Walton v. Mariner Health

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Re: Audrey Walton, et al. v. Mariner Health of Maryland, Inc. No. 33, September Term, 2005 Headnote: A family member may enter into a contract with a nursing home care facility for the care of a parent or other family member. In this case a daughter signed a nursing home facility contract in her capacity as age nt for her m other, the resid ent. Under the terms of the contract, the agent agreed that her mother s care would be paid only through Medical Assistance or Med icare. Me dicare paid for the resident s care for approximately one month. Once Medicare ceased paying, the agent did not apply for medical assistance to cover the cost of the resident s care while at the facility. Moreover, the nursing home facility failed to assist either the resid ent or the ag ent in obtaining medical assistance. The nursing home bill was not paid. After rend ering care f or approx imately 18 months, the nursing home filed suit for breach of contract and obtained a money judgment against the resident and the agent jointly and severally for damages. Under the terms § 19-344(c) of the Health Genera l Article an ag ent s respon sibility is limited to the administration and ma nagement of the resident s funds, unless the agent agrees to pay for the resident s care with the ag ent s own funds. Section 19-344(c)(5) provides that the agent shall apply for medical assistance, that the nursing home facility must assist and advise the agent in seeking medical assistance, and if the agent fails to seek assistance on behalf of th e residen t, the faci lity ma y petit ion the co urt to com pel th e age nt to apply for assistance. Section 19-344(c )(6)(ii) provides that an agent who willfully or with gross negligence violates the requirements of § 19-344(c)(5) regarding an application for medical assistance is subject to a civil penalty not exceeding $10,000.00. The Atto rney Gener al is responsible for enforcing the civil penalties under § 19-34 4(c)(6) (iii). In the instant case, the agent was not personally liable for her mother s nursing home care because there was no agreement to that effect. Moreover, § 19-344(c) of the Health General Article does not provid e the nu rsing ho me fac ility a private cause o f action agains t the age nt for d amag es. In the Circu it Court for P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Case No. CAL03-00464 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 33 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ AUD REY WAL TON , et al. v. MARINER HEALTH OF MARYLAND, INC. _____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: March 14, 2006 This case primarily involves a review of the laws of agency and contra cts and the rules of statutory interpretation. Although Patricia Walton ( Patricia ) and Audrey Walton ( Audrey ) are both na med partie s in this case, the issue befo re us is wh ether Patricia, an agent for Audrey, can be held pe rsonally lia ble for A udrey s o utstand ing deb t. On January 10, 2003, Mariner Health of Southern Maryland ( Mariner Health ), a nursing home faci lity, sued Patricia, as agent, and her mother, Audrey, for breach of contract for failing to pay Audrey s nursing home bill as allegedly agreed to by the parties. On August 11, 2004, the Circuit Court for Prince George s County found both mother and daughter liable to Mariner Health for the outstanding balance incurre d by Au drey and for atto rney fees . The Waltons appealed that decision to the Court of Special Appea ls. Before that court could decide the appeal, we granted certiorari. Walton v. Mariner Health , 388 Md. 97, 879 A.2d 42 (200 5). We must determine whether a contract between an agent, on behalf of the nursing home resident, and a nursing home facility, entitles the nursing home to a private cause of action against an agent for the cost of the resident s care. If an agent neg lects his or her duty to apply for Medicare or Medical Assistance1 on behalf of the resident under Maryland Code (1982, 2000 R epl. Vo l.), § 19-3 44(c) o f the H ealth-G eneral A rticle, can the agent b e held personally liable for the debt incurred by the resident of the nursing home? We must also resolve whether § 19-344(c) of the Health-General Article limits a nursing home fa cility to statutory remedies o r if it may pursue a private cause of action against an agent for personal 1 For purposes of this opinion and the agreement signed between Mariner Health and Patricia, Medicaid means Medical Assistance. liability for an outsta nding deb t incurred by the resident. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George s County. The Circuit Court erred in hold ing that the fin ancial agree ment signe d by the agen t on behalf of the resident rendered the agent perso nally liable for the outstanding nursing ho me bill 2 even though the agent failed to seek Medicare or Medical Assistance for the resident. In addition, we hold that a nursing home facility is limited to remedies prescribed by statute. FACTS On January 26, 2001, Audrey was transferred from Southern Maryland Hospital Center to M ariner H ealth of S outh ern M aryland. That same day, Patricia, as an agent of Aud rey, signed the R esident s A gent Finan cial Agree ment with Mariner Health of Southern Maryland ( Agreement ). Patricia indicated in the agreement that the only methods of payment would b e Medic are or M edical Ass istance. In the a greemen t, Patricia expressly denied any personal responsibility for Audrey s bill. When Audrey was admitted to the faci lity, Medicare paid for Audrey s nursing home bill, how ever , at the end of F ebru ary, 2001, Medicare stopp ed paying for Aud rey s nursing home care. Pa tricia, as agent, was required, as stipul ated in th e agree ment, infra at note 9, to reapply for eligibility or Medical Assistance. There was testimony that Audrey would have been a successful candidate for Medical Assista nce an d, most likely, Medicare. From March 2001 through August 2002, 2 Unless the agent expressly indicated in the contract that he/she knowingly and voluntarily would pay for the resident s care with the agent s own funds, the agent is not personally liable for the principal s contract or debt. 2 Audrey incurred a debt of approximately $4,800.00 a month for her care. The outstanding balance was $86,235.91 for tho se eighteen months. O n January 10 , 2003, M ariner Hea lth filed a Complaint against Patricia and Audrey for Audrey s outstanding bill. The amount requested by Mariner Health was $86,235.91, representing the outstanding balance due and owing, plus $12,935.39 in attorney fees. On July 6, 2004, Patricia testified at trial that she was not aware that Medicare ceased paying for her mother s care and that the nursing ho me debt w as being inc rementally calculated. Patricia stated that she would have applied for medical benefits for her mother had she been aware that Medicare had stopped paying for A udrey s nursin g home b ill. Patricia testified that sh e was no t given notic e of the ou tstanding m onetary obliga tion until after Mariner Health sold the facility to another group. Mariner Health offered no explanation or evidenc e as to wh y it failed to notify A udrey or