Frederick v. Pickett
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City of Frede rick, Marylan d v. Allan M . Pickett, No. 74, September Term, 2005. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CONDEMNATION Petitioner sought review of the Circuit Court f or Frederic k Coun ty s dismissal of th e its condemnation action with respect to Respondent s property. The Court of Appeals held that the Circ uit C ourt erroneously dismissed the condemnation action based on an incorrect interpretation of the requirements of Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37), w hich perm its municipa l corporation s to conde mn blighte d propertie s within areas that are generally non -blighted. Th e Court of Appea ls also held tha t the dismissal may not be u pheld on the ground that the City of Fred erick s Board of A ldermen s actions were ultra vires because the Board was not required to enact an enabling ordinance prior to the passage of an ordinance auth orizing the co ndemna tion of a s peci fic p rope rty. Moreover, the Court of Appeals d etermin ed that, assuming arguendo that an enabling ordinance was required, the Board of Aldermen was empowered to pass the second ordinance in anticipation of the enabling ordinance s approval by the mayor, particularly because the parties do not dispute the fact that the mayor signed the enabling ordinance prior to signing the ordinance specifically aimed at the condemnation of the property at issue in the case at bar. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 74 September Term, 2005 CITY OF FREDERICK, MARYLAND v. ALLAN M. PICKETT Bell, C.J. Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene Eldridg e, John C., (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: April 19, 2006 The case sub judice presents this Court with the task of determining whether the Circuit Court for Frederick County properly dismissed the C ity of Frederick s ( the City ) condemnation action with respect to Allan M. Pickett s property. Because we hold that Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vo l.), Article 23A , Section 2 (b )(37) perm its a municipal authority to condemn individual blighted properties that are not within a blighted area or slum area for urban renewal purposes as a matter of law, we shall reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings. Background In 1982, Allen Pickett purchased a two-story brick home loc ated at 20 W est Fourth Street, Frederick, Maryland ( the Property ), lived there for approximately one week and thereafter leased it until 1993 to a tenant, after which it remained unoccupied. In 1996, the Frederick C ity Police Dep artment rep orted to the O ffice of C ode Enf orcemen t for the City of Frederick th at the Prope rty was littered with broken glass and that the rear entrance to the building was broken open. The Office of Code Enforcement verified the complaint and, upon visiting the premises, determined that vagrants were using the Property and removing the building s contents. Michael Blank, a building inspector with the Office of Code Enforcement, observed that fires were being set within the building and that the floor was covered in trash and fecal matter. Moreover, he noted that the foundation in the rear of the building was sinking, which compromised its structural integrity. On May 8, 1996, the Property was con demned . The City sen t notice to Pick ett instructing him to secure the Property and cle an it up w ithin fiv e days. On May 16, 1996, Bla nk again v isited the Prop erty and confirmed that the building was secured but that the trash on the premises remained. The City remo ved the garbag e and b illed the c osts to P ickett. Two years later, the O ffice of C ode Enf orcemen t once aga in received a compla int from the police stating that the basement door of the Property was broken open and that the Property was covered in litter. An inspection confirmed the allegations of the complaint, and the Office of Code Enforcement again sent a letter to Pickett instructing him to clean up the Property within five days. When a subsequent inspec tion revealed that the Property remained in non-com pliance, the C ity cleaned the P roperty and se nt a bill to Pickett for the costs as well as a penalty of three hundred dollars. After receiving repeated complaints from the police regarding the Property in 1998 and 1999, the Office of Code Enforcement conducted a comprehensive inspection of the premises on September 14, 1999, and sent a Notice of Violation to Pickett informing him that he had a mo nth to make necessary repairs to the Property consisting of removing the garbage from the lot and re pairing the re ar door to b ring it into com pliance w ith the Property Maintenance Code. In Octob er, the Off ice of Co de Enfo rcement in spected the Property again; it remained in a state of non-compliance. On January 20, 2000, Pickett was sent seventy-seven citations for the period from October 16, 1999 through December 31, 1999. The citations were sent to Post Office Box 378, Mount Airy, Maryland, which was an address that the City had for Pickett. On February 9, 2000, the citations were returned to the Office of Code Enforcement as undeliver able. The O ffice of C ode Enf orcemen t subseque ntly 2 posted the citatio ns on th e Prop erty. A subsequent inspection on January 2, 2002, revealed that the corner of the building on the Prope rty continued to sink into the ground and that the Property continued to be used by transients for the consumption of alcohol and crack cocaine. One week later the City took action to reinforce the sinking foundation and declared the building an unsafe structure under the Property Maintenance Code.1 On March 21, 2002, the City s Board of Aldermen2 passed Ordinance G-02-3, the purpose of which was to authorize the City to acquire blighted properties by eminent domain and to subsequently dispose of said properties, and thereby to promote public health, safe ty, and welfare, and to facilitate the use and enjoyment of property. Ordina nce G-02-3 provided in pertinent p art: (1) Pursuant to the express authority descr ibed abov e, the City may: (a) Subject to th e provisions of paragraph (4) of this section, acquire, within its boundary lines, land and pro perty of every kind, and any right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means, for development or redevelopment, including, but not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof; and 1 See generally The F rederic k City Co de, Ch apter 12 .5, Ho using. 