Oakland v. Mountain Lake

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In the Circu it Court for G arrett Coun ty Case No. 11-C-04-8356 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 60 September Term, 2005 MAYOR AND TOWN COUNCIL OF OAKLAND v. MAYOR AND TOWN COUNCIL OF MO UNT AIN L AKE PAR K, ET AL. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Raker, J. Cathell, J., Concurs Filed: April 18, 2006 The primary question in this case concerns the manner of computation of time required to give notice of the hearing on an annexation resolution. In this case, two municipal corporation s seek to an nex the sam e unincorp orated area located in G arrett Cou nty. The computation of time question on app eal is w hether th e termin al day, i.e., April 23, 2004, is to be included or excluded in computing the number of days of the statutory requirement of not less t han 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices. We granted certiorari to answer the following questions: I. Did the Circuit Court err in applying the common law clear time rule in determining that Oakland failed to set the public hearing on the Oakland Annexation Resolution for not less than 15 days after the fou rth publicatio n of the pu blic notices of the Oakland Annexation Resolution as required by Article 23A § 19(d)? II. Did Mountain Lake Park act in contravention of Article 23A, § 19 in holding a referendum election on the Mountain Lake Park Annexation Resolution before the end of the 45-day period during which referendum petitions may be submitted under Article 23A, § 19(f) in an effort to make the Mountain Lake Park annexation effective prior to the stated effective date of the Moun tain Lake Pa rk Anne xation Re solution and the Oakland Annexation Resolution? Oakland v. Mountain Lake Park, 388 Md. 673, 882 A.2d 28 6 (2005). W e shall answ er both questions in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the C ircuit Co urt for G arrett Co unty. I. On Tuesday, March 16, 2004, The Mayor and Town Council of Oakland, Maryland, introduced an annexation resolution (Oakland resolution), R2004-01,1 at a regular meeting of the Oakland Town Counc il, to enlarge its corporate boundaries by annexing property of the Board of Education of Garrett County and the property of Floyd and Eleanor Arnold. Pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(d), pu blic notice of this resolution and the area to be annexed by Oakland was published in The Republican, a newspaper of general circulation in Oakland, on March 18, 2004 , March 2 5, 2004, A pril 1, 2004, and April 8, 2004. The Mayor and Town Council of Oakland held a public hearing on the annexation resolution on April 23, 2004. The Oakland resolution was enacted following the public hearing. The Oakland resolution provided that it would become effective on the forty-sixth day following its enactment, which was June 8, 2004. The Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park introduced an annexation resolution (Mountain Lake Park resolution), Resolution No. 2004-2, to enlarge the corporate boundaries of Mo untain Lake Park by annexing an area known as the Western Annexation at a special meeting on Wednesday, March 17, 2004.2 Included w ithin the boundaries of the 1 According to the Oakland resolution, the property of the Board of Education of Garrett County is located between Dennett Road, South Eleventh Street, and Oakland Avenue, and the property of Floyd and Eleanor Arnold is located at 741 Dennett Road. 2 According to the Mountain Lake Park resolution, the Western Annexation includes 509.820 acres, situate, lying and being in Election District Nos. 7 and 16 of Gar rett C oun ty, Marylan d. -2- Western Annexation was the land sought to be annexed by Oakland, as well as additional land. Pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(d), pub lic notice of th e Mou ntain Lake Park resolution was published in The Republican, a newspaper of general circulation in Mountain Lake Park and the Western Annexation, on March 18, 2004, March 25, 2004, April 1, 2004, and April 8, 2004. The Mayor and Town Council of Mountain Lake Park enacted the Mountain Lake resolution following a public hearing on April 28, 2004. The Mountain Lake resolution stated that it would become effective on the forty-sixth day following its enactment, which was June 13, 2004. Several weeks before the public hearing on the Mountain Lake Park resolution, the Town Clerk of M ountain Lake Park prepared a referendum petition that was circulated to the residents of Parkwood Village East, an apartment complex within the Western Annexation. A resident adv ocate of th at comm unity, after speaking with the Town Clerk, informed the residents of that apa rtment complex that it would be of financial benefit to them to be annexed into Mountain Lake Park, and therefore, they should sign the petition for referendum. Deposition testimony revealed that the petition was circulated only to the residents of Parkwood Village East because Mountain Lake Park officials believed that Parkwood residents supported Mountain Lake s annexation efforts. Following a submission of the requisite number of signatures on a referendum petition, the referendum election was scheduled for May 22, 2004 at P arkwoo d Village E ast, and public notice of this election was published in The Republican on April 29, 2004 and -3- May 6, 2004 pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(i). Thirty-one residents of Parkwood Village East 3 voted in the refere ndum ele ction on M ay 22, 2004, a nd a majo rity of those pers ons voted in favor o f anne xation b y Moun tain La ke Park . Two days before the end of the forty-five day period permitted for the submission of a referendum petition on the Mountain Lake resolution, on June 10, 2004, a resident of the Western Annexation, not residing in Parkwood Village East, submitted another referendum petition on the resolution. Mountain Lake Park did not accept this second petition. The Mayor an d Tow n Coun cil of Mo untain Lake Park filed in the Circuit Court for Garrett County a Com plaint for Declaratory Relief pursuant to Md. Code (1 973, 200 2 Repl. Vol., 2005 Cum. Supp.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, seeking a declaration that the Oakland resolution, No. R2004-01, was void because the Mayor and Town Council of Oakland did not comply with the notice requirement of A rt. 23A § 19(d). The Mayor an d Tow n Coun cil of Oakland filed a Counter-Complaint seeking a judgment declaring the referendum election on the Mountain Lake resolution void and having no impact on the effective date of the Oakland resolution, that the effective day of the M ountain Lake Park resolution could not have been prior to June 12, 2004, which was forty-five days after its enactment, and that the Mountain Lake resolution was ineffective because the Oakland resolution w as effective first. 4 3 Only the residen ts of Pa rkwo od Vill age Ea st particip ated in th is electio n. 4 Under Art. 23A § 19 the enactment date and the effective date of an annexation (contin ued...) -4- The Complaint alleged that the annexation resolution adopted by the Mayor and Town Counc il of Oakland on April 23, 2004 was not in conformance with Article 23A § 19. The facts were not in dispute. Oakland held its annexation resolution hearing on April 8, 2004, and adopted the resolution on April 23, 2004. The notice was published four times in The Republican, with the last publication date on April 8, 2004. The pertinent provision of the annexation statute requires that there be fifteen days between the fourth publication of the notices and the public hearing on the annexation resolution. The question b efore the C ircuit Court was whethe r April 23rd was to be included in determining whether there was not less than fif teen da ys before the hea ring w as held . The Circuit Court held that the town of Oakland had not complied with the requirements of Art. 23A § 19, and that the hearing which was held on April 23, 2004 was less than fifteen days after the publication of the last advertisement. 5 The Court voided 4 (...continued) resolution are diff erent. See Art. 23A § 19(e) ( The resolution shall not become effective until at least forty-five (45) days follow ing its final enactment ) (emphasis added). Because the Oakland resolution was going to be effective first, assuming Oakland follow ed statutory procedures properly, the land identified in the Oakland resolution was annexed by Oakland. Therefore, under the a nnexatio n statute, Oakland alleged in its Counter-complaint that Moun tain Lake Park could not properly annex any of the land annex ed by O akland . See Art. 23A § 19(m) ( The provisions of this section sh all authorize a n increase in the area w ithin any municipal corporation only as to land which is not then within the corporate limits of any other m unicipa l corpo ration ) . 5 In a declaratory jud gment ac tion, the circuit court must enter a declaratory judgment on a separate document, declaring the rights and obligations of the parti es. See § 3-406 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ( Any person . . . whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a . . . municipal ordinance . . . may have determined any (contin ued...) -5- Oakland s annexation on the ground that Oakland failed to comply with the notice requireme nts of Art. 23A § 19(d), and that Mountain Lake s annexation of the disputed area was valid. The Court ruled as follows: When the statute reads not less than 15 days from the date of the last publication, it me ans n ot les s than 15 full d ays from the last public ation. In determ ining com pliance in th is situation, the Court counts forward beginning with the day after the last date of publication, and 15 days is not 14 and ½ days. As to the consequence s of the bre ach of tim e, one cou ld speculate, but it simply cannot be measured. The only recourse is to start over again, if possible. S o, the first ruling the Court makes is that the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance does not apply. Now, Mt. Lak e Park s pe tition to annex the same, and additional prop erty, w as en acte d, an d on the v ery ne xt da y a petition for referen dum w as filed. W as this petition to defeat Oakland s time? W ell, it certainly has that aroma to it. But it was time ly filed; it w as pu blish ed co nspi cuously, and the pe ople were able to vote on it. It was not defeated; it passed . Mr. Tinsley was from the same area and wanted to file his own 5 (...continued) question or construction or validity arising under the . . . ordinance . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it ); Md. Rule 2-601(a) (stating, in pertinent part, that [e]ach judgment shall be set forth on a s eparate do cument ); Secure Financial Service, Inc. v. Popular Leasing USA, Inc., 391 Md. 274, 281, 892 A.2d 571, 575 (2006); Allstate v. State Farm, 363 M d. 106, 1 17 n.1, 7 67 A.2 d 831, 8 37 n.1 ( 2001) . In this case, the trial court failed to do so, and on remand, the court shall enter a judgment consistent with this opinion . We hav e admon ished trial cou rts repeatedly that w hen a dec laratory judgment action is brought, and the co ntroversy is appropriate for resolution by declaratory judgmen t, the circuit court must enter a declaratory judgment. Secure Financial, 391 Md. at 281, 892 A.2d at 575; Converge v. Curran, 383 Md. 462 , 477, 860 A.2d 8 71, 880 (2004). Because there is a justiciable controversy regarding the parties annexation ord inance s, a declaratory judgment action is proper in this ca se. See § 3-409(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceed ings Article; Converge, 383 Md. at 478, 860 A.2d at 880. -6- petition. The petition from the affected area had already been filed, and to hav e another p etition wou ld simply be confu sing to say the lea st. The [Board of Garrett County] C ommissio ners could have filed a petition, and the citizens fro m Mt. Lake Pa rk could have filed a petition, but they didn t. The referendum was filed from the aff ected a rea. It was vote d on and it passed, and the rest is speculation. So the ruling of this Court is th at Oakland did not comply with its time, and that the M t. Park Annex ation is valid. Oakland noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. This Court granted Oakland s petition for writ of certiorari while Oakland s appeal was pending before the intermediate appella te court. Oaklan d v. Mou ntain Lake Park, 388 Md. 673, 882 A.2d 286 (2005 ). II. The question of the sufficiency of the notice turns on the construction of Md. Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A § 19(d) and Md. Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1 § 36. The issue in this case is the proper method of calculating the notice period described in the statute. Art. 23A § 19 sets out the procedu re for annex ation of lan d in Ma ryland. Art. 23A § 19(d) provides that after the introduction of an annexation resolution into the legislative body of a municipality, there must be public notice and a public hearing before the annexation resolution may be enacted by the legislative b ody. The pu blic hearing shall be set for not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices. The pertinent part of A rt. 23A § 1 9(d) reads a s follows: -7- The public notices shall specify a time and place at which a public hearing w ill be held by the legislative body on the resolution; the hearing shall be set for not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices or, if the total area of the proposed annexation is for 25 acres of land or less, not less than 15 days after the second publication of the notices, and shall be held either within the boundaries of the municipal corporation or within the area to be annexed. (Empha sis added). In th e case bef ore us, the he aring wa s held either fourteen days after the last publication of the notices, or fifteen days, depending upon whether t he hearing could properly be held on the fifteenth day. We must decide the meaning of not less than 15 days as used in Art. 23A § 19(d). Petitioner argues that the Circu it Court w as wrong in voiding Oakland s annexation resolution and that the Court computed the days improperly. Petitioner maintains that the phrase not less than 15 days permits the town to hold the hearing on the fifteenth day and that the trial court erred in applying the common-law clear-time rule and holding that fifteen clear days were re quired. Petition er asserts that the Circuit Court erroneously applied the clear-time rule to conclude that the public hearing should have been held after April 23, 2004. Petitioner s argum ent is gro unded in Art. 1 § 36, which establishes a uniform method for computing time in Maryland. Art. 1 § 36 provides in pertinent part, as follows: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included . . . . When the period of time allowed is more than -8- seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be consid ered as other d ays . . . . (Empha sis added). Petitioner maintains that by the plain language of the statute, the time computation method in Art. 1 § 3 6 applies to th e notice per iod set out in Art. 23A § 19 (d). Petitioner s position is that under Art. 1 § 36, the last day of period is included in the computation of time, and therefore, a hearing held on the fifteenth day would satisfy the statutory requirements of Art. 23A § 19(d). Had the Circuit Court applied Art. 1 § 36 to the matter sub judice, petitioner continues, it would have concluded that the public hearing on the Oakland resolution w as held properly on April 23, 2004, because that w as the 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices required by Art 23 A § 19(d). Respondent argues that the general computation of time rule set out in Art. 1 § 3 6 is inapplicab le to the calculation of time under Art. 23A § 19(d) because the latter statute uses the phrase not less than 15 days after the fourth publication of the notices, which requires an application of the clear-time rule, an exception to the general rule for the computation of time. Under the common-law clear-time rule, if an action requires the expiration of a certain number of days, then both the first day and the final day are excluded from the time computation. Therefore, Art. 23A § 19(d) did not permit the Mayor and Town Council of Oakland to hold the public hearing on the Oakland resolution on April 23, 2004 because that date w as less th an fifte en days o f clear tim e after th e fourth publica tion of n otices. -9- We first turn to the question of whe ther the clear-tim e rule governs the computation of time under A rt. 23A § 19. We conclude that the general method for computing time set out in Art. 1 § 36 applies, because the Leg islatu re did not exp ress an in tent t o the contrary. III. The general rule in Maryland, as in most other states, is that in computing the time for the performance of an act or an event, the designated first day is excluded and the last day of the period is includ ed. See Equitable Life Assurance v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 262, 508A.2d 137, 139 (1986); Winter v. O Neill, 155 Md. 624, 635, 142 A. 263, 268 (1928 ). See generally J. A. Bo ck, An notation , Inclusion or Exclus ion of First a nd Last D ays in Computing the Time for Performance of an Act or Event Which Must Take Place a Certain Number of Days Before a Known F uture Date, 98 A.L.R .2d 1331 (1964). Th e general ru le is applicable unless there is an indication or intention to count only clear or entire days. See Winter v. O Neill, 155 M d. at 635, 14 2 A. at 268 ; Graham v. Wellington, 121 Md. 656, 660, 89 A. 232, 233 (1913); Harris v. Latta, 259 S.E.2d 239, 240 (N.C. 1979). In Graham, we noted, in construing the election law requiring that certificates of nomination should be filed not less than twenty-five days before the election, that [w]hile the general rule, in the computation of time, is to include one day and exclude the other, and not to include or exclude both, there are many de cisions wh ich hold tha t if a statute indic ates that there a re to -10- be so m any clear days, or that req uires so m any days at least, both are to be excluded. 121 Md. at 660, 89 A. at 233. The Maryland General Assembly codified the common-law method of time computation, initially enacted in 1941 as Art. 94 § 2, with the express purpose of establishing a uniform method of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the rules of any Court, or by order of Court, or by any applicable statute. 1941 Md. Laws, Chap. 522. (emphasis added). The Act, now codified as Art. 1 § 36,6 provides as follows: In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default, after which the designated period of time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included unless: (1) It is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the period ru ns until the end of the next day, wh ich is neither a Sunday or a holiday; or, (2) the act to be done is the filing of some paper in court and the office o f the clerk o f said court on said last day of the perio d is not open, or is closed for a part of a day, in which event, the period runs until the end of the next day which is neither a Sunday, Saturday, a legal holiday, or a day on w hich the said office is not open the en tire day during ordinary business hours. When the period of time allowed is more than seven days, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall be considered as other days; but if the period of 6 Art. 1 § 36 was codified previously at Md. Code (1957, 1995 Repl. Vol.), Art. 94 § 2. In 1997, the General Assembly transferred the statute from Art. 94 § 2 to Art. 1 § 36 without substan tive cha nges. See 1997 M d. Laws, C hap. 3 1, § 6; Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 19 97 Cu m. Sup p.), Art. 1 § 36. The sta tute read s the sam e today. See Md. Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Art. 1 § 36. The statute was last chang ed sub stantive ly in 1957 . See 1957 Md. Law s, Chap. 399, § 40 (repealing the part of the statute making the computation method applicable to time periods prescribed or allowed by rules or orders of court). Computing time periods prescribed by rules or order of court is now governed by Md. Rule 1-203. -11- time allowed is seven days or less, intermediate Sundays and holidays shall not be cou nted in c ompu ting the p eriod o f time. See also Md. R ule 1-2 03 (go vernin g com putation of time ). In concludin g that the O akland reso lution was invalid bec ause Oa kland did n ot wait fifteen clear days before holding a public hearing after the fourth publication of notices, the Circuit Court did not use the method prescribed by this statute in co mputing th e applicable time. Because Art. 1 § 36 provides a uniform method for computing time prescribed by Maryland law and Art. 23A § 19 does not contain any exceptions to this general rule, the Circ uit C ourt construe d the se sta tutes inco rrectly. This Court has applied the statutory rule for computing time to the determination of the amou nt of tim e requir ed und er a num ber of d ifferen t statutory sc heme s. See, e.g ., Grayson v. State, 354 M d. 1, 14- 15, 728 A.2 d 1280 , 1286 (19 99) (applying Art. 1 § 36 to conclude that a post-conviction petition was timely filed under the P ost Conviction Proc edure Act, then Art. 27 § 645A ); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 536-37, 578 A.2d 1177, 1178-79 (1990) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to conclude that a land installment contract was recorded one day late); Equitable Life Assurance v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 265, 508 A.2d 137, 141 (1986) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine that the insured died within the two-year period during w hich the life in surance p olicy was sub ject to contest); Yingling v . Smith, 259 Md. 260, 262-63, 269 A.2d 612, 613 (1970) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine whether a bill of complain t was timely filed in a suit against an executor); State Housing, Inc. v. Baltimore, 215 Md. 29 4, 298, 137 A.2d 70 8, 711 (19 58) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to determine date by -12- which an appeal from a decision of the Board of M unicipal and Zonin g Appeals of B altimore had to be taken ); Fischer v. Fischer, 193 Md. 501, 505-06, 69 A.2d 51, 52 (1949) (applying Art. 94 § 2 to conclude that an appeal was taken in time); see also P umphr ey v. Stocke tt, 187 Md. 318, 322 -23, 49 A.2d 80 4, 806-07 (1946 ). Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States v. Jalowsky, 306 Md. 257, 508 A.2d 137 (198 6) is instructive a s to the application of the statutory rule for computing time to the matter sub judice. In Jalowsky, we explained that M d. Code (1957 , 1985 Repl. Vo l.), Art. 94 § 2, now codified at Art. 1 § 36 with no changes, essentially is a codification of the common-law rule, requiring the exclusion of the first day and the inclusion of the last [day] in computing time commencing from a particu lar day. See id. at 262, 5 08 A.2 d at 139 . We applied Art. 94 § 2 to determine the final date on which an insurer could contest the validity of an insurance policy under Art. 48A § 390. Md. Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.), Art. 48A § 390 provides that, in pertinent part, a life insurance policy shall be incontestable, except fo r the nonp ayment of p remiums , after it has been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a pe riod of two (2 ) years fro m its dat e of issu e. 7 Writing fo r this Court, Chief Judge Robert Murphy explained why Art. 94 § 2 and Art. 48A § 390 must be construed together: It is thus clear that Art. 48A, § 390 contains a two-year limitation for contesting an insurance policy while A rt. 94, § 2 addresses the comp utation of tim e periods co ntained in 7 Art. 48A § 390 is n ow co dified a t Md. C ode (19 97, 200 2 Rep l. Vol., 2005 Cum. Supp.), § 16-203(a) of the Insurance Article, with no substantive changes. -13- applicable statutes. Both statutes relate, at least in part, to the same subject matter that of time. We have long held that in construing legislative enactments, all statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be considered and harmonized as far as possible. In addition, there is a policy that statutes are not to be co nstrued to alter th e com mon-la w by imp lication. *** As previous ly indicated, Art. 94, § 2 codified the then existing common law rule for computing time. In this regard, the General A ssembly is presumed to have had, and acted with respect to, full knowledge and information as to prior and existing law and legislation on the subject of the statute and the policy of the prio r law. A rticle 94 , § 2 prec eded A rt. 48A , § 390; hence, the General Assemb ly is presume d to have h ad full knowledge of its content and underlying policy when it passed Art. 48A, § 390. Id. at 263, 5 08 A.2d at 140 (citations omitted). Because the General Assembly did not exempt Art. 48A § 390 fro m the gen erally applicable method o f compu ting time set fo rth in Art. 94 § 2, we construed the two statutes in harmony and provided full effect to each of them. Id. at 265, 508 A.2d at 141. In calculating the applicable two-year period under the statute, we excluded the day on which the policy was issued, explaining that the limitations period commences on the following first full day. Id; see also Fischer, 193 Md. at 505-06, 69 A.2d at 52 (concluding that Art. 94 § 2 requires that a Maryland rule governing time for when an appeal may be noted must be construed in light of that statute because its intent is to make uniform the method of co mputation of time ). Respondent argues that the general rule and the method for time computation set forth in Art. 1 § 36 does not apply to Art. 23A § 19 because Art. 23A § 19(d) uses the phrase not -14- less than 15 days, thereby triggering the clear-time rule. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain a nd effec tuate the intent of the Leg islature. See Mo ore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005). In ascertaining legislative intent, we first examine the plain language of the statute, and if the plain language of the statute is unambiguous and consistent with the statute s apparent purpose, we give effect to the statute as it is wr itten. See Pipe r Rudnick v. Hartz, 386 Md. 201, 218, 872 A.2d 58, 68 (20 05). If a statute has more than on e reaso nable in terpreta tion, it is am biguou s. Moore, 388 Md. at 453, 879 A.2d at 1114. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, we resolve the a mbiguity in light of the legislative intent, considering the legislative history, case law, and statutory purpose. See Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 5 83, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005). We consider both the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute and how that language relates to the ov erall me aning, s etting, an d purp ose of the act. See Deville v. Sta te, 383 Md. 217, 223, 858 A.2d 484, 487 (200 4). We av oid a cons truction of th e statute that is unreasonable, illogical, or inco nsistent with co mmo n sense . See Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 82 2, 835 (2005). W e construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rende red surp lusage , superf luous, m eaning less, or n ugator y. Moore, 388 M d. at 453 , 879 A .2d at 11 15. In construing statutes, we presume that the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes affe cting the sam e subject m atter to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law. Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65, 862 -15- A.2d 419, 429 (2004). Therefore, we read together statutes on the same subject and harmonize them to the extent possible, so as to avoid rendering either statute or any portion, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory. Id. at 65-6 6, 862 A .2d at 42 9-30. In the contex t of Art. 23A § 19(d), we do not find that the Legislature s use of the phrase not less than was intended to invoke the clear-time rule and to reject the application of the uniform method for time computation as set out in Art. 1 § 36. Article 1 § 36 was enacted initially in 1941; Art. 23A § 19(d) was en acted in 1955. As we noted in Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, the Legislatu re is presum ed to have had full knowledge of the content and underlying policy set out in Art. 1 § 36. 306 Md. at 263, 508 A.2d at 140. Therefore, more than merely the use of the wo rds not less th an is required to express a legislative intent to employ a different method of time calculation than the uniform method of time computation set out in the statute. See id. at 263, 508 A.2d at 140. The cases relied upon by respondent, with the exception of Pumphrey v. Stockett, 187 Md. 318, 49 A.2d 804 (1946), 8 all predate the enactment of Art. 1 § 36 and are no longer 8 In Pumphrey v. Stocke tt, 187 Md. 318, 49 A.2d 804 (1946), the Court rejected the application o f the clear-tim e rule, and h eld that the method f or time com putation set o ut in the statute, Art. 94 § 2, was applica ble. Id. at 322-23, 49 A.2d at 806-07. The issue was the use of the wo rd within in the election law. The Court held that [t]he method of computation of time, long a matter of d ifficulty, has bee n settled in this S tate by the passage of the Act of 1941, Chap. 522, codified as Section 2, Artic le 94 of the Co de, 194 3 Sup p. . . . Id. at 322, 49 A.2d at 806. The Court addressed appellant s argument, that the clear-time rule shou ld ap ply. C iting as au thority Walsh v. Boyle, 30 M d. 262 ( 1869) , Graham v. Wellington, 121 Md. 656, 89 A . 