Attorney Grievance v. Pak

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Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Hekyong Pak Misc. Docket AG No. 83, September Term, 2005 Headno te: The sanction of disbarment is imposed for an attorney s misrepresentations of material facts before a tribunal, false statements to a third party, fraudulent conduct, and conduct prejudicial to th e administra tion of justice . This conduct constituted violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct ( M RPC ) 3.3(a)(1) an d (2), 4.1(a), 5.5(a)(b) and 8.4(c) and (d), and disbarment is warranted. Moreover, the Court of Appeals has original and com plete jurisdiction over all attorney grievance matters in the State of Maryland, and the Attorney G rievance C ommissio n is not und er any obligation to accept the recomm endations o f the Peer R eview P anel. In the Circuit C ourt for Ba ltimore Co unty Case No. 03-C-06-002149 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 83 September Term, 2005 ____________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. HEKYONG PAK __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilne r, Alan M . (retired, specially assigned), JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Cathell, J. In which Wilner, J. concurs and dissents. Bell, C.J., Raker, J. and Greene, J. join in the concurrence. ______________________________________ Filed: August 2, 2007 The Attorney Grievance Commission ( the Commission ), acting through Bar Counse l, and pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751(a)(1)1 filed a petition for disciplinary action in the Court of Appeals against Hekyong Pak, a.k.a. H. Christina Pak, respondent. The petition charged that respondent violated several of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct ( the MRP C ). 2 Specifica lly, the petition alleges that respondent, through her actions subseque nt to a default on a loan secured by her parents, violated Rules 3.3 (Candor the Tribunal), 3 1 Maryland R ule 16-75 1 provide s, in relevant p art: (a) Comm encem ent of discip linary or remed ial action. (1) Upon Approval of Co mmiss ion. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court o f App eals. 2 By an Order of February, 8, 2005, we adopted changes to the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, effective July 1, 2005. The conduct that led to this case occurred before the effective date of the new Rules Therefore, the Maryland Rules that were in effect at the time of the alleged conduct will be enf orced here in. We no te however, that our conclusions would not be different if conduct similar to that in this case occurred under the presently adopted Maryland Rules. The differences in the Rule sections that w ere allegedly vio lated are no t material and wo uld not lead to different conclusions. 3 Rule 3.3(a)(1) and (2) of the 2005 version of the MRPC provide: (a) A law yer shall not kno wingly: (1) make a false statem ent of ma terial fact or law to a tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is n ecessary to avoid assistin g a crimina l or fraudu lent act by the clien t; The curre nt version o f MR PC 3.3(a )(1) and (2) p rovides: (a) A law yer shall not kno wingly: (1) make a false statem ent of fac t or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement o f material fa ct or law pre viously made to the tribuna l by the lawyer; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal wh en disclosu re is necessa ry to avoid a ssisting a crimina l or frau dulent a ct by the cl ient. 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statem ents to Others), 4 5.5 (Unauthorized P ractice of Law), 5 and 8.4(c) and (d) (Misco nduct) 6 . Pursuant to Maryland Rule 1 6-752(a), 7 we referred the matter to the Honora ble Tim othy J . Ma rtin o f the Circ uit C ourt for B altim ore C ounty to condu ct an 4 Rule 4.1(a) 2005 version of the MRPC p rovides: (a) In the co urse of rep resenting a c lient a lawyer sh all not know ingly: (1) make a false statem ent of material fact or law to a third person; or, (2) fail to disclose a material fa ct to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a crimin al or fra udulen t act by a clie nt. The curre nt version o f the Rule s is identical. 5 Rule 5.5(a)(b) of the 2005 version of the MRPC provides: A law yer shall not: (a) practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity tha t constitu tes the u nautho rized pr actice o f law. The current version of MRPC 5 .5(a), in relevant part states: (a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal pro fession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so. 6 Rules 8.4(c) and (d) of the 2005 version of the MRPC provide: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the admin istration o f justice . . . The curre nt version o f the Rule s is identical. 7 Maryland R ule 16-75 2 provide s, in relevant p art: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and settin g dates for the com pleti on of discovery, filing of motion s, and h earing. -2- evidentiary hearing and return to this Court factual findings and recommended conclusions of law. The facts of this case arise out of respondent s conduct during a period of time when her parents had purchase d property in Pennsylvania, defaulted on a personal guarantee loan on that property, and then executed a series of transactions in order to prevent a judgment from attaching to their property. Using her knowledge of the law, respondent aided and advised her parents in creating shell corporations to transfer title in order to avoid a judgment lien. Due to her actions in these matters, the Commission filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial ac tion with this C ourt. I. Facts Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-7 52(a), we , as stated earlier, re ferred this m atter to Judge M artin of the C ircuit Court f or Baltim ore Co unty to ho ld an ev identiar y hearing . A preliminary hearing was held on June 5, 2006, to address respondent s jurisdictional objections. At the hearing, respondent claimed that this Court does not h ave jurisdictio n to regulate the conduct of attorneys in the State of Maryland if the Peer Review Panel ( Panel ) recommends to the Commission that no action should be taken against an attorney suspected of viola ting the M RPC . The Panel is a group, established by Maryland Rule 16-742, that serves to consider a Statement of Charges against an attorn ey. Its purpose is not an adversarial one, and it does not hold ev identiar y hearing s, decid e facts, o r write f ull opin ions. Md. R ule 16- 743. The -3- Panel consists of at least thre e me mbe rs, the ma jority b eing attor neys, but at least one member must be a la y person . At the preliminary hearing, Judge Martin dismissed respondent s jurisdiction argument, noting that it would be illogical to accept respondent s position that the matter should be dismissed based on the Pan el s finding. The hearing c ourt also stated that the P anel is not an entity that creates binding decisions and that, if it were found to do so , such a d ecision would divest th e Cou rt of A ppeals of its juris diction. As previously indicated, this case arose from the actions of respondent in connection with a hotel that was purchased by her parents and her subsequent actions which led to the Commission filing a petition for disciplinary or remedial action. On February 22, 2007, after a three day ev identiary hearing , Judge M artin issued th e followin g findings of fact: This court, having been persuaded by clear and convincing evidence, finds the following facts: 1. Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 19, 1990. 2. Respondent is the only child of Hosurl and Kyuryon Pak (hereinafter known as the Paks ). The Paks are immigrants from Korea who have been naturalized United States citizens since the 1970 s. 3. Respondent had her real estate license while in her teens. The Paks have owned and operated several businesses over the past 30 years. Mr. Pak is a real estate broker since the 70 s with substantial experience in real estate transactions, the prepara tion and rev iew of rea l estate contracts and the negotiation of same. Mrs. Pak sold real estate with her husband for some 10 years during the Paks marriage. 4. Between 1990 and 1999, Respondent had substantial professional experience in business transactions, the creation of business entities, the creation and rev iew of busine ss contr acts and in real es tate trans actions . This court finds that she had sub stantial acumen and ex perience in these types of matters. 5. In 1999 on behalf of the Paks, Respondent created MEPA Acquisitions LLC (hereinafter MEPA ) by creating both the Articles of -4- Organization and an op erating agreement regarding same. Respondent caused the necessary do cuments to be filed with th e State De partment o f Assessm ents and Tax ation to create the e ntity. 6. MEPA w as owned by Mr. Hosurl Pak with other individuals. 7. MEPA acquired interest in a hotel in L ancaster, Pe nnsylvania in 1999. Respondent represented MEPA in the negotiations and transactions to acquire the hotel. 8. MEPA incurred a first mortgage on the hotel property at the time of the purchase. 9. Respondent acted as counsel for MEPA in negotiating and securing a second loan of $1 million from an entity known as Business Loan Center (also kn own a s Busin ess Lo an Ex press, h ereinaf ter BL E ). She wrote an opinion letter on behalf of MEPA to BLE in order to secure this loan. 10. BLE requ ired the personal guarantees from all the members of MEPA as joint and several obligo rs on the second loan. The Pak s gave their personal guarantees in Febr uary 199 9. Part of the application process required the Paks to provide financial statements reflecting their assets and liabilities. Respondent had actual knowledge of these guarantees. 11. Between 1999 and 2001, Respondent helped the Paks from time to time in the management of the hotel in Pennsylvania. 12. At the time of the BLE loan in 199 9, the Paks owned real estate in Maryland on Oak Ridge Court [Baltimore Cou nty], Summer Fields Co urt [Baltimore Cou nty] and North Ave nue [Baltimore C ity]. 13. In 1999 and there after, the Respondent had actual knowledge of the real properties owned by her parents. 14. Between 2000 and 2003 , in addition to her business, transactional and other professional experience, Respondent was the sole owner and manager of Bayside Title which handled real estate settlemen ts. Respondent s Bayside Title did hundreds of real estate settlements in 2002 alone. 15. In 2001, MEPA sold the hotel to a n entity kn own a s REL EX. Respondent represented her parents in the sales transaction. RELEX assumed the BLE second loan obligation as part of the p urchase. H oweve r, BLE d id not release the personal guarantors on the BLE obligation including the Paks. Respon dent had a ctual know ledge of th e non-relea se of her p arents immediately after the transaction involving RELEX. 16. Between 2001 and early 2003, RELEX defaulted on the BLE loan obligation and the BLE loan came into def ault. On or about February 5, 2003, BLE gave actu al notice of this default to the Paks. Respondent had actual knowledge of the def ault notice received by her parents in early Februa ry -5- 2003. 17. The default by RELEX w as not cured by any of the guarantors. 18. As of February 2003, the Paks had sold the Oak R idge prop erty but continued to own the Sum mer Fie lds and North Aven ue prop erties. Respondent had actual knowledge of these facts. 