Green v. Carr Glass

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

Frederick Green v. Carr Lowery Glass Company, Inc., et al. No. 104, September Term, 2006. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW - WORKERS COMPENSATION - OCCUPATIONAL DEAFNESS: A covered employee is entitled to medical benefits under Md. Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 9-660 of the Labor & Employment Article for occupational deafness only if the hearing loss is compensable under both § 9-505 and § 9-650 of the Labor & Employment Article. In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-05-001945 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 104 September Term, 2006 FREDERICK GREEN v. CAR R LO WER Y GL ASS COM PAN Y, INC ., ET AL. Bell, C.J. Raker Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Wilne r, Alan, M . (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: April 13, 2007 We are called upon in this case to interpret certain provisions of the Workers Compensation Act, Maryland Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), § 9-101 et seq. of the Labor and Employment Article.1 We must decide whether a claimant whose hearing has been damaged within the frequencies established in § 9-505 as a result of his occupation is entitled to have hearing aids provided by his employer/insurer, even though he does not meet the criteria for mon etary compe nsation un der § 9-65 0. We sha ll hold that petitioner is not eligible for me dical be nefits, i.e. hearing aids, under § 9-660 unless he is eligible for comp ensatio n unde r § 9-50 5 and § 9-650 . Petitioner, Frederick Green, was employed by the Carr Lowery Glass Company for over thirty years as a mold shop worker. On August 3, 2004, he filed a claim with the Workers Compensation Comm ission (hereinafter Commission ), alleging that years of exposure to loud glass machine[s] caused loss of hearing. Dr. Brian Kaplan, a physician affiliated with Ear, N ose & T hroat Ass ociates in B altimore, evaluated petitioner s hearing on October 19, 2004.2 Dr. Kap lan s evalua tion stated as f ollows: Mr. Green does have a mild to severe high frequency sensorineural hearing los s. His Ma ryland Com pensation Formula for hearing loss is zero percent. How ever, this pattern of hearing loss is consistent with that caused by significant environmental noise exposure. Th is noise exposure and hearing loss is likely also the cause of the factors for h is bilateral tinnitus. He is a good hearing aid candidate given the degree of 1 All subsequent statutory references herein shall be to the Labor & Employment Article, Md. Code (1999, 2006 Cum. Supp.), unless otherwise indicated. 2 Petitioner sele cted Dr. K aplan to pe rform the e valuation. T he parties do not dispute Dr. Ka plan s m edical c onclus ions reg arding petitioner s con dition. loss and discrim ination score s. The cost of hearing aid s is $5,125.00. I have recommended good hearing protection in the future when in loud environments and will plan on seeing him back o n an as n eeded basis. According to Dr. Kaplan s audiogram, petitioner suffered some hearing loss in the range of freque ncies b etwee n 2000 and 30 00 hert z. The Commission h eld a hearing on Janu ary 28, 2005 to determine whether petitioner sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment, and whether petitioner was entitled to hearing aids, as recommended by Dr. Kaplan. By written order, on February 10, 2005, the Commission denied petitioner s claim, finding that petitioner did not su stain an occ upational d isease of b inaural hea ring loss arising out and in the course of employment as alleged to have occurred on February 25, 2003, and . . . that the [hearing aids] issue is moot. Green filed a petition for judicial review, and both pa rties moved for sum mary judgmen t. On May 27, 2005, after hearing arguments by the parties, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City issued an oral opinion . The cou rt conclude d, it is required that the claimant meet the standard of § 9-6 50 before being e ntitled to medic al bene fits. By written order on May 31, 2005, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer/insurer, denied petitioner s motion for summary judgment, and affirmed the decision of the Commission. Green filed a timely appeal with the Co urt of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appea ls reviewed the contested statutory provisions, § 9-505 and § 9-650, and concluded that an inquiry of the legislative history was unnecessary because the statutory langua ge is -2- sufficiently clear. Green v. Carr, 170 Md. App. 502, 514, 907 A.2d 845, 851 (2006). The intermediate appellate court noted also that the lan guage