232 (1 913), Owens v. Graetzel, 146 Md. 361, 126 A. 224 (1924), and Iverson v. Jones, 171 Md. 649, 187 A. 863 (1936), appellant argued that the clear-time rule should apply. In dicta, the Court rejected his argument, stating as follows: (contin ued...) -16- persuasive. See, e.g., Iverson v. Jones, 171 Md. 649 , 652-653, 187 A. 863, 865 (1936) (concluding that the phrase not less than eigh teen days before requires eigh teen clear days); Winter v. O Neill, 155 Md. 624, 635, 142 A. 263, 268 (1928) (acknow ledging tha t a statute using the phrase at least or not less than requ ires clear time); Owens v. Graetzel, 146 Md 361, 368, 126 A. 224, 229 (1924) (explaining that the phrase at least three weeks means three clear wee ks ); Iverson v. Perlman, 137 M d. 62, 67-68, 111 A. 220, 222 (1920) (concluding that the phra se not less th an thirty days me ans thirty clear days); Graham v. Wellington, 121 M d. 656, 6 60, 89 A. 232, 233 (1913) (indicating that the phrase not less than twenty-five d ays requires tw enty-five clear d ays); Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 262, 266-67 (1869) (discussing En glish cases recognizing the c lear-time rule). In 1948, then Attorney General Hall Hammond, later Chief Judge of the Court of Appea ls of Maryland, in an opinion to the Maryland Secretary of State regarding the final date on which a candidate for public office could withdraw a certificate of candidacy for 8 (...continued) These cases are concerned with statutes where a definite and precise indication is given that clear time is meant by the use of words such as at least or not less than. We find no such mean ing in th e word within . Stiegler v. Eureka Life In s. Co., 146 Md. 629, at pages 655, 656, 127 A. 397. And the cases hold, that in th e absen ce of su ch me aning, the day of the act is to be exclud ed, which is the rule subsequently adopted by the Legislature. Id. at 323, 49 A.2 d at 807 . Obvio usly, dictum is not controlling authority. We think the better view is that the Legislature did not intend to trigger the application of the clear-time rule through the use of phrases such as at least or not less than, and that the Legislature knows how to explicitly require the application of clear time, when that is its intention. -17- nomination, explained his view th at the gener al statutory rule fo r compu ting time was applicable to statutes where an act is to be done at least or not less than a given time. See 33 Op. Att y Gen. 166, 168 (1948). The statute Attorney General Hammond was asked to construe required that withdrawal certificates be filed at least thirty days before the day of the primary election. General Hammond stated in the opinion letter that the method of computation was that prescribed in Art. 94 § 2, the uniform method for time computation, rather than the clear-time rule. He stated as follows: It is our opinio n that Sectio n 2 of A rticle 94 of th e Code is to govern the comp utation of tim e, and that the formula w hich it prescribes is not to be disregarded or ignored because of the phraseology of the statute or rule under consideration. In other words, we believe that the statute is applicable alike in those instances where an act is to be done at lea st or not less than a given time, as well as where it is to be done within a stated period . 33 Op. Att y Gen. at 168. Courts treatment of the effect on the computation of time of the words at least or not less than, w here an ac t is required to ta ke place at le ast or not less th an a certain number of days b efore a know n futur e date, h as not b een co nsistent . See J. A. Bo ck, supra, 98 A.L.R.2 d at 1337 ( noting that a number of cases h ave held that such expressions have no effect on the gen eral rule, and th at other cou rts have take n the view that the exp ressions imply a co unt of c lear days) . With respect to the use of the phrase at least in a contract, the North Carolina Supreme Court stated as follows: -18- We conclude that u se of this ph rase does n ot alter the general rule for the c omputatio n of time. We stress again that the phrase at least is not specially defined in the option contract and therefore mu st be given its ordinar y meaning. When this is done, it is clear that the phrase at least does not specify which method of comp utation is to be used; rather, it merely serves to emphasize that a minimum of sixty days notice must be given, to be comp uted in the m anner in w hich time is normally reckoned. It is important to note that the gene ral rule for computation of time in this jurisdiction comports with the manner in which persons of ordinary understanding would determ ine the tim e within which an act is t o be do ne. Harris v. Latta, 259 S.E.2 d 239, 24 1-42 (N.C . 1979) (citatio ns omitted); Treadway v. Miller, 354 S.W.2d 500, 50 1-02 (Ky. 1962); Watson v . Koontz, 328 P.2d 173 , 174 (Ne v. 1958); State v. Lacklen, 284 P .2d 998 , 1003 ( Mon t. 1955) . The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that the legislature s use of the phrase at least in a statute expresses the idea of a minimum and nothing more, and as such, does not indicate a legislative intent to depart from the general rule for time computation. Santow v. Ullman, 166 A.2 d 135, 13 9 (Del. 196 0); see also Maciborksi v. Chase Serv. Corp. of Az., 779 P.2d 1296, 1302 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that the legislature s use of the phrase at least or not less th an in a statu te does no t indicate an in tent to depa rt from the g eneral rule for time co mputation , and expla ining that the u se of these phrases in a statute reflects both the minimum time period [required] and that a longer time would be permissible ). The court found that construing the Legislature s use of the phrase at least or not less than to require the application o f the clear-tim e rule is unso und: -19- The list of exception cases appears impressive. But, as will be seen, there are very weighty objections to the soundness of these decisions. None of them contains any real discussion of the basis of the exception, nor any satisfactory reason why the addition of the phrase at least is sufficient to indicate a legislative intent to depart from the general rule. Why should at least seven days notice mean, in common parlance, eight days notice? Our exception cases derive from Robinson v. Collins, [1 Har. 498]. The memorandum of the decision contains only the pronouncement that the service must be e xclusive of both the day o f the ser vice an d the da y of the re turn. No authority is cited, but it is permissible to surmise that it follow ed the E nglish p recede nts. *** In 1838 the same Court [in The Queen v. The Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E . 173] had before it the same question, i.e., the construction of the phrase fourteen days at least. The point was fully argued. The Court, with marked reluctance, adhered to the rule in Zouch v. Empsey, [4 B. & Ald. 522 (1821)], though solely on the gro und of ad herence to preceden t. Three of the four justices expressed their disapproval of the rule. Id. at 138. Our early cases stating that use of the phrase at least warrants application of the clear-time rule have their genesis in the same line of English cases addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Ullman; those cases do not explain why the use of at least, or any other p hrase w arrants th e applic ation of the clea r-time ru le. See Wa lsh v. Boyle , 30 Md. 262, 266-67 (1869) (citing The Queen vs. The Justices of Shropshire, 8 Ad. & E. 17 3 (1838), for the propo sition that a statu te requiring f ourteen da ys at least, means fourteen clear days, -20- without additional discussion). We conclu de that th e use of the phr ase at le ast, not less than, or within, is, standing alone, insufficient to indicate a legislative intent to deviate from th e unifo rm me thod fo r comp utation o f time a s set out i n Art. 1 § 36. Acc ordingly, in the absen ce of una mbiguo us legislative in tent to apply a computation method different than that set out in Art. 1 § 36, we reject the application of the clear-time rule to the computation of time required u nder Art. 2 3A § 19 (d). We ho ld that the Circ uit Court erred in applying the clear-time rule to Art. 23A § 19(d). Construing these statutes together and providing each full effect, we exclude April 8, 2004, the day on which the fourth publication of notices by Oakland in The Republican occurred, from the computation of the fifteen-day period required before a public hearing can be held on an annexation resolution. Fifteen d ays from April 9, 2004, the day after the fourth publication of notices, is April 23, 2004, the day on which Oakland held the hearing. April 23, 2004 was neither a Sunday no r a legal holida y. Oakland was p ermitted to hold its public hearing on the annexat ion resolution on that d ay. IV. We turn next to the period of time during which referendum petitions for annexation may be submitted under Art. 23A § 19 and whether Mountain Lake Park acted in contrav ention o f the sta tute. -21- With respect to an nexation o f land in Ma ryland, we have explained that [t]he extension of the bou ndaries of a municip ality is a political matter to be regula ted by the constitution or the legislature of th e State and that [c]usto marily, the pow er to annex is delegated to the city or town by statute, since those political entities have no inherent po wers to add to their size. Rockville v. Brook ville, 246 Md. 117, 128-29, 228 A.2d 263, 270 (1967). By enacting Art. 23A § 19, the General Assembly provided municipal corporations9 with the pow er to ann ex land . Id. at 129, 228 A.2d at 27 0; see 1955 Md. Laws, Chapter 423. Every municipa l corporation in Maryland may annex contiguous land not within the boundaries of another mun icipa lity up on th e init iativ e of t he m unic ipali ty s legisla tive b ody, or a written petition signed by not less than twenty-five percent of the pers ons wh o reside in the area to be annexed and who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct in which the territory to be annexed is located. See Art. 23A § 19(a) - (c). The resolution required to annex the unincorporated area may be either introduced by the legislative body of the munic ipality in accordance with the requirements of Art. 23A § 19(b) or be introduced by the legislative body following a petition by residents satisfying the requirements of Art. 9 Article 23A § 9(a) defines a municipal corporation in pertinent part, as follows: As used in this subtitle the term municipal corporation shall include all cities, towns and villages, now or hereafter created under any general or special law of this State for general governmental purposes, which are subject to the provisions of Article XI-E of the Maryland Constitution, which possess legislative, administrative and police po wers for the general exercise of municipal functions, and which carry on such functio ns throu gh a set of elec ted and other o fficials. -22- 23A § 19(c). 