Attorney Grievance v. Manger
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 50 September Term, 2005 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. WILLIAM HENRY MANGER Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. File: December 14, 2006 The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, by Bar Counse l, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary Action against William Henry Manger, the respondent. The petition charged that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, Diligence,2 Competence,3 1.4, Communication,4 1.5, Fees,5 3.1, Meritorious 1 Maryland Rule 16-751, as relevant, provides: (a) Co mmen cemen t of disc iplinary or remed ial action . (1) Upon approval of the Commission. Upon approval or direction of the Commission, Bar Counsel shall file a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action in the Court of Appeals. 2 Pursuant to that Rule [a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promp tness in r eprese nting a c lient. 3 Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and prepar ation rea sonab ly necessa ry for the r eprese ntation. 4 Rule 1.4 provides: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. (b) A law yer shall explain a matter to the extent reaso nably necessa ry to permit th e client to make inform ed dec isions re gardin g the rep resenta tion. 5 Rule 1.5 p rovides, as re levant: (a) A law yer's fee shall be re asonable. T he factors to be consid ered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; Claims and Contentions,6 and 8.4, M isconduc t,7 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Cond uct, as ad opted b y Marylan d Rule 16-81 2. We referred the case, pursuant to Rules 16-752 (a), 8 to the Honorable Paul A. Hackner, of the Circ uit Court fo r Anne A rundel Co unty, for hearin g pursuan t to Rule 16-757 (c).9 At the hearing, the petitioner and the respondent stipulated to the following facts and (6) the natu re and leng th of the pro fessional rela tionship w ith the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) w hether th e fee is f ixed or conting ent. 6 Rule 3.1 provides: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law . A lawyer m ay nevertheles s so defen d the proce eding as to require that eve ry elemen t of the m oving p arty s case be estab lished. 7 Rule 8.4, as relevant, provides: It is professio nal miscon duct for a la wyer to: * * * * (d) en gage in condu ct that is p rejudici al to the a dminis tration o f justice . * * * * 8 Rule 16-752 (a) provides: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court of Appeals may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the completion of discovery, filing of motions, and hearing. 9 Maryland Rule 16-757 (c) provides: (c) Findin gs and co nclusions. T he judge s hall prepare and file or d ictate 2 that they are esta blished by clea r and con vincing ev idence: 1. Respondent, William Henry Manger, is 75 years old. He holds a B.A. degree from Loyola College in Baltimore (1953) and the LL.B. Degree from Georgetown University (1958). He was admitted to the Maryland Bar on October 24, 1958 and subsequently became a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and California. Respondent is now and at all times relevant to this proceeding was in the active practice of law in Maryland. He is no longer a member of the D.C. or California bars. 2. Respondent has been an attorney for 48 years. His legal practice has concentrated primarily on securities, corporate, franchise and insurance law and related litigation. Respondent has had very little civil trial experience in Maryland courts and virtually no exper ience litigating family law/custody matters in any jurisdiction where he is or w as adm itted to p ractice. 3. Alba Elena M iller, f/k/a Alba Elena Rodriquez (the Complainant ) met with Respondent on or about May 4, 2002 to consult with him about custody issues arising between her and her ex-husband. Complainant had been denied legal joint custody of her two children and only limited visitation largely due to a diagnosis that she suffered from bipolar disorder with paranoid tendencies. After the initial consultation Respondent, by letter dated May 6, 2002, confirmed the May 4 th meeting a nd propo sed the term s upon w hich he w ould represent her wh ich inclu ded, inter alia, the waiver of fees for the initial meeting on M ay 4 th ; an hourly rate of $ 150 per hour; reimbursement of all out of pocket expenses; and a request for an initial retainer of $1,000.Respondent also stated in this letter that he would provide detailed monthly billing statements. Petitioner's exhibit 1, tab 2. 