Lamone v. Capozzi

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Lamon e, et al. v. Capo zzi, et al. - No. 1 43, Septem ber Term 2005. O pinion by Be ll, C.J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW INTERPRETATION ELECTIONS EARLY VOTING The ac ts autho rizing M aryland C ode (20 03, 200 6 Cum . Supp .) § 10-3 01.1 are inconsistent with and in derogation of certain provisions of the M aryland Constitution, in particular, Article X V, § 7, and A rticle I, § 1 , and are not con stitutiona lly suppo rted by A rticle I, § 3; therefore, these acts are unconstitutional and void. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 143 September Term, 2005 ______________________________________ LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL. v. MARIROSE JOAN CAPOZZI, ET AL. ______________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Bell, C.J. ______________________________________ Filed: December 11, 2006 This is the secon d of two cases invo lving early votin g in Maryland. In Roskelly v. Lamone, __ Md. __, __ A.2d __ (2006), this C ourt consid ered a petition to refer Sen ate Bill 478 (2005 ), the act, see Chapter 5, Laws of Maryland 2006, establishing early voting in Maryland, to the voters fo r ratification. C oncluding that the app ellants, the pro ponents of the referendum, had been advised of the determination by the State Administrator of Elections that their petition was deficient be cause it had not been filed timely, but did not timely seek judicial review, we affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court for A nne Aru ndel County, which had dismissed their action. __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __. The early voting scheme was substantially amended during the 2006 session of the General Assemb ly by House Bill 1368 (2006), Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006. Marirose Joan Capozzi, Bettye B. Speed, and Charles W. Carter, the appellees herein, have challenged the constitutionality of the act1 . In the instant case, we address the constitutiona lity of early voting, probing wh ether the acts establishing the proces s are inconsistent with, and, thus, in derogation of, the Maryland Constitution. A. 1 The full relief requested by the appellees in their complaint read: RELIEF 26. In view of the foregoing, as elaborated upon and explicated by the accompanying Points and Authorities, this Court should declare Chapter 5 of the 2006 Laws of Maryland and portions of Chapter 61 of the 2006 Laws of Maryland, insofar as they purport to allow early voting, as well as any other implementing legislation, unconstitutional and enjoin Defendants, the State of Maryland, Linda H. Lamone and the Maryland State Board of Elections, from implementing in any way said early voting. The Maryland Constitution designates when elections in M aryland will oc cur. Article XV, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 7. General elections All general elections in this State shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in the mon th of No vemb er, in the ye ar in wh ich they sh all occu r. Other constitutiona l provisi ons, ad dressin g speci fic elec tions, are consiste nt, e.g., Article XVII, § 2,2 Article II, § 2,3 and Article IV, § 3.4 Specifically, Article XV, § 7 of the 2 Article XVII, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 2. Time of election s for State and coun ty officers Except for a special election that may be authorized to fill a vacancy in a County Council under Article XI-A, Section 3 of the Constitution, elections by qualified voters for State and county officers shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty-six, and on the same day in every fourth year thereafter. (Emphasis add ed). 3 Article II, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 2. Election procedure for Governor and Lieutenant Governor An e lection f or Go vernor and L ieutena nt Gov ernor, u nder th is Con stitution, shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, in the year nineteen h undred a nd seven ty-four, and on the same d ay and mon th in every fou rth year thereafter, at the places of voting for Delegates to the General Assembly; and every person qualified to v ote for D elegate, shall b e qualified a nd entitled to v ote for Governor and Lieutenant Governor; the election to be held in the same manner as the election of Deleg ates, and the returns there of, under s eal, to be add ressed to the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and enclosed and transmitted to the Secretary of State, and delivered to said Speaker, at the commencement of the session of the G eneral A ssemb ly, next en suing s aid elec tion. (Emphasis add ed). 