State v. Dett
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity Case No. 24-C-03-009144 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 25 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ STAT E OF M ARY LAN D, et al. v. EVELYN DETT ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Wilner, J. ______________________________________ Filed: February 7, 2006 The issue befo re us is wh ether, in an action under the M aryland Tort Claims Act (Md. Code, §§ 12-101 through 12-110 of the State Government Article), the State may be found liable for false imprisonment, negligence, or violation of the plaintiff s rights under Article 24 of the M aryland Dec laration of R ights when (1 ) the plaintiff is arrested and brought to a State detention facility by a police officer in the mistaken belief that the plaintiff is the person against whom an arrest warrant has been issued, (2) the detention facility learns throu gh its own investigation that the plaintif f is probab ly not the person named in the warrant or in an implementing commitment order issued by the local sheriff and there is no o ther legal bas is for holding the plaintiff, and (3) the detention facility nonetheless continues to detain the plaintiff for a significant period of time. We shall answer that question in the affirmative. BACKGROUND At approximately 5:00 in the afternoon of Frid ay, M arch 7, 20 03, respo ndent, E velyn Yulonda Dett, was stopped for a traffic violation by Baltimore City Housing Authority police officer Darven Moore. A presumably routine background check by Officer Moore revealed the existence of an outstanding warrant for the arrest of Va ness a Ha wkins A KA Eve lyn Dett. The warrant w as issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on July 31, 2002, for violation of proba tion (VOP). Although M s. Dett protested that she was not Vanessa Hawkins, it is not cle ar, as the re is no s tateme nt from Offic er Mo ore in th e record , if the officer made any further investigation to determine whether Ms. Dett was, in fact, the person named in the warran t. The warrant, No. 802134 014, identif ied Ms. H awkins a s a black fe male born July 11, 1963, with a SID number of 381961. A SID (State Identification) number is a unique number directly linked to an individual s fingerprints. Because of that link, no two persons should have the same SID number; nor, if the proper procedures are followed, should a person ever have more than one SID number.1 The warrant directed any law enforcement officer to apprehend Ms. Hawkins and commit her to the Baltimore City Jail now known as the Baltimore City Detention Center pending a hearing on the VOP charge, permitted her to post bail in the amount of $10,000, identified Tobi Thomas as the responsible Division of Parole and Probation agent, and gave a telephone number and address where that agent could be reached. How much of that information was k nown by Off icer Moore is not clear. Obviou sly in the belief that the person stopped was, in fact, the person named in the warrant, Officer M oore delivered Ms. Dett to the Baltimore City Central Booking and Intake Center (CBIC) at 5:50 p .m. CBIC is a facility operated by the Division of Pretrial Detention and Services of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS ). Within the next hour, Ms. Dett was booked, photographed, and fingerprinted. By 6:35 p.m., CBIC had received, or become aware of, a commitment order issued by the Baltimore City Sheriff to the Warden of the Baltimore City Detention Center, directing the warden to receive into his custody the body of Vanessa Hawkins, identified as a black female 1 Counsel for the S tate has suggested the po ssibility that, if a person has a SID number based on an earlier fingerprinting and a subsequent fingerprinting is not done correctly, a different SID number might result because the two prints would not match. -2- born July 11, 1963, with a SID number 381961, committed to await further action of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Pursuant to that order, entries were mad e in the CBIC log, DO NOT RLSE SUBJECT BOOKED ON CIRC UIT C T #802 134014 . Presum ably in conformance with the commitment order, all of the CBIC records identify Ms. Dett as Vanessa Hawkins. The inmate file created by CBIC is in the name of Van essa Hawkins. At 6:44 p.m., Ms. Dett s fingerprints were sent to the Central Records unit which, within about a half hour, responded with a SID number of 2413966. That number, of course, was different from the SID number on both the warrant and the commitment order. The response, along w ith an ID C ompleted Flag, wa s placed into the Vanessa Hawk ins inmate record at 7:22 p.m. Ten minutes later, Ms. Dett was place d in a group cell at CB IC, where she remained until early the next morning, when she was transferred to the Detention Cen ter.2 At some point during the evening, the discrepancy in SID numb ers was noted. D ebora Driver, the Director of Central Records for CBIC, sent a SID Problem Form to the shift command er. The form stated as its subject, SID PROBLEM S, noted the two SID numbers, and