Attorney Grievance v. Goff

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket No. 56 September Term, 2005 Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Randall E. Goff Bell, C. J. Raker *Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Filed: May 8, 2007 *Wilner, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active membe r of this Co urt; after bein g recalled pursuant to the Cons titution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. Bar counsel, acting on behalf, and with the approval, of the petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Comm ission of M aryland, filed in th is Court, pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action charging the respondent, Randall E. Goff, with violating Rules 1.1, Competence,2 1.3, Diligence,3 1.15, Safekee ping Prop erty, 4 5.3, 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approva l of the Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petitio n for D isciplina ry or Rem edial A ction in t he Co urt of A ppeals . 2 Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepar ation rea sonab ly necessa ry for the r eprese ntation. 3 Rule 1.3 provides: A law yer shall act with reasonab le diligence a nd prom ptness in represe nting a c lient. 4 Maryland Rule 1.15 now provides: (a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Ch apter 600 o f the Ma ryland Rules. O ther proper ty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. (b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for the purpose. (c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, a lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred. (d) Upon receiv ing funds or other pro perty in which a client or third person has an interest, a law yer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by Respon sibilities Regarding Non-lawyer Assistants,5 8.1, Bar Adm ission and Disciplinary Matters,6 and 8.4, Misco nduct, 7 of the M aryland Rule s of Profe ssional Co nduct, as adopted agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds o r other prop erty that the client or th ird person is entitled to rece ive and, up on reque st by the client or third person, sha ll prom ptly re nder a fu ll acc ounting rega rding suc h pro perty. (e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two o r more persons (on e of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the proper ty as to wh ich the in terests ar e not in d ispute. What is now Rule 1.15 (d), was, w hen the charged c onduct occurred, R ule 1.15 (b). 5 With resp ect to a non lawyer emp loyed or retaine d by or associa ted with a la wyer: (b) A law yer having dire ct superviso ry authority over the nonlaw yer shall make rea sonable ef forts to ensu re that the per son s con duct is com patible with th e profe ssional o bligatio ns of th e lawyer .... 6 Pertinently, Rule 8.1 provides: An ap plicant for ad mission or re instatemen t to the bar, or a la wyer in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary ma tter, shall not: (a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful d ema nd for inform ation from an ad miss ions or disciplinar y auth ority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protecte d by Rul e 1.6. 7 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: * * * * (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . * * * * Page 2 by Maryland Rule 16-812, Maryland Rule 16-609, Prohibited Transactions,8 pertaining to his attorney trust account, and Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-306, Limitation on use of trust funds,9 of the B usiness Occu pations and Pr ofessio ns Artic le. We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-75 2 (a), 10 to the Honorable Michelle D. Jaklitsch, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c).11 8 Rule 16-609 provides: An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn o n an attorne y trust account m ay not be draw n payable to ca sh or to bearer. 9 Section 10-306 proscribes a lawyer s use [of] trust money for any purpose other than the purpo se for w hich the trust mo ney is entr usted to the law yer. 10 Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 11 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy Page 3 Following a hearing, the court issued an extensive, detailed and length y opinion in which it made findings of fact and drew from those facts, conclusions of law. Although acknowledging that the respondent holds a license as a title insurance agent from the Maryland Insurance Commission and is an agent with Fidelity National Title Co., which accounts for [a]bout eighty percent of Respondent s present practice (and a comme nsurate proportion of his incom e), the hearin g court dete rmined th at the grievance matter then before it arose from the respondent s practice of law, from events surrounding Responden t s representation of Mark A. Heiss. That representation involved estate and real estate matters, areas that made up a substantial portion of the other twenty percent of his practic e. The representation started when H eiss sough t the respon dent s servic es to open an estate for his mother, Vivian Pauline Heiss. The need for such representation was prompted by, and became apparent with, the revelation that the several - there were eight or nine of them - parcels of property on which the house where Heiss and his parents had lived in Anne Aru ndel County were n ot titled in his mother s name, but in the names of H eiss s father, Raymond, and his two brothers, Charles and A rthur, as [s]ome of the p arcels were titled in Raymond Heiss s and Charles Heiss s names and others were titled in all three brothers names. The manner in which the parcels were titled was of some sign ificance to f amily members and entities other than Mark Heiss, the Estate of his mother an d the Estate of of the statement to each party. Page 4 Raymond Heiss. The beneficiaries of the estates of Charles and Arthur Heiss, in addition to the estates themse lves, also had an interest in the pro perty. As a result, those interested parties obtained representation to protect their interests.12 Although the interested parties agreed that the properties should be sold, they could not agree on whether and how much Mark Heiss was entitled to be reimbursed for maintenance expenses on the home in which his mother lived. To resolve this issue, the respondent brought an action against the other interested parties. That action was settled. As relevant to this case: The agreement called for the properties to be sold, for Mark Heiss to receive $20,000.00 as reimbursement for expenses incurred for the maintenance of the property and, after deducting costs of the sale and payment of all liens and taxes from the proceeds of the sale, the balance of the funds w[as] to be distributed to the estates of the deceased brothers and the various interested parties. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the respondent agreed to open an estate in Maryland for Arthur Heiss and, after the properties had been sold, to distribute the proceeds, after costs, to the vario us intere sted pa rties. For his services, the agreement provided that the respondent would be paid, from the sale proceeds, $ 10,000.00. After being appointed special administrator of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, the respondent opened estates for Vivian Pauline Heiss and Raymond Heiss. Thereafter, all of the parcels of property were sold for $ 200,000.00, which was deposited into the respond ent s 12 The hearing court identified the interested parties as: Catherine Heiss, John E. Heiss, Wilda Heiss, the Estate of Charles Heiss, Jr., the Estate of Raymond Heiss and the Estate of Arthur Heiss. In a footnote, the court refers to Jack Heiss. We assume that the reference is to John Heiss, as it is that name that is used throughout the opinion. Page 5 attorney trust accoun t. Subsequ ently, within a couple o f months of the settlem ent, all of the proceeds of the sale, except that due to the Estate of Arthu r Heiss , had be en distrib uted. Of particular relevance to the case sub judice, in addition to the reimbursement amount provided for in the settlement agreement, Mark Heiss had also been distributed, from his fa ther s estate, through h is mother s estate, a check for $ 65,000.00. It subsequently was determined that that distribu tion was m ade in error, th at it constituted a n overpa yment. When no distribution had been made to the Estate of Arthur Heiss, inquiry of the respondent as to why was made by John Heiss. Initially told that distribution would be made after a wait of six weeks, ex tended to six months, Jo hn Heiss r eferred the matter to his attorney w hen tha t sched ule wa s not m et. John Heiss s attorney spoke to the respondent on the telephone and sent him a facsimile seeking confirm[ation] that the final accounting had been prepared and the funds forwarded to the attorney for the Estate of Helen Peters, the sole beneficiary of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, in New Jersey. The resp ondent did not respond to that letter. Subsequent letters were sen t over the ne xt several m onths, each seeking inf ormation a bout the final accounting and the tran smission o f the escrow funds. T hese letters either were not answered at all or answered untimely. Distribution to the Estate of Arthur Heiss was made on or about August 2, 2003, some 13 or 14 mo nths after the settlement on the properties. By that time , a complain t concern ing Resp ondent s c onduct in handling the proceeds of the sale of the Heiss properties had been filed by John H eiss s attorney w ith Bar Co unsel. Page 6 Pursuant to that complaint, Bar Counsel wrote the respondent to notify him of the complaint and to request information concerning his side of the matter. Bar Co unsel s letter thus asked for both a written response and certain financial records relating to the settlement described in the complaint. Although he supplied the written response, as requested, denying any wrong-doing and indicated that, by then the disbursement had been made,13 the respondent did not provid e the fin ancial re cords. The petitioner conducted an investigation, during the course of which it obtained records from the respondent and one of its investigators interviewed him. The respondent offered an explanation for the delay in disbursing the funds to the Arthur Heiss Estate: He had to w ait 6 month s after the estate was closed to give creditors an opportun ity to file claims; he was unsure whether the old rules or the new rules applied to the estate since the decedent passed away in 1963; there was a problem calculating taxes because it was based on the percentage of the interest in the property; he first attempted to probate th e estate in Alabama; he had to obtain guidance fro m the Anne Arundel Co unty Register of Wills Office; and he had a computer failure during April 2003 and had not backed up the system since December 2001; and he was handling two estates for the same f amily at the same tim e. He also maintained that the funds owed to the Estate of Arthur Heiss remained in [his] trust accou nt until h e disbu rsed tho se fun ds to the estate. As to the latter contention, the findings of the hearing court w ere to the contrary. It determined that the balance of the trust account fell below the amounts owed to the Estate 13 In his response, the respondent advised that the funds were disbursed on or about July 20, 2003. Subsequent documentation reveals that it was actually done on August 2, 2003. Page 7 of Arthur Heiss between May 15, 2002 and the date the funds were disbursed to the interested parties on or about August 2, 2003. More particularly, the hearing court found, as to the respondent s [t]rust [a]ccount [b]alance [d]iscrepancies : The trust accoun t balance on April 10, 2 003 wa s $378.42 . Howe ver, at this time, the amou nt owed to the Estate o f Arthur H eiss/Helen Peters was approxim ately $31,00 0.00. When in cluding am ounts owed to other matters, the trust account should have had a balance o f $283,29 4.88. ($60,0 00.00 in trust funds had been erroneously deposited into Respondent s office/operating account. Furthermore, a paralegal employed by Petitioner, John Debone, conducted an analysis of the tr ust acco unt. Although Respondent did not provide a complete and accu rate accounting for all of the funds received and disbursed in connection with the sale of the Heiss Properties, DeBone created a spreadsheet evidencin g payments and disbursements for trust account number 9983 where the Heiss funds were deposited, as well as for Responden t s second trust account number 1794. Petitioner discovered that Respondent disbursed approxim ately $1,256.87 more than he collected for the Heiss sale. Ad ditio nally, Respondent paid some of the expenses related to the Heiss sale and estates from his office/operating account. At least four checks totaling $3,775.59 were disbursed from Respondent s office/operating account on behalf of the H eiss matter. Responden t s records also indicate that Respondent generated checks on trust account 9983 and deposited those checks back to th e same accou nt. Respondent told DeB one that Fid elity National[14] recomm ended this to create a pape r trail wh en there was a f irst and s econd mortga ge. (Record referenc es and footnote om itted). There were other account balance discrepancies that the petitioner discovered, and the hearing court fo und, in the respondent s trust account. They related to transactions other 14 Fidelity National Property and Casualty Insurance Group. Page 8 than the Heiss settlement and resulted primarily from the respondent s disbursal of funds for the transaction before the funds for the settlement were deposited. The time discrepancy was as much as almost two and a half months and the amount involved, as much as $200,000.00. There were also instances in which the [r]espondent s records reflected that there were funds for some settlements conducted in 2002 and 2003 that had not yet been disbursed by March 2004. The hearing court found also that, in some of the non-Heiss settleme nts, the re spond ent s rec ords did not ma tch the b ank rec ords, i.e.: Checks marked v oid on R esponde nt s records had actually cleared the account. Funds in the sam e amount w ere disbursed twice to the same person, deposits to the bank account did not appear on Respondent s records, and checks were negotiated through the bank that did not appear on R espondent s record s. (Record references omitted). The accidental deposit of trust funds in to the respondent s office/operating account was another reason for the discrepancy in the records. Although the respondent became aware of the mistaken deposit within a week of its occurrence and took some corrective