In Re: Kaela C.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 63 September Term, 2005 __________________________________ IN RE: KAELA C., GUNNER C. AND FRANKLIN C. __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Battaglia, J. Wiln er, J., join s in th e jud gme nt on ly. __________________________________ Filed: September 8, 2006 Petitioner, Leslie C., seeks review of the Court of Special Appeals s judgment affirming the Circuit Court of Fre derick County s order in which it adopted the recommendations and findin gs of a m aster prior to the expiration o f the five-d ay period to file excep tions af forded by Mar yland Ru le 11-1 11 (c). We gran ted certiorari in th is case to answer the following questions: 1. Did the juv enile court err in entering an immediate order dismissing the CINA petitions without affording Petitioner an advance opportunity to file exceptions to the master s findings and recommendations? 2. Did the juv enile court d eprive Petitioner of her right to due process of law by dis missing the CINA petitions without affording her an adv ance opp ortunity to file exceptions to the master s finding and recommendations? 3. Did the Court of Special Appea ls err in applying its decision to Petitioner, who could not have known of the basis for that court s dec ision prior to a ppeal? In re: Kaela C., 388 Md. 673, 882 A.2d 286 (2005). After the filing of briefs and oral argument, we issued an order requesting supplemental briefs and scheduling further proceedings on an additional issue: What is the effect , if any, on the p ending ap peal befo re this Court of the judicial proceedings that have been instituted in the State of California? We shall hold tha t the issues pre sented in M rs. C. s petition f or a writ of certiorari are not moot because Mrs. C. continues to suffer collateral consequences from the circuit court s order transferring custody of the children to Mr. C. and that the circuit court erred in adopting the master s recommendations prior to the expiration of the five days for filing of exceptions provided by Maryland R ule 11-111 (c). 1 I. Background Petitioner, Leslie C. (Mrs. C.), and Christoph er C. (M r. C.) are the b iological pare nts of Kaela C., Gunner C., and Franklin C . Mr. and M rs. C. were d ivorced in A ugust, 2001, and Mrs. C. was awarded legal and physical custody of the children. On December 2, 2003, in response to allegations of abuse, the Frederick County Department of Social Services ( DSS ) remove d all three children from Mrs. C. s care, placed them in emergency shelter care 2 pursuant to its authority under Section 3-815 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,3 and subse quently filed a p etition with the Circu it Court for F rederick C ounty 1 Because we will reverse both the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and the circuit court on that error alone, we shall not address the third issue that Mrs. C. raised in her petition for writ of certiorari, specifically, whether the intermediate appellate cou rt erred when it applied its dec ision to Petitioner. 2 Shelter care means a temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time befo re disposition . Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(w) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 3 Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-815 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed ings Article p rovides in p ertinent part: A local department may place a child in emergency shelter care before a hearing if: (1) Placement is required to protect the child from serious immediate dang er; (2) There is no pa rent, gu ardian, c ustodia n, relativ e, or other person able to provide supervision; and (3)(i)1. The child s continued placement in the child s hom e is contrary to the welfare of the child; and 2. Because of an alleged emergency situation, removal from the (continued...) -2- seeking continued shelter care pursuant to Section 3-815 (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,4 and a determination that the children were children in need of assistance (CINA). 5 Marylan d Cod e (1973 , 2002 R epl. Vo l.), § 3-815 (b) o f the Cou rts and 3 (...continued) home is reasonable under the circumstances to provide for the safety of the child; or (ii)1. Reasonable eff orts have been made but have been unsuccessful in preventing or eliminating the need for removal from the child s home; and 2. As appropriate, reasonable efforts are being made to return the child to the child s home. 4 Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 3-815 (c) of the Courts and Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle provide s in pertinent p art: (1) Whene ver a child is n ot returned to the child s pa rent, guardian, or custodian, the local department shall imm ediately file a petition to authorize continued shelter care. (2)(i) The court shall hold a shelter care hearing on the petition before the disposition to determine w hether the temporary placement of the child outside of the home is warranted. (ii) Unless extended on good cause shown, a shelter care hearing shall be held not later than the next da y on which the circuit court is in session. 5 Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article defines a CINA as: Child in need of assistance means a child who requires court intervention because: (1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and (2) The child s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or unwilling to give p roper c are and attention to the ch ild and th e child s needs. -3- Judicial Proceedings Article. Both parents appeared before the circuit court, sitting as a juvenile court, for the shelter care hearing on December 8, 2003, and, while not admitting the allegations contained in the petition, agreed to the need for continued shelter care. Pursuant to Section 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings,6 the master recommended that the children be placed in licensed foster care pending an adjudicatory hearing,7 that Mr. C. be granted extended, unsupervised visitation, that Mrs. C. be granted supervised visitation, and that an updated family psychological evaluation be performed, and the trial judge immediately adopted tho se recommen dations in the form of an order. The master held an adjudicatory hearing on March 3, 2004 , at whic h Mrs . C., M r. C., and the DSS all appeared with coun sel, in addition to counsel for the children. Because the court-ordered family assessment had not been completed, the DSS requested that the 6 Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), Section 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Pro ceedings A rticle provide s in pertinent p art: Detention, commu nity detention, or shelter care may be ordered by a master pending court review of the master s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 7 An adjudicatory hearing is a hearing under the Juven ile Causes subtitle of the Courts and Judic ial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code to determine whether the allegations in a p etitio n for cou rt inte rven tion filed by the co unty d epartment of social services on behalf of a child, other than the allegation that the child requires the court s intervention, are true. In re Blessen H., 392 Md. 684, 685, 898 A.2d 980, 981 n.1 (2005), citing Md. Cod e (1973, 2002 R epl. Vol.), § 3-801(c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. -4- disposition hearing8 be postponed . Before addressing DSS s request, the master asked whether the parties had reached an agreement as to the facts alleged in the CINA petition: COUNSEL FOR M RS. C.: A h, we re n ot gonna c ontest the petition, Your Hono r. We have some additional facts and information we want to proffer for the court by way of explanation. But we re not admitting or denying the allegations. THE M ASTER : Okay. And [C ounsel for M r. C.]? COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Your Honor, we are going to argue Courts and Judicial Proceedings 3-819 (d), THE MASTER: Russell G.9 CO UN SEL FOR MR . C.: Y eah. Exa ctly. THE MASTER : And what about the allegations contained in the petition? What s mom s *** I mean d ad s position on that? COUNSEL FOR MR.C.: There is only one paragraph that applies to my client. It s on, by, it s on page five and it s letter O and it basically says that my client cannot provide ap propriate care for the three children due to his military obligations and frequent long absences and we don t agree with that. We think 8 Disposition hearing means a hearing . . . to determine: (1) W hether a ch ild is in need of assistance; and (2) If so, the nature of the court's intervention to protect the child 's health, safety, and well-being. Blessen H., 392 at 685, 898 A.2d at 981 n.1, quoting Md. Code (1973 , 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(m) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 9 Russell G. refers to In re Russell G., 108 Md. App. 366, 672 A.2d 109 (1996), in which the Court of Special Appeals held that a child cannot be declared a CINA if one of the child s two parents is willing and able to care for the child. -5- that my client is able and willing to provide care for the children. *** THE M ASTER : Okay. [Counsel for the Children]? COUNSEL FOR THE CHIL DRE N: Th ank you , Your Honor. That came as a surprise to me. If that s the case, Your H onor, I, I think dad s hould be a vailable for cross examination if he, he s going to -Acknowledging that there was confusion among the parties, the master called a recess and asked the parties into her office to clarify the position of each regarding the CINA allegations and thereafter, on the record, summarized the state of the proceedings: THE MASTER : I believe in this matter, and counsel let me know if there s any disagreement, mother and father are proceeding by an Alford type plea where they neither admit nor deny the allegations contained in the petition. However, they agree that those allegations, those same allegations would be the allegations presented by the [DSS] at a full adjudicatory hearing and that the court would find those allegations to be true or sustained by a prepon derance o f the evide nce and th at they would support a finding that the children are children in need of . . . well, actually, we re not gonna g o that far to th e CINA , to the CINA part. Basica lly that the allegation s would be true and thereafter that, that disposition would be continued for a time that will be furth er argued in open court. Is that your understanding, [C ounsel for DS S]? COUNSEL FOR DSS: Yes, Your Honor. That s what the [DSS] understood. THE MAST ER: And is that your u nderstanding, [Counsel for Mrs. C.]? COUNSEL FOR M RS. C.: Yes, Your Honor, and I just have a -6- few fac ts I want to, so me inform ation I wan t to give the co urt. THE MASTER: Okay. [Counsel for M R. C.]