explained that defendant has 2 SID #s Commitment has been entered into the system under 2413966. I contacted fingerprint who insisted that this is the correct #. I spoke to Ada who said that they could not do anything until Monday 3/10 /03. Copies of that fo rm were placed in both the inmate file and a Sid Problem binder. At or about the same time, Ms. 2 There is some ambiguity as to whether she was transferred at 1:31 a.m., as the Court of Special Appeals supposed, or not until 6:23 a.m., which the actual record seems to indicate. T he possible discrepanc y is not importan t to this appea l. -3- Driver prepared and filed a Problem Pap erwork Notice, again noting that defendant has 2 SID # s, that the problem would keep her from being released, and asking Please clarify with fin gerprin t the corr ect # to b e used. The record does not indicate who Ada was, but, in its b rief in this Co urt, the State acknowledges that the p erson o r person s conta cted by M s. Driver were fingerprint technicians at the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS), also a unit and operation of DPS CS. T hey wer e, in othe r word s, CJIS , and Sta te, emp loyees. Prior to Ms . Dett s tr ansfer to the D etention Cente r, CBIC became aware of other discrepancies, beyond the two S ID nu mbers . An Of fender B ooking In formation Report in the CBIC file show s a birth date of Febru ary 6, 1962, fo r the Van essa Haw kins supp osedly being held by CBIC which, in fact, was Ms. Dett s actual birth date whereas both the VOP warrant and the sheriff s commitment order show a birth date of July 11, 1963 for the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and comm itment o rder. At 6:19 a.m. on March 8, CB IC sent an inquiry to CJIS to identify the person w ith SID number 2413966, and the response came back No exact matched record on file. CBIC immediately sent anothe r reque st to CJI S to ide ntify the p erson w ith SID numb er 3819 61. At some point not later than 11:22 a.m., CJIS reported that SID number 381961 was that of Vanessa Ann Hawkins, alias Evelyn Y. Dett. The response also showed two Social Security numbers, neither of which matched that of Ms. Dett, and two dates of birth, one matching the date on the commitment order for Vanessa Hawkins and one being that of Ms. -4- Dett. The response rev ealed as well an FB I number, fingerprint info rmation, eight prior contacts that Vane ssa Haw kins had w ith CBIC, and a height and weight for Vanessa Hawkins that w ere slightly, but not significantly, different from those of Ms. Dett. The prior CBIC contacts tha t were listed in cluded the date and C BIC cas e numbe r for each c ontact. Despite these unexplained inconsistencies the different SID numbers, the nonmatching Social Sec urity numbers, the different dates of birth, the discrepancy in height (two inches) and the additional information that could have led to some clarification (the probation officer s number, the FBI number, the prior CBIC contact information) no further effort was made over th e weeke nd to inves tigate whe ther the perso n being he ld, Ms. D ett, was, in fact, the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and com mitment order. At some point on Monday, March 10, CBIC received a response from a Tracey Powell to the Problem Paperwork Notice sent by Ms. Driver on March 7. Ms. Pow ell stated that these are two different people. Correct SID # 2413966 for Vanessa Hawkins DOB 2-6-1962. SID # 381961 belongs to Evelyn De tt who used Vanessa Hawkins as AKA. DOB 7 -11-63. CBIC responded: [Y]ou still did not tell us which SID is correct for Vanessa Hawkins born 2-10-62 #2413966 is that the correct SID # also the DOB on the relea se is for the in mate w/DOB of 7-11-63, but uses the DOB of 2-6-62. We need to have the lady fingerprinted again since the release had the DOB different from what is on the off ender b ooking sheet. The record does not reveal any response to that communication. Nothing more was done on March 10 to resolve the issue. CBIC had a photograph of Ms. Dett, which -5- presuma bly was taken when she was booked on March 7. At some undefined point, either CBIC or the Detention Center received a copy of a photograph of the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order and had the SID number 381961. The women depicted in the two photographs are somewhat similar but by no means identical in appearance. At 10:27 a.m. on March 11, 2003, the Central Records Office of the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, which operates both CBIC and the Detention Center, sent a request to Bonnie in the Circuit Court for a court seal + true test for Vanessa Hawkins, SID 992413966 . Within an hour, the sheriff sent to the Warden of the Detention Center an order to release Vanessa Hawkins with SID number 2413966, noting WRONG DEF END ANT . The record does not reveal the basis on which the sheriff reached that conclusion. Upon receipt of that directive, the Detention Center promptly commenced the process for releasing Ms. De tt. She was , in fact, released at 1:00 p.m . She had re mained in detention for three full