action immediately, the hearing court determined that, contrary to his testim ony, the mistakes were not corrected entirely until June 2, 2003, more than two months later. During the petitioner s investigation of the Heiss matter, overdrafts in one of the respondent s trust accounts, albeit not the one used in the Heiss settlement, were reported. This prompted an expansion o f the inv estigatio n to cov er these matters and, the refore, a request for info rmation with re spect to them. Page 9 As to this aspect of the pe titioner s investigation and the respondent s response, the hearing court reported: On March 8, 2004, while the investigation of the Heiss matter was ongoing, Bar Counsel received notification of an overdraft on a second Wachovia Bank attorney trust account (account number ending in 1 794) held by Respon dent. On or about March 11, 2004, Bar Counsel wrote to Respondent and requested, within ten days, an explanation for the overdraft and copies of financial records relating to attorney trust acc ount nu mber 1 794. Respondent did not respond within ten days. On or about March 17, 2004, Bar Counsel received notice of a second overdraft o ccurring on March 12, 2004 in this same a ttorney trust acco unt. On or about March 17, 2004, Respondent was notified by letter of the second overdraft notice. Bar Counsel's letter requested that Respondent provide an explanation for the overdraft and copies of financial records within ten days. Respondent did not respond in a timely manner to this request for information. On or about March 19, 2004, Bar Counsel received notice of a third overdraft in attorney trust account 1794. The matter was then docketed for investigation. On or about April 2 0, 2004, A ssistant Bar C ounsel w rote to Resp ondent to notify him that the matter had been docketed and to request an explanation for the ove rdrafts a nd cop ies of fi nancia l record s. Respondent responded to Bar Counsel's letters of March 11 and 17, 2004 on or about April 21, 2004. Respondent explained that the overdrafts occurred because he had opened a new trust account on January 1, 2004, but that several lenders had wired proce eds from settlement transactions to the old account rather than to the new one. . . . In this response, Respondent failed to provide all of the docume nts Bar Counse l requested. Mr. DeBo ne was a ble to confirm that there appe ared to be d eposits ma de to the old account th at should have been ma de to the ne w. Mr. D eBone w as also able to track several instances where Respondent corrected this by transferring funds from the old acco unt to the new accou nt in February 2004. A t one point. Respondent had corrected the mistake by transferring funds from the old account to the new account, but then erred by disbursing funds for that settlement from the old account. By March 2, 2004, however, all of the mistakes were corrected. The overdrafts occurred not because of these wiring mistakes, but due to a double payment of $374,977.17 to Homecomings Financial from the new trust account. Page 10 Respondent did not inclu de this in his ex planation to Bar Co unsel on A pril 21, 2004. On February 11, 2004, a double payment of $374,977.17 had been made from account number 1794 to Homecomings Financial. Respondent wired funds to Homecomings even though he had already issued a check in the same amou nt. Homecomings Financial told Respondent that the check was sent to the wrong office and that they would give Responden t an imme diate credit for the fun ds with no additional inte rest accruing to the borrower, if Respondent wired the funds to them. After Homecomings gave Respondent its word, Respondent wired the funds. Respondent did not place a stoppayment on the check and the check cleared the sam e day the funds were wired. He was aware of the double payment as early as March 14, 2004. On March 19, 2004 , the funds w ere returned to the attorney trus t account. In the meantime, however, funds held in the new trust account as a result of other real estate settlements had been used to cover the deficit caused by the duplicate $374,977.17 disbursement. The bank records establish that $231,341.28 owed from the trust account as a result of a settlement deposit for a party named Fogle could not be disbursed from the account on March 2 and 9, 2004. Th e March 2nd repo rt from the bank indicates that th ere was o nly $126,976.55 in the account. The funds for the Fogle transaction were deposited on March 1, 2004 and were transferred out of the account on March 23, 2004. Assistant Bar Counsel wrote Respondent again on June 8, 2004, requesting more information concerning the overdrafts within 15 days. This information was needed to complete the analysis of account number 1794. Respondent did not resp ond to t he Jun e 8, 200 4 letter w ithin 15 days. Respondent also failed to respond to requests for information in connection with the Heiss investigation. On March 31, 2004, Petitioner sent Respondent a letter in connection with the Heiss investigation which included a request for information within 10 days. Bar Counse l needed th is informatio n to comp lete the analysis of th e accoun t. Respond ent did not re spond w ithin ten days. On April 14, 2004, another request for information was sent to Respondent requesting a response to the March 31st letter within 10 days. On June 3, 2004, DeBone spoke to Resp onden t by teleph one. Respondent said that he was not aware of the letters and th at he was going ou t of town . DeBon e told Respondent that he wo uld fax the letters to Resp ondent. Respondent did not say that was necessary. Respondent told DeBone that he would have somebody Page 11 workin g on the doc uments re quested w hile he wa s gone. A follow-u p letter was sent on June 4, 2004. Respondent, however, did not respond. Re spon dent's daughter got married on May 23, 2004 and his son got married on June 6, 2004. Respondent provided some of the information following the issuance of a subp oena in N ovembe r 2004. R esponde nt also prov ided addition al infor mation to Petitio ner afte r Dece mber 2 004. (Record referenc es omitted). Trust account 1794 was the subject of a 2004 audit by Fidelity, whose regional manager, Frank Jablonski, was closely monitoring the respondent s record keeping and financial accounting.15 That audit [n]oted file shortages, including deposits remaining outstanding or in transit for more than 72 hours, and 196 outstanding checks in excess of 90 days old. A 2005 audit of the same account yielded similar results: file shortages and 220 outstanding check s more than 90 days old. This is inconsistent with Fidelity policy, which is to have deposits m ade immediately or, if not possible, within 72 hours. The respondent was not sanctioned for his deficiencies. Contributing to the respo ndent s rec ord keep ing and fin ancial transa ctions issues were computer crashes that the respondent experienced. The hearing court made findings in that regard: Respondent maintained records of his real estate settlements and his financial 15 The monitoring did not consist of a review of every transaction in the trust account, rath er, Jablonsk i, who is no t a lawyer or an accounta nt, would go to Respondent s office once a month or every other month to pick up documents and to see how things were going. In 2002 and 2003, he conducted Abbreviated Reviews of that trust accoun t. Page 12 transactions