4 Article IV, § 3 of the M aryland Con stitution provid es, as relevan t: § 3. Judicial elections; term of office; retirement Except for the Judges of the District Court, the Judges of the several Courts other than the Court of Appeals or any intermediate courts of appeal 2 Maryland Con stitution state s that all elections i n M aryland shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in the month of November, in the year in which they shall o ccur. Article XVII, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution states that elections by qualified voters for State and county officers shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of Novemb er, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty-six and on the same day in every fourth year thereafter. Article II, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution states that the election of Governor and Lieutenant Governor, under this Constitution, shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November. Article IV, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution states that judges of the Circuit C ourts shall be elected at th e general e lection to be held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Thus, historically, the general elections occur on one day, the first Tuesday after the first Mo nday in No vember, sp ecified by A rticle XV, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution.5 shall, subject to the provisions of Section 5 of this Article of the Constitution, be elected in Baltimore City and in each county, by the qualified v oters of the c ity and of each county, respec tively, all of the said Judges to be elected at the general election to be held on the Tuesday after the first Monday in November, as now provid ed for in the Co nstitution . (Emphasis add ed). 5 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 8-301 of the Elec tion Law Article provides, as relevant: 8-301. Date of general election. (a) In general. (1) There shall be a statewide general election in each evennumbered year. (2) A statewide general election shall be held on the Tuesday follow ing the f irst Mo nday in N ovem ber. See discussion infra concernin g the Gen eral Assem bly s authorizatio n, pursuan t to Article 3 The Maryland Co nstitution also ad dresses , in Artic le I, Th e Electiv e Franc hise, recognizin g two meth ods of ex ercising it, one it prescribes ex pressly and the other it authorizes the General Assembly to prescribe. The first method, by ballot, the Maryland Constitution expressly provides for. It is contained in Article I, § 1, which defines who may vote, where h e or she m ay vote, and the qualification s for doing so. Captio ned Elections by ballot, qualifications to vote, it provides: All elections shall be by ballot. Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next pr ecedin g the ele ction, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which h e resides at all ele ctions to be h eld in this State. A person once entitled to vote in any election district, shall be entitled to vote there until he shall have acquired a residence in another election district or ward in this State . (Emp hasis ad ded). Under this provision, the ballot must be cast in-person and at the polling place in the ward or election district in which the voter resides.6 Because Article I, § 1 p rovides tha t a voter is entitled to vote in his residential election district or ward until he shall have acquired a residence in another election district, a voter who moves from one ward or election district and acquires a new residence in another m ay only vote in the newly acquired ward or e lection district. III, § 49 of the Constitution, to enact statutes, including clarifying ones, not inconsistent with the Constitution. 6 By contrast, an Absentee ballot means a ballot not used in a polling place. Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Supp.) § 1-101 (b) of the Election Law Article. 4 The second method of voting is by Absentee Voting, to address those situations when voters, for whatever r eason, are unable to vote in-person, at his or her designated polling station on the designated day. While, unlike voting by ballot, the Maryland Constitution itself does not mandate absentee voting, it authorizes th e Genera l Assemb ly to do so. Article I, § 3, entitled Absentee Voting, of the Maryland Constitution, provides: The General A ssembly of M aryland shall ha ve pow er to provide by suitable enactment for voting by qualified voters of the State of M aryland who are absent at the time of any election in w hich they are en titled to vote and for voting by other qualified voters who are unable to vote personally and for the manner in which and the time and place at which such absent voters may vote, and fo r the can vass an d return of their votes. The Constitution, in addition to Article 1, § 3, also dele gates to the G eneral As sembly a significant role in the regulation of the election proces s. See Article III, § 49.7 Pursuant to this provision, it is empowered to enact laws to regulate all matters relating to elections, including election judges, their time, place, and manner and the manner of making election returns. The General Assembly s authority in this area is subject to one, albeit sig nificant, limitation: its regula tion and the la ws it enac ts ma y not be inconsisten t with this Constitution ; the statutes and regulations enacted by the General Assembly to govern the exercise of the elective franchise must be consistent with the constitutional provisions that 7 MD CO NST. art. III, § 49 provides: The General Assembly shall have the power to regulate by Law, not inconsistent with this Constitution, all matters which relate to the Judges of election, time, place, and manner of holding elections in this State, and of makin g return s thereo f. 5 provid e for the exercis e of the elective franch ise and which they supp lemen t. The Ge neral Asse mbly, acting pu rsuant to A rticle III, § 49, has tak en seriously its responsibility to regulate all aspects of Maryland elections. The many statutes it has enacted are codified in the Election Law Article ( EL ). Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp .). Many of the statutes in volve in -person , ballot vo ting, e.g. Title 9, Subtitles 1 and 2 of the Election Article, w hich, inter alia, they aim to fac ilitate, make uniform and mak e more reliable. For example, EL § 9-205 and 9-206 dictate the Content and Arrangement of the words on the ballot, EL § 9-210 dictates how candidates names shall be listed on all ballots, and EL § 9-2 08 explain s that, if there is a late change or error in the b allots, the local board shall reprint the ballot if there is enough time, or print a sufficient number of stickers to be affixed to each ballot in corporating the chang e or correctio n, taking step s also to notify all candid ates of t he cha nges. Moreover, EL § 9-101 of the Election Law A rticle establishes that a voting system for voting in polling places and a voting system for absentee voting, shall be selected and certified, and that this certified system shall be used in all counties . EL § 9 -101 (b). T his voting system requires that all voting shall be cast by ballot, EL § 9-201 (a) (1), and that only votes cast o n a ballot shall be counted. EL § 9-201 (a) (2). The State Board of Elections certifies these ba llots and eac h local boa rd of election s prepares th e ballots in accordance with the State Board of Elections prescription, EL § 9-202 (b), such that each ballot is easily understandable by voters, EL § 9-203 (1), and as uniform as possible. EL 6 § 9-20 4 (a). The General Assembly also has acted, pursuant to the authority given it by Article 1, § 3, to provide by suitable enactment for qualified voters who are absent at the time of any election in which th ey are entitled to v ote, and w ho are un able to vote perso nally, to vote and for the manner in which and the time an d place whe re they ma y do so. See Title 9 Subtitle 3. The right to vote absentee applies to every Maryland election. EL § 9-301. The State Boa rd is required to establish guidelines for the administration of absentee voting by the local boards of election, EL § 9-303, each of which is required to keep a record of absentee voting. EL § 9-302.8 EL § 9-304 prescribes who may vote absentee. Although it now states simply, An individual may vote by absentee ballot except to the extent preempted under an applicable federal law, before its amendment by Chapter 6, § 1, Maryland Laws 2006, it set out a series of circumstances that comported with the dictates of Article 1, § 3. See Maryland Code (2003, 2005 Cum. Supp.) § 9-304 of the Election Law 8 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Supp.) § 9-302 of the Election Law Article provides: Each local board shall maintain a full record of absentee voting in the county, including, for each abse ntee voter: (1) the date and time of the board's receipt of an application for an abs entee ballot; (2) the action taken with regard to the application; (3) the appropriate ballot style; (4) the date of issuanc e of a ballo t; (5) if mailed , the address to which th e ballot is sent; (6) the date and time of the receipt of a voted absentee ballot; and (7) an y other inf ormatio n speci fied by th e State B oard. 7 Article.9 Absentee ballots may be obtained from the local board of elections by filling out an Absentee Ballot Application. EL § 9-305 (a).10 An absentee voter may us e an agen t in 9 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2005 C um. Sup p.) § 9-304 of the Elec tion Law Article stated, befo re amend ment: (a) A registered voter may vote by absentee ballot at an election if the voter: "(1) may be absent on election day from the county in which the voter is registered; "(2) because of accident, illness, or physical disability, will be unable to go to the p ollin g pla ce on elec tion day; "(3) because of confinement in or restriction to an institution, will be prevented from going to the polling place on election day; "(4) beca use o f a de ath o r seri ous i llnes s in th e voter's immediate family, will be unable to go to the polling place on election day; "(5) is a full-time student at an institution of higher education located outside the voter's precinct but within the county of registration, and academic requirements prevent the voter from going to the polling place on election day; or "(6) because of employment by or service as an official of the State Board or a local board, is required to be absent from the precinct in which the voter is registered to vote on election day. (b) An individual may vote by absentee ballot if authorized under an applica ble fed eral law . 10 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 9-305 (a) of the E lection Law Article provides: § 9-305. Applications for absentee ballot Genera lly (a) An application for an absentee ballot, signed by the voter, may be made: (1) on a form produced by the local board and supplied to the voter; (2) on a form provided under federal law; or (3) in a written request that includes: (i) the voter's name and residence address; and (ii) the address to which the ballot is to be 8 the absentee v oting proce ss and that a gent may pic k up and deliver the ab sentee vote r s ballot, EL § 9-307,11 or an absentee voter may use a special envelope provided by the State Board. EL § 9-310. An absentee voter may also receive assistance in marking his or ballot. EL § 9-308. By utilizing this method of voting, a voter who is unable to vote personally on Election Day may exercise his or her elective franchise. The General A ssembly, on A pril 9, 2005, two days before the end of the 2005 legislative session, pass ed Senate Bill 478, wh ich authoriz ed early voting in Maryland . This bill was inten ded to give Maryland v oters a seco nd alternative to in-person balloting, mailed , if diffe rent fro m the re sidenc e addre ss. Prior to it amendment by Chapter 6, § 1, Maryland Laws 2006, this provision required an applicant for absen tee ballot to inc lude in his or her w ritten request f or the ballot, the reason, as authorized in § 9-304 of this subtitle, for absentee voting. 