2 Article 2, Se ction 7 of th e Frederick City Charter p rovides in p ertinent part: All legislative powers of the city shall be vested in a board of aldermen consisting of five (5) aldermen who shall be elected as hereinafter provided and who shall hold office for a term of four (4) years or until their successors are elected and qualified. 3 (b) Sell, lease, convey, transfer or otherwise dispose of any of said property, regardless of whether or not it has been developed, redeveloped, altered or improved and irrespective of the manner or means in or by which it may have been acquired, to any private, public or quasi-public corp oration, partnership, asso ciation, p erso n or o ther lega l enti ty. (2) No land or property taken by the City for any of the aforementioned purposes, or in connection with the exercise of any of the powers authorized hereunder, shall be taken without just compensation, as agreed upon between the parties or awarded by a jury, being first p aid or tende red to the pa rty entitled to such compensation. (3) All land or property needed, or taken by the exercise of the power of eminent domain, by the City for any of the aforementioned purposes, or in connection with the exercise of any of the powers authorized hereunder, is hereby declared to be needed o r taken for a public use o r a public be nefit. (4) Before th e acquisition of any single f amily or multiple family dwelling u nit, or other struc ture, is made under this Chapter, a finding or d etermination shall be ma de that: (a) The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such an extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety and welfare; (b) The dwelling unit or structure is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected; (c) The continued deterioration of the dwelling un it or structure will contribute to the blighting or deteriora tion of the area immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and (d) The owner of the dw elling unit or stru cture has fa iled to correct the deterioration thereof. (5) The City sha ll adopt an Ordinance for each acquisition of land or property made unde r the provisions of this Chapter. Each specific ordinance so adopted shall be maintained by the Legislative Clerk o f the C ity in a file title d Em inent D omain . Immedia tely after passing Ordinance G-02-3, the Board of Alderman discussed Ordinance ED-02 -1, which p ermitted the C ity to acquire the P roperty at 20 W est Fourth Street through its eminent domain powers. During the meeting the following colloquy 4 occurred: MAYOR DOUGH ERTY: . . . . We are looking at the ordinance to acquire real property, located at 20 West 4th Street, through the exercise of eminent domain. ALDERM AN M. HAL L: I move for acceptance. ALDER MAN B ALDI: You have to base it on five (5) points. ALDERMAN M. HALL: Okay. Let s see. I move for acceptance of the ordinance to acquire real property located at 20 West 4th Street through the exercise of eminent domain, finding that the structure located at 20 West 4th Street has deteriorated to such an extent as to constitute a serious and growing mena ce to pu blic hea lth, safe ty, and welfare; th at this structure is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected; that the continued deterioration of the structure will contribute to the blighting or de terio ratio n of the a rea im med iately surrounding the structure; and that the owner of the dwelling unit or structure has failed to correct the deterioration thereof. ALDERM AN RAM SBURG: Second. MAYOR DOUGHER TY: We have a motion from Alderman Marcia Hall, a second f rom Ald erman R amsburg . All in favor, signify by raising your right hand. That is five (5) O (0). Ladies and gentlemen, congratulations. Good work, guys. Good job. Pickett has conceded that on March 25, 2002, Frederick Mayor Dougherty signed the enabling ordinance, Ordinance G-02-3, immediately prior to signing Ordinance ED-02-1, whi ch sp ecif ically auth orized th e tak ing o f the Prop erty. On April 10, 2002, the City initiated condemnation proceedings in the Circuit Court for Frederick County. Five days later, the Circuit Court issued a summons for Pickett, which 5 listed his address as 755 Ea st Waters ville Roa d, Fr eder ick, M arylan d 21701. The City, however, was una ble to effe ctuate se rvice pr ior to the expirati on of th at summ ons. On June 28, 2002, the City applied to have the Circuit C ourt reissue th e summ ons for P ickett with the same address. T he court did so. Once again, the C ity was unab le to serve Pickett prior to the expiration of the reissued summons. On September 25, 2002, the City again requested that the Circu it Court reissu e a summ ons for ser vice on Pic kett at the same address, which the court did. The City attempted to ef fect service of process thro ughout the follow ing year. After repeatedly bein g unable to effect ser vice upon