on his office computer. In the spring of 2002, Resp ondent s software stopped working properly. He subsequently switched to a new software program. Respondent was able to recover most of what was lost during this incident from th e com puter an d from paper r ecords . The second computer problem oc curred in the spring of 2 003. Rath er than a sof tware problem, in this incident Respondent s hard drive crashed. He was not a ble to recover anything from the hard drive a fter this second in cident. The only thing that came up on the monitor was a blue, error screen. The hard driv e had reformatted itself so that it no longer contained any information. He had last backed up his computer in December 2001, so that he was able to recover that informatio n, but data fr om De cember 2 001 throu gh April 2003 was gone and co uld not be retrie ved. (Record references omitted). Fidelity did not require the use of any particular computer software program, although Mr. Jablonski had suggested to the respondent a fre e software program that he cou ld use. Other than requesting that he open a new account and get a new computer, Mr. Jablonski offered no advice after learning of the computer crash. The responde nt is assisted in his recordkeeping by an employee, whom he trained, and who has bee n so em ployed f or abou t six years. As to her work and the respond ent s supervision, the hearing court commented: Ms. Andrew s enters finan cial inform ation conc erning the re al estate settlements into Respondent's computer and prepares the documents for settlement. Respondent would also ma ke thes e entries . It was n ot Ms . Andrews' job to back up the computer data. Ms. Andrews prepared monthly Reconciliation Reports for Respondent's attorney trust account. She would discuss these reports with Res ponden t. The Ap ril, May, June, an d Decem ber 2002 reports reflect a shortfa ll in the tru st accou nts. Ms. Andrews testified that lending banks made erro rs. They wo uld indicate that they were sending one amount, and then send another. Although Respondent's office is no longer depositing funds into trust account number 9983, the account still has a balance of approximately $5,000.00. Ms. Andrews started getting the account cleared up about a year ago and is still working Page 13 on disb ursing th ose fu nds to th e rightf ul own ers. (Record referenc es omitted). With respect to the allegations concerning the respondent s practice in the Orphans Court, the hearing court found: Respondent failed to timely file inventories and accountings with the Orphans Court for Anne Arundel County for the Estates of Arthur, Raymond and Vivian Heiss. For the Estates of Raymond and Vivian Heiss, Respondent failed to tim ely file information reports. Respondent told Biennas [the petitioner s investigator] that the Orphan s Court rou tinely issues Show Cause Order s to sho w that it i s time to file the n ecessa ry docum ents. (Record references omitted). The court also confirmed that the respondent obtained a commis sion, in the amount of $2,940.00, from the Orphans Court for acting as special administrator of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, which he collected, but returned when John and Wilda Heiss, believing that the $10,000.00 fee previously paid to the respondent compensated him for all of his work in the H eiss ma tter, obje cted. The hearing court found, however, that [i]t was Responden t s understanding that his $10,000.00 fee did not cover the Heiss estate work. The terms of the Heiss settlement agreement state that the $10,000.00 is to cover Respondent s resolution of the title issues; there is no mention of a fee for estate work . There fore, R espon dent ap plied fo r a com mission in the E state of Arthu r Heiss . On these findings of fact, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.15 (a) and (d), 8.1 (b), 8.4 (d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Maryland Code (2000, 2004 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. It also concluded that the respondent was practicing law when he Page 14 engaged in this misconduct. On the other hand, the hearing court declined to find violations of Rules of Prof essional C onduct 5.3 (b), 8.1 (a) and 8.4 (c) and M aryland Rule 16-609, stating that [t]here is not clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated them. Whether the respondent was practicing law was required to be considered when the respondent moved to dismiss the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action on the basis that he was not practicing law when the charged rule violations occurred. The respondent relied on Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Lich tenberg, 379 Md. 335, 842 A.2d 11 (2004) and Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Davis, 379 Md. 361, 842 A.2d 26 (2004), in both of which this Court dismissed the disciplinary petition, holding: Where the basis of Bar Counsel s complaint relates to conduct not connected with the practice of law, it would b e inapprop riate for this Court to determine in the first instance if respondent violated the Insurance Article , and then to impose sanctions with respect to his license to practice law, particularly where the [Insuranc e] Comm issioner wa s aware o f the cond uct and de clined to exercise his authority to regulate respon dent s c onduc t as an ag ent or b roker. Lichtenberg, 379 Md. at 356, 8 42 A.2 d at 23. See Davis, 379 Md. at 376, 842 A.2d at 35 (indicating that the case was being dismissed for the reasons stated in Lichtenberg). We also held in Lichtenberg that the respondent in that case had not violated Rule 1.15 (a) of the Rules of Profe ssional Co nduct, his co nduct in that regard not having been in connection with the legal representation of a client. 379 Md. at 358, 842 A.2d at 24. The respondent deduced from these propositions, and therefore argued, that a person acting as an insurance agent is not practicin g law and from that p roposition, h e conclud es that activities o f title insurance agents are n ot subject to th e MR PC or to the IOLTA (Income on Lawyers Trust Page 15 Accounts) rules. Rejecting this argument, the hearing court distinguished Lichtenberg and Davis from the case sub judice. It explained: Lichtenberg is distinguisha ble from the case at hand because the Court found that Lichtenb erg did not engage in the active practice of law but instead was acting as a title agent w hose ma in business a ctivity is to conduct real e state settlements. . . . [379 Md.] at 353[, 842 A.2d at 22]. Similarly, the respondent in Davis was not practicing law during the relevant events, he was engaging in title insurance work; the Comm ission did no t allege that the respondent improperly handled the trust accoun t used in his legal prac tice, it alleged only that respondent s title insuranc e compa ny was imp roperly retaining the benefit of the interest earned in the sweep accounts. Davis, 379 Md. at 366[ , 842 A .2d at 29 ]. In this case, while Re sponden t is a title agent, Respondent was prac ticing law during the relevant events. He had to open and administer three estates and, unlike the Lichtenberg case, he maintained the settlement funds in an attorney trust account rather than in a Maryland Affo rdable H ousing Trust (M AHT ). Having concluded that the respondent was practicing law, the hearing court turned to the merits of the charged rule