Philip Morris v. Christensen
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In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-01-003927 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 68 September Term, 2005 PHILIP MOR RIS US A, INC ., et al. v. NON A K. C HRIST ENSE N, et al. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: August 4, 2006 This case concerns the statute of limitations and whether the commencement of a class action suspends the applicab le statute of limitations as to asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been perm itted to continue as a class action. W e are presented w ith two issue s. First, in a matter of first impression before this Court, we must determine whether, and un der what circumstances, the pendency of a putative class action tolls the statute of limitations for the members of the putative plaintiff class who are not named plaintiffs in the action. We shall affirm the judgmen t of the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als on this issue, and hold that the pendency of a putative class action tolls the statute of limitations on the causes of action asserted in the class action complaint for the putative plaintiff class members, but only when the class action complain t gives the de fendants in the class action complaint fair notice of the claims of the putative class member who claims the benefits of tolling. Second, we mu st determine whether the Court o f Special A ppeals was correct in vacating the trial court s grant of summary judgment in favor of petitioner Giant Food, LLC ( Giant ) against respondents and remanding the case to the Circuit Court for reconsideration of this issue in light of Benjamin v. Union Carbide, 162 Md. A pp. 173, 873 A .2d 463 (2005). We granted certiorari in this case and affirmed the Court of Special Appeals in GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. B enjamin , ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___, No. 52, Sept. Term 2005 (filed August 2, 2006). Accordingly, we shall vacate the judgment of the Court of Special A ppeals on this issue, and remand the case to the Court of Special Appea ls with instruc tions to vaca te the Circuit Court s grant of summary judgment in favor of Giant, and to remand the case to the Circuit Court for reconsideration of this issue in light of our opinion in Georgia -Pacific. I. On August 13, 2001, respondent Nona Christensen ( Ms. Christensen ), in her individual capacity and in her capacity as the personal representative of her deceased husband, Russell Christensen ( Mr. Christensen ), brought a survival an d wrong ful death action against petitioners. In her complaint, Ms. Christensen alleged causes of action for strict liability for failure to warn, fraudulent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy. She sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages, including damages for loss of consortium. On September 25, 2002, the com plaint was amend ed to add M r. Christensen s adult children, Lowell Christensen and Lisa Marie Christensen, as plaintiffs. Petitioners Philip Morris US A Inc., Lorillard Toba cco C o., and Liggett Group, Inc. are manufacturers of cigarette products. Petitioners Giant, Crown Service, Inc., George J. Falter Co., Inc., and A & A Tobacc o Com pany, Inc. are inv olved in the distribution an d sale of ciga rette pro ducts. With the exception of Giant, petition ers were a ll defenda nts in a prior putative class action suit filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, which was before us on a petition for -2- a writ of mandamus in Philip M orris v. Ang eletti, 358 M d. 689, 7 52 A.2 d 200 (2000). 1 In that case, we explained the procedural history of the litigation of the Philip M orris class action litigation as follows: On May 24, 1996, [the named plaintiffs] filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against all manufacturers of tobacco and their Maryland distributors, as well as two industry trade groups and a marketing and public relations firm, the majority of whom have jointly filed the petition now before this Court. Seeking both compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief, [the named plaintiffs] assert claims on behalf of themselve s and all simila rly situated Maryland residents (a) who have suffered or continue to suffer from physical injuries or disease caused by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco products, and/or (b) who are nicotine dependent and plead addiction as an injury. [The named plaintiffs ] Fourth Amended Complaint alleges ten counts, eight of w hich emb ody traditional causes of action sounding in tort and contract: fraud and deceit, negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, strict product liability, and conspiracy. In addition, the complaint avers that Petitioners have violated several provisions of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act, codified at Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.) §§ 13-101 to 13-501 of the Commercial Law Article. Lastly, Respondents plead a cause of action heretofore unrecog niz ed in Maryland, requestin g equitable/injunctive relief in the form of court-supervised, defendant-funded medical monitoring of the classes, to d etect, prevent and treat future disease, and to treat addiction. [The named plaintiffs] filed a Motion for Class Certification on September 5, 1997. Following oral argument 1 For convenience, we shall refer to Philip M orris v. Ang eletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000) as the Philip M orris class action, and to the class of petitioners who were defendants in this case as the Philip M orris petitioners. -3- on the motion, the Circuit Court issued an Order and Memorandum Opinion on January 28, 1998, granting the Motion for Class Certification. M ore specifically, the court approved for class action treatment, under Maryland Rule 2-231(b)(3), [the named plaintiffs ] eight traditional tort and contract causes of action and single consumer protection claim. In addition, the trial judge found [the named plaintiffs ] claim for medical monitoring appropriate for prosecution as a class action, u nder R ule 2-2 31(b)(2 ). Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 699-701, 752 A.2d at 205-06 (footnotes omitted). On Febru ary 19, 1998, the C ircuit Court issued a class certification order certifying the named plaintiffs propo sed clas s. See id. at 701-02, 752 A.2d at 206-07. After the Circuit Court issued this class certification Order, the defendants in the Philip M orris class action litigation petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Circuit Court to vacate the class certification Order. We granted the petition and issued a writ of mandamus on June 15, 2000 directing the Circuit Court to vacate its class certifica tion Or der. Id. at 787-89, 752 A.2d at 254-55. Mr. Christensen was not a named plaintiff in the Philip M orris class action litigation, nor did he file a motion to intervene as a plaintiff. He did, however, participate in the litigation. On May 11, 1999, he provided an affidavit on behalf of the named plaintiffs, discussing his smoking habit and his lung cancer. Further, on June 30, 1999, he testified at a de bene esse deposition, in which he also discussed his lung cancer diagnosis and the history of his cigarette use. -4- Returning to the case sub judice, petitioners moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court on September 4, 2003, argu ing that all of respondents claims were barred by the statutes of lim itations. The C ircuit Court g ranted th e motio n on N ovem ber 19, 2 003. In its memorandum opinion in support of the Order, the Circuit Court concluded that M r. Christensen was on inquiry notice by the Spring of 1998 of his claims against petitioners, rendering respondents survival claims untimely. The Circuit Court rejected respondents argument that the statute of limitations was tolled in any way by the pendency of the Philip Morris class action. The court held that respondents wrongful death claims were also untimely, reasoning that Maryland s wrongful death statute does not permit a wrongful death plaintiff to maintain a cause of action once the statute of limitations for causes of action arising out of the underlying wrongful acts has run. Respon dents noted a timely app eal to the Court o f Spec ial App eals. In a reported opinion, that Court reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court as to all petitioners except Giant, vacated the judgm ent of the Circuit Cou rt granting summary judgment to petitioner Giant and remanded the case to that court for further co nsideration on the issue of Gian t s summary judgm ent mo tion. See Christense n v. Philip M orris, 162 Md. App. 616, 875 A.2d 823 (2005). The Court of Special Appeals held that the pendency of the Philip M orris class action tolled the statute of limitations for Mr. Christensen s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners, and reversed the C ircuit Court s grant of sum mary judgment to the Philip M orris petitioners on this b asis. See Christensen, 162 Md. App. at 659, 875 A.2d at 848. Because -5- Giant was not a defendant in the Philip M orris class action litigation, however, the Court of Special Appeals concluded it was necessary to reach the issue of when Mr. Richardson was placed on inquiry no tice of his claim s arising out o f his cigarette s moking in order to determine whether the Circuit C ourt s grant o f summ ary judgmen t to Giant was prop er. See id. at 659, 875 A.2d at 849. Taking note of the fact that it had recently addressed a similar issue in Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corporation, 162 Md. A pp. 173, 873 A .2d 463 (2005), the Court of Special Appeals vacated the Circuit C ourt s grant o f summ ary judgmen t to Giant, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this case . See id. at 666-68, 875 A.2d a t 853-5 6. Petitioners timely petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari, which we granted to consider the following two questions: 1. May M aryland courts c reate a judicia l exception to statutes of limitations under which the filing of a class action lawsuit automatically tolls the runnin g of limitation s for all claims of would be class members? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in remanding the survival claims for reconsideration in light of Benjamin v. Union Carbide Corp., 162 Md. App. 173, 873 A.2d 463 (20 05), when that decision, as well a s this Court s preceden t, supports the trial court s determination that those claims were barred by the general statute of limitations . . . ? Philip Morris v. Christensen, 389 M d. 124, 8 83 A.2 d 914 ( 2005) . -6- II. Petitioners offer three main arguments on the issue of class action tolling. First, they contend that this Court s precedents preclude judicial recognition of a tolling excep tion to a statute of limitations such as the class action tolling exception recognized by the Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974), maintaining that the creation of such an exception is the exclusive prerogative of the Gene ral Assem bly. Second, th ey argue that ev en if we do conclude that we have the authority to judici ally recog nize a c lass actio n tolling excep tion, we should not ado pt a version of class action tolling that would toll the statute of limitations in mass-tort putative class actions such as the Philip M orris putative class action. Third , petitioners m aintain that even if we were to adopt the rationale of American Pipe, the class action tolling rule enunciated therein would not render respondents claims timely, given the Supreme C ourt s elaboration of American Pipe in Chardon v. Soto, 462 U.S.650, 103 S. Ct. 2611, 77 L. Ed. 2d 74 ( 1983) . Respon dents reply that there is precedent in Maryland law for the judicial recognition of tolling exceptions to statutes of limitations. They then argue that Maryland should adopt American Pipe tolling, and sh ould not ca rve out an e xception for mass-tort putative class actions to the class action tolling rule of American Pipe, because adopting such an exception would be inconsistent with this Court s conclusion in Philip M orris v. Ang eletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000), that there is no per se prohibition against mass-tort class action -7- suits, but that each such suit m ust be examined ind ividually on its merits to determine whether certification o f the suit as a class action is appropria te. Finally, respond ents reply to petitioners f inal argum ent that Chardon is inapplicab le to the facts of this case because Mr. Christense n s claims d id not accru e until after the filing of the p utative class a ction in Philip M orris. III. A. This Court s Authority to Recognize American Pipe Tolling As a threshold matter, we first consider the issue of whether this Court has the authority to recognize a tolling exception to statutes of limitations akin to the American Pipe class action tolling exception. Although, as petitioners quite correctly point out, our preceden ts generally have been less than hospitable to the concept of judi ciall y created tolling exceptions, this lack of hospitality is not uniform. In short, although we have on several occasions declined to recognize tolling exceptions, we have been willing to do so when the tolling exception was consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations. Thus, because the version of American Pipe tolling we f ind to be prefera ble is consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations, we conclude that we do have th e authority to recognize this version of American Pipe tolling. In Bertonazzi v. Hillman, 241 Md. 361, 216 A.2d 723 (1966), we recognized a tolling exception to a statute of limitations, and, in the course of doing so, delineated the scope of -8- our authority to recognize such exceptions. There, we addressed the issue of whether a statute of limitations for the filing of a claim against a decedent s estate that required such a suit to be filed within six months after the qualification of the estate s personal representative was tolled during the pendency of an action against the estate that had been filed in the wrong venue.2 See Bertonazzi, 241 Md. at 363-64, 216 A.2d at 724-25. Appellan t, mistakenly believing that appellee resided in Baltimore County rather than Baltimore City after misreading a map, filed suit in Baltim ore Cou nty within the six month limitations period . Id. at 363, 216 A.2d at 724. After the suit in Baltimore County was dismissed for improper venue , appellant then filed suit in Baltimore City, the proper venue, but only after six months had passed from the time of the appointment of the personal representative. Id. at 364, 216 A.2d at 724. Appellant argued that the statute of limitations was tolled during the p endency of the suit in Baltimore County, but the Baltimore City trial court re jected th is argum ent and dismiss ed the c ase. Id. at 364, 216 A.2d at 724-25. 2 The statute, Md. C ode (1957, 1964 Repl. Vol.), Art. 93 § 1 12, provid ed in pertinent part as follows: Executors and adm inistrators . . . shall be lia ble to be sue d in any court of law . . . in any action (except slander) which might have been maintained a gainst the deceased; . . . provided, however, that any such action for injuries to the person to be maintainab le against an executor or administrator must be commenced within six calendar months after the date of the qualification of the executor or administrator of the testator or intestate . -9- We reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the running of the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the suit in Baltim ore Co unty. Id. at 365, 216 A.2d at 725. In support of our holding, we first noted that, at the time, Maryland was one of the few jurisdictions without a savings rule that permitted a suit filed prior to the expiration of the applicab le limitations provision th at was dism issed for a re ason unre lated to the m erits to be refiled within a specifi ed time period . Id. We then examined the tolling rule urged by the plaintiff in light of the purposes statutes of limitations are intended to serve . See id. at 366-67, 216 A .2d at 726. In this vein, we noted that [s]tatutes of limitations are designed primarily to assure fairness to defendants on the theory that claims, asserted after evidence is gone, memories have faded, and witnesses disapp eared, a re so stal e as to b e unjus t. Id. at 367, 216 A.2d at 726. Under the facts in Bertonazzi, we concluded that tolling the running of the limitations p eriod during the pendency of the suit filed in the improper venue was consistent with this primary purpose because the appellee . . . was as fully put on notice of the appella nt s claim by suit in Baltimore County as she would have been by suit in Baltimore City. Id. (emphasis added ). The rule we established in Bertonazzi may be distilled as follows: we will recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations if, and only if, the following two conditions are met: (1) there is persuasive authority or persuasive policy considerations supporting the recognition of the tolling exception, and (2) recognizing the tolling exception is consistent with the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes o f limitatio ns. See id. -10- at 366-67, 216 A.2d at 726 (noting that our interpretation of the statute of limitations at issue in Bertonazzi is consistent with the purposes and aims of limitation statutes generall y and is supported by eminent and persuasive authority ); see also Weaver v. Leiman, 52 Md. 708, 718 (188 0) (o bser ving that r unning o f a statute of lim itatio ns m ay be suspended if there is a cer tain a nd w ell-d efin ed ex cept ion c learl y establish ed by judicial authority (emphasis added)). The second condition ensures that our recognition of a tolling exception to a statute of limitations does not invade the prerogative of the G eneral A ssemb ly. See id. at 367-68, 216 A.2d at 726-27 (noting that tolling exceptions can be recognized when they gra tif[y] legislative intent, and in order to prevent p erversion o f the policy and purpose o f a statute of limitations ). 3 3 For this reason, we disce rn no merit in petitioners suggestion that recognition of a tolling exception to a statute of limitations is per se inconsistent with the separation of powers principles embodied in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Interpreting statutory enactmen ts in order to as certain legislativ e intent is unquestionably a core judicial function; it hardly needs to be said that this Court does not exceed the scope of its pow ers under Article 8 in so do ing. See Stearman v. State Farm, 381 Md. 436, 454, 849 A.2d 539, 550 (2004) (interpreting statutory law is a sp here that be longs uniq uely to the judiciary ); cf. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 11 14 (2005) (cardinal rule o f statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the leg islature). Furthe rmore, it is well-established that we may look to the underlying purpose of a statutory enactment in order to ascer tain legis lative inte nt. See Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1114. In addition, as discussed infra, our conclu sion that w e have the authority to recognize a version of American Pipe tolling is bolste red by the fact that w e find sup port for its recognition in Md. Rule 2-231, which establishes the procedures for class actions. We have long held that Article 8 does not impose a complete separation between the branches of govern ment. Benson v. State, 389 Md . 615 , 644 , 887 A.2d 525, 54 2 (20 05). Con sequ ently, we do not exceed our authority under Article 8 when we exercise our rulemaking authority to adopt a M aryland Rule that effects the operation of a statute of limitations enacted by the (contin ued...) -11- The cases where we have refused to recognize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations are not inconsistent with this rule. For instance, in Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef, 281 Md. 207, 378 A.2d 1100 (1977), we declined to recognize a tolling exception to the default three year statute of limitations on civil actions . Walko, 281 Md. at 208, 378 A.2d at 1100. In Walko, appellant argued that the statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of its motion to intervene in another suit involving appellee in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, rendering its subsequent suit against appellee time ly. See id. at 209, 378 A.2d at 1101. In rejecting appellant s claim that the pendency of his motion to intervene tolled the statute of limitations, we contrasted appellant s proposed tolling exception with the ex ception w e recogniz ed in Bertonazzi, effectively concluding that appellant s proposed tolling rule did not meet either of the Bertonazzi require ments. See id. at 214-15, 378 A.2d at 1104 ( [ w]hatev er facts may have been present in Bertonazzi . . . that moved us . . . do not exist here ). We did not find that the first requirement, that the proposed tolling exception needs to be supported by persuasive authority or argument, was met, because appellant s propo sed tolling rule would p ermit a plaintif f to effec tively postpone the running of the statute [of limitations] for an indefinite period of time. Id. at 215, 378 A.2d at 1104. Nor did we find that the second Bertonazzi requirement, consistency with the purposes of statutes of limitations, had been met. We foun d that appellant s actions 3 (...continued) Gene ral Ass embly. -12- did not rise to a level of ordinary diligence in pursuing a cause of action, and thus concluded that permitting tolling unde r these circum stances w ould be incons istent with the legislative intent behind statutes of limitations, which embody a legislative judgment of what is deemed an adequ ate period o f time in w hich a pers on of ord inary diligence s hould bring his action. Id. (quoting Ferucci v. Jack, 255 Md. 523, 526, 258 A.2d 414, 