Pickett, on Ju ly 7, 2003, the C ity filed a motion for alternate service, w hich the Circuit Court granted, thereby permitting the City to serve proc ess upon P ickett throug h mailing h im a copy of the summons, complaint and other relevant papers at his last known address, which was listed with the State Motor Vehicle Administration as 170 Baughman s Lane, Frederick, Maryland. The City also served Pickett through regular mail at two other addresses: P.O. Box 378, Mount Airy, Maryland; and 755 East Watersville Road, Frederick, Maryland.3 Thereafter, on October 10, 2003, the City obtained a default judgment against Pickett based on his failure to respond to the comp laint. On November 10, 2003, Pickett filed a motion to strike servic e of proce ss and to vacate the default judgment entered against him. On December 12, 2003, the Circuit Court 3 The P.O. box was an address previously on file with the City, and the address on East Watersv ille Road was the reside nce of Pickett s father. 6 vacated the defau lt judgmen t entered ag ainst Pickett, bu t denied his motion to strike service of process. One month later, Pickett filed his answer, wherein he raised the affirmative defenses of ultra vires,4 lack of in personam jurisdiction ov er him, collate ral estoppel, estoppel, and illegality, and asserted the failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as a gro und fo r dismis sal. On April 26, 2005, the C ircuit Court held an eviden tiary hearing addressing the City s entitlement to condemn the Property. At the hearing, Pickett made an oral motion to dismiss the City s condemnation action based on several grounds. He asserted that the City s action was ultra vires because A rticle 23A o f the Ma ryland Code did not em power th e City to condemn an individual property within a non-blighted area, and the Board of Aldermen acted beyond its authority when it passed the ordinance applicable to the Property prior to the mayor s approval of the enabling ordinance. He contended that the City could c ondemn only those properties located within a blighted area, to which end he introduced testimony from a appraiser that his property was not located in a blig hted are a or s lum are a. Pickett also presented portions of Michael Blank s deposition testimony regarding his knowledge of 4 We have defined ultra vires as denot[ing] som e act or transaction on the part of a corporation which, although not unlawful or contrary to public policy if done or executed by an individu al, is yet beyond the le gitimate powers of the corporation as they are defined by the statutes under which it is formed or which is applicable to it, by its charter or incorporation paper. Pennsylv ania R. C o. v. Minis, 120 Md. 461, 488, 87 A. 1062, 1072 (1913). We hav e recogniz ed the app lication of the doctrine of ultra vires to municipal corporations. See Boitn ott v. Mayo r and City Counc il of Baltimo re City, 356 Md. 226, 738 A.2d 881 (199 9); Inlet Associates v. Assateagu e House C ondominium Ass n, 313 Md. 413, 545 A.2d 12 96 (1988). 7 Pickett s actual addr ess in supp ort of his argument that the City was acting in bad faith when it claimed to be unable to provide him with notice of the citations issued concerning the Property and to effectuate service of process in the condemnation proceeding.5 As his final argumen t, Pickett asserted that the City never obtained in rem jurisdiction over him because the City was no t entitled to substituted service because of the bad faith that he alleged formed the basis for its previous attempts to effect service ; Pickett contended that the C ity was aware of an accurate address at which service could have been made. After hearing argument from both sides, the Circuit Court explicated the reasoning for its decision on the record as follows: I heard today attacks on these proceedings on a number of bases. I ve made one ruling[6] and I ve heard attacks on the basis that the ordinance upon w hich this con demnatio n proceed ing is based is itse lf ult ra vires in the w ay that it was ena cted and in accordance with the charter. Or, the argumen t would actually be that it was not enacted in accordance with the charter, and therefore, the action taken was ultra vires. I ve heard testim ony with regard to whether or not there is blight at this p rope rty; argument on the issue of constructive fraud as to the information given to the Court to obtain service of process and whether or not the City knew of or had within its grasp 5 In Mr. Blank s deposition testimony, Mr. Blank conceded that he had received a motion for injunction from Pickett that listed his current address as Route 2, Box 31, Clearville, Pennsylvania prior to the City s initiation of condemnation proceedings involving Pick ett s prop erty. 6 Pickett also argued that the City was collaterally estopped from condemning the Property based on the Circuit Court s previous denial of the City s request for an injunction to allow for a demolition of a balcony on the building on the Property because the City believed that it constituted an imminent danger. The Circuit Court denied relief based on collateral e stoppel bec ause the issu es were su fficiently differe nt. 8 information as to he correct address of Mr. Pickett, and then, fina lly, I don t believe I m excluding anything, arguments on constitutional defects of the proceedings in terms of vagueness of the language of the ordinance, the absence of public ben efit, and prob ably a little more, bu t I m clea r. Ok ay. *** Fun dam enta lly, the Maryland General Assem bly provided in Article 23(a), Section 2 (b), that municipalities have these express powers, and, frankly, we know that the municipality has certain expres s pow ers, its