Attorney Grievance v. Wingerter

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket (Subtitle AG) No. 71 September Term, 2005 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Rex B. Wingerter Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilner, Alan M. (Retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Filed: July 30, 2007 Rex B. Wing erter, the respo ndent, 1 was convicted, fo llowing the tender o f a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, of misprision of a felon y.2 In conside ration of the plea of gu ilty, the United Sta tes Gove rnment dis missed the remaining co unts of a multi-c ount In dictme nt that ea rlier had been f iled aga inst him . The responde nt was the reafter sente nced to a p eriod of im prisonme nt, a year of supervised release, community service and a f ine. Subsequently, Bar Counsel, acting on behalf, and with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, filed 1 The respondent stands suspended from the practice of law, this Court having entered an order to that eff ect on May 4, 2006 , pursuant to Maryland R ule 16-771 (c). Rule 16-771 provides that an order of temporary suspension is available when the respondent has committed a serious crime. Rule 16-701 (k) (3) defines serious crime as a crime that is in at least one of the following categories: (1) a felony under Maryland law, (2) a crime in another state or under federal law that would have been a felony under Maryland law had the crime been committed in Maryland, and (3) a crime under federal law or the law of any state that is punishable by imprisonment for three years or more. The hearing court, having reviewed that definition in light of the definition of Professional misconduct and the proscriptions of Rule 8.4 (a), (b) and (c), opined: Noting the acknowledged plea of guilty entered by the Respondent on August 26, 2005, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ... to 18 U.S.C. Section 4, misprision of a felony ... , said plea undisputedly qualifies (by clear and convincing evidence) as a serious crime under Maryland R ule 16-701 (k) (3) - a crime un der Fede ral law pun ishable by imprisonment for three years or more. It matters not therefore whether mispris ion of a felony is a crime under M aryland la w. That analysis is consistent with what this Court necessarily must have concluded when issuing its temp orary susp ension order. 2 Misprision of a felon y, codified at 18 U.S.C. S ection 4, a fe deral, but no t a Maryland, crime, is committed when someone, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible m ake known to some judge or o ther person in civil or military authority under the United States. It is punishable by fine and imprisonment for not more than three years, or both. in this Court, pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-7513 and 16-771,4 a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial A ction. In that petition, referencing the respon dent s conviction and, indeed relying on it, the respond ent was c harged w ith violating R ule 8.4, M isconduc t,5 of the Marylan d Rule s of Pro fession al Con duct, as adopte d by Ma ryland R ule 16- 812. 3 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. ... (2) Conviction of Crime; Reciprocal Action. If authorized by Rule 16-771 (b) or 16-773 (b), Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals without prior approval of the Commission. Bar Counsel promptly shall notify the Commission of the filing. The Commission on review may direct the withdrawal of a petition that was filed pursuant to this subsection. 4 Maryland Rule16-771 (b) provides: (b) Petition in C ourt of A ppeals. Upon receiving and verifying information from any source that an attorney has been convicted of a serious crime, Bar Counsel may file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 16-751 (a)(2). The petition may be filed whether the conv iction resulted from a plea of guilty, nolo contendere, or a verdict after trial and whether an appeal or any other post-conviction proceeding is pending. The petition shall allege the fact of the conviction and include a request that the attorney be suspended immediately from the practice of law. A certified copy of the judgment of conviction shall be attached to the petition and shall be prima facie evidence of the fact that the attorney w as conv icted of the crim e charg ed. 5 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: (a) violate o r attempt to v iolate the rules o f professio nal condu ct, knowin gly assist or induc e another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a crimina l act that reflects adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ...[.] 2 We referred the case, pursu ant to Rule 16-752 (a), 6 to the Honorable Richard H. Sothoron, Jr., of the Circuit Court fo r Prince G eorge s C ounty, for hea ring pursua nt to Rule 16-757 (c). 7 Following that hearing, Judge Sothoron found facts, by clear and convincing evidence, as follows: 1. Respondent Rex B. Wingerter, a member of the Maryland Bar since 1986, entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Co urt for the Eastern District of Virgin ia (Judge E llis) on August 26, 2005, by way of a criminal inform ation, to mispris ion of a felony, in violatio n of 18 U.S.C ., Section 4. 