Stoddard v. State

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Stoddard v. State, No. 24, September Term, 2006 HEADNOTE: CRIMINAL LAW & PROCEDURE INDICT MEN TS M ULTIPL E COU NTS A S UNIT EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS Md. Cod e (2001), § 10-105 of the Criminal Proc edure Article, provides th at in a criminal case, a defendant may file a petition for expungement of his or her record in certain situations, including, but not limited to, situation s where th e State enters a nolle prosequi. Section 10-107 of the same article provides that if a person is not entitled to exp ungeme nt of one c harge in a u nit, that person is not entitled to expungement of any other charge in that unit. Based on the clear language of § 10-107, a criminal defendant s commission of several acts of burglary across a period of weeks, in different apartments, against different victims, do not constitute a u nit, notwithstan ding that the State incorporated all of the cha rges in the sa me charg ing docum ent. A crim inal defen dant is therefore entitled to expungement, under § 10-105, o f those cha rges for w hich a nolle prosequi is entered and to which he did no t plea d guilty. Those crimes that were committed as a part of the same incident, transaction, or same set of facts as the burglary to which the crimina l defen dant ple d guilty, do comp rise a un it and the refore m ay not be expun ged. In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ounty Criminal No. 03-K-04-004546 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 24 September Term, 2006 ____________________________________ KEVIN TREMAINE STODDARD v. STATE OF MARYLAND ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ____________________________________ Filed: December 5, 2006 In this case, we must construe Md. Code (2001), § 10-107 of the Criminal Proc edure Article, to determine whether a multiple count indictment, charging various counts of burglary and related offenses, which were allegedly committed at different times, in several locations, and against different people, constitutes a single unit within the meaning of the expungement statute. See Md. Code (2001), § 10-101 et seq. Specifically, we must decide whether a defendant s guilty plea to burglary (count 13) of the multiple count indictment precludes expungement of the remaining charges, w hich were nol pro ssed by the State as part of a plea agreement. We hold that, consistent with the plain language of § 10-107, burglary and theft charges that stem from separate and distinct events, althoug h the charges are contained within the same charging document, do not comprise a single unit for purposes of expung ement. Charges arising, how ever, from the same in cident, transac tion, or set of f acts as the count to which a c riminal def endant ple ads guilty com prise a single unit, and therefore may not be expunged. Thus, a guilty plea to one count of first degree burglary, contained within a multiple count charging document, does not preclude expungement of the other burglary and theft c ounts wh ich were n ol prossed, unless the other charges arise from the same in cident, tr ansactio n, or set o f facts to which the def endan t pled gu ilty. FACTUAL BACKGROUND On November 12, 2005, at 2:15 a.m., a police officer working as security for the University Village Apartment Complex in Towson, Maryland, observed a man, later identified as Kevin Tremaine Stoddard ( Petitioner ), walking around inside apartment 2101, and then leaving the apartment by removing a window screen. The officer detained Petitioner, a Tows on Univ ersity student, and arrested him after learning that he did not have permission to be inside that apartment. After receiving Miranda warnin gs, Petitioner admitte d to ente ring ap artmen t 2101 a nd con fessed to a serie s of oth er burg laries as w ell. Petitioner was charged with seven counts of first-degree burglary, two counts of fourth-degree burglary, seven counts of theft under $500, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The S tate chose to consolidate all charg es in a single, multiple-count indictmen t. All charges stemmed from Petitioner s involvement in a series of burglaries and related criminal of fenses inv olving sev eral individu al apartmen ts, located w ithin the University Village Apartment Complex. The crimes occurred over a period of more than two months. A summary of the counts are as follows: Counts 1 and 2: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2104 on October 9, 2004 Counts 3 and 4: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2310 on October 18 and 22, 2004 Counts 5 and 6: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2106 on October 18 and 22, 2004 Counts 7 and 8: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 412 Campus View Dr., Apartment 6102 on October 25, 2004 Counts 9 and 10: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2211 on October 25, 2004 Counts 11 and 12: First degree burglary and theft under $500 involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 3308 on October 25, 2004 