has certain implied powers, it has certain powers necessary to carry out that authority, but for purposes of today s proceeding, we re focused on the express power provided by the General Assembly in item 37 of subsection 2 (b) of Article 23 (a) . . . . It says in addition to the authority provided elsewhere in this subsection, subsection 2 (b), and provided the mu nicipal corporation has urb an renewal authority gran ted u nder Art icle 3 , Sec tion 61 o f the Maryland Constitution, and there s provision in that article for acquisition of property by condemnation, and subject to the provisions of subparagraph (iv) to acquire within the boundary lines of the municipal corporation . . . land and property of every kind by condemnation or developm ent or redev elopmen t, including, but not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof. Now, that subsection (iv) says that before the acquisition of a single f amily or multiple family dwelling unit or structure, other structure is made under this paragraph, ce rtain findings have to be made, four findings. *** What s at issue in this case is a singl e prope rty. . . . In other words, the City has exercised its discretion to an appropriate extent as to this single property, but I m I keep harking back to the definitions which talk about slum area, blighted area, and within each definition of area there are references to dwellings predominate, majority buildings. It nowhere says a slum prop erty, a blighted property. In fact, to step ba ck, it talks about carrying out urban renewal projects and it keeps then referring 9 to slum clearance and slum or blighted areas and redevelopment or the rehabilitatio n of slum or blighted a reas. It doesn t talk about even a renewal, a suburban renewal project which af fects one prop erty. I d on t think I I m not go ing to say it again because I hope I ve made my poin t. The autho rity granted in Article 3, Section 61, which is the enabling cornerstone , refers to blighted area and slum area, which in turn, refer to multiple buildin gs. *** I realize that the a uthority the Co nstitution gran ts and which the general assembly exercised a nd whic h the City has a ttempted to invoke is that authority to take private property through condemnation, eminent domain, when it s necessary for slum clearance, for the purpose of carrying out urban renewal projects, but limited to slum clearance in slum or blighted areas, which, in turn, are area which are areas, first of all, I can stop there but area specifically defined to include multiple dwellings, or, in the case of blighted areas, multiple buildings or a place wh ere a majo rity of buildings h ave decline d in prod uctiv ity. *** With all of that, I must dismiss these proceedings. Mr. Winters, I m going to ask you to submit an orde r. I think you can merely say for the reasons stated, or words to that effect, from the bench, the Court s oral opinio n, the matter will be dismissed. Thank you. On May 26, 2005, the C ity filed its notice of appeal, and thereafter, this Court issued, on its own initiative , a writ o f certior ari, Frederick v. Pickett, 389 Md. 398, 885 A.2d 823 (2005), prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court. The City s brief presented the following issue: Whether under M aryland Cod e (1957, 20 01 Rep l. Vol.), Article 10 23A, Section 2 (b) (37), the Appellant s legislature was required to determine that the Subject Property was within a slum area or blighted area as those terms are defined in Maryland Constitution, Article 3, Section 61 to acquire the Subject Property for the public purpose of development or redeve lopme nt. In his responsive brief in this Court, Pickett also raised the following issues for our consideration:7 1. Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing A ppellant s Amended Complaint because Appellant s simultaneous enactment of both the enabling ordinance and the ordinance specific to Appellee s property rendered b oth the spec ific ordinance and Appellant s subsequent actions in seek ing to condem n Ap pelle e s p rope rty ultra vires, illegal acts? 2. Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing A ppellant s Amended Comp laint becaus e the Circu it Court never acquired in rem juris dicti on over A ppellee s pro perty? 3. Was the trial court legally correct in dismissing A ppellant s Amended Complaint because Appellan t s action in determining the necessity for condemning Appellee s property was so oppressive, arbitrary, and un reasonab le as to suggest bad faith? We hold that the Circuit Court erroneously dismissed the City of Frederick s condemnation action base d on an inc orrect interpretation of the requirements of Maryland 7 When we assume jurisdiction over an appeal pending, bu t undecided, before the Court of Special Appeals, we consider those issues that would have been cognizable by the Court o f Spec ial App eals. M d. Rule 8-131 (b)(2). T hus, we rely on the question or questions in both the appellant s brief and the appellee s brief to present the issue or issues we consid er. See de la P uente v. Co unty Com missioner s of Frede rick Coun ty, 386 Md. 505, 508 n.4, 873 A.2d 36 6, 368 n.4 (2005); Converge Servs. Group, LLC v. Curran, 383 Md. 462, 467 n.1 , 860 A .2d 871 , 874 n.1 (2004 ). See als o Dua l Inc., v. L ockhe ed Ma rtin Co rp., 383 M d. 151, 1 61 n.3, 8 57 A.2 d 1095 , 1100 n .3 (200 4). 11 Code (1957 , 2001 Repl. Vo l.