2. The charge of misprision of a felony is a felony under Federal law and carries a penalty of not more than three years, in addition to being fined. 3. That the transcript of the August 26, 2005, plea proceedings clearly reflected the voluntariness of the Respondent s plea and the fact that he was represented by compete nt and exp erienced c ounsel. 4. That the written plea agreement and related statements of facts entered 6 Maryland Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 7 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 3 into the record on August 26, 2005, clearly and concisely described the nature and extent of Respondent s criminal culpability in committing a misprision of a felony, the time frame of which covered a period from 2000-2004. 5. That the statement of facts is unam biguous in describing dishonest, fraudulent and dece itful condu ct by the Resp ondent o ver a time frame from 2000 to 2004 while Respondent was employed as in-house counsel for Global Recruitment and Immigration S ervices, Inc. (GRIS) based in Falls Church, Virginia. 6. That the conduct referenced in paragraph 5 included but was not limited to: a. Respondent s awareness that his signature on various immigration documents was being forged. b. Respondent s awareness that the signatures of immigrant clients of GRIS were being forged. c. Respon dent s aw areness tha t a light box was being utilized to forge signatures. d. Respondent s awareness that hundreds of ETA 750 applications were submitted on behalf of Cleaners of America (a potential employer of immigrant clients of GRIS) even though Cleaners of America did not have the capacity to hire such large numbers of immigrants. e. Responden t s awarene ss that he w as not, in his capacity as GRIS in house legal counsel, the attorney of record for the applicants referenced in paragraph d. f. Respondent s awareness that GRIS was under investigation by the Federa l governm ent regarding the submission of hundreds of ETA 750 forms on behalf of immigrant clients. g. Responden t s awareness [that] GR IS was misinform ing its immigrant clients regarding the status of their ETA 750 applications. h. Respon dent s awareness of GRIS charging its immigrant clients fees to prepare ETA 750 forms. 7. That the conduct referred to in paragraph 6 and its subparts was never reported in a ny manner to law enfo rcement a uthorities by the R esponde nt. 8. That Respondent was sentenced by [Judge Ellis, consistent with the plea 4 agreement and as the h earing court had earlier repo rted III, and tha t] this sentence was within the Federal guideline range and much more lenient than senten ces imp osed as to other GRIS princip als. 9. That as of the date of the November 8, 2006, Attorney Grievance hearing before this Court, Respon dent had s uccessfu lly completed s erving his six months of incarce ration in Cumb erland, M aryland, and w as currently serving his six m onths o f com munity co nfinem ent in R ockville , Marylan d. The hearing co urt conclud ed that the ch arge of m isprision of a felony, while n ot a crime in Maryland qualifies as a serious crim e in accord with Maryland [Rule] 16.701 (k) (3). It concluded further that it was supported by the unequivocal and unambiguous statement of facts offered as the factual basis for the plea and that the conduct establishing that charge constituted misconduct as defined by Rule 8.4 (b) and (c), Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct. Indeed, th e hearing c ourt expres sly determined , by clear and convincing evidence , that Resp ondent co mmitted a c riminal act inv olving dishonesty, fraud and misrepresentation, which reflected adversely on h is honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a law yer. Rule 8.4 (b) and (c) proscribe, respectively, criminal acts which call into question a lawyer s honesty or trustw orthiness an d condu ct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep resenta tion. In determining that misprision of a felony was a proper predicate for those misconduct charges, to w hich the resp ondent w as called to answer, the hearing co urt relied on the fac tual basis for the respondent s plea, as indicated. It also relied on the plea agreement itself, noting tha t, in that agreem ent, the respondent indicated that he was pleading guilty because [he was]] in fact guilty of the charged offense, that he admit[ted ] the facts 5 set forth in the statemen t of facts filed with th is plea agree ment and agree[d] th at those fac ts establish guilt of the offense charged beyond a reasonab le doubt. W ith regard to the factual basis for the plea, significantly, the respondent, having acknowledged the existence, timing and details of, and the participan ts engaged in, the conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, making false statements and encouragin g alie ns to ente r the United S tates unla wfu lly, iden tified by th e govern men t, con fess ed th at he not o nly did not notify federal judicial or law enforcement authorities of the fraud [or] take steps to stop the fraud[, he] took at least two steps to conceal the crime. First, [he] instructe d employee s at Globa l to start writing th eir initials next to his signature whenever they forged it, but further instructed the same employees to refrain from marking their initials whenever