Patricia that Medicare had ceased paying o r that a de bt had b een inc remen tally tallied f or eigh teen m onths. The trial judge interpreted two provisions of the agreement and, based on that interpretation, held that both Patricia and Audrey were contractually obligated for paying Mariner Health for Audrey s nursing home bill, but reserved judgm ent on damage s for a compromise by the parties. On August 11, 2004, after the parties failed to settle the issue of damages, the court entered a judgment against both women and in favor of Mariner Health for dam ages in the am ount of $75,00 0.00 an d $11,2 50.00 f or attorn ey fees. 3 RESIDENT AGENT S FINANCIAL AGREEMENT In the case , sub judice, the agre emen t consist s of thirty p ages co llectively. T he Resident s Agent Financial Agreement identified in the Circuit Court record as exhibit one (1) consisted of The Financial Agreement With Mariner Health of Southern Maryland ( Financial Agreement ) and Exhibit 1 O bligations of the Agen t. Both ag reements contained the agent, Patricia Walton s signature. The Financial Agreement consisted of twenty-two pages and Exhibit 1 Obligations of the Agent was eight (8) pages long.3 Both of the agreements contained several provisions pertinent to our discussion. FINANCIAL AGREEMENT WITH MARINER HEALTH The Financial Agreement that Patricia signed was an agreement between an agent on behalf of a res ident an d Ma riner H ealth. The contract explained a resident s a gent s rights and obligations and required that the agent select the type of finan cial program responsible for paying for the resident s care. Several payment options were provided including Medicare and Medical Assistance, other third party insurers, the resident s personal funds, the agent s per sonal fun ds, and oth er method s of paymen t.4 The relevant provision in the 3 In the trial record, the page numbers of the Obligations of the Agent agreement were not clearly marked or discernable, except for page one (1). 4 Further, the Financial Agreement contained seven sections. Some sections contained several subsections. Importantly, in this case, sections 3 A-D are relevant since several payment requirements are profiled, specifically; (i) 3.A. Paying for The Resident s Care, allows the agent to pick the payment type, and, here, Patricia indicated that only Medicare or Medical Assistance would pay for her mothers care; (ii) 3.B. Private Pay Residents, was applicable to those residents who paid for their care with their own income, (continued...) 4 Financial Agreement that clearly qualified Patricia as a statutory agent, as defined in § 19344(c)(1), was as follows: This Contract is between Mariner Health of Southern Maryland . . . and Patricia Walton (the Agent or you ) because you have access to (use, management or control of) the income, funds and/or assets of Audrey Walton (the Resident ) and because you are willing to act on beh alf of the R esident. 5 Financial Agreement at 1. Patricia signified that both The Medicare Program and The Medicaid Program (also known as Medical Assistance ) would pay for Audrey s care by marking an X in the appropriate boxes. Patricia did not indicate that she would be liable for payment for Audrey s care from her own personal funds or that payment would be made from Aud rey s personal as sets: 3. . . . A. Who Ca n be Required to P ay for the Resident s Care . Only the Resident and the Resident s insurers can be required to pay for the Resident s care. You cannot be required to pay for the Resident s care from you own funds, unless you knowin gly and voluntarily agree to pay for the cost of the Resident s care with your own funds. * * * * It is antici pate d tha t the R esident s car e will be p aid f or by: 4 (...continued) funds, and/or assets; and 3.C. Medicare Residents and 3.D. Medicaid Residents, both pertained to those residents, such as Audrey, who indicated, supra at 6, that Medicare or Medicaid (Medical Assistance) benefits would pay for their care. 5 Patricia and Audrey Waltons names were handwritten. 5 : : 9 9 9 9 The Medicare Program; The Medicaid Program (also known as Medical Assistance ); Other t hird-pa rty insurer, . . . You with the R esident s income, fund s and/or other assets; You with your own income fund an d/or assets; Other . . . . Financial Agreement at 4. Section 3.B Private Pay Resident, contained informatio n on spec ific payment and service requirements for residents paying with their own private funds.6 Although Audrey was not a Private Pay Resident, this section is relevant to our discussion because the trial judge based his judgment on language contained within this section. The pertinent language in this section p rovided tha t: You [as an agent to a Private Pay Resident] understand and agree that you are responsible for paying the Facility . . . during which [time] the Resident has not been determined eligible for Me dical Assistance. If you do not pay the amount owed us after receiving Facility bills and we hire a collection agency or attorney because of your breac h of this A greemen t, you agree to pay their fees, expenses a nd court costs with your own funds. If you do not pay wh at is owed the Facility, you agre e to apply to Medical Assistance for a determination of the Resident s income and assets available to pay the cost of the Resident s care. Onc e Medic al Assistance determines the 6 When a nursing home consents to payment from a nursing home resident s private funds, it means a nursing facility s acceptance of payment from a source other than the Medical Assistance Program. COMAR 10.07.09.02 §B(21)(a). 6 income a nd assets available to pay for the Resident s care, you agree to use such inco me and a ssets to pay the Facility s bills.2 (Your request for this determination is not the same as applying for Medical A ssistance on behalf of th e Resident.) 2 If you do not request a determination by Medical Assistance, or if payment is not made with the income and assets determined to be available for the Resident s care, the Facility may ask the court to order you to obtain the determination or to make payment. Financ ial Agr eemen t at 5-6. Audrey s care was not paid for by Medical Assistance because Patricia, as age nt, did not apply for Medical Assistance, when Medicare stopped paying her m other s bill. In section 3.D Medica id Residen ts of the agreement, the first sentence began, [] [Mariner Health] participate[s] in the Me dicaid Program. The following in relevant part states that [] [a]lthough it is the Resident s and your resp onsibility to apply for and obtain Medicaid benefits for the Resident, we will assist you, by promptly providing Medical Assistance with all required information in our poss ession. If a R esident is eligible for Medical Assistance, the Facility may not charge, ask for, accept or receive any gift, money, donation or consideration other than Medica id reimburse ment as a c ondition of the Resident s admission or continued stay here. 7 * * * * [] . . . You un derstand an d agree to p ay to the Facility . . . this . . . amount . . . . If you fail to pay this amount, we may request a court to ord er such pa yment. * * * * [] You understand that non-payment of items and services not covered by Medicaid