days and the better part of a fourth. In April, 2003, Ms. Dett filed a claim with the State Treasurer under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. When that claim was rejected, in October, 2003, she filed this action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the State, DPSCS, the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, CBIC, the Detention Center, and the DPSCS Division of Parole and Probation for false imprisonment, violation of her rights under Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, and for failing to follow the proper processing procedures. -6- No answer was ever filed to the complaint or amended complaint. Rather, the State, for itself and the various State units, respon ded with a motion fo r summa ry judgment, asserting that they had legal justification to detain Dett by virtue of her arrest and the commitment order from the sheriff. They argued that, notwithstanding Ms. Dett s protest that she was n ot the Van essa Haw kins who was the subject of the VOP warrant and commitment order, the defendants had no obligation to cond uct any investig ation to determine whether they were holding the right person , but that, in any ev ent, they did conduct some k ind of in vestiga tion and release d her up on ord er of the sheriff to do so . The motion was supp orted by an aff idav it of S usan Mu rphy, an Assistant Warden of CBIC, to which various CBIC records pertaining to Ms. Dett s detention were attached as exhibits. Ms. Murphy contended that, because the Circuit Court offices were closed by the time Ms. Dett arrived at C BIC on Friday afternoon (March 7), she could not be released until [CB IC] r eceived a cou rt ord er releasing h er from c usto dy and that once the CBIC staff were satisfied tha t Plaintiff w as not the person who was the subject of the bench warrant issued by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, they were able to secure an order from the Circuit Court a uthoriz ing her release . She did n ot explain, no r do the do cuments attached to her Declaration explain, what CBIC or the Detention Center did to secure an order from the Circuit Court authorizing her release. Although she stated that, upon learning of the two SID numbers, Ms. Dett was re-fingerprinted, she did not state when that occurred, and there were no docu ments attached to her statement showing that a re-fingerprinting had -7- occurred. Ms. Dett responded that, upon her protest that she was not Vanessa Hawkins, she was advised that she would be re leased if her SID nu mber did not match the one listed on the bench warrant, but that, instead of being released wh en it became clear that the S ID numbers did not match, she was sent to the Detention Center and kept there until the afternoon of March 11. She arg ued that the defenda nts did not have the right to detain he r, because she was not the person who was the subject of the warrant or the commitment order. The court was not impressed. Without a hearing and w ithout any discov ery having be en taken, it granted the motion, entered summary judgment for the defendants, and subsequently denied a motion to alter or ame nd the judg ment. The Court o f Spec ial App eals rev ersed. It conclude d that the lega l authority for the defenda nts to hold D ett pursuant to the warrant and commitment order depended on whether they had, and re tained, a goo d faith reasonab le belief that she was, in fact, the person whom the warrant directed them to detain. If, at any time, they cease d to have th at reasonab le belief, the court co ntinued, they ha d a duty at that point to release her. On the rec ord before it, the court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether, at some point during the nearly four days of detention, the defendants no longer entertained a reasonab le belief that Ms. Dett was the Vanessa Hawkins who was the subject of the warrant and commitment order and that, as a result, summary judgment was inappropriate. The cou rt struck the judgment and remanded the case for further procee dings. Dett v. State , 161 Md. -8- App. 4 29, 869 A.2d 4 20 (20 05). We granted certiorari to determine whether the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als erred in holding (1) that there was a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the defendants lost legal justification to continue their detention of Ms. D ett, and (2) that th ey had an ob ligation to investigate whether Ms. Dett was, in fact, the person who was the subject of the warrant. We shall affirm the judgm ent of the in termediate a ppellate cou rt. DISCUSSION The State acknowledges that Ms. Dett s actions are contingent, ultimately, on whether she was d etained for any a pprecia ble time withou t legal jus tification . Its position is that, where the detention is based on the executio n of a facially valid arrest warrant, legal justification exists, even if the warran t is later determined to be invalid or the detainee is later determined to be innocent or not the person named in the warrant. When proceeding on the basis of a facially va lid warrant, according to the