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37). Although the Circuit Court relied solely on its erroneous interpretation of Maryland Code (1957, 20 01 Rep l. Vol.), Article 2 3A, Sec tion 2 (b)(37 ) as the basis f or its dismissal of the City s complaint for condemnation of the Property, we could affirm the dismissal on any ground adequately shown by the reco rd, wh ether or not relie d upon by the trial c ourt. Berman v. Karvou nis, 308 Md. 259, 263, 518 A.2d 726, 728 (1987), citing Robeso n v. State, 285 Md. 498, 502, 403 A.2d 12 21, 1223 (1979 ) (and cases cited therein), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1021, 100 S.Ct. 680, 62 L.Ed.2d 654 (1980). As we noted in Robeson, [c]onsiderations of judicial economy justify the policy of upholding a trial court decision which was correct although on a different ground than relied upon. This was explained by the Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Com . v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 459, 87 L.Ed. 626 (1943): It would be wasteful to send a case back to the lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on another groun d withi n the po wer of the app ellate co urt to fo rmulate . Robeson, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223. Therefo re we m ay consider w hether the C ircuit Court s dismissal could be affirmed on alternate grounds adequately shown in the record. Of the three alternate grounds presented by Pickett for our consideration, only the issue of whether the Board of Alderm en s appro val of the o rdinance a pplicable to the Property was an ultra vires action was adequately developed in the record. The Circ uit Court s dismissal of the City s condemnation ac tion, however, may not be upheld o n the ground that the B oard of Aldermen s actions were ultra vires because the Board was not required to enact an 12 enabling ordinance prior to the passage of an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of a specific property. Moreover, assuming arguendo that an enabling ordinance was required, the Board o f Alderm en was e mpow ered to pass the second ordinance in anticipation of the enabling ordinance s approva l by the mayor, partic ularly because the parties do not dispute the fact that the m ayor signed th e enabling ordinance prior to signing the ordinance specifically aimed at the condemnation of the property at issue in the present case. The remaining two issues, lack of in rem jurisdiction an d bad faith , were not a dequately developed in the record and as suc h, we ma y not rely upon them as grounds to uphold the Circuit Co urt s dismissa l. Discussion The City argues that the language of the controlling statute, Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37), 8 is clear and u nambigu ous. Acc ording to 8 Maryland Code (1957 , 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b) (37) provides in pertinent pa rt: (b) Express powers. In addition to , but not in substitution of, the powers w hich have been, or m ay hereafter be , granted to it, such legis lativ e body also shall have the following express ordinance-making powers: *** (37)(i) In addition to the authority pro vided elsew here in this subsection, and provided the municipal corporation has urban renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution: 1. Subject to the provisions of subparagraph ( iv) of this 13 the City, the purpose of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) is to empower municipalities to condemn individual blighted properties even within a non-blighted area. Therefore, the City concludes that the Board of Aldermen properly exercised its power to do so when it passed an ordinance authorizing th e condemna tion of Pickett s property. Mo reover, the C ity asserts that even if the language were ambiguous, the legislative history and the context surrounding the enactment of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) sup port the interp retation that the statute does not require the finding of a slum area or b lighted area for the City to b e able to conde mn the Prope rty. paragraph, to ac quire, within the b oundary lines of the municipal corporation, land and property of ev ery kind, and a ny right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condem nation or an other other le gal means, for development or redevelo pment, inclu ding, but not limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof; and *** (iv) Before the acquisition of any single f amily or multiple family dwelling u nit, or other structure, is ma de under this paragraph , a finding o r determina tion shall be m ade that: 1. The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such extent as to constitute a serious and growing m enace to the public health, safety, and welfare; 2. The dwelling unit or structure is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected; 3. The continued deterioration of the dw elling unit or structure will contribute to the blighting or deteriora tion of the area immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and 4. The owner o f the dwe lling unit or struc ture has faile d to correct the dete rioration thereof . 