Stachowski v. Sysco

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In the Circu it Court for H oward C ounty Case No. 13-C-04-059777 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 18 September Term, 2007 Michael D. Stachowski v. Sysco Foo d Services of Baltim ore, Inc., et al. Bell, C.J. Raker Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilne r, Alan, M . (Retired, specially assigned) Cathell, Dale R. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: December 11, 2007 We are called upon in this case to interpret a provision of the Workers Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), §§ 9-101 to -1201 of the Labor and Employment Article.1 We must decide whether a claimant who filed for modification of an award under § 9-736(b) met the statutory requirement of filing within five years of the last compen sation payme nt. We sh all hold that pe titioner s applic ation to modify his award is timely because we find that the term last compen sation payme nt is based on the date when th e last payment by check was received by the claimant, either directly or by the claim ant s attorney or th e claimant s authorized agent. I. Petitioner, Michael Stachow ski, sustained a work-re lated injury wh ile employed w ith Sysco Food Services of Baltimore, Inc., in November 1988. He filed a timely workers compensation claim with the Maryland Workers Compensation Commission (the Commission ) and wa s awarde d compe nsation in an order dated October 12, 1998. The last payments pursuant to the award were in the form of check s from Sysco s insurer, 2 one payable to Stachowski in the amount of $310.50 for additional lost wages, and the second payable to Sta chowsk i s counsel, Goldstein & Byrne, in the amount of $34.50 for attorney 1 All subsequent statutory references herein shall be to the Labor and Employment Article, Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), unless otherwise indicated. 2 All transactions giving rise to petitioner s appeal were performed by Wausau Insurance Company, the workers compensation insurance carrier of Sysco Food Services of Baltimore, Inc. For simplicity, we will refer to both respondents singularly as Sysco. fees. Both checks were mailed on October 21, 1998, to Terrence Byrne at the office of Goldstein & Byrne, and were received the next day, on October 22, 1998. Mr. Byrne then forwarded Stachowski s check to him on October 26, and bank records indicate that the check cleared on November 2, 1998. No further action occurred in relation to the claim until October 22, 20 03, when M r. Stachowski filed for a modification o f the original workers c ompensation award. He requested reimburse ment for m edical bills and additional tem porary disability ben efits covering June 23, 2003 to September 21, 2003, as a result of a surgery arising out o f his original injury. The claim was filed exactly five years and one day from the date the last compensation check was m ailed, and five years exactly from the date Stachowski s counsel received the check. The Commission held a hearing on July 12, 2004, and determined that Sysco sho uld reimburse Stachowski for the medical expenses of the surgery, but that Stachowski s request for mod ification of th e compe nsation aw ard was tim e-barred b y the limitations set f orth in § 9-736 (b). Stachowski s rehearing request was denied. On September 9, 2004, Sysco appealed the part of the Commission s decision that ordered payment of medical expenses. On September 15, 2004, Stachowski appealed the Com mission s denia l of benef its. Both parties cross-petitioned for partial summary judgment on the benefits issue in the Circuit -2- Court for H owa rd County. 3 The Circuit Court granted Sysco s motion and denied Stachowski s cross-mo tion on A ugust 16, 2 005. The Circuit Co urt granted a joint motion to revise and issued an order certifying the rulings on the partial summary judgment motions as final judgments pursuant to Md. Rule 2-602(b), which allows a court to enter a final judgment as to fewer than all claims where there is no just reason for delay. Stachowski noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. In an unreported decision filed on January 18, 2007, the Court o f Special A ppeals aff irmed the C ircuit Court s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Sysco based on the limitations provision of § 9-736(b). We granted certiorari to dec ide wheth er the last co mpensa tion p ayment is the date when the check is mailed or when it is received. II. Stachowski argues that the term last compensation payment in § 9-736(b) of the Workers Compensation Act should be the date when the check is received by a claimant, either individually or through his attorney. He argues no deference should be given to the Commission s construction, which bases the five-year statute of limitations on the date of mailing, because it is contrary to the plain language of the statute. Stachowski relies on the common sense understanding of the term payment, standard usage of the term in the 3 The parties eventually reached a settlement regarding the reimbursement of medical expenses through a binding arbitration agreement dated Decem ber 2, 2005 , and so there is no further issue related to that ma tter. -3- commercial law conte xt, select cases from our jurisprudence, and the definition of the term payment from Black s Law Dictionary to conclude that payment is generally regarded as when the check is received.4 Respondent argues that the interpretation of the last compensation payment as the date when th e check is m ailed is appropriate and that the Commission s construction should be given deference. Sysco relates how the liberal construction generally afforded to the Workers Compensation Act does not apply to the limita tions provisio n and con tends, in any case, that the statute is unambiguous in its plain language. In so doing, Sysco relies on an interpretation of select case law that contradicts petitioner s interpretation. In addition, respondent analogizes to Md . Rule 1-321(a)5 and one of the Commission s promulgated regulations, COM AR 14 .09.01.04, to d emonstra te that the definition of payment as the date of mailing is not novel or inconsistent with the purpose of the limitations clause. Ultimately at issue in this case is whether § 9-736(b) limits the modification of a prior workers com pensation award where the petition to modify is filed five years exactly from the date when the check was received. Section 9-736(b) provides as follows: (b)(1) The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction over each claim under this title. 