse nt judgments are essentially agreements entered into by the parties which must be endorsed by the court. They have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees. Chernick v. Chernick, 327 Md. at 478, 610 A.2 d at 774 (1 992) (citing Local Number 93 v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 519, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3073, 92 L. Ed.2d 405 (1986)). Like contracts, the parties bargain and provide consideration. Consideration is not always tangible. In the case of a consent judgmen t, the fact that the parties give up any meritorious claims or defenses they may have had in order to avoid further litigation may serv e as con sideratio n. Long v. S tate, 371 Md. 72, 86, 807 A.2d 1, 9 (2002). In Chernik , this Court addressed the impact of one of the parties change of mind on a consent order which had been signed and filed with the co urt. Chernik , 337 Md. at 484, 610 A.2d at 777. We held that where the underlying bargaining was not unconscionable nor the product of duress, [t]he fact that one of the parties may have changed his or her mind -14- shortly before or after the submitted consent order was signed by the court does not invalidate the signed consent judgment. Id. The contractual nature of the consent decree meant that when there was uncoerced bargaining for the reciprocal promises made to one anothe r the en d prod uct sho uld not be distu rbed. Id. at 480, 6 10 A.2 d at 774 . The public policy of promoting settlement agreeme nts by ensuring finality is another reason to disallow appeals fro m consent judgments. The Court in Chernick pointed to the desirability of settlement agreements that are binding and enforceable. Id. at 481, 610 A.2d 775 (citing McClellan v. Kennedy, 8 Md. 230 (1855)). In Long v. S tate, the Court explained that treating settlement agreements in civil cases c ontempla ting a conse nt judgme nt, including their interpretatio n, as any other b inding con tract is consisten t with the pu blic policy dictating that courts should look with favor upon the compromise or settlement of law suits in the interest of efficiency and economical administration of justice and the lessening of friction and acrimony. Long v. State, 371 Md. at 84-85, 807 A.2d at 8 (quoting Clark v. Elza, 286 M d. 208, 219 , 406 A.2d 922, 928 (1979)). A lthough the issue in this ca se is moot, as future g uidance to the lower c ourts we turn to the question of whether a party may appeal the e ntry of a cons ent protective order in the D istrict Court. V. -15- The weight placed on the language of § 4-507 and § 12-401(d) by Stuckey and the panel merits a close examination of those statutes.11 Acc ordingly, we review the historical context in which each statute arose. We turn first to § 4-5 07. Section 4-507 is part of a broader statutory scheme enacted in 1980 as the D omestic Violen ce Prot ection A ct. See Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 4-501 through 4-516 of the Family Law Article.12 In 1992, th e Legislatu re substantiv ely amended the provisions of the Act, extending the period of available relief, expanding the definition of those eligible for relief, granting courts the ability to modify a protective order and establishing penalties for violations of the order. 1992 Md. Laws, Chap. 65. Section 4507, in pertinent part, read as follows: (b)(1) If the District Court grants or denies relief u nder a petition filed under this subtitle, a respondent, any person eligible for relief, or a petitioner may appea l to or file a petition for modifica tion in the circuit court of the county where the district court is located. 11 We need not cons ider Md . Rule 7-10 2 in determ ining wh ether there is a right to appeal from a domestic violence protective order entered by co nsent. We have prev iously made clear that the Maryland Rules do not g rant a rig ht to app eal. Dvorak v. County Ethics, 400 Md. 446, 452 n. 10, 929 A .2d 185, 18 9 n. 10 (20 07); Urban a Civic v. Urban a Mob ile, 260 Md. 45 8, 462-463, 272 A .2d 628, 631 (197 1). 12 The Domestic Violence Protection Act was enacted originally by Chapter 887 of the Acts of 1980 and was codified orig inally as §§ 4-501-4-506 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1974, 1980 Cum. Supp.). In 1984, the statute was repealed and reenacted by Chapter 296, §1 o f the Acts of 1984 and recod ified in the F amily Law Article of the Maryland Code (1984) at §§ 4-501 through 4-516. -16- (2) An app eal or petition f or modific ation taken under this subsection to the circuit court shall be heard de novo in the circuit co urt. 13 Md. Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.), § 4-507 of the Family Law Article. Section 4-506(c)(2), which was added also by this enactment, read as follows: If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, or if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order, the court may grant a protective order to protect a ny perso n eligibl e for rel ief from abuse. Md. Code (1984, 1992 Cum. Supp.), § 4-506(c)(2) of the Family Law Article. The language in 4-506(c ) allowing a judge to en ter a final pro tective order if the respondent consents to the entry of a protective order was added by an amendment from the Judicial Proceedings Committee at the first reading of S.B. 282, enacted as Chapter 282 of the Acts o f 1992 . D EPARTMEN T OF L EGISLATIVE R EFERENCE, J UDICIAL P ROCEEDINGS C OMMITTEE, A MENDMENT TO S ENATE B ILL 282, SB 0282/19 7662/1 (1992). The provision for a de novo appeal to the circuit court contained in § 4-507 originated by amendment from the House Judiciary Committee and was recommended for adoption by the Conference 13 Further amendments to § 4-507 did not produce changes relevant to this discussion. In 1994 the provision previously contained in § 4-507(b) th at allowed the circuit cou rt to modify protective orders was repealed and provision was made to allow the judgment of the District Court to remain in effect while appeals were taken. 1994 Md. Laws, Chap . 469. In 1997, § 4-507 (a) was amended to establish that subsequent circuit court orders superseded provisions of the protective order and to allow for an extension of time for the final protective order. 1997 Md. Laws, C hap. 307. T he 2002 amendm ents to § 4-507 brought the language into alignment with the Constitutional amendment expanding the authority of District Court comm issioners to issue interim domestic violence protective orders. 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 235. -17- Committee at the thir d readin g. D EPARTMENT OF L EGISLATIVE S ERVICES, C ONFERENCE C OMMITTEE R EPORT, SB0282/217 669/1 (1992). The 1992 amendm ents were a major legislative undertaking to strengthen the domestic violence law of Marylan d. See Triggs v. Sta te, 382 Md. 27, 45-46, 852 A.2d 114, 125-26 (2004). One of the conce rns surroun ding the ad option of th e bill was the burden it w ould create on the District Court system. See D EPARTMENT OF F ISCAL S ERVICES, F ISCAL N OTE: R EVISED TO S.B. 282 (1992). A manifestation of this concern was that a provision creating access to relief under the subtitle on a 24 hour basis was removed by ame ndment before the bill was p assed. See 1992 M d. Law s, Chap . 65. Proponents argued that while this new relief will impose some additional burden on the District Court, our overriding concern should be on the burden imposed on the abused mother and children. A TTORNEY G ENERAL J OSEPH C URRAN J R., L ETTER TO T HE H ONORABLE W ALTER M. B AKER, C HAIRMAN OF THE J UDICIAL P ROCEEDINGS C OMMITTEE, February 11, 1992 (hereinafter Curran letter). Curran informed the Judicial P roceeding s Comm ittee that settlement before hearing, which was common in the District of Columb ia court proc eeding up on whic h portions o f the 1992 bill was modeled, could dramatically reduce the number of cases the district court has to hear and, thus, mitigate the burden of dealing with the more complex remedies afforded in the new b ill. Id. Propone nts of the bill described the availability of emergen cy family mainten ance in District Court as an essentia l innov ation. Id. Previously, issues of child support would have -18- to be litigated in the circuit court, with delays of up to four month s. Id. Allowing emergency family maintenance in the District Court shifted the burden of circuit court litigation to the abuser if he is u nhapp y with the order, he files a case in circuit court and the support issue is examined de novo. Curran L etter (emph asis in origina l). Allowing review in th e circuit court was a way to ensu re access for victims w hile preserving due process rights for responde nts in prote ctive ord er cases . See J UDITH A W OLFER, L EGAL D IRECTOR, H OUSE OF R UTH, T ESTIMONY B EFORE THE S ENATE J UDICIAL P ROCEEDINGS C OMMITTEE (S.B. 282) (1992). We look next to § 12-401 . Section 12-401 is the general provision that governs appeals from final judgments of the District Court. The District Courts were created in 1970 by Constitutional amendment. The impleme nting legislation retained the right to trial de novo in civil cases where the amount in controversy was less than $1,000. 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 528. As subsequently codified, the provision for appeals, in pertinent part, read as follows: (a) An appeal from a judgment of the District Court in a criminal, motor veh icle, or civil case shall be taken to the Circu it Court in the county in which the judgment was rendered. If the case was originally tried in Baltimore City, an appeal in a criminal or motor vehicle case shall be taken to the Criminal Court of Baltimore and in a civil case to the Baltimo re City Court. In any case, ex cept a civil ca se involving a claim of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or more, there should be an absolu te right to a trial de n ovo. . . . Md. Code (1957, 1970 Cum. Supp.), Art. 26 §156. -19- During the 1971 legislative session the provision was amended as part of a larger revision of the duties and judicial compensation structure of the District Courts. 