they forged an immigrant s or an employer s signature on an ETA 750 application[8] (or related documents). [He] instructed the employees so because he was concerned that if the employees began to initial the forged signatures of the immigran ts and employers on the ETA 750 applications, the initials would expose the fact that the signatures were in fact forgeries. Second, [he] repeatedly informed the Department of Labor and certain imm igrant clients that certain of the employer sponsors had decided to abando n certain ETA 750 applications for economic reasons when in fact he knew or should have known that it wa s becau se the g overnm ent wa s investi gating G lobal. Statement of Fac ts, Parag raph 8. A s signifi cantly, the responde nt acknow ledged, in paragraph 9 of the statement of facts, that he abused a position of public trust in the commission of his offense, and, in paragraph 11, that the actions in which he engaged and 8 [A]n ETA 750 application is an application required by the immigration laws and the regulations prescribed thereunder. The respondent agreed, in the statement of facts, that substantially more than one hundred ETA 750 applications were involved in the criminal violations referenced a nd that each of them contained false stateme nts that were materia l to their a djudica tion. 6 which were recounted in the statement of facts were in all respects knowing and deliberate, and were not committed by mistake, accident, or other innocent reason. In addition, the hearing court determined that the plea and sentencing proceedings are confirm atory. The respondent admitted during the plea proceedings that he was aware of the conspiracy, that he saw acts that should have led [him] to understand and realize that the ... there was a conspiracy to fraudulently bring in non-citizens into the United States. That conspiracy consisted of forging signatures of the aliens and reporting false job offers and job descriptions. Moreover, having heard the recitation of the statement of facts by the Assistant United States Attorney, who, in addition to reiterating the facts surrounding the fraud conspira cy, repeated, detailing the specifics, the respondent s admission that he took active steps to ... conceal the fraud, and not to report it to competent authorities, the respondent resp onded, Yes , your Hon or, t o the trial j udge s in quiry as to its tru th an d acc urac y. Con siste ntly, the respondent, at the sentencing proceeding, in allocution, advised the trial court: ... I am before this Court to be sentenced for misprision of a felony, for failing to report what I believed to be fraudulent contact - to be fraudulent conduct at my former place of employment, Global Recruitment and Immigration Services. I make no excuses for my conduct. I made a series of bad choices during my tenure at Global and I and my family have suffered tremendously from my actions . The hearing cou rt also made findings w ith regard to the responde nt s testimon y in mitigation. They are: 7 13. That the Respondent, by way of his testimony presented at the November 8, 2006, attorney grievance hearing, contradicted the unambiguous statement of facts that served as the factual basis of his plea. Specific ally, the Respon dent: a. disputed the time frame as to when he became aware of any wrongdoing by GRIS principals; b. disputed committing any fraudule nt conduc t; c. disputed possessing any criminal inte nt; d. attributed his actions to bureaucratic sloppiness. 14. That the Respondent s testimony on November 8, 2006, focused upon minimizing his criminal c ulpability as outline d in the unambiguous statement of facts re ferenc ed here in. Further, this position contradicted Resp ondent s admission, without excuse, of guilt before Judge Ellis at both the plea and sentenci ng proce edin gs of Aug ust 2 6 and No vem ber 1 8, 20 05, respe ctive ly. 15. That Respon dent s testimony on Nov ember 8, 2006, re flected little, if any, remorse regarding his conduct as in house counsel for GRIS and the resu lting plea and sentenci ng for mispri sion of a f elon y. 16. That the character evidence presented at the November 8, 2006, hearing, in addition to prior character references provided at the sentencing hearing on November 18, 2005 , all confirmed, as did the pre sentence investigation, that the Respondent enjoyed a well earned reputation as a respected member of the bar (prior to his em ployment w ith GRIS), speciali zing in im migratio n law, a commu nity activist, a provider of pro bono services, and devoted husband and father of two teenage children. 