Wilson v. Nationwide

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Taylor F. Wilson v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company No. 22, September Term, 2006 HEAD NOTE : The Court of Special Appea ls was correct in reversing the C ircuit Court for Carroll County s decision that the fellow employee exclusion contained within an automobile liability insurance policy is invalid. We hold that a business auto insurance policy that contains a fellow employee exclusion is invalid to the extent that it provides less than the minimum statutory liability coverage. The fellow employee exclusion is a valid and enforcea ble contractual provision as to co verage above the minimum statutory liability limits of M aryland s comp ulsory au tomob ile insura nce law . In the Circu it Court for C arroll Coun ty Case No. 06-C-04-040053 IN THE COURT OF A PPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 22 September Term, 2006 __________________________________ TAYLOR F. WILSON v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. Bell , C.J. dissents. __________________________________ Filed: November 14, 2006 On June 20, 2002, petitioner, Taylor F. Wilson ( Wilson ), suffered serious injuries as a result of an auto collision that occu rred while he was the front-seat passenger in a vehicle driven by Daniel Richard McFarland ( McFarland ). At the time of the accident, both the driver and passenger were acting within the scope of their employment with Allegheny Industries, Inc. ( Allegheny ). Wilson f iled a Complaint for D eclaratory Judgment against McFarland, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ( Nationwide ), and his employer, A llegheny, in the C ircuit Court f or Carr oll Cou nty. Wilson requested that the Circuit Court declare the rights and liabilities of the parties, with respect to the bodily injuries in the collision of June 20, 2002, under a Nationwide business automobile liability insurance policy issued to A llegheny. In that re gard, Wilso n sought a declaration th at the fellow employee exclusion in Nationwide s business automobile liability insurance policy was invalid. Motions for summ ary judgm ent we re filed. The trial court heard argument on the motions and gra nted W ilson s m otion fo r summ ary judgm ent, declaring that the fellow employee exclusion w as invalid. N ationwide noted an a ppeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the ruling of the Circuit Co urt for Car roll Cou nty. Nationw ide v. Wilson, 167 Md. A pp. 527, 893 A . 2d 1177 (2006 ). Thereafter, Wilson filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the judgment of the Court of Special A ppeals and posing the following question: Is a fellow employee exclusion contained in a commercial automob ile liability policy valid, enforcea ble and in accord w ith established Maryland public policy where such exclusion operates to limit coverage available under such policy to statutory compuls ory minimum amounts where the policy purchased reflected lim its substantially higher than such minimum amounts? Nationwide filed its cross-petition for certiorari presenting the following question: Whether, the fellow employee exclusion contained in Nationwide s Autom obile Insurance Policy which limits coverage to the statutory minimum for injuries to fellow em ployees is permitted by Maryland s financial responsibility law, § 17-103 of the Transportation Article? We granted both pe titions. Wilson v. Nationwide, 393 Md. 242 , 900 A.2d 749 (2006). We hold that the fello w em ploye e exc lusio n contain ed in the a utom obile liab ility insurance policy issued by Nationwide to Alleghe ny is valid. The e xclusion, as it operates for amounts greater than the mand atory minimu m covera ges for bo dily injuries in this case, neither violates the law of contrac ts nor M aryland s comp ulsory au tomob ile insura nce law . FACTS The fa cts are u ndispu ted. We adopt the facts as stated by J. Kenney, writing for the Court of Special Appeals in this case: Alle gheny, a Maryland corporation, performs general contracting work in the field of telecommunications. Its principal place of business is located in Carr oll Cou nty, Mar yland. On the evening of June 19, 2002, Wilson and McFarland, both employees of Allegheny, were dispatched in a vehicle owned by Allegheny to perform maintena nce wo rk. While returning from the job in the early morning hours of June 20, 2002 , McFar land, the driv er, reportedly fell asleep, crossed the center line of the highway, and struck another vehicle head on. Wilson sustained severe injuries, including broken bones, cuts, and bruises. As a result of his injuries, he has undergone several operations, including two operations to remove more than ten feet of his small intestine. His medical expenses exceeded $100,000. At the time of the accident, Allegheny maintained two insurance policies with Nationwide: a business automo bile policy (the Auto Policy ) and a workers com pensation policy (the Worke rs Compensation Policy ). -2- The amount o f liability coverage under the Auto Policy was $1,000,000. The Auto Po licy provided, in r elevant par t: SECTION II- LIABILITY COVERAGE A. Co verage . We will pay all sum s an insured legally must pay as damage s because of bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto. * * * We have the right and duty to defend any insured against a suit asking for such damages or a covered pollution cost or expen se. Howeve r, we have no duty to defend any insured against a suit seeking damages for bodily injury or property damage or a covered pollution cost or expense to which this insurance does not apply. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit as we consider appropriate. Our duty to defend or settle e nds wh en the Liab ility Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. 1. Who is An Insured The following are insureds : a. You for any c overed auto. b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered auto you own, hire or borrow. * * * B. Exclusions This insurance d oes not ap ply to any of the following: -3- * * * 5. Fellow Employee Bodily injury to any fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of the fellow em ployee s emp loyment or w hile performing duties related to the conduct of your business. A standard endorsem ent for N ationwide business au tomobile policies issued in Ma ryland w as mad e part of the Au to Polic y. The endorsement provided , in pertinent pa rt: With resp ect to coverage provided by this endorsem ent, the provisions of Coverage Form apply un less mo dified b y the end orsem ent. For a covered auto license d or princip ally garaged in, or garage operations conducted in, Maryland, the Coverage Form is changed as follows: A. Changes in Liability Coverage Except with respe ct to the Bu siness Au to Physical Damage Coverage Form, the Fellow Employee Exclusion is replaced by the following: This insurance does not apply to bodily injury to any fellow employee of the insured arising out of and in the course of the fellow employee s employment or while performing duties related to the conduct of your business. Howeve r, this exclusion does not apply for coverage up to the minimum limit specified by the Marylan d Veh icle Law . Wilson, 167 Md. App. at 530-34, 893 A.2d at 1179-80. -4- DISCUSSION Prior to the enactment of § 19-504 of the Insu rance Ar ticle 1 and Title 17 of the Transpo rtation Article 2 , this Court, in a number of cases, had considered exclusions contained within auto ins urance policies . State Farm Mut. Au to Ins. Co. v. N ationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 635, 516 A.2d 586, 588 (1 986). See, e.g., Hicks v. Hatem, 265 Md. 260, 289 A.2d 32 5 (1972); Parker v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 263 Md. 206, 282 A.2d 503 (197 1); State Farm M ut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Briscoe, 245 Md. 147 , 225 A.2d 270 (1967). As this Court noted in State Farm, prior to enac tment of M aryland s com pulsory autom obile 1 Md. Code (1997, 2006 R epl. Vol.) § 19-504 of the Insurance Article requires, [e]ach m otor vehicle liability insurance p olicy issued, sold, o r delivered in the State sha ll provide the minimum liability coverage specified in Title 17 of the Transportation Article. 2 Specifica lly, Md. Cod e (1977, 20 06 Rep l. Vol.) § 17-1 03 (b) prov ides: The security required under this subtitle shall provide for at least: (1) The payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons, in addition to interest and costs; (2) The payment of claims for property of others damaged or destroyed in an accident of up to $15 ,000, in add ition to interest and costs; (3) Unless waived, the benefits described under § 19-505 of the Insurance Article as to basic required primary coverage; and (4) The benefits required under § 19-509 of the Insurance Article as to required additional coverage. -5- insurance [a]bsent a statute to the contrary, we would follow[] the general rule, which was to uphold th e validity of the exclusion. 307 Md. at 635, 516 A.2d at 588. (Citations omitted.) The enactmen t of § 19-5 04 of the In surance A rticle and Title 17 of the Transportation Article, however, sub stantially changed the public policy of this state with rega rd to motor vehicle insurance and reparations for damages caused by motor vehicle accidents. Jennings v. Geico, 302 Md. 352, 357, 488 A.2d 166, 168 (1985). Section 19-504 of the Insurance Article and Title 17 of the Transportation Article and related statutes effectively mandated compulsory automobile insurance with required minimum coverages. The Maryland General Assemb ly enacted the compulsory insurance statutes in an attempt to provide so me recovery for innocent victims of mo tor veh icle acc idents. State Farm, 307 Md. at 639, 516 A.2d at 590. (C itations o mitted.) A s the Co urt of S pecial A ppeals noted, in this case , [a]fter the ena ctmen t of the c ompu lsory liability in suranc e law, c ertain exclusions commo nly found in a utomob ile insurance policies that ef fectively excluded all liability coverage were held to violate public policy and declared invalid. See, e.g., Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 303, 841 A.2d 858 (2004) (holding that a pizza exclusion, by which an insurer could deny coverage to an insured driver delivering property for compensation at the time of th e accident, was void as against p ublic policy); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 