1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 423. Interestingly, the original bill, House Bill 512, was amended from a proposal to eliminate de novo appeal from the District Court to lan guage tha t merely curtailed the scope of the de novo appeal granted in the 1970 law. The session law reads, in relevant part, as follows: In any case the court shall hear and decide the appeal on the record made in the District Court. There shall be no right to a trial de novo in the appe llate court. IN CIVIL CASES INVOLVING A CLAIM OF LESS THAN FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS, IN CRIM INAL C ASES, A ND IN T RAFFIC CASES, THERE SHALL BE A TRIAL DE NOVO IN ALL APPEALS. HOWEVER, BY AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES, THE APPEAL MAY BE HEARD AN D DECIDED ON THE R ECOR D MA DE IN T HE DIS TRICT C OURT . IN ANY CIVIL CASE INVOLVING A CLAIM OF FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS OR M ORE THE APP EAL SHALL BE HEARD AND DECIDED ON THE RECORD MADE IN THE DIST RICT COU RT. 14 Id. In 1972, the statute was amended, again without substantive change. See 1972 Md. Laws, Chap. 181, § 24. Section 12-401 was enacted in its current form in the 1973 codification of the Co urts and Jud icial Proceedings Article . 1973 M d. Law s Spec . Sess., Chap. 2. As subsequently codified, the statute read, in pertinent part, as follows: (c) De nov o and on record ap peals. In a civil case in which the amount in controv ersy exceeds $500, and in any case in 14 In the 1970 Session Laws, strikeout indicated m atters stricken f rom the bill and all capitals indicate d matte rs adde d by ame ndme nt. See 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 1. -20- which the parties so agree, an appeal shall be heard on the record made in the D istrict Co urt. In every other case, including a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, an appea l shall be tried de n ovo. Md. Code (1974 ), § 12-401 of the C ourts and Judicial Procee dings Article. There have been many subsequent amendments to § 12-401. None have wrought substantive change to the provision providing for trial de novo,15 which now reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (f) De novo and on record appeals. . . . In every other case, including a criminal case in which sentence has been imposed or suspended following a plea of nolo contendere or guilty, and an appeal in a municipa l infraction or Code violation case, an appea l shall be tried de n ovo. Id. VI. We now turn to consider the application of §§ 4-507 and 12-401 to domestic violence protective orders entered by consent. When construing a statutory scheme, our primary purpose is to ascertain the intent of the Leg islature. Caroll v. K onits, 400 Md. 167, 191, 929 A.2d 19, 34 (2007). To do so, we first examine the plain language of the statute. Broadwater v. State, 401 Md. 175, 201, 931 A.2d 1098, (2007). The meaning of the plainest language is controlled b y the context in which it appears. Caroll, 400 Md. at 193, 15 There have been only two changes in the language of the sentence in § 12-401 dealing with de novo trial. In 1978 an appeal in a municipal infraction was added to those appeals tried de novo. 1978 Md. Laws, Chap. 735. In 1982, an appeal from a code violation was added. 1982 Md. Laws, Chap. 844. -21- 929 A.2d at 35 (citations om itted). The co ntext of a sta tute is an important aid to our determ ination o f legisla tive pur pose. Johnson v. Baltimore, 387 Md. 1, 12, 874 A.2d 439, 446 (2005); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). That context is informed by a bill s title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal. Kaczorowski, 309 M d. at 515 , 525 A .2d at 63 2. Here we must consider the effects of both § 4 -507 and § 12-4 01. In the case whe re two statutes apply to the same situation, we first attem pt to reconc ile them, and then, if the statutes remain contrad ictory, the m ore spe cific statute con trols. Park & Planning v. Anderson, 395 Md. 172, 183, 909 A.2d 694, 700 (2006); State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 11516, 695 A.2d 143, 149-50 (1997). Accordingly, we first examine the more specific statute, § 4-507, and look to reconcile our interpretation with § 12-401. We have examined the broader context of § 4-507 and found the Domestic Violence Protective Act to be a remedial statute designed to protect victims of domestic violence. Triggs v. State, 382 M d. 27, 45, 85 2 A.2d 1 14, 125 (2 004); Katsenelenbogen v. Katsenelenbogen 365 Md. 122, 133-34, 775 A.2 d 1249, 1 256 (200 1); Coburn v. Coburn 342 Md. 244, 252, 674 A.2d 951, 955 (1995 ); Barbee v. Barbee, 311 Md. 620, 623, 537 A.2d 224, 225 (1988). If protective orders entered by consent were