19. On or about June 9, 2003, BLE filed suit against the Paks in the United States District Court [in the District of Maryland, Northern Division] upon th eir perso nal gua rantees on the lo an. The suit was brought by way of a Comp laint for Co nfessed Ju dgment. 20. At the time of the filing the Paks lived in the residence at Summer Fields. Respondent had, from time to time, lived at Summer Fields Court w ith her parents and had, from time to time, actually paid the mortgage on the property from her own resources. 21. On about June 14, 2003, the Paks were served with BL E s Complaint for Confessed Judgment and supporting documents. Respondent was given these papers immediately following service upon her parents and had actual knowledge of same. 22. On or ab out July 7, 200 3, Respo ndent prep ared a M otion to Dismiss to be filed in th e U.S. D istrict Court on behalf of her parents. At the time it was prepared and filed, Respondent was not a member of the Bar of the United States District Cou rt. Respon dent had h er parents ex ecute the pleading pro se. The Paks relied exclusively on their daughter for preparation and filing this Motion. 23. On or ab out July 11, 20 03, with knowle dge of the impendin g suit, Kyuryon Pak (Re sponden t s Mothe r) solely entered in to a contrac t to sell Summer Fields to the Zirkins. This fact was known by the Respondent. The sales price of Summer Fields was $544,500. 24. On or about July 14, 2003, Kyuryon Pak (the mother of Responden t), with knowledge of the impending suit, entered in to a contract to purchase residential property on Autumn Frost Lane. The purchase price was $205,000. This fact was known by the Responde nt. The Co ntract of Sa le provided that the ultimate name of the buyer would be determined at a later date. 25. On July 15, 2003, but one month and one day after service of the lawsuit and supporting documents upon her parents, Re sponden t, with actual notice of the def ault by REL EX, w ith actual notice of the demand by BLE and the impending lawsuit by BLE against her parents, filed Articles of Organization of the H& K Fam ily Trust, LLC ( H&K ). This was done in an expedited fashion on a one-page document on which the Respondent had interlineated Family as part of the name of this entity. No operating -6- agreement was p repared . The sole members of the H&K Family Trust, LLC were the Paks. 26. The Respondent created this entity (H&K) for the sole purpose of hinderin g, delaying, and /or defraud ing BLE in its quest for satisfaction of the obligation g uaranteed by her parents . Respon dent s assertio n in this matter that this entity was created fo r tax purpo ses at the advic e of a Mr. Kim is, to this court, incredible and completely unpersuasive. Although Petitioner has the burden of persuasion by clear and convincing evidence throughout this proceeding, when Respondent asserts a fact as to the reasons for her actions, she must persuade this court by a preponderance of the evidence that it is so. In this she has completely failed. 27. On July 16, 2003, one day after filing the Articles of Organization of H&K, Respondent prepared and submitted to her parents for execution, quitclaim deeds conveying both Summer Fields and North Avenue to H&K for no consideration. She had her parents execute these deeds and had the deeds recorded in the respective Land Records of B altimore County and B altimore City. 28. Respon dent s action with regard to the above transactions was a continuation of her efforts to hinder, delay and/or defraud BLE in its quest for satisfaction of the obligation guaranteed by her parents. Her explanation as to the reasons for her actions, given the facts, circumstances and the time frame inv olved, we re comple tely incredible an d unpersu asive to this co urt. 29. On August 1, 2003, Confessed Judgment in excess of $1 million was entered in the United States District Court case against the Paks and the other personal guarantors. Notices were sent and Respondent had actual knowledge of these facts in August of 2003. 30. On or about August 14, 2003, Respondent created a Certificate of Partnership for CA CHA Holdings, LLP. This certificate was filed with the State Department of Assessments and Taxation by the Respondent again on an expedited basis. The Resident Agent of this entity was the Respondent and the address of the LL P was R esponde nt s address in Ellicott City, Maryland. 31. On August 15, 2003, but one month after the creation of H&K and having been the titled owner of the Summer Fields property for less than one month, H&K conveyed Summer Fields to the Zirkins for a net to H&K of $243,899.66. 32. The net p roceeds fr om the sale of H& K to the Zirkins were deposited in to Respo ndent s B ayside Title escro w accou nt. 33. On the v ery same day, R esponde nt handled the settlement on behalf of Bayside Title whereby Autumn Frost was purchased by CACHA Holdings, LLP. The funds used to purchase this residence were the net proceeds from the sale of Summer Fields. Th e funds n ot necessar y to -7- complete the transaction, i.e. some $37,000, were disbursed from Bayside Title to the Paks. 34. The deed to Autumn Frost, purchased by CACHA on August 15, 2003, was not r ecorded in August 2003 after the settlement. There is no record of this transaction until April 22, 2004. 35. Respondent, on behalf of her parents, purposely failed to record the CACHA de ed, with the intent to hind er, delay and/or d efraud B LE in its quest to satisfy the personal obligation of her parents. 36. Respondent knew that the procee ds of Sum mer Fields , originally the property of her parents, were n ow in the A utumn F rost property an d still at risk of being discovered and ultimately attached by BLE in its quest for satisfaction of the Paks obligation. 37. Again R esponde nt s assertion th at the deed a nd/or settlem ent file were lost or misplace d is not accepted by this court. Respondent s obligation to produc e sufficien t proof of th is fact was , in no way, m et. 38. On September 9, 2003, a Motion to Vacate the Confessed Judgment was filed b y the Pak s in the U nited S tates D istrict Co urt case . A Mr. Levine and Mr. Driscoll represented the Paks. 39. On December 10, 2003, the United States District Court granted a summary judgment motion on behalf of BLE against the Paks and entered judgment against the Paks in the amount of approximately $1.1 million. 40. On or about January 2004, BLE, as judgment creditor, began post-judgment proceedings and attempted to schedule the depositions of the Paks. 41. From A ugust 15, 2003 until January 2004 CAC HA ha d title to Autum n Frost. 42. The Paks were living in Autumn Frost during this entire time. 43. On January 15, 2004, the Paks sent a check for $30,000 (part of the $37,000 received by the Paks as excess funds after the purchase of Autumn Frost) to a relative in Seattle. This, according to the Paks, was a part payment of an antecedent debt to Mrs. Kyuryon Pak s o ther brother. Respondent had actual knowledge of these circumstances. 44. The action on the part of the Paks and with notice and approval and/or advice of the Respondent were yet further attempts to keep the Paks property out of the risk of attachment in satisfaction of BLE s judgment against the Paks. This court does not believe the testimony of either the Paks or the Respondent as to the reasons for this transaction and the conveyance of these funds. 45. On or about February 20, 2004, with the actual knowledge and cooperation of the Respondent, Yong Sung Kim, Respondent s husband, purchased Autumn Frost from CACHA in his name alone. Mr. Kim never -8- testified in these proceedings. The settlement o n this transaction was handled by American Home Title. 46. The purchase price for the Autumn Frost transaction came from three (3) sources: $5,000 from Respondent s business o perating ac count, $1626.13 from a joint account of the Respondent and Mr. Kim and a loan of $164,000 by Mr. Kim alone. 47. Respondent s name was never placed on the title to Autumn Frost. 48. The Respondent, her husband and the Paks h ave lived in Autumn Frost since August of 2003. 49. Both the deed from the Sellers of Autumn Frost to CA CHA in August of 2003 and the deed from C ACH A to M r. Kim on February of 2004 were recorded after the second transaction with the full knowledge and actual involvement of the Responden t (emphasis added). 50. The actions of Yong Sung Kim with the Paks and with the knowledge, approval and active involvement of the Respondent were yet further attempts to hinder, delay, thwart and/or defraud BLE s quest to obtain satisfaction of its judgment against the Paks 51. Respondent s assertion that CACHA was created on behalf of or in trust for her mother s brother in satisfaction of an antecedent debt is not believed by this court and is unaccep ted. Respo ndent has failed to pro ve this fact by a preponderance of the evidence. 52. On or about February 20, 2004, American Home Title, acting on the instructions from Hosurl Pak and with the advice and approval of the Responden t, wired $196,000 to relatives of the Paks in South Korea. No relatives of the Paks ever testified in these matters. 53. On or about February 24, 2004, American Home Title, acting on instructions from H osurl Pak and with the advice and approval of the Respon dent, disbursed $4 ,126 from the Autumn Frost settlement to the Respon dent. 54. The Court finds no existence of an antecedent debt to any relatives of the Paks in Korea. This Court finds these assertions by the Respondent and her parents w ere yet further attempts to justify their prior actions and were created after the fact to justify these actions in hindering, delaying, thwarting, and/or defrauding BLE in its quest for satisfaction of the guarantees and the ultimate judgment against the Paks. 55. The transfers of both the Summer Fields and North Avenue properties to H &K wer e discovered by BLE on or about February 24, 2004 during the deposition of the Paks. 56. The deposition of the Paks took place four (4) days after M r. Yong S ung Kim took title alone to Autum n Frost. -9- 57. Following the depositions of the Paks, on March 2, 2004, BLE filed a compla int in U.S. District Court, District of Baltimore, to set aside fraudulent transfer and conspiracy against the Respondent and H&K as Defendants. 58. On or about March 25, 2004, Defendant filed an Answer to the Comp laint on beh alf of herself and H&K. She was not a member of the bar of the United States District Court at the time the Answer was filed. 59. In Defendant s communications with the U.S. District Court and counsel for BLE, Defendant did not correct BLE s representation that the proceeds of the sale o f Summ er Fields ha d been w ired to Korea. Defendant failed to correct these representations in her continued efforts to deceive BLE and protec t herself in the fraudulen t transfer/con spiracy suit. 60. Defendant did not disclose that the proceeds from the sale of Summ er Fields ha d actually been used to pu rchase A utumn F rost. 61. Defendant falsely admitted, in her response to B LE s Request for Admissions of Fact, that the funds from the sale of Summer Fields had been wired to Korea. 62. Defend ant did not d isclose in the U.S. District Court proceedings the existence of CACHA Holdings, LLP, the purchase by CACHA of Autumn Frost with the funds from Summer Fields, nor the purchase of Autumn Frost from CACHA by her husband alone. 