14 Pickett concedes that Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) em powers m unicipalities to condemn individual blighted properties within a non-blighted area; however, he asserts that the dismissal may be upheld on appeal regardless of the fact that the Circuit C ourt s interpretation of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) was erroneous. To that end, Pickett argues that the simultaneous enactment of both the enabling ordinance and the ordinance specific to the Property rendered the specific ordinance and all of the actions arising thereu nder ultra vires. Specifically, Pickett contends that the City s Board of Aldermen lacked the legal authority to conduct a fact-finding hearing regarding his property and to pass the ordinance providing for the condemnation of his property on March 21, 2002, because the enabling ordina nce w as not e ffectiv e. The City rejoins that the condemnation action with respect to the Property was not ultra vires because the Board of Aldermen properly approved the ordinance and had the authority to conduct the necessary fact-finding hearing under M aryland law. A ccording to the City, under the applicable statute, the Board of Aldermen was not required to approve an enabling ordinance prior to being able to exercise its power to conduct fact-finding procee dings o r prior to passing the ord inance specifi cally direc ted at Pic kett s pr operty. Our resolution of whether the Circuit Court properly dismissed the Amended Complaint turns on our construction o f the provisions of the M aryland Code. When construing a statute we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the lang uage. Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 59 9, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004); Fish Market Nominee Corp. v. G.A.A., 15 337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n.8, 647 A.2d 429, 434 n.8 (1994); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 90 0, 902 (19 70); Balto. Gas & Elect. Co. v. Board, 278 Md. 26, 31, 358 A.2d 24 1, 244 (19 76); Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000 ). If that langu age is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the pro vision s terms to inform our ana lysis, Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Fish Market, 337 Md. at 8, 650 A.2d at 708; Rand, 280 Md. at 511, 374 A.2d at 902; Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804; however, the goal of our examination is alw ays to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by a particu lar prov ision. Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Morris v. Prince G eorge s County , 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990), citing Dept. of the Environment v. Showe ll, 316 Md. 259, 270, 558 A.2d 391, 396 (1989 ); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 3 89, 397 , 558 A .2d 121 9, 1223 (1989 ). In 1995, the G eneral As sembly enacted Senate Bill 379, which added Subsection 2 (b)(37) to A rticle 23A o f the Ma ryland Code , and provid ed in pertine nt part: (37)(i) In addition to the authority pro vided elsew here in this subsection, and prov ided the m unicipal corporation has urban renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution: 1. Subject to the prov isions of su bparagrap h (iv) of this paragraph, to acquire within the boundary lines of the municipal corporation, land and prope rty of every kind, an d any right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means, for development or redevelo pment, inclu ding, but n ot limited to, the comprehensive renovation or rehabilitation thereof; 16 *** (iv) Before the ac quisition of a ny single fam ily or multiple family dwelling u nit, or other struc ture, is made under this paragraph , a finding o r determina tion shall be m ade that: 1. The dwelling unit or structure has deteriorated to such an extent as to constitute a serious and growing menace to the public health, safety, and welfare; 2. The dwelling u nit or structure is likely to continue to deteriorate unless corrected; 3. The continued deterioration of the dwelling unit or structure will contribute to the blighting or deterioration of the area immediately surrounding the dwelling unit or structure; and 4. The owne r of the dwelling unit or structure has f ailed to correct the deterioration thereof. 1995 Md. Laws, Chap. 519, codified as Md. Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A § 2 (b)(37). The inclusion of the language [b]efore the acquisition of any single family or multiple family dwelling unit, or other structure, is made under this paragraph clearly evidences the General Assembly s intention to grant municipalities the power to condemn an individual b lighted prop erty. The statute d oes so w ithout any con dition that the s pecific property is within a slum area or blighted area, or any requirement that the particular property or land is condemned in conjunction with the condemnation of the surrounding parcels. Moreover, the provision does not encompass a municipality s ability to condemn slum areas or blighted areas as it presumes that the municipality has already been granted such au thority pur suant to Article I II, Sectio n 61 of the M aryland C onstitutio n. This conclusion is bolstered f urther by the inc lusion of a list of four factual determinations that must be made prior to condemning an in dividual blig hted prop erty. 17 Although the statute req uires the municipality to make certain findings regarding the deterioration of the prop erty and give n otice to the ow ner, it does not mandate that the municipa lity make any determinations concerning whether the immediate area surrounding the property in question is currently blighted. The foc us is on the sp ecific prop erty at issue: whether it is currently blighted, will continue to be blighted, and will contribute to the blighting of the s urroun ding lo cality in the future. Rather tha n empow ering the m unicipality to take remedial measures to fight blight as Article III, Section 61 does, Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) ena bles the mu nicipality to take preemptive actions to stop the spread of blight within an area by cond emnin g prop erties tha t are, in an d of the mself, b lighted. The express language of Article 23A, Section 2 (b) (37) requ ires that th e mu nicip ality, prior to exercising the power granted by the statute, must have urban renewal authority under Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution.9 The General Assembly granted the 9 Maryland