Attorney Grievance v. Ward

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 59 September Term, 2005 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. KENNETH STANFORD WARD Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. File: December 18, 2006 The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counse l, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary Action against Kenne th S. Ward, the respondent. The petition charged that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, Competence,2 1.3, Diligence,3 1.4, Communication,4 1.5, Fees,5 1.16, Declining or 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Co mmen cemen t of disc iplinary or remed ial action . (1) Upon approval of the Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 2 Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepar ation rea sonab ly necessa ry for the r eprese ntation. 3 Pursuant to that Rule, [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promp tness in r eprese nting a c lient. 4 Rule 1.4 provides: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A law yer shall explain a matter to the extent reaso nably necessa ry to permit th e client to make inform ed dec isions re gardin g the rep resenta tion. 5 Rule 1.5 p rovides, as re levant: (a) A law yer's fee shall be re asonable. T he factors to be consid ered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; Terminating Representation,6 and 8.4, M isconduc t,7 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Cond uct, as ad opted b y Marylan d Rule 16-81 2. We referred the case, pursuan t to Rules 16-752 (a), 8 to the Honorable Wanda Keye s (6) the natu re and leng th of the pro fessional rela tionship w ith the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) w hether th e fee is f ixed or conting ent. 6 Rule 1.16, as relevant, provides: * * * * (d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law . 7 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate o r attempt to v iolate the rules o f professio nal condu ct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) com mit a crim inal a ct tha t refl ects afve rsely o n the lawyer s h onesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud deceit or misrepresentation; (d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . * * * * 8 Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the 2 Heard, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for hearing pursuant to Rule 16-757 (c). 9 After a hearing, at which the respondent appeared and participated, Judge Heard found the following facts by clear and convincing evidence. The respondent was retained, on October 31, 2002, by the complainant, Soraya Thompson-Brashears, whom he agreed to represent, in connection with the estate of her great aunt, the decedent. The complainant had consulted other attorneys, but chose the respondent because he represented that he was able to proceed without assistance in Maryland and the District of Columbia. In return for opening an estate, the value of which was $ 210,000.00, $ 200,000.00 representing the approximate value of real estate titled in the decedent s name, and filing an action against the decedent s neighbor for fraudulently pledging the dece dent s property as security for lines of credit, in the amount of $ 50,000.00 , he established for his own, and not her, benefit, the complainant agreed to pay, and did pay, the responden t a $3,000.00 retainer, which was to cover the first twenty (20) hours of work at the rate of $ 150.00 per hou r. The resp ondent inte nded, as he informed the comp lainant, to ope n the estate extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 9 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 3 first and then proceed im mediately against the deceden t s neighbor. The complainant initially tried contacting the respond ent for updated information concerning his progress with the legal matters in December and had trouble doing so. When she did reach him, he advised h er that he ha d filed in co urt and w as waiting to get a date. On December 26, 2002, the respondent received a letter from the Register of Wills of Anne Arundel County informing him of that Office s receipt of the decedent s Last Will and Testament and a petition to open an estate in her name under a Will of No Estate and asking for additional information, i.e. a Waiver of Bond, a Death Certificate, clarification of the unsecured debts sc hedule and a c omple te list of in terested person s. The respondent did not respond to the letter or tak e any action w ith regard to it or the estate. Nor did he inform his client, who had hear d nothing of the m atter s dur ing J anuary an d Fe brua ry, 2003, except from the mortgage lender, who was inquiring about the status of the estate. The mortgage lender filed, in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel County, a Petition for Judicial Probate on March 31, 200 3, to pro tect its inte rest. The responden t filed a civil actio n in the Su perior Co urt of the D istrict of Colu mbia against the decedent s neighbor. The complaint, which was signed by the respondent and Will Purcell, a law yer admitted to p ractice in the District of Columb ia, but not by the c lient, alleged fraud and conversion. The complainant also was unaware that Purcell had been directe d to file the actio n on he r behalf . Because he was not admitted to practice in the District of Columbia, prior to filing the 4 complain t, the respondent moved, through Mr. Purcell, to appear Pro Hac Vice in the Superior Court. In tha t motion, he represented that he wa s in good s tanding in , and that there [were] no disciplinary complaints pending against [him] for a violation of the rules of, the Courts, the Suprem e Court of New Je rsey and the C ourt of A ppeals of M aryland, to which he wa s admitt ed to pr actice. T he mo tion wa s filed A pril 4, 20 03. On February 21, 2003, Bar Co unsel had notified the resp ondent of a disciplinary complaint against him then pendin g in M aryland. The District of C olumbia a ction was dismissed w ithout preju dice on two occasions, each time for failure to effect service on the defendant, as required by D.C. Rule 4 (m). The first occasion was on June 18, 2003. Shortly after that dismissal, the complainant, who had been notified of a scheduling conference in the case, went to the Superior Court on the designated date, Aug ust 1, 2003 , only to discover that the respondent did not appear. When contacted by the complainant as to why he failed to respond, the respondent advised her that the case had b een contin ued; he did not inform her that the case had been dismissed. The fraud case was refiled by the respondent, with the assistance of Mr. Purcell, on May 5, 2004 and it was once again dismissed for failure of service on the defendant, on July 14, 2004. The probate ca se was file d in the wrong court, the Orphans Court for Anne Arundel County conclu ded. The decedent was domiciled in Montgomery County. Accordingly, the court ordered, on July 15, 2003, the case transferred to the Montgomery County Orphans Court for administration and further action. That was accomplished on July 28, 2003, 5 when the Montgomery County Register of Wills docketed the Anne Arundel County Orphans Court s order. Sub sequently, after a hearing, the compla inant was appointed personal representative. The probate matter did not proceed smoothly. The inventory for the estate was not timely filed, even after a delinquency notice advised the complainant and the respondent of that fact and of the due date to avoid referral for hearing. The inventory was filed by the respondent more th an ten d ays after th e desig nated due d ate. Subsequently, on October 12, 2004, the failure to f ile a final inve ntory resulted in a show ca use referral to the Orphans Court. Another show cause was issued six days later, this one to the complainant and the responde nt, asking why the complainant, as personal representative, should not be removed for failure to perfect an inventory. Still later, on December 7, 2004, another delinquent notice was posted to the Respondent notifying him that the Interim Account of the Estate of Catherine Parker was past due on November 29, 2004 and that failure to file the account within twenty (20) da ys may result in the personal re presentative s remova l. This app arently prompted the complainant to get new counsel, who effected the transfer of the probate matter to the Dis trict of C olumb ia, the situs of the decedent s property and her domicile and residence for more than a year prior to her death. While the respondent was representing the complainant, the indebtedness charged against the decedent s estate by her neighbor increased from a principal amount of $50,000.00 to an a ggrega te amo unt of $ 57,000 .00 and increas ing due to unpa id intere st. 6 Having found these facts, the hearing court concluded, as follows: Competency * * * * This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent acted incompe tently when he accep ted a case th at required f iling in a jurisdiction where he was not admitted to practice and when he failed to serve notice to Mr. Green. In Att 'y Grievance Comm 'n v. Thompson, 376 Md. 500 , 512 (2002) the M aryland Court of Appeals found that an attorney's failure to file timely reports and a pattern of mistakes that delay the closure of an estate are considered incompetent representation. The Respondent similarly delayed the closure of the estate for his client. Ms. B rashears needed an attorney familiar with the laws of the Dis trict of C olumb ia, and hired the Resp ondent ba sed on his a ssertion that h e could practice in the District. (P lain. Ex. 1, ¶1 1). In fact, the Respondent w as not license d to practice in the District, and it was incompetent for the R espo ndent to twic e fai l to se rve L loyd Green in a timely manner in compliance w ith D.C. Rule 4(m ). (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶24, ¶25 & ¶ 40). Also, the Court of Appeals found in Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. 