4. By letter dated November 4, 2002, Respondent acknowledged meeting with Complainant on that date and agreed, contrary to his previous letter of May 6, 2002, to undertake representation of Complainant with the into the record a statement of the judge's findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regarding remedial action, and con clusions of law. If dictated into the record, the statement shall be promptly transcribed. Unless the time is extended by the Court of Appeals, the written or transcribed statement shall be filed with the clerk responsible for the record no later than 45 days after the conclusion of the hearing. The clerk shall mail a copy of the statement to each party. 3 acknowledged receipt of a $150 retainer instead of the $ 1000 pre viously proposed. Respondent was aware that the Complainant had limited income and agreed to allow the Complainant to make payments as she was able. Petitioner's exhibit 1, tab 3. 5. Subsequently, Respondent prepared a Petition to Se t Asi de or Mo dify a Consent Custody Order Dated April 29, 2001 with the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Case No. C-98-47502 DV, and filed it on January 24, 2003. Petitioner's exhibit 1, tab 9-32. Respondent supported his Petition with an affidavit fro m Com plainant, declarations of persons who knew Complainant to the effect that she exhibited no signs of mental illness and a Memorandum of Law. R espondent's theory of the case was that Complainant had been falsely diagnosed with bipolar disorder with paranoid tendencies, that the licensed psychologist who made the diagnosis was incompetent to do so, and that the psychiatric community is engaging in pseudo science when diagnosing and treating mental disorders. 6. In preparing the Petition, Respondent did not consult the Maryland Rules, statute s or c ase law c oncerning child custody. 7. The Memorandum of Law cited no statutes, cases or court rules. Rathe r, it discusse d Co mplaina nt's history as an immigrant to the United States, crosscultural differences vis-a-vis marriage, alleged mental and physical abuse she had suffered from her ex-husband and an attac k on the li cens ed psycho logist's competence to administer and interpret the psychological evaluation given to Comp lainant. He concluded the Memorandum with an attack on the psychiatric profession and supplied references to work s of acade mic psychologists as well as copies o f articles from newspa pers and a cademic journals. Responden t has stated that he did not intend to retain a ny expert witnesses to rebut the Complainant's psychological evaluation because he wanted to spare Complainant the e xpense and be cause he believed m embers of the psychological professio n are hesitant to testify against one another. 8. Complainant relied on Respondent to determine the correct legal actions to take. On or about March 6, 2003, Complainant received a billing statement from Respondent seeking payment in excess of $25,000. Complainant refused to pay the bill and terminated Respondent's services. 9. On or about December 15, 2003 Respondent received a telephone call from Com plain ant's ex-husband informing Respondent that the Complainant 4 had testified under oa th that Respondent had given her advice that it was legal for her to obtain a copy of her ex-husband's credit report. Respondent assumed that Complainant's testimony had been given during a hearing. Respondent denies ever having given Complainant such advice and considered her stateme nt to be defam atory. 10. On or about December 18, 2003, Respondent filed suit in the District Court of Maryland against Complainant for his unpaid fees. The Complainant prayed a jury trial before the Circuit Court and Respondent amended his Complaint to add a co unt for def amation, pr aying for com pensatory and punitive damages. Petitioner's Exhibits 5 and 6. 11. Respondent has been the subject o f earlier discip linary proceed ings in California and Maryland. Respondent was charged with various acts of professional misconduct during his practice in California for which, on August 22, 1990, the Supreme Court of California suspended him from practice for three years. The execution of the suspension was stayed and Respondent was placed on probation for three years on condition that he be suspended for 90 days and complied with various other conditions. The misconduct grew out of several complaints involving his willful failure to perform his professional duties, to refund unearned fees, to communicate with clients or withdraw from representation in a pro per and timely ma nner. See Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. William Henry Manger, Misc. Do cket (Sub title BV) No. 32 (Md. Ct. A pp. f iled J une 25, 1 993) (Pe r cur iam) . Peti tioner's Exhibit 7. 12. In 1993, Respondent was suspended from practice in Maryland for 90 days as a result of the California suspension. Respondent subsequently applied to the Maryland Court of Appeals for reinstatement and his petition was granted by Notice and Order dated September 12, 1994. Pe titioner's Exhib it 7. 13. Respondent states that his financial circumstances require him to continue to practi ce law for as lo ng as p ossible. A lack of work and income, at the time he was engaged by the Complainant, was the principal motivation for accepting Co mplainant's matter. 