Mundey v. Erie
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Mund ey v. Erie Ins urance G roup, et al. No. 28, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: AUTO INSURANCE COVERAGE CHILDREN OVER 18 NOT RESIDING WITH PARENTS Richard Mundey, Jr., age 21, was a passenge r in a motor vehicle driven by his friend, Amber Burgess. As a resu lt of Amber s negligent operation of her automobile a collision occurred and Mundey suffered serious physical injuries which exceeded $20,000.00, the maximum amount of liability coverage on the vehicle in which he was a passenger. At the time of the collision, Mundey resided temporarily in the home of his grandmother and was not permitted to reside in the home of his parents. Mundey sought a declaration that he was covered under his parents automobile liability insurance policy for payment of his damages pursuant to the uninsu red/un derinsu red mo torist pro vision o f that po licy. We hold that Mundey is not entitled to recover under his parents uninsured motorist endorsement becau se, at the time of the c ollision, he w as not a resid ent of their h ousehold or otherwise insured under the auto mobile liability polic y in questio n. In addition, w e hold that consistent with Md. Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article, Mundey was not a clause 1 insured under his parents automobile liability policy at the time of the a ccident. In the Circu it Court for P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Case No. CAL02-22619 IN THE COURT OF A PPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 28 September Term, 2006 __________________________________ RICHARD A. MUNDEY v. ERIE IN SURA NCE GRO UP, et al. __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. __________________________________ Filed: January 16, 2007 On January 17, 2 002, petitioner, Richard A. Mundey, Jr. ( Mundey ), age 21, sustained serious injuries as a result of an auto co llision that occu rred while h e was the frontseat passenger in a vehicle driven by Amber Rose Burgess ( Burgess ). At the time of the accident, Burgess was insured under a Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF) policy which provided the minimum statutory liability coverage of $20,000. Mundey filed a complaint against Burgess in the Circuit Court for Prince George s County, seeking damages, in exce ss of the MA IF polic y limits, for injuries c aused b y Burge ss s neg ligence . The complaint was amended to add a declaratory judgme nt count against M undey s parents insurer, r espon dent, Erie Insurance Gro up ( Erie ), to determine if E rie s uninsured/underinsured ( UM ) motorist end orsemen t insured M undey, in light of his living arrangements, at the time of the acciden t. In that regard, Mundey sought a declaration that the UM endorsement in the Erie policy covered damages that he sustained as a result of the motor v ehicle c ollision. The negligence claim against Burgess was settled for $20,000 and that count was subsequently dismissed. As to the declaratory judgment count, the parties entered into a stipulation as to the facts with regard to Mu ndey s re sidenc e. The trial court ruled in favor of Erie , find ing that M undey wa s not entit led to coverag e under E rie s policy. Mundey noted an appea l to the C ourt of Specia l Appe als. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial co urt. Mundey v. Erie Ins. Group, 167 Md. App. 444, 893 A.2d 645 (2006). Thereafter, Mundey filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the judgment of the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als. We gra nted the petition.1 Mundey v. Erie Ins. Group, 393 M d. 245, 900 A.2d 75 1 (2006). W e hold that Mundey is not entitled to recover under his parents uninsured motorist endorsement because he was not a resident o f their househo ld or otherwise insured under the automobile liability insurance policy in question. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND We adopt the facts as stated by Judge Frederick Sharer, writing for a panel of the Court of Special Appeals in this case: The Erie Pioneer Family Auto Insurance Policy purchased by [petitioner s] parents pro vided polic y limits of $250,000. T he policy s uninsured/underinsured provision, at issue in this appeal, provides, in relevant part, as follows: U N I N S U R E D /U N D E R I N S U R ED MOTORISTS COVERAGE *** OUR PROM ISE We will pay damages for bodily injury and property damage that the law entitles you or your legal representative to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or 1 Petitioner presents the following questions for our review: 1. 2. Is Erie s limitatio n on cov erage of resident fa mily members invalid because it is not authorized by the motor vehicle insurance statutes? Did the policy s definition of resident exclude Mundey from coverage during a temporary absence from his parents , the named insured s, home? -2- underin sured m otor veh icle. Damages must result f rom a mo tor vehicle accident arising out o f the own ership or use of the uninsured motor vehicle or underinsured motor v ehicle as a motor vehicle and involve: 1. bodily injury to you or others we protect. *** OTHERS WE PROTECT 1. Any relative. Relative is defined in the policy s definitions section: relative means a resident of your household who is: 1. a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption, or 2. a ward or any other person under 21 years old in your care. resident means a person who physically lives with you in your house hold. Your unmarried, unemancipated children under age 24 attending school full-time, living away from home will be considered residents of your household. (Emp hasis in o riginal.) The declaratory judgment action came on for trial on August 26, 2004. Neither party called live witnesses; rather, each proffered evidence from which the Circuit Court could hav e found th e followin g: On or about February 14, 2001, [petitioner], then 20 years old, was arrested and incarcerated for failure to pay a court-ordered fine. [Petitioner s] parents, Richard A. Mundey, Sr. and Sharon Mund ey, agreed to post his bail if he would agree to , inter alia, move out of their home in Lusby, M aryland, and in to his grand mother s h ome in Waldorf, Maryland. It was further agreed that [petitioner] would have to get -3- a job and get his act together before he could move back into his parents home. Upon the posting of bail by his