may result in a disch arge action for nonpaymen t of bills. Financial Agreement at 8-9. OBLIGATIONS OF THE AGENT The addendu m to the Financial Agreement titled, Exhibit 1, Obligations of the Agen t, (hereinafter Agent Obligation Form ) provided, as the title indicated, a resident s agent s responsibilities. The second page of the addendum contained a statement which said, [p]lease initial those questions which describe your authority for acting as the Resident s Agen t. Patricia initialed that she was acting as an agent [a]t the request of the Resident [her mother, Audrey][] and [a]s a family member . . . with authority to manage, use or 8 control the Resident[ ]s income, funds and/or assets[] Agent Obligation Form at 2 . Further, in pertinent part, the document provided that [t]he financial obligation is limited to the amount of the Resident s income, fu nds and a ssets. The A gent assumes no personal liability for the Resident s stay at the Facility unless the Agent voluntarily agre es to be pers onally respon sible for any payments required under this Co ntract which are not paid by the Reside nt or a th ird-party in surer. Agent Obligation Form at 1. An agent who intentionally or with gro ss negligen ce failed to apply or reque st a determination for Medical Assistance would be subject to penalties: I understand that I could be subject to both civil and criminal penalties for failure to meet my obligations as an Agent as follows: * * * * 2. If I willfully or w ith gross neg ligence fail to seek on behalf of the Resident all assistance from Medical Assistance which may be available to th e Residen t, or fail to coop erate fully in the eligibility determination process, I understand that I could be subject to a civil money penalty of up to $10,000.00. This amount would be paid from my ow n funds. Agent Obligation Form at 4-5. Further Patricia s handwritten initials, PW signified that she would not use her own personal funds for her mother s care: 1. Do you knowingly and voluntarily agree to make payments required under this Agreement from YOUR OWN RESOURC ES? Yes ____/ No PW . . . . 9 Agent s Obligation Form at 6. ANAL YSIS Agency Law Mariner Health asserts that Patricia, as agent, was obligated to apply for Medical Assistance and she breached that duty. Therefore, she is personally liable (along with Audrey) for the total sum owed to the nursing home facility for Audrey s care. Patricia contends that under the agreement she, as an agent for Audrey, had two statutory and contractual obligations to Mariner Health. The first obligation was to use the Audrey s assets and income to p ay for her care. The second obligation was to apply for Medical Assistance. Patricia maintains that to hold a nursing home resident s agent personally liable for a resident s outstanding nursing home bill requires more than a signed agreement or an agent s simple failure to obtain Medical Assistance benefits. The Financial Agreement established Patricia as a statutory agent under § 19-344(c). An agent, in these types of situations, often a relative of a nursing home resident, manages the resident s finances or acts on behalf of an elderly or ill relative. In 1988, the Legislature enacted legislation to lim it the liability of an agent to a nursing home residence. The Legislature defined an agent as, a person who m anages, us es, or contro ls the funds or assets that legally may be used to pay the applicant s or resident s share of costs or other charges for the facility s services. Section 19-344(c)(1) of the Health - General Article. An agent is, [o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another a representative. BLACK S 10 L AW D ICTIONARY 68 (8th ed. 200 5). An agent s function is to represe nt the rights of the principa l. An agen t s authority is limited by the instru ctions, restriction s and nee ds of the p rincipal. Penowa Coal Sales Co. v. Gibbs & Co., 199 M d. 114, 119 , 85 A.2d 4 64, 467 (1 952); Proctor v. Holden, 75 Md. App. 1, 20, 540 A.2 d 133, 14 2; cert. denied, Holden v. Freeman & Kagan, 313 Md. 506, 545 A.2d 1343 (1988) ( T hree elem ents are integ ral to any agency relationship: (1) the agent is subject to the principa l s right of co ntrol, (2) the ag ent has a du ty to act primarily for the benefit of the principal, and (3) the agent holds a power to alter the legal relations of the principal. ). An agent has the authority to enter into a contrac t on beh alf of th e princip al. Stawn v. Jones, 264 Md. 95, 98, 285 A.2d 659, 662 (1972) ( It is well established law that an agent can enter into a co ntractual relationship with a third party to the extent of the ag ent s prescribed authority. ). Furth er, an agen t is employed to represent h is principal in regard to contractual obligations with a third person. Henkelmann v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 M d. 591, 6 00, 26 A .2d 418 , 423 (1 942). If the contract is to benefit the principal only, the agent is immune from personal liability for breach of that contrac t. City of Baltimore v. Musgrave, 48 Md. 272, 289 (1878) ( It is also a universal principle of the law of agency that the powers of the agent are to be exercised for the benefit of the principal only, and not of the agent or third p arties. ); Local 1852 Waterfront Guard Ass n of Port of Baltimore I.W.A. v. Amstar Corp., 363 F.Supp. 1026, 1030 ( 1973) , enforced, 508 F .2d 839 (1974 ), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 11 2398, 44 L.Ed .2d 667 (1 975) ( It is a w ell settled princip le of agency law that an agent acting within the scope o f his author ity for a disclosed principal is not bound o n a contrac t made in the principal s na me. ); Curtis G. Testerman, Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 576-77, 667 A.2d 649, 653 (1995) ( The rule in Maryland is clear that, if an agent fully disc loses the iden tity of his pri ncip al to t he th ird party, then, absent an agreement to the contrary, he is insulated from liability . ) (quoting A.S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 265 Md. 53, 56, 288 A.2d 596, 597-98 (1972); King v . Industr ial Ban k of Wa shingto n, 474 A.2d 151, 155 (D.C. 1984) ( The designation of the signer as an agent and the naming of the principal are essential to the avoidance of liability on neg otiable and nonneg otiable con tracts alike. ); Rittenberg v. Donohoe Const. Co., Inc., 426 A.2d 338, 341 (D.C. 1981) ( W here a princ ipal is disclosed, no liability will fall upon the agent for acts committed by the principal unless he binds himself for same by definite w ords or stipu lation. ); Hend erson v . Phillips, 195 A.2d 400, 402 (D.C.) (19 63) ( [W ]hen his principal is disclosed . . ., the agent ordinarily does not incur personal liability. The law is well settled th at when a n agent ac ts in good faith on behalf of a disclosed principal, he is not held resp onsible in the event of his p rincipal s default. ). Patricia, as an agent, had a primary duty to Au drey, the principa l, and Patricia s duty to Mariner Health, a third party, was limited . Agency law precludes a finding ag ainst Patricia for dama ges. As an agent, Patricia entered into the contract only for the benefit of Audrey and is personally insulated from liability by virtue