Attorney Grievance v. Butler

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Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Alphonzo Jerome Butler Misc. Docket AG No. 27, September Term, 2005 ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE Our goal in matters of attorney discipline is to protect the public and the p ublic s confiden ce in the le gal p rofe ssion rather than to pu nish the a ttorn ey. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE An attorney who uses his or her attorney trust account as a personal account, an d fails to coo perate with Bar Co unsel in the investigation of disciplinary matters is subject to sanctions. Under the circumstances of the present case, the app ropriate sanction is d isbarmen t. ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS Appropriate sanction for attorney misconduct involving the intentional misappropriation of cl ient a ssets , ordinarily, is disbarment, unless there are compelling extenuating circumstances that justify a lesser sanction. In the Circu it Court for M ontgom ery County No. 20195-M IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 27 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ _______________________________________ ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ALPHONZO JEROME BUTLER ____________________________________ ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. _______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 16, 2006 The Attorney Grievance Commission o f Maryland ( Petitioner ), acting purs uant to Maryland Rule 16-751,1 filed a Petition For Disciplinary Or Remedial Action against Alphonzo Jerome B utler ( Respondent ) on July 22, 2005. The Petition alleged that Respon dent, who was admitted to the Bar of this Court on December 17, 1996, violated Rules 1.15 (Safekeepin g Property), 2 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), 3 and 8.4 1 Maryland Rule 16-751 (a) provides: (a) Commencement of disciplinary or remedial action. (1) Upon approval or direction of the [Attorney Grievance Commission], Bar Counsel shall file a Pe tition for Discip linary or Rem edial Actio n in the Co urt of A ppeals . 2 MRPC 1 .15 (a) provides: (a) A law yer shall hold pro perty of clients or third perso ns that is in a lawyer's possession in connection w ith a represen tation separa te from the la wyer 's ow n pro perty. Funds shall be kept in a s eparate account maintained pursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other proper ty shall be identifie d as such a nd appro priately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kep t by the lawyer and shall be preserv ed for a period of five years after termination of the representation. 3 MRPC 8 .1 in relevant part provides: An applicant for admission or reinstateme nt to the bar, or a lawyer in connectio n with a ba r admission application or in connection with a discip linary matter, shall n ot: (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowin gly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplin ary au thority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (Miscon duct) 4 of the Maryland Rules of Professional C onduct ( MR PC ), Maryland Rules 16-607 (Commingling of Funds) 5 and 16-609 (P rohibited Transactions), 6 and §§ 10-306 4 MRPC 8 .4 in relevant part provides: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers' Rules of Professional Condu ct, knowin gly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act that refle cts adversely o n the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice; 5 Maryland Rule 16-607 provides: a. General p rohibition. An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account b y Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. of this Rule. b. Exceptions. 1 . An attorne y or law firm s hall either (A ) deposit into an attorney trust account funds to pay any fees, service charges, or minimum balance required by the financial institution to open or maintain the account, including those fees that cannot be charged against interest due to the Maryland Legal Services Corporation Fund pursuant to Rule 16-610 b 1 (D), or (B) enter into an agreement with the financial institution to have any fees or charges deducted from an operating account maintained by the attorney or law firm. The attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account any funds expected to be advanced on behalf of a client and expected to be reimb ursed to the attorney by the clien t. (contin ued...) 2 (Misuse of Trust Money) 7 and 10-606 (Penalties)8 of the Business Occupations and 5 (...continued) 2. An attorney or law firm may deposit into an attorney trust account funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potentially to the attorney or law firm. The portion belonging to the attorney or law firm shall be withdrawn promptly when the attorney or law firm becomes entitled to the funds, but any portion disputed by the client shall remain in the account until the dispute is resolved. 3. Funds of a client or beneficial owner may be pooled and commingled in an attorney trust account with the funds held for other clients or beneficial owners. 