10 Once an annex ation resolutio n is introduc ed pursua nt to the requ irements of Art. 23A § 19(b) or (c), notice must be provided and a public hearing must be held on the annex ation res olution , pursua nt to the r equirem ents of Art. 23 A § 19 (d). 10 Art. 23A § 19(b) provides as follows: Initiation by legislative body. (1) T he proposal for change may be initiated by resolution regularly introduced into the legislative body of the municipal corporation, in accordance with the usual requireme nts and pra ctices applica ble to its legislative enactments, and also in conformity with the several requireme nts contained in subsections (b) and (c) of § 13 of this subtitle, but only after th e legislative body has obtained the consent for the pro posal from not less than 25 percent of the persons who reside in the area to be annexed and w ho are registered as voters in county elections and from the owners of not less than 25 percent of the assessed valuation of the real property located in the area to be annexed. The reso lution shall describe by a survey of courses and distances, and may also describe by landm arks an d other well-k nown terms, the exact area proposed to be included in the chang e, and shall c ontain comple te and detailed provisions as to the conditions and circumstances applicable to the chan ge in boundaries and to the residen ts and p roperty w ithin the area to b e anne xed. Art. 23A § 19(c) provides in pertinent part, as follows: Initiation by petition. The proposal for change also may be initiated by a written petition signed by not less than twenty-five per centum (25%) of the persons who reside in the area to be annexed and who are registered as voters in c ounty elections in the precinc t or precincts in which the territory to be annexed is located, and by the owners of not less than twenty-five per centum (25%) o f the assesse d valuation of the real p roperty located in the are a to be a nnexe d. The record reveals that the legislative bodies of Oakland and Mountain Lake Park introduced their respective annexation resolutions pursuant to Art. 23A § 19(b) and obtained the required consent of not less than twen ty-five percen t of the indiv iduals residin g in the areas to be annexed. -23- Following the public hearing, the legislative bo dy of the mu nicipality may enact the annexation resolution, although the resolution shall not become effective until at least fortyfive (45) da ys follow ing its fin al enac tment. Art. 23 A § 19 (e) (em phasis a dded). T hose individuals residing in the area to be annexed who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct in which the territory to be annexed is located may petition for referendum of the resolution [a]t any time within the 45 day period following the final enactment of the resolutio n. Art. 23A § 19 (f) (emphasis added ).11 Those residents of the annexing municipa lity who are qualified voters may petition for referendum on the resolution [a]t any time within the forty-five day (45) period following the final enactment of the re solution . 11 Art. 23A § 19 (f) provides as follows: Petition for referend um by re sidents of are a to be ann exed. At any time within the 45 day period following the enactment of the resolution, a number of persons equal to not less than 20 percent of the persons who reside in the area to be annexed and who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct or precincts in which the territory to be annexed is loc ated may, in writing, petition the chief ex ecutive and administrative officer of the municipal corporation for a referendum on the resolution. Upon the presentation of a petition to the officer, he shall cause to be made a verification of the sign atures thereo n and sha ll ascertain that the persons signing the petition represent at least 20 percent of the person s who res ide in the area to be annexed and who are registered as voters in county elections in the precinct or precincts in which the terr itory to be annex ed is located. Upon verifying that the requireme nts of this subsection have been complied with, the officer shall by proclamation suspend the effectiveness of the resolution, contingent upon the results o f the ref erendu m. -24- Art. 23A § 1 9(g) (emp hasis added). 12 Finally, the governing body of the cou nties or cou nty in which the municipality is located, by at least a two -thirds majo rity vote, may petition in writing the chief executive of the municipality for a referendum on the resolution at any time within the 45-day period following the final enactment of the resolution. Art. 23A § 19(h) (emphasis added ).13 Subsections (f), (g), and (h) each provides that the chief executive 12 Art. 23A § 19(g) provides as follows: Petition for re ferendum by residen ts of mun icipality. At any time within the forty-five (45) day period following the final enactment of the resolution, a number of persons equal to not less than twenty per centum (20%) of the qualified voters of the municip al corporation may, in writing, petition the chief executive and administrative officer of the municipal corporation for a referendum of the resolution. Upon the presentation of a petition to the officer, he shall cause to be made a verification of the signatures thereon and shall ascertain that the persons signing the petition represent at least twenty per centum (20%) of the qualified voters of the municipal corporation. Upon verifying that the req uirements o f this subsection have been complied with, the officer shall by proclamation suspend the effectiveness of the resolution, contingent upon the results of the referendum. 13 Art. 23A § 19(h) provides as follows: Petition for referendum by county govern ing bod y. At any time within the 45-day period following the final enactment of the resolution, the governing body of the county or counties in which the municipality is located, by at least a two-thirds majority vote, may petition in writing the chief executive and administrative officer of the mun icipal corporation for a referendum on the r esolutio n. Upon verifying that there has been compliance with the requirements of this subsection, the officer by proclamation shall suspend the effectiveness of the resolutio n, contin gent up on the r esults of the refe rendum . -25- officer of the municipality shall suspend the effectiveness of the annexation, pending the results of the referendum on the annexation resolution. Oakland argues that Mountain Lake Park s holding of a referendum election on May 22, 2004, less than forty-five days after the residents of Parkwood Village East s submission of a petition for referendum on April 29, 2004, was in contravention of Art. 23A § 19(f). By holding a referendum election and attempting to make its annexation resolution effective prior to the conclusion of the forty-five day pe riod, petitioner a rgues, M ountain Lake Park ignored the plain language of Art. 23A § 19, thereby disregarding the intent of the General Assem bly. Respondent argues that an annexation resolution can become effective prior to the conclusion of the forty-five day period following the final enactment of the resolution when a petition for referendum is presented and a referendum election on that petition occurs. Because the purpose of the forty-five day period is to provide citizens with sufficient time to circulate and present a referendum petition to the municipality, respondent maintains, waiting for the forty-five day period to elapse once a referendum petition is circulated and presented lacks an y purpos e. Therefore, respondent concludes, Art. 23A § 19(l), providing that an annexation resolution will be effective following the fourteen-day period subsequent to a referendum election, is the period of time applicable to this case.14 14 Art. 23A § 19(l) provides as follows: Result of election. If only one petition for a referendum is filed and if a m ajority of the pers ons voting on the que stion in (contin ued...) -26- Because a majority of ind ividuals having vo ted in the referendum election cast votes in favor of annexation, Mountain Lake Park claims that its annexation resolution became effective on June 5, 2004, two weeks after the referendum election was held on May 22, 2004, which is prior to the stated effective date of Oakland s resolution June 8, 2004.15 See Art. 23A § 19(l) (providing that if the annexation passes referendum, it shall become effective . . . on the fourteenth day following the referendum ). We disagree. Moun tain Lake Park s receipt of one petition for referendum and its holding of a referendum election do es not perm it it to ignore othe r provisions of Art. 23 A § 19 c learly applicable to the case sub judice. Cf. Blackwell v. City of Seat Pleasant, 94 Md. App. 393, 406, 617 A.2 d 1110, 1 116 (199 3) (Cathell, J.) (explaining that a municipality s noncompliance with the procedures for enacting a charter