State, there is no duty on the part of the detaining entity to investigate the nature o r validity of the wa rrant. Contra riwise, the Sta te argues that it had a mandatory legal duty to hold Ms. Dett until ordered otherwise by the court. At the very lea st, it posits, it had a duty to hold her until it was sure of her identity and that it acted reasonably in securing her release once it concluded she was not the person named in the w arrant or commitme nt order. Three claims were asserted in the amended complain t false imp risonmen t, violation -9- of rights guaranteed by Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, and an action captioned as being filed under the State Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act does not create any independent substantive causes of action but rather, subject to the conditions and limitations stated therein, merely substitute s liability on the part o f the State fo r liability that otherwise would exist on the part of covered State employees and officials. Little attention was given to that claim in either of the lower courts or, indeed, in the State s brief in this Court. At best, the averments in the count so captioned suggest a claim of negligence, which presupposes a duty, and, under the circumstances in this case, it can easily be d ealt with in the con text of th e false im prisonm ent claim . That is true as well with the claim under Article 24, which, like the false imprisonment claim, is also premised on a deprivation of liberty without legal justification. The State notes the existence of the Constitutional claim but presents its defense that there was legal justification for Ms. Dett s detention in the context of the false imprisonment claim and makes no separate, independent argument with respect to the Constitutional provision.3 The Court of Special Appeals essentially treated the two claims together, as so shall we. 3 Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights is the State analogue to the due process clauses of the F ifth and Fourte enth A mend ments. Baltimor e Belt Railro ad Co. v. B altzell, 75 Md . 94, 99, 23 A . 74 (1891 ); Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265, 270, 101 A. 710, 712 (1917); Matter of Easton, 214 Md. 176, 187, 133 A.2d 441 (1957 ). It provides, in releva nt part, th at no pe rson sh all be ta ken or i mpriso ned or d isseized of his . . . liberties or privileges . . . or deprived of his life, liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land . Implicit in that provision, of course, is that, if there is legal justification for the deprivation of one s liberty, there is no violation of Article 24, as the d eprivati on wo uld be in confo rmanc e with th e law o f the lan d. -10- False imprisonment is a common law tort. We have defined it as the deprivation of the liberty of another without his consent and without legal justification. Great A tl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 M d. 643, 654 , 261 A.2d 731, 738 (1970); Heron v. Strader, 361 Md. 258, 264, 761 A.2d 56 , 59 (2000 ); Manikh i v. Mass T ransit, 360 Md. 333, 365, 758 A.2d 95, 112 (2000). Th ere is no dispute here that Ms. Dett was deprived of her liberty for nearly four days and that the deprivation, from its inception, was without her consent. The only issue, therefore, as to all three claims, is whether the deprivation, or any substantial part of it, was without legal justification. In that regard, we are mindful that the case was resolved in the trial court on summary judgment, which is appropriate only if, after viewing all of the evidence properly before the court in a light most favo rable to Ms. Dett, it is clear that there is no genuine dispute of any material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. De La P uente v. Fr ederick C ounty, 386 Md. 505, 510, 873 A.2d 366, 369 (2005); Maryland R ule 2-501(f). As noted, both CBIC and the Detention Center are units within the DPSCS Division of Pretrial Detention and Services. Maryland Code , § 5-201 of the Correctional Services Article (CS), which creates those units, specifies that the Division has the sam e authority with regard to the custody of its inmates and the operation of the Baltimore City Detention Center as . . . the sheriffs have under this Code with regard to the detention of inmates committed to their custody and the operation of local correctional facilities. One of the specific duties assigned to the Commissioner of Pretrial Detention and Services the head -11- of the Division is to keep safely any inmate committed or transferred to the custody of the Commissioner until the inmate is discharged in a ccordance w ith law, CS § 5-20 2(c)(2), which is equivalent to the statutory duty of managing officials of local correctional facilities in that rega rd, see CS § 11-10 3(a), and to the common law duty of sheriffs, when acting as jailors. See Harford County v. University, 318 Md. 52 5, 569 A.2d 64 9 (1990). The State cites C S § 5-202 in support o f its position tha t it had not just the legal justification, but the legal mandate, to hold Ms. Dett until ordered by the