? And is that your understanding, COUN SEL FO R MR . C.: Yes, Your H onor. THE MASTER: And is that your understanding, [Counsel for the Children]? And actually, the children h ave agree d to stipulate to the COUNSEL FOR THE C HILDREN: That s correct THE M ASTER: allegations. COU NSEL FOR T HE C HILD REN : That s corre ct. *** THE MASTER : Okay. In, in this matter I will, in the, in the matter of the C. children I ll note for the record that the social worker, mother and fath er are pre sent, as ar e [D SS] s attorne y, mom s attorney, dad s attorney, and the children s attorney. I will note that the [DSS] and the children stipulated to the allegations contained in the petition and agreed that they were sufficient to determine that the children are children in need of assistance. I also will note that mother and father neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the petition. Howeve r, they did agree that those same allegations would be the allegations presented by the [D SS] at a full adjudicatory hearing and, and that those allegations would be prove n by a preponderance of the evid ence and support a f inding that the children are children in need of assistance. Thereafter, based on that I will find that the allegations contained in the petition are true and sustaine d. The circuit court subsequently adopted the master s recommendations and issued an Order, within tw o days, finding that, -7- the child and the [DSS] stipulated to the allegations contained in the [DSS] s Petition, and mother and father neither admitted nor denied the allegations co ntained in th e Petition; however, they agreed that had there been a full adjudicatory hearing in this matter, those same allegations would have been the allegations presented by the [DS S], and those same allegations would have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and otherwise support a finding that the children are Children in Need of Assistance, and . . . the Circuit Co urt for Frederick Cou nty, Maryland . . . fin ds that the fo llowing facts as alleged in the petition are true and are sufficient to find that the children need or require the court s intervention. The court ordered the children to remain in licensed foster care and scheduled the disposition hearing for March 17, 2004.10 During the disposition hearing, M r. C. requeste d, pursuan t to Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-819 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,11 that the CINA 10 The docket entry for March 9, 2004 reads: Order for Adjudication [F]iled that the Co urt finds that th e followin g facts as alle ged in the petition are true and are su fficient to find that the children need or require the Court s intervention and that the disposition in this matter shall be continued until March 17, 2004 at 1:00 p.m. 11 Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-819 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: If the allegations in the petition are sustained against only one parent of a ch ild, and there is another p arent availab le who is able and willing to care for the child, the court may not find that the child is a child in need of assistance, but, before dismissing the case, the c ourt may aw ard custod y to the other pa rent. -8- petition be dismissed and that custody of the children be transferred to him. He argued that the CINA petition did not allege that he had ever abused or neglected the children, but that he had been unable to ta ke care of the children because o f his enlistment in the United States Navy. Mr. C. contended that the ship that he was stationed on, the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan, was currently berthed in Virginia, but was being transferred to San Diego, California, where he was in the process of purchasing a house, and that once his ship was transferred, he wou ld apply for, and be granted, sho re duty to enable him to prope rly care for the children. Mr. C. maintained that, if he w as granted c ustody that day, he would b e permitted to travel by air with the child ren. Mrs. C. opposed M r. C. s request on the basis that M r. C. s plans were conjectural and requested that the children remain in foster care so that she could continue working toward reunification with them. The master postponed ruling on these requests in order to give Mr. C. and his fiancée the opportunity to submit to psychological evaluations, to have Mr. C. s fiancée un dergo a b ackgrou nd check , to allow M r. C. to obtain documentation from the Navy affirming that he would be granted shore duty in California, and to give Mr. C. the opportunity to negotiate visitation arrangements with Mrs. C. On April 21, 2004, the parties appeared before the master for the conclusion of the disposition hearing at which time each of the parties was heard: COUNSEL FOR DSS: The, we felt that it was appropriate for the court to dismiss the CINA and place the child with the father. The court declined to do that and continued the dispositionary hearing until today and suggested or ordered that a number of things occur. Some of those things I can repo rt to the court have occurred. O ne is the addendum to the C. fam ily -9- assessme nt. I believe it s be en filed w ith the court in each of these cases. *** COUNSEL FOR DSS: We do believe that the case has been made against, not, I hate to use the word against, but in regard to Mrs. C. And therefore the court is required to a pply Courts and Judicial, Sec tion 3-819 (e) and dism iss the CIN A petition and provide, and provide custody to fathe r. And we wo uld ask the court to do that today. And I would, I would add that the, I m sure that somewhere in the record th e, the children really want to be with their fath er an d it s reall y causing prob lems in keeping them in foster care. One child is probably gonna be removed today if, if not returned because of the behavior, and I think the [DSS] s p osition is that that is directly attri butable , I think it s his? COUN SEL FOR THE CH ILDREN : Yes. COUNSEL FOR DSS: Working with that case. His desire to be returned home o r to be returned to his father. THE M ASTER : Okay. [Counsel for M rs. C.]. COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: Ah, yes, Your Ho nor. With respect to the [DSS] s request, Your Honor, I think that s precluded already by the court s order of March 3 rd . The, all parties agreed that the facts in the petition supported a finding of the children that were in need of assistance and that was agreed to on the record and signed by the Master and signed by [the trial judge] on March 5 th . So there s no way that the section cited by the [DSS] is, is applicable at this po int. Barring the judge reversing this order. But, so the children, the facts had been agreed to by the parties sufficient to support a finding of CIN A agains t both parents. So Russ ell G. no longer applies. Your Honor, the father, again, I ve subpoenaed the father. I ve requested that the subpoena be continued to this hearing. That he produce evidence of shore duty of his, any assignment other than to the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan. It is, I have not received any -10- documentation to that effect. He s still, he s still single. He s not married. And he is, has shore duty until September of 2005. He s not, it s not possible for him to have these children. He has apparently intentions to marry somebody although that s not mentioned in Dr. Weaver s [12] report. The word marriage was not mentioned in that entire report or the addendum, to this Ms. O R eilly. And her extended family is in Oakland which is 12 hours from San Diego and she s full-time Navy going to school full-time and she s intending to take care of these children. Highly unrealistic. I think D r. Wea ver mu st have been, I don t know what she was thinking, but the word marriage was not mentioned. Mr. C. s either gonna do this on his own or he s not gonna do it at all. He may ha ve some help here and th ere but I don t think this court can rely on an engagement of some young lady that is in the Navy full-time and subject to call to go to Iraq or wherever, going to school full-time as an aviation maintenance. Ah, it s all very nice, but I don t think this court can rely on that for g iving him c ustody. He s s ubject to the Family Care Regulations of the U.S. Navy which re quire him to designate someone to take care of the children should he be called up. He has as we k now sh ip duty and fe eling the w orld situation he could be called up at a ny minute. He hasn t designated anybody contrary to Navy regulations for these children. And w e ve subp oenaed th at. We ve a sked him to produce it. He hasn t and so he has no plan for these children, Your Honor. He s still stationed in Virginia and he s in the process of buying a h ouse in California, San Diego area with the prospect of the U.S.S. Ronald Reagan will ship out and go where her, via whatever, the Panama Canal to, to California and that he will be then stationed on ship duty in California. But that is yet to be produced and he s apparently relayed some of these plans to Dr. W eaver. Your Honor, my client has entered into therapy with D r. Rinehart. She s visited regularly with the children. She is doing everything she can to get he r life together. S he s going to school online full-time at home. A nd she sub mitted a rebu ttal to 12 Dr. Weaver was the psychologist retained to complete assessments of the family and Mr. C. s fiancée. -11- Dr. Weaver s initial report detailing the mistakes that D r. Weaver made in that. She s working with her church and she wants to have an opportunity to reunite with these children, Your Honor, and I do n t see how this court cou ld release these children to su ch an unc ertain specu lative arrang ement. The master also heard from Mr. C. s counsel, who again requested that custody be transferred to him, pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-819 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, because Dr. Weaver s family assessment concluded that placement with Mr. C. would be in the children s best interests. The children s counsel agreed: [COUNSEL FOR T HE CH ILDRE N]: If one refers to D r. Weaver s first report, Your Honor, she even interviewed dad and dad s fiancée, she was pretty clear. She w as really unequivocal even at that time and she does refe r to Gunner s behavior. Emotionally regressed, developmentally delayed, severe behavioral problems. I can tell you almost first hand that his behavior has deteriorated in the past week. He is in the foster home of the daughter to Judy, my assistant, (inaudible), and she s on the phone ab out three tim es a day now . It s, it s deadly serious. It really is serious. Th is little boy seems to have for some reason no respect for women and he does have respect for men. I m h earing this fro m the foster parents and I m relating it to the dad. I utterly, totally, Your Honor, support the [DSS]. What concerns me, and there s been allusions to it just now and it, it s taken all I can do to stop this happening, and that is the foster mother calling and DSS and saying this is too much to deal with. We re talking about things like this little boy undoing a safety belt while he s sitting in a vehicle. He now has a special bus to take him to school because the bus driver just won t put up with the behavior of this kid in the bus anymore. He, it s beyond what a foster parent should have to put up with. And I don t wa nt him, Yo ur Hono r. I go there qu ite often and it s a great place if