Attorney Grievance v. Guida

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Attorney Grievance Commission v. Joseph M. Guida, Misc. Do cket AG No. 17, S ept. Term, 2004. ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE DISCIPLINARY ACTION CONDUCT OF DISHONESTY, FRAUD, DECEIT, OR MISREPRESENTATION MITIGATION OF SANCTION BASED ON ATTORNEY'S MENTAL OR PHYSICAL CONDITION Disbarment is warranted where an attorney violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC ") 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 8.1(b), and, most significantly, 8.4(c) and (d) in connection with the attorney's falsifying of an adoption order and judge's signature. This Court maintained that in cases of intention al dishones ty, deceit, or misrepresentation, the ordinary sanction of disbarment shall not be diluted unless the proof satisfies the significant threshold for excusing or mitigating a sanction for such conduct, based on the attor ney's mental or physical condition at the time of the misconduct, as outlined in Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md . 376 , 773 A.2d 463 (20 01). Her e, the attor ney's severe major depression (and related sequelae) was not so great that it satisfied the Vanderlinde threshold for mitigation of the sanction for his violations of the MRPC. Circuit Co urt for Harfo rd Coun ty C a se # 12 -C - 04 -0 0 16 3 6M 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 17 September Term, 2004 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. JOSEPH M. GUIDA Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: February 7, 2006 I. In this attorney disciplinary action, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland ("Petitioner"), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Joseph M. Guida, Esquire ("Respondent"), charging him with violations arising out of his representation of Mr. and Mrs. Danny Lee Bird. Respondent was charged with violating Rules 1.1 (Co mpetence), 1 1.3 (Diligence), 2 1.4(a) and (b) (Commu nication), 3 (Fees), 4 1.5(a) 1 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property),5 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Rule 1.1 provides: A lawyer shall pro vide com petent repre sentation to a client. Competent representatio n requires th e legal kno wledge, sk ill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. Unless otherwise provided, all Rule references in this opinion are to the Maryland Rules of Profes sional Conduct ( M RPC ). 2 Rule 1.3 provides: A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptn ess in representing a client. 3 Rule 1.4 (a) and (b) provide: (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and prom ptly comply with reasonab le reques ts for inf ormatio n. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the exten t reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 4 Rule 1.5(a ) states that: A lawyer s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered (contin ued...) 1 Disciplinary Matters),6 and 8.4(c) a nd (d) (M isconduc t)7 of the Maryland Rules of 4 (...continued) in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular e mploymen t will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship w ith the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) wheth er the fee is f ixed or con tingent. 5 Rule 1.15(a) provides: A lawyer shall ho ld property of clients or third persons tha t is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Fun ds shall be k ept in a separate account m aintained p ursuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Marylan d Rules. O ther proper ty shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds an d of other p roperty shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termina tion of th e repres entation . 2 Professional Con duct ("MRP C"); 8 and Maryland Rule of Procedure 16-812.9 The case was assigned by this Court to Judge Emo ry A. Plitt, Jr. of the Circuit Court for Harford County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and thereafter render findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law with regard to the alleged violations. After a number of extensions of time were granted by this Court, the hearing judge commenced the 6 Rule 8.1(b) provides: An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in connec tion with a b ar admissio n application or in connectio n with a dis ciplinary matter, sh all not: * 7 * * * (b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. * Rule 8.4(c) and (d) provide: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: * * * * (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. * 8 Because Respondent's conduct occurred prior to 1 July 2005, the effective date of the latest global revision of the MRPC, the version of the MRPC in effect prior to 1 July 2005 is applicable to the present case. 9 Maryland Rule 16-8 12 simply ado pts the M RPC, as set forth in the appe ndix of the Maryland Rules of Procedure, and does not constitute a discrete provision establishing a standard of conduct itself which one may be said to have violated. 3 evidentiary hearing on 13 Jan uary 2005 10 and carried it over to 18 March 2005 when it was concluded. On or about 7 April 2005, Judge Plitt filed his 25 March 2005 w ritten opinion in this matter. In the opinion, the hearing judge made the following factual findings, by a clear and convincing evidentiary standard:11 The Respo ndent, J oseph M. G uida, w as admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals on Decem ber 1, 1976. He most recently maintained an office for the practice of law at 608 South Main Street, Bel Air, Maryland 21014. Stacia Lynn Bird is the mother of Kaitlyn Stanle y (d/o/b 9/25/90) and Jessica E. Stanley (d/o/b 9/12/93). On July 15, 1998, this court issued a Judgment of Absolute Divorce at Mrs. Bird s request from he r then husban d, David Lee Stan ley. David Lee Stan ley is th e nat ural fath er of Kaitlyn and Jessica. Mrs. Bird was awarded sole custody of Kaitlyn and Jessica. Subsequent to her divorce from M r. Stanley, she married Danny Lee Bird. Afte r some disc ussion, M r. and M rs. Bird decid ed that they would like to petition an appropriate court for M r. Bird to formally adopt Kaitlyn and Jessica. Mr. and Mrs. Bird contacted Mr. Guida in May of 2002 to possibly retain him to handle the adoption matter. Mr. Guida completed an Attorney New Matter Memo on May 8, 2002. Mr. Guida d iscussed w ith them how a doptions are handled and 10 Although Respon dent could not be pres ent at the 13 January 200 5 hearing, h is counsel represented that Respondent specifically authorized the hearing to p roceed in h is absenc e. 11 Bar Counsel earlier had provided to Respondent and his counsel a written Request For Admissions of Fact and Genu inenes s of D ocum ents. The Request went unanswered. At the hearing, Respondent s counsel conceded the truth of the matters contain ed in the R equest. Acc ordingly, and pursuant to Maryland Rules 16-756 and 2-424(b), the matters addressed in the Request were deemed admitted for purposes of these proceedings. 