parents,[petitioner] was released from jail and moved into the home of his grandmother, Shirley Sterling, in Waldorf. Shortly thereafter [petitioner] got a job in Waldorf; first at Oak Ridge Construction Company and then at Damon s Restaurant. Approximately one month after he m oved in w ith his grandmother [petitioner] obtained his driving learner s permit. [Petitioner] was not, at any time releva nt to the issues in th is case, enrolled in college. [Petitioner] lived with his grandmother in Waldorf for the 11 months preceding the accident. During that time he visited his parents home approxim ately four to six tim es. He spe nt the night at their house on two occasions - Thanks giving and Christmas night. On those occasions, [petitioner] slept on an extra bed in his younger brother s room, as his former bedroom had been converted to other family use. At his grandmother s home, [petitioner] had his own bedroom and was free to use the en tire house, an d the teleph one. [Petition er] ate his meals with his grandmother and, when he was not at work, he either watched television or spent time with his girlfriend at his grandmother s house. In December 2001, [petitioner s] father denied [petitioner s] request to move back into the family home. Except for his pay record at Damon s Restaurant, [petitioner] continued to use his parents Lusby address as his home address. Although [ petitioner] never filed for a change of address in Lusby, his mother either broug ht his mail when she visited h er mother, o r mailed it to [petitioner] at the Waldorf address. After hearing the proffers an d arguments of c ounsel, the Circuit Court issued an o pinion from the bench providing , in relevant pa rt: It appears to me that the definitions used in Erie s policy ar e not void against pub lic po licy, but are in fact log ical, clear, and s tated in plain language, sufficient to put all policyhold ers on notice of the extent of risk that this con tract is intended to cover. The temporary residence of the [petitioner] at his grandmother s home was temporary based on the limits placed by the homeowners who are the insured s under this policy. That is it wa s entirely up to his parents, the named insured homeowners, to determine how long that temporary reside nce w ould co ntinue. The policy anticipates that issue in its -4- specific statement re garding fu ll-time studen ts living away f rom home who are unemancipated children under a ge 24 . . . . *** Here we have a young man who was emancipated abso lutel y. He was over 18. He was living and working on his own. He was not dependent for any purpose for his parents, and therefore could not even be considered an unemancipated child over 1 8 . . . . Only a temporary residence for school purposes for an unemancipated child between the ages of 18 and 24 would allow that person to still be continued as a memb er of the house hold. I see nothing v oid against public policy in this. We have, in ad dition, the intention declared by the parents that he was not to be considered a member of the household in any number of ways. O ne, they forw arded his m ail to him at the other location. Two, he was supposed to be self-supporting at another location. Three, they did not notify the insuranc e compa ny of his driving on his learner s permit because they were not permitting him to use their vehicles. All of those intentions clarify the intention that he not be considered a resident of the househo ld at the time of this incident. It is sa d, it is tragic, but it is the law, an d I see noth ing in public policy or in the statutory lan guage, or in any of the appellate decisions, to suggest otherwise. The Circuit Court s oral opinion was fo llowed by a declaratory judgment order, filed on October 19, 2004. The order declared that the relevant policy pro visions did not violate p ublic po licy and th at, because [petitioner] was not physically living in his parents household for the 11 months prior to the accident, he was not an insured by definition under the policy and does not qualify for uninsured or und erinsure d moto rist cove rage. -5- Mundey, 167 Md. A pp. at 447-50, 893 A .2d at 646-48 (alterations adde d)(footnotes omitted). DISCUSSION A. We turn first to Maryland s Motor V ehicle Insurance Law and our interpretation of the uninsured motorist provisions. Petitioner contends that Erie narrowed the required coverage, without any statutory authority, by inserting into the com mon dec laration, wh at is in petition er s view , an und uly restrictiv e defin ition of residen t. Petitioner posits that the policy requirement that residents physically live in the named in sured s ho usehold is invalid and illegal and further that Maryland s Motor Vehicle Insurance Laws are to be liberally construed so as to provide coverage for Mundey. In order to determine whether Mundey is entitled to collect under the uninsured motorist provision of his parents automob ile liability insurance policy, we must interpret Md . Code (1997, 20 06 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article,2 the UM Endorsement and subsequent definitions 2 Specifically at issue is Md. Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-509 of the Insurance Article, which was in force at the time of the collision. Section 19-509 provides: (a) In this section, "uninsured motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle: (1) the ownership, maintenance, or use of wh ich has resu lted in the bo dily injury or death of an insured; and (2) for which the sum of the limits of liability under all valid and colle ctible liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities applicable to bodily injury or death: (continued...) -6- 2 (...continued) (i) is less than the amount of coverage provided under this section; or (ii) has been reduced by payment to other persons of claims arising from the same occurrence to an amount less than the amount of coverage provided under this section. (b) The uninsured motorist coverage required by this section does not apply to a motor ve hicle liability insuran ce policy that insu res a moto r vehicle that: (1) is not subject to registration under § 13-402 of the Transpo rtation Article because it is not driven on a highway; or (2) is exempt from reg istration under § 13-402(c)(10) of the Transportation Article. (c) In addition to any other coverage required by this subtitle, each motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State