of § 9-505 is much too broad to function independently and serve as the sole basis for compensation, medical expenses, or otherw ise. Id. at 517, 907 A.2d at 853. Instead, the court held that § 9-505 establishes that occupational deafness due to indu strial noise in ce rtain freque ncies is a com pensable condition, and that one who suffers occupational deafness is entitled to compensation and benefits if he or she also meets the require ments in § 9-65 0. Id. at 518-19, 907 A.2d at 854. This Court granted Green s petition for writ of certiorari to address the following question: Is a Claimant whose hearing has been damaged as a result of his occupation and who meets the criteria for benefits under Labor & Employment Article § 9-505 entitled to have hearing aids provided by the Employer/Insurer, despite the fact that he does not meet the criteria for monetary compensation under Labor & Employment Article § 9-650? Green v. Lowery, 396 M d. 12, 91 2 A.2d 648 (2 006). The question of whether a trial court s grant of summary judgment was proper is a question of law subject to de novo review on app eal. Cochran v. Norkunas, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __, 2007 WL 816862, at * 4 (2007). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501, we independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a genuine dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law. M d. Rule 2-5 01(f); see Hill v. Knapp, 396 Md. -3- 700, 711, 914 A.2d 1193, 1199 (20 07). In the case sub judice, there is no ge nuine disp ute of material f act. We first recount briefly the history and statutory framework of M aryland s Workers Compensation Act, as related to hearing loss in particular. Workers compensation encompasses two main categories of compensable events: accidental personal injury and occupational diseases. §§ 9-501 , 9-502; Means v. Baltimo re Coun ty, 344 Md. 661, 664, 689 A.2d 1238, 12 39 (1997 ); see also Yox v. Tru-Rol, 380 Md. 326, 330-36, 844 A.2d 1151, 1153-57 (2004) (providing a detailed history of Maryland s Workers Compensa tion Act). Tod ay, an em ploye e s h earin g los s may fall into e ither cate gory, depending on whether the employee experienced a sudden traumatic event or was exposed repeatedly to loud noises. See Yox, 380 Md. at 332 , 844 A.2d at 115 4. This was not alw ays the case, however. As first enacted in 1914, the Workers Compens ation Act p rovided co mpensa tion only for accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of employment, and an employee was not required to show that his or her disa bility resulted in a loss of wages or earning capac ity. Yox, 380 Md. at 330-31, 844 A.2d at 1153-54. Thus, an employee who suffered the total loss of hearing in both ears due to a one-time accident that created a loud blast, for example, would have re ceived comp ensatio n. See Belschner v. Anchor Post, 227 Md. 89, 92, 175 A.2d 419, 420-21 (1961). Compensation for hearing loss as an occupational disease, however, was not pro vided u ntil 195 1. See Yox, 380 Md. at 332, 844 A.2d at 1154. At that time, claims for occupational disease related to hea ring loss w ere not com pensable unless the -4- employee showed that he or she was no longer able to work in the occupation that produced the disability. See Belschner, 227 Md. at 92-93, 175 A.2d at 422; Yox, 380 Md. at 333-33, 844 A .2d at 11 54-55 . In 1967, the Legislature amended the Workers Comp ensation A ct to create a se parate provision dealing specifi cally with occup ational d isease h earing lo ss. Yox, 380 Md. at 33334, 844 A.2d at 1155. The new provision, § 25A of Article 101, provided that occupational deafness shall be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this section and set forth a testing methodology for determining eligibility for compensation. 1967 Md. Laws, Chap. 155; Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 104, 519 A.2d 1348, 1350, cert. denied, 310 Md. 147, 528 A.2d 473 (198 7). The ne w provisio n stated that o nly hearing losses in the range of 500, 1000, and 2000 cycles per second were compensable, and provided that, [i]f the losses of hearing average 15 decibels or le ss in the three frequencies, such losses of hearing shall not then constitute any compensable hearing disability. 