4 told Mr. and Mrs. Bird that they would need to obtain docume nts and additional information for him before he could proceed. Mr. and Mrs. Bird obtained the services of Mr. Guida through a legal service s plan referr al. Mr. and M rs. Bird form ally retained M r. Guida to h andle the adoption matter in August of 2002. They paid Mr. Guida the sum of $735.00 on August 16, 2002. Previously on July 22, 2002, Mr. Guida sent Mr. and Mrs. Bird a Retainer Agreement which they signed and returned to him. Thus, as soon as the agreed fee was paid, Mr. and Mrs. Bird completed the arrangeme nts with Mr. Guida and he undertook the representation. The gap between July 22, 2002 and August 16, 2002 had to do with the Birds getting the money together and obtaining some additional documents for Mr. Guida. Mr. Guida admitted that by early September, 2002, he had received f ull payment and all necessary docum ents. Mr. Guida told M r. and Mrs. Bird that the entire adoption pro cess would take a nywhere between three and four months. After retaining M r. Guida, M rs. Bird wo uld periodic ally contact his office to inquire as to progress. Between October 1, 2002, and the end of May, 2003, Mrs. Bird and her husband contacted Mr. Guida s office on numerous occasions. These contacts were by telephone and in person. In a ddition to contacting Mr. Guida s office, Mr. and Mrs. Bird contacted the Cecil County Circuit Court Clerk s Office to check on the status of their case. When they did, they found out there was no case yet filed. On some of these occasions (status contacts), Mr. Guida told the Birds that the case was delayed in the court. He told the Birds that he would check the progress of their case with the court and let th em kn ow. Mr. Guida told the Birds these things knowing full well that he had never filed the action with the court. Sometime in December of 2002, in response to one of the Birds many inquiries, Mr. Guida gave Mrs. Bir d a document entitled Judgment of Adoption Penden te Lite. When he gave 5 this document to Mrs. Bird, he told her that the Ju dge decid ed to issue a tempora ry adoption O rder while a ttempts we re made to locate the girls natural father. A handwritten notation appears on the bottom of the O rder stating that a final Order would be issued in 60-90 days. The Order and the handwritten notation at the bottom purport to bear the signature and initials respectively of the Honorable O. Robert Lidum, Judge of the Circuit Court for Cec il Co unty. In a word, the purported Order is a fraud and the alleged signature and initials of Judge Lidum are forgeries. Judge Lidum provided an Affidavit to the Attorney Grievance Commission so stating and Mr. Guida has admitted that the document is a fake and that he forged the document and Judge Lidum signature and initials. Mr. and Mrs. Bird were very concerned about the matter in March of 2003, three months having pa ssed. Mr. G uida told them that he would check the status with the court. Thereaf ter, Mr. Guida failed to return ph one calls from the B irds and was not in his office when the Birds would go there to inquire. Fina lly, in May of 2003, Mr. Guida told the Birds he was going to have surgery but wo uld check with the c ourt concerning the progress of their case an d get ba ck to the m. He never did. Having received no communication or response from Mr. Guida, the Birds filed their complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission on July 7, 2003. Two days after the B irds filed their complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission, Mr. Guida wrote them a letter apologizing for his actions. In that letter of July 9, 2003, he attributed his failures to physical and psychological problems. He enclosed with that letter a check in the amount of $735.00 representing a full refund of the money that the Birds h ad paid Mr. Guida when they retained him. After being formally notified by the Attorney Grievance Commission of the Birds comp laint, Mr. G uida ultimate ly responded to Deputy Bar Counsel, Glenn M. Grossman, by letter dated September 16, 2003. In his letter to Mr. Grossman, Mr. Guida admitted the truth of the Birds complaint. H owever, in 6 that same letter, M r. Guida did not explain the fraudulent adoption Order. The formal notification to Mr. Guida from the Attorney Grievance Commission of the Birds complaint was a letter to Mr. Guida from Mr. G rossman dated July 13, 2003. Mr. Grossman s letter directed Mr. Guida to respond within 10 days. He did not. In fact, M r. Guida did not respond as directed by Mr. Grossman until September 16, 2003, some two months after the date of M r. Grossman s letter. Mr. Guida has also admitted that after receiving the $735.00 payment from the Birds he failed to deposit and maintain tho se funds in the required trust accoun t. [ ]Mr. Guida admits the truth of what happened. [ ] When the hearing of January 13, 2005 was adjourned, [his attor ney] again told me that Mr. Guida d oes not disp ute the facts and that the real issu e in this matter is mitigation. (Internal footnote omitted; som e alterations in original). Based on the facts as found by him (and conceded by Respondent), the hearing judge, citing as authorities Att y Griev. Comm n v. Christopher, 383 Md. 624, 861A.2d 692 (2003) and Att y Griev. Comm n v. Vanderlinde, 364 M d. 376, 773 A.2d 46 3 (2000), c oncluded that, as to the flagship charges, Respondent violated Rules 8.4 (c) and (d). He reasoned as follows: [Respondent s] creation of a fraudule nt adoption Order and his forgery of the signature and initials of Judge Lidum and thereafter representing to the Birds that it was a bonafide Order of the Circuit Court for Cecil C ounty is beyond any shadow of a doubt dish onest, fraud ulent, deceitf ul and a gross misrepresentation in violation o f Rule 8.4(c). It is also without doubt, clearly prejudicia l to the adm inistration of ju stice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). Mr. Guida intended that the Birds rely on the fraudulent Order. He then gave the Birds a handwritten note suggesting that they give this copy to the girls for Christm as. 7 Respondent also violated Rule 8.4(c ) and Ru le 8.4(d) by his continuing misreprese ntations am ounting to o utright lies to the Birds concerning the status of their case and his representation to the Birds that the Order was genuine. As to these violations, the violation of Rule 8.4(c) are obvious. As to Rule 8.4(d), such conduct is clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice. Clients and the public have the right to expect that attorneys will be truthful and, when it comes to court proceedings, that they can rely on