court the issuer of the warrant pursuant to which she was being held to release her. It relies as well on Glover v. State, 143 Md. App. 313, 794 A.2d 735 (2002) for that proposition. Neither the statute nor Glover provide tha t support. This Court has adhered to the view, first expressed in Great Atl & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, supra, 256 Md. at 655, 261 A.2d at 738, that [w]hatever technical distinction there may be between an arrest and a detention the test whether legal justification existed in a particular case has been judged by the principles applicable to the law of arrest. See also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 12 0, 660 A.2d 44 7, 472 (1995); Montgomery Ward v. Wilson, 339 Md. 701, 721, 664 A.2d 916, 926 (1995); Heron v. Strader, supra, 361 Md. at 264-65, 761 A.2d at 59. Because both an arrest and a detention invo lve a deprivation of lib erty, it is reasonab le to apply a single standard or set of standards to determine whether, from the perspe ctive of tort law , either is le gally justif ied. It is important to ke ep in mind, ho wev er, th at the act o f arrest is ordinarily a -12- momentary event. In Bouldin v . State, 276 Md. 511, 515-16, 350 A.2d 130, 133 (1976), we defined an arrest as the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another (1) by touching or putting hands on him; (2) or by any act that indicates a n intention to take him into custody and that subjects him to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest; or (3) by the consent of the person to be arrested. In State v. Evans, 352 Md. 496, 514-15, 723 A.2d 423, 431-32 (1999 ), we stressed the imme diate physical nature of the encounter and held that whether the officer has any intent that the seizure lead to a prosecution has no bearing on whether an arrest has occurred. Once the physical requirements for an arrest have been met along with the intent to seize and detain, the arrest is complete, and, although the person may remain unde r arrest, t he arres t thereaf ter beco mes a c ontinu ed dete ntion. This becomes important because the legal justification for the arrest based on the identity of the arrestee can dissipate over time. The detaining authority may come into possession of information, not known at the time of arrest or not known at some earlier point in the detention, which, by establishing that the person being detained is not, in fact, the person authorized to be detained, may cause the legal justification relating to id entity to disappear. The standards used to determin e legal justifica tion remain the same, but, in the course of a continuing detention, their application needs to be reexamined whenever changes in the factual underpinning of their application become known. That, indeed, is what this case is all abo ut. The general rules regarding when an arrest is regarded as privileged i.e., legally -13- justifiable so as to protect the person making the arrest (or imposing the detention) from liability for fals e impris onme nt, are se t forth in Chap ter 5, Title B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 125, dealing with the arrest of the wrong p erson und er a warran t, provides: An arrest under a warrant is not privileged unless the person arrested (a) is a person s ufficiently named or otherwise described in the warrant and is, or is reasonably believed by the actor to be, the person intended, or (b) although not such person, has knowingly caused the actor to b elieve h im so. Of particular relevance here is § 12 5(a), which contains two requirements for privilege: (1) that the warrant sufficiently name or identify the person to be arrested; and (2) that the person arrested either be that person or that the arresting officer reasonab ly believe the arrestee to be that person. In Comment c. to § 125, the American Law Institute concludes that a person is sufficiently named if both the first n ame and surname given in the warrant are phonetica lly closely similar to such a p erson s name . The warrant satisfied that requirement; it noted the first and last names of Vanessa Hawkins and, as a n alias, E velyn D ett. The first requirement was thus cle arly met as to Off icer M oore. The situati on with respect to CBIC and the Detention Center is a bit more am biguous. The co mmitment order, although referencing the warrant by number, named only Vanes sa Haw kins as the p erson to be detained an d said nothing about Evelyn Dett, even as an alias. To meet the first requireme nt, the State -14- defenda nts must show that they, like Officer Moore, relied upon the warrant, for that is the only authority to de tain someo ne name d Evelyn D ett. Comment d. to § 125 addresses the second requirement. It states that if there are two persons to whom the n ame applies w ith co mplete a ccur acy or with subs tanti ally equal sufficiency [] the actor is privileged to arrest the one whom, after using due diligence, he reasonably believes to be the person intended. Comment f. expounds on this, noting that it is reasonable for the person charged with executing the warrant to rely on the name