415 (1969)). In other cases in which w e have de clined to reco gnize a tolling exception to a statute of limitations, we have also found, as we did in Walko, that the tolling exception under examin ation failed to meet one or both of the Bertonazzi require ments. See, e.g., Boo th Glass Co. v. Huntingfield Corp., 304 Md. 615, 624-25, 500 A.2d 641, 645-46 (1985) (declining to recognize a tolling exception that would suspend the running of the statute of limitations applicable to a claim based on negligent installation of a product during the time that the installer of the product attempted to repair the p roduct bec ause there w as authority only for the proposition that the initiation of repairs suspends the running of the statute of limitations on a theory of equitable es toppel, and , under M aryland law, eq uitable estop pel can suspend the running of a statute o f limitations on ly if the defendant holds out an inducement not to file suit or indicates that limitations will not be plead, neither of which is accomplished by undertakin g repairs of a produc t alleged to ha ve been n egligently installed); Burket v. Aldridge, Adm r, 241 Md. 423, 428, 216 A.2d 910, 912 (1966) (declining to recognize a tolling exception that would toll the general three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort -13- actions upon the alleged tortfeasor s death because the absence of an express statutory provision providing for such to lling was u nderstand able in the light of the purposes of Statutes of Limitatio ns ); McMahan v. Dorchester Fert. Co., 184 Md. 155, 159-60, 40 A.2d 313, 315-16 (1944) (declining to recognize a tolling exception to a twelve-year statute of limitations for initiation of an action to collect on a n ote that would suspend the running of the statute upon a payment of principal on grounds that the statute expressly provided for a three-year suspensio n upon e ach payme nt of interest, ind icating the leg islature had e xpressly considered when and how payments on the note should suspend the running of the limitations period and decided that payments of principal should not suspend the running of the limitations period). In assessing whether we have authority to recognize a version of the American Pipe class action tolling rule, it is also significant that the principal justification for recognition of such a rule is that it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the class action procedures set out in Md. Rule 2-231. The Rules of Procedure established by this Court in its exercise of its rulemaking powe r have th e force of law . See Do tson v. State, 321 Md. 515, 523, 583 A.2d 710, 714 (1991 ). Thus, insofar as our recognition of an American Pipe class action tolling rule is groun ded in Ru le 2-231, it diff ers from th ose situations where we have declined to recognize a tolling exception in part because there was no provision in existing law that supported the tolling e xceptio n. Comp are Boo th, 304 Md. at 624, 500 A.2d at 645 (declining to recognize a tolling exception because the legislature . . . made no such -14- provision that would toll the statute in accordance with the proposed tolling excep tion) with Walko, 281 Md. at 211-12, 378 A.2d at 1102 (concluding that the statute of limitations w ould not be tolled during pendency of a motion to intervene [a]bsent a statutory provision saving the plaintiff s rights to bring suit upon d enial of the motion to interven e). Indeed, this Court no t only has the au thority to adopt rules that alter the operation of existing statutes of limitations, it has exercised its rulemaking authority to adopt such a rule. Maryland Rule 2-101(b), added to the Maryland Rules in 1992, provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided by statute, if an ac tion is filed in a United States District Court or a court of a nother state within the period of lim itations prescrib ed by Mar yland law and that court enters an order of dismissal (1) for lack of jurisdiction, (2) because the court declines to exercise jurisdiction, or (3) because the action is barred by the statute of limitations required to be applied by that court, an action filed in a circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the order of dismissal shall be treated a s timely file d in this S tate. Thus, to the extent that Rule 2-231 provides authority for our recognition of a version of the American Pipe class action tolling rule, our adoption of Rule 2-101(b) provides support for our recognition of such a rule, because our adoption of Rule 2-101(b) provides precedent for alteration of existing statutes of limitations by a Maryland Rule. B. The Scope of the American Pipe Class Ac tion Tolling Rule We now consider the arguments for adopting a version of the rule at all, and those for adopting particular versions of the rule. To this end, we begin by examining in detail -15- American Pipe and its progeny, in particular Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 103 S . Ct. 2392, 76 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1983). In American Pipe, the State of Utah filed a civil antitrust action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah for treble damages against American Pipe and the other petitioners, alleging that they had fixed the price of co ncrete and steel pipe sold to the State. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 541, 94 S. Ct. at 760. The suit was filed as a class action suit, purporting to be brought on beha lf of public bodies and agencies of the state and local government in the State of Uta h who are end users o f pipe a cquired from th e defe ndants , and on b ehalf of other wester n States that had not bro ught sim ilar action s. Id. The suit by the State of Utah was timely under the applicable statute of limitations, 15 U .S.C. § 16(b), which provides that a party has one year from the time that civil or criminal proceedings brought by the United States to enforce the a ntitrust laws h ave conc luded to file a civil antitrust s uit. Id. at 541-42, 94 S. Ct. at 760.4 After the suit was transferred to the United States District Court for the Central District of Califo rnia by the Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation, the petitioners moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) for a n order that th e suit could not be maintained as a class action. Id. at 542, 9 4 S. Ct. a t 760-6 1. The trial judg e grante d the m otion. Id. at 542-43, 94 4 The United States brought criminal and civil antitrust actions against American Pipe and the other petitioners. These proceedings concluded on May 24, 1968, when a consent judgment was en tered in the civil a ction. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 542, 94 S. Ct. at 760. The suit was filed on May 13, 19 69, m aking it t imely by ele ven da ys under 15 U.S .C. § 16(b). Id. at 542, 9 4 S. Ct. a t 760. -16- S. Ct. at 761. In its memorandu m opinion in supp ort of the Order, the trial court evaluated whether the proposed class satisfied the four pr erequisites fo r bringing a class action se t forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). 5 Id. at 543, 94 S. Ct. at 761. The trial court concluded that, although the prerequisites of commonality, typicality, and the suitability of the class representative had all been met, the requirement of numero sity had not be en met, on the groun d that the estim ate of the size of the plaintiff class provided in the complaint was, in the court s opinion, overstated. Id. Con sequ ently, the trial court concluded that joinder of all the members of the class w as not im practica ble, and refuse d to certi fy the pro posed plaintiff class. Id. After the trial court denied class certification, approximately sixty members of the proposed plaintiff class moved to intervene as plaintiffs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, moving to interv ene as o f right p ursuan t to Fed . R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), and in the alternative, to intervene by permission pursua nt to Fe d. R. C iv. P. 24 (b)(2). Id. at 543-44, 94 S. Ct. at 761. The trial cou rt denied the request on grounds th at the motion s to intervene were 5 Federal R ule of Civ il Procedur e 23(a) read s as follow s: One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repres entative partie s will fairly and adequ ately prote ct the inte rests of the class . Conditions (1)-(4) in the rule are commonly referred to as the prerequisites of num erosity, com mona lity, typicality, and the adequacy of representation. See Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 732-43, 752 A .2d at 223-29 (employin g this terminology and discussing these conditions). We shall adhere to this common usage in this opinion. -17- untimely, concluding that the running of the limitations period had not been tolled by the filing of the putative class action o n their b ehalf. Id. at 544, 94 S. Ct. at 762. On appeal, the United States Co urt of Ap peals for the Ninth C ircuit reversed , holding tha t the limitations period was tolled by the filing of the pendency of the putative class action, and did no t begin to run again until the trial court entered its Orde r denying class ce rtificatio n. Id. at 544-45, 94 S. Ct. at 762. The Suprem e Court, in upholding the judgm ent of the U nited States C ourt of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit, began by examining the history of the then-current version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, contrasting it with the pre-1966 version of the R ule. See id. at 545-50 , 94 S. Ct. at 762-64.6 The C ourt no ted that, u nder the prior version of the Rule, there was no 6 Prior to 1966, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 read as follows: (a) Represe ntation. If per sons cons tituting a class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on beh alf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the class is (1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the own er of a prim ary right refuses to enforce that right and a memb er of the class thereby beco mes entitled to enforce it; (2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or (3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a commo n relief is sou ght. (b) Secondary action by shareholders. In an ac tion broug ht to (contin ued...) -18- mechanism for determ ining at any po int in advan ce of fina l judgmen t which of those potential members of the class claimed in the comp laint were actual members and would be bound by the judgment. Id. at 545- 46, 94 S . Ct. at 76 2-63. Accordingly, the prior version of the Rule was characterized as bein g merely an invitation to join der a n invitation to become a fellow traveler in the litigation, which might or might not be accepted. Id. at 546, 94 S. Ct. at 763 (quoting 3B JAMES W M. M OORE E T. A L., M OORE S F EDERAL P RACTICE ¶ 23.10(1) (2d ed.)). This facet of the prior rule permitted members of the putative plaintiff 6 (...continued) enforce a secondary right on the part of o ne or more shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the compla int shall be ve rified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he c omplains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of th e United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. Th e compla int shall also set f orth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desire s, and the rea sons for h is failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort. (c) Dismissal or compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule n otice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court d irects. If the righ t is one defin ed in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court re quires it. -19- class to sit on the side lines during the course o f litigation and intervene only if they concluded that the course of events during trial was favorable, because there was no fear that they would be bound by an unfavorable final judgment if they chose not to interv ene. Id. at 547, 94 S. Ct. at 763. It takes little perspicacity to discern that this facet of the R ule prompted objections on grounds of unfairness to defendants, who were not given a corresponding right under the prior version of the Rule to potentially hav e multiple attem pts to achie ve a fa vorabl e outco me in litig ation. See id.7 The Court then observed that the 196 6 amend ments to R ule 23 w ere intende d to remed y this perc eived d efect. Id. The Court exp lained the m echanics a nd ultimate e ffects of these amendments as follows: Under the present Rule, a determin ation whe ther an action shall be maintained as a class actio n is made b y the court (a)s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action . . .. Rule 23(c)(1). Once it is determined that the action may be maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)(3), the court is mandated to direct to members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances advising them that they may be excluded from the class if the y so request, that they will be bound by the judgment, whether favorable or not if they do not request exclusion, and that a member who does not request exclusion may enter an appearance in the case. Rule 23(c)(2). Finally, the prese nt Rule pro vides that in R ule 23(b)(3) actions the judgment shall include all those found to be members of the class w ho have r eceived notice and who have not requested exclusion. Rule 23(c)(3). Thus, potential class 7 As the Court noted, practice under the former version of the Rule sometimes permitted membe rs of the putative class to await eve n final judg ment on th e merits to determ ine wh ether to j oin the s uit. American Pipe, 414 U .S. at 547 , 94 S. C t. at 763. -20- members retain the option to participate in or withdraw from the class action only until a point in the litigation as soon as practicable after the commencement of the action when the suit is allowed to continue as a class action and they are sent notice of their inclusion within the confines of the class. T hereafter they are either nonparties to the suit and ineligible to participate in a recovery or to be boun d by a judgm ent, or else they are full members who must abide by the final judgment, whether favora ble or ad verse. Id. at 547-49, 94 S. Ct. at 763 -64 (footnotes om itted). The Court then proceeded to articulate the rationale for its holding. The principal rationale offered by the Court was that tolling was necessary to effectuate the purposes behind the revis ed vers ion of R ule 23. Id. at 553-54, 94 S. Ct. at 766. The Court noted that [a] contrary rule . . . would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure. Id. at 553, 94 S . Ct. at 766. Th is is so because, without a rule that tolls the statute of limitations, members of the putative class would be forced to file protective motions to join or intervene in the action in order to ensure that they would not be barred from bringing suit individually in the event that the cou rt determined that the ac tion cou ld not b e main tained a s a class a ction. See id. at 553-54, 94 S. Ct. at 766. Thus, the Court, in an oft-quoted passage, concluded as follows: We are convinced that the rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must be that the commencement of a class action susp ends the ap plicable statute of limitations a s to all asserted members of the class w ho wou ld have been parties had the suit bee n perm itted to co ntinue a s a class a ction. Id. at 554, 9 4 S. Ct. a t 766.. -21- Despite the appare nt breadth o f the abov e-quoted la nguage, b oth the opin ion of the Court and, in particu lar, the concurring opinion o f Justice Bla ckmun, w ere carefu l to note that the class action tolling rule adopted by the Court in American Pipe was to be applied in such a way that its application was not inconsistent with the purposes behind statutes of limitations. The Court, noting that statutes of limitations are in tended to g ive notice o f suit to defenda nts within a reasonable amount of time to prevent loss of evidence and the fading of witnesses memories, concluded that these policies underlying statutes of limitation were not undermined under the facts of American Pipe. Id. at 554-55, 94 S. Ct. at 766-67. The Court stated as follows: The[se] policies . . . are satisfied when, as here, a named plaintiff who is found to be representative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. Within the period set by the statute of limitations, the defendants have the essential information necessary to determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation, whether the actual trial is conducted in the form of a class action, as a joint suit, or as a principal su it with addition al interv enors. Id. at 554-55, 94 S. Ct. at 766-67 (footnotes omitted). The Court s concern with ensuring that the tolling rule it was adopting was not at odds with the policies underlying statutes of limitations was further evidenced by the narrowness of its statement of its holding: We hold that in this posture, at least where class action status has been denied solely because of failure to demonstrate that the class is so nu merous that joinder o f all members is impracticab le, the commen cement o f the origina l class suit tolls -22- the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make tim ely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit in approp riate for class ac tion statu s. Id. at 552-53, 94 S. Ct. at 765 -66 (emphasis add ed). Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in American Pipe, wrote sep arately to emphasize that he did not regard the Court s opinion as necessarily tolling the statute of limitations for every member of a putative plaintiff class once a putative class action has been filed. See id. at 561, 94 S. Ct. 770 (B lackmun, J., concurring). Interpreting the Court s holding to toll the statute of limitations only for putative class members who move to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, Justice B lackmun noted that, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b), a trial court may deny intervention if it concludes that [it] will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. Id. at 562, 94 S. Ct. at 770 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b )). Given the importance of upholding the purposes behind statutes of limitations, Ju stice Black mun cau tioned that trial c ourts shou ld exercise th eir discretion under R ule 24(b) to prevent attorneys in class actions cases from fram[in g] their pleadings as a class action, intentionally, to attract and save members of the purported class who have slept on their rights. Id. at 561-62, 94 S. Ct. at 770. In Crown, Cork & Seal, the Court considered whether the filing of a putative class action tolled the statute of limitations for putative class members who filed individual claims after class certification was denied rather than intervened in the original action, an issue left unresolved by American Pipe. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 348-49, 103 S. Ct. at 2395. -23- The Court answered this question in the affirmative, holding that American Pipe applies to toll the statute of limitations for the individual claims of putative class members filed after denial of class certif ication just as it tolls the s tatute of limitation s for inte rvenor s. See id. at 350-51, 1 03 S. Ct. at 2 395-96. T he Cou rt reasoned that extension of American Pipe to later-filed individual claims was necessary to prevent individual putative class members from filing protective claims, and hence was necessary to avoid the inefficiencies that the American Pipe tolling rule wa s design ed to av oid. Id. at 350-51 , 103 S. Ct. a t 2396. Th is is so, the Court maintained , because there are many reasons for a plaintiff to prefer filing an individual claim over intervention: the putative class member may choose to file in a more convenient forum than the forum of the original putative class action, the putative class member may not wish to share control of the litigation with the other plaintiffs in the original action, and, if intervention as of right is not available, the plaintiff runs a real risk of a denial of its m otion to interven e unde r Fed. R . Civ. P. 2 4(b). Id. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O Conno r, wrote separately to reiterate the view expressed by Justice Blackmun in his concurrence in American Pipe. Id. at 354, 103 S. Ct. at 2398 (Powell, J., co ncurring). Ju stice Pow ell admonished that the American Pipe tolling rule should not be read . . . as leaving a plaintiff free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status. Id. He endorsed Justice Blackmun s view in his concurrence in American Pipe that, when a putative class member seeks to intervene by permissio n pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b) after denial of -24- class certification, the trial court should protect defendants from having to defend claims of which they had no prio r notice. Id. at 355, 103 S. Ct. at 2398. Justice Powell then cautioned that the same c oncern ab out ensuring th at defendants are not prejudiced by permissive intervenors asserting claims of which the class action suit did not give no tice applies w ith equal force w hen a puta tive class member files a separa te claim after class certificatio n is denied, stating as follows: Sim ilarly, when a plaintiff invokes American Pipe in support of a separate lawsuit, the district court should take care to e nsure that the suit raises cla ims that concern the same evidence, memories, and witne sses as the su bject matter of the original class suit, so that the defendant will not be prejudiced. Claims as to whic h the defe ndant w as not fairly placed on notice by the class suit are not protected under American Pipe and are barred by the statu te of lim itations. Id. (quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 562, 94 S . Ct. at 770 (Blackmu n, J., concurring)). The wide majority of states with class action rules similar to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 have followed American Pipe and endorsed a class action tolling rule.8 State court opinions endorsing American Pipe class action tolling and lower federal court opinions applying it, 8 See, e.g ., Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Oh io 2002); Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 954 S.W.2d 93 9, 941 (Ark. 1997 ); Am. Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757, 76 2 (Utah 1992); Levi v. Un iv. of Haw aii, 679 P.2d 129, 132 (Haw . 1984); Waltrip v. Sid well Corp., 678 P.2d 128, 13 2 (Kan. 1984); Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 646 P.2d 988, 101 0 n.28 (Ida ho 1982 ); Nolan v. Sea Airmotive, Inc., 627 P.2d 1035, 10 42 (Alask a 1981); First Baptist Church of Citronelle v. Citronelle-M obile Gathering, Inc., 409 So.2d 727, 729-30 (Ala. 1981); Alessand ro v. State Farm, 409 A.2d 347, 350 n.9 (P a. 1979); Steinberg v. Chicago Med. Sch., 371 N.E.2d 634, 645 (Ill. 1977 ); Bergquist v. Int l Realty, Ltd., 537 P .2d 553 , 561 (O r. 1975 ). -25- however, vary in terms of their depth of treatment, and, most significantly, in terms of the emphas is they place on ensurin g that American Pipe is applied co nsistently with the purposes of statutes of limitations. In Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 751 P.2d 923 (Cal. 1988 ), the Californ ia Supreme Court aptly observed that American Pipe represented an attempt to balance two fundamental policy conside rations, the protection of the class action device, and the effectuation of the purp oses of the statute of limitations. Id. at 935. Consequently, the Jolly court observed, some courts implementing American Pipe have emphasized the first policy consideration, and oth ers hav e emp hasized the latter. Id. Courts emphasizing the policy of ensuring that the class action rule functions efficiently have either held explicitly that the concern of the American Pipe Court with ensuring that efficien cy of class action procedure and avoiding duplicate individual filings takes primacy over the promotion of the purposes of statutes of limitations, or have adopted or implemented American Pipe in such a way as to implicitly indicate such primacy by omission of discussion of the purposes of statutes of limitation. See, e.g., Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 635 F.2d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that it was implicit in American Pipe that effec tuation of the purpose of litigative efficiency and economy, (which Rule 23 was designed to perform) transcends the policies of repose and certainty behind statutes of limitations ); Blaylock, 954 S.W.2d at 941 (citing American Pipe and concluding that pending putative class action tolled applica ble statu te of lim itations w ithout fu rther an alysis). -26- Cases applying American Pipe that have focused on the policies underlying statutes of limitations, echoing Justice Blackmun s concurrence in Americ an Pipe and Justice Powell s concurrence in Crown, Cork & Seal, have held that American Pipe class action tolling applies only when the class action complaint gives the defendants notice of the claims of the putative class members who intervene or file suit individually after class certification is denied . See, e.g., McCarthy v. Kliendienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (declining to adopt a per se rule that w ould render American Pipe inapplicable when class certification is denied on g roun ds of lack of typ icality or commonality, but noting that the class action c omplaint m ust result in the defendant receiv[ing] fair notice of the nature of the intervenors claims for American Pipe to apply); Jolly, 751 P.2d at 936 (dec lining to apply class action tolling where class action complaint sought only injunctive relief for the putative class, but individual claim filed after class certification was denied sought money damages). This divergence in the interpretation and application of American Pipe and its progeny is understandable given the ambig uity in American Pipe s discussion of the relation between the purposes of statutes of limitations and the class actio n tolling rule the Court articulated in the opin ion. Specifically, the Court s discussion of this issue in American Pipe is ambiguous between (1) imposing an additional necessary condition for the application of the class action tolling rule it was adopting, and (2) simply claiming that the rule it was adopting was in fact consistent with the purposes underlying statutes of limitations, at least under the -27- facts of the case before it. Thus, when the Court in American Pipe noted that the policies underlying statutes o f limitatio ns we re satisfi ed wh en def endan ts have been notifie[ d] . . . not only of the substantive claims against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs, it is unclear whether the American Pipe Court intended, by virtue of the narrow statement of its holding, to adopt a requirement that a defendant be so notified by a class action complaint in order for a plaintiff to assert class action tolling against the defenda nt. The differing approaches taken by courts applying American Pipe identified by the Jolly court, in our view, can be seen as representing the differen t possible resolutions of this ambiguity in American Pipe. We adopt the American Pipe class action to lling rule, and its extension in Crown, Cork & Seal, but with the understanding that the American Pipe tolling rule incorporates the discussion of notice as an additional requirement that must be met in order for a plaintiff or intervenor to claim the benefit of the rule. Md. Rule 2-231 was modeled after the 1966 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, the version of Rule 23 in effect when American Pipe was decided. See Md. Rule 2-231, Source Note (every subsection of the Rule, other than subsection (g) d ealin g with discov ery, derived in whole or in part from the 1966 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). In particular, subsections (a ) and (c) of the 1966 version of Rule 23, those aspects of the Rule principally relied upon by the American Pipe Court, are virtually identical to subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 2-231. We have long held that federal caselaw interpreting a Federal R ule of Civil Procedure is persuasive authority for the interpretation -28- of a Maryland Rule patterned after the federal rule. See, e.g., Garay v. Overholtzer, 332 Md. 339, 355, 631 A.2d 429, 437 (1993 ). In particular, in in terpreting R ule 2-231 we have looked to federal au thority interpreting Rule 23 given the dearth of authority in Maryland analyzing the specific requirements of . . . Rule 2-231. Philip M orris, 358 Md. at 724, 752 A.2d at 219. We find the principa l rationale offered by the American Pipe and Crown, Cork & Seal courts for the recognition of a class ac tion tolling rule to be persua sive. One o f the main reasons for having a class action p rocedure in the first place is, as the American Pipe Court correctly observed, the promotion of judicial econo my and e fficien cy. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553, 94 S. Ct. at 766. Class action procedures are designed to promote these ends by preventing duplication , permitting w hen possib le the claims of large classes of persons to be litigated at once rather than individually or as a joint action in order to avoid unn ecessary repeated litigation of substantially similar issues, and to avoid the procedural inefficiencies involved with the joinder of large numbers of parties and with the litigation of joint actions involving large numbers of parties. The ends of eff iciency and economy, therefore, are undermined to the extent that members of a putative plaintiff class have a genuine incentive to file prophylactic motions to intervene o r individual complaints in orde r to prevent their claims being barred by the statute of limitations. We agree with the American Pipe Court that, in the absence of a class action tolling rule, putative plain tiff class me mbers w ill indeed have a sufficiently strong incentive to file protective claims to justify adoption of a class action to lling rule . -29- Moreover, we agree with the Crown, Cork & Seal Court s co nclusion tha t there is no reason to extend tolling to putative class members who intervene in an action after class certification is denied but to deny it to individual class m embers who la ter file individual suits.9 As the Crown, Cork & Seal Court ob served, filing an individual claim may be strategically more advantageous than intervention for a putative plaintiff class member who 9 We express no opinion as to whether we would recognize the doctrine of crossjurisdictional class action tolling, under which the filing of a putative class action in a different jurisdiction tolls the statute of limitations for putative class mem bers to file individual claims in the jurisdiction recognizing cross-jurisdictional tolling while the issue of class certificatio n is pending in the other jurisdiction. The supreme courts of states that recognize class action to lling have sp lit on the issue of whether to adopt cross-jurisdictional tolling. Compare Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Oh io 2002) (recognizing cross-jurisdictional class action tolling) with Maestas v. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc., 33 S.W.3 d 805, 80 8 (Tenn. 2 000) (dec lining to recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 11 02, 1104 (Ill. 1998) (same ). Likewise, federal co urts exercisin g diversity jurisdiction have split on the issue of whether state suprem e courts would recogn ize cros s-jurisdic tional cla ss action tolling. Compare Primavera Familien stifung v. Ask in, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that Connecticut would recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling) with Wade v. Danek Med., Inc., 182 F.3d 2 81, 286-8 8 (4th Cir. 19 99) (conc luding that V irginia would not recog nize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling). Jurisdictions that have declined to recognize cross-jurisdictional class action tolling have done so primarily out of concern that doing so would open their courts up to forum shopping. See Maestas, 33 S.W.3d at 808 (arguing that [a]doption of the d octrine wo uld run the risk that T ennessee courts would become a clearinghouse for cases that are barred in the jurisdictions in which they otherwise would h ave been brought. ); Portwood, 701 N.E.2d at 1104 (noting that few jurisdictions have adopted cross-jurisdictional class action tolling, and concluding that this fact would, if cross-jurisdictional class action tolling were adopted in Illinois, encourage plaintiffs from across the country to bring suit [in Illinois] following dismissal of their class actions in federal c ourt. ). In Vaccarie llo, howev er, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected this argument, maintaining that cross-jurisdictional class action tolling would simply preven t