11 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 9-307 of the Elec tion Law Article provides: (a) Use authorized. - A qualified applicant may designate a duly authorized agent to pick up and deliver an absentee ballot under this subtitle. (b) Qualifica tions of age nt. - An agent of the voter under this section: (1) must be at least 18 years old; (2) may not b e a candid ate on that b allot; (3) shall be designated in a writing signed by the voter under penalty of perjury; and (4) shall execute an affidavit under penalty of perjury that the ballot was: (i) delivered to the voter who submitted the application; (ii) marked and placed in an envelope by the voter, or with assis tanc e as a llow ed by regu latio n, in t he ag ent's presence; and (iii) retur ned to th e local b oard by th e agen t. 9 absentee balloting being the other. The Govern or vetoed th e bill on Ma y 20, 2005. E arly in the next legislative session, o n January 16 , 2006, both houses of the Gene ral Assem bly overrode the Governor s veto, enacting Senate Bill 478, as Chapter 5, Maryland Laws 2006. See Article II, § 17(d) of the Maryland Constitution.12 A new § 10-301.1 thus was added to the Election Law Article. That section permitted voters to vote early, eight hours each day for a five-day period beginning the Tuesday before a primary or general election through the Saturday before the election day, at sites designated by the local bo ard of elec tions as early voting sites. At least three locations were req uired to be e stablished in A nne Aru ndel, Harford, Howard, M ontgomery, Prince Ge orge s and Baltimo re Counties and in B altimore City. During the 2006 legislative session, another bill pertaining to early voting, House B ill 1368, was introduced and passed, as em ergenc y legislation . That b ill repeale d § 10- 301.1 and reenacted it with amendments. As amended, § 10-301.1 extended the early voting period 12 MD CO NST. art. II, § 17(d) provides: (d) Any B ill vetoed by the G overnor sh all be returne d to the Ho use in which it originated immediately after the House has organized at the next regular or special session of the General Assembly. The Bill may then be reconsider ed accord ing to the pro cedure sp ecified in this s ection. An y Bill enacted over the veto of the Governor, or any Bill which shall become law as the result of the failure of the Governor to act within the time specified, shall take effect 30 days after the Governor's veto is over-ridden, or on the date specified in the Bill, whichever is later. If the Bill is an emergency measure, it shall take effect when enacted. No such vetoed Bill shall be returned to the Legislature when a new General Assembly of Maryland has been e lected a nd sw orn sinc e the pa ssage o f the ve toed B ill. 10 from eight hours to eleven h ours daily and spec ified, either ge nerally 13 or w ith partic ularity, 14 where early voting would take place in each county and B altimore City. HB 1368 was passed on March 29, 2006 and vetoed by the Governor on April 7, 2006. Both houses overrode the Gov ernor s veto on April 10, 2006, thus enacting HB 1368. Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006. On July 16, 2006, the a ppellees, reg istered voters in Queen Anne s County, Maryland, filed, in the Circuit Court for Q ueen Anne s County, a Verified Co mplaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief15 against the appellants, the State of Maryland, Linda Lamone, in her capacity as Administrator of the Maryland State Board of Elections, and the M aryland State Board of Election s. They alleged in the com plaint that § 10 -301.1 of the Election Law Article was ena cted in dero gation of A rticle I, § 1, Article XV, § 7, and Article XVII, §§ 116 13 In all but the largest counties, Charles County and Baltimore City, HB 1368 prescribed that the early voting locations would be in the County Seat, without specifying the exact location. 14 In Anne A rundel, Baltimore, Harfo rd, Howard, M ontgomery and Prince George s Counties and Baltim ore City, HB 1368 ex pressly designa ted the early votin g locations to be used. In Charles C ounty, it specified that the early votin g location w ould be in Waldorf, MD. 15 Filed simultaneously therein were a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Motion for Tempo rary Restraining Order an d Prelimina ry Injunction, an d a mem orandum of points and authorities. 