237, 528 A.2d 912 (1986) (concludin g that a ph antom ve hicle exclus ion, which ex cluded liab ility coverage to a Maryland insured in cases where there was no physical contact between the insured vehicle and the phanto m veh icle, wa s invalid under M aryland la w). Wilson, 167 Md. App. at 537, 893 A.2d at 1183. Wilson argues that Nationwide s attempt to reduce liability coverage from the stated -6- policy amount of $1,0 00,000 per pe rson to the sta tutory limit of $20 ,000 per pe rson is unlawful because, in his view, the General Assembly permits only certain exclusions and that this Court has acted to invalidate many exclusions which were not expressly authorized. Simply put, Wilson contends that this Court should deem the fellow employee exclusion invalid because it has not been recognized by Maryland s General Assembly. Wilson cites, among other ca ses, Jennings and Enterprise v. Allstate, 341 Md. 541 , 671 A.2d 509 (1996), in supp ort of th is propo sition. In Jennings, at issue was the validity of a hous ehold exc lusion claus e contained within an autom obile liab ility insuran ce polic y. The hou sehold ex clusion in that policy opera ted to bar coverage for family m embers in jured in an accident involving the insured vehicle. Jennings, 302 Md. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. Mr. Jennings was involved in an automobile collision. The vehicle was owned by him but operated by his stepson who resided in the same household. Mr. Jennings brought a declaratory judgment action against GEICO, the automob ile liability insu rer, asserting that the household exclusion contained in the policy was void because it was con trary to the statute.3 In Jennings, we held that the hou sehold exclusion clause of . . . [the] automobile liability insurance policy was invalid. We reasoned 3 Jennings c ontended that the hou sehold ex clusion at issu e was inc onsistent w ith the public policy expressed in § 17-103 of the Transportation Article. The Court of Special A ppeals corr ectly said, it is the pu blic policy of this S tate, as reflected in this legislation, that security for bodily [injury] and death claims be provided for all . . . motor vehicles in the form of liability coverage in the minimum amounts of $20,000 for one person and $40,000 for two or more persons. Nationwide v. Wilson, 167 Md. App. 527, 546, 893 A. 2d 1177, 1189 (20 06). -7- that the exclusio n was co ntrary to the pub lic policy expres sed in M aryland s com pulsory automob ile liability law. State Farm, 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586. In that case, we agreed with the rea soning in a similar case that the ex clusion w as contrary to the public policy [b]ecause the stated pu rpose of [M aryland s compulsory insurance law ] is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum level, [and that] such an exclusion provision contravenes the purpose and policy of the . . . act. Jennings, 302 Md. at 362, 488 A.2d at 170. (Alteration added.) (Citation om itted.) In Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 M d. 436, 4 44, 849 A.2d 5 39, 544 (2004 ), we sa id, the purpose of the Maryland compulsory statutes is to [assure] recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle s accide nts. Nonetheless, we stated in State Farm that we do not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory minimum coverage, so far as the household exclusion is concerned. Succinctly stated, the public policy in question in State Farm and in . . . [Stearman] is that all automobile liability policies shall contain bodily injury or death liability cov erage in at least th e amo unt of $ 20,000 /$40,00 0. (Citatio ns omi tted.) In Enterprise, the issue before the Co urt was whether the lessor of a moto r vehicle is relieved of financial responsibility for third-party claims resulting from the negligent operation of its rental vehicle by a permittee w hen the ve hicle s opera tion is in violation of the express terms of the rental agreement. 341 Md. at 543, 671 A.2d a t 510. Following an automob ile collision resu lting in bodily injury, A llstate sought a declaratory jud gment tha t, based on § 18-102,4 Enterprise was obligated to provide minimum security in the amount 4 Md. C ode (197 7, 2006 R epl. Vol.) §1 8-102 of the Transp ortation Ar ticle (continued...) -8- 4 (...continued) provides: (a)(1) The Administration may not register any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer to be rented until the owner of the vehicle certifies to the satisfaction o f the Adm inistration that the owner h as security for the vehicle in the same form and providing for the same minimum benefits as the security required by Title 17 of this article for motor vehicles. (2)(i) In this para graph, "rep lacement v ehicle" me ans a veh icle that is loaned by an auto repair f acility or a dealer, or th at an individ ual rents temporarily, to use while a vehicle owned by the individual is not in use because o f loss, as "loss" is defined in that individu al's applicable p rivate passenger autom obile insurance policy, or because o f breakdow n, repair, service, or damage. (ii) Subject to subparagraph (iii) of this paragraph, an owner of a replacem ent vehicle m ay