of her station as an agent. The issue remains however of whether Patricia, as an agent, was personally immune from liability 12 under t he term s of the contrac tual agre emen t or the sta tute. The Agreement Mariner Health maintains that although Patricia was an agent, she was, nevertheless, personally liable for the nursing hom e bill under an apparen t privity of contract 7 theory because a contract ex isted betwe en Mar iner Health and Patricia . In its Comp laint, filed in the Circuit Court, Marine r Health asserted that Patricia agreed that when Audrey s funds were exhausted, Patricia would seek medical assistance promptly and provide all necessary information and docu mentation requested to establish M edicare elig ibility for her mother. Mariner Health contends that the trial court found Patricia had a contractual obligation, under a contrac t which was ap proved by DH MH , 8 to pay for Audrey s care using the resident s funds or applying for Medical Assistance.9 Mariner Health asserts that Patricia, as agent, 7 Privity of contract means a, relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing so. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY at 1237 (8th ed. 2004). 8 Mariner Health argues that the contractual language expressly stated that an agent would be personally responsible if she or he failed to apply for medical assistance or make payment with the income or assets available for the resident s care. All Maryland nursing home admission contracts must be approved by the DHMH to ensure that they fall within the parameters of public policy. The Mariner Health Resident s Agent Financial Agreement was approved the DHMH. Financial Agreement at 5. 9 At trial, Mariner Health s counsel acknowledged that Audrey was eligible for Medicare, stating, I don t deny that [Audrey] had Medicare benefits and had medical assistance been applied for, we wouldn t be here today. Mariner Health stated that neither Patricia nor Au drey contacted Prince G eorge s Department of Social Services for Medical Assistance. Mariner Health admitted that it had (continued...) 13 disregarded her duty to app ly for medical a ssistance, there fore she is p ersonally liable for the costs inc urred f or her m other s c are. Patricia specified in the agreem ent that Audrey s care would be paid solely from Medicare or Medical Assistance.10 Patricia states that she, as a n agent, can not be held personally liable for Audrey s outstanding nursing home bill because she explicitly indicated in the agreement that she would not knowingly or voluntarily use her own personal funds for her mo ther s ca re. Patricia asserts that Mariner Health breache d its duty to mitigate damages, 11 and its contractual duty to advise and assist Patricia with applying for Medical Assista nce. 9 (...continued) a duty to advise th e family to apply and assist them in seeking medical assistance, however did n ot ad mit th at it b reac hed that d uty: THE COURT: If I understand your testimony correctly . . . [Mariner Health] really doesn t oversee the initiation of a Medicaid request . . . . That would be the department of social services for that jurisdiction. Is that right? MARINER HEALTH WITNESS: Correct. The nursing homes d[o] not make that decision. They advise [the] family to apply. They may assist them in getting some to the documentation, but they have to make that face to face appointment with the local department. 10 Medicare had paid for Audrey s care initially through February 2001. 11 Patricia argues that M ariner Hea lth failed in its du ty to mitigate dam ages wh en it did not notify them for eightee n month s that Medicare had c eased paying for Au drey s nursing home care or that a debt was accruing every month for eigh teen m onths. Instead Mariner Health did nothing for eighteen months as a small manageable debt, which could have been easily remedied by applying for Medical Assistance, became a debt of a large significance in which the time to apply for Medical Assistance had passed. 14 The trial judge held that the Resident s Agent Financial Agreement was clear and provided that Patr icia, as ag ent and relative f or her m other, was responsible to pay her mother s expenses as outlined in several provisions. The trial judge continued: The focus of this [c]ourt is [ Mariner Health s] Exhib it Number 1, which is the [R]esident[ ]s [A]gent [F]inancial [A]greement with Mariner H ealth. . . and then the evidence that s been pres ented as to e verybody s und erstanding of this agreem ent. This agreement does speak for itself. It is in evidence, and it states that Patricia W alton has sig ned in her c apacity as a relative and agent of her mother [and is] obligate[d] . . . for the financial obligations s temming from serv ices rendered while her mother was living at the Mariner Health Care fac ility in southern Maryland. Page four of the agreement has be en referenced indicating tha t it is the anticipation that the reside nt s care w ill be paid by [M]edic[aid] . . . or the Medicare pro gram. Those are the two blocks that were checked off. I have revie wed this a greemen t. And I point out among[] other provisio ns . . . at the bottom of page five, the last of the page read s in part, [12] [ ][y]ou understand and agree that you are responsible for p aying the [ F]ac ility for items [and services] provided to the resident during any period of time in w hich the [R ]esident is or was a resident of the [F]acility and during which the resident has not been determined eligible for [M]edical [A] ssistance . If you do not pay the amount owed us after receiving [F]acility bills, and we hire a collection agent or attorney because 12 The indented language was quoted by the trial judge from the agreement. 15 of your breach o f this agreement, you agree to pay their fees, expenses, and court costs with your own fund s.[ ] [13] There is a foo tnote at p age six that read s, [ ][i]f you do not request a determination by [M]edical [A]ssistance or a payment is not made with the income and assets determined to be available for the [R]esident s care, the facility may ask the [c]ourt to order you to obtain the determination or to mak e payment.[ ] [14] It is clear that also there was no evidence presented to this Court that there was at any point in time a request to process the Mariner Health Care bills through medical assistance v ia the Prince George s County [D]epartment of [S]ocial [S]ervices. (Alterations added). The trial judge determined that both Patricia and Audrey were liable to Mariner Health for damages. This determination raises the issue of whether the contract is ambiguous, 13 This section is located in the 3.B. Private Pay Residents section of the agreement. We hold that this section was not applicable to either Audrey or Patricia. Patricia indicated in the agreement that Audrey s care would be paid only by Medicare and/or Medical Assistance, thus Audrey was not a Private Pay Resident. 