Counts 13-15:First degree bu rglary, theft und er $500, an d possessio n of parap hernalia involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2101 on November 12, 2004 -2- Count 16: Fou rth degree burglary involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on November 4, 2004 Count 17: Fou rth degree burglary involving 402 Campus View Dr., Apartment 2204 on September 4, 2004 On April 4, 2005, pursuant to a plea agreemen t, Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, charging first-degree burglary, in exchange for the State entering a nolle prosequi as to the remaining 16 counts. Counts 13-15 arose from the same incident, transaction, and set of facts. Those crimes allegedly occurred on Nove mber 12, 2004 , and involved the bu rglary and theft of personal property from apartment 2101. The theft of personal property gave rise to the charge of possession of paraphernalia. The burglaries listed in the remaining counts, which were nol prossed, all took place on different days and in different apartment units than did the burglary in count 13. On June 8, 2005, Petitioner was sentenced to four-years imprisonment with all but 90 days suspended and the last 30 days to be served on home detention. He also was placed on two-years probation, effective upon release, and was ordered to pay restitution to each of the burglary victims. In addition, Petitioner was ordered to abstain from alcohol, illegal drugs and abuse of prescription drugs, submit to random urinalysis, and to seek alcohol and drug treatment. The court also ordered that Petitioner have no contact with the victims, the ir property, or the University Village Apartments. On September 1, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion for Mo dification of Sentence , in which he reques ted that the trial co urt strike its judgment of gu ilty and enter probation before -3- judgmen t. Subsequently, on October 24, 2005, Petitioner filed a Petition fo r Expun gement, requesting that the court expunge counts 1-12 and 14-1 7. In his Petition for Expu ngemen t, Petitioner certified that he h ad not b een co nvicted of any cr ime, other than a min or traffic violation, since the Sta te nol prosse d counts 1-12 and 14-17. On October 25, 2005 , the State filed an Answer to the Motion for Modification of Sentence, requesting that P etitioner s motion be denied.1 On November 9, 2005, the State filed an Answer to the Petition for Expu ngem ent. The Circuit Co urt held a he aring on Ja nuary 19, 200 6. At that hearing, Petitioner conceded that counts 13-15 all arose from the same incident and that, becaus e he pled g uilty to count 13, counts 14 and 15 could not be expunged. The State argued that because all 17 of the counts constituted a single unit, Petitioner s guilty plea to count 13 prevented all of the counts from being expunged. The Circuit Court denied the Petition for E xpunge ment. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 2 On June 7, 2006, 1 The Circ uit Court fa iled to rule on Petitioner s m otion, in effe ct, denying it. 2 Petitioner pre sented the f ollowing question in h is brief on ap peal: Did the Court err by denying the petition for expungement on the ground that all counts of the indictment were one criminal unit, although the crimes alleged took place at different times and in different places, and involved different victims? The State presented the following question in its brief: Where Stoddard was charged in a single indictment with 17 crimes arising out of a burglary spree and possession of drug (contin ued...) -4- while the case was pending in the intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiora ri on its o wn m otion. Stoddard v. State, 393 Md. 242 , 900 A.2d 749 (2006). DISCUSSION The parties dispu te whethe r, under § 1 0-107 of the Crimin al Procedu re Article, all of Petitioner s charges, when consolidated within a single charging document, constitute a unit, such that Petitioner s guilty plea to count 13 precludes the expungement of any of the remaining counts. N otably, becaus e Petitioner p led guilty to count 13, that count cannot be expunged, and that issue is therefore not before this Co urt. See § 10-105(a) (limiting expungement for charges that resulted in a finding of guilt to a person who has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Governor and who was convicted of only one criminal act that was not a crime of violence). The expungement of counts 14 and 15 is also not at issue in this case because Petitioner conceded that because those counts arise out of the same incident as count 13 they all constitute a unit, preven ting their exp ungeme nt. Aside fro m this concession, Petitioner co ntends that th e remainin g counts d o not cons titute a single un it because the other burglaries are separate and distinct units. The State contends, how ever, that because all of the burglaries occurred in a limited time frame, in only two apartment 2 (...continued) paraphern alia upon arrest, and pursuant to a plea agreement he plead guilty to one co unt of first de gree burg lary in return for the entry