amendment pursuant to Art. 23A § 13 14 (...continued) that referendum shall vote in favor of the proposal for change, the change shall become effective as proposed on the fourteenth day following the referendum. If two petitions for referendum are filed, the votes cast for the two referenda shall be tabulated sepa ratel y, so as to show individually the tabulation of votes cast in the munic ipal corpora tion and in th e area to be annexed . If in both tabulatio ns, each being r eckon ed sepa rately, a majority of the persons voting on the question shall vote in favor of the proposal for change, the change shall become effective as proposed on the fourteenth day following the referendum. In the event there are two referenda, unless there is such a favorab le majority in both tabulations, reckoned separately, the proposal for cha nge sh all be vo id and o f no fu rther ef fect w hatsoe ver. 15 No petition was submitted o n the Oakland res olution for referendum , and thus, there was no reason for the chief executive officer to suspend the stated effective date. -27- divested the electorate of its right to veto by referendum the Council s attempt to change the basic form of gove rnment of the m unicipality). The intent of the Genera l Assembly is clear. It provided for the sub mission of referendu m petitions at any time within the forty-five days following the enactment of an annexation resolution by the residents of the area to be annexed, the residents of the annexing municipality, and officials of the county governing body in whic h the m unicipa lity is located . See Art. 23A § 19(f) - (h). The pla in language of the referendum provisions of Art. 23A § 19, subsections (f) - (h), makes clear that the General Assemb ly intended for a referendum election to occur after the forty-five day period following the enactm ent of the a nnexation resolution. B y operation of Art. 23A § 19 (f) - (h), each constituency receives a fixed period of time during which to consider the proposed annexation, circulate a petition for referendum, and ultimately, present a petition for referendum to the municipality. Moreover, the General Assembly contemplated that more than one referendum petition might be submitted regarding an annexation proposal, which indicates that it did not intend to permit municipalities to alter the prescribed forty-five day time period governing the submission of referendum petitions following the municipality s receipt of a single petition from one constituency. 16 See Art. 23A §19(l) (explaining how the election results will be tabulated based on the number of petitions for referendum received). 16 Testimony at trial revealed that another resident of the Western Annexation submitted a referendum petition on June 10, 2004, two days prior to the conclusion of the forty-five day period, though Mountain Lake Park officials took no action in response to it. Art. 23A § 19(l) clearly contemplates the possibility that more than one referendum petition could be submitted. -28- This statutory framework cannot be ignored. See Kane v. Bd. of Appeals for Prince George s County , 390 Md. 145, 162, 887 A.2d 1060, 1070 (2005) (explaining that we construe a statute as a wh ole so th at no w ord, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, mean ingless, or nugatory ). Responden t s contention that its annexation resolution was effective on June 5, 2004, fourteen days after the re ferendum election w as held as to the petition subm itted by residents in the area to be annexed, contravenes Art. 23A § 19. Besides running contrary to Art. 23A § 19 (f) - (h), governing the submission of referendum petitions, respondent s argument ignores the plain lang uage of A rt. 23A § 19(e). Art. 23A § 19(e) states that an [annexation] resolution shall not become effective until at least forty-five (45) days following its final enactm ent. The m andato ry langua ge of A rt. 23A § 19(e) means that the Mountain Lake Park resolution could not have been effective prior to June 12, 2004, the forty-fifth day following the enactment of the resolution.17 See State v. Green, 367 Md. 61, 82, 785 A.2d 17 The text of the Mountain Lake Resolution stated that it would not become effective until the forty-sixth day following its enactment June 13, 2004. If Mountain Lake Park had followed the requirements of the annexation statute, the effective date would hav e been later. First, Mountain Lake should have waited forty-five days following enactment for the submission of petitions for ref erendu m. See Art. 23A § 19(f) - (g) Next, following the submission of a valid petition, the Mayor should have suspended the effective date of the resolution. See id. After that, Mountain Lake should have set a date for the referendum election, not less than fifteen days and not more than ninety days from the publication of the notices that were required to be published for not less than two con secutive weeks in a newspaper of genera l circulation in th e annexin g municip ality and the area to be annexed. See Art. 23 A § 19 (i). Finally, if a majo rity of those voting in the referendum election voted in favor of the proposal, the resolution would have been effective two weeks after the referendum election . See Art. 23A § 19(l). Assuming Oakland s annexation process was (contin ued...) -29- 1275, 1287 (2001) (recognizing that [w]hen the Legislature commands that something be done, usin g words such as sh all or must rather than m ay or should, th e obligation to comp ly with the statute o r rule is m andato ry ). The Circuit Court erred in concluding that the Mountain Lake Park resolution was valid, and that Oakland failed to follow the requ irements of Art. 23A § 19(d). JUDGMENT OF THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR GARRETT COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR ENTRY OF A PROPER D E C L A R A T O RY JUDGMENT IN CONFORMANCE WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE P AID BY R ESP OND ENT S. 17 (...continued) properly completed, and thus, its resolution became effective on June 8, 20 04, Mo untain Lake P ark wo uld be b arred fr om an nexing the sam e land. See Art. 23 A § 19 (m). We express no view concerning the prior jurisdiction rule as it is not an issue before the Court in this case. -30- Circuit Co urt for Garre tt County IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 60 September Term, 2005 Mayor and Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor and Town Council of Moun tain Lake P ark et al. Bell, C. J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Cathell, J. Filed: April 18, 2006 I concur w ith the result rea ched by the C ourt. I write sep arately in order to address an issue of first impression as to the law and also as to the facts presented to the Court in the briefs, but not resolved in the majority s opinion. In this first case (at the level of this Court) of competing annexations in Maryland,1 we have been asked to adopt the common-law prior jurisdiction rule for an nexations b etween c ompeting municipa lities. This rule provides, generally, as follows: The rule that amo ng separa te equivalen t proceedin gs relating to the same subject matter, that one which is p rior in time is prio r in jurisdiction to the exclusion of those subsequently instituted, applies, generally speaking, to and among proceedings for mun icipal incorpo ration, anne xation, or consolidation of a particular territory. In proceedings of this character, while the one first commenced is pending, jurisdiction to consider and determ ine others concerning the same territory is excluded. . . . This principle of the common law is based upon the genera l public policy of the promotion of the orderly administration of government and justice. Thus, the first of tw o or more annexatio n proceed ings preva ils over those subsequently commenced relating to the same property. 2 McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 7.22.20 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted ). See also 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 56; Rethin king M unicipa l Anne xation P owers , 24 Urb. Law 247, 289 (1992) ( In the vast majority of states, however, courts have developed the prior jurisdiction rule, which gives priority to the municipality deemed to have initiated proceedings first. ); Joni Walse r Crich low, Competitive Annexation Among Municip alities: North C arolina A dopts the Prior Jurisd iction Rule , 63 N.C. L. Rev. 1260 (1985). The statement quoted from McQ uillin is in accord with my view th at compe lling reasons exist that shou ld cause this 1 I have reviewed the cases on Maryland annexations and have discovered no reported Maryland case in which municipalities are fighting to annex the same land at the same time. Court to consider the issue, and in doing so, to formally adopt the common law prior jurisdiction rule for an nexation c ases. The a nnexation statutes, in my view , contemp late an orderly annexatio n process. T he proces s is laid out very explicitly in Maryland Code (1957, 2005 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23A, § 19. When two or more municipalities2 are fighting each other (over the acquisitio n of tax base by one entity and the efforts of the other to stop developm ent) via a nnexatio n, the resu lting frac as, as in the pre sent case , is fa r fro m orderly. In the case at bar there are two municipalities fighting over tax base one to acquire it and the other to deny it to the first city. A cursory look at the map of Maryland show s that there are scores of p otential battle grounds, and in seve ral instances more than two municipalities are in fighting distance of what one can reaso nab ly presume to be attractive areas for 2 The re may hav e bee n a th ird m unic ipali ty involve d in the cu rren t con troversy. There are several sheets of a Petition to cause the Town of Mountain Lake Park (hereinafter Moun tain Lake) an nexation to go to a