there s now here else to g o, but we v e got a -12- dad and from what I, I had a conversation with him outside and I, I think he s got it toge ther, Your Honor, th at he will put, and I ve been very serious with him about w hat he s looking forward to and, and Dr. Weaver addresses that as well. Da d has got to be lookin g at ong oing th erapy. But he co mes out q uite favora ble in the, in the addendum to the report as does his fiancée. They do seem like responsible people. These kids, Your Honor, need to go home. They need to go to their father w here, is the place that Dr. Weaver recommended and, ah, and dad s got th is house. It looks like it s (inaudible). And if he has to go back on a ship at some point there s got to be something that I imagine the Navy will help him put in place in the way of day care. This little boy needs some stability and foster care is not for him. I m asking you to put the children in their father s care, Your H onor. Having heard all of the parties, the master reported her findings and recommendations: THE MASTER: In this situation I v e had the o pportunity to review all of the exhibits that have bee n submitted . I think this is a very difficult situation for everybod y involved. I m certain of that. Dr. Weaver s assessments generally recommend that the placement of the children be with their father and suggests that Mr. C. is available to care for the children. The Paragrap h O in the [DSS] s report says that, the language is that father is currently unava ilable. Now currently is at the time the petition was filed or current, is currently unable to provide approp riate care for the children due to his military obligations and frequent long absences. Now today at disposition we re presented with information that father is available to care for the children and we also have the suggestion or the recomme ndation on the part of dad and related concurrent to the child, I m not giving a whole lot of weight to dad s request because it s sort of selfserving and, but that, that the children be placed with dad and I think that there has been credible evidence presented this afternoon that supports a placement of the children with dad. So in this matter as to disposition I will find as follows. Based on the information that has been received subsequent to the adjudicatory hearing, I find that father, Christopher C., is available and is able and willing to care for the children. I find -13- that Dr. Weaver has recommended the placement of the children with father and therefore pursuant to 3-819 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings, I believe that it is appropriate to find that the allegations in the [DSS ] s petition are really only sustained against mother and I think pursuant to that, based on all the information I am required to dismiss the petition. How ever, before dismissing the petition I will adopt the [DS S] s recommendation that . . . Mr. C. be awarded physical and legal custody of the children. Mr. C. and his fiancée and the children participate in family therapy as soon as possible, im mediately after relocation in C alifornia. Th at the children participate in individual therapy imm ediately after their re location. Th at a further visitation schedule be established. That mother enjoy reasonab le and liberal visitation with the children. That Mrs. C. participate in individual therapy and that Mr. C. seek special academ ic service s for G unner i mmed iately, and I will dismiss the petition and I will prepare a report and recommendation as quickly as I can. COUN SEL FO R MR . C.: Your Hon or? THE M ASTER: Y es. COUNSEL FOR MR.C.: I think you misspoke a little bit. You said 3-819(e). Um, I think you meant 3-819(d) because that s the one that we w ent under. THE MASTER: D? COUN SEL FO R MR . C.: Yes, Your H onor. Because (e) talks about in the disposition remove a child from the child s home. COUNSEL FOR M RS. C.: Your H onor, I just wanted to inform the court and all parties that we pla n to take an exception to the court s ruling so that placement of the children should not be changed until THE MA STER: Hold -14- COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: final court orders THE MAS TER: hold, hold on. Let me finish this. It s 3-819 (e), [Counsel for M r. C.]. COUN SEL FO R MR . C.: E, Your Ho nor? THE MA STER : Yeah , you can l ook it u p. That s the, I m relying on the Russell G. -COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: Oh, okay THE MA STER: situation COUNSEL FOR MR. C.: that s fine. THE MAS TER: [ Counse l for Mrs. C.], your comments are noted for the record. Thank you very much. CO UN SEL FOR MR . C.: O kay. THE MASTER : I ll inform the court and what happens from here I don t have a w hole lot of control over. COUNSEL FOR DSS: Your Honor, can we request that the court s order, I forget the exact langu age and I know it s questionable whether it can be done, but that the court s order become an immediate order pending the exceptions hearing. THE M ASTE R: Actua lly I think I can do that. COUNSEL FOR MRS. C.: I, I would object to that, Your Honor. THE MAST ER: Okay. [Co unsel for Mr. C .], [Counsel for the children], do you wish to be heard? COUNSEL FOR MR . C.: Ah, we supp ort the [DSS] s position, Your Hon or. -15- COUN SEL FO R THE CHILD REN: A s do I, Your Ho nor. THE MAST ER: I will recommend in light of the imminent necessity to remove Gunner from his home, pursuant - - and pursuant to Maryland Rule 9 -208 (h)(2) as well as the CINA provision of Courts and Judicial Proceedings which indicate that when the placement of the child is changed, the Master can recommend the, ah, can recommend that the court adopt that recommendation immediately. I will also recommend that my . . . that the recommendations be adopted immediately. But certainly counsel would be entitled to a hearing on that and that will conclude these matters. Two days later the circu it court adopted th e master s recommendations, which had been submitted in writing, and issue d the following O rder: FOUND, that father, Christopher C., is available, willing and able to care for the children; and FOUND, that Dr. Weaver has recommended the placement of the children with their father; and FOUND, that the children are not children in need of assistance for the following reasons: The children s father is available, able and willing to care for the children; and FOUND, that the childre n have po orly adjusted in th eir placemen ts in foster care and it is in their best interests to be placed with their father immediately; and FOUND, that Gunner s current f oster care pla cement is jeopardized due to his p oor beha vior and h is immedia te placement with his father is in his best interests; and FOUND, that extraordinary circumstances exist pursuant to Md. Rule 9-208 (h)(2) that justify the entry of an immedia te Order in light of the children s poor ad justment to foster care and the jeopardy of G unner s cu rrently placeme nt. The circuit court therefore ordered transfer of legal and p hysical custody of the children to -16- Mr. C., who immediately took them to California.13 Immedia tely thereafter, M rs. C. noted a n appeal to the Court o f Special A ppeals contending that the circuit court deprived her of her right to file exceptions to the master s recommendations with in fiv e days as provided by Maryland Rule 11-111 (c) by adopting the recommendations two days after the master entered her findings. The Court of Special Appeals, although noting that the circuit court had e rroneously relied upon M aryland Rule 9-208 (h)(2) to immediately adopt the m aster s recomm endations, d etermined that the circuit court had the authority to do so under Maryland Rule 11-115 (b) s provision stating a commitment recommended by a master . . . m ay be implemented in advance of co urt approv al. In so holding, the Cou rt of Special Appeals relied upon Section 3-801 (h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed ings Article s definition of the word commit as to transfer custod y. Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), § 3-801 (h) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. The Court of Special Appea ls also held that the circuit court s immedia te adoption of the master s recommendations did not preclude Mrs. C. from filing exceptions. Further, the intermediate appellate court determined that, based upon the master s statement on the record that her recommendations would be immediately effective pending the excep tions hearing , Mrs. C. co uld not claim that she w as misled into believing that the court s im mediate adoption of the recommendations precluded her from filing 13 The April 21, 2 004, dock et entry reads Child Not Found CINA; and Custo dy Origin al Paren t. The A pril 23, 2 004 do cket en try reads Order for CI NA C losure. -17- exceptions. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ju dgment o f the circuit court. During the pendency of her appeal, Mrs. C. also filed an action for Registration of Out-of-S tate Custody D ecree in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, pursuant to Section 3443 of the California Uniform Child Custo dy Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 14 On Oc tober 22, 20 04, pursua nt to California Code (1999), Section 3410 of the Family Code,15 Judge Halgren of the Superior Court of California contacted the 14 California Code (1999), Section 3443 of the Family Code provides: (a) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a ch ild custody determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial co nformity with this part or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this part and the determination has not been modified in accordance w ith this part. (b) A court of this state may utilize any remedy available under other laws of this state to enforce a child custody determination made by a court of another state. The rem edies prov ided in this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the a vailability of other remedies to enforce a child custody determination. California Code (1999), Section 3443 of the Family Code. California adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as Part 3 of its Family Code in 1999. 1999 Cal. Stat. Ch. 867. 