1967 Md. Laws, C hap. 155; Crawley, 70 Md. App. at 104, 519 A.2d a t 1350; see also Yox, 380 Md. at 334, 844 A.2d at 1155-56 (sum marizing compe nsability criteria). We have recognized that the intent o f the Leg islature in enacting the new provision was not only to provide technical criteria for measuring occupational loss of hearing but also to make such loss compensable w ithout regard to inability to work or loss of wages. Yox, 380 Md. at 335, 844 A.2d at 1156 (quoting Crawley v. General Motors Corp., 70 Md. App. 100, 107, 519 A.2d 1348, 1352 (1987)). Thus, we held that the statute provided that an employee may be -5- eligible for occupational disease compensation due to work-related hearing loss withou t a showing of disablem ent, i.e., loss of w ages or inability to p erform regular work . Yox, 380 Md. at 33 5, 844 A .2d at 1156 ; Crawley, 70 M d. App . at 101, 5 19 A.2 d at 134 9. As part of the L egislature s g eneral cod e revision p rocess in 19 91, the Workers Compensation Act, Art. 101, was repealed and recodified as Title 9 of the Labor and Employment Article. Yox, 380 Md. at 335, 844 A.2d at 1156. The new statute split the former provisions regarding occupational hearing loss between subtitle 5, dealing with the entitlement to and liability for compensation, and subtitle 6, dealing with benefits. §§ 9-501 et seq.; Yox, 380 Md. at 335, 844 A.2d at 1156. It is the 1991 codification of the statute that is at issue in this ca se. Our focus is prim arily on three sections of the Workers Compensation Act, located in two of th e subtitles of T itle 9: § 9-505 , which de fines occu pational deafn ess; § 9-650, which sets forth the criteria for calculating the percentage of hearing loss; and § 9-660, which provides for me dical be nefits. For c larity, we set forth the full text of these sections below. As additional context, we include also all of the text in Part VII of Subtitle 6, entitled Occupational Deafness. Subtitle 5, Entitlem ent to and Liability for Compensation, contains Section 9-505, entitled Occupational deafness. Section 9-505 states as follows: (a) In general. Except as otherwise provided, an employer shall provide co mpensa tion in acco rdance w ith this title to a covered employee for loss of hearing by the covered employee -6- due to industrial noise in the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz. (b) Short-term employer. An employer is not liable for compensation for occupational deafness under subsection (a) of this section unle ss the cove red emplo yee claiming benefits worked for the employer in employment that exposed the covere d emp loyee to h armfu l noise f or at leas t 90 days. Subtitle 6 of Title 9 is entitled Be nefits and consists of s everal Parts. P art I addresses general provisions, for example, while Part VII concerns occupational deafness and Part IX provides for medical benefits. Part VII starts with § 9-649, entitled Scope of part. Section 9-649 state s as follow s: A covered employee who suffers from occup ational deafness shall be paid compensation in accordance with this Part VII of this sub title. Section 9-650, entitled Calculation of percentage of hearing loss, provides: (a) Measurement instruments. (1) Hearing loss shall be measured by audiometric instrumentation that meets the following criteria: (i) ANSI 3.6-1996; (ii) ANSI S3.43-1992; and (iii) ANSI 3.39-1987 or any ANSI standard that supersedes the previous calibration or measurement criteria. (2) Measu rements shall be con ducted in a sound roo m that me ets the ANSI 3.1-1991 criteria for maximum permissible ambient noise for audiom etric test room s. (3) Beha vioral psychoaco ustic measurem ents shall be obtained with instrumentation that utilizes insert earphones, as referenced in ANSI 3.6-1996. (4) Electrodiag nostic measurements such as auditory evoked potentials, acoustic emittance mea surements, or distortion product otoacous tic emissions may be obta ined to determine the nature and extent of workplace hearing loss. (5) A udiologic results shall be used in conjunctio n with oth er informa tion to evaluate a claimant s compensable hearing loss. -7- (b) Calculation Average thresholds of hearing. (1) The percentage of hearing loss for purposes of compensation for occupational deafness shall be determined by calculating the average, in decibels, of the thresholds of hearing for the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz in accordance with paragraph (2) of this subsection. (2) The average of the thresholds in hearing s hall be ca lcula ted b y: (i) adding together the lowest m easured los ses in each of the 4 frequen cies; and (ii) dividing the total by 4. (3) To allow for the average amount of hearing loss from nonoccupational causes found in the population at any given age, there shall be deducted from the total average decibel loss determined under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection one-half of a decibel for each year of the covered employee s age over 50 at the time of the last exposure to industrial noise. (c)(1) If the average hearing loss in the 4 frequencies determined under subsection (b) of this section is 