Ohio plaintiffs from filing protective cla ims in Oh io courts during the pendency of a putative class action in the federa l courts. See Vac cariello, 763 N.E.2d at 163. -30- would wish to pursue a c ause of action in the eve nt that cla ss certifi cation is denied . See Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 350-51, 103 S. Ct. at 2396. Furthermore, refusing to extend class action tolling to later-filed indiv idual claims may eff ectively shorten the time that a putative class member has to pursue his or her cause of action in the event that class certification is denie d. As a prospective intervenor in an action filed as a putative class action, a member of the putative plaintiff class in such an action has no control over the litigation. Consequently, the putative class member is powerless to prevent dismissal of the original action, and thus may be left unable to litigate the claim even though the statute of limitations, as tolled by the pendency of the putative class action, has not completely run, because the putative class member would be left withou t an action in which h e or she co uld intervene. We are equally pers uaded, ho wever, tha t American Pipe must be unders tood to incorporate the discussio n of the role statutes of lim itations play in pro viding no tice to defenda nts as imposing an additional requirement that must be met under the American Pipe class action tolling rule. Thus, under the version of class action tollin g we reco gniz e tod ay, in order for a plaintiff to cla im the ben efit of class action tolling, the plaintiff mu st show, in addition to the other requirements un der American Pipe, that the class action complaint notified the defendants of not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 555, 94 S. Ct. at 767. Consequently, we agree with the views on the scope of the -31- American Pipe class action tollin g rule expre ssed in Justice Blackm un s conc urrence in American Pipe and Justice Powell s concurrence in Crown, Cork & Seal, and understand the class action tolling ru le we reco gnize toda y to be subject to the limitations d iscussed in these concurrences. In particular, we emphasize that, in order to claim the benefits of class action tolling, the individual suit must concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit, American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 562, 94 S. Ct. at 770 (Blackmun, J., concurring), and that [c]laims as to which the defendant was not fairly placed on notice by the class suit are not protected und er American Pipe. Crown, Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 355, 103 S . Ct. at 2398 (Powe ll, J., concurring). In our view, these notice restrictions on the scope of the American Pipe class action tolling rule are necessary because they ensure that the rule is consistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations. A s discussed in detail supra, § III.A, this Court has long recognized the strong policy considerations in favor of strict application of statutes of limitations, and according ly has recog nized tolling e xceptions o nly if the tolling ex ception is consistent w ith the generally recognized purposes for the enactment of statutes o f limitatio ns. One principal purpose of statutes of limitations is to provide defen dants with notice of a claim within a sufficient period of time to permit the defendant to take necessary steps to gather and preserve the evid ence n eeded to defe nd aga inst the s uit. See, e.g., Hecht v. Resolution Trust, 333 Md. 324, 332-33, 635 A.2d 394, 399 (199 4). If the class a ction tolling ru le we ado pt did not contain the no tice restrictions d iscussed ab ove, then it co uld potentia lly be applied to -32- preserve a claim that would otherwise be untimely, even though the defendant did not receive fair notice during the statutory limitations period that it may have to defend the claim. Thus, if we recognized American Pipe class action tolling without the notice restrictions, we would, contrary to established precedent, recognize a tolling exception that is inconsistent with the purposes of statutes of limitations. C. American Pipe Class Ac tion Tolling and M ass-Tort Su its Petitioners argue that even if we recognize a class action tolling rule, we should restrict the rule so that the statutes of limitations are never tolled by the filing of a putative class action complaint that alleges causes of action arising out of a mass-tort incident. We are not persuaded. To our kn owled ge, no court that has recognized some form of American Pipe class action tolling has adopted the per se mass-tort exception advocated by petitioners. In Jolly, the California Supreme Court supported this view in dicta, but it did not reach the issue of wheth er to ado pt a ma ss-tort ex ception . Petitioners point to one other opinion discussing a potential mass tort exception to the American Pipe class ac tion tollin g rule, In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, No. 00 Civ. 2843 (LAK), MDL 1348, 03 Civ . 8933, 2005 W L 26867 (S.D .N.Y. Jan. 5, 2005). There, the court, ap plying New Mexico law, held th at New Mexico would not extend American Pipe class ac tion tollin g to ma ss-tort ca ses. Id. at *3. The court based its conclusion on a lack of positive indication in New Mexico case law that New Mexico would -33- apply American Pipe class action tolling to mass-tort cases, coup led with the court s cursory observation that [t]he wisdom of adopting the American Pipe rule in mass-tort cases is, to say the least, highly debatable. Id. (citing Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The Impropriety of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 Geo. Wash . L. Rev . 532 (1 996)). Furthermore, we are not persua ded by the reasons offe red by courts and comm entators in support of a mass-tort e xception to the American Pipe class action tolling rule. In dicta, the Jolly court expre ssed skep ticism as to whether American Pipe tolling should be applied to mass-tort suits: [B]ecause personal-injury mass-tort class-action claims can rarely meet the community of interest requirement in that each mem ber's right to recover depends on facts peculiar to each particular case, such c laims may be presump tively incapable of apprising defendants of the substantive claims being brought against them . . . a prerequisite, in our view , to the application of American Pipe. This being so, putative class mem bers wou ld be ill advised to re ly on the mere filing of a class action complaint to toll their individual statute of limitations. The presumption, rather, should be to the contrary i.e., that lack of commo nality will defea t certification and preclude application of the American Pipe tolling d octrine. Jolly, 751 P.2d at 937-38 (citations omitted). We note that the Jolly court here is not endorsing the per se m ass-tort rule ad vocated b y petitioners, but is o nly endorsing the rule that a class action complaint that is not certified on grounds of lack of commo nality is presum ptively incapable of giving defendants adequate notice of the substantive claims being b rough t agains t them, n ot invar iably so. Id. at 937 ( emph asis add ed). -34- We think there is good reason for not extending this presumption to a per se exception. The mere fact that class certificatio n is denied f or lack of c ommo nality does not mean that the class a ction com plaint failed to give adeq uate notice to the defen dant of the substantive claims of every member of the putative class who may file an individual action or intervene after denial of class certification. As the Jolly court correctly points out, denial of class certification in a mass-tort suit may indicate that the notice provided by the complaint to the defenda nt was ina dequate, b ut it does not invariably render the class action complaint incapable of giving adequate notice to the defendant of an individual putative class member s claims. This determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. The defects in th e argume nts offered in support of a per se mass-tort exception support our view. Lowenthal and Feder argue as follows: For mass tort personal injury cases, that notice must be sufficient to identify who the absent class members are. In such cases, each plaintiff's experience with the tort-causing agent, medical history, condition and prospects, and economic and personal profile are unique. Although some issues like whether the product causes injury--may be co mmon to all members of the putative class, the crux of each p laintiff's claim is the individualized experience with and reaction to the tort-cau sing ag ent . . . . The inadequacy of notice fo r tolling purpo ses is highlighted by examin ing how such classes are typica lly described in pleading s. Althoug h each ple ading is unique, personal injury mass tort classe s are typically describe d as all persons injured by their use of drug x, or all persons injured by their exposure to y. Such descriptions provide d efendan ts with no basis for gathering evidence about any particular plaintiff other than those specifically named. Indeed, the only notice -35- the defendant receives is that something it did (e.g., the design or manufacture of its product) is alleged to have caused harm. That notice is sufficient to alert the defendant to preserve and gather evidence relating to its ow n condu ct. The filing of an individual action, h owever, provides that notice, too. Yet, no one suggests that an individual filing should toll the limitations period for all possib le plaintiffs. Ra ther, the notice provided in the class action if it is to be sufficient to toll the limitations period must do more : it must enab le the defendant to gather evidence necessary to defend itself on the unique issues presen ted by the class of mass to rt plaintif fs. Lowen thal & Fed er, supra at 575-77 (footnotes omitted). In short, Lowenthal and Feder argue that a mass-to rt class action compla int is per se incapable of providing notice to a defendant adeq uate to ap ply American Pipe tolling because the com plaint does n ot permit the defendant to identify non-named putative class membe rs, and kno wledge o f the identity of the putative class members is neces sary f or the defendant to gather and preserve the evidence necessary to defend against their claims. This argument is defective in two main respects. First, there is no basis for the assumption that a defendant will invariably be unable to identify particular putative class members simply because the class action complaint involves claims arising out of a mass-tort incident. Even if the class is defined in terms of the persons who may have been injured by a particular pro duct or exp osed to a p articular even t, whether su ch a class de finition is adequate to permit the defendant to ascertain the identities of the putative class membe rs will depend upon the type of class involved, the particular class description provided in the complain t, and, most significantly, the information the defendant possesses