541, 547 (1978) that neglect and inattentiveness to a client's interests constitute incompetent representation. Similarly in the case at bar, th e Re spon dent was inattent ive to his C lient 's interests when h e opened an estate in the wrong ju risdiction, An ne Arun del County, Maryland. A cursory reading of the Death Certificate of Ms. Parker would have indicated to the Respondent 7 that the decedent's domicil[e] was the District of Columbia, which was the proper jurisdiction to open the estate. Furthermore, Ms. Brashears informed the Respondent that her aunt's property was [in] the District o f Colu mbia, and that she needed an a ttorney capable of movin g forward in the District of Columbia. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶4, ¶10 & ¶44). The Respondent's actions were sloppy at best, reckless, and indicate a lack of thoroughness and attention to details which prevented the timely closure of Ms. P arker's Estate, a nd therefo re reach the level of inco mpe tenc y. Diligence * * * * This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respo ndent did not act with reasonab le diligence and promptness in representing a client when h e failed to file th e estate in the pro per juris diction. ( Plain. E x. 1, ¶15 ). In Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Guida, 391 Md. 33, 43 (2006), the Court found a violation of Rule 1.3 when an attorney failed to file a relatively uncomplicated matter, an adoption filing. Similarly in this case it was crucial for Respondent to determine the correct jurisdiction. The evidence in this case was uncomplicated and the Respondent could have accomplished proper filing with reasonable diligence. The Respondent had docume nts indicating the decedent was domiciled in the District of Columbia at her death. Ms. Brashea rs indicated th at the relevan t property was in the District of Columbia, but he still opened the estate in M aryland instead of its proper place. (Plain. Ex . 1, ¶4 & ¶26). Furthermore, this Court finds Rule 1.3 was violated when the Respo ndent twice failed 8 to perfect service on M r. Green. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶ 26 & ¶34). In Att'y Grievance Comm 'n v. Fezell, 361 Md. 234, 243 (2000 ), the Court determined that an attorney did not exercise due diligence when failing to serve a defendant in a divorce matter when the defendant's address could have easily be en obtaine d from the client. Similarly, the Respon dent twice failed to serve Mr. Green for the fraud and conversion case, even when Ms. Brashears gave the Respondent Mr. Green's address and told him Mr. Green was the decedent's neighbor. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶26 & ¶4). The Respondent's repeated failures to properly serve Mr. Green , given the evidence, demonstrates a lack of reasonable diligence. * * * * This Court finds by clear and conv incing evid ence that the Respon dent violated Rule 1.4(a) & (b) w hen he told Ms. Brashears that he wa s admitted to the DC Bar wh en he w as not, and also, for failing to inform his client that he intended to seek other counsel in the District of Columbia to assist him. In Att'y Grievance Comm 'n v. McLa ughlin, 372 Md. 467, 468 (2002), the Court found that a violation of Rule 1.4 exists if an attorney fails to communicate, truthfu lly, the progress of a case to the client. (Plain; Ex. 1, ¶10 & ¶11). This Court finds that, by clear and convincing evidence, Ms. B rashears specifically aske d if Resp ondent co uld handle legal issues in the District of Columbia. She interviewed and rejected other lawyers who could not practice in the District of Columbia. This Court believes Ms. Brashears was a credible witness and further finds that Respondent mus t have told her he could act in the District of Colum bia because he was subsequently retained. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶10 & ¶ 11). This 9 Court does not b elieve or find credible Respondent's statement that he informed Ms. Brashears that he was not admitted to practice in the District of Columbia or that he intended to seek assistance from another attorney to file matters for him in the District of Columbia. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶ ll). Also, this Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent further violated Rule 1.4(a) & (b) when he failed to tell Ms. Brashears that the Green case w as dism issed. In Att'y G rievance Comm 'n v. Finessey, 283 Md. 541, 547 (1978)[,] the Court found a violation of this com municatio n rule when an attorney told a client a hearing was rescheduled when it was actually dismissed. Similarly, the Respondent misrepresented the status of his clien t's case. Ms. Brashears traveled to the S uperior Court of the D istrict of Columbia for a Conference Hearing regarding the Green case; however the Respondent never appeared. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶29 & ¶30). Upon contacting the Respondent, he told Ms. Brashears that the case was con tinued, wh en in fact it was dismissed du e to the Respond ent's failure to serve Mr. Green a summons. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶29 & ¶30). The Respondent's lack of candor left Ms. Brashear uninformed as to the progress of her case, and hindered her ability to make informed decisions concerning her representation. Fees * * * * This Court finds b y clear and convincing ev idence that the Respo ndent's fees were unreasonable; he charged and accepted fees when no w ork was performed in furtherance of 10 the case in violation of M RPC 1.5(a)(4). In Att'y Grievan ce Com m 'n v. Mc Lauglin, 372 Md. at 499 the C ourt determ ined that an attorney charg ed an unr easonab le fee wh en little or no work was performed for the client. In the case at bar, the Respondent entered into a retainer agreement for $3,000.00 for twenty (20) hours at an hourly rate of $150.00. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶1). Although not unreasonable on its face, the Respon dent did little wor k to resolve his clie nt's interests. The Green case was dismissed twice for lack of service, and the Respondent opened the estate of Ms. Parker in the wrong jurisdiction, which was subsequently transferred to Montg omery Cou nty, and only through the efforts of other counsel, later retained, was the issue opened in the proper jurisdiction. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶40-44). The Respondent received fees, but failed to take necessary steps on the client's behalf, thereby hindering and impeding a timely resolution of the client's issues. Declining: or Termination Representation * * * * This Court finds that the Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Responden t violated Rule 1.16(d). In McLa uglin, 372 Md. at 507, an attorney was found in violation fo r not returnin g unearned fees, the court sta ted that an atto rney has a du ty to return the entirety of unearned fees under this rule. Unlike McLa ughlin, the Respondent indicated that he returned the retainer fee an d is paying an additional $7,000 for a malpractice settlement to Ms. Brashears. The Respondent has made six (6) $850.00 monthly installments to satisfy the settlement agreement, totaling $5,100.00. 11 However, the Respondent indicated, at the hearing, that he has not m ade additio nal paymen ts between April 2006 and the hearing date. The Respondent has returned $3,000.00 to the client representing the entire advance retainer fee. Miscon duct - False Statemen t and M isrepresenta tions unde r Oath * * * * This Court finds the Petitioner proved by clear and convincin g evidence that the Respondent misrepresented to his client the status of the Green case. In Att'y Grievance Comm 'n v. Finessey, 283 Md. at 545[,] the Court found an attorney made misrepresentations to a client when he indicated tha t a hearing was rescheduled when it was actually dismissed. The facts in the case at bar are very similar. Ms. Brashears testified that she traveled to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for a scheduled Conference Hea ring, but the Respondent never arrived at the courthouse, later claiming that the meeting was cancelled. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶35). Ms. Brashears then requested an update on the status of the case, and the Respondent replied that the case was continued, when it was actually dismissed. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶34-37). T he Resp ondent ne ver reveale d the dismis sal to the client, nor did he indicate that he intended to re-file the case against Mr. Green. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶37-40). This was a blatant misrepresentation of facts by Respondent and a failure to provide accurate information concernin g a case to R esponde nt's client. This Court further finds that the Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence 12 that the Respondent made misrepresentations to the Superior Court of the District of Columb ia in his Motion to Appear Pro H ac Vic e. Respondent knowingly and falsely stated that there were no disciplinary com plaints pend ing against h im and did so under oath and/or affirm ation. In Att'y Grievance C omm 'n v. M yers, 333 Md. 440. 