6 Maryland Rule 16-609 provides: An attorney or law firm may not borrow or pledge any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account, obtain any remuneration from the financial institution for depositing any funds in the account, or use any funds for any unauthorized purpose. An instrument drawn on an attorney trust account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer. 7 Section 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code provides: A lawyer may not use trust money for any purpose other than the purpose for w hich the trust money is entrusted to the law yer. 8 Section 10-606 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code provides: (a) Practice without adm ission; misrepresentation. -(1) A corporation, partnership, or any other association that violates § 10-601 or § 10-602 of this subtitle is subject to a fine not exceeding $ 5,000. (contin ued...) 3 Professions Article of the Maryland Cod e (2000, 20 04 Rep l. Vol.). In acco rdance w ith Maryland Rules 16-752(a) a nd 16-757(c), 9 we referr ed the ma tter to Judge Nelson W. Rupp, 8 (...continued) (2) An officer, director, partner, trustee, agent, or employee who acts to enable a corporation, partnership, or association to violate § 10-601 or § 10-60 2 of this subtitle is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. (3) Except as provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection, a person w ho violates § 10-601 o f this subtitle is gu ilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. (b) Attorney trust accounts. -- A person who willfully violates any provision of Subtitle 3, Part I of this title, except for the requirement that a lawyer deposit trust moneys in an attorney trust account for charitable purposes under § 10-303 of this title, is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $ 5,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or both. (c) Other offenses. -- Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, a person who violates any prov ision of this title is guilty of a misde meanor a nd on co nviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $ 1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both. 9 Maryland Rule 16-752(a) states: (a) Order. Upon the filing of a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, the Court o f Appe als may enter an order designating a judge of any circuit court to hear the action and the clerk responsible for maintaining the record. The order of designation shall require the judge, after consultation with Bar Counsel and the attorney, to enter a scheduling order defining the extent of discovery and setting dates for the c omple tion of d iscove ry, filing of motion s, and h earing. Maryland R ule 16-75 7(c) states in p ertinent part: (contin ued...) 4 Jr., of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for an evidentiary hearing and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. On April 20, 2006, Judge Rupp held a hearing and on April 27, 2006, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in which he found that Alphonzo Jerome Butler had violated MRPC 1.15(a), 8.1(b), 8.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), Maryland Rule 16-607, M aryland Rule 16-609, and §§ 10-306 and 10-606 of the B usiness Occupations and Pr ofessio ns Artic le of the Marylan d Cod e. I. After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Rupp made the following factual findings and conclusions of law: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Pursuant to an Ord er of the C ourt of A ppeals date d July 28, 2005, the captioned matter was transmitted to the Circuit Court for Montg omery Cou nty to be heard and determined by the undersigned judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, in accorda nce with M aryland Rule 16-757. On August 18, 2005, the Respon dent, Alphonzo J. Butler, was personally served with process issued by the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. The Respondent filed his answer to the charges contained in the Petition for Disciplinary or Reme dial Ac tion on Septem ber 2, 20 05. On December 15, 2005, the Court entered a Scheduling Order, which provided that all written discovery responses were due by January 6, 2006, that all discovery were to conclude on or before January 17, 2006, that all motions were to be filed on or before February 3, 2006, and set trial for March 9, 2006. The Respondent was personally served with Petitioner s discovery requests-Request for Admission of Fact and Genuineness of D ocuments, 9 (...continued) The judge shall prepare and file or dictate into the record a statement of the judge s findings of fact, including findings as to any evidence regard ing rem edial ac tion, and conclu sions o f law . . . . 5 Interrogatories and Req uest for Production of Documents on August 18, 2005. The Respondent failed to answer at all Petitioner s discovery requests. On December 20, 2005, the Respondent was served, by first class mail, with a Notice of Deposition for January 12, 2006. The Respondent failed to appear for his deposition and failed to respond to Petitioner s telephone messages and letters requesting to reschedule his deposition. Accordingly, on February 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a Motion for Sanctions against Respondent, which was granted in part by the Court on March 14, 2006. The Respondent neither filed any opposition to Petitioner s Motion for Sanctions nor served Petitioner w ith any discovery requests. The Court rescheduled the hearing to take place on April 20, 2006. Notice thereof was mailed to the Respondent at his last known address. The Respondent failed to app ear in court on April 20, 2006. Having considered evidence introduced by counsel for the Petitioner on April 20, 2006 , this court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Marylan d Rule 16-75 7(c)[.] Findings of Fact Alphonzo J. Butler (hereinafter the Resp ondent ) w as originally admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on December 17, 1996. The Respondent maintained a law office in Silver Spring, Maryland. On May 9, 2002, the Respondent opened an escrow account, titled Alphonzo J. Butler, LLC, Attorney Trust Account , Account No. 970069156, (hereinafter Attorney Tru st Accou nt ) with A llfirst Bank, which subseque ntly merged with Manu facturers and Trade rs Trust Company (hereinafter M&T Bank ). On or about May 10, 2004, the Respo ndent rece ived $675 from his client Seymour Clarke to pay a child support obligation ow ed to Mr. Clarke s ex-wife, Jo-Ann Clarke. On May 12, 2004, the Respondent deposited the $675 from Mr. Clarke to his Attorney Trust Account. After the deposit was made, the Respondent s Attorney Trust Account had a balance of $1,307.13. On or about M ay 13, 2004, th e Respo ndent issue d from h is Attorney Trust Account, on behalf of his client, Mr. Clarke, Check No. 2037 made payable to Jo-Ann Clarke in the amount of $675. Check No. 2037 was not presented to the ba nk for paymen t until Jun e 17, 2004, a t which time the Responden t s Atto rney T rust Account had only a balance of $62.13. At the time Ms. Clarke presented Check No. 2037 of $675 for payment, Respondent had insufficient funds in his Attorney Trust Account to cover the amount of the check. M&T Bank, nevertheless, honored the check, resulting in an overdraft on Respondent s Attorney Trust Account and a negative balance of 6 -$612.87. On or about June 25, 2004, Bar Counsel received written notification dated June 18, 2004 f rom M& T Bank of the overdraft on R espondent s Attorney Trust Accoun t. On June 29, 200 4, Bar Counse l sent a letter to Respondent requesting his written response to the June 18, 2004 overdraft notice from M&T Bank of his Attorney Trust Account, including copies of his client ledger cards, deposit slips, canceled checks, and monthly bank statements of his escrow account from the period beginning January 200 4 to June 2004. The Respondent sent his written response dated July 22, 2004 claiming that the overdraft was an unintentional bookkeeping error and a mistake. The Respondent further claimed that he was planning to shut down his solo private practice as he had recently accep ted an off er and w ould be wo rking a s an A ssistant P ublic D efend er in Au gust 20 04. Then, or about July 9, 2004, Bar Counsel received a second written notification from M&T Bank dated July 7, 2004 of an overdraft on Responden t s Attorney Trust Accou nt as a result of presentment for payment in the amount of $10.71 by Global Pay Global STL . M&T Bank honored the check, but it caused an overdraft o n Respo ndent s A ttorney Trust A ccount. As a result of the second overdraft, Respondent s Attorney Trust Account had a negative balanc e of $-6 23.58. O n or about July 15, 2004, Bar Counsel received a third written notif ication from M&T Bank d ated July 8, 2004 of an overdraft on Respondent s Attorney Trust Account as a result of presentment for payment by American E xpress Collection in the amount of $5.00. M&T Bank again honored the chec k, but it caused an overd raft on Respond ent s Attorney Trust Ac count, resultin g in a negative balance o f $-628.5 8. On July 15, 2004, Bar Counsel sent another letter to Respo ndent requ esting his written response to the overd raft notices from M&T Bank of his A ttorney Trust Account. The Responden t did not respond to that letter. On or about Octobe r 13, 2004, Bar Co unsel receiv ed yet a fourth written notification from M&T Bank dated October 5, 2004 of an overdraft on Responden t s Attorney Trust Accou nt as a result of presentment for payment in the a mou nt of $5.0 0 by American Express Collection . M&T Bank honored the chec k, resulting in an overdraft on R espondent s Attorney Trust Account and a negative balance of $-643.58. On October 14, 2004, the office of Bar Counsel sent a letter to R esponde nt requesting his written response and explanation to the multiple overdraft notices from M &T B ank of his Attorney Trust Account and additional bank records of his escrow account. The Respondent did not respond to that letter. Additional letters were sent to the Respondent by the office of Bar Counsel requesting for his written response to the various overdraft notices and for additional information. The 7 Respo ndent d id not re spond at all to tho se letters. Co nseq uently, the Petitioner subpoenaed relevant bank records, including copies of monthly bank statements, ca nceled ch ecks, and d eposit slips, of Re spond ent s A ttorney T rust Ac count. The records showed that from the period beginning January 2004 and November 2004, the Respondent used his Attorney Trust Account for personal and business matters. For