63. On July 9, 2004, Judge Frederick Motz held that the conveyances of Summer Fields and North Avenue properties were fraudulent. He set aside the transactions and entered summary judgment against the Respondent of $200,000 in favor of BLE. 64. In Defendan t s Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment by Judge Motz, the Defe ndant aga in failed to disclose the creation of CACHA, the funding of CACHA s purchase of Autumn Fields, the transfer of Autumn Fields to her husband by CACHA and the facts of that transaction. The Motion was denied by Judge Motz. 65. The ruling and judgment of Judge Motz were appealed by Defendant to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The decision of Judge Motz was affirm ed by the Fou rth Circuit on February 3, 2 005. The Fourth Circuit also denied Defendant s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc. 66. At a meeting w ith Mr. Aronson between March of 2004 and May of 2004, Respondent showed him a document in Korean to which was attached an English translation. This document was a purported promissory note from Kyuryon Pak to her brother allegedly recognizing an antecedent debt from the Paks to her brother. Respondent stated that she first saw the document some time after Augus t 2004 [2 003]. He r statements a re again co ntradictory to her -10- action and previous statements. 67. Responden t told Mr. Aronson that the money did not go to Korea as of the sale of Summer Fields. Respondent contradicted herself in her own responses to request for a dmission (question 21 , Petitioner s exhibit 8). 68. The Court does not accept Respondent s assertions (or for that matter her mother s) that a promissory note was prepared by her mothe r in 1995 and executed by her in Korea in consideration of an antecedent debt by her mothe r and fa ther to h er mate rnal un cle. The timing of the disclosure of this note in these proceedings (after she was sued in 2004), the very language of the note and the allegations that her mother never showed her or her father the note after returning from Korea are unb elievab le to this c ourt. Add ition ally, the failure of credible corroborative evidence of the existence of this antecedent debt and obligatio n is fatal to R esponde nt s assertion o f this fact. 69. On July 29, 2004, the Petitioner made inquiry to the Respondent as to the facts and circumstances of the transactions involving her parents prop erty. In her response on August 25, 2004, Respondent makes ab solutely no mentio n of he r creatio n of C ACH A, the transfer of Autum n Frost to CACHA, the subsequent transfer of Autumn Frost to her husband alone or the sources of the fundin g of the purcha se. This cour t finds that she intentionally failed to disclose these transactions in yet further, if vain , attempts to protect her actions with respect to the BLE suit and BLE s efforts to satisfy the obligation of her parents and, as a m atter of fact, to p rotect herself as to Petitioner s i nquiry. 70. Finally, after a subsequent letter from Petitioner to Respondent on December 21, 2004, she first provided information regarding CACHA and the ultimate tra nsactions re garding the purchase of Autu mn Fros t. 71. Melvin Sykes, Esquire, a noted and well-respected expert on these matters, gave expert opinions on behalf of the Respondent. He clearly assumed a valid legal business purpose for the creation of the H&K Family Trust under these particular circumstances and had no opinion on whether there were valid tax/capital gains or other legitimate reasons for the creation of this b usiness entity. Mr. Sykes clearly assumed the existence of an antecedent debt of the Paks to a third party in Korea in giving his opinion that the transfer of these funds were m erely an al lowab le prefe rence to one cre ditor ov er anoth er. The court has found, as a fact, that there were no proven business purposes or valid reason for the creation of H&K Family Trust nor was the re an antecedent debt to the Paks relatives proven as the Respondent has claime d. As su ch, this c ourt do es not a ccept th e opinio ns of M r. Sykes. -11- Judge Martin also provided the following conclusions of law, based on the facts of the case: §3.3. Candor Toward the Tribunal Rule 3.3 sets forth special duties of lawyers as o fficers of the cou rt to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client s case with persuasive force. P erforman ce of that d uty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advoc ate s du ty of cand or to the tribuna l. [ ] In this case, having made the findings of fact as ind icated, this court concludes, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent has violated Section 3.3(a)(1) and (2) by her statements under oath wherein she admitted that the money was transf erred to Korea from the proceeds of the sale of Summer Fields and she knew that this was untrue. This she did in her answer to the fraudulent lawsuit filed by BLE. Respondent intentionally failed to disclose that the proceeds from Summer Fields had been used to purchase Autumn Frost. She failed to disclose that the Autumn Frost property was owned individually by her husband and the sources of funds for the purchase of Autumn Frost from CACHA. She failed to disclose the creation of CACHA and the transfer ultimately to her husband. She falsely admitted in her Answers to Request for Admissions that the funds from Summer Fields had been wired to Korea and in a Motion to Alter or Amend the Ultimate Judgment she purposely failed to disclose the true labyrinthine course of transactions involving her parents property and the ultimate purchase of Autumn Frost. The court concludes that all of these statements and failures to disclose represent a violatio n of 3.3 (a)(1) an d (2). Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others. A lawyer is requ ired to be truthful in dealing with o thers on a client s behalf (or in this case on a client s or her own behalf) but genera lly has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing par ty of relev ant fac ts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentation can also occur by partially true but misleading statements, or omissions that are the equivalent of affirm ative false state ments (emphas is added). S ee comm ent 1 Rule 4.1. This court, after having found facts as described above, concludes by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated Rule 4.1(a)(1) and (2). Responden t s affirmative failure to cor rect BLE s assertion in its original lawsuit that the fun ds were w ired to Korea from the Summer Fields settlement -12- was both a false statement of fact and a failure to disclose a material fact when disclosure was necessary to avoid a criminal or fraudulent act. These actions or failure to disclose were relied upon by counsel for BLE and certa inly represented a statement to a third person. Additionally, Respondent s admission under oath in the Request for Admissions of Fact that the funds were wired to Korea from the Summer Fields settlement was untrue and Respondent s failure to disclose the true nature and extent of a ll transactions (H&K to Zirkins, Autumn Frost to CACHA , Autumn Frost from C ACH A to Responden t s husband) we re all intentional failures to disclose material fac ts to counsel for BLE which would have been necessary to avoid the Paks fraud upon BLE. Ad ditio nally, Respon dent s respo nse to Petitioner s inquiry of July 29, 2004 certainly required truthfulness and full disc losure of a ll the transactions involving her parents property and the ultimate disposition of the funds. Responden t s response o f Augu st 25, 2004 (Petitioner s E xhibit 17) is a c lassic example of her utter f ailure to be tru thful and to disclose what had actua lly occurred and happened regarding the property. Her response was a violation of Rule 4.1(a) (1) o r (2). It wasn t u ntil Decem ber of 20 04 whe n she finally decide d that the truth mu st be told . Rule 5.5(a)(b) Unauthorized Practice of Law, Multijurisdiction Practice of Law This court, having made findings of fact as described above concludes, by clear and convincing eviden ce, that Responden t violated Code § 5.5(a)(b ). A lawyer may practice law on ly in a jurisdiction in w hich the law yer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be ad mitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regu lar basis or m ay be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose on a restricted basis. (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer s direct action or by a lawyer assisting another person (emph asis add ed). See Rule 5 .5, Com ment 1 . Respo ndent, on behalf of her parents, prepared a Motion to Dismiss BLE s original suit in 2003 when she had not been admitted to practice in the U.S. District C ourt. Her pare nts relied upon her exclusively and they signed the Motion at her direction. Respondent had the Motion filed in the litigation. She was clearly practicing law and not admitted to practice law in the United States District Cou rt as required by local rule of the U.S. D istrict Court, R ule 102.1.a .1. Ad ditio nally, Respondent filed an Answer on behalf of MEPA and herself, to BLE s second action, i.e. the Complaint to set aside the Fraudulent Transfer. This Respondent did prior to her being admitted to the Bar of the United States District Court and is, similarly, a violation o[f] Ru le 5.5(a)(b). -13- These conclusions are made pursuant to the facts found and the law applicable, although this court feels the violations are technical in nature and certainly not serious breach es of th e Cod e of Pr ofessio nal Re sponsi bility. 8.4 (c) Misconduct This court, having made findings of fact as described above, concludes, by clear and c onvincing evidence , that Respo ndent viola ted Rule 8.4(c). Hone sty is of paramount importance in the practice of law, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688 (2005). Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important m oral character traits of a lawyer, Attorney Grievance C ommission v. M yers, 333 M d. 440 ( 1994) . This court concludes that from the point in time whereupon Respondent understood that her parents were going to be sued by BLE on their personal guarantees, she undertook to do whatever she believed it w ould take to protect her parents properties; even if that involved fraud, deceit, dishonesty or misrepresentation. Her steps were many and as previo usly stated, quite labyrinthine. With actual knowledge of the impending lawsuit, Respondent created a shell busine ss entity as the first step in attempting to defraud BLE by divesting her parents of titled ownersh ip to the propertie s they owne d. This shell was H&K Family Trust, LLC. There was no business purpose or legitimate reason to create this e ntity. Within a day or two, Respondent took the next steps by creating quitclaim deeds and having her parents execute them transferring their entire ownersh ip of the properties to the shell entity for no consideration. Respondent argues that because these transac tions were recorded and therefore transparen t, they were not fraudulen t. This court is persuaded in no way that the recording of these transactions changes or affects the intent of the Respondent displayed in he r actions throu ghout thes e unfortun ate circumstances. Responden t s next step (among others) was to create CACHA, another shell entity. There was no business purpose o r legitimate rea son to create this entit y. Respondent then advised and assisted her parents to effect the sale of Summer Fields by H & K to the Zirkins. She created yet another strand in her web by having the proceeds h eld in escrow for H & K. She then orchestrated the purchase of Autumn Frost by CACHA using the original Summer Fields funds. She purposely did not have the CACHA deed recorded at that time thereby concealing the transactio n. Contin uing her efforts, she had her parents send $30,000 of the original Summer Fields funds to a relative, thereby further divesting the mselves o f this prop erty. She then assisted and/or advised -14- her husband to purchase, in his own name alone, Autumn Frost from CACHA, using her own funds as well as joint funds with her husband in the transaction. Her name, significantly, was never placed on the deed. The Paks, the Respon dent, her husband and the family have continued to live in Autumn Frost since CACHA purchased it. Through her advice and assistance, she had $196,000 sent to relatives in Korea from the A utumn F rost transaction. She belatedly describes this transaction as a payment of an antecedent debt which is comp letely una ccepte d by this co urt. At the end of her eff orts, her paren ts were made insolvent by these transactions which certainly hindered and/or prevented BLE in its quest for satisfaction of the obligation guaranteed by the Paks. Section 15-207 of the [C]ommercial Law Article of the Maryland Annota ted Code provides: [ ]Every conveyance and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presume d in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and fu ture creditors.