of a nolle prosequi on the remaining counts, did the trial court properly apply Section 10-107 of the Criminal Proc edure Article to deny Stoddard s petition for expungement of the nol prossed co unts in the ind ictment? -5- buildings, all for the purpose o f supportin g Petitioner s drug hab it, they constitute a u nit within the meaning of § 10-107. This issue is therefore a matter of statutory interpretation. A. Statutory Interpretation We recently summarized the rules of statutory interpretation in Walzer v. Osborne, ___M d. ___, ___ A.2d __ __ (slip op. at 5 -8) (filed N ovembe r 17, 2006 ): The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor of Mt. Lake Park, 392 M d. 301, 3 16, 896 A.2d 1036 , 1045 (2006); Chow v. State, 393 Md. 431, 443, 903 A.2d 388, 395 (2006) (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 Md. 1, 11, 874 A.2d 439, 445 (2005); Moo re v. Sta te, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); O Connor v. Balt. Cou nty, 382 Md. 102, 113, 854 A.2d 1191, 11 98 (2004 ); Mayor of Balt. v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 98 7, 991 (2000). As this Court has explained, [t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. State D ept. of Assessments and Taxation v. Maryland-N at l Capital Park & Planning Comm n, 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 690, 696 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994 ); see also Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395 (stating that [s]tatutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology ) (citations omitted). We do so on the tacit theory that the Legislature is presume d to have m eant wha t it said and said what it mea nt. Witte v. Azarian, 369 M d. 518, 5 25, 801 A.2d 1 60, 165 (2002 ). When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determ ine the Legislature s intent. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Un ion v. M VA., 346 M d. 437, 4 45, 697 A.2d 4 55, 458 (1997). If the words of the statute, constru ed accord ing to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain me aning, we will give ef fect to the statute as it is written . Jones v. Sta te, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 -6- (1994). In addition, [w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute s meaning. Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d 645, 654 (2001); see Chow, 393 Md. at 443, 903 A.2d at 395. If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language , either inheren tly or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends. . . . Chow, 393 Md. at 443-44, 903 A.2d at 395. If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effe ct in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration]. Fraternal Order of Police v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (1996) (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). We have said that there is an a mbiguity within [a] statute when there exist two or m ore reason able alternative interpretations of the statute. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). When a statute can be interpreted in more than one way, the job of this Court is to resolve that a mbiguity in light of the legislative intent, using all the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disposal. Id. If the true legislative intent cannot readily be determined from the statutory language alone, howe ver, we may, and often must, resort to other recognized indicia among other things, the structure of the statute, including its title; how the statute relates to other laws; the legislative history, including the derivation of the statute , comme nts and explanatio ns regarding it by authoritative sources during the legislative process, and amendm ents proposed or added to it; the general purpose behind the statute; and the relative rationality and legal effect of variou s comp eting co nstructio ns. Witte, 369 Md. at 52 5-26, 801 A.2d at 165. In construing a statute, [w]e avoid a construction of the statute that is unreasonable, illogical, -7- or inconsiste nt with common sense. Blake v. Sta te, ____Md. ____, ___A.2d ___ (slip op. at 12) (filed October 24, 2006) (citing Gwin v. MVA, 385 Md. 44 0, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005 )); see Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125 , 137, 647 A.2d 1 06, 112 (1994). In addition, the meaning of the plainest language is controlled by the context in which it app ears. State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 13 41 (1996) (citations om itted). As this Court has state d, [b]ecause it is part of the contex t, related statutes or a statutory sch eme that fa irly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, bu t, if appropria te, in the context of the entire statutory scheme of which it is a part. Gordon Family P ship v. Gar On Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2 d 753, 75 7 (199 7) (citatio ns omi tted). We now turn our attention to the statute at issue in this case. B. The Crim inal Record E xpungem ent Statute The General Assembly enacted the Criminal Record Expungement Statute, § 10-101 et seq. of the C riminal Proc edure A rticle, in 1975 [for] the purpose of providing for the expungement of certain p olice and co urt records, providing procedures for such expung ement, prohibiting certain practices concerning crim inal charge s not resulting in conviction, and relating generally to criminal records. 