what they are told and the purported court documents given to them. One can only imagine the Birds reaction when they actually went to the Circuit Court for Cecil County and ultimately found out that nothing had been filed. Mr. Guida s conduct clearly is a blow to the administration of justice and thus, in the final analysis prejudicial thereto. (Internal citation omitted). Judge Plitt concluded that Rule 1 .3 also had b een violated by Respon dent, in that agreeing to represent the Birds, he took no action at all to follow through on the adoption . . . a relative ly uncom plicated matter. A violation of Rule 1.15(a) was found because the fee and cost advance paid by the Birds to R esponde nt was no t deposited in to a trust acco unt. As to Rules 1.4(a) and (b), the hearing judge found the former to have been violated (the Birds were not kept reasonably informed about the status of the adoption initiative), but not the latter (the B irds testified that Respo ndent exp lained wh at was ne cessary to accomplish the ado ption and they both professe d to understand w hat was expected ). The hea ring judge w as not persu aded suf ficiently that the claimed violation of Rule 1.5(a) had merit. Rather, he concluded that the $735.00 flat fee for the adoption undertaken, including court costs, was not unreasonable. 8 Finding a violation of Rule 8.1(b), the hearing judge noted that Respondent conceded that he failed to respond timely to Bar Counsel s request for information. Fina lly, the hearing judge found a violation of Rule 1.1 because, although no evidence was presented that Respondent lacked the requisite latent knowledge or skill to handle an adoption of the relatively uncomplex nature of the one so ught by the B irds, he clearly did not provide the thoroughness and preparation for the undertaken representation. Turning to the matter o f mitigation, w hich the he aring judge duly noted ne eded to satisfy only a preponderance of the evidence standard (M d. Rule 16-7 57(b)), Judg e Plitt concluded: Mr. Guida has established by a preponderance of the evidence that prior to the death of his father in 1999, he had a relatively successful law practice. Af ter the death o f his father, he started h aving d ifficulty. It was revealed during the testimony on March 18, 2005, that Mr. Guida was the subject of a Conditional Diversion Agreement [with Petitioner] in 2001 having to do with his failure to record a deed for another client. That Conditional Diversion Agreement apparently terminated close to the time that he undertook representation of the Birds. The Birds complaint was received by the Attorney Grievance Commission on July 7, 2 003. B y letter of Ju ly 15, 200 3, from Deputy Bar Counsel, Glenn M. Grossman, Mr. Guida was advised of the complaint and directed to provide information. It is clear that at least by June 19, 2003, Mr. Guida knew a complaint was coming. On that date, Mrs. Bird contacted the Circuit Court for Cecil County concerning the fraudulent Order. At the request of an employee of the Clerk s Office, she faxed a copy of the O rder to the co urt. Almost immediately she was contacted by the Clerk s Office and advised that the Order was fraudulent and also was advised that she should contact the Attorney Grievance Commission. On that same date, she confronted Mr. Guida concerning the matter via telephone call. 9 At that point, M r. Guida kn ew he w as in troub le. B y letter of July 9, 2003, he returned the Birds money to them and admitted what he had done. H e had also had at least a pre liminary exchange of corr espon dence with M r. Grossman. The significance of this is that shortly thereafte r, in August of 2003, Mr. Guida co ntacted G ary Pasquine lli, Ph.D., a psycho logist. Dr. Pasquine lli testified that when he first saw Mr. Guida it was his recollection that he was taking an anti-depressant that had been prescribed for him by his medical do ctor.[12] Dr. Pasqu inelli testified that af ter his initial evaluation, Mr. Guida came under his care for individual psycho-therapy and has been in his care every since on a week ly or bi-weekly ba sis. Dr. Pasq uinelli described Mr. Guida at the time he undertook his therapy as being very negative an d experien cing difficu lty with fatigue and other symptoms of depre ssion. Dr. Pasquinelli suggested that Mr. Guida obtain additional medication which he ultimately did. Dr. Pasquinelli s testimony was relatively brief and centered on his initial evaluation of Mr. Guida and his continuing treatment of him . At the request of Mr. Guida s counsel, Mr. Guida was evalua ted by D r. Christi ane Te llefsen , M.D ., a Board Certified Forensic Psyc hiatrist. [13] Dr. Tellefsen met with Mr. Guida on March 19, 2004 . In addition to her interview with Mr. Guida, Dr. Tellefsen reviewed treatment records of Dr. Pasquinelli. She also interviewed Mr. Guida s wife and Judith Eagle, Esquire, a local attorney with whom Mr. Guida shares office space. She also reviewe d material supplied to her by M r. Grossman and the previous Condition al Diversio n Agree ment. Dr. Tellefsen described h er mission a s to determine whether or not, in her professional opinion, Mr. Guida had any mental disorder or emotional problems affe cting his conduct. Dr. 12 Judge Plitt noted that Respondent did not identify the name of the prescribing physician. 13 Judge Plitt observed, in a footnote, that Dr. Tellefsen had been recommended by Deputy Bar Counsel to Respondent s counsel as a psychiatrist who w as well acq uainted w ith attorney grievance matters. 10 Tellefsen was also provided with information concerning the complaint of the Birds. Dr. Tellefsen described M r. Guida as a good student who had a good Jesuit education and was intellectually successful. He was also involved in numerous outside activities, talented musically and having a successful practice. Mr. Guida had previously served as an Assistant United States Attorney and had been employed at the law firm of Smith, Somerville and Case prior to setting out on his own. His mother and father came to the United States from Italy and settled in New Jersey where h e was bo rn. Dr. Tellef sen opine d that the de ath of Mr. Guida s father in 1999 affected him more than he may have realized. Dr. Tellefsen described Mr. Guida as coming from a traditional Italian Catho lic Jesuit background and, as the oldest sibling, having to tak e res ponsibility of the family upon the death of his fathe r. This includ ed a respo nsibility, off and on, for taking care of his mother. Following the death of his father, Mr. Guida s health deteriorated. He gradually withdrew from the multitude of outside activities in which he was involved and, according to Dr. Tellefsen, started a downward slide into major depression. His depression was c ompounde d by a back injury in 2002 which ultimate ly required surgery. He experienced a lot of back