given in the warrant unless he knows or is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that a mistake has been made. Thus, the Comment continues, the actor is privileged to arrest the person to whom the name applies w ith complete accuracy even if the actor may have some reason to suspect . . . that the person, though accurately named, is not the person intended but is not privileged to arrest a person, though accurately named, if the actor knows by his own senses, or has information which leaves him no room reasonably to doubt, that a mistake has been made . An example given is a warrant for the arrest of XYZ for wife-beating and the arrestee, XYX, is an unmarried 12-year-old child. Although some courts, particularly in older cases, have adopted a strict view that an officer who arrests the wrong person, even one with the same name or general description as the person named in the warrant, is liable even if he or she acts in good faith , most courts have applied principles similar to those set forth in § 125 of the Restatement and have adopted instead a reason able be lief test. See, in gene ral, Willia m B. Jo hnson , Liability for -15- False Arrest Or Imprisonment Under Warrant As Affected By Mistake As To Identity Of Person Arrested, 39 A.L.R. 4th 705 (1985). The ma jority, and to us the better reasoned, view is that, where the warrant sufficiently names or identifies the person to be arrested and the arresting officer, despite some evidence to the contrary, reasonably believes that the person arrested, bearing that name, is the person named in the warrant, the officer is not liable for false imprisonment, even if he or she, in fact, arrests the wrong person.4 We are not concerned here with the conduct of Officer Moore, but of CBIC and the Detention Center. CBIC received Ms. Dett pursuant to either the warrant or the sheriff s commitment order. The commitment order, as noted, directed the commitment of Vanessa See Rodriguez v. United States, 54 F.3d 41 (1 st Cir. 1995) ; Schneider v. Kessler, 97 F.2d 542 (3 rd Cir. 1938) ; King v. Robertson, 150 So. 1 54 (Ala. 19 33); Montgomery v. City of Montgomery, 732 So.2 d 305 (A la. Civ. Ap p. 1999); Boies v. Raynor, 361 P.2d 1 (Ariz, 196 1); Walton v. H ill, 152 P.2d 639, 641 (Cal. App . 1944); Stewart v. Williams, 255 S.E.2 d 699 (G a. 1979); Rodriguez v. Kraus, 619 S.E.2d 800 (G a. App. 2005); Blocker v. Clark, 54 S.E. 10 22 (Ga. 1 906); Smith v. Sh eriff of Cook County , 660 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. Ap p. 1995); Barnes v. Wilson, 450 N.E .2d 1030 , 1033 (Ind . App. 198 3); O Neill v. Keeling, 288 N.W . 887, 889-9 00 (Iowa 1939); Filer v. Sm ith, 55 N.W. 999 (Mich. 1893); Boose v. City of Rochester, 421 N.Y .S.2d 740 (A.D. 19 79); Robinson v. City of Winston-Salem, 238 S.E.2 d 628, 63 1 (N.C. A pp. 1977 ); Golden v. City of Cleveland, 554 N.E.2d 1 48 (Ohio App. 19 89); State ex rel. A nderson v . Evatt, 471 S.W.2d 949, 950-51 (Tenn. A pp. 1971 ); Mildon v. Bybee, 375 P.2d 458 (Uta h 1962); Stalter v . Wash ington , 86 P.3d 115 9 (Wash . 2004); White v. Jansen, 142 P. 11 40 (Wa sh. 1914); Wallner v . Fidelity & Deposit Co., 33 N.W .2d 215 (Wis. 1 948). 4 For the contrar y view, see Wolf v. Perryman, 17 S.W. 772 (Tex. 1891) and Clark v. Heard, 538 F. Supp. 800 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that, under Texas law, the protection ordinarily allowed an officer who proceeds under a facially valid warrant does not apply to the arrest and detention of the wrong person and that such an arrest, even under a d uly issued wa rrant, amou nts to false im prisonme nt); Jordan v. C.I.T. Corporation, 19 N.E .2d 5 (M ass. 193 9). -16- Hawkins, SID No. 381961, date of birth July 11, 1963, and said nothing about Evelyn De tt, SID No. 2413966, date of birth February 6, 1962. Although the warrant noted that Vanessa Hawkins was also know n as Evelyn D ett, it contained no identifying information beyond that contained on the com mitment order and, indee d, identified th e subject of the warran t with the same SID n umber and da te of birth that was contained on the comm itment order. Whether or not required by law to do so, CBIC has adopted a routine procedure for identifying persons placed directly in its custody booking, photographing, fingerprinting, and obtaining from the fingerprints a SID number and Ms. Dett was subjected to that process. Within two hours after receiving custody of M s. Dett, CBIC was aware of and had made note of a problem two SID numbers. It recognized and recorded the fact that the existence of those two numbers would keep her from being released. By 11:30 the next morning, Marc h 8, the SID No. 381961 for Vanessa H awkins had be en verified and C BIC was aw are that V anessa Haw kins ha d eight p rior con tacts w ith CB IC. Viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in a light most favorable to Ms. D ett, it may fairly be inferred that CBIC had files with respect to those contacts, files from which a photograph, fingerprints, and other identifying information pertaining to Vanes sa Haw kins wou ld likely have been available. Ms. Dett