17. That other than the finding s set forth in paragraph 16, the Respondent has failed to prove by preponderance of evidence , any additional mitigating factors . The same factors - the plea agreement, the statement of facts in support, the respondent s responses during the plea and senten cing proce edings - tha t supported the Rule 8.4 findings an d conclus ion, the hear ing court fo und und ermined a nd, indeed , all but negated, the respo ndent s m itiga tion testim ony. A ccor ding ly, it rejecte d tha t testi mon y. 8 The respondent, unlike the petitioner, that took no exceptions to either the hearing court s findings of fact or conclusions of law, filed Exceptions of R ex B. Wingerter, Respon dent, To The Findings And Conclusions Of The Hearing Judge And Opposition To The Recommendation Of Petitioner. In that pleading, he took three exceptions to the findings of facts made by the hearing court and the conclusions it drew and offe red his reasons for urging this Court to reject the recommendation of disbarme nt made by the petitioner. The thrust of the first exception, to Paragraph 4, was to dispute the clarity and conciseness with which his criminal conduct was described. Thus, noting that he was not alleged to have been a direct co-conspirator, only that he was present at Global Recruitment and Immigration Service, Inc. ... at the time in question as in-house counsel, and that during that time , and based on his activities, he came to have an awareness that the conspirators were com mitting the immigration crimes in question, and that there was no specific allegation, either in the plea agreement or the statement of facts in support of that agreeme nt, of a defin ite time frame when the respondent became aware of those crimes, the respondent argues that Paragraph 4 of the Hearing Judge s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law is erroneous when it concludes that the Statement of Facts and Plea Agreement clearly and concisely described the nature and ex tent of the Respon dent s criminal culpability in committing a misprision of a felony. Necessarily, he submits, therefore, that his testimony at the November 8, 2006 hearing is very relevant as to what he 9 knew and w hen he knew it in judg ing his c ulpabili ty. The respondent s second exception is to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Findings of fact and Conclusions. Like the first, he decries the man ner in wh ich the respo ndent s co nduct is described and characterized, and the time frame during which that conduct occurred, arguing that the factual basis for the plea does not unambiguously describe dishonest, fraudulent or deceitful co nduct by Re sponden t over a time f rame from 2000-20 04. To m ake the po int, the respondent directs our attention to the Statement of Facts, Paragraph 7, which, he maintains, fails to specifically state when, during the course of the conspiracy perpetuated by others, ... Responden t became a ware of their actions. T hat, he subm its, contradicts Paragraph 5 and, in fact, renders it clearly erroneous. With regard to the Sixth Paragraph, the respondent maintains that his subjective understanding of the facts enum erated in Pa ragraph 7 of the State ment of F acts is relevant and critical to the determination of his culpability. In that regard, he refers us to the evidence addressing each of the statements made in the Statement of Facts, which, he asserts, is both significant and relevant. That evidence, he explained, illuminated his subjective understanding of the facts, which was in each instance, contrary to that acquired by the hearing court from the plea agreement and the statement of facts in support of the plea. For example, concedin g that he kn ew, and, in deed, perm itted his signatu re to be signed on pro forma documents, the respondent argues that his signature was not a forgery and that he had no fraudulent intent when he authorized employees of Global to sign his name to the 10 routine appearance of counsel on immigration forms. Similarly, he denied knowing that his signature had been signed to hundreds more documents than he authorized until after the indictm ent. To like eff ect, the respo ndent exp lained that, although he was aware that the signatures of aliens and corporate sponsors were being signed to documents by persons other than the alien and subject corporate sponsor, he trusted the representation of Global s management that it had permission to do so. The responde nt compla ins that, rather tha n accept h is subjective understanding of the facts, [t]he Hearing Judge focused solely on the broad record of conviction and concluded that the Respondent s behavior at Global was unambiguous ... dishonest, fraudulent and deceitful ... [and] inferred that the Responden t s explanations almost to be an extension of his offense by construing that Respondent repeatedly attempted to excuse or minimize h is criminal culpability. Further, he argues: It is certain that particular facts within the broad plea agreement did not comport with the R esponde nt s specific, su bjective understan ding of h is understanding of events. But the Respondent certainly did not endorse, and there is nothing in the record to support, the embellished dialogue between the Assistant U.S. Attorney and Judge Ellis where they assume the Respondent knew he was complicit in fraud, and he knew it for a long time, and even offered a suggestion on how it could be concealed, is that right? Thus, the respondent submits that the hearing court s reliance on the plea and sentencing proceedings contradicting his contentions, and disregarding his subjective understan ding of the facts is totally wrong. By so relying, he says, the hearing court mistaken ly interpret[ed] the Respondent s admission that he knew of Global s wrongdoing, 11 which was the basis of the plea to misprision of a felony, to mean that the Respondent took part and wa s complicit in the substantive offenses of the co-d efendan ts. To the re sponden t, considered in light of his testimony at the