after July 1, 1975, shall contain coverage for damages, subject to the policy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident arising out o f the own ership, main tenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle; and (2) a surviving relativ e of the insu red, who is described in § 3-904 of the Courts Article, is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because the insured died as the result of a motor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. (d) The unin sured mo torist coverage required by this section shall be in the form and subject to the conditions that the Commissioner approves. (e)(1) The unin sured mo torist coverag e contained in a motor ve hicle liability insu ranc e policy: (i) shall at least equ al: 1. the amounts required by Title 17 of the Transportation Article; and (continued...) -7- 2 (...continued) 2. the coverage provided to a qualified person un der Title 20 , Subtitle 6 of this article; and (ii) may not exceed th e amoun t of liability coverag e pro vide d under the policy. (2) Unless w aived in accordance with § 19-510 of this subtitle, the amount of uninsured motorist coverage provided under a private pa ssenger m otor vehicle liability insurance policy shall equal the amount of liability coverage provided under the policy. (f) An insurer may exclude from the uninsured motorist coverage required by this section benefits for: (1) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured's household for an injury that occurs when the named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor veh icle that is owned by the named in sured or an immedia te family mem ber o f the nam ed in sure d wh o res ides in the nam ed in sure d's household; and (2) the named insured, a family member of the named insured who resid es in the named insured's household, and any other individual who has other applicable motor veh icle insurance for an injury that occurs when the named insured, family member, or other individual is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by the insured motor veh icle while the m otor vehicle is operated or used by an individual who is excluded from cov erage und er § 27-60 6 of this article. (g) The limit of liability for an insurer that provides uninsured motorist coverage under this section is the amount of that coverage less the amount p aid to the insured, that exhausts a ny applicable liability insurance policies, bonds, and securities, on behalf of any person that may be held liable for the b odily injuries or death of the insured. (h)(1) A policy that, as its primary purpose, provides coverage in excess of other valid and c ollectible insurance or qualified self-insurance may include the uninsured motorist coverage provided for in this section. (2) The uninsured motorist cov erage requ ired by this section is primary to any right to recovery from the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund under Title (continued...) -8- of relative and resident. Our interpretation must con form to the well-settled principles of statutory construction. As this Court recently said in Walzer v. Osborne, ___Md. ___, ___ A.2d _ ___ (slip op. at 5- 8) (filed Nove mber 1 7, 2006 ), [t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor of Mt. Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 1036, 10 45 (2006 ); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citation s omitted); see also Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2 d 439, 44 5 (2005); Moo re v. Sta te, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); O Con nor v. Balt. C ounty, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Mayor of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000 ). *** If the lang uage o f the sta tute is am biguou s, however, then co urts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration]. Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 2 (...continued) 20, Subtitle 6 of this article. (i) An endorsement or provision that protects the insured against damages caused by an uninsured motor vehicle that is contained in a policy issued and delivered in the State is deemed to cover damages caused b y a motor veh icle insured by a liability insurer that is insolvent or otherwise unable to pay claims to the same extent and in the same manner as if the damages were caused by an uninsured motor vehicle. (j) A provision in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy issued after July 1, 1975, about coverage for damages sustained by the insured as a result of the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle that requires a dispute between the insured and the insurer to be submitted to binding arbitration is prohibited and is of no lega l effect. -9- 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). We have said that there is an ambiguity within [a] statute when there exist two or m ore reason able alternative interpretations of the statute. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of th is Court is to resolve that ambiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. Id. If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, however, we m ay, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia amon g other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute, comme nts and explanations regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendments proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of various comp eting co nstructio ns. Witte, 369 Md. at 525-26, 801 A.2d at 165. In construing a statute, [w]e avoid a const ruction of the s tatute tha t is unrea sonab le, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense. Blake v. State, 395 Md. 213, 224, 909 A.2d 1020, 1026 (2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005)); see Frost v . State, 336 Md. 125 , 137, 647 A.2d 1 06, 112 (1994). In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it appears. State v. P agano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1 341 (1 996) (c itations o mitted). A s this Co urt has s tated, [b]ecause it is part of the co ntext, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundam ental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be co nsid ered . Thu s, no t only are we required to interpret the s tatute as a w hole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory scheme o f which it is a part. -10- Gordon Family P ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 