pain and neurological difficu lty. He had to take medication for the back pain. From her discussion with M r. Guida, Ms. Eagle, and Mr. Guida s wife, Dr. Tellefsen determined that Mr. Guida, at some point along the depression scale, started to in essence lose control of his practice. He started staying away from the office and not following up on inquiries from clients. He gained about 100 pounds in weight, had no energy, had back pain, and became withdraw n. It was D r. Tellefsen s opinion that Mr. Guida s depression became worse in June of 2002, some months before his surgery. Dr. Tellefsen learned that Mr. Guida became the subject of many complaints from his clients con cerning his lack of attention. According to Dr. Tellefsen, Mr. Guida basically ignored h is practice. M r. Guida him self testified that 11 he lost importan t clients. He w as terminate d as a particip ant in a pre-paid legal services plan as a result of the Bird s compla int. Dr. Tellefsen agreed with Dr. Pasquinelli that Mr. Guida had suffered from severe depression during the time he was representing the Birds. In response to questions from Bar Counsel on crossexamination, Dr. Tellefsen testified that she could not find any indication o f any dishon esty on Mr. G uida s part. It was Dr. Tellefsen s opinion that during the course of his representation of the Birds, Mr. Guida suffered from major depression complicated by his back troubles and other medical problems (including his obesity) and that the combination of these things seve rely impaired h is ability to maintain his functioning and his law practice. As previously noted, by letter of July 9, 2003, Mr. Guida returned the Birds money to them and apologized for his actions. He expressed remorse in that letter and expressed remorse when he testified before me on March 18, 2005. The question for me then is do I find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Guida has established mitigation? Based on the uncontradicted testimony of D octors Tellefsen and Pasquine lli, I find that Mr. Guida has established mitigation. That is not th e end of it. With regard to the violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4, I find that he has not established mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Tellefsen was asked very specifically about the fraudulent adoption Order and the forging of Judge Lidu m s signature. Dr. Tellefs en said that sh e thought th at Mr. Guida saw the forgery as a way to satisfy the Birds. While she characterized Mr. Guida s depression as a strong influence on his actions, Dr. Tellefsen testified that in her p rofessional opinion, Mr. Guida h ad created the fraudulent document and forged Judge Lidum s signature knowing exactly what he was 12 doing and knowing that it was wrong and deceitful. D r. Tellefsen also testified th at Mr. G uida knew that he had not followed through on the actions he was supposed to take for the Birds. Amazin gly enough, Mr. Guida testified that he had no recollection of preparing the fraudulent Order. When confronted with the facts, Mr. Guida told me that he clearly did it. Mr. Guida said that he was having trouble forming a mental picture of preparing the fraudulent Order and could not believe that he had don e it. Mr. Gu ida was e vasive abo ut it when crossexamined by Mr. Grossman and asked questions by me. At one point, I asked Mr. Guida directly if he was telling me under oath that he had absolutely no recollection of preparing the Order and forging Judge Lidum s signature. His response was equivocal at best. He wanted me to believe that he had blocked it out of his min d. Mr. Gu ida was a good histo rian with reg ard to all of the events surrounding his representation of the Birds with the exception of the fraudulent Order. He also knew that he was ignoring them. Based on listening to the witnesses, evaluating their testimony and considering all of the facts, Mr. Guida knew exactly what he was doing when he prepared the fraudulent Order and knew exactly what he was doing when he ignored and then lied to the Birds abou t the matter. I also do not find that he has es tabli shed by a preponderance of the evid ence mitiga tion with reg ard to his handling of the mon ey paid by the B irds. It is a simple mechanical matt er to appropr iately deposit f unds paid by a client. His depression and back troubles had absolutely no affe ct on his failur e to p rope rly deposi t money. His medical and psychological problems do in fact mitigate by a preponderance o f the evide nce his failu re to promptly respond to bar Co unsel s inquiry. The inquiries from Bar Counse l came abo ut the time tha t he began his treatment with Dr. Pasquinelli. He was in severe depression at that time and had been ignoring his practice. (Internal footnotes omitted; some alterations to original). 13 Petitioner filed a written exception to Judge Plitt s conclus ion that a vio lation of R ule 1.5(a) had not been established by clear and convincing evidence. Conceding that a $735.00 fee, in the abstract, was not unre asonable for the adoption undertaking in this case, Bar Counsel nonetheless argued, citing Atty. Griev. Comm n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 394, 794 A.2d 92, 104 (2002), that the fee was unreasonable because Respondent took no ac tion to follow through p roperly on the u ndertaking . As to sanction, Bar Counsel urges disbarment in light of the unmitigated intentional dishonesty revealed by the facts underlying the violations of Rules 8.4(c) and (d) primarily, but also taking into account the violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(a), and 8.1(b ). Respondent also filed written exceptions to Judge Plitt s findings of fact and conclusions of law. He gen erally excepted to each de termination adverse to h is interests on the basis that: [Respondent s] position has always been that the conduct occurred, but that it did not legally amount to the Violations alleged because his most serious and utterly [debilitating] mental and physical and health conditions were the root cause of the misconduct and they rend ered him u tterly unable to c onform his conduct in accordance with the law and with Maryland Rules of Profession al Condu ct. Also styled as a gen eral excep tion, Respo ndent, believing that his mitigation evidence in all respects met the preponderance of the evidence standard, complained that it was illogical for Judge Plitt to accept that evidence as mitigating the Rule 8.1(b) violation, but not the other violations. More specifically, Respondent excepted to the findings and conclusions 14 relative to the violation of Rule 1.15(a). His basis was that the fixed fee was earned when paid and, thus, properly deposited directly into his office account. He also took exception to the finding s and con clusions as to the Rule 1 .1 violation because he did not deem his failure to follow through or prepare as bearing on competence. Finally, Respondent pleaded that his 30 years at the B ar deserve d someth ing less than disbarme nt. Reiterating his argument that the mitigation evidence proved that he was ill at the time of the unchallenged factual events, he u rged that he did what he d id solely to provide h is clients childre n with a Christmas present, albeit in the form of a fraudulent adoption decree. II. We acce pt a h earin g jud ge's findings of fact unless we determ ine that they are c learly erroneous. Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Stolarz, 379 Md. 387, 397, 842 A.2d 42, 47 (2004); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 274, 808 A.2d 1251, 1256 (2002). This deference acco rded to the h earing judg e s finding s is appropr iate, in part, because the fact finder is in the best position to assess the demeanor-based credibility of a witness. Stolarz, 379 Md. at 398, 842 A.2d at 48; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17 , 741 A.2d 1143, 11 52 (1999 ); see also Md. R ule 16-759(b)(2)(B) ("The Court shall give due rega rd to the o pportunity of t he hearin g jud ge to asse ss the cre dibility of witnesses."). The hearing judge is pe rmitted to "pic k and cho ose whic h evidenc e to rely upon" from a conflicting array when determining findin gs of f act. Attorney Grievance Comm 'n v. Fezell, 361 M d. 234, 2 53, 760 A.2d 1 108, 11 18 (20 00) (C itation o mitted). 15 In deciding whether the hearing judge's findings of fact are clearly erroneous wh ere exceptions are filed, this Court looks first to M d. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B), which states that "the Court of Appeals sha ll determine whether the findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof set out in Rule 16-757(b)." Under M d. Rule 16-757(b ), where exceptions to findings of fact are filed by Bar Counsel, we consider that Bar Counse l, before the hearing judge, "ha[d] the burden of proving the averments of the peti tion by clear and convincing evidence." See also Attorney Grievance Comm n v. DiCicco, 369 Md. 662, 681, 802 A.2d 1014, 1025 (2002) ("Clear and conv incing evidence m ust be more than a m ere preponderance but not beyond a reasonable doubt.") (Internal quotations omitted) (Citations omitted). Thus, where the exceptions are filed to findings that were favorable to the Respondent attorney, under Md. Rule 16-757(b), we consider also that the attorney "who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or extenuation has the burden of proving the defense or m atter by a prepon deranc e of the eviden ce." 14 See also Attorney 14 Md. Rule 16-710(d) states: "Factual findings shall be supported by clear and convincing evidence." We have previously addressed the relationship of Maryland Rules 16710(d) and 16-7 57(b): [t]he 'clear and convincing' standa rd of Rule [16-710(d)] applies to the measure of proof imposed upon the Attorney Grievance Commission in factual determinations essential to establishing its case against the attorney. It does not a pply to factual matters sought to be established by the attorney in defense of the attor ney's position, including whether mitigating circumstances have been shown. As to this, the preponderance of the evidence standard is the applicable measure of proof. (contin ued...) 16 Grievance Comm n v. Garfield , 369 Md. 85, 797 A.2d 757,765 (2002) (stating that "an attorney in a d iscip linar y proceeding need only establish factual matters in defense of an attorney's position by the preponderance of the evidence, including whether mitigating circumstances existed at the tim e of the alleged misco nduct"). III. Petitioner s sole excep tion, as noted previously, is to the hearing jud ge s failure to conclude that a violation of Rule 1.5(a) occurred when Respondent accepted a $735.00 fee, but did not perform the services for which the fee was collected. We sustain the exception. A situation simila r to the one at hand was presented in Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 794 A.2d 92 (2002). In that case, the attorney collected a flat fee of $1,000 to: meet with the client at the facility where he was incarcerated; obtain a hearing as to the parole revocation that caused him to be incarcerated; and, represent him at the hearing. Monfried, 368 Md. at 382, 794 A.2d at 97. Although the attorney did arrange, via telephone, for a hearin g to be scheduled, he did not m eet with his c lient, comm unicate to h im or his family the date of the hearing, or attend the hea ring. Monfried, 368 Md. at 383-84, 794 A.2d at 97-98. 14 (...continued) Attorney Grievan ce Com m n v. G arfield, 369 Md. 85, 99 n.13, 797 A.2d 757, 7 65 n.13 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Bakas, 322 Md. 603, 606, 589 A.2d 52, 53 (1991)) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 355 Md. 465, 483, 73 5 A.2d 1027, 1 037 (1 999)). 17 The hearing judge in Monfried neglected to conclude whether the attorney violated Rule 1.5(a), as charged, by collecting a fixed fee, but not performing the services. Monfried, 368 Md. at 390, 794 A.2d at 101-02. Bar Cou nsel, on exception, argued to this Court that the fee, in light of the services actually rendered, was unreasonable. The attorney responded that it was a fair fee . Id. The Court re-characterized Bar Counsel s argument as one that the fee was u nearne d. Monfried, 368 M d. at 393, 794 A.2d at 103. Relying on Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637, 629 A.2d 67 8 (1993), 15 the Court c oncluded in Monfried that, [a]lthough the fee may have been reasonable for the services that [the hearing judge] found w ere to be pro vided, Re sponden t did little or no w ork for [th e client]. Accord ingly we hold that the hearing judge was clearly erroneous in failing to find Respondent charged an unreasonable fee in violation of MRPC 1.5. Monfried, 368 Md. at 394, 794 A.2d at 104. Guida s misconduct in the present case leads to a similar conclusion. His lack of effort on behalf of the Birds, after collecting the fee, is manifest. Thus, although $735.00 as a fee for a relatively straightforward ado ption may not be unre asonable on its face, in the context of Guid a s failure to perform the services to any mean ingful deg ree (and, ind eed, to 15 In Dietz, Bar Counsel argued that Dietz s misconduct in connection with the representation made it un reasonab le for him to retain the fee collecte d. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Dietz, 331 Md. 637, 647, 629 A.2d 678, 683 (1993). Under the circumstances, the Court agreed that the situation rendered the fee excessive and found a violation of MRPC 1.5. Id. 18 falsify the desired re sult, even in a misguided effort at concealment of his nonfeasance), the fee became unrea sonable. Petitioner s exception is sustaine d. Guida violated M RPC 1.5(a). IV. Regarding Respo ndent s specif ic exce ptions, w e first examine his challenge to the determined violation of MRPC 1.15(a) for not placing the $735.00 initially into his trust account. A dmitting that h e deposited the mone y directly into his office operating a ccount, Guida contends nonetheless that there was no violation because it was a flat fee [ ]earned when it was paid; subject of course to his perfor manc e of the agreed upon [ l]egal [s ]ervice s. We overrule this exception. Inherent in Guida s exception, as framed, are the seeds of its lack of persuasive force. The fee, w hen pa id, was not earn ed. It wa s paid f or futu re legal s ervices . As such, it qualified as trust money for purposes of MRPC 1.15(a) and should have been deposited in a trust account, not an operating or attorney s office account. This is clear from our decisions in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 818 A.2d 219 (2003) and Attorney G rievance C omm n v. McLa ughlin, 372 Md. 467 , 813 A.2d 114 5 (2002). In Blum, the hearing judge found that the attorney deposited directly into his personal or operating a ccounts fu nds paid to him by clients for future legal services. Blum, 373 Md. at 297, 818 A.2d at 232. The fu nds, w e conc luded, w ere not e arned w hen so depos ited. Id. Funds given in anticipation of future legal services qualify as tru st mo ney an d, ac cord ingly, are to be depo sited in trust acc ounts sepa rate from the attorney s property, to be removed 19 promptly by the attorney a s earne d. Blum, 373 Md. at 298-99, 818 A.2d at 233. To depo sit such trust money into the attorney s personal or operating accounts before the fees are earned constitutes a violatio n of M RPC 1.15(a) . Id. at 299, 818 A.2d at 233; see also M cLaugh lin, 372 Md. at 504, 813 A.2d at 1167. Guida s other specific exception related to the findings and conclusion that he violated Rule 1.1. He contends that his admitted failures to be thorough, prepare, and follow through on pursuit of the adoption did not constitute incompetence within the meaning of the Rule. He points to Judge Plitt s finding that [t]here is no evidence that Mr. Guida did not possess the legal knowledge or skill to handle the adoption matter. We overrule this exception. Rule 1.1. is framed in the affirmative, outlining generally the principle that a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. It then defines the elements of competent representation: legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the represen tation. Altho ugh Judg e Plitt found that Petitioner adduced no evidence as to Guida s shortcomings regarding the knowledge and skill elements, the hearing judge, based on Guida s concessions and Bar Counsel s evidence, found that Responden t utterly failed to satisfy the thoroughness and preparation elements. Evidence of a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficie nt alone to support a violatio n of R ule 1.1. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 22-23 , 762 A .2d 950, 961-62 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 74, 753 A.2d 17, 26-27 (2000). 20 V. A. We shall consider Respondent s general exceptions as part of our analysis of the sanction, if any, to be imp osed in this case. It is appro priate to do so because R espondent s general exceptions proclaim that his mitigation evidence established, by a preponderance of evidence, that his most serious and utterly debilitati[ng] mental and physical a nd health conditions were the root cause of the m isconduc t and they rend ered him u tterly unable to conform his conduct to the require ments of th e MR PC. M oreover, alth ough it is fo r this Court to decide w hat to mak e of mitigatio n evidenc e in a given case, Guid a points ou t a perceived inconsiste ncy in how Judg e Plitt trea ted th e mit igati on evide nce. Spe cific ally, Guida argues that [the hearing judge s] bifurcated findings that Mr. Guida established mitigation by a preponderance of the evidenc e to some charges but not others are inconsistent with the facts and illogical. They are of little help to th is Court. Either Mr. Gu ida was d isabled or he was n ot. It is improper to decide his disabilities mitigate some of the conduct (i.e. violations of Disciplinary Rules 1.1 [this Rule was not specifically men tioned ei ther way, so it is assumed mitigation was proved] and 8.1) but not all of it (i.e. violations of Disciplinary Rules 1.3, 1.15, 1.4, and 8 .4). Judge Plitt said that the uncontradicted medical evidence established mitigation. I f it w as es tabli shed , it ha d to b e by a preponderance as to the entire case. Otherwise, he would have said it had not been established. There is no middle ground between not proven and proven called established. Neither Dr. Tellefsen (who was recom mended to M r. Guida s Attorney by Bar Counsel), nor Dr. Pasquinelli, said 21 anything that would support Judge Plitt s bifurcated findings. Bar Counsel presented no medical evidence. Mitigation, which a respondent attorney need prove only by a preponderance of the evidence, has b een a nalyz ed traditi onally by the Court in terms of American Bar Association s recommended standards. For example, in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Glenn, we stated: The mitigating factors listed in the ABA Standards include: absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; pe rsonal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to recti fy consequences of miscond uct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses. (Footnote omitted). 341 Md. 448, 488-89, 671 A.2d 463, 483 (1996); see also Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375, 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005). As such, facts tending to show mitigation are used to determine the severity of the sanction and not whether evidence adduced has establish ed a violatio n of the rules by clear an d conv incing e videnc e. Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 368, 872 A.2d at 709. We intentionally set a high bar for a respondent in a case where the flagship violation is of Rule 8.4(c) ( con duct involving dishon esty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation ) bef ore we will excuse or mitigate the sanction of such a violation based on the respondent s mental or phys ical condition at the time of commission of the conduct constituting the violation. 22 That high bar is described best in Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. 