[ ] The indicia of fraud are: the insolvency or indeb tedness of transferor; lack of consid eration for th e conveyan ce; relationsh ip between the transferor and the transferee; dependency or threat of litigation; sec recy or conce alment; departure from the usual method of business; the transfer of the debtor s entire estate; the reservation of benefit to the transferor; and the retention by the debtor of possession of the property. See Berger v. Hi-Gear Tire and Auto Sup ply, Inc., 257 Md. 47 (1970). All of these factors are essentially present in this matter, inc luding secr ecy or conce alment. Respondent was an e xperience d business attorney, well co nversant in business transactions a nd in real estate law . She com pounde d her dece it and fraud upon B LE by her la te coming allegations of the existence of an antece dent de bt by her p arents to a relative in Kor ea. This alleged debt was brought to light later in the litigation and wa s made to th is court, mere ly to bootstrap her own defense of the fraudulent conveyance claim and the inquiries of the P etitioner herein. Although this court believes that the actions of the Respondent were driven by her love and conc ern for her parents as w ell as to protect them from what she felt to be sharp business practices by BLE, her actions regre ttably encomp assed mu ltiple violations of the code she swore to abide and to u phold. 8.4 (d) This court, having made findings of fact as described above, concludes, by clear and c onvincing evidenc e, that Resp ondent vio lated Rule 8.4(d). In addition to her intentional acts assisting her parents in their fraud -15- upon the B LE, Res ponden t s misreprese ntation of th e facts to Mr. Aronson, to the U.S. D istrict Court, to the Petitioner he rein and, fo r that matter, to th is court in her testimony in this unfortunate matter, all represent conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Conduct which is likely to impair public confidence in the profession, impact the image of the legal profession and engender disrespect for the court is condu ct prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice . Attorn ey Grievance Commission v. Child[ress], 360 Md. 373 (2000). As stated, Resp ondent utilize d her subs tantial experie nce and s kill to fraudulen tly thwart the e fforts by BL E to satisfy the obligation of her parents. She knew what she was doing and concluded that the ends she sought justified the means she utilized. As the inquiry into her actions g ot more and m ore focused and closer to her, she com pounde d her violatio ns by intentiona lly failing to disclose substantial and material fac ts. The we b she wo ve, so finally entangled, completely broke and she found herself in the present situation. Her actions and conduct are certainly prejudicial to the administration of justice. [Footnote om itted]. The Commission did not take any exceptions to Judge Martin s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Resp ondent, ho wever, did file exceptions to Judge Martin s findings, pursuant to Rule 16-758(b ).8 Respondent excepted to each and every conclusion of th e Circuit Court and still contends that this C ourt lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate the m atter. Respondent also argues that the hearing court should have concluded, on the basis of Mr. Syke s testimony, that there was no fraudulent basis for the formation of the shell e ntity of H&K, L.L.C. ( H& K ) (this was the first of two business entities created by the respondent after the defau lt procee dings f rom he r paren ts BLE loan ha d begu n). She notes 8 Maryland R ule 16-75 8 provide s, in relevant p art: (b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the app ropriate disposition under R ule 16-759 (c). -16- that creation of H&K was completed at the adv ice of H enry S. K im, a C.P .A., and that his professional advice contradicts Judge Martin s conclusion that there was no valid business reason to create H&K. Respondent further contends that there was a legitimate pre-existing debt to Korean relatives and that CACHA, L.L.P. ( CACHA ) (the second of the two business entities) w as creat ed to fa cilitate the repayme nt of this debt. A ccording to an affidavit from a Korean l awye r, pro vide d by re spon dent, the debt was cer tified by a promissory note in 1995, several years before the events that led to the case sub judice occurred, and that this explanation of the existence of the debt should have been sufficient for the lower court. Respondent takes exception to the lower court s conclusions that for fraudulent reasons she was not named o n the title to the A utumn F rost property. Sh e asserts that i t is no t Ko rean custom f or w ome n to b e giv en tit le to p rope rty. Add ition ally, respondent argues that the Commission failed to satisfy the clear and convincing evidence standard in showing that respondent knew of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland local rule requiring a lawyer to be a member of the Bar of that court in order to file pleadings and, as a consequence, p urpose ly violated the rule. D. Md. Loc. R.102.1.a.ii. 9 9 Respondent also objects to the finding that she had actual Local Rule 102.1.a.ii provides: Parties appearing pro se. When a p arty is appearing pro se, the Clerk w ill accept for filing on ly documen ts signed by that party. Attorneys who have prepared any documents which are submitted for filing by a pro se litigant must be members of the Bar of this Court and must sign the document, state their name, address, telephone number and their bar number assigned by this Court. -17- knowledge of her parents actions regarding the creation of CACHA and the purchase of the Autumn Frost property. Respondent states that she did not intentionally fail to record the deed from th e CA CHA transac tion, rather it w as a mis take by a th ird party title comp any. Concerning the finding that the Paks transferred m one y from the pr operty sales to Korean relatives, respondent objects that there is no evidence to support that she had knowledge of these transfers. O verall, the respondent primarily objects to: (1) the hearing court s non-acceptance of Mr. Syke s conclusions (which were contingent on truth of factual assumptions found by the trial court to be incorre ct), (2) that any frau dulent act o ccurred in conjunction with the creation of the business entities H&K and CACHA , (3) that she had any knowledge of the wire transfers to Korea, and (4) the fact that the Circuit Court came to a conclusion opposite tha t of the Pan el. Respondent asks this court to accept M r. Syke s conclusions (expressly conditional on factual assumptions contrary to the facts found by the hearing court) as compared to Judge Martin s conclusions of law, stating that each and every one o f the lower court s conclusions is based on no evidence whatsoever. She argues that the lower court reached unreason able conclusions regarding M RPC 5.5(a)(b), disrega rding the testimony of M r. Sykes, and on what she alleges is clear evidence that she never entered an appearance on behalf of her parents before the United States District Court for the District of Ma ryland. In addition, she notes th at Judge M otz, the presid ing federa l judge, allowed her adm ission to the Maryland Federa l Court Bar du ring the fraud a nd con spiracy ca se. Respondent asks that this Court credit the Panel s find ings and conclusion s instead of Judge M artin s findings and -18- conclusions. II. Standard of Review In an Attorney Grievance case, we accept the hearing judge s findings of fact, unless they are clearly erro neous . Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (20 06); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 397, 842 A.2d 42, 47 (2004). This defe rence to the hearing judge s findings is based in part on the fact finder being in the best position to assess the c redibility of a witness. M d. Rule 16-759(b )(2)(B); 10 Guida, 391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095 ( [t]he fact finder is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of a witness ); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999) ( Such deference is paid, in part, because [the hearing judge] is in the best position to assess first hand a witness's credibility ). The petitioner has the burden of proving the averments of his or her petition by clear and convincing evidence and a respondent who provides an affirmative defense has the burden of proof by a prep ondera nce of eviden ce. Guida, 391 Md. at 50-51, 891 A.2d at 1095 (citing Md. Rule 16 -757(b)). 11 10 Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) states: If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Cou rt of App eals shall determine whether the findings o f fact hav e been pro ven by the req uisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact ch allenge d by the e xceptio ns. The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnes ses. 11 Maryland R ule 16-75 7 states, in relev ant part: (b) Burdens of proof. The petitioner has the burden of proving the (continued...) -19- Although we give d eference to the hearin g judge s f indings of fact, we rev iew the conclusions of law de novo. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2 d 1145, 1 160 (200 2); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Harrington, 367 Md. 36, 49, 785 A.2d 1260, 1267-68 (2001) ( As to the conclusions of law of a judge, to whom we have assigned hearing du ties in an attor ney grievance case , our consideratio n is essen tially de novo . . . . ). III. Discussion A. Jurisdiction The respondent argues that this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case sub judice because, under the Maryland Rules, there is no procedure for the Commission to direct Bar Counsel to file a petition for disciplinary or remedial action. We disagree. Maryland Rule 16-711 codifies and defines the Attorney Grievance Commission. Of note is subsection (h)(9) of that rule,12 which p rovides the authority for the Comm ission to bring an action against an attorney. Bar Counsel is appointed by the Attorney Grievance 11 12 (...continued) avermen ts of the petition by clear and convincing evidence. A respondent who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the evid ence. Maryland R ule 16-71 1(h)(9) pro vides, in relev ant part: (h) Powers and duties. The Commission has the powers and duties to: . . . (9) exercise th e authority gran ted in the R ules in this C hapter w ith respect to the approval or disapproval of (A) the dismissal of a complaint or Statement of Charges, (B) the termination of a complaint with or without a warning, (C) a Conditional Diversion Agreement, (D) a reprimand, or (E) the filing of a Pe tition fo r Discip linary or R emed ial Actio n . . . . -20- Commission and serves with the approval of the Court of Appeals. Md. Rule 16-712(a). Bar Counsel has the authority, subject to the supervision of the Commission, to file and prosecute petitions for disciplinary and remed ial action s in the n ame o f the C omm ission. Md. R ule 16- 712(b )(5). The Peer Rev iew Pan el is established by Maryland R ule 16-742, and the process by which the Panel deliberates is outlined in M aryland Rule 16-743. O f important note here is sub-parag raph (e), stating : (e) Recommendation. The Peer Review Panel may recommend to the Commission that a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action be filed or make any recommendation to the Commission that Bar Counsel may make under Rule 16-734(a), (b), or (c). The Panel sha ll accomp any its recommendations with a brief explanatory statement. Md. Rule 16-743(e) (emphasis added). The language of the Rule clearly states that the findings of the Panel are recommendations to the Commission. The Commission is not under any obligation to follow th e findings o f the Pane l. Moreover, the deliberations, speech, writings, and conduct that occurs before the Panel is conf idential, p rivilege d and n ot subje ct to disc overy. Md. Rule 16-723(a); 13 See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Kinnane, 390 Md. 324, 335, 888 A.2d 1178, 1185 (2005) (an attorney was disbarred for criminal conduct involving a $70,000 retainer for future work, and 13 Maryland R ule 16-72 3 provide s in relevant p art: (a) Confidentiality of peer review meetings. All persons present at a peer review mee ting shall mai ntain the c onfiden tiality of all speech, writing, and conduct made as part of the meeting and may not disclose or be compelle d to disclose the speech, writing, or conduct in any judicial, administrative, or other procee ding . . . . -21- the hearing court refused to enter into evidence the report of the Peer Review Panel. We affirmed the hearing court s decision, ruling that the Peer Review Panel s report is indeed confidential). Lastly, we exam ine the Co mmission s authority to bring an actio n against an a ttorn ey. Maryland R ule 16-751(a) (1) provides that: Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Discip linar y or Remedial Ac tion in the Court of Ap peals. Respondent argues that the Commission does not have the power to direct Bar Counsel to file a petition for disciplinary or remedial action if the Panel votes to dismiss any charge s of pro fession al misco nduct. W e disag ree. To determine the intent of the Court in ad opting a sec tion of the M aryland Rule s, this Court has held that we will apply the same methods and principles that we use when analyzing a statute . Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250 , 264, 757 A.2d 7 96, 804 (2000); see State v. Romulus, 315 Md. 526, 533, 555 A.2d 484, 497 (1989). In order to effectuate the purpose and objectives of the rule, we look to its plain text. Johnson, 360 Md. at 264, 757 A.2d at 804. Pursuant to this standard of review, it is u nnecessa ry, as the respon dent sugg ests, to look to the legislative histo ry of Maryland Rule 16-7 51(a)(1). If th e languag e of the rule is plain and unambiguous, then it is not necessary to consider other resources in order to arrive at a mea ning fo r the rule . Johnson, 360 Md. at 264-65, 757 A.2d at 804. ( If the words of the rule are p lain and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ceases and we need not venture outside the text of the rule. ). The language approval or direction is clear and unambiguous -22- and we therefore need not consider the Rules Committee report. The Commission may direct Bar Cou nsel to fil e a pe tition agai nst an atto rney. Although the Panel serves a legitimate and important fu nction, its conclusions are merely recommendations under the statutory scheme. The language of Maryland Rule 16743(e) states that [t]he Peer Review Panel may recommend . . . (emp hasis ad ded). This language is again clear and unambiguous. A recommendation is mere advice and is not man dato ry. By way of example, we held in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Kinnane that the Panel s findings are only recommendations, stating: Where there is no more than a recommend atory function, one that is not binding and certainly not dispositive, there is even more reason to insulate Peer Review Panel Reports from subsequent disclosure at later stages of the attorney discipline process. 390 Md. 324, 338, 888 A.2d 1178, 11 87 (2005). The Commission was not bound to the recommendations of the Panel and has the auth ority to proceed with charges if it so desires. We have previously held that the content of the Panel s deliberations are confiden tial. Id. at 333-34, 888 A.2d at 1184. Chief Judge Bell, writing for the court, noted: [P]ursuant to Maryland Rule 16-7 23, certain m atters pertainin g to the Peer Review proces s are co nfiden tial. Section (b) (2) of that R ule list the records and proceedings of a Peer Review Pa nel as among suc h matters. The Rep ort of the Peer Review Panel qualifies as rec ords and proceed ings [that] are confidential and not open to public inspection [whose] contents may not be revealed by the Commission, the staff of the Commission, Bar Counsel, the staff and investigators of the Office of Bar Counsel, members of the Peer Review C ommittee, or any attorney involved in the p roceeding. -23- Id. at 336, 888 A.2d at 11 85. We a lso stressed th at the deliberations of the Panel are confidential in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Lee, stating: Despit e the common sense appeal of permitting use of statements made during the Peer Review process to expose later inconsistencies or intentional misrepresentations, we conclude that the b etter course is to declaim, borrowing and mutating somewhat a currently popular advertising slogan, what happ ens in Peer Review stays in Peer Review. 387 Md. 8 9, 113, 874 A.2d 897, 911 (2005). This Court has noted that the substance of deliberations discussed by the Panel is confidential and cannot be used in attorney grievance proceedings. The Commission was not under any obligation to follow the advice of the Panel. The Commission was within its authority to direct Bar Counsel to file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against an attorney that the Commission believed did not abide by Mar yland s L awyers Rules o f Prof essiona l Cond uct. This is true regardless of the Panel s recom mend ations. The Court of Appeals has original and complete jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary matters arising fr om the condu ct of a m embe r of the M aryland S tate Ba r. Attorney Grievance Com m n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 220, 892 A.2d 533, 539 (2006) ( [T]his Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline matters ); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 292, 888 A.2d 344, 347 (2005) ( Original jurisdiction ov er attorney discip line matters re sides in the Court of Appeals. We determine, ultimately, whether an attorney has committed the misconduct charged by the Attorney Grievance Commission. ); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. James, 385 Md. 637, -24- 654, 870 A.2d 229, 239 (2005) ( In proceedings involving attorney discipline, this Court has original and complete jurisdiction ). This Court is the ultimate arbiter of any claims concerning attorney misconduct in the State of Maryland, and the rules and procedures governing an Attorney Grievance action are predicated upon the Court of Appeals having jurisdiction to hear su ch a ca se. Therefore, the respondent s assertion that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case sub judice, is without m erit. We reject respon dent s view concernin g jurisdiction, affirming that the Court of Appea ls does indeed have original and complete jurisdiction over all attorney grievance matters within the State of Maryland. B. Findings of Fact As noted, in an attorney grievance action, this Court will accept the hea ring court s findings of fact, unle ss the findin gs are clearly erro neous, bec ause the he aring judge is in a better position to assess the bearing an d demeanor of witnesses and other evidence. Md. Rule 16-7 59 (b)(2)(B ); Guida, 391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095. Respondent takes exception to nearly every finding of fact presented by Judge Martin, arguing that there w as no frau dulent intention or act that occurred through the creation of H&K and CA CHA, the two business entities established by respondent after litigation had begun following the default on her parent s loan. Respondent also notes that she did not know of the Rule requiring a lawyer to be admitted to the Bar of the United States District Court of Ma ryland, in order to file therein. She asks this Court to be persuaded by the testimony of an expert witness, Mr. Sykes, who testified on her behalf at trial. Mr. Sykes -25- was of the opinion that if there was a valid antecedent debt paid through the two shell entities, H&K and CA CHA, then everything that the respondent did in creating those entities (H&K and CA CHA ) was not f raudulent. A dditionally, respondent asks this Court to be moved by the testimony of a C.P.A., K im, w ho advise d her on th e creation o f the shell entities, st ating tha t they we re create d for tax shelter p urpose s. We a re not p ersuad ed. After hearing trial testimony and reviewing the evidence presented, Judge M artin, in a comprehensive manner, made his findings of fact in this cas e. Respon dent has fa iled to demons trate the existence of factua l incons istencie s that sho uld tip th e scale in her fav or. Therefore, this Court accepts the findings of fact by the hearing court, without modification or amendment. Respondent s exceptions are denied. C. Conclusions of Law As a rule, this Court reviews the hearing judge s conclusions of law de novo. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Reinhardt, 391 M d. 209, 2 21, 892 A.2d 533, 539 (2006). Judge Martin found that respondent violated Rules 3.3, 4.1, 5.5, 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the MRPC. We shall analyze each alleged infraction. 1. MR PC 3.3 MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (2) state: (a) A lawyer sh all not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the clie nt. . . . An attorney must a t all times display candor with the truth tow ards a tribunal or inquiry board. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 531, 894 A.2d 502, 518 -26- (2006) (attorney was disbarred for a series of violations, including misrepresenting material facts to a bankruptcy court); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Kent, 337 Md. 361, 371, 653 A.2d 909, 914 (1995) (an attorney was found to show a lack of candor before a tribunal, when it was re vealed in a sub sequen t inquiry th at he w as not tru thful to t he trial co urt). Judge Martin found through clear and convincing evidence that the respondent had violated MRPC 3.3(a)(1) and (2). He found that respondent was not truthful to the trial court in her statements under oath. This was based on respondent s admission in her testimony in the Unite d States D istrict Court for the District of Maryland (this testimony occurred during the seco nd of th e two c ases tha t the resp onden t was in volved in, Business Loan Express, LLC v. Hekyong Pak, No. C iv. JFM -04-63 4, slip op . at 1-2 (D . Md. J ul. 9, 2004)) that money was transferred to Korea from the proceeds of the sale of Summer Fields (the first property that the Pak fam ily sold, in J uly, 2003) when she knew that was not true. In fact, the funds were wired a fter the s econd proper ty sale (the A utumn Frost p roperty). Respondent also failed to disclose the source of the funds that were used to purchase Autumn Frost (the property that was bought after the sale of Summ er Fields, and was sub sequently sold to respondent s hu sband). Respondent objects to this conclusion by asserting that the hearing court s conclusions are improper , based on th e evidenc e presente d and suggests that this Court accept the conclusions of expert witness Sykes (which were based on a factual predicate contrary to that which the hearing court ultimately fo und), ra ther than Judge Martin s conc lusions . Respo ndent, m oreove r, does n ot direct ly address the con clusion s of the hearing court. -27- We agree with th e hearin g court that the r espon dent vio lated the se rules. We arrive at this conclusion through the facts that have been accepted in this case and because respondent has provided an insufficient rebuttal argument concerning the land sale and transfer of funds to Korea. Candor towards the tribunal is a necessity in the practice of law, and as a consequence of her actions and intentional failures to disclose we hold that the respon dent vio lated M RPC 3.3(a)(1 ) and (2 ). 2. MR PC 4.1 MRPC 4.1 exists to insure that attorneys will honestly represent the facts w hen in discussions with a third p arty. An intention al misrepres entation of a material fa ct that is made to oppo sing co unsel m ay constitu te a viola tion of M RPC 4.1. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Steinberg, 395 M d. 337, 367 , 910 A.2d 429, 446 (2006); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566, 589, 805 A.2d 1040, 1052-53 (2002) (attorney misled a third pa rty conce rning re presen tation of a work er s com pensat ion actio n). The hearing court found, through clear and convincing evidence, that respondent was in violation of MR PC 4.1(a)(1) and (2 ). Judge Martin found that respondent failed to correct BLE s (the loan company bringing the defau lt action) assertio n in its original lawsuit that the funds were wired to Korea from the Summer Fields settlement, when in fact the funds were sent after the sale of the Autumn Frost property. This was a material om ission on the part of the respon dent, as she k nowing ly allowed op posing co unsel to rely upon an incorrect record. Additi onally, respondent admitted under oath that the funds were wired to Korea through the Summer Fields settlement and this admission was untrue. -28- Again, opposing counsel relie d on this statem ent. Respondent argues, unconvincingly, that the Commission has not met its burden of proof in this case. She also argues that no perjury charges were filed against her for any misrepresentations in the pleadings. While the filing of perjury charges, and/or conviction of same, may well be relevant in the context o f attorney disciplinary proceedings, the failure to file such charges is not conclusive, and is of much less relevance. Perjury may, generally, consist of misrepresentations, but not all misrepresentations are p erjurous and not all perjuro us misrep resenta tions w ill cause a prose cutor to initiate pe rjury char ges. MRP C 4.1(a)(1 ) and (2) ex pressly forbids conveying a false statement o r failing to disclose a material fact to a third party. We hold that respondent s conduct constituted a violation of this rule. Her misrepresentations a nd false statements w ere intentional and were made in order to mislead opposing counsel. These false statements and omissions of fact were r elied up on by op posing couns el durin g litigatio n. 3. MR PC 5.5 MRPC 5.5 provid es that a lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the ru les of th at jurisdic tion. Attorney Grieva nce v. V elasqu ez, 380 Md. 651, 846 A.2d 422 (2004) (in which a Maryland attorney was disbarred f or practicing law in V irginia without being admitted to the Virginia ba r); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Alsafty, 379 Md. 1, 19, 838 A.2d 1213, 1224 (2003) (in which a New York attorney was disbarred for practicing law in Maryland w ithout being admitted to the M aryland bar). Furthermore, an -29- attorney in Maryland is require d to kno w the ru les of p rofessi onal co nduct. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Awuah, 346 Md. 420 , 435, 697 A.2d 4 46, 454 (1997). The pertinent local rules of the United S tates District Court for the District of Maryland that respondent allegedly violated are: Rule 102. General filing and service requirements. 1. Signatures, identifying information and proof of service. a. Signatures i. Parties represented by counsel. When a party is represented by counsel, the Clerk sha ll accept for filing only documents signed by a member of the Bar of this Court whose appearance is entered on behalf of that p arty. Use of any of the methods for signing an electronic document established by the Court, inclu ding use o f an attorne y s login and password to electronica lly file a docu ment, con stitutes the attorn ey s signature o n the docu ment. ii. Parties appearing pro se. When a party is appearing pro se, the Clerk will acce pt fo r filin g on ly doc ume nts signe d by th at pa rty. Attorn eys who have prepared any documents which are submitted for filing by a pro se litigant must be members of the Bar of this Court and must sign the do cument, state their name, address, telephone number and their bar number assigned by this Co urt. D. M d. Loc al Rule 102.1.a .i and ii. Judge Martin s c onclusion that respondent violated MRPC 5.5 was based on two actions by respo ndent. In the first occurrence of the violation, respondent, on behalf of her parents, prepared a motion to dismiss (for the first, loan defau lt case, Business Loan Express, LLC v. Hosurl Pak, No. Civ. JF M-03-1 691, slip op . at 1 (D. M d. Dec. 9, 2003)) in United States District Court for the District of Maryland, Northern Division. In so doing, she was in actual v iolation of D. Md. Local Rule 102.1.a.ii, which arguably requires that when a pro se filing is made with the aid o f an atto rney, that a ttorney m ust be a memb er of the bar. Sub sequ ently, she filed a motion in her own name (for the second, fraud case, Business Loan -30- Express v. Hek yong P ak, No. Civ. JFM-04-634, slip op. at 1-2 (D. M d. Jul. 9, 2004 )), again without being adm itted to the bar in violation of D. Md. Local Rule 102.1.a.i. Although Judge Motz later admitted her to the bar of the Federal District Court, she was not so admitte d at the tim e of bo th of the se action s. Respondent claims that there is a difference between the unauthorized practice of law and an unauthorized ap pearance in a court where one has not been formally admitted. She also claims that because Judge Motz allowed her to become a member of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland Bar, that these prior appearan ces are irrelev ant. We disagree. Maryland s courts and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland are jurisdictionally distinc t. By her actions , responde nt violated the legal practice rules of another jurisdiction. W hen this fac t is coupled with a plain language reading of the local rule of the federal district court and the MRP C, respon dent is foun d to be in violation of MRPC 5.5 because of her unauthorized practice of law in th e fede ral cour t. We hold that respondent was in violation of MRPC 5.5, regardless of whe ther she knew o f the local federal court rules, and regardless of the fact that Judge M otz eventu ally admitted he r to the federal bar. 4. MRPC 8.4(c) MRPC 8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct for an attorney to engage in conduct in volving d ishonesty, fraud , deceit or mis representatio n. A law yer must at all times accura tely repres ent the f acts. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 711, 867 A.2d 259, 272 (2005) (an attorney who misrepresented his representation of a client -31- was found to be in violation of 8.4(c) and was ordered disbarred). Willfully providing false information in a deposition or in courtro om pro ceedin gs is a cle ar violat ion of th e rule. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. White, 354 Md. 346, 364, 731 A.2d 447, 457 (1999) (an attorney who gave false testimony in a deposition and as a witness was found in violation of 8.4(c) and ordered disbarred). Candor and truthfulness are two of the most important moral character traits of a lawyer. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 449, 635 A.2d 1 315, 13 19 (19 94). Judge Martin concluded that respon dent unde rtook frau dulent action s in order to protect her parents and their assets and thus violated MRPC 8.4(c). He found that her actions to create shell business entities (H&K, L.L.C. and CAC HA, L .L.P) had n o legitimate business purposes and were used to transfer title to the Pak s properties, without consideration. The evidence b efore the hearing cou rt was sufficient for Judg e Martin s conclusions. The hearing court also noted that respondent advised her parents when to send the funds to Korea and orchestrated the purchase of the Autumn Frost property in her husband s name only. Lastly, the hearing court fou nd that the Respon dent s actions were within the definition of fraud, as outlined in Ma ryland C ode (19 75, 200 5 Rep l. Vol.), § 15207 of the Commercial Law Article.14 14 Maryland Code (1975, 2005 Repl. Vol.), § 15-207 of the Commercial Law Article prov ides: Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presume d in law, to hi nder, del ay, or defraud present or future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present (continued...) -32- Respondent asserts that there can be no misconduct, because her actions were not fraudulen t. Again, respondent asks us to consider the testimony of h er expert witness, Mr. Sykes, and disreg ard the find ings of the h earing cou rt. Moreover, the respondent contends that the business entities were created for legitimate, tax related purposes. We accept Jud ge Mar tin s findings and conc lusions on this issue and hold that the respondent did violate M RPC 8 .4(c), becaus e there is clear and convincing evidence that her actions were an effort to delay, hinder, or defraud her parents creditors. Actions by an attorney that constitute fraud, dishonesty, deceit or misrepresentations constitute an egregious violation of the M RPC. T here is amp le evidence to conclude that respondent made material misrepresentations concerning her actions on b ehalf of h er parents. A lthough n o specific intent is needed to prove a misrepresentation, in these proceedings the misrepresentations were intentio nal. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 590, 876 A.2d 642, 657 (2005) (attorney was disbarred for 8.4(c) misrepresentations, which she blamed on her counsel). Moreover, respondent s creation of shell business entities and the subsequent title transfers w ere an eff ort to hinder BLE in its quest to collect on a judgement against her parents. Combined with the misrepresentations of fact, these fraudulent acts constitute an egregio us viola tion of M RPC 8.4(c). 5. MRPC 8.4(d) It is profession al miscond uct for a law yer to engag e in conduct that is prejudicial to 14 (...continued) and fu ture cre ditors. -33- the administratio n of justice. MRP C 8.4(d). A n attorney wh o fails to resp ond truthfu lly brings the legal profe ssion into disrepute an d is therefore acting in a m anner preju dicial to the admin istration o f justice . Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101, 111, 892 A.2d 469, 475 (2006 ); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Childress, 360 Md. 373, 381-82, 758 A.2d 117, 121 (200 0) (case w as remand ed, but the co urt noted tha t conduct w hich is likely to impair pub lic confidence in the profession, impacts the image of the legal profession and engenders disrespect fo r the Cour t is conduct p rejudicial to the administratio n of justice). The hearing court concluded by clear and convincing evidence that respondent s conduct also constituted a violation of MRPC 8.4(d). By creating shell business entities in orde r to defraud creditors and conveying misrepresentations of facts to opposing counsel, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland and petitioner, respondent committed acts that were pre judicial to the a dministration of justice. R esponde nt does not directly rebut these conclusions. Instead she again argues that the hearing court was incorrect on the findings of fact that le d to this conclusion of law. We accept Judge Martin s extensive and well reasoned findings and conclusions. We hold that respondent s conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, constituting a violatio n of M RPC 8.4(d). R esponden t used her k nowled ge of the la w to mislead and de fraud h er paren ts credito rs. Her misrepresentations of the facts were relied upon by opposing counsel and her actions to divest her parents assets hindered the collection of funds from the judgment rendered by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. In Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Sheinbein, we described the effect such -34- actions have on the legal profe ssion: W hen an of ficer of the le gal system imp roperly thwar ts the mechanisms within it, he shows a disrespect for that system and the public confidence in the legal profe ssion as a w hole nece ssarily suffers a devastating blow. 372 Md. 224, 25455, 812 A.2d 9 81, 998 (2004 ). V. Sanctions We now turn to the question of sanctions for these serious violations of the Maryland Rules of Profe ssional Co nduct. The sanctions for a violation of the MRPC depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, and any mitigating circumstances. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209 , 223, 892 A.2d 5 33, 541 (2006). When delivering the appropriate sanction, we are guided by our interest in protecting the public and inspiring confidence in the leg al profe ssion. Attorney Grievance v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 595, 876 A.2d 642, 660 (2005). The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and guide other lawyers away from violating the MRPC, not to punish the law yer. Reinhardt, 391 Md. at 223, 892 A.2d at 541. Bar Counse l suggests that the app ropriate sanc tion in this case is disbarment because respondent engaged in a web of lies and undertook any means necessary to protect her parents assets, even if it involved fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresenta tion. Respondent does not make a recomm endation for sanctions. Bar Counsel notes that there are no credible extenuating circumstances in this case and that Judge Martin found through clear and convincing evidence that respondent had engaged in intentionally disho nest behavior and condu cted herself fraudulen tly in order to thw art a -35- creditor s attempts to collect on a judgment. We agree with these findings. These m ultiple violatio ns of th e MR PC are egregio us. The sanctio n must be disb armen t. There is am ple p rece dent for disb arment b ased on th ese v iolat ions . Honesty and proper represe ntations of the f acts are essentia l in the pr actice o f law. In the case before us, respondent intentionally misled opposing counsel, the hearing court, and her parents creditors. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 714, 867 A.2d 259, 275 (2005) (disbarme nt is the appro priate sanctio n for an atto rney, if that attorney was intentionally dishonest in dealings w ith a third party); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 304, 818 A.2d 219, 237 (2003) (disbarment is also appropriate when an attorney has mad e multiple rep resentations in an attemp t to obfuscate the truth in ord er to save him or her self). This Court observed in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Vanderlinde, that [u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest c onduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic chara cter to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse. 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 46 3, 488 (2001). Eve ry attorney in the State of Maryland has sworn or affirmed an oath to abide by the rules and laws of this State. Respondent s conduct in the case sub judice was dishonest, misleading, fraudulent and prejudicial to the administration of justice. We thus ORDER that Hekyong Pak a/k/a H. Christina Pak be disbarred. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THE COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF A LL -36- TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-715, FOR W H ICH SUM JUDGMENT I S ENTERED IN FAVOR OF ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COM MISSION AGAINST H E K Y O N G P A K A / K / A H. CHRISTINA PAK. -37- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 83 September Term, 2006 ______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. HEKYONG PAK ______________________________________ Bell, C. J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, Wilne r, Alan M . (retired, specially assigned), JJ. _______________________________________ Concu rring Opin ion by Wilne r, J., in which B ell, C.J. and R aker and G reene, JJ. join ______________________________________ Filed: August 2, 2007 I concur in th e decision to disbar M s. Pak, and, w ith one exc eption, I agre e with the analysis set fo rth in the lead O pinion lead ing to that resu lt. My only conc ern is with the treatment in that Opinion of the alleged violation of MRPC 5.5(a), which prohibits a lawyer from practic[ing] law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. The lead Opinion would affirm a finding that Ms. Pak violated that Rule by (1) preparing a motion to be filed by her parents pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, and (2) subsequently filing in that court an answer to a complaint against her and a family trust, both at a time when she had not been formally admitted to the Bar of that court in conformance with Local Rule 701 of the court. I d isagree with th at conc lusion. To the best of my knowledge, this Court has never before addressed whether an attorney who is a mem ber in good standing of the Bar of this C ourt and who is the refore lawfully permitted to practice law in this State is in violation of MRPC 5.5(a) if he or she prepares or files pleadings or motions or otherwise appears in the U.S. District Court for the Dis trict of M aryland w ithout h aving b een fo rmally ad mitted to the Ba r of that court. This is an important issue. One may start with the plain words of the Rule. MRPC 5.5(a), as noted, precludes a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction . . . . The lead Opinion bases its finding of violation on the simplistic premise that Maryland s courts and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland are jurisdictionally distinct and that [b]y her actions, respondent violated the legal practice rules of another jurisdiction. Other than to discuss whether what M s. Pak d id cons tituted th e practic e of law , that is the extent o f the an alysis. Obviously, the Federal courts are jurisdictionally distinct from the State courts, but I do not believe that MRPC 5.5(a) uses the term jurisdiction in that context. It speaks of practicing law in a jurisdiction, in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). That, to me, indicates a geographic context, not one of dual judicial sovereignty within the same State. The prohibition is against practicing law in another State (or District or territory, or perhaps even country, which, for simplicity, I will characterize as a State) in violation of the rules in that State. An unauthorized appearance as an attorney in a Federal court located in such a State would constitute a violation of Rule 5.5(a), but the violation would not be founded on the fact that the appearance was in a Federal court to which the attorney had not been admitted but on the fact that the appearance as counsel would constitute the practice of law in that State. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, though not part of the Maryland judiciary, is not in a separate geographic enclave. It is in the State of Maryland, and Ms. Pak was at all relevant times admitted to practice law in that jurisdiction. To illustrate the point, Ms . Pak could have ente red the Fed eral courtho use in Baltimore or Greenbelt and, subject to security and decorum constraints imposed by the court or the U.S. Marshals, sit in the lobby or other available space and draft pleadings or legal memoranda, consult with clients, negotiate settlements, and do a variety of other things that would constitute the practice of law. A lot of law is practiced in the corridors, -2- lobbies, and rest rooms in the courthouse. None of that would violate MRPC 5.5(a), even if the conduct pertained to a case pending in the Federal court, because it all would have occurred in Maryland. She could not, however, have done the same thing in some other State whe re she wa s not adm itted to practice . The Ru le is plainly foun ded on g eograph ic boundaries, which is implicit not only from its wording but from its deeper jurisdictional underpinning. Subject to Federal Constitutional constraints, the regulation of the practice of law in the Unite d States has long and g enerally been re garded as a State ma tter. The bas ic qualification s for adm ission to the B ar gradu ation from an accred ited law sch ool, successful completion of a State-administered Bar examination, real proof of good moral character, and, in some States, completion of a professionalism course are established by the legislative or judicial authorities of the respective State Governments, and it is the State judicial authority that determines whe ther those qualifications have b een met. In most States, the State Supreme Court determines who may practice law in the State, which it do es by forma lly