14 This language, also, is contained in the section titled 3.B. Private Pay Residents section of the agreement. Patricia indicated on the agreement that Audrey s care would be paid only by Medicare and/or Medical Assistance, we find that this section was applicable to residents who paid with private funds, as such, this section was not applicable to Audrey. Further, we disagree with Mariner Health s argument that this section of the agreement makes the agent, Patricia, personally liable to Mariner Health. We interpret the language of the sentence to mean that if Audrey was a private pay resident, Patricia would have to either request a determination from Medical Assistance or pay the nursing home costs with Audrey s personal funds. See infra at 18-19. 16 particularly the interpretation of specific language contained in a footnote, pertaining to the role and personal liability of a nursin g home r esident s ag ent. Gene rally, when see king to interpret the meaning of a contract our search is limited to the four c orners of th e agreem ent. Under the objective theory of contracts we look at what a reasonable person in th e same position would have understood as the meaning of the a greem ent. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 293 M d. 409, 420 , 445 A.2d 14, 19 (19 82); Board o f Trustees of S tate Colleges v. Sherman, 280 M d. 373, 380 , 373 A.2d 626, 629 (1977); Sagner v. Glenangus Farms, 234 Md. 156, 162, 198 A.2d 277, 283 (1964). W hen interpre ting a contra ct, our main focus is the customary, ordinary, and accepted meaning of the language used. Atlantic Contracting and Material Co., Inc. v. Ulico Cas. Co., 380 Md. 285, 301, 844 A.2d 460, 469 (2004)(quoting Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 324 Md. 44, 56-57, 595 A.2d 469, 475 (199 1)). This C ourt adhere s to a well-se ttled principle, w hen interpreting a contract, that [u]nder Maryland law, the interpretation of a contract, including the question of whether the language of a contract is ambiguous, is a question o f law sub ject to de novo review . See Towson v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 78, 862 A.2d 941, 946 (2004). We have long adhered to the objective the ory of contract interpretation, giving effect to the clear terms of agreements regardless of what the parties may have intended by those terms at the time of contract forma tion. Id. at 78, 862 A.2d at 946-47. Under the obje ctive theo ry: A court construing an agreement under [the objective theory] must f irst determine from the language of the agreem ent itself wh at a reasonab le person in the position of the parties 17 would have meant at the time it was effectuated. In addition, when the language of the contrac t is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction, and a court must presume that the parties meant what they expressed. In these circumstances, the true test of what is meant is not what the parties to the contra ct intended it to mean, but what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would have thought it mean t. Dennis v. Fire & Police Employees Ret. Sys., ___Md. ___, ____ A.2d ___, slip op. at 18 (filed January 18, 2006) (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Danie ls, 303 Md. 254, 261, 492 A.2d 1306, 1310 (1985)(internal quotations omitted )). Myers v. Kayhoe, ____ Md. ____, ____ A.2d ____, (slip op. at 7 - 8 ) (filed February ___, ____)). We conclude that the trial court was erron eous in its rulin g for seve ral reasons. F irst, Patricia, as agent, can bind Audrey, the principal, to a contract, however, Patricia is not personally liable in damages for breach of that contract. Secondly, the trial judge s misinterpretation of the contract was based upon two provisions in the document under consideratio n tha t specific ally di d not app ly to ei ther Patricia o r Au drey. The trial judge bas ed his judgment on two provisions contained in section B of the agreeme nt, supra at n.12-13, which applied exclusively to private pa y resid ents. Audrey, however, was not a private pay resident because there was no evidence at trial that her priva te funds were use d to pay for her care. Patricia e xpressly indicate d on the ag reement, supra at 6, that Audrey s ca re would be paid w ith either M edicare or M edical Ass istance and not with 18 Audrey s personal funds. Patricia cannot be held personally liable under the terms of the agreeme nt, supra at 9, becaus e she did n ot know ingly or volunta rily agree to use her personal funds to pay for her mother s nursing home care. The M edical Ass istance sectio n applicab le to Audr ey s care, supra at 7-8, contained language which sta ted that M ariner Hea lth would assist the agent in applying for and obtaining Medical Assistance benefits.15 Furthermore, if there were services or item s not cove red by Me dical Assista nce and P atricia, as agen t, did not pay for those services, the facility was free to initiate transfer or discharge procedures agai nst A udre y. See § 19-3 45(a)(4 ). Secondly, one of the private pay provisions which is contained in a footnote provides: If you do not request a determination by Medica l Assistance , or if paymen t is not made with the income and assets determ ined to be a vailable for the Resident s care, the Facility may ask the court to order you to obtain the determination or to make payment. 16 (Emp hasis ad ded.) The trial judg e misint erprete d that pr ovision . The trial judge essentially based his decision on the last three words of the pro vision to establish Patricia s personal liability. We disagree with that conclusion. The lang uage of th e private pay provision is clear and unambiguous. The trial judge, 15 Before this Court, at oral argument, co-counsel for Patricia stated that a facility would need to aid an individual with requesting a determination and applying for Medical Assistance because the procedures are difficult to understand for a layman. 16 The trial judge found the additional language in the Financial Agreement supported the conclusion that Patricia was personally liable. See supra pp. 6-7,15-16. The language was located, supra at note 12, in the Private Pay Residents section of the agreement. 19 however, interpreted the language to mean that if Patricia did not request Medical Assistance to pay Audre y s bill, Patricia would be pers onally liab le for pa yment. T o the co ntrary, a correct interpretation o f the langu age mea ns that if an agent does not (a) requ est a determination by Medica l Assistance or (b) make payment with the Resident s assets or income determined available fo r the Resident s care, then the facility may ask the court to order the agent to do either (a) or (b). The last three words, to make payment does not mean that an a gent ca n be he ld liable f or the p rincipal s breac h of co ntract. The trial judge was incorrect in (1) basing his opinion on two provisions that do not apply to Patricia or Audrey because they were not private pay residents, and (2) misinterpreting the langua ge to mea n that Patricia was personally liable for her mother s nursing home care. A s we n ote in the next se ction, infra, the trial judge s determination contradicts § 19-344(c) of the Health-General Article and Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 10.07.09.07 that an agent s liability is limited regarding nursing home facilities and agreements that stem from that relationship. Statute The agreement was based on § 19-344(c) and was discussed by both petitioner and respondent in their appe llate briefs. The