449 (1994), the Court of Appea ls disbarred an attorney for lying under oath, before a judge, claiming he had no traffic violations for thirty years. The Court commented that [c]andor and truthfulness are two of the most important character traits of a lawyer. Id. The Re sponden t, in this case, admitted that he knew of a pend ing disciplina ry action in Maryland before filing his pro hac vice motion. Therefore, this was an egregious false statement in his application to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Evidence presented at trial showed that on February 2,2003 a letter was sent by the Attorney Grievance Commission detailing a complaint from Daryl Lament Torain. (Plain. Ex. 1 Attachment 1). In addition, on March 9, 2003, Respondent sent a letter to the Attorney Grievance Commission denying the a llegation s, and on March 29, 2003, Respondent addressed the complaints of Mr. Torain in writing. (Plain. Ex. 1, Att. 2 & 3). Clearly, on April 4, 2003, the Respondent filed his Application for Admission Pro Hac Vice knowing of the Torain allegation pending with A ttorney Grievance Com mission. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶23). Petitioner presented evidence of statements contained in the application where the Respondent clearly indicated that there were no disciplinary com plaints pend ing against h im 13 for violation of the rules of th e cou rts fo r Ma ryland or N ew J erse y. (Plain. Ex. 1, Att. 7, see application attached). But the Torain Complaint was pending, and the Respondent had just replied to that complaint days before filing his pro hac vice application. The Respondent clearly misrepresented this fact to the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶25). Respondent's testimony at trial explaining his actions lack credibility, candor and truthfulness. Conduct Prejudicial to Justice * * * * This Cou rt fin ds by c lear a nd convincin g eviden ce th at the Respondent's actions were prejudicial to the administration of justice. Behavio r that may seriou sly impair public confidence in the entire profession, without extenuating circumstances, may be conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 222 (2005). The Respondent's dilatory and incompetent representation, and his failure to act to preserve the Estate of Catherine Parker, harmed his clien t's interests and created a further indebtedn ess against th e decede nt's property from the principal amount of $50,000.00 to an aggregate amount o f $57,000 .00 and gro wing w ith unpaid interest. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶(45). These actions impaired the client's confidence, and the public's confidence in the entire legal profession, and as suc h are a prejudicial to justice and violate R ule 8.4(d). This Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent prejudiced the administration of justice when he made misrepresentations both to his client and while under 14 oath. Failure to represent a client in an adequate manner a nd lyi ng to a client constitute a violation of Rule 8.4(d)[.] Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Reinhardt, 391 M d. at 222. The Respondent attempted to cover mistakes when he misrepresented to his client the status of the Green [case] and the Respondent made misrepresentations under oath to the Superior C ourt of the District of Columb ia on his application to appea r pro hac vice. (Plain. Ex. 1, ¶19 & ¶3 0). These actions impair the public's confidence in the entire legal pro fession , and as such are prejudicial to [the administration of] justice an d violate Rule 8.4(d). * * * * This Court finds that the Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the Respondent violated the following rules thus causing a violation of Rule 8.4(a): 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) & (b), 1.5(a), and 8.4(c) & (d). Rule 8.4(a) is violated in regards to the attorney's conduct concerning other charges of the M RPC . See Att'y G rievance Com m'n v. Calhoun, 391 Md. 532, 570 (2006). The Respondent was required to provide M s. Brashea rs with com petent, diligent representation, which he did not do. The Respondent did not commu nicate to his client necessary information so she could make appropriate decisions concerning representation. The Respondent failed to perform legal services of any reasonable value, but retained a fee. Furthermore, Respondent intentionally made misrepresentations to his client and the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, and engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. How ever, this Co urt finds that th e Respo ndent did n ot tech nica lly violate Ru le 15 1.16 (d), because he returned all unearned advance fees to ... Ms . Brashears after the client retained new counsel. Having determined that the respondent violated MRPC Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 (a) & (b), 1.5 (a) and 8.4 (a), (c) and (d), the hearing court observed: Many of the Respondent's violations