satisfy the require ment of p aragraph ( 1) of this subsection by maintaining the required security described in § 17-103 of this article that is secondary to any other valid and collectible coverage and that extends coverage to the owner's vehicle in am ounts required unde r § 17-103(b) of this article while it is used as a replacement vehicle. (iii) If an owner of a replacement vehicle provides coverage as provided under subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, the agreement for the replacement vehicle to be signed by the renter or the individual to whom the vehicle is loan ed shall con tain a provisio n on the fa ce of the ag reement, in at least 10 point bold type, that informs the individual that the coverage on the vehicle being serviced or repaired is primary coverage for the replacement vehicle and the coverage maintained by the owner on the replacem ent v ehic le is s econ dary. (b) N otw ithstanding a ny pro visio n of the renta l agreem ent to the c ontrary, the security requ ired under th is section sha ll cover the o wner of the vehicle and each person driving or using the vehicle with the permission of the owner or lessee. (c) If the A dministration finds that the vehicle ow ner has faile d or is unab le to maintain the required security, the Administration shall suspend the (continued...) -9- of $20,000 per person/$40,000 per occurrence . . . [of] bodily injury . . . . Enterprise, 341 Md. at 544, 671 A.2d at 511. Judge Raker, writing for the Court, stated that if the General Assemb ly had intended to exclude coverage for unauthorized permittees, it would have made such an exclusion an explicit part of the law. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 549, 671 A.2d at 514. Acc ordingly, pursuant to rules of statutory construction, the Court held that § 18-102 of the Transportation Code cover[ed] operators of leased vehicles driving these vehicles with the permission of the le ssee ev en wh en the le ssee vio lated the terms o f the ren tal agree ment, and that, despite the terms of Enterp rise s rental agreement, Enterp rise must provide the required security to the extent of th e statuto ry minim um. Enterprise, 341 Md. at 543, 671 A.2d at 510. In State Farm, we considered whether the household exclusion contained within an automob ile insurance policy was w holly invalid, or whether its invalidity extend[ed] only to the amount of minimum liability coverage required by the compulsory insurance law. 307 Md. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587-88. We acknowledged that the household exclusion at issue in that case was not a mong th e exclusion s expressly perm itted by the Ge neral Asse mbly, but, nonetheless, still found the exclusion valid. We explained that what the legislature has prohibited is liability coverage of less than the minimum amounts required by § 17-103 (b)(1) of the Transportation Article and therefore [t]he household exclusion violates pub lic policy only to the extent it operates to prevent this mandatory minimum coverage. State 4 (...continued) registration of the vehicle. -10- Farm, 307 Md. at 637, 516 A.2d at 589. The household exclusion in that case provided for coverage in excess of the amounts required by § 17-103 (b)(1) of the Transpo rtation Article and the refore d id not v iolate pu blic poli cy. Judge Adkins, writing for the Court in State Farm, warned against reading Jennings too sweepin gly, as Wilson d oes in this case. The Court no ted that Jennings speaks in broad terms of the invalidity of the household exclusio n because of its violation of the statutory compulsory liability insurance policy. State Farm, 307 Md. at 636, 516 A.2d at 588. We reaffirm Jennings and point o ut that Jennings and State Farm stand for th e principle tha t, although not explicitly mentioned by the General Assembly, an exclusion can be a valid and enforcea ble contractual provision as to coverage above the minim um statutory au tomobile liability insu rance a moun t. In addition, Wilson contends that our holding in Larimore v. Am. Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 522 A.2d 889 (1989), is unmistakable that the fellow employee exclusion is invalid.5 In Larimore, the issue before the Court was whether a fellow employee exclusion in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy . . . [was] valid in light of M aryland s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law and Maryland s workers compensation law. 314 Md. at 619, 552 A.2d at 889. Mr. Larimore was involved in a workplace accident, resulting in serious 5 As the Court of Special Appea ls noted, [f]ellow em ployee exclusions are liability exclusions in automobile policies that are seen most often in commercial policies . . . and are designed to prevent an employer from maintaining coverage for employees under both worker s compensation and business automobile insurance policies. Wilson, 167 M d.App . at 536, 8 93 A.2 d at 118 2. (Citati ons om itted.) -11- injuries. Subsequently, he sought a declaratory judgment declaring, among other things, that the fellow employee exclusion was void under Maryland s compulsory insurance law. On appeal, the intermed iate appellate c ourt validated the fellow employee ex clusion, at