4 Petitioner s brief argues payment is complete on the date when the check is honored by the bank and, alternatively, the date when the chec k is received . At oral argu ment, howe ver, the f irst conte ntion w as with drawn and on ly the seco nd wa s argue d. 5 Among other things, Md. Rule 1-32 1(a) provid es that [s]erv ice by mail is com plete upon m ailing. -4- (2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the Commission may modify any finding or order as the Comm ission considers justified. (3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission may not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within 5 years after the latter of: (i) the date of the acciden t; (ii) the date of disablement; or (iii) the las t comp ensatio n payme nt. Petitioner and respondent agree that subsection (b)(3)(iii), the last com pensat ion paym ent, controls in this case. III. The Workers Compensation Act (the Act ) was enacted in 1914. 1914 Md. Laws, Chap. 800 (codif ied at Md. Code (1914), Art. 101 §§ 1 64). We have summarized the purpose of the Workers Compensation Act as follows: [T]he o verall purpo se of the A ct . . . is to protect workers and their families from hardships inflicted by work-related injuries by providing workers with compensation for loss of earning capacity resulting from accidental injury arising out of and in the course of em ploymen t. Howard Co. Ass n , Retard. C it. v. Walls, 288 Md. 526, 531, 418 A.2d 1210, 1214 (1 980). In light of this purpose, we have often repeated that the statute should be construed as liberally in favor of in jured emp loyees as its prov isions will pe rmit in order to effectuate its benevolent purposes. Any uncertainty in the law should be resolved in favor of the claima nt. Design Kitchen v. Lagos, 388 Md. 718, 724, 882 A.2d 817, 821 (2005) (quoting -5- Harris v. Board of Education, 375 Md. 21, 57, 825 A.2d 365, 387 (2003)). This Court has long recognize d, howe ver, that [t]he general rule of liberal construction of the Workers Compensation Act is not applicable to the limitations provision of § 9-736. Stevens v. RiteAid, 340 Md. 555 , 568, 667 A.2d 6 42, 649 (1995). In the original act, the Commission s power to modify an award was unrestricted: Section 54 of the Workmen s Compensation Act, prior to the passage of chapter 342 of the Acts of 1 931, prov ided that: The powers and jurisdiction of the Commission over each case shall be continuing and it may from time to time make such modifications or change with respect to former findings or orders with respect thereto as in its opinion may be justif ied. Under the law as it then stood there was no stated limitation upon the time within which the commission might reopen a case for the p urpose of mo difying a n awa rd. Ireland v. Shipley, 165 M d. 90, 96 , 166 A . 593, 59 6 (193 3) (intern al citation omitted ). See also Md. Code (1914), Art. 101 § 54. In 193 1, the A ct was a mend ed to pr ovide a time lim it for reo pening a final a ward. As expla ined by Judg e Offutt, w riting for this C ourt: [C]hapter 342 of the Acts of 1931 repealed and re-enacted section 54, amending it by adding these words provided, however, that no modification or change of any final award of compensation shall be made by the Commission unless application therefor sh all be made to the Commission within one year next following the final award of compensation. Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. at 96, 166 A. at 596. Thus the original language of the statute limited the time for modifying an award to one year from the fin al awa rd of co mpen sation. 1931 Md. Laws, Chap. 342. The date of the final award of compensation was the date of the -6- Commission s order granting a final award. Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. at 100-01, 166 A. at 598. In 1935, the time limit was increased from one to three years, and the limitation for modification was extended to apply to non-final awards as well. The provision then limited modification to within three years nex t following the last final award of compensation for final awards, and within three years next following the last payment of compensation for awards not design ated final. 1935 Md. Laws, Chap. 236 (codified as amended at Md. Code (1924 , 1935 C um. Su pp.), A rt. 101 § 54) (em phasis a dded). In 1957, the provision was recodified as § 40(c), the predecessor to § 7-936(b). 1957 Md. Laws, Chap. 814 (codified as amended at Md . Code (1957 ), Art. 10 1 § 40( c)). Section 40(c) omitted the previous distinction betw een final and nonfinal awards, and adopted the limitation of three years following the last payment of compensa tion for all awards, irrespective of their finality. Id. (emphasis added). Thus the date of payment became controlling for final award s as well, rather than the date of the Commission s o rder. The provision was amended again in 1969, with the result of increasing the time limit for modifications from three to five years in its final version.6 1969 Md. Laws, Chap. 116 (codified as amended at M d. Code (1957 , 1969 Cum . Supp.), Art. 101 § 40(c)). Subsequent 6 Interestin gly, proposed Senate Bill 309 in 1969 originally contained language abolishing the time limit p rovision en tirely, but was amended bef ore adop tion to simply increase the limitations period. 