instance, Respondent made payments to Pepco and Verizon from his Attorney Trust Accou nt. Furthermore, automatic monthly debits were made from Responden t s Attorney Tru st Accou nt for payment to Global pay Global STL and A merica n Exp ress Co llection. Conclusions of Law This Court concludes that the Respondent, after depositing client funds in his Attorney Trust Account on behalf of his client Seymour Clarke to pay for child support obligation owed to Mr. Clarke s ex-wife, Jo-Ann Clarke, failed to properly hold said funds in escrow, thereby violating Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct (MRPC) 1.15(a). After the Respon dent depo sited $675 into his Atto rney Trust A ccount, he knowin gly withdrew monies from the account and reduced the balance below the amount to which M s. Clarke w as entitled and used said c lient monies for his personal purpose, thereby violating MRPC 8.4(a), (b), and (c), Maryland Rule 1 6-609 and M d. Bus . Occ. & Prof. C ode A nn. §§ 1 0-306 and 10 -606. The Respondent never replenished his Attorney Trust Account of the improperly withdrawn funds and never repaid M&T Bank for honoring the multiple overdrafts on his account. The Respondent s Attorney Trust Accou nt maintaine d a negativ e balance. T he Resp ondent fu rther used h is Attorney Trust Account to pay personal and business debts, thereby violatin g Ma ryland R ule 16- 607. The Respondent violated MRPC 8.1(b) when he knowingly and repeatedly failed to respond to lawful demands for information from the office of Ba r Coun sel. Taken in its totality, the Resp ondent s c onduct w as prejudicia l to the adm inistratio n of jus tice and therefo re violat ed M RPC 8.4(d). (Altera tion add ed.) II. Recently in Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Lee, 393 Md. 546, 558, ____ A.2d ____ 8 (2006) we said: The Court of Appea ls exercises original jurisdiction over attorney discipline pro ceedings. This Co urt has the u ltimate authority to decide whethe r a lawyer has violated the professional rules. We accept a hearing judge s findings of fact unless we determine that they are clearly erroneous. As to the hearing judge s co nclusions o f law, our c onsideration is essentially de novo, even wh ere defau lt orders and judgmen ts have b een en tered at th e hearin g level. Either party may file post-hearing w ritten exceptio ns to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge. Maryland Rule 16-758.[10] Maryland Rule 16-759(b)(2) provides: (2) Findings of fact. (A) If no exceptions are filed. If no exceptions are field [sic], the Court may treat the findings of fact as established for the purpose o f determin ing appro priate sanc tions, in a ny. (B) If exceptions are filed. If exceptions are filed, the Court of Appea ls shall determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16757(b). The Court may confine its review to the findings of fact challenged by the excep tions. The Court shall give d ue regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses. Thus, if no exceptions are filed timely, we accept the hearing court s findings of fact as established for the purposes of determining the appropriate sanction. (Citatio ns omi tted.) 10 Maryland R ule 16-75 8 provide s, in pertinent p art: (a) Notice of the filing record. Upon receiving the record, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals shall notify the parties that the record has been filed. (b) Exceptions; recommendations. Within 15 days after service of the notice required by section (a) of this Rule, each party may file (1) exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing judge and (2) recommendations concerning the app ropriate disposition under R ule 16-759(c). 9 III. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent filed exceptions to the hearing judge s findings of fact and conclusions of law. Therefore, as discussed supra, for the purposes of determining the appropriate sanction, we accept Judge Rupp s findings of fact as established. Respondent violated MR PC 1.1 5(a), 8.1 (b), 8.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), Maryland Rules 16-607 and 16-609, and §§ 10-306 and 10-606 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code. Based upon our independent review of the record, and for the reasons set forth below, we agree with the conclu sions of law and hold th at Bar Co unsel presented clear and convin cing ev idence of Re spond ent's wr ongdo ing. We turn, the n, to the a pprop riate san ction. T he prim ary objec tive of th is Cou rt, in matters of attorney disc ipline, is to protect the pu blic, promo te general an d specific deterrence, and mainta in the int egrity of th e legal p rofessi on. Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Roberts, 137 Md. 165, ____ A .2d ____ ; Attorney Griev. Co mm n v. Clark, 363 Md. 169, 184, 767 A.2d 865, 873 (2001) ( The appropriate sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including consideration of any mitigating factors. ). Petitioner recommends that we impose the sanction of disbarment. Respondent has failed to make any recommendation. We ado pt Petitioner s recommendation and impose the sanction of disbarme nt. In Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 802 A.2d 1014 (2002), the hearing judge determined that DiCicco violated MRPC 1.15(a) by failing to ho ld the prope rty 10 of his clients or third persons separate from his own, occasionally using his escrow account "as if it also served as his personal bank account." Id. at 675-76, 802 A.2d at 1021-22 (footnote omitted). This Court agreed with th e hea ring judg e's findin g tha t Res pondent's usage of his escrow account as a personal bank account constituted a violation of MRPC 1.15(a). In the instant case, Respondent used his Attorney Trust Account for personal and business matters , makin g payme nts to Pe pco, V erizon, G lobal pay Global STL, and American Express Collection. Here, we find, as we did in DiCicco, that Respondent s conduct frustrated the purpose of MRPC 1.15(a) and in so doing violated the rule.11 Similarly, in using his Attorney Trust Account to pay personal and business debts, Respondent violated Md. Rule 16-607, requiring that [t]he portion [ . . . of funds] belonging to the attor ney [ . . .] sha ll be w ithdraw n pro mptly when th e atto rney [ . . .] becomes entitled to the funds . . . , and Rule 16-609 prohibiting an attorney from pledg[ing] any funds required by these Rules to be deposited in an attorney trust account . . . . In the present case, Respondent withdrew client funds from his Attorney Trust Accou nt, to which he was in no way entitled, in violation of Maryland Rule 16-607 and 16- 11 Unlike the instant case, in Attorney Griev. Comm'n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 802 A.2d 1014 (20 02), we h eld that there was no intentional misappropriation of client funds. In DiCicco, because there was an absence of fraudulent intent and [ . . .] lack of evidence that any client suffered financial loss resulting from Respondent s misconduct[] we indefinitely suspended DiCicco with the right to seek reinstatement after 90 days. Id. at 688, 802 A.2d 1028. In the instant case, unlike DiCicco, Respon dent intention ally misappropriated client fund s. Therefo re, indefinite su spension is a n inappro priate sanction. Because Respon dent intention ally misappropriated client funds, we impose, instead, the sanction of disbarme nt. 11 609. See Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Herman, 380 Md. 378, 844 A. 2d 1181 (2004) (holding that it was a violation of Maryland Rules 16-607 and 16-609 for an attorney to borrow money in the form o f a home equity loan, and to then dep osit the borrowed money into his trust account in order to pay the amount owed to his client). Mr. Clarke had a child support obligation, requiring tha t he make a payment to his ex-wif e, Ms. Clarke. Mr. Clarke entrusted Respon dent with th e payment am ount, directing Respon dent to make the payment to Ms. Clarke on his b ehalf. In turn, Respondent deposited the funds into his Attorney Trust Accou nt. Respondent then issued a check to Ms. C larke, but faile d to mainta in the fund s in his Atto rney T rust A ccou nt un til the chec k cle ared . Accord ingly, Respondent violated § 10306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code when he used client funds for a purpose other than that for which the money was entrusted to him. I n violating § 10-306, Respondent also violated §10-606(b) which provides, [a] person who willfully violates any provision of Subtitle 3, Part I of this title [ . . .], is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . Moreo ver, MR PC 8.4(a ) provides th at [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to [ . . .] violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . Because we determine that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a), we con clude that Responden t s conduct also violated MRPC 8.4(a). MRPC 8.4(b) prohibits a lawyer from commit[ting] a criminal act that r efle cts adversely o n the lawyer s h onesty, trustworthiness, or fitness . . . . We hold that when Respondent deposited client funds in his trust acco unt, 12 and intentionally failed to maintain th ose fund s in his account, he committed a criminal act in violat ion of M RPC 8.4(b). In Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 741 A.2d 11 43 (1999 ), we held that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a), (b), and (c) and BOP § 10-306 and thus found that Respondent was disho nest within the mean ing of M RPC 8 .4(c). MR PC 8.4(c ) prohibits an attorney from engag [ing] in misrep resenta tion. condu ct involv ing dish onesty, fra ud, dec eit, or In Sheridan, Respondent, after receiving two settlement checks, deposited the checks in his escrow account but failed to keep the collected funds separate, later withdrawing them and applying the money for his own professional and personal use. Id. at 18, 741 A. 2d at 1153. W e noted tha t Respon dent exhib ited a lack of probity, integrity and straightforw ardness in h is conduc t regarding h is client and [ . . . ] his actions were dishonest . . . . Id. at 26, 741 A.2d 11 56-57. In the case sub judice, we conclud e, sim ilarly, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(a) and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article. As noted supra, Respondent used client funds to pay personal a nd business debts. Accordingly, we find, as we did in Sheridan, that Respondent s actions w ere dishonest and in violation of MRPC 8.4(c)12 . 