concerning the -36- relation between the product or event involved and the putative class memb ers. There is no reason to assum e, as do L owen thal and Feder, t hat a defendant will never possess the necessary information to ascertain the identities of putative class membe rs. For exam ple, if a class action c omplaint a sserts claims on behalf of a class of persons injured by the use of a particular product, it is entirely possible that the defendant may be able to ascertain the identities of the putative class members on the basis of its sales records.10 A second, eq ually significant, d efect in Low enthal and Fed er s argum ent is their assumption that the defendant must be able to ascertain the identity of every putative class member in order for any member of the putative class to claim the benefit of class action tolling. They claim that the notice provided in the class action if it is to be suff icient to toll the limita tions pe riod must . . . e nable the defen dant to gath er evidenc e necessar y to defend itself on the unique issues presented by the class of mass-to rt plaintiffs. Lowenthal & Feder, supra at 577 (em phasis added). This is mistaken. The class action complaint must give the defendant sufficient notice to enable the defendant to defend itself on the unique issues presented by each particular member of the putative class who later files an individual action or intervenes in the underlying action after denial of class certification, if that 10 It is possible that the defendant may not have kept adequate sales records, or that the sales records coupled with other information available to the defendant may not be adequate to determine which persons w ho purchased the product may have su ffered injury from its use. This, ho wever, is b eside the po int, which is s imply to point out that Lowenthal and Feder err in assuming that a defen dant will inv ariably lack the a ccess to info rmation necessary to determine the identity of putative class members. -37- particular member of the putative class is to be able to claim the benefits of class action tolling. If a class action complain t gives a defendant adequate notice of the claims of a particular member of the putative class who later files an individual action or intervenes after a denial of class certification, we see no reason why the statute of limitations should not be tolled for the claims of that particular member of the putative class simply because the class action complaint did not give the defendant adequate notice of the claims of some other member of the putative class. In such a situation, the defendant is placed on notice of the particular class member s claims, and it therefore has the opportunity to preserve and gather evidence specific to that class member s claim, even if it cannot do so for some other class members. Given that the defendant had adequate notice of the particular class mem ber s claims, the purpose of the statute of limitations is satisf ied with respect to the claims of that particular class member, and thus it is appropriate to extend the benefit of class action tolling to that particular defendant regardless of the adequacy of the notice received by the defendant of the claims of other putative class members. D. Chardo n v. Soto and the Tolling Effect of American Pipe Class Action Tolling Petitioners final argument on the issue of class action tolling is that, even if we were to adopt American Pipe class action tolling, the tolling effect of the American Pipe class action tolling rule, as articulated by the Supreme Court in Chardon, is such that respondents claims would not be rendered timely by the rule. Petitioners argument rests on a misreading of Chardon. -38- In Chardon, the Court had to determine the tolling effect of a putative class action filed in the United States D istrict Co urt for P uerto R ico und er 42 U .S.C. § 1 983. See Chardon, 462 U.S . 651-52, 10 3 S. Ct. at 26 13. The C ourt began by observin g that in a § 1983 action, the applicable statute of limitations is provided by state law un less the state limitations law is in consiste nt with federa l law. Id. at 655-56, 103 S. Ct. at 2615. In light of this, the Court needed to decide whether, and if so to what extent, American Pipe constituted federal law that would su percede P uerto Rican law governing the tolling effect of the f iling of a putative class ac tion. Id. at 656, 1 03 S. C t. at 2616 . The petitioners in Chardon argued tha t American Pipe established a uniform federal rule concerning the tolling effect of class actions filed in federal co urts, and that u nder this rule the filling of a putative class action simply suspends the running o f the applica ble limitations period from the time which the putative class action is filed to the time that class certification is denie d. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the First C ircuit, however, concluded that the tolling effect should be determined by reference to Puerto Rican law, under which the effect of to lling a statute of limitations is that the statutory limitations period begins to run anew once the tolling ceases. Id. at 655, 103 S. Ct. at 2615. The Supreme Court aff irmed the F irst Circuit, reasoning that American Pipe simply asserts a federal interest in assuring the efficiency and economy of the class action procedure, and that, consequ ently, this federal interest is satisfied so long as under the applicable state law governing the tolling effect of the filing of a putative class action each unnamed plaintiff -39- is given as much time to intervene or file a separate a ction as he w ould have under a state savings statute applica ble to a party whose action has been dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits . . . . Id. at 661, 103 S. Ct. at 261 8. The rule under Pu erto Rican law, which, under the First Circuit s interpretation of Puerto Rican law, started the running of the limitations anew once class certification was denied, provided unnamed class members the same protection a s if they had filed actions in the ir own na mes wh ich were s ubseque ntly dismiss ed, so i t satisfied this intere st. Id. at 661, 103 S. Ct. at 2619. Petitioners argue that Chardon held that, under American Pipe, the tolling effect of the filing of a putative class action is to give putative class members the same num ber o f days to file suit or intervene after denial of class certification as they would have to refile a complaint under the applicable state savings statute, and that we should, in adopting American Pipe, adopt this holding as well. As the discussion of Chardon above makes clear, however, this is not the holding of Chardon. Rather, w hat Chardon held is that when under a specific fed eral statutory caus e of action the statute of limitations applicable to that action is provided by state law, American Pipe requires that putative class members must have at least as much time to file individual suits or to interv ene as they w ould und er the applica ble state savings statute. Under Chardon, if a state provides that the filing of a putative class action carries a tolling effect that results in more time for pu tative class m embers to file complain ts or intervene after the denial of class certification than the state savings statute provides for refiling of complaints dismissed without prejudice, then the time period -40- provided for in the state rule on the tolling eff ect of the cla ss action co mplaint w ould apply in federal court, not the time period for refiling provided for in the state savings statute. Chardon, then, does not speak to the issue of the tolling effect of the class action tolling rule. That is a matter of state law, and consequently is for us to decide. To the extent that petitioners argument is that the tolling effect of a denia l of class certif ication is simp ly to give putative class members the thirty-day period pro vided for in Md. R ule 2-101 (b) to file an individual complaint or to intervene in the underlying action, w e are not persuaded. In our view, a thirty-day period is not sufficie ntly long because it may actually result in some putative class members having less time to file their claims than they would have had if a putative class action covering their claims had never been filed.11 A rule that permits such a counterintuitive result is not fair to prospective p laintiffs. Furth er, such a rule is inconsistent with the pre sumptive in tent of the L egislature tha t, in enacting a statute of limitations with a certain prescribed limitations period, a plaintiff will have at least that much time to file suit. 12 11 For example, suppose that plaintiff P s cause of action for claim C accrues on January 1, 2007, the re is a three year statute of limitations for claims like C, a putative class action that includes P in the pu tative plaintiff c lass and co vers claim C is filed on January 1, 2008, and class certification is denied on June 1, 2008. If we adopted petitioners proposal concerning the tolling effect of class action tolling, then under thes e facts, P w ould have only until July 1, 2008 to file an individual suit or to intervene to pursue claim C, even though P would have had until January 1, 2010 to file suit on C if the class action had not been filed. 12 Unlike jud icially recognized tolling exceptions that lengthen statutory limitations periods, there is, to the best of our know ledge, no ju dicially created doctrine rec ognized in any jurisdiction that shortens a statutory limitations period, and there is no such doctrine in (contin ued...) -41- Although we do n ot definitively resolve the issue of the precise tolling effect of the class action tolling rule we adopt today, we do hold that the tolling effect of the rule must provide at least as much time as is provided if the tolling effect is the suspension of the running of the applicable limitations period during the pendency of the putative class action.13 Accordingly, we hold that if the conditions for the application of class action tolling are met, the filing of a class action complaint suspends the running of the statute of limitations at minimum from the time the putative class action is filed until the time that class certification is denied.14 This rule avoids the potentially unfair and counterintu itive results that could occur under petitioners proposed tolling effec t rule. Furtherm ore, this rule is in accord with our prior cases recognizing tolling excep tions. In Bertonazzi, where we held that a statute of limitations for the filing of a claim against a decedent s estate was tolled because 12 (...continued) Maryland law. 13 Thus, we leave for another day the issue of whether, and if so under what circumstances, we might conclude that the pendency of a putative class action sh ould provide a putativ e class m embe r with m ore time than is p rovide d by a sus pensio n rule. 14 Some co urts have als o held that if a putative class action is filed, class certification is denied, and the denial of class certification is appealed, the statute of limitations is tolled until the den ial of cla ss certifi cation is affirm ed on a ppeal. See, e.g., Davis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 600 F . Supp . 