15 California Code (1999), Section 3410 of the Family Code provides in pertinent part: (a) A court of this State ma y commun icate with a c ourt in another state concernin g a procee ding arising under this p art. (continued...) -18- presiding judge in Frederick County, Maryland, and the judges agreed that the State of California would assume jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues of the C. children, without prejudice to Mrs. C. s pending appeal in Maryland. Judge Halgren thereafter conducted a custody hearing and issued an order stating: The court has reviewed and considered the parenting plan submitted by Family Court Services. That report previously had been provided to the parties. The court also h as consulte d with Frederick County (Maryland) Circuit Court Judge . . ., the judge presiding in the matter of the [C. Children]. . . . Letters summarizing those consultations have been provided to the parties. The court then iterated that California had jurisdiction over the custody and visitation issues for the C. children, and, having reviewed the parties filings and heard oral arguments, awarded both legal and physical custody of the children to Mr. C. and granted supervised visitation of all the children to Mrs. C. On April 23, 2005, during a supervised visit with the children, Kaela C. was injured during Mrs. C. s attempt to intervene in a fight among the children. Another Su perior Court Judge, Judge Kutzner of the California Superior Court issued a new visitation order on June 28, 2005, suspending Mrs. C. s visitation rights, and stating: This court has reviewed and considered the May 19, 2005 supplemental report submitted by Family Court Services, the May 18, 2005 letter submitted by Child Protective Services, the findings in the related case involving these parties by the Frederick County Circuit Court for the State of Maryland and 15 (...continued) -19- the published decision on that case by the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, the filings in this court by the parties, and the arguments and testimony presented at the hearing. Shortly after Mrs. C. s visitation rights were suspended in California she petitioned this Court f or a writ of certiorari. II. Discussion A. Mootness The first issue we are called upon to resolve is whether the case at bar has been rendered moot by California s assumption of jurisdiction over the matters of custody and visitation with th e C. ch ildren. Mrs. C. contends that a case is moot when there no longer exists a controversy between the parties so that the court cannot provide an effective re medy. She a rgues that this case is not moot because the circuit court s April 23, 2004 order sustaining the CINA allegations against M rs. C. and tran sferring cu stody of the ch ildren to M r. C. continu es to affect Mrs. C. s custodial rights in California and that, were this Court to remand the case for further proceedings, she would be able to challenge the master s finding by filing exceptions in the circuit co urt. Mr s. C. points o ut that the fac t that this contro versy is still alive in Maryland is evidenced by the California court s recognition that its resolution of custodial and visitation issues should not prejudice the ongoing proceedings in the Maryland courts. Con vers ely, the DSS argues that this case is moot because the circuit court could not grant Mrs. C. any relief were we to remand this case for further proceedings. The DSS -20- maintains that the California court has since grante d Mr. C. custody through its own proceedings, and the pro priety of the C alifornia cou rt s orders can not be revie wed by a Maryland court. Finally, the DSS maintains that the circuit court also should not endeavor to maintain concurrent jurisdiction with the C alifornia court because that w ould be contrary to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Accordingly, the DSS argues that only the Califo rnia cou rts can p rovide Mrs. C . proper relief. A case is moot wh en there is no longer any existing controversy between the parties at the time that the case is before the court, or when the court can no longer fashion an effective remed y. Hammen v. Baltimor e Coun ty Police D ept., 373 Md. 440, 449, 818 A.2d 1125, 1131 (20 03); J. L. Matthews, Inc. v. Maryland-Nat l Capital Park and Planning Comm n, 368 Md. 71, 96, 792 A.2d 288, 302 (200 2); In re Michael B., 345 Md. 232, 234, 691 A.2d 1309, 13 10 (1997); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 250, 674 A.2d 951, 954 (1996). Because w e do not sit to give advisory opinions , we generally order that moot actions be dismissed without a decision on the me rits. In re Rosa A. Riddlemoser, 317 Md. 496, 502, 506, 564 A .2d 812, 815 (198 9). Where there might be some effects from the trial court s decision in a moot case we vacate the judgments below and order that the trial court dismiss the actio n. See, e.g., Hammen, 373 Md. at 457-58, 818 A.2d 1135-36; Robinson v. Lee, 317 M d. 371, 380 , 564 A.2d 395 (198 9); State v. Peterson, 315 Md. 73, 82, 90, 553 A.2d 672, 677 , 681 (198 9); Attorney General v. Anne Arundel County School Bus Contractors Ass n, 286 M d. 324, 330 , 407 A.2d 749, 753 (1979). W here, how ever, it seems -21- apparent that a party may suffer collateral consequences from a trial court s judgment, the case is not m oot. Toler v . Motor V ehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 219, 817 A.2d 229, 232 (2003) (holding that issue of whether petitioner s driver s license was wrongly suspended was not moot, despite the fact that the suspension period had ended and his full driving privileges had been restored, because of potential collateral circumstances the initial suspension could cause); see also In the Matter of A.K., 628 S.E.2d 753 (N.C. 2006) (holding that adjudication of petitioner s daughte r as a neglec ted child w as not mo ot even after full custody of the daughter was returned to the petitioners because of the collateral consequences the adjudication may have on the petition ers credibility); Williams v . Ragaglia , 802 A.2d 778 (Conn. 2002) (holding that judgment revoking petitioner s special foster care license was not moot regardless of the fact that petitioner was later granted full custody of the foster children because the judgmen t could hav e collateral co nsequen ces with regards to her future ability to be a foster parent); In re A.V., 844 A.2d 739, 741 (Vt. 2003) (holding that question of whether child was in need of care and supervision ( CHINS ) was not moot, despite the fact that the child was no lon ger within the statutory age param eters for being considered a CHINS, where the lack of parental supervision continued to have collateral consequences on child s ability to function in the world); In re Hatley, 231 S.E.2d 633, 634 -35 (N.C. 1977) (determining that issue of whether petitioner was wrongly involuntarily committed to a mental institution was not moot even though the commitment order had since expired because of the commitment s potential adverse collateral legal circumstances). Cf. In the -22- Interest of I.S., 607 S.E.2d 546, 549 (Ga. 2005) (holding that issue o f whether trial court erroneously determined children to be deprived was moot because the parents retained custody of the children and failed to show that they suffered any adverse collateral consequences re sulting from the determ ination). Whenever the courts of two or m ore states are embroiled in custody proceedings16 the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, or its successor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, is implicated. Thus, to determine whether the issues raised by Mrs. C . are mo ot, we f irst mus t explor e the rele vant pr ovision s of the se acts. T he Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1968 to address both the increased mobility of individuals and the negative results of that mobility, namely the rampant kidnaping of children by parents looking to relitigate custody determinations in a m ore favorable forum, a tactic known as seize and run. Unif. Child Custody Jurisdic tion Ac t, 9 U.L.A. 262-65 (199 9); Cath erine F . Klein, L eslye E. O rloff, H ema S aranga pani, Border Crossings: Understanding the Civil, Criminal, and Immigration Implications for Battered Women Fleeing A cross State L ines with Their Children, 39 Fam L.Q . 109, 114-15 (200 5); 16 Custody proceeding is defined by Maryland law as any proceeding in which a custody determination is one of several issues and includes a child neglect or dependency proceeding. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201 (d) of the Family Law Article. Custody determination is defined by Maryland law as a judicial decision, order, or instruction that r elate s to th e cus tody of a child or to visitation rights. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201 (c) of the Family Law Article. -23- Christopher L. Blakesley, Child Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 Emory L.J. 291, 293-97 ( 1986). T he A ct serves seve ral purpo ses, s peci fica lly: It limits custody jurisd iction to the states where the child has his home or where there are other strong contacts with the child and his family. . . .It provides for the recognition and enforcement of out-of-state custody decrees in many instances. . . . Jurisdiction to modify decrees of other states is limited by giving a jurisdictional preference to the prior court unde r certain conditions. . . . Access to a court may be denied to petitioners who have eng aged in ch ild snatchin g or similar p ractices . . . . Also, the Act opens up direct lines of communication between courts of different states to prevent jurisdictional conflict and bring about interstate judicial assistance in custody cases. 9 U.L.A. 111 (1979). By 1981 the Act had been adopted by all fifty states and the District of Columbia. UCCJEA, prefatory note 1. Maryland adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in 1975. 1975 Md. Laws Ch. 265, § 2. In 1997, N CCU SL prom ulgated the Uniform Child Cu stody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act, revisory of the earlier Act, to provide stro nger guid elines for de termining w hich state has original jurisdiction, continuing jurisdiction, and modification jurisdiction17 over a child custody determination.18 UCCJEA, prefatory note 1. California adopted the revised Uniform 17 Under the revised Act, modification jurisdiction means jurisdiction to change, replace, supercede, or otherwise make after a previous determination concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court that made the previous determination. Section 102 (11) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act 1 (Nat l Conference of Comm r On Unif. State L aws 1998). 18 Under the revised Act, custody determination means a judgment, decree or other order of a court prov iding for the legal custody, ph ysical custody, or visita tion with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, tempo rary, initial, and modification order. (continued...) -24- Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement A ct (the Califo rnia UC CJEA ) in 1999, m aking it applicable to the California proceedings in this case. 1999 Cal. Stat. Ch. 867. The revised Act was not a dopted in M aryland until 2004, however, and is only applicable to cases filed to establish or modify child custody on or after October 1, 2004. 2004 Md. Laws Ch. 502. Because the case before us was initiated in Maryland in 2003, it falls under the guidelines of the original Maryland U niform Child C ustody Jurisdiction Act ( M aryland UCCJA ). Under Section 9-204 of the Maryland UCCJA, a court has jurisdiction to enter a custody determination by initial decree 19 or modification decree 20 if: (1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of the proc eeding, or (ii) h ad been th e child s home state within 6 months before commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of the child s removal or retention by a person claiming custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-204 (a)(1) of the Family Law Article. Home state is defined as 18 (...continued) The term does not include an order relating to ch ild support or other monetary obligation of an individual. Section 102 (3) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act 1 (Nat l Conferen ce of Com m r On Un if. State Laws 1998 ). 