disciplinary hearing and the subjective unders tanding of the f acts it co nveyed, [t]here was no evidence presented by the Assistant U.S. Attorney that the Respondent engaged in the dishon est, fraudule nt and dec eitful conduct embo died in th e unde rlying, sub stantive offen ses. With respect to the allegations in Paragraph 8 of the Statement of Facts, the respondent explained his failure to inform the proper authorities of the fraudulent immigration activities by stating that he became aware of the information only after the indictments had been issued and Concerning the two step s to concea l the crime, first, Respondent understood Global employees had authorization to sign the names of immigrant s or employer s signatu res on th e form s. Second, Respondent insisted in plea negotiations that the phrase knew o r should have known be inserted because the government insisted on declaring that certain applications were withdrawn solely on account of their investigation, which Respondent firmly believed was not true . The respondent s third exception relates to the nature of the offense of misprision of a felony. He maintains that that offense is not a criminal act involving dishonesty, fraud and misrepresentation and his conduct constituting the offense does not evidence dish onesty, fraud or misrepresentation. The factor critically important to the respondent s position is that [t]he Respondent s testimony and the Statement of Facts supporting the conviction of misprision of a felony do not establish conduct that embodied dishonesty, fraud 12 or deceit under Maryland disciplinary law. Thus, stressing that he was not charged as a coconspirato r and that his admissions of acquiring knowledge of fraud being committed by Global and the na med indiv iduals and n ot reporting it supported his conviction of the offense of misprision of a felony - he argues on the theory of willful blindness, citing United States v. Messer, 139 F.3d 895, 1998 WL 112532 (4th Cir. 1998)9 - the respondent maintains that he never po ssessed or e ver admitted to having the mens rea to commit those [substantive] crimes. He argues fu rther that, beca use [h]e n ever particip ated in the offenses of his codefendants[, h]e can not be, and he was not, held responsible as a co-conspira tor for the crime h e failed to repo rt. Acknowledging and conceding, as he must, that paragra ph 8 of th e statemen t of facts in support of the plea agr eement sta tes that, in addition to having knowledge of the crimes, the immigration fraud and false statements, he took at least two step s to conceal the crimes, the respondent proffers, nevertheless, that his a dmission in that paragra ph reaso nably satisfied the concealment element and, in any event, any steps aimed at concealment did not 9 Judge Chasanow noted in State v. McCallum, 321 Md. 451, 458, 583 A.2d 250, 253 (1991) (Chasanow, J., concurring), that willful blindness, exists where a person believes that it is probable that something is a fact, but deliberately shuts his or her eyes or avoids making reasonable inquiry with a consci ous pu rpose to avoid le arning the truth . Willful blindness is not the only theory that would support the respondent s guilt of misprision of a felony. He was an immigration expert and, therefore, setting aside any requirement to be bound by the respondent s subjective understanding, it may be inferred that the respondent s acquisition of knowledge of fraudulent conduct was the acquisition of the knowledge that a crime was being committed, which under federal law, he had a duty to report. 13 rise to the level of deceit, intentional dishonesty or misrepresentation. More particularly, he argues: In the Respondent s circumstances, he agreed that he concealed purported forged names for individuals who he subjectively believed had authorized their signing. Similarly, he consented to concealing the truth about abandoned applications because the paragraph specifically inclu ded a neg ligent, should have k nown standa rd. Aware that concealment may have a more sinister motivation, the respondent denies that his conduct in this case could be equated with the more egregious offenses of making false statements or purposef ully deceiving a governm ent authority or involved moral turpitude. Rather, he argues that [t]here simply was no proof by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed a criminal act involving dishonesty, fraud or misrepresentation or that he had any intent wha tsoever to en gage in su ch acts. Th at is confirmed, the respondent submits, by the fact that he did not make any financial gain as a result of his con duct or from th e unde rlying con duct of the co-d efend ants. It is well settled that we review th e conclusions of law drawn by the hearing c ourt de novo. Rule 16-759(b )(1).10 See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 27-28, 10 Maryland Rule 16-759(b) provides: (1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge's conclusions of law. (2) Findings of Fact. (A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purp ose o f det ermining approp riate sanc tions, if a ny. (B) If Exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Co urt of Appeals shall determine whether the findings of fact have 14 922 A.2d 554, 569-70 (2007); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, 398 Md. 257, 265-66, 920 A.2d 45 8, 463 (20 07); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 700, 919 A.2d 66 9, 675 (20 07); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, 6-7, 912 A.2d 640, 644 (2006); Attorney G rievance C omm'n v . McLa ughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 11 60 (2002 ); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (199 4) (noting th at the ultimate decision as to whethe r an attorney ha s engage d in professional misconduct rests with this Court). When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclu sions o f law w ill be ove rruled. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 700, 919 A.2d at 675; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 Md. 134, 146-1 47, 913 A.2d 1 , 8 (200 6). Moreover, a hearing court's findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that they are clearly errone ous. Mahone, 398 Md. at 265, 920 A.2 d at 463; Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 50, 891 A.2d 1085, 1095 (2006). W eighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the f act find er. been pro ven by the req uisite standard of proof set out in Ru le 16-757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exceptions. The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibil ity of witn esses. 15 State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733 , 750, 720 A.2d 3 23, 331 (1998). We overrule the responde nt's exception s. The resp ondent do es not, indeed, he can not, dispute the f acts - they are set forth in detail in the plea agreement and the Statement of Facts in supp ort of th at agree ment. What he disputes is what should be made of those facts, and, in particular, whether they should, indeed must, be moderated or explained, by the respondent s subsequent testimony concerning his subjective understanding and intent. His position is that, because the facts, as they are reflected in the plea agreement and the Statement of Facts, do not specifically charge him with being a co-conspirator and are ambiguous as to the when he learned of the crimes, what criminal conduct the facts do establish is uncle ar and m ust be e lucidate d by extrin sic evid ence, i.e ., his testimony at the disciplinary hearing . More specifically, the respondent believes that his testimony not only was relevant to the issue of when and what he knew, but was required to be believed in determ ining h is culpa bility and h ence sa nction. The hearing court was not required to a ccept the res ponden t s explanatio n for his conduct. It was free to disbelieve, as it un doubte dly did, his explan ation. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Pow ell, 328 Md. 276, 292, 614 A.2d 102, 110 (1992) (in wh ich, citing Attorney Grievan ce Com m n v. N othstein, 300 Md. 667, 684, 480 A.2d 807, 816 (1985), we stated that [i]t is elementary that a trier of fact may elect to pick and choose which evidence [or story] to rely upon ). Moreover, a final judgment of conviction is conclusive evidence 16 of the guilt of the c rime ch arged. See Maryland Rule 16-771 (g). 11 The respondent pled guilty to misprision of a felony and the statement of facts in support d etailed the circumstances in which the crime o ccurred. The respon dent admitted being aw are of facts indicating that the named co-defendants were engaging in immigration fraud, making false statements and encouraging aliens to enter this country illegally and not reporting those crimes to the proper authorities. But the respondent also admitted taking steps to conceal the conspiracy. This was evidence of not simply a passive involvement; it demonstrated an active involvement. With this active concea lment as a predicate,12 the hearing court can 11 Maryland Rule 16-771(g) provides: (g) Conclusive Effect of Final Conviction of Crime. In any proceeding under this Chapter, a final judgment of any court of record convicting an attor ney of a cr ime, whe ther the c onvictio n res ulted from a ple a of g uilty, nolo conte ndere, or a v erdict after trial, is co nclusive ev idence of the guilt of the attorney of that crime. As used in this Rule, "final judgment" means a judgment as to which all rights to direct appellate review have been exhausted. The introduction of the judgment does not preclude the Commission or Bar Counsel from introducing additional evidence or the attorney from introducing evidence or otherwise showing cause why no disciplin e shou ld be im posed . To be su re, as the respo ndent argu es, this Rule d oes not pre clude his of fering evid ence to establish that no sanction should be imposed. That does not give license, however, to a respondent to prove that his conviction was not justified and, on that basis, to argue for no sanction. That is essentially what the respondent has attempted in this case. The hearing court s findings in this regard, that the respondent has contradicted the plea agreement and the statement of facts in support and demonstrated a lack of remorse and appreciation for his conduct, are not erroneous. 