7 53, 757 (1997 ) (citation s omitte d). The history of Maryland s Uninsured Motorist Statute, as summarized by the C ourt in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. DeHaan, 393 Md. 163, 900 A.2d 208 (2006), informs our discussion. In DeHaan, we noted that, [t]he Legislature first enacted the uninsured motorist statute as Chapter 73 of the Acts of 1972. This section was part of a large bill which also created the Maryland Automobile Insurance Fund (MAIF), the bill provided: (c) In addition to any other coverage required b y this subtitle, every policy of motor v ehicle liability insurance issued, sold, or delivered in this State after January 1, 1973 M AY con tain coverage, in at least the amounts required under Section 7-101 of the Article 66 ½ of the Annotated Code of Maryland (1970 Replacement Volume and 1972 Supplem ent), for damages which the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle bec ause of bo dily injuries sustained in an accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such uninsured motor vehicle . . . . The statute was later amended and codified as Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Repl. V ol., 1978 Cum . Supp .), Art 48 A, § 54 1 (c). The enactment of this section complied with one of the recommendations made in a Report of the Specia l Comm ittee on No -Fault Insurance dated January 31, 1972. The committee s recommendation stated: To complement the first party covera ge and to p rotect more fully a Maryland driver, the second bill requires the driver to c arry uninsured motorist coverage in the event he suffers damage caused by an out-of-state driver not protected by liability insurance. DeHaan, 393 M d. at 171 -72, 90 0 A.2d at 213. As one commentator has noted, the Maryland Uninsured Motorist Endorsement -11- specifically establishes three classes of persons ability to recover under the policy. Andrew Janquitto, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Maryland, 21 U. Balt. L. Rev. 17 1, 221 (1992). Of the three classes of persons, this case concerns only what has been labeled clause 1 insureds: Clause 1 insureds co nsists of the n amed insu red, the named insured s spouse, and members of the named insured s household . . . . The coverage granted to . . . [them] is per sonal and compreh ensive: it does not run with the insured vehicle. Ra ther the policy co vers clause 1 insureds in a variety of situations: when they are occupying a vehicle under the policy, when they are occupying most other vehicles, when they are riding bicycles, and when they are ped estrians . Id. We have stated that the phrase resident of the same household is not ambiguous, but rather [t]he words themselves are clear, simple, and in general use. Peninsula Ins. Co. v. Knight, 254 Md. 461, 477, 255 A.2d 55, 63 (1969)(holding that the insured was a member of his parents household and that their claim against him was precluded by an exclusionary clause in a policy of insurance issued by Peninsula. Further acknowledging that [a] resident of a household may have a status rangin g from tem porary to perm anent but . . . he is nonetheless a resident in light of a number of factors including his usage of the living space and the stor age location of his belon gings.) Petition er urges this C ourt to cons ider him a clause 1 insured under his parents automobile liability policy at the time of the accident and therefore entitled to coverage. For the reasons discussed infra, we disagree. The essence of this appeal is our interpretation of subsection (c)(1) of § 19-509. Subsection (c)(1), requires that -12- each motor veh icle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State . . ., shall contain co verage fo r damage s, subject to the policy limits, that: (1) the insured is entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle bec ause of b odily injuries susta ined in a m otor vehicle accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the uninsured motor v ehicle . . . . (Empha sis added). T he statute does not define the word insured.3 Because the L egislature failed to define insured, we must examine what the Legislature intended insured to mean in light of the Legislature s general purpose and in context of the statute as a whole. Nesbit v. Gov t E mploy ees Ins. C o., 382 Md. 65, 76, 854 A.2d 879, 885 (2004)(citation omitted). Furthe r, [w]e have repeatedly stated that where th e [L]egisla ture has cho sen not to define a term u sed in a statute, th at term s hould, . . . be given its ordinary and natural mean ing. By not defining these words in the statute, there is nothing to indicate the [L]egislature intended to express a technical me aning. DeJarnette v. Fed. Kemper Ins. Co., 299 Md. 708, 717, 475 A.2d 454, 459 (1984) (citations omitted ). Petitioner expands upon an argument presented by commentator, Andrew Janquitto, in a treatise on M aryland m otor ve hicle law . Mr. Janquitto urges that [b]ecause the UM statute does not indicate who must be insured, the only guidance is a negative implication from the exclusions. In other words, if certain persons such as family members, can be 3 According to Andrew Janquitto, the term insured is not defined because it was the intent of the Legislature to ex tend uninsured m otorist coverage to the nam ed insured s resident relatives and permissive users of the insured vehicle. Andrew Janquitto, Uninsured Motorist Coverage in Maryland, 21 U. B alt. L. Re v. 171, 2 20 (19 92). -13- excluded under some specified circumstances, they must be included in all other circum stances . Andr ew Jan quitto, Maryland Motor Vehicle Insurance § 8.9 (A)(1) (2006 Supplement). Petitioner further expands up on Mr. Ja nquitto s arg ument by citing specific statutes from which, P etitioner contends, this Court can im ply the meaning of the w ord insured. Petitioner contends that the Legislature intended insured to include all family members of the named insured, including those who are temporarily absent from the household. Accordingly, petitioner avers that Maryland s Motor Vehicle Insurance Laws do not authorize an exclusion for temporarily absent resident relatives. Further, petitioner asserts that had the General Assembly intended to give insurers permission to narrow the coverage in this way, it would have expressly included a provision to that effect in the original UM s tatute or, later, after this Court s interpretation of the term resident in Forbes