1975 Md. Laws, Chap. 260; See also In the Matter of the Expungement of Records of Diane M., 317 Md. 652, 653, 566 A.2d 108 (1989). In the context of the statute, [e]xp ungement w ith respect to a court record or -8- police record means removal from public inspection. § 10-101(e). This removal can be achieved in one of three ways: (1) by obliteration; (2) by removal to a separate secure area to which persons who do not have a legitimate reason for acce ss are denied access; or (3) if access to a court record or police record can be obtained only by reference to another cou rt record or police record, by the expungement of it or the part of it that provides access. Id. One of the Gene ral Assem bly s purpose s in providing for an expungement procedure was to help protect individuals seeking employment or admission to an educational institution, by entitling them to expungement of unprove n charges , so that those in dividuals could avo id being unfairly judged during their application processes. § 10-109.3 To further this purpose, 3 Section 10-109, entitled Prohibited Acts, states as follows: (a) Applications for employment or admission. (1) Disclosure of expunged information about criminal cha rges in an application, interview, or other means may not be required: (i) by an employer or educational institution of a person who applies for employment or admission; or (ii) by a un it, officia l, or employee of the State or a political subdivision of the State of a person who applies for a license, permit, registration, or governmental service. (2) A person need not refer to or give information concerning an expunged charge when answering a question concerning: (i) a criminal charge that did not result in a conviction; or (ii) a conviction that the Governor pardoned. (3) Refusal by a person to disclose information about criminal charges that have been expunged m ay not be the so le reason for: (i) an employer to discharge or refuse to hire the person; (contin ued...) -9- the General A ssembly exp ressly prohibited potential em ployers and ac ademic in stitutions from requiring applicants to disclose information about expunged criminal charges, subject to a hea vy penal ty for viola tion. Id.4 Section 10-105 provides the authority for expungement of criminal records, and outlines the situations in which a criminal defen dant may pe tition for such expung ement. Section 10-105, entitled Expungement of record after charge is filed, states, in relevant part: (a) Petition for expunge ment. -- A person who has been charged with the commission of a crime, including a violation of the Transportation Article for which a term of imprisonment may be imposed, may file a petition listing relevant facts for expungement of a police record, court record, or other record maintained by the State or a political subdivision of the State if: (1) the person is acquitted; (2) the charge is otherwise dismissed; 3 (...continued) or (ii) a unit, official, or employee of the State or a political subdivision of the State to deny the person's application. (b) Penalties. (1) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or both for each violation. (2) In addition to the penalties provided in paragraph (1) of this subsectio n, an officia l or employee of the State or a political subdivision of the State who is co nvicted un der this section may be removed or dismissed from public service. 4 In addition, no one may open or review an expunged record or disclose to another person any information from that record without a court order from either the court that ordered the record expunged or, in the case of a police record when no charge is filed, the District Court that has venue. § 10-108. -10- (3) a probation before judgment is entered, unless the person is charged with a violation of § 21-902 of the Transportation Article or Title 2, Su btitle 5 or § 3-211 of the Criminal Law Article; (4) a nolle prosequi or nolle prosequi with the requirement of drug or alcohol treatment is entered; (5) the court indefinitely postpones trial of a criminal charge by marking the criminal charge stet or stet with the requirement of drug or alcohol abuse treatment on the doc ket; (6) the case is compromised under § 3-207 o f the Criminal Law Article; (7) the charge was transferred to the juvenile co urt under § 4-202 of this article; or (8) the person; (i) is convicted of only one criminal act, and that act is not a crime of violence; and (ii) is granted a full and unconditional pardon by the Go vernor . * * * (Emp hasis ad ded.) Most relevant to o ur analysis in this ca se is § 10-10 7, entitled Charges arising from same incident, transaction, or set of facts, which provides: (a) Multiple charges as u nit. -(1) In this