12 We are not persuaded by the respondent s explanation of the concealment element of the statement of facts. An admission to being aware of wrong-doing and not reporting it is a far cry from being aware and counseling how to conceal that wrongdoing. Nor can counseling concealment under the circumstance of this case, in our view, be anything other than the equivalent of, if not more egregious than, making false 17 hardly be faulted for concluding that the respondent engaged in conduc t in violation of Rule 8.4 (b) and (c) - helping and counseling violators as to how to conceal their violations is a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness in other regards - and, in so doing, also engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. It was the charge of misprision of a felony, as supported by the unequivocal and unambiguous statement of facts entered into the record on August 26, 2005" that the hearing court concluded constituted the misconduct in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The concealment steps were clearly alleged and stated in the statement of facts and they were not disputed. That is certainly a substantial basis for the hearing court s c onclus ions. This leaves for re solution the iss ue of the a ppropriate sanction. The petitioner recommends disbarment. It relies on the nature of the respondent s conduct involved in the respondent s conviction, conduct that the hearing court determined to be infected with dish onesty, fraud, deceit and misrepresentation. Noting this Court s growing intolerance for attor neys who engage in such conduct, stressing the respondent s testimony at the disciplinary hearing, w hich the he aring court c haracterized as reflect[in g] little, if any, remorse regarding his conduct as in-house counsel for GRIS and the resulting plea and sentencing for misprision of a felony, and contending tha t the respon dent has fa iled to present extenuating circumstances warranting a lesser sanction, the petitioner argues that the stateme nts or de ceiving a gove rnmen tal autho rity. 18 only approp riate sanction is disbarme nt. The respondent opposes the petitioner s recommendation of disbarment. He maintains initially, citing the cases,13 that there are no reported cases in the United States finding that the crime of misprision of a felony requ ires automa tic disbarme nt. A review of the reported cases from other jurisdictions shows that the general punishment is suspension 13 The resp ondent pr offers the f ollowing as confirm atory of his asse rtion: In re Felmeister, 890 A. 2d 334 (N. J. 2 006) (18 m onth susp ension); In re Harper, 2006 WL 147954 7 at 1 (S.C. 2 006) (two year suspensio n); Duncan v. B oard of Disciplinary Appea ls, 898 S.W. 2d 759, 762(Tex. 1994) (misprision of a felony not a crime of moral turpitude, requiring compu lsory discipline); In re Lockhart, 795 So. 2d 309, 310 (La. 2001) (thre e year suspen sion, misprisio n of a felo ny and cons piracy to com mit mail fraud); Disciplinary Counsel v. Mesi, 647 N. E . 2d 473, 47 6 (Ohio 1 995) (inde finite suspensio n for misp rision of a fe lony and othe r serious acts o f miscond uct); In re Russ ell, 493 N.W. 2d 715, 716 (S.D. 1992) (one year suspension, although, in addition to not repo rting the c rime , the r espo ndent assiste d the fligh t of th e crim inals by le ndin g mo ney, furnishing a car, and p roviding h is credit cards to them ); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shortall, 592 A. 2d 1285, 1291 (Pa. 1991) (three year suspension, despite also providing the FBI with a false story supporting his client and testifying untruthfully at grand jury); Matter of Morris, 793 P. 2d 544, 547 (Ariz. 1990) (6 month suspension, no showing of dishon est motive o r desire for p ecuniary gain ); In re Fishman, 801 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (N.Y. A pp. Div. 20 05) (one year suspensio n); Matter of Fronk, 666 N.Y.S. 2d 1023, 1 024 (N .Y. Ap p. Div. 1 997) (tw o year sus pensio n). But see Office of D isciplinary Counsel v. Longo, 761 N.E. 2d 1042, 1043 (Ohio 2001) (disbarment where respondent convicted of misprision of a felony, with knowledge of his intention to purchase marijua na out o f state, als o transf erred fu nds to h is partne r). We see this case as quite close to Longo, where it w as the und erlying condu ct, rather than th e convictio n, that determ ined the lev el of the resp ondent s c ulpability. As in that case, there is more in this case than simply a conviction for failing to report a crime; the respondent participated in the crime, by taking steps to conceal it. In any event, we do not agree that a sanction less than disbarment, imposed in those cases where the respon dent ac tually and positive ly assisted th e perpe trator, see, e.g., Shortall; In re Russell, was appropriate. Those cases simply are not persuasive. 