v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 322 Md. 689, 589 A.2d 944 (1991). Moreover, petitioner argues that t he defin ition of r esident containe d within Erie s po licy is invalid bec ause it restricts the legislatively m andated c overage a nd, moreo ver, that the policy provisions are inconsistent with Maryland s UM statute and are thus invalid. Finding no explicit definition of insured within the UM statute, petitioner contends that this Court should look to the exclusions contained within the UM statute and elsewhere within the motor vehicle insurance scheme, and that these exclusions show by negative implication that the Legislature intended the term insured to include family members of the named insured that are temporaril y -14- absent from the household. Petitioner relies on several sections of the Insurance Article for this prop osition. S pecific ally, petition er cites § 19-50 5 and § 27-60 6 as instr uctive. Pursuant to § 19-505, the personal injury protection (PIP) statute, automobile insurance companies that issue, sell, or deliver policies in M aryland must provide PIP coverage for the first named insured, and any family member of the first named insured who resides in the first named insured s household. Md. Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 19-505 (a)(1)(i) of the Insurance Article. Insurers are, howeve r, permitted to exclude from coverage those persons enumerated in subsection (c)4 of § 19-5 05. Petitione r contends that the 4 Subsectio n (c) of § 1 9-505 pro vides: (c)(1) An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits for: (i) an individual, otherwise insured under the policy, who: 1. intentionally causes the motor vehicle accident resulting in the injury for which benefits are claimed; 2. is a nonresident of the State an d is injured as a pedestrian in a motor v ehicle accident that occurs outside of the State; 3. is injured in a m otor vehicle accident w hile operating or voluntar ily riding in a motor vehicle that the individual knows is stolen; or 4. is injured in a motor vehicle accident while committing a felony or while violating § 21-904 of the Transportation Article; or (ii) the named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured's household for an injury that occurs while the named insured or family member is occupying an uninsured motor ve hicle own ed by: 1. the named insured; or 2. an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured's household. (2) In the c ase o f mo torcycles, an in sure r may: (i) exclude the economic loss benefits described in this section; or (ii) offer the economic loss benefits with deductibles, options, or specific exclusions. -15- exclusions allowed under subsection (c) are very limited, that, pursuant to § 19-505, Mundey should be provided PIP coverage, and that it can be conclud ed that the Legislature intended the word insured to mean all resident family members of the named insured, whether tempo rarily abse nt or no t. Section 27-606 p ermits a family automobile to remain insured, instead of having the insurance policy canceled, by excluding from the insurance policy a member of the househo ld whose driving record would have warranted a cancellation or non-renewal of the policy. Petitioner contends that the op erative language in § 27 -606 is family memb ers residing in the ho useho ld of the exclud ed ope rator or u ser or ve hicle ow ner. M d. Code (1997, 2006 Repl. Vol.), § 27-606 of the Insurance Article. Petitioner asserts that the policy issued by Erie exceeds the statutory authorized exclusions by seeking to exclude him from PIP and UM coverage while he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a non-relative. Petitioner cites additional sections of the Insurance Code in support of his argument. Petitioner suggests that the intent of the Legislature is revealed by reading §§ 19-509 and 20-601 together. Here, petitioner contends that the operative language, family who resides in the household, indicates the Legislature s intention to require insurers to cover family residents to the same extent that the state fund covers the m, th roug h M AIF . Finally, petitioner contends that the in tent to include househo ld residents in the term ins ured is revealed in various other sections including § 19-506, the waiver of PIP benefits; § 20-603, notice of claim for d ama ges; § 27-601 , noti ce fo r can cella tion or no n-re new al of a policy; -16- §§ 27- 604 an d 27-6 05, both addres sing pre mium increas es. In opposition, respondent contends that, at best, the group of persons who are to be provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage would be the named insured and his or her family members who reside in the named insured s household, but that there is no mandate for any other persons to be covered. Respondent argues that coverage need not be extended to a named insured s relatives who intend to move in with the named insured in the future o r those w ho do n ot physica lly reside w ith the na med in sured. We first address petitioner s contention that the exclusions contained within the UM statute and elsewhere within the motor vehicle insurance scheme show by negative implication that the Legisla ture intended the term insured to include all relatives of the named insured who are tem porarily absent from the hous ehold. In Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., [t]he question before us . . . [was] wh ether § 19-5 09 of the In surance A rticle require[d] an insurer to provide uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of a person who was not an insured under the policy. 