C onstitution A rticle III, Section 6 1 provide s in pertinent p art: (a) The Gene ral Assembly may authorize and empower any county or any municipal corporation, by public local law: (1) To carry out urban renewal projects which shall be limited to slum clearance in slum or blighted areas and redevelopment or the rehabilitation of slum or blighted areas, and to include the acquisition, within the boundary lines of such county or municipal corporation, of land and property of every kind and every right, interest, franchise, easement or privilege therein, by purchase, lease, gift, condemnation or any other legal means. The term slum area shall mean any area where dwellings predom inate which, by reason of depreciation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or any combination of these fa ctors, are 18 City of F rede rick urba n ren ewa l auth ority in 1961. 19 61 Md . Laws, C hap. 632. It is apparent from the General Assembly s use of the phrase: In addition to the authority provided elsewhere in this subsection, and prov ided the municipal corporation has urban renewal authority granted under Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution, Md. Code (1957, 20 01 Rep l. Vol.), Art. 23A, §2 (b)(37) (emphasis added), that the General Assembly intended the grant of urban renewal authority under Article III, Section 61 to be a prerequisite to the municipality being able to condemn a blighted property within a nonblighted area. There fore, the co ndition prec edent enu merated in Section 2 (b)(37) of Article 23A that the municipality be empowered to condemn slum areas or blighted areas pursuant to Article III, Section 61 of the Maryland Constitution is satisfied in the present detrimental to the public safety, health or morals. The term blighted area shall mean an area in which a majority of buildings have dec lined in productivi ty by reason of obsolescence, depreciation or other causes to an extent they no longer justify fundamental repairs and adequate maintenance. *** (b) The general Assembly may grant to any county or any municipal corporation, by public local law, any and all additional power a nd author ity necessary or proper to carry into full force and effect any and all of the specific powers authorized by this section and to fully accomplish any and all of the purposes and objec ts contemp lated by the pro visions of th is section, provided such additional power or authority is not inconsistent with the term s and prov isions of this s ection or w ith any other prov ision or prov isions of the Constitutio n of Maryland. 19 case, and the City was empow ered to condem n individua l blighted pro perties located within non-b lighted a reas. Pickett presents us with three alternate bases for upholding th e Circuit Court s dismissal of the condemnation action: the action was ultra vires because o f the man ner in which the ordinance regarding the Property was approved by the Board of Aldermen; the Circuit Court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Prop erty; and the City s actions throughout the condemnation process were motivated by bad faith. We shall address each in turn. At argumen t before this C ourt and b y implication in h is brief, Pickett conceded that the enabling ordinance was signed by the Mayor of the City of Frederick prior to the signing of the ordinan ce that applie d specifica lly to the Prope rty; however, h e continue d to mainta in that because th e enabling ordinance was not in effect prior to the Board of Alderm en s factfinding hearing regarding the condemnation of the Property, the Board was acting beyond its authority and the ordinance condemning his property was ultra vires. We disagree. Pickett argues that a n effective enabling o rdinance w as required before the City could properly exercise the authority to condemn individual property under Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37). The express language of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) does not enumerate the enactment of an ena bling ordina nce amo ng the conditions preced ent to the m unicipality exercising its authority to condemn a blighted property within a non-blighted area. As we recently noted, where the legislature intends to include a particular provision within a statute, it genera lly does so expres sly. See Johnson v. Mayo r and City Counc il of Baltimo re City, 20 387 Md. 1, 16 n.9, 874 A.2d 439, 448 n.9 (2005). The G eneral As sembly has e xpressly required enabling ordinances or resolutions in other circumstances such as the issuance of bonds by muni cipal co rporatio ns, see Md. Cod e (1957, 2001 R epl. Vol.), Art. 23A §§ 33 and 34, yet has not done so in Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37). Therefore, because the General Assemb ly did not exp ressly require that th e municip ality enact an enabling ordina nce in Article 23A, Section 2 (b )(37), we c onclude th at an enab ling ordinan ce is not requ ired to utilize the powers explicated in that statute. We hold that the Board of Aldermen possessed the authority to conduct a fact-finding hearing when it did so and was empowered to pass the ordinance applicable to the property at issue in the case at bar prior to the Mayor s approval of the e nabling ordina nce. Furthermore, assuming that the City was required to enact an enabling ordinance to exercise its cond emna tion po wer un der Ar ticle 23A , Section 2 (b)(37), the ordinance permitting it to condemn the Property was not ultra vires. We addressed the similar issue of a legislature s ab ility to pass legislation p rior to an ena bling statute s e ffective da te in Blumenthal v. Clerk of the Circuit Co urt for Ann e Arund el County , 278 Md. 398, 365 