14. Respondent has recently developed and has the potential to develop significant new business, all of w hich is transactional in nature and generally falls w ithin his p reviou s legal ex perienc e. Resp onden t's Exhib it 1. 5 The responde nt and the c omplaina nt also testified , as to which the hearing court found, by a clear a nd con vincing standa rd, the fo llowin g. The complain ant and the responde nt disagreed as to the number of times, and when, the respondent billed the complainant. She contended that she received only one bill from her engagement of the respondent in November 2002 to March 2003, while the respondent maintained that he sent three. The court determined that he sent two, finding the responde nt s testimon y as to the November bill he claimed to have sent not to be credible: inter alia, perusal of the bill revealed time and e xpenses th at post-dated the date of the bill and the language of the cov er letter to the Jan uary bill, which the court fo und wa s sent to the complainant, makes it clear that the January statement was the initial statement sent to the com plainan t. The hearing court also made findings with regard to the value of the respondent s work to the complainant as well as its nature and significance: A significant p ortion of R esponde nt's activity, for wh ich he billed h is client, was aimed at educating himself on mental he alth issues, so th at he could challenge the opinions of Dr. Gombatz, which had been relied upon by the court in earlier procee dings. However, the knowledge gained by Respondent as a result of this re search w ould have had limited u tility in the presentation of his client's case. It might have been useful for Respondent to have a general understanding of the me ntal health issu es involved in the case in order to effectively examine witnesses. Ho wever, R esponde nt's education at his clien t's expense wen t too far. It should have been apparent to the Respondent that he wou ld not be a w itness in the case an d that educ ating himse lf was not a substitute for presentation of expert testimony on the mental health issues. The bulk of Respondent's research was of a general nature and should not have been billed to the client. A client wh o engages cou nsel has a right to 6 expect that the attorney will have sufficient general knowle dge to com petently represent her. While it may be appropriate to charge a client for ca se-specific research or familiarization with a unique issue involved in a case, general educa tion or b ackgro und res earch s hould n ot be ch arged to the clien t. Similarly, the significan t amount o f time that R esponde nt devoted to preparing a memorandum to accompany the Petition to Set Aside or Modify the Custody Order, as w ell as the submission of w itness declarations in support of the Co mplain ant, were essentially pointless. While it might have been useful to interview potential witnesses and even obtain their statements for his file, Respondent should have realized that these declarations consisted of inadmissible hear say. The trial court could not have considered the declarations to prove the substance of the witness statements. The Court also finds that the Complainant was excessively billed for administrative activities and other items that should have been absorbed as office overhead, such as looking up zip codes, making up Rolodex cards and the like. Complainant should not have been charged for such items at all, and certain ly not at an attorney's h ourly rate. The quality of the respondent s work on behalf of the complainant and, therefore, h is competence did not escape scrutiny. Noting that, in representing the complainant in her attempt to have a custody order, entered by consent more than a year earlier, modified, the respondent was required to establish that a material change in circumstances has occurr ed, the hearing court found that, instead, the Respondent focused his significant efforts on a quixotic attempt to establish that the court was wrong when it entered the custody orde r in the first place. Although the respondent s efforts were extensive, they were not the efforts of a competent lawyer, for such a lawyer would not have failed to recognize the lack of viability of that approach. That he did not, the hearing court determined, indicated that the respondent failed to demonstrate the knowledge, thoroughness, skill, and preparation 7 require d of a c ompe tent attor ney with respec t to his rep resenta tion of th e Com plainan t. As indicated the hearing court was satisfied that the respondent s efforts were extensive. It also found that he worked extremely hard on behalf of his client, communicating with her regu larly; during the r epresentatio n he wa s in comm unication w ith the complainant, through face to face mee