25 decibels or less, the covered employee does not have a compensable hearing loss. (2) If the average hearing loss in the 4 frequencies determined under subsection (b) of this section is 91.7 decib els or more, the covered employee has a 100% compensable hearing loss. (3) For every decibel that the average hearing loss exceeds 25 decibels, the covered employee shall be allowed 1.5% of the compen sable hearing loss, up to a maximum of 100% comp ensabl e hearin g loss at 9 1.7 dec ibels. (d) Binaural percentage of hearing loss. The binaural percentage of hearing loss shall be determined by: (1) multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better ear by 5; (2) adding that product to the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear; and (3) dividing that sum by 6. (e) Amplification device; bone conduction threshold s. (1) In determining the percentage of hearing loss under this section, consideration may not be given to whether the use of an amplification device improves the ability of a covered employee to understand speech or enhance behavioral hearing thresholds. (2)(i) In determining a workers compensation claim for noise-related hearing loss, audiologic data shall use both bone -8- conductio n and air conductio n results. (ii) If a conductive loss is present, the bone conduction thresholds for each ear, rather than the air conduc tion levels, sha ll be used to c alculate a claima nt s ave rage he aring lo ss. Section 9-651, entitled Extent of Liability, states as follows: (a) In general. Except as provided in s ubsection ( b) of this section, an em ploye r is liable for the full extent of the occupational deafness of a covered employee if: (1) the employment of the covered employee by the employer has contributed to any extent to the occupational deafness of the covered employee; and (2) the e mployer othe rwise is liable under this section and § 9-505 of this title. (b) Limitation on liability. An employer is liable only for the part of the deafness attributable to the employment by the emp loyer if the employer establishes by competent evidence, including the results of a professionally controlled hearing test, the extent of the deafness of the covered employee that existed before exposure to harmful noise in the employment of the emplo yer. Finally, § 9-660, located in Part IX Medical Benefits of Subtitle 6 and entitled Provision of medical services and treatment, states as follows: (a) In general. In addition to the compensation provided under this subtitle, if a covered employee has suffered an accidental personal injury, compensable hernia, or occupational disease the employer or its insurer promptly shall provide to the covered employee, as the Commission may require: (1) medica l, surgical, or other atten dance or tre atment; (2) h ospital and nursing services; (3) medicine; (4) crutches and other apparatus; and (5) artificial arms, feet, hands, and legs and o ther prosthe tic appliances. (b) Duration. The em ployer or its insure r shall provid e the medical services and treatment required under subsection (a) of this section for the period required by the nature of the -9- accidental pers onal inju ry, compensable hernia, or occupational disease. (c) Award or order Not to reopen case or change previous award. Except as provided in § 9-736(b) and (c) of this title, any award or order of the Commission under this section may not be construed to: (1) reopen any case; or (2) allow any previo us aw ard to b e chan ged. As we have often stated, the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and to effect uate the intent of the Leg islature. Department of Human Resources v. Howard, __ Md. __ , __ A.2d __, 2007 WL 738449, at *3 (2007). In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain la nguage o f the statute, an d if the plain la nguage o f the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute s apparent purpose, we give e ffect to the s tatute as it is writte n. Id. The ordinary and popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of termino logy within legislatio n. See D eville v. S tate, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (2004). If a statute has more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. See Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 453, 879 A.2d 11 11, 1114 (2005 ). Ambiguous o r equivocal statutory language requires us to consider not only the ordinary meaning of words, but also to interpret how that langua ge relates to th e overall meaning, setting, and purpo se of an act. See Oakland v. Mountain Lake, 392 Md. 301, 316, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006). We resolve any ambiguity in light of the legislative history, prior