19 Initial decree is defined as the first custody decree concerning a particular child. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201 (g) of the Family Law Article. 20 Modification decree is defined as a custody decree that modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether made by the court that rendered the prior decree or by ano ther cou rt. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201 (h) of the Family Law Article. -25- the state in which the c hild, imm edia tely preceding the time involved, lived with the child s parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least 6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old, the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of te mpo rary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month or other period. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-201 (f) of the Family Law Article. When issuing a custody decree, however, basic tenets of due process first must be followed; namely, parties must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard, as set forth by Section 9-205 of the Maryland UCCJA: Before making a decree under this subtitle, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be give n to the contestants, any parent w hose pare ntal rights hav e not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside this State, notice and opportun ity to be heard shall be give n pursuan t to the Maryland Rules. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-205 of the Family Law Article (em phasis added). 21 The 21 Section 9-205 was repealed in 2004 and replaced by Section 9.5-205, which provides: (a) In genera l. Before a child custody determination is made under this title, notice and an oppo rtunity to be hear d in accordance with the standards of § 9.5-107 of this title shall be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law of this State as in child custod y proceeding s betwee n residents of this State, any parent w hose pare ntal rights hav e not been previously terminated, and any person having physical custody of the child. (b) Exclusions. This title does not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice or an opportunity to be heard. (continued...) -26- requirement of due process also dictates whether the Maryland decree is binding on the parties, as Section 9-212 evidences: A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under § 9-204 of this subtitle binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in accordance with the Maryland Rules of Procedure, or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportun ity to be heard. As to these parties, the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and a s to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this subtitle. Maryland Cod e (1999), Section 9-21 2 of the Family Law Article (emphasis add ed). 22 21 (...continued) (c) Joinder and intervention. The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a par ty in a child custody proceeding under this title ar e govern ed by the law of this State as in child custody proceedings between residents of this State. 2004 Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 9.5-205 of the Family Law Article. 22 Section 9-212 was repealed in 2004, 2004 Md. Laws Ch. 502, and replaced by 9.5-105, which provides: (a) Binding. A child custody determination made by a court of this State that had jurisdiction under this title binds all persons who have been served in accordance with the laws of this State or notified in accordance with § 9.5-107 of this subtitle or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. (b) Conclu sive. As to tho se persons , the determin ation is conclusive as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the determination is modified. Maryland Code (1999, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 9.5-105 of the Family Law Article. -27- These two Maryland provisions are almost identical to Sections 423 and 12 24 of the UCCJA, after which they were modeled. The comments to Section 4 of the UCCJEA reinforce the importance of adherence to the due process requirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard: This section lists the persons who must be notified and given an opportunity to be heard to satisfy due p rocess req uiremen ts. . . . Strict compliance with section[] 4 . . . is essential for the validity of a custody decree within the state and its recognition and enforcement in other states under sections 12, 13, and 15. UCCJA, § 4 comment (emphasis added), as do the comments to Section 12: This section dea ls with the intra -state validity of custody decrees 23 Section 4 provides: Before making a decree under this Act, reasonable notice and opportun ity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose p arental right have not been previously terminated, and any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is o utside this State, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to section 5. UCCJA, § 4. 24 Section 12 provides: A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under section 3 binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in accordance with section 5 or who have sub mitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the custody decre e is conclus ive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisio ns to this Ac t. -28- which provides the basis for their interstate recognition and enforcem ent. The two prerequisites are (1) jurisdiction under section 3 of this Act and (2) strict compliance with due process mand ates of n otice an d oppo rtunity to be hea rd. UCCJA , § 12 comme nt (emphasis added ). Assuming due process has been afforded all parties, once an initial custody decree has been issued by a Maryland court, parties may enroll that determination in a sister state. In California, that enrollment is controlled by Section 3443 of the California UCCJEA, which provides in relevant pa rt: (a) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody determination of a co urt of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with this part or the determination was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of this part and the determination has not been modified in accordanc e with this part. California Code (1999), Section 3443 of the Family Code.25 Section 34 43, identical to 25 Maryland also has a provision which allows for the enrollmen t of out-of-s tate custody determinations, Section 9-213, which provides: The courts of this State shall recognize and enforce an initial decree or modification decree of a court of another state that had assumed jurisdiction un der statutory pro visions sub stantially in accordance with this sub title, or that was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the subtitle, so long as this d ecree has n ot been m odified in accordance with jurisdictional standards s ubstantially similar to those of this subtitle. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-213 of the Family Law Article. -29- Section 303 of the UCCJEA, also requires that due process have been afforded the parties to the initial custo dy proceedin g. In prom ulgating Se ction 303, N CCU SL exp lained that: This section is based on Section 13 of the UCCJA which contained the basic duty to enforce. The language of the original section has been retain ed and the duty to enforce is generally the same. UCCJEA,§ 303 comment. Comments to Section 1326 of the UCCJA in turn state: Recognition is accorded to a decree which is valid and binding under section 12. . . . Under this in terpretation a s tate is permitted to recognize a custody decre e of another s tate regardless of lack of personal ju risdiction, as long as due process requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard have been m et. UCCJA, Section 13 com ment (emphasis ad ded). Thus, a prerequisite for enforcing a sister state s custody decree is that all parties were afforded both proper notice and an oppo rtunity to be heard during the proceedings lea ding up to that de cree. See In re Termination of Parental Rights to Thomas J.R., 663 N .W.2d 734, 741(W is. 2003) (ac knowle dging that in order for a custody determination issued by one state to be valid and reco gniz ed by a sister state, the parties m ust have b een affo rded notice and an op portunity to be heard); Arkansas Dep t of Human Serv. v. Cox, 82 S.W.3d 806, 811 n.1 (Ark. 2002) ( [U]nder the UCCJEA, 26 Section 13 of the UC CJA pr ovides in re levant part: The courts of th is State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in accordance with this Act or which was made under factual circumstan ces meetin g the jurisdictio nal standard s of the A ct. -30- no child-custody determination order may be enforced in a foreign state if there was no notice and an opportunity to be heard when the child-custody determination order was issued in the rendering state. The UCCJEA streamlines the process of obtaining enforcement of child-custody determinations in foreign states, but it does not dispense w ith due process. ); Houtchens v. Houtchens, 488 A.2d 726, 731 (R.I. 1995) (declining to defer to Tex as s simultaneous proceedings because the Texas proceedings were not in substantial conform ity with the due-pro cess require ments of n otice and o pportunity to be heard ); Roundtree v. Bates, 630 P.2d 1 299, 130 2 (Okla.19 81) ( Th e [UC CJA] d eclares that fu ll effect mu st be given a valid out-of-state decree if the due proc ess requirem ents of notice a nd oppo rtunity to be heard have b een met. ). Once the Maryland decree has been enrolled in a sister state, modification jurisdiction over that decree is controlled by that state s mod ification statute . In this case, tha t statute is Section 3423 of the California UCCJEA , which provides: Except as otherw ise provide d in Section 3424, a co urt of this state may not modify a chi ld cu stod y dete rmin ation mad e by a court of another state unless a co urt of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 3421 and either of the following determinations is made: (a) The court of another state determines it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Sections 3422 or that a court of this state w ould be a m ore conv enient forum under Section 3427. (b) A court of this state or a co urt of the other state determines that the child, the child s parents, and any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in the other state. -31- California Code (1999 ), Section 3423 of the Family Code. Section 3423 was modeled after Section 20 3 of the U CCJE A, comm ents to wh ich emph asize that: [This section] prohibits a court from modifying a custody determination made co nsistently with this A ct by a court in another State unless a court of that State determines that it no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction . . . or that this State would be a more convenient forum. . . .The modification State is not author ized to determine that the original decree State has lost i ts jurisdic tion. UCC JEA, Se ction 203 c ommen t. Thus, under Section 3423, a California court cannot modify a Maryland custody determination unless Maryland determines that it no longer has continuing jurisdiction. The Ma ryland UCCJA has a similar provision, Section 9 -214 (a). 