subtitle, if two or more charges, other than one for a minor tr affic v iolation , arise from the same inc ident, transaction , or set of facts, the y are con sidered to b e a unit. (2) A charge for a minor traffic violation that arises from the same incident, trans action, or set o f facts as a charge in the unit is not a part of the unit. (b) Effect on right to exp ungement. -(1) If a person is not entitled to expungement of one char ge in a unit, the person is not entitled to expungement of any other charge in the unit. (2) The disposition of a charge for a minor traffic violation -11- that arises from the same incident, transaction, or set of fac ts as a charge in the unit does not affect any right to expungement of a charge in the unit. (Empha sis added .) To resolve the issue now before us, we must discern the General Assembly s meaning of the word unit, as used in § 10-107(a)(1), at the time that it enacted this statute. Spec ifically, we mu st determine whether several burglaries, committed on various days, in several a partments, a gainst diffe rent victims, co nstitute a single unit within the contemplation of § 10-107, such that a guilty plea to one charge would preclude the expun geme nt of the other ch arges u nder § 1 0-107 (b)(1). The State s main argumen t rests on the p remise that if Petitioner s burglary charges arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, or were part of a continuing scheme, his guilty plea to count 13 precludes expungement of the rest of the charges because the charges then constitute one unit. The State first contends that the G eneral Assemb ly s expungement scheme was not designed to expunge charges that were consolidated with, or related to, the charge on which a guilty finding was made. According to the State, the term unit must be read broadly so that when a person is found guilty of one charge, he or she is not en titled to have e xpunge d other cha rges that are c onsolidated with the charge on which he or she was found guilty. The State avers that the plain language of § 10-107 compe ls the conclusion that if a petitioner is found guilty of one charge, and then seeks expungement of the other consolidated charges which have been dismissed, he is not entitled to expung ement. T he State finds additional support for this argument in the language of -12- Maryland R ule 4-203 (a), which p rovides, in rele vant part: Two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdem eanors or any combination thereof, may be charged in separate counts of the same charging document if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. The State also cites to Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606 (2000), for the proposition that this Cou rt recognize d that a transa ction is not lim ited to a single act, but may be in the nature of a continuing transaction involving more than one act. The State argues that we should therefore read the language of § 10-107 to preclude expungement when charges are part of a co ntinuing sch eme, in add ition to whe n they constitute a single unit. Petitioner contends that the face of the charging document demonstrates clearly that the crimes charged do not all stem from th e same incident, transaction, or set of facts, but rather that each bu rglary constituted a separate u nit within the contemplation of § 10-107. Petitioner argues that grouping charges in one indictment, in and of itself, does not mean that the crimes charged amount to one unit. Further, Petitioner asserts that continuing scheme does not have th e same m eaning as same incid ent, transaction , or set of fac ts, and that § 10-107 does not preclude expungement of counts, to which a nolle prosequi has been entered, that are part of a continuing scheme. Petitioner concedes, for purposes of analysis of the issue, that the burglaries could possibly be considered a part of a continuing scheme. Petitioner asserts, however, that the Legislature did not use the phrase continuing scheme in enacting § 10-107, and that Maryland Rule 4-203 used disjunctively the phrases same act -13- or transaction and transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan , dem onstratin g that the two ph rases ha ve diff erent m eaning s. Accord ing to Petitioner, Rule 4-203(a) s use of the disjunctive also de monstrates that the State s decision to list all of the charges in the same indictment does not m ean that all of the charges are part of one un it. To address these contentions, we begin our analysis with the language of § 10-1 07 to discern the Legislature s meaning of the word unit. See Walzer, ____ Md. at ____, ____ A.2d. at ____ (citing State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 348 Md. at 13, 702 A.2d at 696; Montg omery C ounty, 333 Md. at 523, 636 A.2d at 45 2). Section 1 0-107 state s expressly that if two or more charges . . . arise from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, they are considered to be a unit. In examining the facts of this case, we reject the proposition that Petitioner s alleged burglaries, committed over a period of more than two months, and involving different ap artments, co nstituted a sing le unit. In our view, each alleged burglary constituted a separate incident, transaction, and involved a different set of fac ts. In this respect, it is the Legislature s use of the words incident, transaction, and the phrase set of facts, that are dispositive in our analysis. When interpreting a statute, the ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. Walzer, ____ Md. at ____, ____ A.2d. at ____ (citations om itted). Black s Law D ictionary defin es incident a s [a] discre te occurrence or happening, BLACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 777 (8th ed. 1999), and discrete as -14- [i]ndividu al; separate; distinct. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 499 (8th ed. 1999). By reading these two defin itions togethe r, it becomes clear that the G eneral As sembly included the word discrete in its definition of incident because it intended an incident to be something that occurred at a specific point in time and not something that transpired over a period of time or lasted indefinitely. Each of Petitioner s alleged burglaries occurred at a specific point in time; each occurred on a single date. Moreover, those nine burglaries, as a whole, did not occur at a specific point in time; they occurred over a period of time lasting for more than two months. We therefore hold that the nine burglaries charged do not represent a single inciden t, within the clea r mean ing of § 10-10 7. The meaning of the wo rd transactio n is also unambiguous. Black s Law Dictionary defines transaction as either [t]he act or an instance of conducting business or other dealings . . . , or [s]omething performed or carried out . . . . B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 1535 (8th ed. 1999). Within the contemplation of this definition, we conclude that each of the alleged burglaries also represents a separate transaction. For each burglary, Petitioner performed a separate action and carried out a separate plan. There exists nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner s plan was to burglarize the eight apartments over the course of two mo nths on tho se specific dates, such th at each bu rglary would represent a step within a single ongoing transaction. Instead, the burglaries each had a specific start time and end time an d theref ore rep resent in dividu al transa ctions. We find guidance for this conclusion in our p rior case law as w ell. -15- In Cooksey, 359 Md. at 11, 752 A.2d at 611, we discussed that criminal acts may combine to create one separately punishable offense . . . when the acts are committed as part of a single incid ent or transac tion. There, we stated that what was dispositive for the single transaction theory was whether the offenses contained in the s ame charge w ere committed at the same time, Id. (discussing State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 A. 500 (1893)), and therefore it did not matter that the theft involved the taking of several articles of property or that the crimes were committed against many different victims. In the present case, however, Petitioner acted alone and therefore c ould not h ave com mitted a bu rglary in more than one apartment at the same time. Because Petitioner is charged with committing each burglary at a dif ferent time, th e burglaries d o not cons titute a single inc ident or transaction. Lastly, each burglary contained a differen t set of alleged facts. For ex ample, in co unts 1 and 2, P etitioner burgla rized ap artmen t 2104 o n Octo ber 9, 2 004, and stole a baggie of marijuana from Claire Hammond at that location. In counts 3 and 4, however, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2310 and stole money from Stephanie Yanke at that residence on October 18 and 22, 2004. In counts 9 and 10, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2211 on October 25, 2004, and, from that apartme nt, stole Ritalin pills from Claire Steinbraker. In counts 13-15, Petitioner burglarized apartment 2101 on November 12, 2004, and stole a glass pipe from Sherri Mag araci. While the State sugg ests that Petition er may have committed all of the burglaries for the same purpose, to support his drug habit, the language of § 10-107 -16- does not contain the word purpose; it contains the phrase, set of facts. None of the burglaries had the sam e set of facts. While Petitioner allegedly visited some of the apartmen ts more than once over the two-month period, and allegedly visited more than one apartment on certain dates, the facts as alleged differed, at least to some degree, for each burg lary. Petitioner alleg edly commit ted nine separate burglaries at eight different apartmen ts on seven differen t days, over a period of time lasting more than two months. We therefore conclu de that th e burgl aries co ntained differe nt sets of facts. Because each of the burglaries charged in counts 1-12 and 16-17 constitutes an incident that was separate from that in co unts 13 -15, w e hold th at they did not com prise a si ngle un it. The State asserts that