376, 413-14, 773 A .2d 463, 485 (200 1). In cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud stealing, serious crim inal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as compelling extenuating circumstances, anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the root cause of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney s utter inability to conform his or her cond uct in accor dance w ith the law and the MRPC. Vanderlinde explained why the bar was set at th at height: Unlike matters related to competency, diligence and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest c onduct by a la wyer almos t beyond excuse. Honesty and dishonesty are, or are not, present in an attorney s character. Disbarment ordinarily should be the sanction for intentional dis honest co nduct. Id. 418, 773 A.2d at 488. B. The uncontradicted sum mary of Respond ent s relevant history, as related by Dr. Tellefsen, was th at, befo re 1999 , he was re latively healthy, led a happy family and professional life, and engaged in several ex tracurricular p ursuits. Wh en his fathe r died in 1999, he b egan to w ithdraw fr om his family and hobbies, neglect his law practice, and put on weight, approx imately 100 pounds ov er a couple of years. By the time he was engaged by the Birds in July 2002, Guida, as opined by Dr. Tellefsen, likely was suffering from severe 23 major depression, together with physical maladies associated with his obesity, i.e., back pain and neurological problems.16 In her direct ex amination testimony at the hearing before Judge Plitt on 18 March 2005, when asked by Responden t s counsel whether, in December 2002 when he forged the order of adoption, Guida s medical and/or mental condition would have interfered with his ability to apprecia te that that con duct was wrong, Dr. Tellefs en stated, in p ertinent part: I don t think there was anything about his condition that would have impaired his ability to understand the difference between doing something that s right and doing something that s wrong. I don t think that he would have not known that what he was doing in sig ning that na me was a bad thing to do if not actually illegal. * * * I don t think there is anything that would say that he didn t know th at in his hea d that tha t s wha t he wa s doing . The problem is that his thinking at the time was af fected by his depression, was disturb ed by his dep ression and his ability to rationalize and appr opriately, inability to app ropriately rationalize became impaired and his thinking was affected by the level of depression that he had. So in his mind he gets the idea he s doing something that s a good thing at the moment because he is trying to ma ke the client h appy by getting th is order to them by Christmas. That s the way I remember this, that it was impo rtant to the fam ily they have this for a Christmas present for their child. * * * So while I can t say he didn t know it was wrong, I do think that the depression was the source of the conduct itself. 16 Guida, due to an injury, underwent back surgery for disc herniation in May 2003. 24 During cross-exam ination, Bar C ounsel elicited from Dr. Tellefsen the following points: (1) despite h is increased d epression a fter mid-20 02 and the cognitive d efects 17 he was experiencing, Guida knew he was not performing the legal services for which he had been engaged by the Birds and that he misrepresented to them that he was working on the matter nonetheless; and (2) he knowingly constructed the fabricated adoption order and sent it to the Birds with an origina l note misrep resenting fu rther that he h ad the origin al order in his possessio n to cover-up the fraud. Also during the time period of greatest depression, according to Dr. Tellefsen, Res ponden t nonethele ss was ab le apparen tly to pay his withholding taxes w hen due ( he told m e he didn t have any trouble w ith that ). Ultimately, Bar Counsel and Dr. Tellefsen engaged in the following exchange: Q. Can you explain why in this o ne case the re was this dishonest act when in other cases at least with respect to the hard evide nce that there is any indication he had do ne it? A. Yes. Actually, I think I can. Q. Is that because he wanted to do something for the clients because it was coming up to Christmas? A. Mr. Gu ida is Italian, he is Ca tholic, Jesuit education , family man, lots of kids. This is a client that comes to him saying they want this order for this kid for Christmas. I think that that just says it all. I think that that is the driving force of this biza rre behavior. 17 Dr. Tellefsen explained the cognitive defects manifesting themselves in Guida, as: dela yed proce ssing spe ed fo r information , an in abili ty to co ncen trate , inab ility to maintain attention to tasks, and low motivation to approach office work. 25 Q. Wouldn t you call that the root cause? A. That, you know, I mean, that s the rocket on the launch pad and the depression that he has is the rocket fuel and, you know, I guess Christmas is the match that lights the whole thing up.[18] During the latter half of 2002, after engagement by the Birds, he claimed to have taken with him to Ce cil County the adoptio n file in orde r to file the petition in the Circuit Court on at least two different occasions, but left the file in the car while h e attended to other clients cases in the District Cou rt. He expla ined that w hen he retu rned to the car each time his back acted up and he could do nothing but sit in his car w orrying over h is inability to walk, until after the courthouse closed each day. It was during his recovery from the May 2003 back surgery that he realized that he suffered from depression.19 His wife threatened to leave him if he did not seek help. This was the impetus to consult Dr. Pasquinelli in August of 2003. During cross-examination of Respondent, the following transpired, in pertinent p art: THE COURT: Are you telling me that you have absolutely no recollection of preparing a fraudulent court order and forging Judge Lidum s signature on it? Yes or no. A [M r. Guida]: Y es, I have a re collection of that. THE COU RT: Ask your next question. 18 Respondent also produced the testimony of Dr. Gary Pasquinelli, a psycholog ist. Guida began seeing Dr. Pasqu inelli in Aug ust 2003 f or psychothe rapy. Dr. Pasq uinelli testified to various anti-depressants G uida was prescribed by an unnamed p rimary care physician and how, over the course of psychotherapy, Respondent s mood had improved. 19 His explanation left somew hat unclear whether these failures to file the adoption petition were attributable to his back pain, his difficulty in walking, or his late-recognized depression. 