27 The purp ose behin d this prohibition against modification is to prev ent two states from ex ercising concurrent jurisdiction and maintaining simultaneous proceedings. We had the opportunity to explore modification jurisdiction un der the M aryland UC CJA in Harris v. Melnick, 314 Md. 539, 552 A.2d 38 (1989), where we explained that 27 Section 9-214 (a) of the Maryland UCCJA provides: If a court of ano ther state has ma de a cu stody dec ree, a court of this State shall no t modify that de cree unless (1) it appears to the court of this State that the court that rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this subtitle or has decline d to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the c ourt of this State has jurisdiction. Marylan d Cod e (1999 ), Sectio n 9-21 4 (a) of the Fam ily Law A rticle. -32- FL § 9-214(a) is § 14(a) of the Uniform Act. The reporter for the Uniform Act wa s Professo r Brigitte M. Bodenheimer whose extensive writings on that subject highlight the importance of § 14(a). *** Bodenheimer . . . points out that the rules governing modification jurisdiction are markedly different from the rules applicable to initial jurisdiction. Initial jurisdiction is determined primarily by § 3 (FL § 9-204). Modification jurisdiction, on the other hand, is governed primarily by Section 14, reinforced, where necessary, by the stronger clean hands rule of Section 8(b). As the Commissioners' Note to Section 6 states, once a custody decree has been rendered in one state, jurisdiction is determined by Sections 8 and 14 . This means that only one state - the state of continuing jurisdiction - has power to modify the custody decree. Only that state d ecides w hether to de cline the exercise of its jurisdic tion in an y particula r case. The rule is clear and simple. There can be no concurrent jurisdiction and no jurisdictional conflict between two states. Id. at 548-550, 552 A.2d at 42-43 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). We determine d in Harris that, bec ause M aryland h ad issue d the init ial custo dy decre e, If Maryland retained continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter, then the Md. Uniform Act does not restrain the exercise of that jurisdiction. Under that circumstance FL § 9-214(a) contemplates that continuing jurisdiction will be exercised and the [other state s] counterpart statute instructs the courts of that state that they shall not modify the Maryland decree. Id. at 552, 5 52 A.2 d at 44. Thus, in order for a second state to modify the initial decree issued by a Maryland court, the pa rties must ha ve been a fforded d ue proces s in the issuance of the initial decree, -33- and the Maryland court must relinquish jurisdiction. The court may relinquish jurisdiction under Se ction 9-207 (a) of the M aryland UC CJA, w hich prov ides in releva nt part: (a) Action if this State is inconvenient forum. A court which has jurisdiction under this subtitle to make an initial decree or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it f inds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of ano ther state is a more appropriate forum. *** (e) Action on finding of inconvenient forum. If the court finds that it is an inconvenient fo rum and that a cou rt of anothe r state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings on condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in another named state or on any other conditions which my be just and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate the party s consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. Maryland Code (1999), §§ 9-207 (a) and (e) of the Family Law Article. Once this has occurred, Maryland no longer has jurisdiction to issue further custodial determinations in the relinquished matter. In this case, it is clear th at Maryland was the C. children s home state at the time of the commencement of the proceeding as the children had been residing in M aryland with Mrs. C. since 2001, and that the circuit court s order immediately transferring custody of the three children to Mr. C. was the initial decree, and therefore Maryland retained exclusive jurisdiction to modify that decree. When Mrs. C. subsequently enrolled the initial decree with the Superior Court of California, however, the circuit court judge in Maryland, after speaking with the California judge, transf erred jurisdictio n over the m atter to Califo rnia. See -34- Harris, 314 Md. at 556, 552 A.2d at 46 (stating the circuit court had authority under Section 9-207 to tra nsfer custo dy to Colorado if it concluded that Colorado was a more convenient forum ). Therefore, we can no longer afford Mrs. C. a remedy in the Maryland courts for what we believe is a denial of her due process rights.28 Clearly, howev er, Mrs. C . continues to 28 Both the Maryland UCCJA and the California UCCJEA, while acknowledging that due process is a prerequisite to the legitimacy of any custody decree, fail to provide a remedy in situa tions such a s the case at b ar where a parent alleg es denial of due proc ess in the sister state s origin al award of custody. This discrepancy is evidenced by remedy provisions afforded in other situations, namely where one of the parents has initiated a custodial proceeding by improper means such as kidnaping or seizing physical custody of the child by other illegal means. For example, Section 9-208 of the Maryland UCCJA provides in relevant p art: (a) No existing decree. If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongf ully taken the ch ild from an other state or h as engag ed in similar reprehens ible condu ct, the court may decline to exercise jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances. (b) Existing decree. Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall no t exercise its jurisd iction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without consent of the person entitled to custody, has improper ly removed th e child from the physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improper ly retained the child after a visit or other temp orary relinquishment of physical cu stody. If the petitioner has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state, the court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances. Maryland Code (1999), Section 9-208 of the Family Law Article. Likewise, Section 3428 of the California UCCJEA prov ides: (a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424 or by any other law of this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction un der this part because a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has (continued...) -35- suffer collateral consequences from the Maryland judgment because the California court has relied upon that judgment in making its own custody determinations, and custody of her three children rem ains with M r. C. Thus, th e case is not m oot. B. Due Process of Law In Disposition Hearings Mrs. C. argues that the trial court erro neously adopted the master s recommendations prior to the expiration of the five days required by Maryland R ule 11-11 1 (c) to perm it a party to file exceptions and that, therefore, she was denied her due process right to have her exceptions heard by a jud icial officer o f the court. M rs. C. conten ds that, of the various provisions which govern juvenile proceedings, only Section 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides for the issuance of an immed iate order, and only in the following circumstan ces: the deten tion of a ch ild, placeme nt of the ch ild in commu nity detention, or placement in shelter care. Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), § 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Further, Mrs. C. claims that Rule 11115 (b) is governed by Rule 11-111 (c) s plain language, which requires the court to wait for the expiration of the five days provided for the filing of exceptions before adopting the 28 (...continued) engaged in unjustifiab le conduc t, the court sha ll decline to exercise its jurisdiction. California Code (1999), Section 3428 of the Family Code. These provisions prohibit a sister state from exercising jurisdiction altogether, thereby forcing parents to recognize the home state s jurisdiction and abide by its custodial determinations. No such provision exists when a denial of due process is alleged. Thus, once Mr. C. enrolled Maryland s decree with the California court, no provision was in place to stop California from embracing that decree. -36- master s recom mend ations. Moreover, Mrs. C. avers that the Court of Special Appeals erred in defining Rule 11 -115 (b) s use of the word commitment as meaning to transfer of custody because, c onsistent w ith Section 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the word should be limited to mean the detention of juveniles or placement in community detention or shelter care.29 Lastly, Mrs. C . asserts that, eve n if Rule 29 We do not reach the issue of whether the Court of Special Appeals, in dicta, correctly defined the word commitment as used in Rule 11 115 (b) because, under Section 3-819 (e) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, before custody can be transferred to another parent, the allegations in the CINA petition first must be sustained against the custodial parent; the record does not clearly reflect that the allegations in the CINA petition were sustained against M rs. C. Although the master announced during the March 3, 2004 adjudicatory hearing: [The] mother and father neither admitted nor denied the allegations contained in the petition. However, they did agree that thos e sam e alle gatio ns w ould be . . . prov en by a preponderance of the evid ence and support a finding that the children are child ren in n eed of assistan ce. The docket entry following that proceeding makes no mention of whether the allegations were sustained against either of the parents. It states: [F]iled that the court finds that the following facts as alleged in the petition are true and are sufficient to find that the c hild need or requ ire the s in terventi on . . . . Confusion surrounding whether the allegations were sustained against either of the p arents was apparent at the April 21, 2004 disposition hearing when counsel for Mrs. C. asked the master: With respect to the [DSS] s request, Your H onor, I think that s precluded alrea dy by the court s order of March 3rd . The, all parties agreed that the facts in the petition supported a finding of the children that were in need of a ssistance an d that was (continued...) -37- 11-115 (b) permitted the trial court to adopt the master s recommendations prior to the five days permitted by filing exceptions, becau se such an interpretation o f the rule w ould represent a change in CINA procedures, application of such a change to this case w ould be fundamentally unfair to Mrs. C. and therefore only should be applied to future cases. The DSS contends that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding that the trial court had the authority under Rule 11-115 (b) to imm ediately adopt the master s recommendations. The Court of Special Appeals interpretation is further supported, the DSS argues, by Section 3-802 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which requires that all CINA provisions be construed liberally. Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Rep. Vol.), Section 3-802 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. With regard to Section 3-807 (d)(3) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, the DSS alleges that Section 3-807 (d)(3) was designed to give masters the authority to issue an immediate order in a limited number of emergency situations where immediate protection of the child is nece ssary. Contrary to Mrs. C. s contentions, the DSS asserts that, when c ompared with Ru le 11-115 (b), which only permits a master to implement his or her recommendations (...continued) agreed to on the record and signed by, by the Master and signed by [the circuit court judge] on March 5th . So there s no way that [Section 3-819 (e)] cited [to] by the [DSS] is applicable a t this point. The final dispos ition order also fails to mak e any mention of whether the CINA petition allegations were sustained against Mrs. C. Whether the allegations in the CINA petition were sustained against Mrs. C. is an issue that could have been resolved had Mrs. C. been afford ed a pro per opp ortunity to file exc eptions . -38- imm edia tely, not issue an order, it becomes clear that Section 3-807 (d)(3) was intended to expand upon, not limit, the authority delegated to masters under Ru le 11-115 (b). Further, the DSS m aintains that, i f masters are capable of issuing immediate orders in CINA proceedings pursuant to Section 3-807 (d)(3), trial judges also can issue imme diate orders in CINA proceedin gs pursua nt to Rule 11-115. Lastly, the DS S asserts that, b ecause R ule 11-115 took effe ct over thirty years ag o, its application in this case is not novel and theref ore the Court of Special Appeals holding was not unfair to Mrs. C. The question of wh ether the circuit court erred in adopting the master s recommendations prior to the expiration of five days requires us to construe statutes and provisions of the R ules. Public Service Com n of Maryland v. Wilson, 389 Md. 27, 45, 882 A.2d 84 9, 860 (20 05); Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80-81 (2004). We apply the same principles when interpreting rules as we apply when interpreting statues. Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 80-81; Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 77, 775 A.2d 1218, 1223 (2001). We begin our analysis by first looking to the plain meaning of the rule s language, our examination of which is guided by the principle that we should read the rule as a whole, so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory. Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316 , 896 A.2d 103 6, 1045 (2006); Kane v. Board of Appeals of Prince Georges County , 390 Md. 14 5, 162, 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (20 05); Giant Food, Inc. v. Dep t of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 194, 738 A.2d 856, 860-61, 863 (1999). If the language of the rule is subject -39- to more than one interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we resolve that ambiguity by looking to legislative history, ca se law, a nd statu tory purp ose. Mayor of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316, 896 A.2d at 10 45; Canaj, Inc. v. Baker and Div. Phase III, 391 Md. 374, 403, 893 A.2d 1067, 1084 (2006); Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 M d. 583, 5 91, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005 ). If, however, the rule is clear and unambig uous, we n eed n ot look beyond the prov ision 's terms to inform our analysis. City of Frederick v. Pickett, 392 Md. 411, 427, 897 A.2d 228, 237 (2006), qu oting in turn Davis, 383 Md. at 604-05, 861 A.2d at 81. In construing the meaning of the rule s language, however, our primary goal is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomp lished, or the e vils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules." General Motors Corp. v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 352, 879 A.2d 1049, 1055 (2005) quoting Davis, 383 Md. at 605, 861 A.2d at 81. Section 3-807 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article grants masters the authority to conduct juvenile proceedings such as disposition hearings and states in relevant part: (c) Exceptions to findings, conclusions, and recommendations. (1) Any party, in accordance with the Maryland Rules, may file written exceptions to any or all of the master s findings, conclusions, and recommendations, but shall specify those items to which the party objects. *** (d) Proposals and recommend ations. (1) The proposals and recommendations of a master for juvenile causes do not constitute ord ers or final ac tion of the c ourt. (2) The proposals and recommendatio ns shall be p romptly -40- reviewed by the court, an d, in the abse nce of tim ely and proper exceptions, they may be adopted by the court and appropriate orders entered based on them. (3) Detention, community detention, or shelter care may be ordered by a master pending co urt review of the m aster s findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Maryland Code (1974 , 2002 Supp. V ol.), Section 3-807 of the C ourts and Judicial Proceedings Article (emphasis added). This authority is governed by Rule 2-541, which provides in pertinent pa rt: (f) Entry of Order. (1) The court shall not direct the entry of an order or judgment based upon the master s recommendations until the expiration of the time for filing exceptions, and, if exceptions are timely filed, until the court rules on the excep tions. Maryland Rule 2-541. D isposition hearings are guided by Maryland Rule 11-115, the relevant part of which states: b. Disposition - Judg e or m aster. The disposition made by the court shall be in accordance with Section 3-820 (b) of the C ourts Article. If the disposition hearing is conducted by a judge, and his order includes placement of the child outside the home, the judge shall announce in open court and shall prepare and file with the clerk, a statement of the reasons for the placement. If the hearing is conducted by a master, the procedures of Rule 11111 shall be followed. In the interest of justice, the judge or master may decline to require strict application of the rules in Title 5, exce pt those relating to the co mpete ncy of w itnesses . A commitment recommended by a master is subject to approval by the court in accordance with Rule 11-111, but may be implem ented in ad vance of c ourt appr oval. 30 30 Although no challen ge to the co nstitutionality of Ma ryland Rule 11-115 (b) s (continued...) -41- Maryland Rule 11-115 (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 11-115 (b) explicitly requires that proceedings before a master follow the procedures set forth in Rule 11-111, which provides: a. Auth ority. 1. Detention or shelter care. A master is authorized to order detention or shelter care in accordance with Rule 11-112 (Detention or Shelter Care) subject to an immedia te review b y a jud ge if requ ested by any party. 2. Other matters. A master is authorized to hear any cases and matters assigned to him by the court, except a hearing on a waiver petition. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of a master do not constitute orders or final action of th e court. b. Report to the court. Within ten days following the conclusion of a disposition hearing by a master, he shall transmit to the judge the entire file in the case, togeth er with a written report o f his pro posed finding s of fac t, conclusions of law, recommendations and p roposed o rders with re spect to adjudication and disposition. A copy of his repo rt and proposed order shall be served upon each party as provided by Rule 1321. c. Revie w by court i f exce ptions filed. Any party may file exceptions to the master s proposed findings, conclusions, recommendations or proposed orders. E xceptions s hall be in writing, filed with the clerk within five days after the master s report is served up on the party, an d shall specify those ite ms to which the party excepts, and whether the hearing is to be de 30 (...continued) provision permitting the immediate implementation of a master s recommendations has been raised in this case, it is important to note that this p rovision is no t consistent w ith this Court s holdings regard ing the r ole of a master . See e.g. Bar Ass n v. Marsh all, 269 Md. 510, 516, 307 A.2d 67 7, 680 (1973) (noting that a master s findings and report are only advisory ); In re Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 105-106, 321 A.2d 516, 527 (1974) (stating that under A rticle Four, Section One of the Constitution, [m]asters are not judges and, therefore, are not vested with any part of the judicial power of the State. . . . [A] master s findings do not become binding u ntil approve d by a judge. ); Harrym an v. State, 359 Md. 492, 506-507, 754 A.2d 1018, 1026 (2000), and cases there cited. -42- novo or on the record. Upon the filing of e xceptions, a prompt h earing shall be scheduled on the exceptions. An excepting party other than the State may elect a hearing de novo or a hearing on the record. If the State is the excepting party, the hearing shall be on record, supplemented by such additional evidence as the judge conside rs relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. I n either case the hearing shall be limited to those matters to which exceptions have been taken. d. Review by court in absence of exceptions. In the absence of timely and proper exceptions, the m aster s proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations may be adopted by the court and the propo sed or othe r appropria te orders may be entered based on them. The court may sch edule and conduct a further hearing supplemented by such additional evidence as the court considers relevant and to which the parties raise no objection. Action by the court under this section sh all be taken with in two days a fter the exp iration of the time for filing exceptions. Maryland Rule 11-111. When construing these rules, we m ust bear in mind that they are "precise rubri cs," established to promote the orderly and efficient administration of justice, and thus are to be strictly followed. Gen. Motors Corp, 388 Md. 341, 356, 879 A.2d 1049, 1057 (2005) (holding that General Motors forfeited its right to file a motion for judgment not withstanding the verdict when it failed to renew its motion after the close of all evidence as Rule 2-519(a) required); Harvey v. Williams, 319 M d. 238, 2 42 n. 2, 572 A.2d 149, 151 n. 2 (1990) (declining, pursuant to Rule 8-303 (b)(6), to address questions not presented in the petitioner s petition for certiorari); King v. State Road s Comm n, 284 Md. 368, 371-72, 396 A.2d 267, 269-70 (1979) (holding that a new trial was warranted when trial judge struck five -43- jurors, thereby violating Rule 543 's requiremen ts for perem ptory challeng es); Robinson v. Board