issue, concluding that the fello w emp loyee exclusio n should be upheld be cause of th e availability of workers compensation benefits. Larimore, 314 Md. at 621, 552 A.2d at 890. This Court however, disagreed, holding that the fellow employee exclusion in that case wa s invalid under Maryland la w. We re asoned th at the insuran ce policy in that c ase remo ve[d] all insurance coverage and [would] leave[] the tort defendant uninsured if the tort plaintiff . . . [were] a fellow employee, and if the accident arouse out of and in the course of employment. Larimore, 314 M d. at 623 , 552 A .2d at 89 1. We compare the insurance policy in Larimore with the insurance policy issued in the present case. The fellow e mployee exclusion con tained in Nationw ide s policy is a standard provision which reduces coverage in connection with claims by an employee against the employer as a result of an injury on the job and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto. The fellow employee ex clusion in this case closely resembles the household exclusions at issue in State Farm and Stearman, in that they all exclude coverage beyond the mandatory minimum coverage, but, unlike the exclusion in Larimore, do not exclude all coverage. It is our view that, similar to Jennings, Larimore should not be read so sweepingly. In Larimore, this Court did not reach the question of whether a fellow employee exclusion that excluded coverage above the mandatory minimum coverage -12- was valid. Instead, Larimore is unmistakable, only in its holding, that the availability of workers compensation insurance coverage does not permit the insurer to exclude a ll coverage under t he liabilit y policy. That case, however, is silent on the issue in the case sub judice and thu s, is not d irect pre ceden t. In further support of his position, Wilson cites West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 723 A.2d 1 (1998). In that case, we invalidated insurance policy provisions that excluded vehicles owned or operated by a self-insurer or by any governmental unit or agency from the definition of uninsured/underinsured vehicles. Stearman, 381 Md. at 445, 849 A.2d at 545. Wilson contends that, as we did in Popa, we should refrain from applying the holding in State Farm.6 As we noted in Stearman, however, the application of State Farm was inappropriate, in part, because the statutorily required minimum uninsured/underinsured coverage which an insurer must offer is not $20,000/$40,000. Instead, an insurer must offer an amount of uninsured/underinsured coverage equal to the liability coverage provided for in the po licy. Stearman, 381 Md. at 447 n. 7, 849 A.2d at 546 n.7 (quoting Popa, 352 Md. at 477-78, 723 A.2d at 12 ). As the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals accurately noted in this case, in Popa this Court was concerned that the purchaser of a policy could unexpectedly find that the coverage amount set-forth on the declaration page 6 As discussed supra, in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 644, 516 A.2d 586, 592 (1986), we held that the household exclusion clause was invalid only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage of $20,000/$40,000. -13- of the policy was limited to the statutory m inimum . Wilson, 167 Md. App. at 544, 893 A.2d at 1187. This is not a concern in the present case because Nationwide is not required to offer an amount o f coverag e equal to th e liability coverag e provided in the policy. Allegheny purchased the policy and the provisions of the policy satisfy the minimum statutory requireme nt, 7 under Maryland law. To that end, we see the facts of Popa as significan tly distinct and thus decline to apply its holding here. Wilson further asserts that the fellow employee exclusio n contrave nes the pu blic policy underlying the compulso ry insurance s tatutes. He c ontends th at this Court s decisions in Jennings, State Farm, Nationwide, and Stearman were limited to household exclusions, have not been a pplied in an y other contex t, and do no t operate as a general va lidation of all exclusions that provid e cove rage ab ove sta tutory min imum s. While this C ourt has on ly dealt with the fellow employee exclusion in Larimore, and our previous decisions in Jennings, State Farm, Nationwide, and Stearman dealt with the household exclusion, the validity of which is not in question today, we have ma de clear ou r view of the public policy underlying the compulsory insurance statutes. As noted supra, in Stearman we said the purpose of the Maryland compulsory statutes is to [assure] recov ery for innocent victims of motor vehicles accidents. 381 Md. at 444, 849 A.2d at 544. Thus each automobile insurance policy must 7 As discussed supra, each automobile insurance policy minimally must include liability insurance for the payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $2 0,000 for any one perso n and up to $40 ,000 for any two or m ore persons, § 17-103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article; §19-504 of the Insurance Article. -14- contain coverage for the follo wing: liability insur ance of th e payment o f claims fo r bodily injury or death arising fro m an acc ident of up to $20,000 for any one p erson and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons[] . . . . Jennings, 302 Md. at 358, 488 A.2d at 169. The fellow employee exclusion provision under review is in compliance with M aryland s compulsory automob ile insurance law. We noted in Stearman, that despite the allure of the idea of total compensation for any innocent victim of a motor vehicle accident, there is no indication that the General Assembly s purpose in enacting the compulsory insurance statutes was to assure complete insurance recovery for all victims. 