appealable, the incentive for domestic violence victims to enter into such ag reements w ould be diminished. The reduction -22- or elimination o f the option to enter protective orders by consent implicates another legislative goal. In the 1992 amendments, where the provisions at issue here emerged, the Legislature was concerned also with the costs of implementation. Protective orders entered by consent sa ve admin istrative costs of trial. Allowin g a de novo appeal from a consent order in evitably in creases costs. In construing a statute, it is a long-standing rule of statutory interpretation that the common law will not be repealed by implica tion. Robinso n v. State, 353 Md. 683, 693, 728 A.2d 698, 702 (1999); Lutz v. State 167 Md. 1 2, 15, 17 2 A. 35 4, 355- 356 (1 934). A statute is not presumed to repeal the co mmon law furthe r than is exp ressly declared, a nd that a statute, mad e in th e aff irma tive w ithout an y negative expressed or implied, does not take away the common law. Robinson, 353 Md. at 693, 728 A.2d at 70 2 (quotations omitted). In Lutz, we said as follows: The rules of the common law are not to be changed by doubtful implication, nor overturned except by clear and unambiguous language. In order to h old that a statute has abrogated common law rights existing at the date of its enac tment, it mus t clearly appear that they are repugnant to the act, or the part thereof invoked, that their surviv al would in effect deprive it of its efficacy and render its provisions nugatory. Lutz, 167 Md. at 15, 172 A. at 356 (quoting 25 R.C.L. 1054). If the common law and the statute are in conflict, however, the common law yields to the statute to the extent of the inco nsistenc y, and a statute whic h deals w ith an entire subject-matter is generally construed as abrogating the common law as to that subject. Id. (interna l citations omitted ). -23- Maryland comm on law is clear th at, as a ge neral ru le, the only persons who may appeal a judgm ent are th ose agg rieved b y that judg ment. Thompson, 395 Md. at 248-49, 909 A.2d at 1041. The corollary that a judgment entered by consent may not be app ealed is we ll supported in our ju risprud ence. Bryant, 387 Md. at 42, 874 A.2d at 463. There is no express declaration contained in the text of § 4-507 or anywhere in the legislative history that purports to abrogate or limit the common law rule that a party must be aggrieved in order to have the right to appeal. Section 4-507 makes no mention of ord ers ente red by co nsent. The Legislature was silent on the matter and we will not read this statute as an abrogation of the commo n law rule th at a party may not a ppeal from a consen t judgmen t. Indeed, § 4-507 does not conflict with the common law16 because its provisions can be given full effect without derogation from the commo n law. If a responde nt, any person eligible for relief, or a petitioner is construed as only referring to those respondents, persons eligible for relief and petitioners that are aggrieved by the judgment of the District Court the statute and the co mmon law are bo th given full e xpression. T his Court has said [i]t needs no authorities to su pport the proposition that one cannot appeal from a decree wherein the relief he prays f or has b een gra nted. Mug ford v. C ity of Baltimore,185 Md. 266, 269, 44 16 We have suggested in the past that the structur e of the appea ls statutes , i.e., conferring a broad, general grant of appeal subjec t to enume rated limitation s, further sug gests that they are meant to represent the entire subject matter of the law of appeals. State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 78, 785 A.2d 1275, 1284 (20 01). We c ontinue to a ffirm this prin ciple insofar as the appeals statu tes do add ress that subje ct matter. No part of the a ppeals provisions contained in Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl. Vol.), §§ 12-101 to 12-502 of the Cou rts an d Jud icial Proc eedi ngs A rticle , add ress consent judg men ts in a ny wa y. -24- A.2d 745, 746 (1946). A construction allowing appeals only in the event that a party is aggrieved by the judgm ent of the D istrict Court is consistent with common law and the intent of the Legislature in enacting § 4-507. Accord Bd. of Sup ervisors v. P innell, 166 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1942) (alth ough ap peals from the quarterly court are usually considered de novo, they are final judgments and are thus subject to the rule that there is no appeal from a consent judgment); Bigler v. Bigler, 260 P. 1081 (Colo. 1927) (although appeal from a will contest is tried de novo, absent statutory instruction to the contrary, the general principle that there is no right to appeal from a consent judgment will apply). It is the one we adopt here. Section 12-401 m ay be construe d in harmony with § 4-507. The lang uage at issu e in § 12-401 is the result of amendments that softened the original grant of the right of de novo appeal from decisions of the District Court. The 1970 establishment of the District Cou rts granted an abso lute right to trial de novo. 1970 Md. Laws, Chap. 528. The next legislative session produced a change that represented an appare nt compro mise betw een an ab solute right to a de novo appeal and its complete elimination, proposed in the original reading of House Bill 512. 