tings, e-mails letters and telephone calls, on m ore than fifty occasions. Thus, the hearing court found: while the Respondent s efforts may have been largely pointless, there can be no doubt that they were substantial. There was no indication that the client was ever concerned that she was not being kept up-to-date about the progre ss of he r case. Based on the foregoing factual findings, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated Rules 1.1, 1.5 (a), 3.1 and 8.4 (d). As to Rule 1.1, the re spondent conceded that it was violated by his conduct of the representation of the complainant, acknowledging, on reflection, the relevant rules of court, rules of evidence, case law, and the Maryland Rules of P rofe ssional C onduct d emo nstra te tha t his theory of the ca se, strateg y, tactics and time expended on the matter were erroneous and misplaced and did not rise to the level of com petent re presen tation.... T he Ru le 1.5 (a) violation was base d on his bills to the complainant being excessive and unreasonable, consisting of billings [that] included extensive activity that would not further the goals of the client, ... constitut[ing] general background readings n ot billable to a client and clerical and adm inistrative tasks th at should be a part of the attorney s general overhead. Bringing an action for defam ation again st his 8 former client, without having conducting legal research into its viability and without appreciating that Maryland law provides for a broad privilege for allegedly defamatory statements in judicial proce edings, or th at doing so likely [wou ld] erode the public confidence in the legal profession, sufficiently supported the Rule 3.1 and 8.4 (d) violations. The respondent conc eded the appropriaten ess of the trial court s conclusion that his conduct in this regard was prejudicial to the administration of justice. On the other hand, the hearing court d etermined that the respo ndent did n ot violate Rules 1.3 or 1.4 (b ). As to the fo rmer, the co urt was satisf ied that, despite his other shortcomings,10 [the respondent] acted with ex traordinary dilige nce and p romptnes s in representing [the com plainant]. T hat this was so was reflected in the respondent s billing statements. While the respond ent s compliance w ith Rule 1.4 (b) was n ot perfect, the hearing court was not persua ded that the delay, from N ovembe r to January, in submitting a billing state men t, req uired to b e sub mitte d mo nthly, was a vio lation, particu larly in view of the frequent communications between the parties, which was established by the billing stateme nts them selves. The hearing court noted that the respondent had a disciplinary history . He was disciplined in 1990 by the Supreme Court of California for various acts of professional 10 The hea ring court reje cted the arg ument tha t the lack of d iligence w as reflected in the respondent s failure to familiarize himself with the law and rules controlling the subject of his representation. That, the court opined, resulted from a lack of comp etence rather th an eff ort, how ever m isguide d. 9 misconduct during his practice in Californ ia. As a result, in 1993, this Court imposed reciprocal discipline, a 90 day suspension. There also were mitigating circumstances in this case, the hearing court found: With respect to the instant case, there was no co ntention that Respond ent s misconduct resulted from a physical or mental imp airment. The Cou rt concludes that Respondent did not act in bad faith and had no intention to defraud or injure Ms. Miller. Respondent has expressed contrition on the witness stand and has cooperated with the AGC by admitting violations of the applicable disciplinary rules. Respondent s offer to seek guidance from a mentor with respect to his transitional practice, take courses in professional responsibility and the Law yers Rules of Profession al Condu ct and refra in from handling litiga tion matters in the future sh ows a w illingness to be gin rehabili tation so that futu re rule v iolation s will no t occur. The petitioner filed Petitioner s Recommendation For Sanction. In that pleading, it noted its exception to the hearing court s failure to find that the respo ndent acted in bad faith and with intent to defraud or injure the complainant, maintaining that clear and convincing evidence to that effect was shown by the respondent s undertaking of the representation without sufficient general knowledge competently to do so, the fact that the respondent s principal motivation for undertaking the representation was lack of work and income, and the filing, by the resp ondent, of a defamation claim against the complainant, a claim that was both unfounded and, therefore, frivolous. Necessarily, therefore, to the extent that the respondent s intent to defraud or injure formed the basis of the hearing court s finding of mitigation, the petitioner disputed it. Moreover, it