388 Md. 82, 86, 878 A .2d 615 , 617 (2005). Jaedon Johnson, a minor, sought to recover under his mother's insurance policy for the death of his father, a man who was not a named insured under that policy, was not married to the policyho lder, and did not live with the policyhold er, arguing th at § 19-509(c)(2) required the insurer to pay the benefits sought. As part of our analysis in that case, we considered the plain language of §19-509(c)(1), noting that [t]he words of the statute require each motor v ehicle liability insurance policy to include coverage fo r that -17- policy s insured for b odily injuries sustained by that policy s insured, in a motor v ehicle accident involving the use of an uninsured motor vehicle. Johnson, 388 Md. at 89, 878 A.2d at 619 (emphasis in original). The minor argu ed that recovery under his m other s policy was necessarily conditioned on his being a survivor of an insured under the statute. Finding his argument illogical, we opined that such an interpretation would mean that the [L]egislature was requiring every policy to provide uninsured motorist coverage to an unknown number of people, no t named in the policy, wh o are related to (but not living with) someone who is protected by the policy, in the event that tho se unkno wn peo ple should be involve d in an accide nt with an unin sured m otor ve hicle. Id. (alteratio n adde d). Our interpretation o f §19-50 9(c)(1) and analysis of legisla tive intent as ex plicated in Johnson are instructive. Although the term insured is not defined, within the context of the uninsured motorist statute, its ordinary meaning is covered or coverage at the time of the accident. See Johnson, 388 Md. at 89, 878 A.2d at 619; Forbes, 322 Md. at 708, 589 A.2d at 953. It is our view that the Legislature intended for coverage to be extended to the insured motorist and all fam ily members re siding with the named insured. By contrast there may be situations where a family member of the named insured who resides with the named insured and is occupying an insured or u ninsured motor veh icle or is struck as a pedestrian by an insured or uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named in sured or an immedia te family member or operated or used by an individual who is excluded from coverage under § 27-606 of the Insurance Article. In those situations, by virtue of statutorily-created -18- exceptions, an insurer may exclude the injured family member from the benefits of uninsured motoris t covera ge. See § 19-5 09 (f). The case sub judice is not a case of exclusion, as an entire class of persons w ho are statutorily required to be covered are not being d enied c overag e. Cf. Pa. Nat l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gartleman, 288 Md. 151, 416 A.2d 734 (1980) (holding that the exclusion contained in the policy at issue in that case d enied PIP coverage to a class of p ersons statuto rily required to be covered and was consequently invalid and that as a result, the named insured was entitled to benefits under the policy s PIP provision). This case is not a case of exclusion, rather it is a matter of determining if the Legislature contemplated that Mundey and similarly situated individuals should be covered under the UM statute. We are unpersuaded that the Legislature intended to require coverage for family members of the named insured who do not physically live with the named insured. We hold, therefore, that § 19-509 requires automobile liability insurance contracts to provide uninsured motorist coverage, at a minimum, to the named insured as well as any family members who reside with th e nam ed insu red. B. Petitioner argues that Erie s policy continued to provide UM coverage during Mundey s absence f rom his pa rents , the na med insu red s, hom e. Thus, pe titioner contends that the Court should ap ply Forbes, and conclude that Mundey was an insured under his p aren ts po licy. Petitioner further argues that in Forbes this Court relied on the -19- Supreme Court of Rhode Island s ana lysis in Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980 (RI. 1990). According to Petitioner, in Carrera, in its analysis of resident, that court considered intent to remain for more than a mere tran sitory period and intent to return to the residence within the reasonable foreseeable future. Th e Court of Special A ppeals, in petitioner s view, failed to consider the intent element in its analysis of the case sub judice. Petitioner notes that temporary absences from one s household are frequent and that the application of narrow interpretations would result in there being no coverage during these temporary situations. Respondent asserts that the subject policy is unambiguous and further that this Court should enforce the policy as written. In turn, respondent discourages the application of Forbes in this context. As explained below, we disagree with petitioner s contention that his absence from his parents home did not preclude him from UM coverage. We turn first to our previous holding in Kendall v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 348 Md. 157, 702 A.2d 767 (1997). In Kendall, at issue was the proper construction of uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage provisions contain ed in an au tomobile liab ility insurance policy. In that case, petitioner argued that the insurance poli cy at issue was ambig uous. T his Co urt stated that, [u]nder Maryland law, when deciding the issue of coverage under an insurance policy, the primary principle of construction is to apply the terms of the insurance contract itself. Maryland does not follow the rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, that an insurance p olicy is to be construed most strongly against the insurer. Rather, following the rule applicable to the construction of contracts generally, we h old that the intention of the parties is to be ascertained -20- if reaso nably po ssible fr om the policy as a whole . Kenda ll, 348 M d. at 166, 70 2 A.2d a t 771 (citations omitted ). We con clude that the plain language of the policy in this case is unambiguous and clearly indicates who is covered by the policy. Cove rage is provided for relatives who physically live in the named insured s househo ld and the named insured s unemancipated children under twenty-four who live away from home, bu t attend scho ol. 5 In this case, Erie was exposed to greater risk by insuring unemancipated children who live away from home. Our decision in Amalgamated Cas. Ins. Co. v. Helms, 239 Md. 529, 539, 212 A.2d 311, 318 (1965), allows for policy provisions that narrow the insurer s liability in a manner not inconsistent with statutory requirements. Likewise, an insurer may expand the scope of uninsured/underinsured coverage so long as the exp ansion is consis tent with the statu tory requi remen ts. We agree with respondent s contention that because the language of the residency clause contained in the policy is unambiguous and because it does not conflic t with Maryland s Motor Vehicle Insurance Law, Mundey is not entitled to coverage. Furthermore, in our view, Mundey does not qualify as a resident under the totality of the circumstances test set out in Forbes. First, we look to the decisions of other jurisdictions