A.2d 279 (1976). The action in Blumenthal arose out of legislation enacted by the General Assemb ly that permitted the counties and Baltimore City to establish through ordinance or resolution their own tax rate for the recordation of instruments conveying title and securing debts. Id. at 400, 365 A.2d at 281. The statute provided that it would become effective on July 1, 1968 . Id. at 409, 365 A.2d at 286. The counties and Baltimore City, however, 21 enacted tax rate ordinances prior to the effect ive date of the s tatute. Mr. Blum enthal and his co-plaintiffs argued that even if the statute permit[ted] Baltimore City and the counties to fix the recordation tax rate, the ordinances enacted by Baltimore City and by Baltimore and Charles Counties, though adopted after [the statute] was signed and though not themselves to beco me e ffec tive u ntil July 1, are void because they were promulgated prior to the effect ive date of the enablin g statute . Id. We determined that the County Commissioners may exercise the authority with which (they have) been expressly, or as a reasonable implication, invested by law. Id. (additions in original), quoting Montgomery Co. v. Met. District, 202 Md. 293, 304, 96 A.2d 353, 357 (1952). Concomitantly, we stated our conclusion that by reasonable implication [the statute] conferred upon the political subdivisions the power to adopt, prior to the effective date of the statute, implementing legislation which itself was not to become operative until that very same effective date. Blumenthal, 202 Md. at 409, 365 A.2d at 286. We also quoted with approval from the Supreme C ourt s reasoning in Druggan v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 36, 46 S.Ct. 14, 70 L.Ed. 151 (1925). In Druggan, Congress enacted the National Prohibition Act befo re Prohibition went into effect, but after the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified. Justice Holmes, writing for the Supreme Court, observed that Congress has a present power to enact laws intended to carry out constitutional provisions for the future when the time comes for them to take effect. Id. at 39, 46 S.Ct. at 1 5, 70 L .Ed. at 1 53. This reasoning is controlling in the case sub judice. Assuming arguendo, that the City 22 was required to enact an enabling ordinance prior to exercising its power to condemn individual blighted propertie s within a n on-blighted area, the Bo ard of A ldermen c ould nevertheless engage in a fact-finding hearing and pass an ordinance in anticipation of the Mayor s approval of the enabling ordinance under the rationale explicated in Blumenthal. Moreover, as Pickett conceded, the enabling ordinance was approved by the Mayor prior to her approval of the ordinance specifically applicable to the Property, and therefore, the ordinance permitting th e condem nation of th e Property was not effective before the enabling ordinance was given effect. Thus, pursuant to our reasoning in Blumenthal, the Board of Aldermen did not act beyond the scope of its authority in passing the ordinance authorizing the condemnation of Pickett s property prior to the mayor s signing of the enabling ordinance because the specific ordinance was not in effect prior to the enabling ordinance. Pickett also presents lack of in rem jurisdiction and bad faith as alternate grounds for affirming the Circuit Court s dismissal of the City s condemnation action. During the evidentiary hearing, the majority of both parties argument focused on the construction of Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37) and the issue of w hether the Board of Aldermen s passage of the ordinance condemning Pickett s property was ultra vires. Beyond Micha el Blank s deposition testimony concerning the issuance of the citations with respect to the Property and his awareness of an accurate address for service of process, which was read into the record, the issue of in rem jurisdiction w as not dev eloped. M oreover, it is un clear whe ther Pickett was arguing that the findings made by the Board of Aldermen were made in bad faith or that 23 the City s efforts to effect service of process to obtain in rem jurisdiction were made in bad faith, or both . Furtherm ore, the Circ uit Court, altho ugh prese nted with argument concerning in rem jurisdiction an d bad faith , did not spec ifically address th e contentions. Therefore, because there is a dea rth of nece ssary factual de tail in the record regarding these contentions, we will not affirm the Circuit Court s decision on those g round s. See Berman, 308 Md. at 263, 518 A.2 d at 728; see also Robeson, 285 Md. at 502, 403 A.2d at 1223 (and cases cited therein) , cert. denied, 444 U .S. 102 1, 100 S .Ct. 680 , 62 L.E d.2d 65 4 (198 0). Conclusion Based on the plain language of Maryland Code (1957, 2001 Repl. Vol.), Article 23A, Section 2 (b)(37), we conclude that the City of Frederick is empowered to condemn individual blighted properties within a non-blighted area. Moreover, although we may affirm the dismissal of the City s condemnation action on a lternate grounds, we determine that the Board of Aldermen s passage of the ordinance condemning Pickett s property was not an ultra vires action and thus, the dismissal may not be upheld on that ground. Furthermore, because the issues of lack of in rem jurisdiction or bad faith were not adequately developed in the record, w e will not affirm the dismissal on those grounds and leave those issues open for the C ircuit Co urt to ad dress o n rema nd if ne cessary. T herefo re, we r everse . JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THI S OP INIO N. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLEE. 24 25
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