of County Comm rs , 262 Md. 342, 346, 278 A.2d 71, 73-74 (1971) (vacating trial court s granting of motion d ismissing ac tion against tw o police of ficers filed p ursuant to Rule 3 23 (b) b ecause the rule d id not ap ply to pub lic offic ers). The Court of Special A ppeals corr ectly held that the circuit court erred in relying on Maryland Rule 9-208 (h)(2) fo r its authority to immediately adopt the master s recommendations because Title 9 of the ru les do[es] not apply to actions in a juvenile court. Maryland Rule 9-201. The Court of Specials Appeals erred, however, when it further determined that, pursuant to R ule 11-11 5 (b), the trial cou rt had the au thority to implement the master s recommendations prior to the expiration of the five days for filing exceptions and that M rs. C. s right to f ile exceptions under R ule 11-11 1 (c) persisted in spite of the tr ial court s imm ediate o rder. By Rule 11-1 15 (b) s plain language, a master s recommendations are subject to approval by the court in ac cordance with Ru le 11-111 , and Ru le 11-111 unmistakin gly provides parties five days to file exceptions to a master s recommen dations. The fact that Rule 11-111 prohibits the trial court from taking any action on the master s recommendations before the expiration of those fiv e days is evinced by subsection (d) of Rule 11-111. Subsection (d), entitled Review by court in absence of exceptions, which requires that the trial court take action within two days after the expiration of the five-day period for filing exceptions. Any interpretation of Rule 1 1-111 permitting a trial court to adopt the master s -44- recommendations prior to the expiration of the exception s period w ould rend er this provision of subsection (d) nugatory and impair a party s right to file excep tions. Acco rdingly, Rule 11-115 (b) s provisions purported ly permitting a m aster to imm ediately implement his or her recommendations cannot be interpreted in such a way as to ob viate a party s righ t to Rule 11111 (c) s five-day exceptions period, as evinced by Rule 2-541 (f), which states that [t]he court shall not direc t the entry of an o rder or judg ment base d upon th e master s recom mend ations u ntil the ex piration of the tim e for filin g exce ptions. Moreover, to hold that a party s right to file exceptions persists even after the trial judge has adopted the master s recommendations contravenes the very purpose for affording parties the opportunity to except. As Judge A lan M. W ilner, writing f or this Court, reflected in O Brien v. O Brien, 367 Md. 547 , 790 A.2d 1 (20 02): [E]xceptions serve a dual purpose to infor m the cou rt, first, that the excepting party is not satisfied with the master s recommendation, and, second, of the reason why the court should not accept that recommendation. Id. at 555, 790 A.2d at 5-6. Thus, once the trial court has adopted the master s recom mend ations, th e very pu rpose f or filing excep tions ha s been u nderm ined. Central to our conclusion in this case is the re cognition of the fact that a m aster s recommendations are not binding upon the parties and do not carry the force of the law un til they are adopted by the trial judge. See Maryland Cod e (1974, 2002 R ep. Vol.), Section 3807 (d)(1) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ( The proposals and recommendations of a maste r for juven ile causes do not constitute orders of final action of -45- the court. ) (emphasis added); Maryland Rule 11-111 (a)(2) ( The findings, conclusions and recommendations of a master do not constitute orders or final action of the court. ) (emphas is added ). See also Anthony Plumbing of Maryland, Inc. v. Attorney General, 298 Md. 11, 16, 467 A.2d 504, 506 (1983) ( The master s findings do not finally dispose of the litigation in the trial court; they may be excepted to by the parties and are not binding until confirmed and implemented by the trial court. ); Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 658, 625 A.2d 95 9, 971 (19 93); Anderson, 272 M d. at 102-03, 321 A .2d at 525-26 ( Th e court may, by special reference, require [a master] to hear evidence and find and report facts to the [trial judge], but before such finding can become binding, it must be approved by the court. ) (quoting Boston v. N ichols, 47 Ill. 35 3 (186 8)). A master s recommendations do not constitute an order binding upon the parties because there exists a clear distinction between the role of a master and that of a judge. We had the opportunity to explore the role of the trial judge vis-a-vis the master in Domingues v. Johnson, 323 Md. 486, 593 A.2d 1133 (19 91). We h eld that a trial judge, when reviewing a party s exceptions, was first required to de termine whether the master s factual findings were clearly erroneous, and then to exercise his or her own independent judgment to determine whether the master had reached the correct legal conclusions based upon those factual findings. We emphasized that the trial judge s ow n indepen dent judgm ent is required because [l]itigants in a child custody proceeding, as in all judicial proceedings, are entitled to have their cause determined -46- ultimately by a duly qualified judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. . . . While the system of resorting to Masters is one of long standing and u ndoubtedly has salutary effects resulting in the more expeditious dispatch of the judicial process, the system cannot su pplant the u ltimate role of judges in the judicial proces s itself. Id. at 492, 593 A.2d at 1135- 36 (em phasis a dded). See also O Brien, 367 Md. at 554, 790 A.2d at 5 ( [A] master is not a judicial officer, and is not vested with judicial powers. ); In re DeWayne H., 290 Md. 401, 402 n.1, 430 A.2d 76 , 77 n.1 (1981), quoting in turn Anderson, 272 Md. at 10 6, 321 A .2d at 527 ( [A] master is a ministerial officer, and not a judicial officer. . . . [U]nder the Maryland Constitution a master is entrusted with no part of the judicial power of this State. ). Thus, to protect a party s right to have a matter heard b y a judge, Rule 11-111 (c ) requires that upon the filing of exceptions, the trial judge must hold a prompt hearing on those exceptions. The import of this provision was iterated by the Court of Special A ppeals in Matter of Jackson, 22 M d. App . 108, 321 A.2d 827 (1974), where Ms. Jackson filed exceptions to a master s findings and recommendations pursuant to Rule 908 (e)(2), the predecessor to Rule 11-111 (c). The trial court subsequently held a de novo hearing on the exceptions, causing Ms. Jackson to appeal on the ground that the de novo hearing before the trial judge had denied her the opportunity to directly challenge the master. The Court of Special Appeals held that the statutory scheme where by a trial court, after exceptions are taken to the recommen dations of a master, hears the matter de novo, did not violate a party s due process of law. In so doing, the court emphasized that -47- [t]he clear import of the law is that the hearing de novo before the judge is the only means of challenging the findings and recommendations of the master (and, by necessary implication, the propriety of the procedures by which the master arrived at those f inding s and re comm endatio ns). Id. at 111, 321 A.2d at 828-29. As Rule 11-111's provisions demonstrate, the only circumstances under w hich a party is guaranteed a hearing before a trial judge are those in which the party has filed exceptions. See Maryland Rule 11-111 (c) ( Upon the filing of exceptions, a prompt hearing shall be scheduled on the e xceptio ns. ). Cf. Maryland rule 11-111 (d) ( In the absence of timely and proper exceptions . . . [t]he co urt . . . may schedule and conduct a further hearing. ). Thus, the right to file exceptions is a required protective provision of litigants due process right to have his or her matter heard by a duly qualified judge. Accordingly, in the case before us, when the trial judge adopted the master s recommendations only two days after the disposition hearing, he not only failed to observe Rule 11 -111(c), but also violated M rs. C. s right to have five days to file exceptions to the master s recommendations. The DSS contends, however, that, in light of the escalating difficulties Gunner was having in his foster care home, the circuit court was ju stified in immediately transferring custody of the children to Mr. C. instead of perpetuating their stay in various fo ster care homes, an action that was consistent with our holding in In re Ado ption/Gu ardiansh ip No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 104, 642 A.2d 201, 204 (1994). We disag ree. In Adoption /Guardia nship No. 10941, we had the occasion to address the guidelines for -48- placement of children outside of the ir homes as set forth in M aryland s foster care legislation and in so doing we recognized that a child s best interests are served through the establishment of permanency in a child s life and the minimization of time spent in foster care. Id. at 106, 642 A.2d a t 205. We em phasized th at, in determin ing wha t placemen t is most appropriate for a child, in addition to the child s best interests, [a]nother important interest that must be considered . . . is the right of a parent to raise his or her child. This right, recognized by constitutional principles, common law and statute, is so fundamental that it may not be ta ken aw ay unless clearly justified. Id. at 112, 642 A.2d at 208. Thus, when the court seeks to place a child outside of his o r her ho me, [t]he welf are and be st interests of the child must be w eighed with great care a gainst every just claim of an o bjecting parent. Id. In the case sub judice, the circuit court cited in its disposition order that Gunn er s current foster care p lacement is jeopardize d due to his poor beh avior and h is immedia te placement with his father is in his best interests. In so do ing, the circuit c ourt failed to recognize that the need for permanent placement in a child s life does not obviate the parent s right to due pro cess. We therefore hold that the circuit court erred in adop ting the master s recommendations prior to the expiration of the five days afforded by Rule 11-111 (c) for filing exceptions. Because California has assumed jurisdiction over the C. children s custody proceedings, however, the only remedy that we can provide Ms. C. is to reverse the Court of -49- Special Appeals judgment and rema nd this case to the Circuit C ourt for Fre derick Co unty with orders to dismiss the case, thereby relieving Ms. C. of the collateral consequences she continues to suffer fro m the M aryland judgm ent. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED AND CASE R E M A N D E D T O T H AT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCU IT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY BE REVERSE D AND THE CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COUR T WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS THE ACTION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY FREDERICK COUN TY IN TH IS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS. Judg e Wi lner joins in th e jud gme nt on ly. -50-
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