that have interpreted similar residency clauses. In Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. McEachern, 218 S.E.2 d 645 (G a. Ct. 5 We agree w ith the Court of Spec ial Appeals that it cannot be a rgued that Erie s policy limits coverage to the named insured. Mundey, 167 Md. App. at 459, 893 A.2d at 653 ( 2006) . -21- App. 1975), the court was asked to analyze the policy language extending uninsured motorist protection to any relative of the named insured if a resident of the same household. In that case, the insured s son was married and purchased a home nearby. The insured provided the down payment for the purchase of the home and, although the son paid most of his wife s expenses, the couple co ntinued to ta ke their me als at the insured s residence. The son s wife was injured by an unidentified driver who left the scene. The wife sought uninsured motorist coverage unde r the insured s policy for damag es sustained. The cou rt held that the named insured s son did not qualify as a resident of the named insu red s household. Th e court noted that although financial support was an important factor in determining whether the insured s son and wife w ere members of the insured s household, there was no support for the son s contention that the insured s su pport exten ded the insu red s hous ehold to include the son s new home . In Girrens v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 715 P.2d 389 (Kan. 1986), the issue was whether a son was a dependent person under his father s automobile insurance policy. Following a motorcycle collision, the insured s son sought recovery of uninsured motorist coverage benefits. Specifically, the policy under review in that case provided uninsured coverage to any depe ndent pers on who se legal reside nce is the household of the insured . . . . Girrens, 715 P.2d at 391. Th e insured s son argued that the term dependent person was ambiguous under the policy, and had to be construed to include the injured party. The court disagreed and found the term, as used in the policy, unambiguous. The court affirmed -22- the trial court s judgment, which found in favor of the insurer. In so doing, th e court approved the stand ard e mployed to de term ine if the son w as a d epen dent, spe cific ally, whether a substantial contribution required to provide the necessities of life was made by his parents. Girrens, 715 P.2d at 393. We find persuasive United Serv. Auto. Ass n v. Swann, 749 A.2d 23, 26 (Vt. 2000), which noted the shared characteristics of residency . . . to be physical presence within a common abode on [a] reasonably regular basis at a reasonably recent time, regardless of whether the individu al uses the address for various legal and practical purposes or subjectively considers it his home. Swann involved the construction of a homeowner s insurance policy. The issue before the Court was whether, under Maryland law, Swann was a residen t of his p arent s h ome a t the time of the a cciden t. Swann, 749 A.2d at 24. Chief Judge Amestoy, writing for the court in Swann, predicted tha t Maryland Courts w ould approve the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Patterson, 231 Va. 358, 344 S.E.2d 890 (1986). Swann, 749 A.2d at 26. According to the court in Patterson, while a p erson s inten tion to become a memb er of a partic ular house hold need not be coupled with continuous residence, the inten tion mus t be a ccom panied b y a reasonab le degree of regularity in the person s residential contacts with the household; casual, erratic contacts are not sufficient. Patterson, 344 S.E.2d at 893. As suggested, we agree with the Patterson rational e. As discussed infra, this Court ha s, in other case s, interpreted re sidency clause s in -23- insurance policies , though none in volve f acts iden tical to tho se of th is case. Our decision in Knight is instructive insofar as it details the factors that the Cou rt looks to when making a determination of residency. In Knight, we were asked to construe . . . an exclusionary clause in a policy of insurance issued by . . . [ Peninsula Insurance Company]. 254 Md. at 463, 255 A .2d at 56. In Knight, the Court was asked to construe the words resident and household as they were used in the insurance policy at issue. In that case, the insured moved o ut of his family hom e and into h is parents ho me. Subs equently, his pa rents were injured in an auto collision, and, later, sued their son to recover co mpensa tion for their damages. The Court found that the insured w as a residen t of his paren ts househo ld at the time of the accident. In finding him a resident of his parents home, the court noted several factors as importan t, including that the insured, occupied one bedroom, not an apartm ent, . . . did not buy and cook . . . [his] own food, and all his belongings were in the attic. Knight, 254 M d. at 478 , 255 A .2d at 63 . At issue in Carrera was whether Mark Read, who was killed by an uninsured motorist in an auto collision and was the son of the insured, Concetta Carrera, was a resident of the insured s household at the time of the accide nt. Carr era argu ed, inter alia, that the trial court in that case faile d to consid er decede nt s intentions to return to the insured s household. That court agreed that decede nt s intention is pertinent to a determination o f reside nce. Carrera, 577 A.2d at 984. The court held that [t]he meaning of the term residence or resident is a mixed question of law and fact. In order to determine if a person is a resident of a particular -24- household, the court m ust conside r whethe r in the totality of the circumstances that person maintains a physical presence in the household with inte nt to remain for more than a m ere transitory period, or that person has a reasonab ly recent history of physica l presence to gether w ith circumstances that manifest an inten t to return to the res idence within a reaso nably fo reseeab le period . Carrera, 577 A.2d at 985. Additionally, that court cited favorably Blacks Law Dictionary, 1176 (W est 5 th Ed. 1971), which noted that although domicile and reside nce are us ually in the same place , they are freque ntly used as if they had the same me aning, but they are not identical terms, for a person may have two place s of residen ce, as in the city an d country, but o nly one domicile. Residence means living in a particular locality, but domicile means