refe rendum election in the extract on w hich there is noted town of LL Heights voters and a note is in the extract dated June 6, 2004, that states: This is to verify that the Town of Mt. Lake Park has received a petition to referendum from people in the annexed area. Judy A. Paugh 6/10/04. Apparently, while Mountain Lake was trying to upset Oakland s plan to annex by a preemptive annexation, its own annexation effort was opposed (or perhaps supported) by residents of another town identified as LL Heigh ts. LL Heights presumably refers to the town of Loch Lynn Heights, which from the State map app ears to be su fficiently close to both Oa kland and Mountain Lake to be in a competitive position with Mountain Lake in respect to annexation. From the map it appears closer to Mou ntain L ake tha n Mo untain L ake is to Oakla nd. Thus, it appears tha t three mun icipal corporatio ns (or at least their residents) are involved in the present case. One supposes that such competitions and disputes are not rare. All the more reason, I respectfully suggest, for the adoption of the common-law prior jurisdiction rule in order to en sure the resid ents of area s to be annexed of an orderly process in whic h they can assert th eir rights not to b e anne xed. -2- annexation.3 With the h uge increase in property values over the last decade, the attractiveness of the annexatio n process to expand ta x base ha s increased , and will continue to be attractive as municipal corporations seek to find new sources of revenu e in order to fund the services that are increas ingly bein g dem anded . Presumably, nearby municipalities will continue to battle annex ation of the areas betw een the cities, b y annexation efforts of their own either to secure tax base or to stop development as in th e prese nt case. Even if annexation is a short term fix in respect to the acquisition of tax base (or the stopping of development), it will neverth eless remain popular in th e near futu re to political figures who are prim arily conc erned w ith the sh ort term in the fir st place. If the maintenance of procedural order, by itself, is not a sufficient reason to adopt the common-law prior jurisdiction rule, the special burden the lack of the prior jurisdiction rule places upon the citizens in the to be annexed areas under the Maryland process, is, as I see it, sufficien t to justify the adoption of the rule. T his is especially true in inv olun tary annex ations (i.e ., annexations in itiated by munic ipalities as opp osed to annexations initiated by residents of the areas to be anne xed) such as those at issue in the present proceedin gs. Maryland Code (1 957, 200 5 Repl. V ol.), Art. 23A, § 19(f) entitled 3 Such areas could include Ocean City/Berlin, Salisb ury/Fruitland, E lkton/No rtheast, Havre de Grace/Aberdeen/Edgewood, College Park/Greenbelt/Beltsville/Laurel, Potomac/ Rockville/Wheaton, and many other municipal combinations. -3- Petition for referendum by residents of the area to be annexed provides the process for residents of areas subject to annexation efforts, to petition the issue to a referendum election.4 In many instanc es a substan tial numbe r of the reside nts in areas to b e subjected to annexation efforts do not want to be annexed by any municipality. They resist being the new tax base for their neighboring municipalities. They may not want additional limitations on developm ent. They simply may not want to pay the taxes, pay the water charges, pay sewer charges or be subject to the laws or ad ministrative ac tivities of the m unicipality. Their efforts to resist annexation are grounded on their ability to petition for a referendum. Bringing the issue to an election is done, as Section 19(f) requires, by the affected citizens obtaining the signatures of not less than 20 percent of the persons who reside in the area to be annexed and who are registered voters in county elections . . . . The petition is then presented to the relevan t municipa l officer fo r verification, a nd if verifie d, a referendum election is subsequently held pursuant to the proper procedures established by statute. The referendu m proces s is not easy. Of ten it is a very difficult process to obtain the necessary number of signatures during the allotted period of time and, if the pe tition is accomp lished appropriately and defende d during the signature ve rification process, there remains a very costly and time consuming political process leading up to the referendum 4 There are separate provisions for the residents of the annexing municipality to have the ability to petition annexations to referendum and for them to hold a sep arate election in the municipality limited to the voter residents of the m unic ipali ty. There are also provisions for the county go verning b ody to cause a referendu m election to be held b y a two-thirds v ote of that g overni ng bod y. -4- election. Generally, the larger the area to be annexed and/or the larger the number of registered voters in the area, the more difficult and expensive the process will be. What occurred in the case at ba r exemplifies the problem. The facts indicated that initially Oakland comme nced w ith an annex ation of a 4 5.395 acre (roughly rectangular) tract contiguous with its municipal border. One hundred percent of the registered voter-reside nts of that area and the owners of one hundred percent of the assessed value of the area to be annexed, consented. At that point, the area proposed to be annexed by Oakland was separated from (not contiguous to) Mountain Lake. In order to stop Oakland from annexing the small area contiguous to Oakland s borders (but not contiguous to Mountain Lake s borders), Moun tain Lake in itiated procee dings to annex a much larger 509.820 acre tract that included all of the area be tween its municipal boundary and the then municipal boundary of Oakland. It thus included the same 45+ acre tract already in the process of being annexed by Oakland. Twenty-five percent of the registered voter-residents of the larger area to be annexed and the owners of twenty-five percent of the assessed value of the larger area to be annexed by Mountain Lake, consented. Moun tain Lake s aid in its notice letter to p roperty owners, dated M arch 5, 200 4, that it was a nnexing th e large tract an d, in seeking their consent, state d that: . . . . The sole purpose of this annexation is to protect our residential areas within the Tow n from d evelopm ent near ou r borders w hich may be detrimental to the health and safety of the citizens of Mountain Lake Park. The failure of the -5- Garrett County Commissioners to enact zoning regulations[5] has forced us to make this decision. Three recent events lend proof to the necessity of this action: 1. The destruction of some of the most productive farmland in the county and the substitution of a racing facility complete with noise, dust, and possible pollution of a stream. 2. The discovery that the Garrett County Commissioners were allowing hunting o n property w hich is adjac ent to the Y ough G lades Sch ool. 3. The failur e of the G arrett Coun ty Commissioners to take action to protect the public from dangerous buildings. The collapse of the roof of the former Treasure Island facility and the collapse of a building in the South ern Garre tt Industrial Park are two examples. The sad fact is that unless you live in an incorporated town in Garrett C ounty you have no protection from unwanted development and from many other problems. Think of the noisiest and dirtiest type of business you can it could become your neighb or. . . . 6 The most important reason to ad opt the rule is th e heavy burd en placed on residen ts of unincorporated areas by permitting simultaneo us multiple a nnexation s which, if residents want to remain as they are and desire not to be annexed by any entity, they must obtain the signatures on multiple petitions to brin g the multip le annexa tion efforts to multiple referendums. As an example, in the instant case, if the residents of the 45 + acre tract sought 5 Garre tt Coun ty has no c ounty-w ide zon ing. 6 It seems to me that there appears to be a political battle un der way in G arrett County between Mountain Lake and the county go vernmen t, and Mo untain La ke is using annexation of the d ispu ted a reas as a w eapo n in that b attle. Presum ably, Mountain Lake could, eventually, under its theory, continue to annex into the county until all of the county not already in municipalities would become Mountain Lake. In that way, it could become the governm ent. In any event, to use anne xation to ov errule coun ty governm ent policies an d in the process try to stymie another town s annexation, seems to me another reason that the prior jurisdiction rule should be adopted in Maryland. -6- to be annex ed by Oak land wan ted to remain un-annexed they would have to obtain the signatures of only twenty-five percent of the voting re sidents of that sma ll area to gene rate an election where they could work to defeat the annexation. When Mountain Lake subseque ntly commenced its annexation effort, which included the same land that Oakland was annexing, the residents o f the origina l area of the O akland an nexation w ould have to generate another additional separate petition, this one containing at least twenty-five percent of the voting residents of the 509 + acre tract in order for the residents of the 45+ acre tract to be able to generate a separate referendum election on that annexation. The two annexation petitions would, under the Maryland statutes, be required to be presented to two different municipalities for separate verifications. If verified, the residents of the area of the original annexation effort (O akland s 45+ acres) would have to fight two electio n battles to rem ain free of annex ation. If Loc h Lynn H eights had d one the sam e thing to fo restall Mountain Lake s annexatio n that Mo untain La ke did to fo restall Oakland s, the