violations. Having reviewed how this Court has interpreted Rule 1.1, see Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 54, 891 A.2d 1085, 1097 (2006) ( Evidence of a failure to app ly the requisite thor oughne ss and/or pr eparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to support a violation of Rule 1.1. ) ; Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 630, 714 A.2d 856, 863 (1998) ( [T]horoughness and preparation reasonably necessary for competent representation includes the proper management of case files ), the hearing court found that the combination of Respond ent s lackadaisical handling o f trust fund s, his unreliable recordkee ping system, h is failure to routinely back up his computer, and his lack of urgency in correcting the errors once Page 16 discovered rise to the level of incompetent representation. With respect to the handling of the trust account, relying on Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Brown, 380 Md. 661, 667-68, 846 A.2d 428, 431 (2004) and Attorney Grievance C omm n v. Maignan, 390 Md. 287, 29697, 888 A.2d 34 4, 349 (2005) (unintentiona l conduct d oes nor ne gate incom petence), it concluded, more partic ularity, that [f]ailure to properly maintain a client s settlement monies in an escrow account may also demonstrate incompetence under MRPC 1.1. The respondent s incompetence was reflected, the court said, in his distribution, in the Heiss settlement, of $1,256.87 more than he collected and in his giving Mark Heiss $12,978.00 more than he was due.16 The court noted particularly the respondent s failure promptly to disburse the money owed to the Arthur Heiss Estate, citing Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 369, 872 A.2d 693, 709 (2005) and observing that 13 to 14 months elapsed before the funds were delivered and that the delay was not lost on the Orphans Court, which scheduled a show cause hearing to con sider the reason for the respo ndent s failure to file the Inventory and First A dministration Accou nt. 17 It also observed: 16 As expla ined by the he aring court: Respondent paid Mark Heiss $20,000.00 for maintenance expenses on May 15, 2002 and then advanced Mark Heiss $65,000.00 from the Estate of Vivian Pauline Heiss just five days later. However, Respondent miscalculated the advance because he included the $20,000.00; he forgot that he h ad alrea dy paid M ark He iss $20 ,000.00 just five days bef ore. (Record referenc es omitted). 17 The respondent did not appear at the show cause hearing, but he did make the subject filings, albeit almost two m onths thereafter. Page 17 Respondent was not well prepared to handle the complexities of th e estate work. Respon dent expla ined that his delay was, in part, due to the fact that he had to consult with the Anne Arundel County Register of Wills office, he had a problem calculating taxes, he had mistak enly attempted to probate in Alabama, and he was not sure whether the old rules or the new rules applied to the Estate of Arthur Heiss because he had passed away in 1963. W hile these deficiencie s alone ma y not rise to the level of incompe tence, this Court finds that when conside red in totality and as Responden t s explanation for the 13 to 14 month delay, they provide clear and convincing evidence that Respo ndent f ailed to p rovide comp etent rep resenta tion. (Reco rd refer ences o mitted). The hearing court determined that the respondent did not act with reasonable diligence and promptness in the representation of an y one of his three estate clients: the estates of Arthur Heiss, Raymond Heiss and Vivian P auline He iss. In each, the administratio n accoun ts were not filed w hen due a nd, in fact, w ere not filed u ntil after a show cause order regarding the failure to file h ad been iss ued and, th en, well after the return date. Moreover, in none of the c ases is the re an explana tion for the delay. In the Arthur Heiss matter and the Vivian Pauline Heiss matter, the respondent did not appear at the Show Cause hearing. Although addressing the Arthur Heiss Estate, the hearing court made the point: Respondent apologizes for not appearing at the Show Cause hearing on June 12, 2003, however, Respondent provid es no ex planatio n for th e delay in f iling the require d docu ments. The basis for the Rule 1.15 (a) violation w as twofold: [o]n at least three occasions, The hearing court also made note of the fact that [t]here was no evidence in the Orphans Court file explaining the reason for the Respondent s delay other than a June 18, 2003 letter mentioning that Respondent had discussed a week-long extension with the judges . Page 18 Respondent disbursed funds to clients before their settlement checks were deposited, citing Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 372, 872 A.2d at 711, and the respondent failed to preserve complete and accurate records for his account funds, a proposition with which the respondent agrees, at leas t insofar as th e record o f the Heiss receipts and disbursem ents is concerned. As to the latter, the respondent s computer crashes are a significant consideration: . . . Respondent backed up his computer in D ecember 2001 . . . . [A] software crash occurred in April 2002. Even though Respondent lost data and suffered this crash, he failed to back up his computer for another year. Respondent explained in testimony that he did not back up his computer after the crash in April 2002 because he did not know how accurate the information was on h is system. Respondent said that he did not back up the server more freq uently because it had to be done when no one was using the computers, it took about four hou rs to perform, and someone had to be present to switch the tapes, so it could not occur during work ho urs. Even if true, this Cou rt finds that this rationale is inadequate. Respondent failed to adequately back up his computer records and, therefore, must bear some of the blame of the data lost due to the comp uter failu res. (Reco rd refer ences o mitted). The former was also th e basis for the hearing co urt s conclusion that the respondent violated § 10-306 of the Busin ess, Oc cupatio ns & P rofessi ons A rticle. It reasoned in that regard: The evidence established that it was Respondent s practice to conduct settlements prior to depositing the funds for those settlements and that Respondent knew that there were times that the checks he disbursed at settlement would be negotiated before he deposited the checks to fund the settlement. In one instance, it was more than five weeks between the disbursement of more than $200,000.00 and the deposit of the corresponding funds. Responden t was therefore aw are that funds for other settleme nts were Page 19 being disbursed to pay the checks in settlement where the d eposits were delayed. This conduct provides clear and convincing evidence that § 10-306 was v iolated. As with the Rule 1.15 (a) violation, the hearing court relied on Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 372, 872 A.2d at 711. The hearing court found a violation of Rule 1.15 (d) by virtue of the respond ent s failure to respond to inquiries (a minimum of four, by telephone, e-mail and letter) made by attor neys representing persons interested in the Arthur Heiss Estate or the Estate of Helen Peters, through that estate. In so doing, the court rejected the respondent s defense that he did not believe that he was