1969 Md. Laws, Chap. 116. -7- amendm ents have not affected the substance of the five year limitations provision dating from th e last co mpen sation p ayment. 7 IV. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Salamon v. Progressive, 379 Md. 301, 307, 841 A.2d 85 8, 862 (20 04). Wh en review ing a grant o f summary judgment, we must make the threshold determination as to whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists, and only where such dispute is absent will we proceed to review dete rminations of law. Remsburg v. Montgom ery, 376 M d. 568, 579, 831 A.2d 18, 24 (2003). Here, the parties stipulate to the relevant facts, and so we review the lower court s interpretation of the statute to see if it is le gally corre ct. Salamon, 379 Md. at 307, 841 A.2d at 862. In order to determine the meaning of the last payment of compensation in § 7936(b), we look to the principles of statutory construc tion. The primary goal of statutory construction is to asce rtain the intent of the Leg islature. Clipper Windpower v. Sprenger, 399 Md. 539, 553, 924 A.2d 1160, 1168 (20 07). Our in quiry begins w ith the plain language of the statu te. Casey v. R ockville, 400 M d. 259, 2 88, 929 A.2d 7 4, 92 (2007). Ord inary, 7 In 1991, th e provision was reco dified as § 9-736(b) from former Art. 101, § 40 without substan tive cha nge. 19 91 M d. Law s, Chap . 8 (codi fied at M d. Cod e (1991 ), § 9736(b) of the Labor and Employment Article). In 2002, Section 9-736(b)(3) was amended to provide for two additional benchmarks that could affect the time period for modification, but neither is at issue in this case. 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 568 (codified at Md. Code (1991, 1999 Repl. V ol., 2002 Cum. Su pp.), § 9-736(b) of the L abor and Em ployment Article). -8- popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of the plain language of the text of a statute. Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006). If the statutory language is clear and u nambigu ous, we n eed not loo k beyond th e statute to determ ine the L egislatu re s inten t. Casey, 400 M d. at 288 , 929 A .2d at 92 . We have said that [i]n construing the plain language, [a] court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute ; nor may it construe th e statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. 563, 576-77, 870 A.2d 186, 193 (2005) (quoting Price v. State , 378 Md. 378 , 387, 835 A.2d 1 221, 1226 (200 3)). Statutory text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nug atory. Patterson Park v. Teachers Union, 399 Md. 174, 197, 923 A.2d 60, 74 (2007). To determ ine legislative in tent, the plain lan guage sh ould not b e interpreted in isolation, but [r]ather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole and attempt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Clipper Windpower, 399 Md. at 554, 924 A.2d at 1168 (quoting Kushell v. DNR, 385 Md. at 577, 870 A.2d at 193). A statute is ambiguous where two or more re asonab le interp retation s exist. Chow v. State, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395. When a statute is ambiguous, we consider the common meaning and effect of statutory language in light of the objectives and purpose of -9- the statute a nd Le gislative intent. Stoddard v. State, 395 Md. 653, 662, 911 A.2d 1245, 1250 (2006). We give deference to a consistent and long-standing construction given a statute by an agency charged w ith adm inistering it. Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 455, 459 (1997). Manifestly, agency regulations must be reasonable and consistent with the letter and spirit of the law under which the agency acts. Falik v. Prince George s Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 41 7, 588 A .2d 324 , 328 (1 991). In determining whether an agency interpretation shall be given deference, we have said as follows: The weight given an agency s construction of a statute depends on several fac tors the du ration and c onsistency of the administrative practice, the degree to which the agency s construction was made known to the public , and the de gree to which the Legislature was aware of the administrative construction when it reenacted the relevant statutory language. Other important consideratio ns include the extent to which the agency engaged in a process of reason ed elabora tion in formulating its interpretation and the nature of the process through which the agency arrive d at its interpretation, w ith greater weight placed on those agency interpretations that are the product of adversarial proceedings or formal rules promulgation. An administrative agency s construction of the statute is not entitled to deference, how ever, when it conflicts with the unambiguous statutory language. Marriott , 346 Md. at 446 , 697 A.2d at 459 (internal citations omitted). V. -10- Following these principles, we turn first to whether the phrase last compensation payment is ambiguous as use d in the Workers Compensation Act. The phrase does not appear elsewhe re in the M aryland Cod e, and the term payment is not defin ed within the Act. Our search has uncovered no legislative history concerning its intended meaning.8 There are at least two competing interpretations of the statutory language in this case. One interpretation is that by using the word payment rather than rece ipt, the Leg islature did not intend to require that the claimant actually receive payment for the limitations provision to run, but instead desired to give the Workers Compensation Commission broad au thority to determin e the date pa yment is made under