the Legislature intended to include continuous crimes in § 10107, when it stated that if a person is not entitled to expungement of one charge in a unit, he or she is not entitled to expungement of any other charge in the unit. W e conclude, how ever, that the Legislature clearly articulated, in § 10-107 , that a unit consists only of charges that arise out of the sa me incident, transaction, or set of facts. We the refore reject the State s claim that the Legislature intended for a continuing scheme to also constitute a unit for purposes of expungem ent because now here in that provision does the Legislature mention the phrase continuing scheme or use any language to imply such a meaning. Black s Law Dictionary defines continuing as [u]ninterrupted; persistin g. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 339 (8th ed. 1999). If the Legislature intended to limit expungement of charges in cases where the charges were part of a continuing scheme, then it certainly could have included -17- such la nguag e. Instead, it included language to the contrary, because, as explained above, an incident means a separate, distinct occurrence. The Legislature even chose to title § 10-107 Charges arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts, which provides additional support for this conclusion. We cannot assume authority to read into the [Statute] what the L egislature ap parently delibera tely left out. Judicial construction should only be resorted to when an ambiguity exists. Therefore, the strongly preferred norm of statutory interpretation is to effectuate the plain language of the statutory text. Chow, 393 Md. at 444, 903 A.2d at 395 (citations omitted). Because the Legisla ture spoke of a unit on ly as charges arising from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts and made no mention of a continuous scheme, we will not read such an assumption into the language of the statute.5 The language of § 10-107 is clear and its meaning unambiguous, such that we need not, and should not, look beyond that pro vision. See Jone s v. State, 336 Md. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1206-0 7. None theless, we w ill address the p arties conten tions that M aryland Rule 4-203(a) provid es supp ort for th eir view s. Maryland Rule 4-203(a) provides guidance for the State as to the manner in which offenses should be joined in a charging document. That Rule provides that the State can choose to charge two or more offenses in separate counts of the same charging document if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or 5 We note that our research reveals no cases where this Court has ever concluded that burglary could constitute a continuing crime or transaction. We need not reach the merits on this point because we conclude that the plain language of § 10-107 is unambiguous, and the Legislature made no mention of a continuous scheme when it enacted § 10-107. -18- are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a comm on schem e or plan (e mphasis a dded). W e again agree with Petition er and con clude that M aryland Rule 4-203(a) is written in the disjunctive, and therefore distinguishes between charges arising out of the same act or transaction and charges that are part of a continuing scheme. We do not agree with the State that the language of Rule 4-203(a) somehow demonstrates that the Legislature intended for a unit and continuing scheme to be synonymous or to suggest that because of this Rule, we must construe broadly the Legislature s use of the word unit. The State argues that Petitioner does not, and cannot, contend that the charges against him were not properly joined into a single c hargin g docu ment. The State contends that the burglaries were properly consolidated and that they also constituted a unit that arose from the same incident, transaction, or set of facts. To support this contention, the State asserts that all of the burglaries occurred within two months, in only two apartment buildings, that Petitioner took from each burglarized apartment either drugs, drug paraphernalia or money to support his d rug addition , and that he c onfessed to the burgla ries. We reje ct this contention because Maryland Rule 4-203(a) provides that the State may list all of the counts in one indictment if the c ounts we re of the sa me or sim ilar character. Permission to consolidate offenses of the sam e or similar ch aracter doe s not necessarily satisfy the definition of unit for purposes of expungement. We also are not persuaded by the State s argument that M arylan d Ru le 4-203(a) p rovides the State w ith th e aut hority to determine -19- whether the charges comprise a unit, simply based on how the State chooses to organize the charges together in one indictment, or separately. Petitioner asserts that if we read § 10107 to mean th at all charges contained in one indic tment con stitute one un it, then we would be allowing the State to affect whether a defendant would be entitled to an expungement simply by changing the group ing of cou nts, and cha rging und er one indic tment wh en it