admitting qua lified candid ates to practice within the g eograph ic confines of that State. Ordinarily and this is certainly true in Maryland a lawyer admitted to p ractice by that co urt may not on ly practice in any of the courts o f the State but ma y engage in the pr actice o f law w ithout ev er setting foot in a ny courth ouse. Most, if no t all, of the 94 U .S. District Co urts in the cou ntry honor tha t State role by making any lawyer admitted to practice by the highest court of the State in which the District Court is located eligible for admission to the Bar of that court. Many, indeed, -3- like the District Court for the District of Maryland, make a lawyer admitted by the highest court of any State so eligible. With an important exception noted below, the additional requirements for admission to the Bar of a Federal court are generally rather minimal and mostly proced ural. Althou gh they tend to require that th e attorney be fa miliar with Federal rules of civil and criminal procedure, the local rules of the court, and the Federal Rules of Evidence, they do not ordinarily require the successful completion of a Federal Bar examination or place any additional requirements on the nature or extent of the attorney s legal ed ucation or e xperience . In that impo rtant sense, the Federal co urts themselves recognize the primacy of the States in regulating the practice of law.1 Until now, our jurisprudence under MRPC 5.5(a) has been limited to two categories of persons: (1) those who improperly practice law in Maryland without having been adm itted to practice here by this Co urt, and (2) tho se who a re admitted to practice in Maryland but improperly practice in another State without having been admitted by that State to do so. The two cases relied on in the lead Opinion Attorney Grievance v. Velasquez, 380 Md. 651, 846 A.2d 422 (2004) and Attorney G rievance v . Alsafty, 379 Md. 1, 838 A.2d 1213 (2003) involved one or the other of those situations. Velasquez was a Maryland attorney who was disciplined under MRPC 5.5 for unlawfully practicing in Virginia when h e was not adm itted to practice in that State. Alsafty was a N ew York 1 It is certainly questionable from this construct whether the local rules governing the admission of lawyers to the Bar of the Federal courts can be said to co nstitute the regulation of the legal profession, fo r purposes of M RPC 5.5(a). -4- attorney who practiced in Maryland when he was not admitted to do so.2 When w e apply MRPC 5.5(a) in those manners, we implement our own role in regulating the practice of law in Maryland and gratify the legitimate role of our sister States in regulating the practice of law within their resp ective b orders. So far, the interplay with the Federal courts in the context of MRPC 5.5(a) has involved a converse situation. Follo wing the p ronounc ement of the Supre me Cou rt in Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 10 L. Ed. 2d 428 (1963), we have concluded that an attorney not admitted to practice law in Maryland does not violate MR PC 5.5 by practic ing, eve n from a Mar yland of fice, exclusively in Federal court or before a Federal agency, if, under Federal law or the rules of the Federal court, the lawyer is autho rized to p ractice b efore th at agen cy or cou rt. See Attorney Grievance v. Bridges, 360 Md. 489, 759 A.2d 233 (2000) but compare Attorney G rievance v . Harris-Sm ith, 356 Md. 72, 737 A.2d 567 (1999) and c.f. Kennedy v. Bar A ss n, 316 Md. 646, 561 A.2d 200 (1989); Attorney Grievance v. Barneys, 370 Md. 566 , 805 A.2d 104 0 (2002). That precept is based on the Supremacy Clause that a State may not, through a Rule such as MRPC 5.5, preclude a person from practicing before a Federal court or 2 Alsafty practiced for a brief period in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland prior to his admission by that court, but the violation of MRPC 5.5 was based on his unauthorized practice in Maryland, which was extensive, not on his appearance in the Federal court on behalf of indigent clients. The unauthorized Federal court activity was noted in rejecting Alsafty s defense that, even though not admitted in Maryland, it was permissible for him to prac tice in Federa l cou rt. Obvio usly, that defense had no basis if he had not be en admitted to practice in th e Federal c ourt. -5- agency if Federal law permits the person to do so. It does not necessarily follow, however, at least under a Supremacy analysis, that MRPC 5.5 is violated when a lawyer admitted to practice in Maryland acts as counsel in the U.S. District Court here without having been ad mitted to that court s Bar. There have been but a few cases that have even tangentially dealt with the issue now before us, and they provide no enlightened analysis. In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Scuro, 522 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1988), an attorney admitted in Ohio applied for admission to practice before the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, which required as a condition of admission that the lawyer pass a Federal bar examination of som e kind. T he law yer failed the exa minatio n and w as there fore no t admitte d. Noneth eless, over a p eriod of fo ur years, he pro ceeded to represent ab out thirty clients before tha t court. Wh en that wa s discovere d, the District C ourt held the lawyer in contempt. That, in turn, led to a disciplinary proceeding in Ohio. In a one-paragraph per curiam opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the lawyer s conduct violated not only the Rule s of the Fe deral court b ut also the T exas Co de of Pro fessional R esponsibility and the R ules of the T exas Sup reme Co urt govern ing the prac tice of law , and that it warranted a six month suspension. None of those rules were cited, and it is not clear from the summary opinion whether the violation was founded on Scuro s unauthorized practice in the State of Texas or specifically on his appearance in the Federal court in that State. In re Pryor, 864 So. 2d 157 (La. 2004) involved a Louisiana attorney who faced multiple cha rges, mostly invo lving lack o f diligence a nd failure to cooperate with -6- Disciplinary Counsel. One of the charges arose from the attorney s representation of a client in a probation revocation matter in the U.S. District Court when he had not taken the necessary steps to be admitted to practice in that court. In regard to that issue, the hearing committee observed that, although respondent may have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in federal court, any violation was only technical in nature. Other than mentioning the hearing committee s conclusion, the court, itself, gave no further attention to the matter but suspended the attorney for the other violations. In In re Schoeneman, 891 A.2d 279 (D.C . 2006), an a ttorney who se license to practice law had been revoked in Virginia, his home State, and, on a reciprocal basis, was suspended in the District of Columbia and by the U.S. District Court in D.C., provided legal advice to and drafted pleadings for three clients with respect to matters before the U.S. Distric t Court. Th e real grava men of th e charges u ltimately brough t against him involved the neglect of those clients and his failure to inform them of his suspension, but he was also charged with a violation of Rule 5.5. The D.C. hearing committee and the Board on Professional Responsibility found no violation of that Rule, essentially on the ground th at the service s provided by Schoen eman du ring his susp ension did not constitute the practice of law. The D.C. Court disagreed with that conclusion and held that the attorney s cond uct did constitute the practice of law, at a time when he had been suspended from practice in every jurisdiction in which he had been admitted. Id. at 281. Schoeneman, in other words, was not authorized to practice at all, in any court located in the District of Columbia. -7- On this scant authority and given the actual wording of MRPC 5.5, it is a real stretch to con strue that Ru le as applying se parately to practic e in a Fede ral court, and it is not nec essary fo r the pu rity and pr eserva tion of th e legal p rofessi on to m ake tha t stretch. For one th ing, our colle agues in the U.S. Distric t Court are f ully capable of dealing w ith attorneys who attempt to practice in their court without being properly admitted to do so. See U.S. District Court Local Rules 703 - 705. They do not need a strained construction of MRPC 5.5 for that purpose. Nor do we; there are other ways that this Court can deal with th at situatio n. In addition to the more routine qualifications common in the admission rules of many Federal courts, Local Rule 701 of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland requires, as a condition of admission to practice before that court, that the attorney be w illing, available a nd comp etent to acce pt appointm ents by the Co urt to represent indigent parties in civil cases in this District unless the acceptance of such appointments is inconsistent with an attorney s professional employment obligations as, for example, a government attorney. When an attorney knowingly proceeds to practice in that court without being admitted, and thereby seeks to escape the obligation of pro bono service that th e court has m ade a con dition of su ch admiss ion, the attorne y may well be in violation of MRPC 6.1(a), 6.2, and 8.4(d). MRPC 6.1(a) provides that a lawyer has a p rofessi onal res ponsib ility to rende r pro bo no pub lico lega l service . Rule 6.2 adds, even m ore p ointedly, that a lawyer s hall n ot seek to avoid ap poin tmen t by a tribunal to rep resent a pers on excep t for good cause . . . Ru le 8.4(d), of c ourse, mak es it -8- professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. That approach, it seems to me, is a better way to address the problem, for it focuses on the deceptiveness of the lawyer and the eff ect of that deceptiveness o n the lawyer s obligations under Ru les 6.1 and 6.2, rather than on a strained construction of the w ord jurisdiction in MR PC 5.5 an d a blurring of the pred ominant ro le of the Sta tes in regulating the practice of law. In that latter regard, it also avoids the prospect of a lawyer duly adm itted to p ractice b y this Cou rt facing crimina l liability und er Ma ryland C ode, § 10-601 of the Bus. Occ. & Prof. Article for practicing in the Federal court without having been admitted under Local Rule 701.3 For all of these reasons, I would not find a violation of MRPC 5.5. I am authorized to announ ce that Ch ief Judge B ell and Judg es Raker and Gre ene join in th is Opinion. 3 Section 10-601 provides that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a person may not practice, attempt to practice, or offer to practice law in the State unless admitted to the Bar. Section 10-101(d) defines Bar as the Bar of this Court, unless the context requires otherw ise. If this Court were to hold that practice in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland without being admitted to the Bar of that court constitutes the unauthorized practice of law under MRPC 5.5, the claim could be made that such practice constitutes the practice of law in the State without being admitted to the Bar in violation of § 10-601. Violation of that statute is a misdemeanor that carries a one-year jail sentence and a fine of $5,000 . See § 10-6 06(a)(3 ). -9-

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