1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 423. Instead of either extreme, the Legislature chose a comp romise of enu merate d instan ces of d e novo appea ls. Id. This sequence of legislative events suggests tha t when the Legislature means to g rant the abso lute right of a ppeal, it is capable of doing so. The Legislature instead chose to c ircumscribe the right of appeal de novo, and, although it has expanded it slightly since 1972, it has never chosen to return to the language granting the absolute right. -25- Section 12-401(f) determines the mode of appeal from a District Court judgment and does not grant or constrain the right of appeal. The grant of a right to appeal in domestic violence protective orders is governed squarely by § 4-507. In Harper v. State, 312 Md. 396, 540 A.2d 124 (1988), this Court considered the mode of appeal appropriate for contempt cases heard in the Dis trict Cou rt. The State argued that subsections 12-401(d) and (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Md. Code (1974, 1984 Repl. Vol., 1987 Cum. Supp.), which are equivalent to subsections 12-4 01(f) and (g) today, did no t apply to contempt cases. Id. at 401, 540 A.2d 12 6. The Sta te reasoned that becaus e the right to appeal from a contempt case was granted by § 12-402 of the 1987 Code, not § 12-401(a), subsections 12-4 01(d ) and (e) did no t app ly. Id. The Court assumed arguendo that § 12-402 granted the right to appeal and held that §§ 12-401(d) and (e) governed all determinations of whether an appeal from the District Court was on the record or de novo. Id. at 404, 540 A.2d 1 28. The fact that § 12-402 was silent concerning the characteristics of th[e] appeal and that no other statute addressed the mode of appeal was integral to the Court s decision to look to § 12- 401. Id. In considering appeals from domestic violence protective order, the right to appeal and the mode of appeal are delineated in § 4-507. It is th erefore un necessary, in the absence of any express grant of an absolute right to de nov o trial in § 12-4 01, for this Court to consider the ap plicability of § 12-401(f) any further. -26- In the case sub judice, the reviewing court need not look beyond the Order to see that it was entered by consent and note that respondent has not challenged the validity of that consent nor the jurisd iction of the Dis trict Cou rt in ente ring the Order . The mere entry of a consent order is evidence of the benefits accruing to respondent under a judgment. A consent order ensures that the two parties will not be subject to the further time and expense of litigation, a tangib le bene fit. See Long, 371 M d. at 86, 807 A.2d at 9. Like any contract, respondent s and petitioner s reciprocal promises act as con sideratio n. See Che rnik, 337 Md. at 480, 610 A.2d at 774. Stuckey was spared the uncertainty of further litigation. Moreover, in this case there was evidence that Stuckey benefitted materially from the agreement to an order b y consent. Fo r instance, in th e TPO the District C ourt awarded exclusive use and possession of the shared residence to Ms. Suter. The final protective Order omitted this provision, although the judge had the power to order that relief under Maryland Code (1984, 2006 Repl Vol.), § 4-506(d)(4) of the Family Law Article. The Court also did not order Stuckey to provide emergency family maintenance, § 4-506(d)(9), pa rticipate in counseling, § 4-506(d)(11) or any of the other relief available under § 4-506(d). Md. Code (1984, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 4-506(d) of the Famil y Law Article. The entry of the consent judgment gave Stuckey the benefit of certainty that Ms. Suter would be granted no further relief. Stuckey benefitted from the entry of the consent Order by getting what he bargained for cessation of litigation under terms he agreed to. -27- Stuckey agreed to the entry of the Order by consent. After agreeing to the Order, Stuckey was no longer an aggrieved party. Instead, he received the result he wanted and intended at the time. Stuckey s consent is evidence that the Ord er was a d isposition in h is favor. Absent any allegation of irregularity in the entrance of the judgmen t, the right to appeal from the consent judgment simply did not exist under § 4-507. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT VAC ATED ; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS THE APPEAL AS MOOT. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT. -28-
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