case law, and statutory purpose. Department of Health a nd Men tal Hygien e v. Kelly, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, 2007 WL 763681, at *10 (2007). We avoid a construction of the statute that is u nreasona ble, illogical, -10- or inconsisten t with comm on sen se. See Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005); Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1115. We presume also that the Legislature has acted with full knowledge of prior legislation, and we construe the statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugato ry. Oakland, 392 M d. at 316 , 896 A .2d at 10 45. Before this Court, petitioner argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred by holding that a claimant with work-related hearing loss is not entitled to a hearing aid under § 9-505 solely because h e is not also elig ible for mo netary benefits under § 9-650. Petitioner concedes that he is not eligible for monetary benefits under § 9-650, but he argues that provision of medical benefits is a separate analysis to that of monetary compensation because § 9-660 says, in addition to the compensation provided under this subtitle and compensation is defined as only monetary compensation. Petitioner further asserts that § 9505 establishes liability for occupational deafness even where the level of injury does not rise to the thresho ld for mon etary benefits under § 9-650. Thus, petitioner asserts that he is entitled to reasonable med ical expenses under § 9-660 because he suffered a hearing loss within the rang es set fo rth in § 9 -505. Respondent replies that petitioner does not become eligible for any type of workers compensation benefits unless the claim is deemed compensable under both § 9-505 and § 9650. Respondent argues further that § 9-505 and § 9-650 are complementary parts of the -11- same test for determinin g benefits in occupational deafness cases, and that § 9-505, standing alone, d oes no t create a n entitlem ent to be nefits. Our analysis begins with § 9-5 05. Section 9-505 (a) sta rts with the w ords in ge neral and is located in a subtitle that establishes the ma in categories of injuries that are compen sable under the W orkers Co mpensa tion Act. 3 Section 9-505 (a) states that, [e]xcept as otherwise provided, an employer shall provide compensation in accord ance with this title to a cove red em ployee fo r loss of hearing . . . due to industrial noise in the frequencies of 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 3,000 hertz. § 9-505 (a) (emphasis added). Section 9-505 (b) requires that an employee claiming benefits have worked for the employer and been exposed to loud noises for at least 90 days. § 9-505 (b). This general language in § 9-505 establishes minimal requirements for an occupational deafness claim. The section estab lishes certain frequencies where a loss of hearing may, in accord ance with Title 9, constitute occupational deafness. Section 9-5 05 also ack nowled ges that occ upational d eafness is an occupational disease, regardless of a person s inability to work or loss of wage s. See Yox, 380 Md. at 33536, 844 A.2 d at 1156- 57 (reiterating that the 1967 amendments to the Workers Compensation Act were intended to make occupational hearing loss, as distinguished from other o ccupa tional di seases, c ompe nsable withou t regard to disab lemen t). 3 The categories include accidental personal injury, occupational disease, hernia, and occup ational d eafne ss. §§ 9- 501 9 -505. -12- Section 9-505 sets forth only general requirements for making an occupational deafness claim. The language of § 9-505 does not provide any specific criteria for determining the extent of an employee s hearing los s. Nor doe s § 9-505 d etail how to calculate a worker s entitlement to occupational deafness related compensation.4 Moreover, nothing in the language of § 9-505 explicitly states that an employer shall provide medical benefits to covered employees with hearing loss in the named frequencies. Instead, the language of § 9- 505 rel ies on q ualifying langua ge, [e]xcept as otherwise provided, an employer shall provide compe nsation in a ccordan ce with this title, to direct the re ader to additional details. § 9-505 (a). The word title refers to the entire Act, which includes subtitle 6, where s ections on c alculation of percent hearing loss, § 9-650, and medical benefits, § 9-660 are set forth. Because of the qualifying language and the general language used in § 9-505, we do not read § 9-505 to independ ently establish employer liability for compensation or medical benefits if a covered employee suffers hearing loss in the identified 4 Petitioner argues that medical expenses are excluded