living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home. Carrera, 577 A.2d at 983. This Court has said that [t]he words reside or resident mean domicile unless a contrary intent is shown. A person may have several places of abode or dwelling, but he can have only one domicile at a time. Oglesby v. Williams, 372 Md. 360, 373, 812 A.2d 1061, 1068 (2002) (citations omitted). Further, we have defined domicile as the place with which an individual has a settled connection for legal purposes and the place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, habitation and principal establishme nt, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to which place he has, whenever he is absent, the intention of returning. The controlling factor in determining a person s domicile is his intent. Id. We caution conflating dom icile with residency in this context, b ecause in o ur view, this C ourt s dom icile analysis places grea ter empha sis on intent, and therefore is not the appropriate test for residency. The appropriate test for resid ency, in our view, is that elucidated in Forbes, as it requires more tha n mere inte nt to -25- return to a place . In Forbes, Carol Forbes was killed, and her children injured, in an automobile collision that occurred while they were riding as passengers in an uninsured s motor vehicle. The issue was whether Carol Forbes, who left the family home, was still a resident of that previous household. At the time of the accident, Carol Forbes was not living with her husband in the family home, instead she was living with the uninsured motorist. Carol Forbes s husband sought a d eclaratory judg ment to esta blish that H arleysville Mutual Insurance Company, which had issued an automobile liability policy on a jointly titled family vehicle, was responsible for providing UM coverage under the uninsured motorist provision contained in the policy. This Court adopted a totality of the circumstances test to determine residency and held under the circumstances, . . . that Carol Forbes was an insured and a covered person at the time of the accident. Forbes, 322 Md. at 709, 589 A.2d at 953. We considered the parties marital status at the time of the accident, that no divorce discussions or proceedings had begun, the length of time of the separation, the address on Carol Forbes driver s license, her voter registration, as well as the temporary nature of her living arrangements. In holding that Carol Forbes was still a resident of the family household, notably, we did not explicitly consider her intent to return. Petitioner contends that in Forbes, the Court relied on Carrera, and that the Court of Special Appea ls did not consider the Forbes Court s reliance and, as a result, misconstrued the law. The result, petitioner argues, was that the Court of Special Appeals placed excessive -26- emphasis on the physical presence factor and trivialized evidence of Mundey s intent to return to his parents household. We are unconvinced that the Court in Forbes relied on the rationale of Carrera to the extent suggested by Petitione r. Forbes cites Carrera for the principle that residence is a conclusion based on the aggregate details of the living arrangem ents of the parties. Forbes 322 M d. at 705 -06, 58 9 A.2d at 952, ( citing Davenport v. Aetna C asualty & Surety Co., 241 S.E.2d 593, 594 (Ga . App. 197 8); Carrera, 577 A.2d at 985). Forbes does not, however, directly adopt the rationale of Carrera nor does it explicitly factor intent to return into the residency analysis. In our view, the Court of Special Appea ls appropriately analyzed the facts of Forbes and concluded that the totality of the circumstances test was applicable. As discussed infra, we agree and fin d nothing wro ng with the Court of Special Appeals application of the Forbes holdin g. For purpo ses of this de cision, we w ill assume tha t Mund ey intended to return to his parents home in Lusby, Maryland. We agree, howev er, with the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals that the facts of Forbes . . . [are] more compelling than the facts of the case . . . [sub judice]. Mundey, 167 Md. App. at 454, 893 A.2d at 650. In the case at bar, Mundey had been excluded from the family home for nearly one year an d his paren ts denied his r equests to return. Mundey had not contributed to the family expenses and his bedroom had been converted to other family use. Further, he visited inf requently, and spent only tw o nights at his parents home after moving into his grandmother s residence. In our view, even if Mundey intended to return to his parents home, his visits were so infrequent that it cannot -27- be argued that they occurred with any reaso nable deg ree of regu larity. Munde y s contacts with his parents home were casual and erratic an d, as a result, insu fficient to su pport a conclusion of residen cy. His presen ce in his parents household was neither continuous nor significant. Unlike his connection to his pa rents hom e, Mund ey spent a con siderable amount of his leisure time at his grandmother s hom e; he had a room ther e, ate his mea ls there, and was free to invite guests. We are not presented with the question of whether Mundey was a resident of his grandmother s home, rather, the question is whether he was a resident of his pare nts home . We disag ree with petitioner s contention that the application of the Forbes totality of the circumstances test dictates a finding that Mundey was a resident of his parents home, because, inter alia, his attachment to his parents househo ld was, in fact, attenu ated. The C ircuit Court, therefore, was correct in finding that Mundey was not physically living in his parents household at the time of the accident, that he is not an insured, by def inition, unde r the policy and that he does not qualify for uninsured or underinsured motorist cov erage. W e reiterate that w e are not de aling with a situation in which a resident of a househ old is tempo rarily absent for employment related purposes or because of a planned vacation. In this case, Mundey was not a resident of his parents househo ld and therefore was not entitled to covera ge. Moreover, a short term absence from a househ old by a residen t does not, by itself, exclude that person fro m covera ge. We lim it the hold ing in th is case to the parti cular fa cts of th is case. -28- JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS. -29-
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