12 In Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Sheridan, Respondent was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law after h aving been fou nd to have violated R ules 1.15(a), (b), and(c), and Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Business Occupations and Professio ns Article § 10-306. In Sheridan, we found mitigating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction than disbarment. Id. at 35, 741 A.2d 1161. Sheridan acknowledged that his conduct was, at times, unethical. Furthermore, we found it significant that the hearing (contin ued...) 13 In addition, MRPC 8.1(b) requires that a lawyer, in connection with a disciplinary matter, must not knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority . . . . Bar Counsel sent num erous requ ests to Respondent requesting that he supply information necessary to its investigation. Bar Counsel sent reques ts to Re spond ent date d July 15, 2 004 an d Octo ber 14, 2004, to which he never responded. Respondent had an affirmative duty to respond to Bar Counsel s requests for inform ation, yet f ailed to d o so, in c lear viol ation of MR PC 8.1 (b). In Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Cherry-Mahoi, we said: This Co urt [ . . .] has found conduct constituting th e misappr opriation of client or third p arty funds to be prejud icial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). 388 Md. 124, 159, 879 A.2d 58, 80 (2005). We noted that MRPC 8.4(d) is violated when a n attorney s conduct negatively impacts [ . . .] the public s image or the perception of the courts or the legal profession . . . . Id. at 160, 879 A.2d at 80 (citation omitted). Because we find that Resp ondent s conduct constituted an intentional misappropriation of client funds, his conduct also violated MRPC 8.4 (d). Respondent violated numerous provisions of the MRPC, the Maryland Rules, and the 12 (...continued) judge found that Respondent did not act intentionally when he violated his ethic al duties . Id. By contrast, in the instant case, we are not presented with any mitigating circumstances nor are we led to believe that Respondent unintentionally violated his ethical duties. Therefore, although we find, as we did in Sheridan, that Responden t violated MRP C 1.15(a), Business Occu pations Article § 10-30 6, and M RPC 8.4(c), the appropriate sanction is not indefin ite suspe nsion, ra ther, disb armen t is appro priate. 14 Business Occupations and Professions Article of the Maryland Code. The most egregious violation committed by the Respondent was the intentional misappropriation of funds. See Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Williams, 335 Md. 458, 644 A.2d 490 (1994). We have held that the [m]isapp ropriation of funds by an attorney is an ac t infected w ith deceit and disho nesty and ordinarily will result in disbarment in the absence of compell ing extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction. Attorney Griev. Co mm n v. Vanderline, 364 Md. 376, 406, 773 A.2d 463, 480 (2001) (citatio n omitted); see also Attorney Griev. Comm n v. Sabghir , 350 Md. 67, 84, 710 A.2d 926, 934 (1998). In the instant case, Respon dent fails to offer any mitigating factors or any sufficiently compelling excuse fo r his egregio us condu ct.13 13 Respondent neither attended the hearing before Judge Rupp concerning this matter nor the proceedings in this Court. In addition, Respondent failed to file exceptions to the hearing judge s findings of fact and conclusions o f law, or Petitioner s recommendation for disbarme nt. Assistant Bar Counsel reports to the Court that she spoke with Respondent the day before oral argument. During the course of the conversation, Respondent indicated that he would attend oral argumen t but wou ld orally request a postponement of the oral argument because he intended to obtain representation in this matter. R esponde nt s intended counsel, however, required that he obtain a postponement before agreeing to represent him. Also, Respondent indicated to Assistant Bar Counsel that he had been sick in May and June, walked into the emergency room at the end of May and was not discharged until the end of June. Further, he said that he was, at some point, in the ICU and diagnosed with diabetes. On the day of oral argument, this Court received notification via facsim ile that Respondent was being treated in the Emergency Department at Washington Adventist Hospital. The facsimile was written on Washington Adventist Hospital Emergency Department letterhead and sign ed by a registered nu rse. It failed, how ever, to indicate Respondent s condition or diagnosis, or any other reason for this Court to find that this matter should not proceed as scheduled for oral argu ment. 15 In light of the totality of the circumstances, and the severity of Respon dent s miscon duct, w e conc lude tha t disbarm ent is the approp riate san ction. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY T H E C L E R K O F T H I S C OU R T , INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-515(C), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN F A V O R O F T H E A T T O RN E Y GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF M ARYLAND AGAINST ALPHONZO JEROME BUTLER. 16

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