Legislative history demonstrates that the Department of Health and M ental Hygiene ( DHMH ) and the Maryland State Bar Association reviewed independent nursing home contracts and found inconsistencies and widespread use of clau ses in violation of existing law or o f ques tioned c onfor mity. 20 Department of Legislativ e Reference, Bill Summary, HB 683 at 2 (1988). As a result of legislation, all Maryland nursing ho mes are req uired to draf t their admissio ns contracts to reflect the state s model. COM AR 10.07.09 .06 §A-B (1996). Mariner Health contends that the agreement wa s fair, equitable, and that the language p aralleled the State s statutory provisio ns. Further, M ariner Hea lth asserts that Patricia breached her duty to apply for Medical Assistance, therefore, Patricia is personally liable under the statute for damages incurred by the nursing home. Moreover, Mariner Health maintains that the absence of an express prohibition in § 19-344 (c) permits a private cause of action against the resident s agent for breach of contrac t.17 Accord ing to Mariner Health, because a private cause of action was not expressly authorized does not defeat the contractual right to one. In Mariner Health s view, 17 Mariner Health cites Allfirst Bank v. DHMH, 140 Md. App. 334, 780 A.2d 440 (2001) which considers the issue of attorney fees which were not expressly provided for in Health - General § 19-337. The intermediate appellate court held that attorney fees are based on a contractual right that the, statute does not say how payment to a secured creditor is to be made or when it is to be made. Id. at 367, 780 A.2d at 459. Our case sub judice, is distinguishable from Allfirst, because the language of § 19-344 clearly provides for a statutory remedy, which Mariner Health chose not to follow. The boundaries of the statute are clear that if an agent fails to request a determination or seek Medical Assistance, a nursing home has two choices: (a) seek an injunction; or, (b) request that the Attorney General seek enforcement of the agent s statutory duties. In other words, the facility may petition a circuit court to compel the agent to either request a determination for Medical Assistance or apply for Medical Assistance. Whether or not the facility seeks an order from the court, the Attorney General is responsible for pursuing civil enforcement remedies when an agent wilfully or with gross negligence violates the law. See § 19344(c)(4)(v), (5)(iii), (6)(iii) of the Health- General Article. 21 it was not required to pursue statutory remedies because the legislative enactments did not bar M ariner H ealth fro m seek ing a pr ivate ca use of action. Patricia argues that the statute provides remedies that Mariner Health failed to pursue before it filed a private cause of a ction. Furthe r, Patricia contends that Mariner Health failed to notify her promptly that Medicare had ceased paying for Audrey s care and failed to advise and assist her in applying for Medical Assistance as required by the statute. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. O Con nor v. Baltim ore Cou nty, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 1198 (2004); Privette v. State, 320 Md. 738, 744, 580 A.2d 188, 191 (1990) (citations omitted). We may consider the general purpose and aim of a statute in an effort to discern legislative intent. Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). Our longstanding rule is that if the la nguage u sed in the statute is clear, unambiguous, and consistent with its objective, the words will be accorded their ordinary meaning. Ayres v. Townsend, 324 Md. 666, 672, 598 A.2d 47 0, 473 (1991) (citations om itted); see G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Stroh Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746 , 755, 521 A.2d 1 225, 1230 (198 7). Advan cements in the area of nursing home care regulations by the government began with the Federal Nursing Home Bill of Rights which was derived from the Social S ecurity Act designated as the Patient s Bill of Rights, as a stipulation for nursing homes participating in the Medicaid program. See 42 U.S .C. §§ 3 01 - 13 97 (19 82); D avid S. D ouglas , et. al., Lfor the Elderly: Le gal Rights (And Wrongs) Within The Health Care System, 20 HARV. 22 C.R.-C.L. L. R EV. 425, 471-72 (19 85). The federal Patient s Bill of Rights offered a compilation of patient rights, which contain provisions that require nursing homes to provide patients with information concerning their medical needs, co nditions and costs. In the 198 0 s the Maryland Leg islature enacted similar legislation by establishing p rovisions se t forth in Maryland Code (1982, 2000 Repl. Vol.), §§ 19-342 - 19-345 of the Health General Article, sometimes referred to as Maryland Nursing Home Bill of Rights ( NH BR ). See Oak Crest Village, Inc v. Murphy, 379 Md. 229, 240, 841 A.2d 816, 822-23 (2004); Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 164 Md. App. 497, 512, 883 A.2d 1008, 1017 (2005). The NHBR provides a nursing home resident with similar rights and protections. Further, part of the NHBR mandates that nursing home a dmissions agreem ents shall be fair, clear, unders tandab le, and c onfor m to the law. See Bill Sum mary, H.B . 683 at 2 . In 1988, the General Assembly passed House Bill 683 which amended § 19-344 of the Health-G eneral Artic le and presc ribed in sub section 19-344(c) the rights and responsibilities of an agent. T he legislature intended to limit an ag ent s per sona l liab ility. That intent was evidenced by the bill summary, which states: [House] Bill [683] clarifies that the financial responsibility of an applicant s agent is limited to the extent of the applicant s funds but the facility may require the agent to distribute any funds of the applicant fo r the costs of care that are n ot covered by Med icare tha t the app licant ag reed to p ay. Bill Summary, H.B. 683 at 1. Further, the legislative rationale for the amendment was that the circumstances surrounding admission to a nursing home are highly stressful for a pplicant[]s a nd their fam ilies. Most pe ople 23 are not in a pos ition to carefu lly read and negotiate a contract at this time. It is therefore vital that the con tracts be scree ned to assure that they conform to existing law and are clear and understandable. Supra at 2. Section 19-344(c) provides for the duties of agents (as attorneys-in-fact, guardians, representatives payees, or mere family members or friends) w ho hand le income and assets for a nursing home resident or have some control over the person s income and/or assets. It states: Duties and rights o f applicant s agen t. (1) In this subsection agent means a person who manages, uses, or controls the funds or assets that legally may be used to pay the applicant s or resident s share of co sts or other ch arges for th e facility s service s. Section 19-344(c)(1) of the Health General Article. An agent s responsibility includes ensuring that payment is made with the fu nds or assets delegated to p ay for the resident s nursing home care. An a gent is respon sible to, if nece ssary, request a determination or seek Med ical As sistance on beh alf of th e reside nt. The Code of Maryland Regulations explicitly and in detail outlines the liabilities, responsibilities, and rights of a nursing home admission s contract agent as: Third-Party Signature on Admission C ontract. * * * * B. If an agent . . . signs the contrac t, the agent ac cepts responsibility to pay for the cost of the resident's care only to the extent of the resident s available funds and assets. 