the statute. Another interpretation is that the use of the wo rd payment m erely directs the C ommissio n to apply the common understanding of the term. An examination of our case law supports the existence of ambiguity among these conflicting c onstructions . While this Court has never had a case that turns on the interpretation of the exact day on which the last compensation payment was made, we have addressed indirectly the matter in several instances. We have said in the past that the limitations provis ion by its terms is plain and unambiguous, and leaves no room for interpretation. Adkins v. Weisner, 238 Md. 411, 414, 8 As noted in Part III, supra, a limitations provision has been in existence since 1931, with the last compensation payment language developing in 19 35 and ap plying to all awards after 1957. Since then the current § 9-736(b) has been subject to various increases and decreases in the number of years in which the Commission has the ability to modify an award and the addition of alternate benchmarks for the statute of limitations provision, but has un dergon e no ch anges w ith regar d to its ph rasing o f the la st comp ensatio n payme nt. -11- 209 A.2d 255, 256 (1965). This was an accurate statement based on the facts at issue in Adkins, where a claimant filed a petition for m odification o ver five m onths after th e statute of limitations had passed. The petition to modify the award was filed on October 2, 1963, and [i]t was stipulated by the parties that as of April 20, 1 960, all payments were made that were due. Id. at 413, 209 A.2d at 256.9 The claimant in Adkins asserted that th e proper d ate for the last compensation payment was when his last payment would have been made had he not requested a lump sum award, rather than the date when the last award in fact was made. Based on the stipulation that the award was made on or before April 20, 1960, the question of whether a payment was made whe n it was mailed or w hen it was received w as not before the Court, and our sta tement ab out the clear a nd unam biguous la nguage o f the limitations provision did not anticipate this issue. We held an application to modify an a ward time -barred in Vigneri v. Mid City Sales, 235 Md. 361, 201 A.2d 861 (1964). In Vigneri, the claimant filed for modification on December 28, 1958, for a claim where it was clear that the last payment of compensation to the claimant was made on or before November 5, 1954. Id. at 364, 201 A.2d at 862. This Court focused on the dates when the claimant had received payments, noting that he received payments throu gh M arch 13 , 1954 . . . . H e was a gain pa id com pensat ion . . . through October 30, 1954. On November 5, 1954, the employee signed and filed with the 9 The applicab le statute at the tim e, Art. 101, § 40(c), limited m odifications to applica tions m ade w ithin thre e years ne xt follow ing the la st payme nt of co mpen sation. -12- commission a settlement receipt indicating the duration and amount of the temporary total benefits he had received. Id. at 363, 201 A.2d at 861 (emphasis added). The date relied upon for the run ning of the statute of limitations was the date the settlement receipt was filed with the Commission, though we noted that the last payment might have been made on or before this date. Again, the petition to modify the award was barred by several months, and so the conservative date of the settlement receipt did not affect the outcome. The ambiguity as to the exact date continued in Chanticleer Skyline Rm. v. Greer, 271 Md. 693, 319 A.2d 80 2 (1974). T he issue in th at case was whether a payment of attorney fees to a claimant s attorney constituted a last compensation payment under the statute. We found that it did, noting that the counsel fee . . . was paid by the insurer to the attorney on June 15, 1970 , and thus f ell within the statute of limitations. Id. at 696, 319 A.2d at 803. A finding tha t the fee w as paid on a certain date provides n o guidance as to whether the payment was mailed, received, or delivered in person to the attorney on the date listed. The most releva nt case, for p urposes o f understa nding the d ate when the last compensation payment is made, is Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 620 A.2d 340 (1993). In Vest, the claimant sought review of the Commission s refusal to reopen an award. We affirmed the lower court ruling that the award was time-barred because it was filed over seven years after the last compensation p ayment. In reaching this conclusion, however, we noted that [i]n Vigneri, the claimant had last received a payment of compensation on November 5. Id. at 474, 620 A.2d at 346. We conclude d that Vigneri -13- supports our holding that it is the date of the last payment of compensation . . . that determines when the limitations period commences . . . . We simply looked to the date that the claimant last received compensation to determine when the limitations period comm enced . Id. at 477, 620 A.2d at 347-48 (emph asis added). This Co urt has never, before or since, so explicitly indicated the proper m ethod for s earching f or the date of the last compensation payment, and our language concerning the date of receipt should be considered very persuasive. By contras t, in Porter v. Bayliner, 349 Md. 609, 709 A.2d 1205 (1998), we noted when reciting the facts that [b]y check dated August 22, 1989 . . . the appellees paid the claimant. Id. at 612, 709 A.2d at 1206. This Court then referred to the August 29, 1994, filing to reopen the award as occurring more than five years after the lump sum payment of August 22, 1989. Id. Thus from the recitation of the facts, this Court noted the date of issuance of the check as the time fro m which the limitations p rovision ran . The issue in Porter, however, dealt with whether a Commission awar d of requ iring periodic payments could be satisfied in a single lump sum payment. Since we held that a lump sum payment unauthorized by the Commission does not se rve to implicate the limitations provision of § 7-936(b), the reference to when the last compensation payment was made was not relevant to the outcom e of t he ca se, an d sho uld b e we ighe d acc ordingly. Similarly, in Mona Electric v. Shelton, 377 Md. 320, 833 A.2d 527 (2003), we affirmed the decision of the intermediate appellate court that payments made by an employer -14- in the absence of any Commission award did not serve to implicate the limitations provision of § 7-93 6(b). While ultimately finding the statute inapplicable because a voluntary payment did not constitute a compensation payment under the statute, we noted in the facts that the last check sent . . . was dated October 3, 1994. Id. at 323, 833 A.2d at 529. Whether that date was the relevant point at which we believed the limitations provision began to run is indeterminable, because the only further guidance provided is that the insurer argued that since the last payment of compensation to Shelton was in October, 1994, the request for modification, filed in November, 1999, was outside the limitations period and was therefore barred . Id. at 324, 833 A.2d at 529. While mentioning the date of mailing, the language provides no further guidance as to whe ther that spec ific date controlled when holding the last paymen t was in Octo ber, 199 4. The references to the dates when the check was drawn in Porter and mailed in Mona are useful on ly as indication o f ambigu ity in the phrase last compensation payment. When contrasted with the clear language focusing on when the checks were received in Vest and Vigneri, complete with the directive on how to fin d the date of the last compensation payment in Vest that has never been overruled, we find that at the very least, no clear rule has emerged from our case law. We note that similar confusion is reflected in the Court of Spe cial Appeals. In Seal v. Giant, 116 M d. App . 87, 94, 6 95 A.2 d 597, 600 (1997), the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals refers only to the date the last payment was made, but the record indicates the date used -15- was the date on the check as submitted by the insurer. This stands in c ontrast to the Court of Special Appea l s later characterization of that decision in Mona Electrical v. Shelton, 148 Md. App. 1, 810 A.2d 1022 (2002), where the intermediate appellate court noted the claimant in Seal received her last payment of compensation one month earlier than if she had been paid weekly. Id. at 10, 810 A.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). It also stands in contrast to the payment date calculation in the decision in WMA TA v. He witt, 153 Md. App. 42, 834 A.2d 985 (2003), where the Court of Special Appeals stated that w here a payment of attorney s fees was due June 25, and payment was mailed on July 10 but received on July 11, the payment was sixteen days late under COM AR 1 4.09.01 .24A( 4). Id. at 53, 834 A.2d at 992. While not dealing directly with § 9-736(b ), the court nonetheless included the day on which the payment was mailed when computing the timing of the payment under a workers compensation award of attorney fees. We find no factors to support d eference to the administrative agency s interpretation of the statutory provision because of the lack of a clearly articulated or promulgated rule concerning the date of the last compensation payment. This case stands in contrast to Falik v. Prince George s Hosp., 322 Md. 409, 588 A.2d 324. There, we gave deference to the Workers Compensa tion Commission where the term community was patently ambiguous and undefine d in the statute and the C ommissio n promu lgated rules e ffecting a s ingle-rate scheme for paym ent und er § 37( c). In Falik, the Commission had adopted and published a -16- Fee Guide which was subjec t to freq uent rev iew an d revisio ns. Id. at 414-15, 588 A.2d at 326-27. L egislative acq uiescence was clear b ecause: [A]s a result of a recomm endation of the G overnor s Commission to Study the W orkers Com pensat ion Syste m . . . § 37(c) was amended by ch. 591 of the Acts of 1987 by adding this provision to its text: At least once every 2 years, the Commission shall review the allowable fees and other charges for completeness and reasonableness and shall make appropriate revisions to established guidelines. Id. at 417 n.1, 588 A.2d at 328 n.1. Instead, this case is more akin to the facts in Marriott Employees v. MVA, 346 Md. 437, 697 A.2d 455. In Marriott, we held that the agency interpretation was unpersuasive where the construction was inconsistent within the agency, where the Legislature was not likely aware of the a gency in terpreta tion, and where there was no evidence indicating that the interpretation grew out of a process of reasoned elaboration and . . . was certainly not the result of an adversarial process or formal rulemaking. Id. at 449, 697 A.2d at 461 (quoting Balto. Gas & Elec. v. Pu blic Serv. Comm n, 305 Md. 1 45, 161, 501 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986 )). See also Bouse v. Hutzler, 180 Md. 682, 687, 26 A.2d 767, 769 (1942) ( The court below decided in favor of the defendant upon the presumption that his method of calculation was in accordance with the unvarying administrative practice. It appears, however, that the practic e in this State has certainly not been uniform in the last generation. ) As in Marriott, there exists no formal Commission rule, and no evidence that the -17- interpretation argued for here arises out of a process of reasoned elaboration. Under such circumstances, no deference should be afforded. Sysco, in arguing for agency deference, places sole reliance on Maryland Rule 1321(a) and a Commission