19 from th e practic e of law for a pe riod of time. He next embraces the hearing court s find ing of mitig ation, adding that, in addition to ha ving been convicte d of misp risio n of a fel ony: The Respondent also stands as an attorney whose nearly twenty (20) years of practice were devoted to providing legal services and defenses to individua ls without means or rank. He was a local leader in the practice of immigration law and an expert on the immigration consequences of criminal convictions, providing numerous presentations at judicial conferences, bar associations seminars, and offering mentoring to less experienced attorneys. He did this all withou t financ ial com pensat ion. He taught asylum and refugee law at the Washington College o f Law a t the Ame rican Un iversity, published widely in the field and had a boo k contract w ith West Law prior to his conviction. He offered countless hours of pro bono advice. The Hearing Judge acknowledged the Responden t s legal services were stellar in nature. That the Responde nt s yearly income rarely topped $ 60,000 underscored the fact that his commitment to the practice of law was not pecuniary but to lend a helping hand to those who n eeded it. In arguing for a sanction less than disbarment, the respondent poses the question as when did he come to k now ab out the frau d ... and ... was h is behavior so egregious, when juxtaposed against the R esponde nt s prior twe nty (20) years of leg al services, tha t the public need be protected from him, and perhaps equally important, ought the public be deprived of his futu re servic es. This Court has made clear that the well settled purpose and goal of attorney discipline proceedings is to protect the public, not to punish the erring attorney. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. at 702-703, 919 A.2d at 677; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 ( 2006) . See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Parker, 389 Md. 142, 155, 884 A.2d 104, 112 (200 5); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 381 Md. 241, 283-84, 849 A.2d 20 423, 448-49 (20 04). That purpose is achieved, the public is protected, when the sanctions are comme nsurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the inte nt with which they were committed. Attorney G rievance C omm'n v . Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003 ). While the circumstances of each case-the nature and effect of the violations-are critical, and ordinarily decisive, factors in determining the severity of the s anction to be im posed , Parker, 389 Md. at 155, 884 A.2d at 112, there are other important factors we have identified, including the lawyer's state of mind which underlies the misconduct, actual or potential injury flowing from the misconduct, the duty of this Court to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public in allowing the Respondent to continue in practice, and any mitigating or aggravating factors, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 396, 794 A.2d 92, 105 (2002 ), the atto rney's rem orse fo r the mis condu ct, Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Wyatt, 323 Md. 36, 38, 591 A.2d 467, 468 (1991 ), the likelihood of repe tition of the misc onduc t, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Freedman, 285 Md. 298, 300, 402 A.2d 75, 76 (197 9), an d the attor ney's prior grievance history. Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A .2d 556 , 561 (1 975). Rees, 396 Md. at 254-55, 913 A. 2d at 72. What this Court said in Attorney Grievance C omm'n v. Wa rd, 396 Md. 203, 218, 913 A.2d 41, 50 (2006) has a particular relevance to the case sub judice: It is well settled that [d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest condu ct. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2 001). See Attorney Grie vance C omm 'n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 56 5, 597, 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2005); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646, 790 A.2d 621, 628 (200 2). This is so, because [u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excu se. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488. Thus, like in the case of a misappropriation of entrusted funds, see Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991), in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer will 21 result in d isbarm ent. In Vanderlinde, we addressed what would suffice as extenuating circumstance justifying a lesser sanction, where intentional dishonest conduct by an attorney has been established. We said that the compelling extenuating circumstances must be present and associated with the illegal or improper acts at the time committed. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 397, 773 A.2d at 475. We elucidated this point in the holding: in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as compelling extenuating circumstances, anything less than the m ost serious an d utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the root cau se of the m isconduc t and that also result in an attorney's utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the MRPC. Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dish onesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherw ise. Id. at 413-414, 773 A .2d at 485 (empha sis in original). There have been no compelling extenuating circumstances shown in this case. The respondent s past stellar practice, his pro bono com mitment, his lack of pecu niary overreaching or motivation and his mentoring, while all are commendable and are not disregarded, do not meet the standard we have set for compelling extenuating circumstances that would justify a lesser sanction than disbarment. Accordingly, we adopt the petit ione r's recommendation. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR O F THE A TTOR NEY G RIE V A N CE C O M M I S S I O N A G A I N S T R EX B . WINGERTER. 23

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