26 Q [Bar Co unsel]: Did you not tell Dr. Tellefs en that you did not have a rec ollection of it? A [M r. Guida]: It de pends on when w e are talking a bout. * * * Yes, I told D r. Tellefsen I d id not have a recollection of preparing, of actually signing that and I still don t have a recollection in my mind or a picture of myself doing it. Howeve r, when I looked at it I knew that it was me. I knew from the signature and the notes and that s how I am saying yes I did. You know, maybe that s splitting hairs. I don t know. Q [Bar Co unsel]: W ell, I am not sure that the answer you just gave is consistent with the answer you gave to His Ho nor. Maybe we ca n mak e it a little sh arper. D o you rec all, I think my first question was executing the pseudo order, actually signing the judge s name, do you recall that? A [Mr. Guida]: I on ly recall that in retrospect. I mean, that s what I can tell you. I can t - Q [Bar Counsel]: What does that mean? A [Mr. Guida]: It means when Mrs. Bird, maybe if you will allow me to answer it this way. In June of 03 when I w as recuperating from surgery Mrs. B ird I believe wrote to you at that time and then I saw the complaint. It was at that particular time when I looked at it that I said I can t believe that I d id that. But I ackn owledg ed to myself th at I did it. Now, did I recall it in December of 02? I seem to have blocked that out. I hon estly seem to ha ve blocke d out that I actually sat down and signed that thing. Q [Bar Counsel]: Why did you answer Judge Plitt s question with a yes you do remem ber? * * * A [Mr. Guida]: Because I know that I did it and I am not trying to say that I did no t do it. Q [Bar Counsel]: But you don t recall the actual circumstances? 27 A [Mr. Guida]: I don t recall the mind set I had at the time when it happened. W hen I saw it in June of 03, I guess that s six months later. I couldn t believe that I had done that. I h onestly couldn t be lieve that I had done that. C. In Attorney G rievance C omm n v. Davis, we explained: Our consideration of the app ropriate disciplinary measure to be taken in any given c ase involvin g violation o f the Rule s of Professional Condu ct is guided by ou r interest in protecting the public and the public s confidence in the legal profession. The purpose of such proceedings is not to punish the lawyer, but should deter other lawyers from engaging in similar c onduct. The public is protected when w e impose sanctions that are comme nsurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. 375 Md. 13 1, 166-67, 825 A .2d 430, 451 (200 3). Respondent argues that, having concluded that he proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a severe major depression20 during the time he represented the Birds, Judg e Plitt was bound by logic and consistency to find complete mitigation of all of his misconduc t, not merely of select violation s of the M RPC. A lthough w e agree, on this record, with the general all-or-nothing approach of Respondent s argument, we conclude that the mitigation evidence does not rise to the level of excusing or mitigating a ny of Respondent s violations. 20 Although there was evidence adduced that Guida experienced weight gain from his depression, which may have led to his back and leg problems, as well as a host of other obesity-related systemic problems, the expert testimony focused on depression as the chief mitigator of the misconduct in Respondent s representation of the Birds. 28 Dr. Tellefsen s testimony may have satisfied a but for s tandard, i.e., G uida wo uld not have falsified the adop tion order but for his depression. Yet, since we decided Vanderlinde, that is not sufficient in cases of intentional dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation, to dilute the ordinary sanction of disbarment for such violations. The level of proof to satisfy the Vanderlinde threshold is there . . . needs to be almost conclusive, and essentially uncontroverted evidence that would support a . . . finding not only that the attorney had a serious and debilitating mental condition, but that the mental condition, in a sustained fashion, affected the ability of the attorney in normal day to day activities, such that the attorney was unable to accomplish the least of those activities in a normal fashion. Unless that standard is met the impairment is not the root cause of the miscond uct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418-19, 773 A.2d at 488. The totality of Dr. Tellefsen s testimony, as well as Guida s own testimony, revealed that Respondent contemporaneously knew that what he did in falsifying the adoption order and Judge Lidum s signa ture wa s wron g. Dr. Tellefsen s actual examination o f Guida s ability otherwise to perform day-to-day tasks in his law practice during the relevant time was inadequate, although she opined pessimistically in that regard. N onetheless , she did indicate that he apparently managed to pay his withholding taxes. Guida s own testimony evinced that he represented other clients at the same time that he was supposed to be representing the Birds. See n.21 infra. Our review an d conside ration of this record leav es us persu aded only that, while Respondent suffered from a severe m ajor depres sion at the rele vant times, h is 29 depression (and related sequelae) was not so great that it satisfied the Vanderlinde threshold for mitigation of the sanction for his violations of the MRPC. We are not unmindful of other mitigating factors that appear on this record. Although it was disclosed that Respondent had been the subject of a Conditional Diversion Agreement with Petitioner reg arding a co mplaint from 2000 or 2001 regarding preparation of a deed, that Agreement was discharged successfully in June 2003.21 Respondent expressed contrition and remorse f or his misco nduct and refunded to the Birds the fee they paid him. He was forthcoming in the com plain t reso lutio n pro cess , although initially failing to respo nd in time ly fashion to Pe tition er s i nquiry. Yet, at bottom, Respondent fails to persuade us that something short of disbarment is appropriate in order to protect the public and deter other attorneys from similar misco nduct. Respondent engaged in intentional dishonesty and deceit that undermines the trust that must be at the center of the lawyer-client relationship. This Court has stated that intentional dishonest conduct b y an attorney is alm ost beyond excuse a nd that disba rment sho uld ordinarily be the sanc tion for suc h condu ct. Vanderlinde, 364 Md. at 418, 773 A.2d at 488. See Attorn ey Grieva nce Com m n v. Be nnett, 304 Md. 120, 497 A.2d 1140 (1985) (holding 21 In the course o f comple ting succes sfully the extern al monitorin g of his law practice called for in the Agreement, which included the time period of his representation of the Birds, Guida apparently was able to demonstrate the ability to maintain his law practice generall y. The attorney who served as monitor under the Agreement also represented Guida in the instant case. 30 that forging a judge s na me on court doc ument warran ts disbarment). In this case, we find that disbarment is the appropriate sanction. IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-515(C), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR O F T H E A T T O R N E Y G R I E V A N CE COM MISSION AGA INST JOSE PH M . GUIDA. 31

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