procedural regulation, COMAR 14.09.01.04(B)(3), which both read in relevant part that [s]ervice by mail is complete upon mailing. Both provisions, however, deal with the service of papers, such as pleadings and other papers filed with the Court or Commission respectively, upon another party. The procedural regulation of filings is inapposite to compensation payments. In addition, both provisions have accompanying safeguards that would not be present under Sysco s proffered interpretation of § 9-736(b). Maryland Rule 1-321(a) is tempered by the requirem ent p roviding an ad ditio nal th ree d ays to act under any prescribed limitation period if service is by mail, pursuant to Md. Rule 1203(c). Sysco s analogy is undercut by the fact that Md. Rule 1-203(c) was held inapp licable to the time limit for appeals under § 9-737 of the Workers Compensation Act in Chance v. WMATA, 173 Md. A pp. 645, 920 A .2d 536 (2007). 10 As to the Comm ission regula tion, it requires an accompanying certificate of service indicating the date and manner of the service 10 In Chance v. WMATA, 173 Md. App. 645, 656-57, 920 A.2d 536, 542 -43 (2007), the Court of Special Appeals articulated that the purpose behind the mailbox rule, Md. R ule 1-203(c), was to put parties on an equal footing regardless of how they were served, such that a party served via mailing had as much time to respond as one who received service in person. Section 9-737 of the Labor and Employment Article required service by mailing only, thereby eliminating the need for such parity. Though we do not reach the q uestion, it is interesting to note that the reason M d. Rule 1-203(c) did not apply to § 9-737 would not hold true under § 9-736(b), where payments may be made either by mailing or direct deliv ery. This perhaps lends even further support to our conclusion that the date of mailing should no t be the determ inant date o f the last com pensation p ayment. -18- in subsection (B)(4). We find these provisions should not inform the outcome in the case at hand. Sysco also draws suppo rt for its construction of § 9-736 (b) from the statutory interpretation principle that, in contrast to the overall liberal construction of the Workers Compensation Act in favor of the claimant, the limitations pro vision shou ld be strictly construed. While Sysco provides a correct recitatio n of the law , Sysco s reliance on this principle is misplaced. Strict construction of the statute of limita tions does n ot require this Court to choose the more narrow of two competing interpretations of the limitations provision. Rather, it requ ires us to disce rn the legislative intent behin d the prov ision to determine the correct date on which the last compensation payment occurs as a matter of law. Only the correct applicatio n of the pro vision will se rve the purp ose of strict en forceme nt, which is to encour age a brigh t line rule and disallow claims beyond the statutory period provided. We hav e said that [a ] statute of lim itations whic h is triggered b y an externally verifiable date is a classic example of an obje ctive, bright-line rule which fosters pred ictable outcomes in other wise u npredi ctable si tuations . DeBusk v. Johns Hopkins, 342 Md. 432, 439, 677 A.2d 73, 76 (1996 ). In the case o f mailing v ersus receip t, the parties cite p ossible complications with either rule, and accordingly, we should look only to which construction is proper. The limitation itself, as we noted in Vest, serves the p urpose of limiting liability when the reopen ing of a cla im is too attenuated from the original injury. We said as follows: [A]ny attempt to reopen a case based on an injury ten or fifteen years old must necessarily encounter awkward problems of -19- proof, because of the long delay and the difficulty of determining the relationship between some ancient injury and a present aggravated disability. Another argument is that the insurance carriers would never know what kind of future liabilities they m ight incu r, and wou ld ha ve diffic ulty in comp uting ap propria te reserv es. Vest, 329 Md. at 471 , 620 A.2d at 344 (quotation omitted). Petitioner here does not rely on tolling or other equitable remedies seeking to avoid the application of the statute of limitations. Ra ther, petitioner a rgues that h e falls within the statutory time period by virtue of the date when he received his last compen sation payme nt. The definition of the date when payment occurs cannot be cr afte d narrow ly or lib erall y; rather, this Court should seek a proper definition of the term. Only the result of such an inquiry will properly serve the purpose of the statute and its limitations provision. For the foregoing reasons, we see no reason to afford deference to the agency interpretation of the last paym ent of c ompe nsation . VI. We turn now to the task of determining the meaning of the phrase last compensation payment in the limitations provision. The common understanding of the term payment and a harmon ious readin g with the Work ers Com pensation A ct as a wh ole lead us to conclude that the la st comp ensatio n payme nt dates from th e time it is receive d. We look first at the dictiona ry definition of the word payment f or insight as to legislative intent. Dictionary definitions are not dispositive as to the meaning of statutory terms. Marriott, 346 Md. at 447, 697 A.2d at 460. Nonetheless, such definitions provide a -20- useful starting point for discerning what the legislature could have meant in using a particular term. 2A N ORMAN S INGER, S UTHERLAND S TATUTORY C ONSTRUCTION § 47.28 (7th ed. 2007). Black s Law Dictionary defines payment as: 1. Performance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of the oblig ation. 2. The mo ney or other va luable thing so delivered in satisfaction of an obligation. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1165 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Since Sysco does not contend that the date of payment is the date of issuance, there is no argument before us that the term as used in § 9-736(b) refers to the physical object as payment, but rather to the act of being paid. When limiting our inquiry as to when the date of payment occurs, the first definition p rovided ab ove clearly po sits delivery as the in tegral date fo r payment. This definition of payment is in acco rd with the principles of commercial law in the Maryland Uniform Commercial Code, which petitioner relies upon to support the inference that payment is not made at the point of mailing. Md. Code (1975, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 3-310 of the Commercial Law Article.11 Petitioner contends that delivery and acceptance are key components of payment and that issuance alo ne does n ot constitute payment. Messing v. Bank of America, 373 Md. 672, 821 A.2d 22 (2003). The Court of Special Appeals found that deliv ery constitutes conditional payment in Ward v. Federal 11 Petitioner cited § 3-602 of the Commercial La w Article o f the Ma ryland Code in support of his argument. We find instead that the pertinent provision is § 3-310 of the Commercial Law Article, quoted infra. -21- Kemper Ins. Co., 62 Md. App. 351, 358, 489 A.2d 91, 95 (1985). In Ward, the Cou rt of Special Appeals said that [w]hen the drawer draws a check on the drawee and delivers the check to the payee, the check ordinarily is regarded as . . . a conditional payment of the underlying obligation . . . . The underlying obligation represented by the check is . . . suspended until the check is hono red. Id. at 358, 489 A.2d at 95 . This prop osition is in conformance with § 3-310(b) of the Commercial Law Article, which states in relevant part that: [I]f a note or an uncertified check is taken for an obligation, the obligation is suspend ed to the same exte nt the obliga tion wou ld be discharged if an amount of money equal to the amount of the instrument were taken, and the following rules apply: (1) In the case of an uncertified check, suspension of the obligation continues until dishonor of the check or until it is paid or certified . Respondent counters that the use of the term payment in the Workers Compensation Act is subs tantively differe nt than the term in either commerc ial context or common usage. Re sponden t refers to the o ther provisio ns within th e Act that re fer to payment. We find, however, that those provisions run contrary to the proposition respondent argues. Section 9-713, dealing with the paymen t of benef its, calls for an em ployer to beg in paying benefits within 21 days of the Commission s order. Section 9-727, on the payment of an award, states the employer shall begin paying compensation within 15 days of an award or payment due date, and § 9-728 provides for penalties when an employer fails to begin paying within the prescribed time. To begin paying cannot be considered the -22- equivalent of payment, and thus heavily supports the idea that mailing would satisfy proof of beginn ing to p ay, but no t of paym ent itself . Finally, Sysco cites § 9-903 captioned Effect of receipt of amount in action, for the proposition that the Leg islature uses the term receipt when it intends the date of receiving a benefit to control. Closer examination of the provision, howev er, indicates that the entire term receipt of amount in action is meant to distinguish the provision from an award ordered by the Commission. Section 9-903(a) provides in relevant p art that if a covered employee . . . receive[s] an amount in an action: (1) the amou nt is in place of any award that otherwise could be made under this title; and (2) the case is finally closed and settled. The purpose of § 9-903 is to ensure that money received for an injury in the absence of a Commission award will count towards any amount an employer might be ordered to pay if a claim is made in the fu ture for the same injury. The requirement that the money must be received in order for it to satisfy the statutory obligation further buttresses Stachowski s claim that the relevant date of a compensation payment should be the date it is received. While the common understanding of payment and other re ferences to the term in the Code are sufficie nt support to determine the outcome of this case, we need not rely solely on Maryland law to explicate our answer. An instructive analogue is found in the Longshore and Harbor Workers Com pensat ion Ac t, 33 U.S .C. § 90 1 950 (2000 ). Section 922 of the Act provides, in relevant part, for the modification of awards at any time prior to one year after the date of the la st payme nt of co mpen sation. Id. § 922. The United States Supreme -23- Court discussed th is requireme nt in Intercounty Constr. Corp. v. Walter, 422 U.S. 1, 95 S.Ct. 2016, 44 L.E.2d 643 (1975). While deciding the provision d id not bar a d eputy commissioner from issuing an award where the previous payment had been voluntary and did not fall under § 922, Justice Scalia, writin g for the Court, noted the claimant requested a hearing two years after his last receipt of a voluntary payment of compensation from the carrier. Id. at 5, 95 S.Ct. at 2019. The Act is more thorough in tracking compensation payments, however, because § 914 calls for the claimant to p rovide rece ipts of payme nt to the employer and for the employer to file notice with the Commission within 16 days after the final payment has been made. 33 U.S .C. § 914(g) and (k) (2 000). Other states have interpreted the date of payment similarly. The Pennsylva nia Supreme court provides the most rec ent exam ple, in Romaine v. W.C.A.B., 901 A.2d 477 (Pa. 2006). A claima nt sought re view of h er petition to rein state benef its after the Workers Compensation Appeal Board dismissed her claim as un timely. Under the Penns ylvania Act, a petition to reins tate benefits had to be filed within three years after the date of the most recent payment of compensation made prior to the filing of such petition. 