could have been promptly re-fingerprinted to make certain that her prints were accurately recorded and resubmitted for confirmation of a SID num ber. It is not clear from this record that any of that was promptly done. Had CBIC simply obtained the photograph and fingerprints of Vanessa -17- Hawk ins inferably in its possession , it would have known without question that the person it was holding wa s not the person nam ed in the warrant or the co mmitment order. The Restatement standard that we have adopted provides that a detention is not privileged unless the person detained is reasonably believed by the actor to be the person intended [to be detained]. From the evidence we have recounted, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. D ett, there is no q uestion bu t that a jury could re asonably find that, as early as midmorning on March 8, and certainly by March 10, CBIC, and thus DPSCS, could no longer reasonably believe that the person it was holding as Vanessa Hawkins was the person named in the w arrant a nd com mitme nt orde r. See Ha yes v. Kelly , 625 So.2d 628 (La. App. 1993), cert. denied, 625 So.2d 628 (La. 1994) , and cert. denied, 633 So.2d 171 (La. 1994); Stalter v. Washington, supra, 86 P.3 d 1159 . Relying on CS § 5-202(c)(2) and Glover v. State, supra, 143 Md. App. 313, 794 A.2d 735, the State nonetheless insists that it had both the right and a ma ndate to ho ld Ms. D ett until ordered by the court to release her. That is not the case. Section 5-202(c)(2) directs the Commissioner to keep an inmate safely in custody until the inmate is discha rged in accord ance w ith law. If the inmate being held is not the person ordered to be held, h oweve r, the law req uires that person be discharged as soon as that fact becom es clear. The statute does n ot direct, and C onstitutionally could not direct, the Commissioner to hold someone the Commissioner knows or reasonably believes is not the person author ized to b e detain ed. As we indicated, CBIC and the Detention Center may -18- have no comm on law o r statutory duty to inve stigate whe ther a perso n comm itted to their custody is, in fact, the pe rson autho rized to be so committed, but once they become aw are of facts that convince them that the person they are holding is not the person they are authorized by the warran t or comm itment orde r to hold, they mu st, as promp tly as reasona bly possible, take the necessary steps, through the appropriate administrative structure, to release the person an d notify the co urt or other ag ency that issued the warran t or other detention orde r (1) t hat th ey hav e done so , and (2) w hy. In Glover, the plaintiff, Jam es Glove r, began serv ing a 30-day sentence at the Baltimore City Detention Center on October 4, 1996. The lawfulness of that detention was unchallenged. On Octob er 18, 1996, the Baltimo re City Sheriff filed a detainer, directing the warden of the Detention Center to hold James Glover, SID No. 991 140962 , date of birth 8/13/58, until further action of the Cir cuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Bench Warrant No. 896236002 for failure to appear fo r trial on a cha rge of un authorized use. It is not clear whether a copy of the warrant was sent to the Detention Center; there was no copy of it in th e record . Glover protested that he was not the James Glover wanted for unauthorized use, but the Detention Center, acting pursuant to the detainer/com mitment order, continued to detain him until Dece mber 4, 19 96, whe n it produce d him in court on the unauthorized use charge. The court determined that the James Glover detained pursuant to the sheriff s detainer was not, in fact, the James Glover wanted for failure to appear on an unauthorized use charge and -19- thus ordered his release. Glover then filed suit aga inst the City and the State for negligence and a violation of Constitutional rights. Glover did not dispute that he was, in fact, the person ide ntified in the detainer the SID number stated in the detainer, 991140962, was his SID number and therein lies the critical difference. Glover s complaint was that the warrant and commitment order were incorrect, that they named the wrong person. It is ordinarily not for the arresting officer or jailer to determine whe ther the warrant or detainer ca lling for the arrest or detention of a particular person is valid, was lawfully issued, or properly named the person ordered to be arrested. Those are issues for the court to resolve. The problem here is not the validity of the warrant o r commitm ent order dire cting the dete ntion of Van essa Haw kins AK A E velyn Dett; it is that the individual detained was not that person and there is competent evidence to show that CBIC and the Detention Center knew that to be the case and yet continued to detain her for a significant period of time. Th e Court of Special A ppeals w as correct in concluding that summary judgment was inappropriate. JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APP EALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS. -20-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