questioned the respondent s contrition, as found b y the hearing c ourt, noting his answer to the petition in which he denied any misconduct and his failure to reim burse the co mplainan t for attorneys fe es she incu rred in 10 defending the defamation action or to refund a portion of the fees she p aid him. As to the latter, the petitioner asserts, [i]t is difficult to understand how Respondent justifies retaining these funds in light of his acknowledging his services were incompetent and therefore of little or no value to the clien t. Adding the respondent s prior California , and this Court s rec iprocal, susp ension to the foregoing, the petitioner recommends that the respondent be indefinitely susp ended, w ith reinstatement conditioned upon his repayment to the complainant of the fees he charged and the reimbursement of her attorneys fees in defending against the respondent s defamation action. The respondent took no exc eptions . He did file, however, Respondent s Response To Trial Cou rt s Findings Of Fac t And C onclusion s Of La w And Petitioner s Recommendation For Sanction. Maintaining that the record reflects, as the hearing co urt determined, the exact opposite of what the petitioner contends to be the case, the respondent urges this Court to reject the petitioner s exception. He stresses the lack of any suggestion in the record o r findings o f an intent to defraud or injure and, in fact, the opposite finding by the hearing court. I f the petitioner s exception were sustained, he adds, every case of professional negligence or incompetence [would be converted] into an intentional tort or species of fraud. While not denying that he was intending to enrich himself at the expense of his client, that is, afte r all, what the fee does, the respondent maintains that the record does not support that that was his only motivation or that the fee, reflected in the time and effort 11 he expended to earn it, [was] out of all proportion to what cou ld be achiev ed to serve h is client s objectives. W ith regard to th e defam ation action, th e respond ent states that his real intention in addin g the defamation count to his suit for legal fees was to rebut the insinuation that he had given his client illegal advice and to protect his professional reputation. Nor does the res ponden t believe his f ailure to refund a portion of the fee the complainant paid him evidence a lack of contrition for his misconduct. He believes that he earned some of the fee a nd, [b]ased on the record, there is no way fo r Petitioner to determine exactly how much of the $25,000 purported fee Respondent claimed from the Complainant he in fact earned. Although acknowledging his prior discipline and that the type of misconduct in which he has been found to have engaged alone warrants, ordinarily, an indefinite suspension, the respondent nevertheless seeks a lesser sanction than indefinite suspension due to the circumstances of this case. He does so based on the unique circumstances of this case, the steps he has agreed to take to ensure that he does no furthe r harm to the public,11 and the fact 11 The respondent testified in mitigation, and the hearing court acknowledged, that He is pre pared to tak e remedia l steps and p lace significa nt limits on his future practice, including (1) taking academic or continuing legal education courses in professional responsibility; the Maryland s Lawyers Rules of Profession al Condu ct and such other cours es as the C ourt of A ppeals sha ll direct; (2) if a present or future client presents him with a matter requiring litigation, Resp ondent w ill immediate ly associate with or refer the m atter to a lawyer experienced in the type of litigation involved; and (3) to seek a mentor from the Business Law Section of the American Bar Association or the Maryland State Bar Association to provide him with oversight concerning his transactional practice. 12 that the prior discipline wa s ministerial, be ing the resu lt of condu ct that did no t occur in Maryland, and remote in time. We shall overrule the petitioner s excep tion. There is ample evidence to support the findings of fact made by the hearing court and, just as important, those factual findings justify the conclusions drawn from them. Exceptions will be overruled when the findings are not c learly erron eous, Attorney Grievance C omm n v. McCoy, 369 Md. 226, 235, 798 A.2d 1132, 1 137 (2 002). See Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Garland, 345 Md. 383, 392, 692 A.2d 465, 469 (1997 ) (citing Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 347, 624 A.2d 503, 505 (1993)), and the conclusions are supported by the facts found.12 Turning to the question of the appropriate sanction for the misconduct found, we reiterate the well settled standard that guides that decision. The purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and not to punish the e rring attor ney. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Velasquez, 380 Md. 651, 660-61, 846 A.2d 422, 427-28 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm n v.Tinsky, 377 Md. 646, 653, 835 A.2d 542, 546; Attorney Grievan ce Com m'n v. Fran z, et. al., 355 Md. 752, 760-61, 736 A.2d 339, 343-44 (1999) Attorney Grievance C omm'n. Myers, 333 Md. 440, 446-47, 635 A.2d 1315, 1318 (1994); Attorney Grie vance C omm 'n v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 364, 624 A.2d 503, 12 Although phrased as a finding of fact, the hearing court s finding with respect to the int ent with which the resp onden t acted is really a mix ed que stion of law an d fact. The facts from which the conclusion is drawn are largely not in dispute; certainly it is not conten ded tha t the cou rt was c learly erron eous in its fact-f inding . 13 513 (1993); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Protokowicz, 329 Md. 252, 262-63, 619 A.2d 100, 105 (199 3); Attorney Grievance C omm'n v. M yers, 302 Md. 571, 580, 490 A.2d 231, 236 (1985); Atto rney G rievance Com m'n v. Velasquez, 301 Md. 450, 459, 483 A.2d 354, 359 (1984); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Montgomery, 296 Md. 113, 119, 460 A.2d 597, 600 (1983). What the appropriate sanction fo r the particular m isconduc t is, in the public interest, generally depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case, as the facts and circumstances of a case w ill determ ine how severe the san ction sh ould be . Attorney Griev. Com m'n v. Babbitt, 300 Md. 637, 642, 479 A.2d 13 72, 1375 (1984); Montgom ery, 296 Md. at 120, 460 A.2 d at 600; Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. Pollack, 289 Md. 603, 609, 425 A.2d 1352, 1355 (1981). The attorney's prior grievance history, as well as facts in mitigation, constitute part of t hose f acts and circum stances . Maryland State Bar Ass'n v. Phoebus, 276 Md. 353, 362, 347 A.2d 556, 561 (1975). The public interest is served when a sanction designed to effect general and specific deterrence is imposed on an attorney who violates the disciplin ary rules. See Protokowicz, 329 M d. at 262-63 , 619 A.2d at 105; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 355, 587 A.2d 51 1, 521 (19 91); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Alison, 317 M d. 523, 5 40-41 , 565 A .2d 660 , 668 (1 989). Notwithstanding our overruling of the petitioner s exception, we nevertheless believe that the appropriate sanction is an indefinite suspension, as the petitioner has recommended and which the respondent has concede d to be the typically mandated one for conduct of the nature in which he engaged . 14 We do not believe that the arguments the respondent offers for a lesser sanction carry the day. Althoug h neither the conduct in which the respondent was found to have engaged nor the rule violations it was found to constitute rises to the level of conduct or violations warranting disbarment, the misconduct is quite serious and can n ot be cond oned. M oreover, w e are not satis fied that th e circumstances of this case are of sufficient uniqueness as to justify, much less require, the imposition of a lesser sa nction. Ce rtainly, the fact that th e only prior viola tion, and th e sanction in respect thereto, is not recent is relevant, but it is difficult to attribute substantial mitigating weight to the fact that it was not incurred in this State, and it cannot be, in any event, charac terized a s ministe rial. Whether the safeguards the respondent has proposed will have the anticipated effect can be, and indeed must be, judged in the light of subsequent events. Th us, their efficacy and desirability, as well as their exact nature, may be, and, perha ps, should be addressed, when the decision to re admit him is considere d. This is consistent with what we did, and said, in Attorney Grie vance C omm 'n v. Black, 362 Md. 574, 580, 766 A .2d 119, 123 (200 1): We decline ... the petitioner's invitation to delineate specific conditions of reinstateme nt, except the payment of costs, a condition in any event, whether stated or not, preferring to reserve to ourselves the broade st discretion to review, at the time of application, th e respond ent's fitness fo r reinstateme nt. By not specifying a monitor, or any of the other recommended conditions, as prerequisite for reinstatem ent, however, we do not mean to suggest that they are not app ropriate or sh ould not b e done. W e simply will not now express an opinion on the matter of what is, or will be, required for rein stateme nt. See also Attorney Grievance Comm n v . Holt, 894 A.2d 602, 605, 391 Md. 673, 678 (2006). 15 Acc ordingly, the respon dent is orde red indefin itely suspended from the practice of law. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PU RSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY G R IE V A N C E COMMISSION AGAINST WILLIAM HENRY MANGER. 16
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