from the definition of compensation as it is used in § 9-505. Although the term compensation is defined in § 9-101 (e) as the money payable under this title to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee, including funeral benefits, we have previously acknowledged that compensation may have a broader meaning that include s medic al bene fits. See Holy Cross Hosp. v. Nichols, 290 Md. 149, 160, 428 A.2d 447, 452-53 (1981) (noting that compensation for which the Un insured Emplo yers Fun d was respon sible inc luded m edical b enefits , but holding that a compensation award which sought to be changed or modified does not include a request for medical benefits); cf. Vest v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 329 Md. 461, 46768, 620 A.2d 340, 343 (1993) (stating that definition of compensation in § 9-101(e) is broad and encompasses most forms of payment to employees provided under the statute, but it excludes the payment of medical expenses). Regardless of the definition of compensation as it is used in §9-505, our holding is the same. -13- frequencies. An employee must also qualify for compensation and benefits under § 9-650 and § 9 -660. Section 9-650, entitled Calculation of percentage of hearing loss, provides precise testing proced ures fo r determ ining th e exten t of a w orker s hearing loss. The threshold of hearing loss that mu st be met in § 9-650 is calibrated such that any hearing loss experienced due to aging is deducted from the overall calculation of loss. § 9-650 (b) (3). M oreove r, § 9-650 states that a covered employee does not have a compensable hearing loss if the average hearing loss in th e four f requen cy range s is 25 d ecibels o r less. § 9-650 (c) (1). In requiring an average hearing loss of more than 25 decibe ls, the Legislatu re determin ed that a certa in threshold of loss b e met in order to warra nt com pensat ion. See Yox, 380 M d. at 328 , 844 A.2d at 1152. As we stated in Yox: We shall hold tha t an occupational deafness disablement occurs when the hearing loss is sufficient to become compe nsable under § 9-650. A claim for workers compensation benefits based on occupational deafness must therefore be filed within two years from the time the hearing loss reaches that level of comp ensability and the employee has actual knowledge that the lo ss was caused by his/her emplo yment. Id. (emphasis added). The criteria in § 9-6 50 presum ably establish a th reshold that is lower than whate ver leve l of hea ring loss constitu tes disa bleme nt, because occupational hearing loss was me ant to be co mpensa ble withou t regard to d isablemen t. See Yox, 380 Md. at 335-36, 844 A.2d at 1156-57. We note, how ever, that the L egislature did not set a thresh old -14- such that any hearing loss attributed to work is compensated an individual must have an average loss of m ore than 25 decibels in the named frequ encies. § 9-650 (c) (1). The Court of Special A ppeals corr ectly noted that § 9-505 d oes not esta blish criteria to calculate hearing loss. Judge J. Frederick Sharer, writing for the panel, recognized that § 9-505 lacks any accounting for age-related hearing loss. Judge Sharer stated as follows: Were [§ 9-505] to be the whole of the test, nearly every employee of a certain age, at every task, will have suffered a compen sable disablement. It is a fact that the human aging process is accompanied by some degree of hearing loss in a substantial percentage of the population. To accept [petitioner s] reasoning , our holding would e ntitle nearly every worker in an industrial setting to compensation in the nature of medical expenses, including hearing aids, even in the absence of a § 9-650 calculation of occupational hearing loss. Under that scenario, the § 9-650 (b) (3) provision, providing for deduction for the average amount of hearing loss from nonoccupational causes to be found in the population at any given age would be rendered meaningless. Green, 170 M d. App . at 517, 9 07 A.2 d at 853 . We ag ree. Section 9-650 provides the technical criteria for m easuring o ccupation hearing los s, and § 9-5 05 lacks su ch criteria because it references what is already established in § 9-650. The two sections are com plem enta ry, and a cov ered emp loyee must co mply with both to be eligible for benefits. Petitioner concedes that he is not eligible for compensation under § 9-650, but argues that he is entitled to a hearing aid under § 9-660, Provision of medical services and treatme nt. We do n ot find sup port for pe titioner s assertion. Section 9-660 governs the provision of medical benefits for all forms of workers compensation claims. Section § 9- -15- 660 begins with the words in general and then