residents of the initial tract might hav e had to mount thre e simultane ous, but en tirely different, battle s in order to remain free from annexation. The prior jurisdiction rule would prevent the imposition of such potentially onerous burdens on residents of unincorporated areas. With the annexation statutes clearly designed for orderly process, I believe the adoption of such a rule would be clearly within the contem plation o f the sta tutes pu rposes . -7- It certainly can be argued that if the Legislature wanted the prior jurisdiction rule to be applied it would have included it in the statute. And it could have. But that argument to some extent begs the question. Generally, the prior jurisdiction rule is a creature of the comm on law not statu te law. For the most part, the states that have already adopted the rule initially did so not by statute, but by case law. In respect to the state courts that have been presented with the issue, I have found only one that has categorically rejected it M ississippi, wh ich only recen tly rejected it after having previously ad opted it. 7 Howeve r, in Mississippi, annexation statutes now require as an automatic part of the process, that an nexation p etitions be pre sented to courts and that the courts are to d etermine the reasonab leness of su ch annex ation effo rts in every case, whether c ontested or not. In that co ntext, in a case involving c ompetin g annexations, the court rule d that the co urts had the du ty to determine the reasonableness of competing annexations and had the power to apportion boundaries of annexed areas between competing annexations. In the process the Mississippi court abandoned its previous acceptance of the prior jurisdiction rule. See In re Enlargement and Extension of the Mun. Boundaries of the City of D Iberville , 867 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 2004). There is no equivalent statute in Maryland, and the fixing of boun daries of an nexed are as is determin ed in this State by the area described in the petition. While courts can determine whether the process was 7 In City of Muscatine v. Water, 251 N.W. 2d 544 (Iowa 1977), the Supreme Court of Iowa adopted the prior jurisdiction rule. A recent statute may have effectively overruled that case. -8- accomplished properly, there is no statute or case law that permits courts to independently establish bound aries of annex ations w hen the re are co mpetin g cities. The majority rule in this country is that the common law prior jurisdiction rule applies when there ar e com peting a nnexa tions. In City of S t. Josep h v. Villa ge of C ountry Club, 163 S.W. 3d 905, 907 (Mo. 2005) the Missouri Supreme Court noted: At issue is which of two municipalities has jurisdiction to proceed with the annexation. The issue is determined by application of the common law doctrine of prior jurisdiction. T he doctrine of prior jurisd iction has lon g been es tablished in Missou ri. It provides that, as between two municip alities competing for the same territory, the o ne undertaking the fi rst v alid s tep toward a nnexatio n has prio rity. This Court described the doctrine in . . . as follows: The prior jurisdiction doctrine resulted from the sound recognition that there cannot be two municipal corporations with co-extensive powers of government extend ing ove r the sam e area. . . . [T]he one which takes the first valid step to establish the consolidation or annexation has the superior claim regardless of which one co mplete s its proc eeding s first. (Citatio ns omi tted.) See also, Town of Spencer v. Town of East Spencer, 351 N.C. 124, 127-28, 522 S.E. 2d 297, 300-301 (1999) where that Court stated: . . . [P]recedent established by this Court that annexation reso lutions of intent are not so ephemeral as a proposed ordinance, since they have substantive legal effect by conclusively determining prior jurisdiction. . . . [P]rior jurisdiction to annex territory is determine d as of the d ate of the ad option of a valid resolution o f intent. ... [T]he prior jurisdiction rule is the majority rule and is applied universally in conflicts b etween tw o municip alities attemptin g to assert jurisdiction over the same territory. . . . Under the rule, annexation proceedings begin when a municipa lity takes the first mandatory public pro cedural step in the statutory process . . . (Citations omitted.) -9- Accord: Amre p South west, In c. v. Tow n of Be rnalillo, 113 N.M. 19, 21-22, 821 P. 2d 357, 359-60 (1991) ( To be sure, in at least one decision the doctrine was supported b y a statutory codification. The Ca lifornia statute, howev er, merely codif ied the com mon-law rule previously recognize d in California, and the commentators appear to be unanimous in stating that the common-law rule applies to annexation proceedings. ) (citations omitted). The prior jurisdiction rule was also applied in the case of Town of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77, 47 N.W. 2d 292 (1951) which involved two municipalities fighting over annexation of an area in a third mu nicipality. The pr ior jurisdiction ru le had first been adopted in Wisconsin in the case of Village of Brown Deer v. Milwaukee, 274 Wis. 50, 79 N.W. 2d 340 (1956). The doctrine was also described as having been adopted by the Arizona Courts in McCu ne v. City of P hoenix, 83 Ariz. 98 , 317 P.2d 537 (195 7), discussing a dispute between the Arizona cities of Phoenix and Scottsdale over their conflicting attempts to annex the same area. Also holding that the doctrine applies were the supreme courts of Arkansas (City of Gosne ll v. City o f Blythe ville, 272 Ark. 218, 613 S. W. 2d 91 (1981)), N orth Dak ota (City of West Fargo v. City of F argo, 251 N.W. 2d 918 (N.D. 1977)), Indiana (Taylor v. C ity of Fort Wayne, 47 Ind. 274, (1874)), and Iowa (Independent Dist. of Sheldon v. Bd. of Supervisors of Siou x Cou nty, 51 Iowa 658, 2 N.W. 590 (1879)). Also holding that the doctrine applies in their state s we re the inte rmediate appellate cou rts in Ken tuck y (City of Covington v. Beck , 586 S. W. 2d 284 (Ky. App. 1979)) and Florida (City of Daytona Beach v. City o f Port O range , 165 So. 2d. 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964 )). -10- The California intermediate appellate court case of People e x. rel. Forde v. Town of Corte Madera, 115 Cal. App. 2d 32, 34-38, 251 P.2d 988, 989-91 (1952) involved a factual situation similar to that of the present case: It appears that the town of Larkspur, which on its southerly and easterly boundaries abuts Corte Madera, annexed some land adjoining that annexed by Corte Madera, and including the strip on which Fordes property is located. The basic question presented is whether the Corte M adera or the Larkspur ann exation shall prevail. . . . ... The rule conferring priority on the first city to file is part of the public policy of the state. It was the rule at commo n law. . . . The court held that section 7 of the Annexation Act . . . , conferring priority as between two conflicting annexation proceedings on the first to be instituted was declaratory of existing common law . . . . Thus, at comm on law, an d pursuan t to a consisten t statutory schem e, priority is granted to that city f irst instituti ng pro ceedin gs. (C itations o mitted.) Accord: In re Petition to Annex Certain P roperty to the City of Wood Dale, 244 Ill. App.3d 820, 827, 183 Ill.Dec. 343, 349, 611 N.E. 2d 606, 612 (1993) ( The general rule governing conflicting petition s . . . is that the f irst to initia te an an nexatio n is entitle d to prio rity . . . . [P]riority . . . is not dependent on the correctness or validity of the annexing petitions. ); Vill. of Creedmoor v. Frost Nat l Bank, 808 S.W. 2d 617,618 (Tex. App. 19 91) ( Th e principle of first-in-time is still important in municipal law. ). There is another reason that I b elieve mak es it imperative that we dire ctly resolve this issue. In its brief, when addressing the issue of time com putation, the re sponden t indirectly indicated a problem that may exist because we have failed to address the issue of the prior jurisdiction rule. Under the circumstances of this case, we tacitly will be approving a first to finish rule. Respondent states in its brief: -11- This argument is significant because in the event the Court concludes that the Oakland hearing was held in a timely manner, the effective date [the finishing date] of the Oakland Annexation would be June 8, 2004, three days later than the date that Mountain Lake claims is the effective date of its annexation resolution. Article 23A, § 19(m) prohibits a municipality from annexing land already incorporate d in anothe r municipa lity. Therefore, the town whose annexation is determined to be effective first, will have successfully annexed the property which both municipalities are attempting to annex in common. ... [W]hen the Mountain Lake Park annexation resolution became effective, the Oakland annexatio n either wa s void or w as not yet effec tive. [Em phasis added .] [Foo tnote om itted.] In effect, by failing to address the issue of the prior jurisdiction rule wh ere a party is asserting that the first to finish controls, we are indirectly rejecting the prior jurisdiction rule and risk having a first to finish ru le becom e the law in this State. By not expres sly rejecting the first to finish position, as I believe we should, we send, in my view, an inapprop riate message to the State s m unicipalities tha t potentially open s up the Sta te to an annex ation fr ee-for- all. I respectfully suggest that we should follow the lead of the vast majority of states that have addressed the issue and adopt as part of the common law, the prior jurisdiction rule in the pr esent ca se. I also suggest that in light of the Court s failure to adopt the Rule, that the matter be brought to the attention of the Legislature for its consideration. -12-

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