1312, 1316 ( D. M d. 1985 ). Und er Ma ryland law , howe ver, a circuit court s ruling on a class certification issue is typically a nonappealable interlocutory order, and hence is reviewable only after entry of a final judgment in the underlying action. See Philip M orris, 358 Md. at 714-15, 752 A.2d at 213-14. Thus, we see no reason to extend the rule to toll the statute of limitations during the pendency of an appeal of denial of class certification, as, in Maryland, such appeals will ordinarily be dismissed for lack of ap pellate jurisdicti on. -42- the claim had been filed in the wrong venue, we held that the tolling effect of the filing of the claim in the wrong venue was to suspend the running of the statute of limitations from the time of the f iling of the co mplaint in the improper venue to the time of the dismissal of the origina l comp laint for lack of venue . See Bertonazzi, 241 Md. at 366, 216 A.2d at 726. We see no reason to give a different tolling effect to the class action tolling rule we recognize toda y. E. Application to the Facts of this Case Applying the foregoing principles, we have little difficulty in concluding that the filing of the Philip M orris class action tolled Mr. Christensen s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners, and that the effect of this tolling is to render respondents claims against these pet ition ers timely. Most of the preconditions for the application of class action tolling are not in dispute. Mr. Christensen was a member of the Philip Morris putative cla ss. With the exception of Giant, all of the petitioners were defendants in Philip M orris. All of the causes of action asserted by respondents against the Philip Morris petitioners in the case sub judice were asserted in the Philip M orris class action c omplaint. 15 Although the pa rties dispute when M r. Christensen s claims against the Philip Morris petitioners accrued, they do not dispute that his claims did n ot accrue p rior to 1998. Th us, the statute of limitations for Mr. Ch ristensen s 15 This is so with the exception, of course , of the counts for w rongful death, wh ich are discussed infra. -43- claims against the Philip Morris petitioners asserted on his behalf in the original class action was suspended from the date his actions accrued until May 16, 2000, when this Court issued its mandate in Philip M orris vacating the Circuit Co urt s class certifica tion Or der. See Philip Morris, 358 Md. at 788-89, 752 A.2d at 254-55. Accordingly, if the filing of the Philip Morris class action complaint tolled Mr. Christensen s claims, respondents survival claims against the Philip Morris petitioners were timely filed when respondents initiated the survival claims in the instant case on August 13, 2001, as they would have had until May 16, 2003 to file their claims. See Geo rgia-Pac ific, slip op. at 38 (under Maryland law, statutes of limitation apply to su rvival cl aims). The one remaining question is whether the Philip Morris petitioners received a dequate notice of Mr. Christensen s claims. We conclude that they did. The class action complaint in Philip M orris defined th e putative p laintiff class as including a ll Maryland residents who have suffered or continue to suffer from physical injuries or disease caused by smoking cigarettes or using smokeless tobacco products . . . . Philip M orris, 358 M d. at 700, 752 A.2d at 206. The Philip M orris petitioners possessed information that was sufficient for them to determine that Mr. Christensen was a member of this class, as Mr. Christensen actively participated in the Philip M orris litigation by providing an affidavit and giving deposition testimony in which he stated that he had a h istory of smoking and had been diagnosed with lu ng can cer. Given that the Philip M orris petitioners po ssessed this -44- information about Mr. Christensen, there is no question that they were given adequate notice of his claims by the Philip M orris class action c omplaint. 16 Acc ordingly, we hold that the necessary conditions for the application of class action tolling of Mr. Christensen s claims were met, and that, as a result, respondents survival claims against the Philip M orris petit ione rs are time ly. Fina lly, we hold that respondents wrongful death claims against the Philip M orris petitioners are also timely. The Circuit Court, rejecting class action tolling, dismissed these claims as well as th e survival cla ims, reason ing that, und er the Wro ngful D eath Statute, Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2005 Cum. Supp.), § 3-901 et seq. of the Co urts and Judicial Proceedings Article ( C JP ), respon dents cou ld not maintain these claims if M r. Christensen s claims would have been time-barred at the time respon dents filed th eir wrongful death claims if he had not previously died. Given our holding that Mr. Christensen s claims w ere not ti me-ba rred un til May 16 , 2003, after the time respo ndents wrongful death claims had all been filed, the Circuit Court s conclusion was erroneous, even assum ing that i t had co rrectly inter preted th e Wro ngful D eath Sta tute. The Circuit Co urt s interpretatio n of the W rongful D eath Statute is, however, erroneous. Respondents wrongful death claims would not have been barred by virtue of the expiration of the limitations period for Mr. Christensen s claims unless the limitations period 16 We express no opinion as to whether the complaint would have given the Philip Morris petitioners ad equate no tice in the absence of Mr. Christensen s participation in the Philip M orris class action litigation. -45- on his claims had run prior to the time of his death. See Geo rgia-Pac ific, slip op. at 36 (holding that grant of summ ary judgment in favor of defendants on a wrongful death claim was improper notwithstanding propriety of grant of summary judgment in favor of defenda nts on surviva l claim on grounds of limitations, where decedent s cause of action was held to accrue in 1 997, wro ngful dea th claims were filed in 2003, and applicable statute of limitations was three years); see also M ills v. Int l Harvester Co., 554 F. Supp. 611, 613 (D. Md. 1982) (ap plying Marylan d law, and concludin g that wrongful death actio n did not lie because there was no wro ngful act within me aning of s tatute because statute of limitations for underlying claim had run prior to time of decedent s death). This is so because the determination as to whether the decedent would have been entitled to maintain an action and recover damages, and hence whether there is a wrongful act within the meaning of CJP § 3-901 (e), is ma de at the time of the dec edent s death. See Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 143 n.4, 571 A.2d 1219, 1221 n.4 (1990) (observing that if a decedent could not have brought a cau se of actio n for inju ry at the time o f death, the wrong ful death ac tion . . . is preclud ed (em phasis a dded) ( citation a nd inter nal quo tation om itted)). Given that the pendency of the Philip M orris class action tolled the statute of limitations on Mr. Christensen s claims against the Philip M orris petitioners, the statute of limitations applicable to Mr. Christensen s claims does not serve as a bar to respondents wrongful death claims against the Philip M orris petitioners. These wrongful death claims, therefore, are timely so long as they are timely under CJP § 3- 904(g)(1), w hich gives a party -46- three years after the death of the deced ent to ini tiate a w rongf ul death action. See GeorgiaPacific, slip op. at 26. Inasmuch as respondents wrongful death actions against the Philip Morris petitioners were all initiated within three years of Mr. Christensen s death in January 2001, the y are ti mely. IV. We now turn to the second issue in the case, whether the Circuit Court granted summary judgment properly to petitioner Giant on respondents claims against Giant. Giant was not a defendant in the Philip M orris class action, and therefore respondents cannot appeal to class action tolling to render their claims against Giant timely. The dispute between the parties conc erns the time at which Mr. Christensen s causes of action against Giant arising out of his lung cancer accrued. The answer to this question, in turn, depends upon application of the discovery rule to the factual reco rd before the Circuit C ourt whe n it granted summ ary judgm ent. Subsequent to the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals s opinion b elow vac ating the C ircuit Court s grant of summary judgment to Giant and remanding for reconsideration in light of Benjam in v. Union Carbide, we granted certiorari and af firmed the judgm ent of the Court of Special Appeals in Georgia-Pacific. In Georgia -Pacific, we endorsed the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, holding that, with respect to occupational expo sure to asbestos, a claimant, inc luding a w rongful d eath claima nt, is placed on inquiry notice of the causation -47- element of a cause of action to recover for injuries resulting from mesothelioma when the claimant has (1) knowledge that the person whose injury forms the basis for the claim has been diagnosed with mesothelioma, and (2) knowledge of expos ure to as bestos. See Geo rgia Pacific, slip op. at 37-39. We further agreed with the Court of Special Appeals that the rationale for this holding is that, given the general state of knowledge concerning the relation between asbestos exposure and disease in 1997, the time the dec edent cam e to know of his diagnosis of mesothelioma and his asbestos exposure, a reasonable person would have investigated and discovered a causal connection between mesothelioma and asbestos exposure . . . . See id. at 37 (citing Benjam in, 162 Md. A pp. at 205, 873 A .2d at 481). We agree with the Court of Special Appea ls that the Circuit Court should reconsider the propriety of granting summary judgment to Giant in light of the subsequent appellate refinement of the inquiry notice rule. Accordingly, because our opinion in Georgia -Pacific affirming the Court of Special Appeals is now the controlling authority on this issue, we vacate the judg ment o f the C ourt of Specia l Appe als, and reman d the case to the Court of Special Appea ls with instructions to vacate the Circuit Court s grant of summary judgment in favor of Giant, and to remand the case to the Circu it Court for reconsideration of the issue of whether petitioner Giant is entitled to summary judgment in light of Georgia -Pacific. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEA LS AFFIR MED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART. CASE REM ANDED T O T H AT -48- COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY RELATED TO GIANT FOOD LLC AND TO RE MAND TH E CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE P AID BY PETITIONERS. -49-
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