of the MRPC could have been avoided if he wou ld have ad mitted to his c lient his lack of experience and/or qualifications. With each mistake the Respondent reached the point of falsehoods and misre presentations which were id entified in the end. This is similar to the facts in Att 'y Grievance Comm 'n v. Finnesey, 283 Md. at 456, where an attorney did no t intend to ch eat his client, bu t deliberately lied to cover up his neglect and mistakes by assuring the client that the case was runnin g smoo thly whe n, in fac t, it was ra pidly dete riorating . Neither the petitioner nor the respondent has taken exceptions from the hearing co urt s findings of fact or conclusions of law. Therefore, the findings of fact are treated as established for purposes of determining the appropriate sanction. Attorney Griev. Com m n v. Sweitzer, __ Md . __, __, __ A .2d __, __, 2 006 W L 3346 857*4 (2 006); Attorney Griev. Com m'n v. Logan, 390 Md. 313 , 319, 888 A.2d 3 59, 363 (2005); Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A). 10 Moreover, reviewing the hearing court's conclusions of law de novo, as we m ust, see Rule 16- 10 Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2)(A) provides: (A) If No Exceptions Are Filed. If no exceptions are filed, the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose of determining approp riate san ctions, if any. 16 759(b)(1); 11 Logan, supra, satisfies us that the conclusions of law follow from, and are supported by, the court's factual findings, which, as we have seen, have been established. Turning to the sanctio n, we no te that the respondent did not file a recommendation for sanction. He app eared at ora l argumen t, howeve r, by counsel, w ho, while e xpressly acknowledging the misconduct, the severity of which he did not minimize, urg ed the court to impose a sanction short of disbarment. The petitioner, on the other hand, filed Petitioner s Recommendation for Sanction, in which it urges the respondent s disbarment. In addition to emphasizing that the hearing court found multiple instances of the Respondent s dishonest condu ct, of the kind and magnitude for which this Court has, in the past ordere d disbarm ent, citing Attorney Griev. Com m n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597, 876 A. 2d 642, 661 (2005) and Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A. 2d 463, 488 (2001), the petition er remin ds us th at the res ponde nt has a prior dis ciplinar y history, a significant factor to be taken into accou nt. That the re sponden t s prior disciplin e is an indef inite suspension, impos ed just th is year and which still is in ef fect, see Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Ward, 394 Md. 1, 904 A.2d 477(2006), buttresses its disbarment recommendation, the petitioner maintains. It is well settled that [d]isbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dishonest conduct. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 418, 773 A.2d 11 Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(1) provides: (1) Conclusions of Law. The Court of Appeals shall review de novo the circuit co urt judg e's conc lusions of law . 17 463, 488 (2 001). See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 597, 876 A.2d 642, 660-61 (2 005); Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Lane, 367 Md. 633, 646, 790 A.2d 621, 628 (2002). This is so, because [u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the mos t important m atters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a lawyer almost beyond excuse . Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A. 2d at 488. Thus, like in the case of a misappropriation of entru sted fu nds, see Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 403, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991), in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, intentional dishonest co nduct by a law yer will result in disbarment. There have been no compelling ex tenuating circumstances s hown in this case. In fact, the hearing court expressly and unmistakably rejected the respondent s proffered mitigation. Moreover, we agree with the pe titioner that the re sponden t s prior discip linary history supports its recommended sanction. In the recent case in which he was in definitely suspended from the practice of law, the respondent was found to have violated some of the same rules he has b een found in this case to have violated: Rules 1 .1, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(d). Acc ordingly, we ado pt the petitioner s recommendation. Disbarment is the appropriate sanction in this case. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL 18 PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE A T T O RN E Y COMMISS ION WARD. 19 AGAINST G R I E V A N CE KENNETH S.

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