24 C. If an agent . . . signs the contract, the agent is not, by signing the contract, accepting a ny responsibility for making p ayments from the agent's own personal funds, unless the agent does so volu ntarily. The fac ility shall list separately in the contract any obligations voluntarily entered into by the agent, and the agent shall initial these o bligations on the contrac t. D. An agent who has not paid a current obligation for the resid ent's care may apply to the Medical Assistance Program for a determina tion of the f unds ava ilable to pay for the cost of the resident's care. E. An agent shall distribute any funds, including income or assets of the app licant or reside nt that the Medical Assistance Program has determined to be available, to pay for the cost of the resident's care in the fac ility. F. An age nt shall seek, on behalf of the applicant or resident, all assistance from the Medical Assistance Program that may be available to th e applicant o r resident. G. The Attorney General may impose civil money penalties against an agent who wilfully or with gross negligence violates the requirements of this regulation as follows: (1) An agent who wilfully or with gross negligence violates § E of this re gulation is su bject to a civil m oney penalty not less than the amount of funds subject to the violation; and (2) An age nt who wilfully or with gross negligence violates § F of this re gulation is subject to a c ivil money pe nalty not exceeding $10,000. COM AR 1 0.07.09 .07 (19 96). A nursing facility may not require a third-party guarantee of payment to the facility as a condition of admission. 42 USCA 1395i-3(c)(5)(A)(ii) or 1396r(c)(5)(A)(ii). The Maryland statute, however, allows an individu al to guarantee payment for a resident s care. 25 Section 19-344(c )(7) of the H ealth-Gen eral Article ( [ N]othing in this subsection may be construed to prohibit any person from knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to guarantee payment for the cost of an applicant s care ). Thus, an agent could agree to guarante e payment of the resident s costs. An agent of th e nursing h ome resid ent may be su bject to penalties if the agen t willfully or with gross negligenc e either fails to s eek or distribu te medical assistance funds earmarked for the r esiden t s care. See § 19-344(c)(4) and (5) of the Health - Gene ral Artic le. In summa ry, an agent s res ponsibility is limited to the administration and management of the resident s funds. An agent is not personally liable for the resident s nu rsing home care costs, unless the a gent, volun tarily and know ingly agrees to pay for the resid ent s care w ith the agent s own funds. 18 Section 19-344(c)(5)(i)-(iii) provides that an agent shall apply for medical assistance, that the nursing home facility must assist and advise the agent in seeking that assistance, and if the agen t fails to seek assista nce on be half of the resident, the f acility may petition a court to compel the agent to apply for assistance.19 Further, an agent, who 18 Patricia indicated in her agreement with Mariner Health that she did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to use her own resources to pay for her mother s nursing home care. 19 Section 19-344(c)(5)(i),(ii) and (iii) states: (i) An applicant, a resident, or the agent of an applicant or resident shall seek, on behalf of the applicant or resident, all assistance from the medical assistance program which may be available to the applicant or resident. (continued...) 26 willfully or with gross negligence violates the requ iremen ts of . . . [§ 19-34 4(c)(5) ] . . . regarding an application for medical assistance by or on behalf of an applicant or resident is subject to a civil penalty not exceeding $10,000.00. Section 19-344(c)(6)(ii) of the Health General Article. Statutory Remedies There were several statutory remedies that Mariner Health chose not to pursue. Mariner Health argues that there are no statutory preconditions to a facility s right to sue an agent for breach of the Resident s Agent Financial Agreement because § 19-344(c) does not prohibit or condition a facility s contractual action against a resident s a gent. Ma riner Health contends that one of the remed ies is that a facility m ay . . . petition the app ropriate circu it court for an order . . . . The word may denotes, it argue s, that the Ge neral Asse mbly considered this remedy to be permissive rather than mandatory. Section 19-344(c)(5)(iii). 19 (...continued) (ii) The fac ility shall cooperate with and assist the agent in seeking assistance from the medical assistance progra m on b ehalf o f the ap plicant o r residen t. (iii) If a resident o r the agent o f a resident fails to seek assistance from the medical assistance program o r to cooperate fully in the eligibility de termina tion pro cess, a facility providing care to the resident may, without requesting the appointment of a guardian, petition the appropriate circuit court for an order requiring the resident or agent of the resident to seek assistance from the medical assistance program or to cooperate in the eligibility de termina tion pro cess w ith due d iligence . 27 Mariner Health further asserts that the statute m erely notes tha t the Attorne y General is responsible for enforcing and prosecuting agents who fail to apply or request a determination for Medical Assistance. Section 19-344(c) does not expressly state that a private cause of action against a resident s agent is authorized or prohibited under the statute. In the absence of that statutory directive, we think it is not appropriate to expand the statute to include remedies that w ere not specified. Further, [a] frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides a remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume other remedies. Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc., Inc. v. Gudis, 78 Md. App. 550, 56 0, 554 A .2d 434 , 439 (1 989), aff d, 319 Md. 558, 573 A.2d 1325 (1990) (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 94 S.Ct. 690, 69 3, 38 L.Ed2d 6 46, 652 (1974)). In Sugarloaf, the statute provided for criminal penalties, administrative punishments, injunctive relief, and taxpayer suits under limited circumstances. It did not provide, however, for private causes of action. The Court of Special Appeals held: The remainder of the legislative history is silent in regard to implied private rights of action. Where the legislative history does not indicate any discussion whatsoever as to whether a statute gives rise to such a right, the fact that the ordinance is silent would weigh heavily against an intent by the council to create a private cause of action. [T]he legislative history of the 1934 Act simply does not speak to the issue of private remedies . . . . At least in such a case as this, the inquiry ends there: The question whether 28 Congress, either expressly or by implication, intended to create a private right of action, has been definitely answered in the negative. Id. at 557, 554 A.2d at 437-38 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The intermediate appellate co urt held that th e provision s of the M ontgom ery County Code at issue in that case did not create an implied or express private cause of action. That court examin ed the legislative intent and relied upon the principle that it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it. Sugarloa f, 78 Md. App. at 559, 554 A.2d at 438 (quoting Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.11, 19, 100 S.Ct.242, 247, 62 L.Ed.2d 146, 154-55 (1979)). We affirmed the judgm ent of the Court of Special Appeals on other grounds, but did not address whether the provisions of the Montgom ery County Code created an implied or express private cause of action. Sugarloaf Citizen s Assoc . v. Gud is, 319 Md. 55 8, 566-67, 573 A .2d 1325, 1330 (1 990). Further, the Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of the Maryland Chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys in support of the Waltons position provided: Applying these principles to another statute within Health General, Title 19 , the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland held that H ealth General Sec tion 19-71 2(b)(1)(ii) creates no priv ate cau se of ac tion. See IVTx, Inc. [. . .] v. United Healthcare of the M id-Atlan tic, Inc., 112 F. Supp.2d. 445 ([D.M d.] 2000) . There, the [p]laintiff; a provider of health care services, sued the [d ]efendan t health maintenance organization (HMO) for failure to pay the obligations (to the [p]laintiff) of a health care provider within the [ d]efendant[ s] HMO network. [Id.] The basis of the lawsuit, [ ]for money owed,[ ] was He alth 29 General § 19-712(b)(1)(ii), w hich pr ovides , inter alia , that an HMO who enters into [a] contract with a health care provider for health care s ervices to the HMO membe rs is responsible for all claim s for ser vices re ndered by the he ath care provid er. Id. at 446[-47]. Relying upon Maryland law, the Court dismissed the complain t, holding that, because the statute contains a provision charging the Insuran ce Com missioner w ith enforce ment of its terms, the inclusion of this express rem edy to ensure pa yment to providers of health care services to H MO s pre cludes any private c ause of action f or collec tion. Id. at 449. In an analogous case, but brought by a nursing home resident, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the federal Medicaid Act does not create an implied cause of action between Medicaid residents and their private nursing homes. Stewart v. Bern stein, 769 F.2d 108 8 (5th Cir. 1985). There, a nursing home resident claimed that the Medicaid Act afforded her an implied private cause of action against a nursing home from which she had been involuntarily discharged in violation of federal M edicaid reg ulations. No ting that the M edicaid Act provides specific remedies for the enforcement of regulatory rights, the Court refused to provide a private remedy, stating that absent any [ ]direct evidence[ ] to the contrary, the judiciary [ ]will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that congress did not intend to provide.[ ] Id. at 1092 (quoting California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 [, 101 S.Ct. 1775, 1781, 68 L.Ed .2d 101] (1981)). [Altera tions ad ded.] In 1995, the General Assembly passed House Bill 343 to safeguard nursing home residents from being invo luntarily discharg ed from a facility due to no npayment. See House Bill 343, Bill Summary, Department of Legislative Reference (1995). The thrust of the Bill and the intent of the Legislature was to ensure protection for nursing home residents and their 30 agents from unscrupulous and unethical actions by a nursing home facility. The purpose of the legislation was to place limitations on nursing home facilities and to limit their remedies against residents an d their agen ts pursuant to statute. Thus, the Legislature set forth expressly those remedies a nursing home facility could pursue when dealing with a nonpaying residen t. If an agent fails to apply for assistance through the medical assistance program on behalf of the reside nt, the agent is in violation of the requirements of § 19-344(c )(5) and, is subject to a civil penalty not exceeding $1 0,000.00. Section 19 -344(c)(6)(ii).20 If an agent violates his or her duties under § 1 9-344(c)(4 ) or (5), the age nt is also subje ct to civil penalties.21 A nursing home fa cility may obtain a co urt order co mpelling a n agent to f ulfill his or her duty to disburse funds and/or apply for medical assistance.22 If a facility elects not to pursue the remedies provided under § 19-344(c)(4) or (5), to petition a circuit court for an order to compel an agent to either apply or request a determination for Medical Assistance, 20 A nursing home facility should report any violation of § 19-344(c)(4) and (5) to the Attorney General, [t]he Attorney General is responsible for the enforcement and prosecution of violations of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. See § 19344(c)(6)(iii). 21 If an agent violates the requirements of § 19-344(c)(4) and obtains funds for the resident s care, yet was willfully and grossly negligent in distributing those funds when due to the facility, the agent shall be liable to a civil penalty not less than the amount of funds subject to the violation. Section 19-344(c)(6)(i). 22 The provisions of COMAR (similar to the langu age conta ined in §19-344(c)(6)(i)) provides that an agent is subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General, not exceeding $10,000.00, if the agent wilfully or with gross negligence fails to apply for Med ical As sistance . See supra at note 6. 31 it may not then , as Marine r Health suggests, see k a private cause of action. The statute does not pro vide fo r such a remed y. A nurs ing h ome faci lity may choose to obtain a co urt order to compel a n agent to either apply or request a determina tion for M edical Ass istance. It must, however, report any violation of § 19-3 44(c)(4) an d (5) to the Attorney General because, [t]he Attorney General is responsible for the enforcement and prosecution of violations of paragraphs (4) and (5) of this subsection. See § 19-3 44(c)(6 )(iii). The trial judge did not add ress the issue of statutory remedies or M ariner Health s failure to pursu e those remed ies. Mariner Health was bound under the statute to pursue any applicable statutory remedies. We hold that a trial court ma y not, carte blanche, ignore the statutory provisions imposed to limit a nursing home facility s cause of action against fam ily members acting as agents for a sick or elderly family member. Both § 19-344(c) and COMAR prescribe the rights and responsibilities of an agent to essentially the administration and m anage ment o f a resid ent s fu nds. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE S COUNTY IS REVERSED. THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMEN T AGAINST PATRIC IA WALTON. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. 32

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