381 Md. at 449, 849 A.2d at 547. (Emphasis in original.) Further, we said that if the General Assembly had intended something closer to complete insurance recovery for all victims, [it] would have said so or increased the mand atory liability limits. Stearman, 381 Md. at 450, 849 A.2d at 547. In this case, the fellow employee exclusion contained within Nationwide s policy with Allegheny provides that the exc lusion doe s not apply for coverage up to the minimum limit specified by the Maryland Vehicle Law. Effectively, Allegheny contracted with Na tionwide to provide the statutorily required minimum for any liability incurred as a result of a fellow emplo yee accid ent. Despite A llegheny and Nationw ide s right to enter into a m utually agreeable contract, Wilson argues that the fellow employee exclusion in this case permits Allegheny and Nationwide to contract away the rights of Allegheny s employees. As a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish. A contractual provision tha t violates pub lic policy is -15- invalid, but only to the extent of the conflict between the stated public policy and the contractual provision. State Farm, 307 Md. at 643, 516 A.2d at 592. Further, [t]he pub lic policy embodied in the co mpulsory insurance la w extend s only to liability coverage up to and including the statutory minimum coverage. Id. When reviewing insurance policies this Court must determine whether the clauses contained within the policy are contrary to the state s public policy as expressed in the releva nt statute s. See Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 125, 48 A.2d. 754, 759 (1946). In the case sub judice, Nationwide and Allegheny entered into a contra ct to provide automobile liability insurance. They were free to enter into a contract that provided for coverage above that required by the compulsory insurance law, as compulsory insurance creates a floor rather than a ceiling to liability coverage. Admitted ly, it is possible that Nationwide s policy will not provide full and complete recovery for all victims, but as discussed supra, it is not by law req uired to do so. Insurance contracts may law fully excl ude pa rticular ris ks. Under the auto policy in this case, Allegheny is able to minimize the increased premiums associated with maintaining coverage under two policies, a business automobile policy and a workers compensation policy. To that end, however, the insurance policies Allegheny maintained with Nationwide provided Allegheny s employees w ith the statutorily ma ndated au to liability coverag e in addition to workers compensation benefits.8 Moreover, we would be acting as a legislative body if we 8 Assuming arguendo, under the policy presented in this case, if the injuries exceed the $20,000 minimum coverage provided by the Auto Policy, recourse for an Allegheny employee who is injured by a fellow employee s negligent actions is through workers (continued...) -16- were to conclude that Nationwide or Allegheny acted outside their rights when they contracted to reduce coverage consistent with the Maryland co mpulsory insurance statutes. Compulsory insurance requires minimum auto liability insurance coverage. Only the General Assemb ly or the parties to th e contract m ay increase the a mount o f coverag e, in this contex t, not the C ourts. CONCLUSION We hold, therefore, that a business auto insurance policy that contains a fellow employee exclusion clause is invalid to the extent that it provides less than the minimum statutory liability coverage. So far as the public policy evidenced by M aryland s compulsory automob ile insurance la w is concerned, it is a valid and enforceable contractual provision as to cove rage ab ove tha t minim um statu tory liability lim its. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT O F S P E C IA L A P P E A LS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER. 8 (...continued) compensation benefits. In this case, there is no dispute that Allegheny provided workers compen sation cove rage for this a ccident. -17- In the Circu it Court for C arroll Coun ty Case No. 06-C-04-040053 IN THE COURT OF A PPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 22 September Term, 2006 __________________________________ TAYLOR F. WILSON v. NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. __________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Bell , C.J. __________________________________ Filed: November 14, 2006 Respect fully, I dissent for the same reasons stated in my dissenting opinion filed in Stearman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 381 Md. 436 , 849 A.2d 539 (2004).

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