states [i]n addition to the compensation provided under t his sub title, if a covered employee has suffered an accidental pers onal inju ry, compensable hernia, or occupational disease the emplo yer or its insurer pro mptly shall provide medical treatment and services. § 9-660 (a) (emphasis added). Subsection (b) also requires the employer or its insurer to provide the medical treatment and services for the period required by the nature of th e accidenta l personal in jury, compensable hernia, or occupational disease. § 9 -660 (b). The language of § 9-660 m akes prov ision of m edical bene fits continge nt, through the use of the word if, on the employee actually suffering an occupational disease, compen sable hernia, or accidental injury. As noted above, we have held that an occupational deafness claim, as an o ccupation al disease, occurs w hen the he aring loss is su fficient to become compen sable under § 9-650. Yox, 380 Md. at 328, 844 A.2d at 1152. Because petitioner concedes that he is not eligible for compensation under § 9-650 and therefore concedes also that he is not suffering an occupational deafness disease, we hold that he is not eligible f or med ical ben efits un der § 9- 660. Petitioner s assertion that § 9-505 establishes liability to provide medical benefits for occupational deafness even where the level of injury does not rise to the threshold for monetary benefits under § 9-650 f ails. There is n o evidenc e in the lang uage of th e statute that two separate thresholds one for compensation and one fo r medical b enefits exist. The provision of medical benefits under § 9-660 is a separate consideration to that of -16- monetary compensation, but the analysis of hearing loss related medical benefits relies on the calculation o f percent h earing loss in § 9-650. Medical services and treatment are to be provided in addition to compe nsation if a covered employee has suffered an occupational disease, and the only way to determine if the employee may make an occupational deafness claim is to follow the metho dology set for th in § 9-650 . See Yox, 380 Md. at 328, 844 A.2d at 1152. The language in § 9-505 stating that loss of hearing by the covered employee due to industrial nois e in the [spe cified] freq uencies d oes not esta blish liability for medical benef its becau se it is gen eral and lacks sp ecific c riteria. Petitioner asserts that § 9-651 provides f urther evide nce that § 9-505 w as intended to have a meaning independent from § 9-650. We di sagree . Petitioner relies on language in § 9-651 stating that an employer is liable if, amongst other things, the employer otherwise is liable under this section and § 9-505 of this title. § 9-651(a )(2). Petitioner su ggests that, because § 9-651 does not specifically refer to § 9-650, satisfaction of § 9-650 is not required to establish a cla im for me dical benef its under § 9 -660 if the employee meets the criteria set forth in § 9-505. Petitioner makes no new argument by relying on the language of § 9-651. Even though § 9-651 does not explicitly refer to § 9-650, § 9-505 references § 9-650 by requiring that compensation be provided in accordance with this title. § 9-505 (a). The language of § 9-651 does not support petitioner s assertion that § 9-505 establishes an independent ground for medical benefits, nor does § 9-505 establish an independent ground. -17- Considering the statute as a whole, it is inconsistent that the calculation of compensation in accorda nce with § 9-650 w ould includ e specific au diometric instrumentation methodo logy while pro vision of m edical bene fits under § 9-660 w ould not rely on similarly detailed requirements. As the Court of Special Appeals noted, calculation of hearing los s, especially cons idering the n eed to acco unt for age -related hear ing loss, is complicated and the statute is, by necessity, complex. Green, 170 Md. App. at 517, 907 A.2d at 853. The Leg islature intended to set forth a techn ical set of criteria for when occupational deafness would be compensable. Yox, 380 Md. at 334, 844 A.2d at 1155. Section 9-5 05 is impo rtant in the statutory sche me beca use it sets forth the genera l criteria for entitlement and liability as a result of work-related hearing loss, and because it references other sections in Title 9. Based on the language and structure of the Workers Compensation Act, we hold that a cov ered employee is entitled to med ical benefits under § 9-660 for occupational deafness only if the hearing loss is compensable under both § 9-505 and § 9650. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIA L APPEALS AFFIRMED. C O ST S T O B E P A ID BY PETITIONER. -18-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.