would be just as perm issible to charge under more than one charging document. Petitioner contends that giving the State such power would abrogate the principles of § 10-107 and Maryland Rule 4-203(a) and w ould usurp the legislative power. We agree with Petitioner on this poin t. Whether the State should have consolidated all of the cha rges in one indictmen t is neither an issue before this Court nor is it relevant to our analysis. Whether the State chose to list the charges separately or co nsolidate them in one indictment does not change our analysis. If the charges do not comprise a unit, then a guilty plea to one count does not preclude expungement of the other counts, regardless of how the State chose to organize the charges. In addition, the State argues that because we recognized in Cooksey, 359 Md. 1, 752 A.2d 606, that a tran saction is not limited to a single act, but may be in the nature of a continuing transaction involving more than one act, we should read the language of § 10-107 to preclude expungement when charges are part of a continuing scheme. As we already mentioned, the principles of statutory interpretation direct us to end our inquiry with the clear language of the s tatute w hen the statute is n ot amb iguous . Marriott E mployee s Fed. Cr edit Union v. MV A., 346 M d. 437, 4 45, 697 A.2d 4 55, 458 (1997 ). In any event, this case is -20- distinguisha ble from Cooksey for thre e reaso ns. Thu s, Cooksey is not dispositive to our analysis. First, Cooksey dealt specifically with sexual child abuse and other related sexual offenses, not bur glary off enses. S econd , Cooksey did not involve the criminal expungement law. Furthermore, Cooksey focused on whether the State could bundle a number of singleact offenses into the same count. To the contrary, this case hinges on w hether the State s inclusion of numerous burglary and theft counts in one indictment, means that a guilty plea to one coun t precludes e xpunge ment of th e other cou nts. The Sta te did not try to bu ndle all of the burglary and theft charges and the one possession of paraphern alia charge into one count; the State separated each of Petitioner s alleged offenses into individual counts. Cooksey neither addressed nor resolved the problem at issue in t his case . We therefore reject the State s argu ment that Cooksey provides guidance to us on this point because it does not discuss whether numerous counts o f burglary cou ld constitute a single transac tion and did not involve expungement of charges from a criminal record. Lastly, the State suggests that because Petitioner pled guilty to count 13, his record has already been marred by a criminal conviction for purposes of employment and applying for admission to academic institutions, so that he no longer needs to have the remaining 14 counts expunged. On these grounds, the State contends that the purpose of § 10-109 is rendered nugatory by Petitioner s guilty plea to count 13. W e do not ag ree. While Petitioner s guilty plea to count 13 may have already marred his record, we do not believe -21- that the purpose of § 10-105, § 10-107, or § 10-109 is as the State suggests. Nowhere in the context of these provisions does the Legislature provide that once an individual has a criminal record, he is no longer entitled to have expunged any other criminal charges because his record is marred for purposes of employment or applying for admission to an educational institution. Instead, the clear language of § 10-107 demonstrates that Petitioner is still entitled to have expunged the remaining 14 counts, from his record , so that those additional charges will not affect negatively his job search or application for admis sion to an educational institution in the future. It is obvious th at a record w ith 17 crimin al counts w ill be more detrimental to a person s job search or application to an academic institution than a record with 3 criminal counts. CONCLUSION We conclude that the Circuit Court was incorrect to reject Petitioner s request for expungement of counts 1-12 and 16-17 and was correct to reject Petitioner s request for expungement of counts 14 and 15. Because the burglary charges were separate incidents, transactions, or involv ed diffe rent fact s, the y constitute nine separate units. Based on the plain lang uage of § 10-1 07, it is cle ar that the Gen eral A ssem bly intended th at a unit be comprised only of charg es that arise fro m the sam e incident, transaction, or set of facts, and not a continuous scheme. When the charges do not comp rise a single un it, a guilty plea to one of the counts precludes exp ungeme nt only of thos e counts co ntained in th e same un it, and does not preclude expungement of the counts contained in any other units. -22- JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY REVERSED IN PART AND A F F I R M E D IN PA RT. C A S E REMANDED TO THAT COURT W I T H I N S T R U C T IONS T O EXPUNGE COUNT S 1-12 AND 16-17 OF THE CHARGING DOCUMENT. BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT. -23-

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