77 PA. C ONS. S TAT. § 772 (West 2002). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the outcome reached by the Comm onwealth Co urt and appeal board but disagreed with the reasoning. Answering the question of when the date of payment occurs for the running of the statute of limitations, the court determined that the only date of im port is the date upon w hich the ch eck is receive d. Id. at 486. Th e court relied on its case la w on negotiable instruments, Blac k s -24- Law Dictionary s definition of payment, the construction of the term in the commercial code, and a surve y of result s from sister state s. Id. at 480-86 . On this last p oint, the court concluded that the predominate view, and the one with w hich we a gree, is that paym ent is received when the check is received, a view held by at least twenty-four states. Id. at 483. In North Carolina, the Commission may review awards provided that no such review shall be made after two yea rs from the date of the last payment o f compe nsation pu rsuant to an award u nder this Article. N.C. G EN. S TAT. § 97-47 (2005). Th e North Carolina C ourt of Appeals, in an opinion ultimately holding a claimant s application for modification untimely, neverthele ss interpreted the date of the last payment of compensation by stating, [i]t is well established by case law that this section provides a limitations period requiring any claim for additional compensation on the grounds of a change in condition to be made within two years of the date the last payment of com pensat ion wa s receiv ed by the claima nt. Hunter v. Perquimans County Bd. of Educ., 533 S.E.2d 562, 56 5 (N.C. Ct. App . 2000). In Louisiana, the Court of Appeal remanded a case to determine when the last check was receive d by a claim ant. Seliga v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 174 So.2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1965). Claims were limited by Louisiana statute, but the lim itation did no t apply until the expiration of one year from the time of making the last payment. L A. R EV. S TAT. A NN. § 23:1209 (2005). The Louisiana court applied principles from commercial law: The last payment in the instant case was made by check. And in the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a check or draft is a condition al payment; w hen the instru ment is -25- honored on presen tation, it constitutes payment as o f the date it was re ceived . Id. at 879. See also Stroupe v. Workmen s Comp. Comm r, 152 S .E.2d 544, 547 (W. Va. 1967) ( This Court has heretofore regarded the date on which the claimant receives the commissioner s check as th e date of th e making of the last payment in any permanent disability case within the meaning of Code, 1 931, 23-4 -16, as ame nded. ); Cornell v. Stimson Lumber Co., 477 P.2d 898 (Or. 1970) (stating that the last payment of compensation occurred when th e check was received by the claimant, not when it was honored); Tiller v. 166 Auto Auction, 65 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) ( Except for cases in which the check is dishonored, we think that for the purpose of determining when a final award of the Commission has been paid by a liable party, the relevant date is the date the checks were offered to and accepted by the claimant. ), overruled on other grounds by Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 22 0 (Mo. 2003 ) . An examination of the minority of states that have determined payments based on mailing date shows that the reason for doing so is often to avoid assessing penalties to the insurer for late payments. See, e.g., Kiesecker v. Webster City Meats, Inc., 528 N.W.2d 109 (Iowa 1995) (holding payment occurs at m ailing to avo id assessing a penalty for late payments and interest for late payments und er I OWA C ODE §§ 85:30, 86:13 (W est 1996)); Am. Int l Group v. Carriere, 2 P.3d 1222 (Alaska 2000) (deferring to a promulgated bo ard interpretation in existence since 1981 because b asing the da te of mailing is a reasona ble interpretation where th e board w ould otherwise have to impose late penalties und er A LASKA -26- S TAT. § 23.30.155(e), (f) (2006 )); Eaton v. Sealol, Inc., 447 A.2 d 1147 (R .I. 1982) (imp licitly counting the date of mailing as the date the payment is made, avoiding the assessment of penalties against the insurer under R.I. G EN. L AWS § 28-35-4 3 (2003)); Audobon Tree Service v. Childress, 341 S.E.2d 211 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (construing the predec essor statute to the current V A. C ODE A NN. § 65.2- 524 (2 007 R epl. Vo l.) to mean that the date of mailing was the date compensation was paid, because it avoids insurer liability), superceded by statutory amendment as noted in Ratliff v. Carter Machinery Co., 575 S .E.2d 571 (Va. C t. App. 2003). W e note that the Maryland Code contains no conflict, because the assessment of penalties depends not on payment, but the beginning of payment. There is no policy reason, based on the avoida nce of pe nalties where a mailing is delayed, to support interpreting payment as the date of mailing under Maryland workers compensation law. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the date of the last compensation payment for the purposes of the limitations provision in § 9-736(b) of the Workers Compensation Act is the date when payment is received by a claimant or his or her lawful representative. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIR CUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPIN ION . COSTS TO BE PAID BY A PPE LLE E. -27-

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