obligated to speak w ith those attorneys because their clients were not, so far as he believed, interested parties to the Estate of Arthur Heiss. It reasoned: a letter from on e of the attorn eys described his clients as persons interested in the Helen Peters Estate, which the respondent had listed as an interested person in the estate papers he filed; for purposes of resolving the title issues concerning the properties, John and Wilda Heiss were Respondent s clients and the attorney s letter indic ated that it wa s in conne ction with those issues that the respondent had been hired to represent their clients. Finally, the hearing court concluded that the delay in distributing the funds owed to the Estate of Helen P eters was itself a violation of R ule 1.15 (d). There is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 8.1 (b), the Page 20 hearing court concluded.18 This was shown, it said, by the several requests, made of the respondent by Bar Counsel, for information concerning the Heiss matter and the overdra fts in his trust account that the bank reported, to which the respondent either failed to respond altogether or to do so timely. That the respondent provided the requested information eventually did not, it asserted, excuse the violation that untimely response constituted. Moreover, the hearing court continued, Bar Counsel s requests, which this Court has made clear are lawful demands, see Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 250, 760 A.2d 1108, 1116 (2000), were read by the respondent, who was also aware that he was not respon ding an d . . . that failure to respond was a violation of MRPC 8.1. Nor was the hearing court persuaded by the respo ndent s effo rts, detailed in testim ony, to comply or h is contention that often B ar Coun sel asked f or volum inous ma terial, makin g complia nce in the time allotted impossible. It pointed out in that regard that the respondent never asked for an extension of time to provide the records and neve r wrote or c alled to say that he did not have the requested records. The hearing court found that, in violation of Rule 8.4 (d ), the respon dent enga ged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, conduc t [that] reflects negatively on the 18 The petitioner also argued that, by failing to mention in his explanation of the overdrafts that he had twice disbursed approximately $ 374,000.00 to pay off a mortgage holder, a fact of which he was aware when his response was made, the respondent violated Rule 8.1 (b), because he thereby did not correct Bar Counsel s misapprehension regarding the cause of the overdrafts. The hearing court was not persuaded that the petition er had p roven t his viola tion. Page 21 legal profession and sets a bad example for the public at large : Respondent ignored efforts of opposing counsel to obtain an accounting for the Heiss trust funds. If Respondent believed that Schaffer s and Obrecht s clients were not entitled to an accounting, he should have so advised them. Ignoring Schaffer s and Obrech t s comm unications b etween J anuary and J uly 2003 caused John Heiss to incur unnecessary legal expenses. Respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he failed to respond to demands for information from Bar Counsel in a timely manner and when his statements to Bar Counsel were not accurate. Respondent engaged in conduc t prejudicial to th e administra tion of justice when he failed to file timely Inventories, Information Reports and First and Final A dminis trative A ccoun ts in the H eiss Esta tes. Although it makes no recommendation, the hearing court offers factors in mitigation for the Court to consider when fashioning the appropriate sanction: the personal commitm ents of the responden t with regard to the marriage of both his son and his daughter weeks apart in 2004 account, in part, for the failure to respond to Bar Counsel s information requests, and the respondent s computer crashes, over which h e had no c ontrol, preclude the respondent from providing the com plete rec ords req uested by Bar C ounse l. 19 In addition,19 While included in the Mitigation section, by its terms, it is clear that the following was not a dvocated by the hearing court: Respondent would have the Court consider the motive behind the attorney grievance complaint. He states that it is ironic that John and Wilda Heiss waited for so many years after the Heiss brothers deaths in 1960, 1963 and 1975 to atte mpt to reso lve the ow nership of the property inv olved, yet could not wait thirteen months for the disbursement of the funds owed to the Estate of Helen Peters. Any alleged delay in resolving the title issues concerning the Anne Arundel County Heiss properties should be laid at the feet of those to whom it belongs, the Heiss family members who were the respective su rvivors of th e three He iss brothers, bu t who did nothing to Page 22 it notes the respondent s lack of a prior disciplinary history, the fact that the respondent derived no person al benefit fro m his misu se of fun ds and tha t [a]lthough the banks sent overdraft notices, there is no evidence that the banks ever refused to pay a check because no one co mplain ed to him that the c hecks h ad not b een pa id. Both the petitioner and the respondent filed ex ception s, see Maryland Rule 16-758,20 the petitioner to certain of the hearing court s conclusions of law, i.e. the Rule 1.15 (d) violation and the fa ilure to find a vio lation of R ule 16-60 9, and the re sponden t to both findings of fact and conclusions of law. Both also f iled reco mmen dations for san ctions. The petitioner urges the Court to suspend the respondent indefinitely from the practice of law. Not unexpectedly, the respondent has a far different recommendation; if the Court does not dism iss the di sciplina ry action, h e recom mend s a reprim and. The petitioner s Rule 1.15 (d) exception relates to changes to the Rule since the misconduct occurred. T he condu ct occurred in 2003 an d in 2004. At that time, the petitioner points out, w hat is now Rule 1.15 (d ) was R ule 1.15 (b). Consequently, it submits, resolve patent title problems and certainly should not be sought to be attributed to respondent. This is a lso one of the re spond ent s ex ception s. 20 Maryland R ule 16-75 8 provide s, in pertinent p art: (b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the appropriate disposition under Rule 16759(c) . Page 23 the conclusion of law should be that the respondent violated R ule 1.15 (b). The gravamen of the petitioner s exception regarding Rule 16-609 is that [t]he same evidence which supports Judge Jaklitsch s finding that Respondent used trust funds for purposes other than the purposes entrusted in violation of Bus. Occ. & Prof. Article § 10-306 supports the finding that Respondent used trust funds for unauthorized purposes in violation of MR PC 16 -609. Noting that Rule 1 6-609 pro hibits the use o f funds re quired to be deposited in an attorney trust account, it submits that the finding s that the respo ndent disb ursed, in con nection w ith settlements, funds on deposit from earlier settlements, knowing that the funds for those settlements had not been deposited and that the respondent overpaid his client by more than $ 12, 000.00 were sufficient to establish a violation of that Rule. It is not necessary, the petitioner argues, that it show, as the hearing court determined, that the respondent benefitted or gained from the unauthorized purpose. The respondent filed seven exceptions to the hearing court s findings of fact and conclusions of law. T he first challen ged the co urt s threshold conclusion that the conduct constituting the Rules violations occurred while the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. As he did in the hearin g court, the re sponden t argues that, because h e is a real estate title insurance agent, a pursuit, he maintains, in which he was engaged when the charged violations occurred a nd whic h this Cou rt has held is n ot the practice of law, he is subject to the regula tory authority of the Insurance Commissioner, not the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. This Court, in other words, he asserts, has already spoken on the Page 24 subject in Lichtenberg and Davis, making clear that engaging in, functioning as or conducting the busines s of a real esta te title insurance agent is not a n activity constituting the practice of law and such activity hence is not controlled by or subject to the MRPC or statutes regulating the practice of la w, thus in sulating him from disciplinary proceedings, initiated by the petitioner, premised on those activities. The respondent s second exception is to the various references the hearing court made with regard to time lapses between the distribution of settlement proceeds and the de posit in the respondent s trust account of the funds from which those proceeds were to be paid. He submits that real estate settlement[] checks customarily are handed out at the settlement table, although funds for the disbursements involved frequently are not yet in hand or deposited, although [their] payment has been arranged. The numerous references in the findings and conclusions to the respondent s failure to meet the time requirements set by Bar Counsel are the next subject of the respondent s exceptions. In addition to noting his lack of input in s etting the time requireme nt, he com plains that no notice appears to have been taken of the time burden respondent already bore because of daily require ments incid ent to his title insurance business and his law practice, his efforts to recover an immense amount of data and records in the same time interval as well presented an insoluble problem which obliged respondent to do as m uch as he feasibly could to placate comp eting de mand s. The respondent also points out that he responded to the requests, albeit not in the time prescribed. The hearing co urt s referen ces to the notices of overdrafts received by Bar Counsel Page 25 are the next subject of the exceptions. The respondent argues that they are not consistent with the record, which is devoid of any clear and convincing evidence that those trust account checks that were the subject of those notices were not paid by the bank. He notes, in that regard, that, despite the fact that many of the check s were of a substantial a mount, there was no evidence of any irate payee s coming after respondent for a pound or more of flesh, or even politely pressing him for payment. He nex t excepts to the hearing cou rt s references to his trust account checks being outstanding for more than 90 days and to his having been placed on the Title Company s Significant Findings Report on several occasions. As to the former, the respondent argues that 90 days outstanding is not unus ual. As to the latter, he maintains that the issues causing his placement on the list were promptly resolved. Exception six relates to the adverse findings and conclusions regarding the Estate of Arthur Heiss. This exce ption highlig hts that the relativ es interested in that Estate d id nothing to clarify the interests of Arthur Heiss for more than 40 years follow ing his death in Alabama, yet now seek to complain about delay and that the New Jersey attorney representing the Estate of Helen Peters, with whom he dealt, made no complaint as to the time delay. Therefore, the respondent respectfully suggests that any censure concerning the history or handling of the that estate should be directed at those whose actions or lack of it warrant it, the relatives of Arthur Heiss who blithely ignored the estate for more than 40 years, but now seek to play the put the blame on Mame game and point fingers at others, Page 26 including [the res ponde nt], readily disregarding that it was thro ugh [his e fforts] that the estate was revived and wha teve r ben efits may th ereb y accrue to them ca me as a res ult of his efforts . The respondent s final exception is to the hearing court s conc lusion that his representation in the Heiss matter was incompetent. He is particularly concerned by the characterization of his repre sentation and actions, using terms such as lackadaisical and unreliable, and referring to his failure to back up his computer and to correct discovered errors as routine, and lacking urgency. He offers that none of the characterizations are warranted by the record and that he acted properly and d iligently, within the c ontext of h is netwo rk and p ersona l ability. Maryland Rule 16-759(b) provides: (1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit court judge's conclusions of law. (2) Findings of Fact. (A) If No Excep tions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purp ose o f det ermining approp riate sanc tions, if a ny. (B) If Exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of Appea ls shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16757(b). The Co urt may conf ine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the exception s. The Co urt shall give due re gard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnes ses. Thus, we review de novo the hearing court's conclusions of law. Rule 16-759(b)(1); Page 27 Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mahone, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___, 2007 WL 1051696, *4 (No. 7 , Septemb er Term, 2 006) (Filed April 10, 2 007); Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. ___, ___, ___ A.2d ___, ___, 2007 WL 816836, *4 (No. 53, September Term, 2005) (Filed March 20, 2007); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Hodgson, 396 Md. 1, __, 912 A.2d 64 0, 644 (2006); Attorney G rievance C omm'n v . McLa ughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Joehl, 335 Md. 83, 88, 642 A.2d 194, 196 (1994) (noting that the ultimate decision as to whether an attorney has engaged in professio nal miscon duct rests w ith this Court). When the factual findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by the facts found, exceptions to conclusio ns of law will be overruled. Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Manger, 396 M d. 134, 146- 147, 91 3 A.2d 1, 8 (2006). Moreover, a hearing court s findings of fact will not be overruled unless we determine that they a re clearly e rroneo us. Mahone, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___; Guida, 391 Md. at 50, 891 A.2d at 1095. Weighing the credibility of witnesses and resolving any conflict in the evidence are tasks proper for the fact finder. State v. Stanley, 351 Md. 733, 750, 72 0 A.2d 323, 33 1 (199 8). We shall overrule the respondent s exceptions. Exceptions three and seven challenge the correctness of the hearings court s findings of fact. On the other hand, exceptions two, four, five and six are more concerned with the effect of the findings on the respondent or others, with whether the respondent was benefitted or othe rs were advers ely impac ted. None Page 28 of the findings is clearly erroneous. Neither is the impact of any of them such that it undermines or negates their correctness. We review exception one de novo. That review convinces us that the hearing court was correct, the misconduct that the respondent was found to have engaged in did occur while the respondent was practicing law. To be sure, as the hearing court found, the respondent is a title insurance agent, licensed by the State Insurance Commission and that approxim ately 80 percent of his business activ ity, and income, involve activities associated with that profession. On the o ther hand, h is practice of law, wh ich include s an estate practice and a commercial and residential real estate practice, consumes the remainder, or 20 percent of his business activity. The hearing court s findings that the respondent was retained to represent M ark Heiss in connection with his mother s estate is neither disputed nor clearly erroneous. Nor is it seriously contended that the expansion of the scope of the undertaking to include the sale and settlement of the Heiss real estate changed the nature of the respondent s responsibilities. The hearing court concluded, we hold correctly, that the respondent was practicing law during the period when he was engaged in the Heiss matter. The real estate settlements he conducted in connection therewith were conducted not as a title insu ranc e age nt, bu t as an atto rney. This case is nothing at all like Lichtenberg and Davis. In neither of those cases was it contended, or even arguable, that the attor neys in those cases were practicing law. Indeed, in Lichtenberg, the Court clearly stated the context for its holding: Page 29 The heart of Bar Counse l s complaint against respondent boils down to one contention: that by depositing into his title insurance company s account the interest from funds en trusted to him by clients of the title insu ranc e com pany, without the express consent of the beneficial owne rs, respondent violated the Maryland Rules of Profession al Condu ct. Respondent does not engage in the active practice of la w but inste ad was a cting as a title ag ent who se main business activity is to conduct real estate settlements, which is governed pursuant to the Insurance Article of the Maryland Code, by the Commissioner of the In suranc e Adm inistratio n. 379 Md. a t 353, 84 2 A.2d at 21. Davis, of course, involved the same issue. 379 Md. at 380, 842 A.2d at 37. At issue here is not the insurance company account, rather the respondent s escrow account. Also, here, the respondent undertook the representatio n of a clien t; that is not disputed and it was this representation that was the genesis of the issue, with the resolution of which the respon dent was subsequently charged and which he was pursuing when the charged conduct occurred. If the respondent is correct, a title insurance agent who performs a settlement during the course of representing a client wo uld never be able to be the subject of disciplinary proceedings, no matter how egregious the miscon duct. We certainly did not create such a loophole. The petitioner s exceptions are well-taken; consequently, we shall sus tain them . The exception pertaining to Rule 1.15 (d) is at best technical. Neither the petitioner nor the respondent is unclear as to the conduct of the respondent that the hearing court found to be violative of a Rule of Professional Conduct or the substance of the Rule that it found to have been violated. The rub is that, while the Rule as it ex ists today prohib its the condu ct in which the respondent was found to have engaged, it does so in a different se ction than it did Page 30 when the disciplinary petition was filed. Until 2005, the requirement that an attorney promptly notify persons with an interest in funds the attorney is holding in trust deliver those funds or give an accounting on request was codified in section (b) of the Rule. Now it is in subsection (d). Rather than the Rule in existence when the conduct occurred, the hearing court referenced the current Rule. That does not negate the violation. We agree with the petition that the hearing court shou ld have found a violation of Rule 1.15 (b ). Rule 16-609 , like § 10-306, proscribes the use of any funds [required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account] for any unauthorized purpose. The hearing court found, we co nclude , approp riately, a vio lation of the latter, b ut not th e form er. Because the statute and the Rule have the same requirement, we are at a loss as to why one, but not the othe r. As the pe titioner points o ut, there is no requirement of personal gain or benefit accruing to the attorney con tained in the Rule anymore than there is any such requirement in the statute. Acc ordingly, we sustain the p etitioner s exc eption on th is point. We turn to the determination of the appropriate sanction in th is case. We do so fully cognizant that the purpose, and goal, of attorney discipline are to protec t the public, no t to punish the errin g attorn ey, Mba-Jonas, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___; Attorney Grievance Com m'n v. Rees, 396 Md. 248, 254, 913 A.2d 68, 72 (2006), which are achieved when the sanctions are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were c omm itted. Attorney G rievance C omm'n v . Stein, 373 Md. 531, 533, 819 A.2d 372, 375 (2003). Page 31 The petition er recom mend s an ind efinite s uspen sion fro m the p ractice o f law. It does so based on the nature a nd severity, as w ell as the num ber of the c harges. Th e respond ent, as we have seen , believes that disciplinary proceedings are not appropriate at all. Thus, he argues that the proc eedings sh ould be dismissed withou t any sanction. If, however, there is to be a sanction, he suggests a reprimand will suffice and, at worst, a thirty day suspension. We share the petitioner s concern regarding the protection of the public, our paramount objective, given the nature of the charges and the respondent s response when confronted with issues and problems. While we acc ept the mitigating factors the hearing court identified, w e are not pa rticularly comforted. That the respondent did not benefit from the Rule violatio ns doe s not ne gate the ir occur rence o r his culp ability. Nor does the fact that no one, other than the beneficiaries of the Estate of Arthur Heiss, was adversely impacted. Putting family first is commendable, of course, but under certain circumstances, as for example the present o ne, it may highlig ht the inade quacy of th e response and confirm the court s conclusion that it lack s suf ficie nt urgency. While a co mputer cra sh may not b e able to be avoided, th e respond ent s failure to back up th e data regu larly and his explanation for not doing so is troubling, if not telling. We believe, under the circumstances, that the petitioner s recommended sanction is the appropriate one. The respondent is ordered indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. He may reapply for readmission 60 days after the date of this Court s order of suspension. Page 32 IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSIO N AGAINST RANDALL E. GOFF. Page 33

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