16 Article XVII, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 1. Purpose; definition o f officers The purpose of this Article is to reduce the number of elections by providing that all State and cou nty elections shall be held only in every fourth year, and at the time provided by law for holding congressional 11 and 2 17 of the M aryland C onstitutio n. In essence, the appellees complained that early voting was not authorized by any part of the Constitution, as the provisions of Article I only ackno wledg ed two ways to v ote: in-p erson b allot vot ing and absent ee ballo ting. The case was transferred on July 28, 20 06, upon motion of the appellan ts and pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006 Cum. Supp.) § 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,18 to the Circuit Court for Anne Arun del Co unty. The app ellants elections, and to bring the te rms of ap pointive of ficers into ha rmony with the changes effected in the time of the beginning of the terms of elective officers. The administrative and judicial officers of the State shall construe the provisions of this Article so as to effectuate that purpose. For the purpose of this Article only the word officers shall be construed to include those holding positions and other places of employment in the state and county governments whose terms are fixed by law, but it shall not include any appointments made by the Board of Public Works, nor appointments by the Go vernor for term s of thre e years. 17 Article XVII, § 2 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 2. Time of election s for State and coun ty officers Except for a special election that may be authorized to fill a vacancy in a County Council under Article XI-A, Section 3 of the Constitution, elections by qualified voters for State and county officers shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday of November, in the year nineteen hundred and twenty-six, and on the same day in every fourth year thereafter. 18 Maryland Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2006 Supp.) § 6-201 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: § 6-20 1. In general (a) Subject to the provisions of §§ 6-202 and 6-203 and unless otherwise provided by law, a civil action shall be brought in a county where the defenda nt resides, carrie s on a regu lar business, is e mployed, or h abitually engages in a vocatio n. In addition , a corporatio n also may be sued wh ere it maintains its principal offices in the State. (b) If there is more than one defendant, and there is no single venue 12 filed an oppo sition to the appellees Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, and their own motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. At the hearing, the appellants argued that Article I, § 1 was not a prohibitory provision; rather, they maintain, it merely sets forth the entitlement to vote of thos e who meet its e nume rated qu alificatio ns. Stated diff erently, its goal was not to restrict voters from voting outside of their district, but to prevent the Legislature from forcing voters to travel great distances especially in the times of horse and buggy to exerc ise their f ranchis e. 19 Thereafter, on Au gust 8, 2 006, the Circuit Court issued its Memorandum Opinion. In the accompanying Order, it held that § 10-301.1 and the implementing legislation were unconstitutional and void. The court concluded, specifically, the provisions in early voting that would allow some voters to cast votes in a district or ward other than the one in which applicable to all defendants, under subsection (a), all may be sued in a county in which any one of them could be sued, or in the county where the cause o f action arose. 19 The appellants also argued that Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution was applicable only to the general election, and not to the primary election. The C ircuit Court rejected that a rgumen t, explaining: such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12-year-old, non-U.S. citizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election. In addition, noting that Article I, § 1 begins with the phrase all elections, it was satisfied that th ere could b e no dou bt that the vo ter location qu alification is ap plicable to all elections, primary and general elections. 13 they reside are inconsistent with the language of Art icle I, Sec tion 1. 20 Relying on Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. 235, 23 8, 24 A. 606, 607 (1892), in which this Court stated that [one] cannot lawfully vote in a ward or election district in which he does not resides, even though that ward or election district be within the legislative district or county where he has residen ce, and Smith v. H ackett, 129 M d. 73, 76 -77, 98 A. 1 40, 141 (1916), in which we noted that [t]he only condition imposed by the Constitution as to the place where the right to vote shall be exercised is that it must be in the election district of which the voter is a residen t, the Circuit Court concluded that the Constitution entitled qualified vo ters to cast votes only in the electio n district in which they reside. It also f ound that A rticle 1, § 1 is mandatory and cannot be waived; its instruction is not simply permissive. Accordingly, the Circuit Co urt rejected the appellants entitlement argumen t. The court reasoned that because the case involved constitutional interpretation, and [t]he Maryland Constitution was carefully written and solemnly adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1867, and approved by the people of the State, Buchholz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 285-286, 13 A.2d 348, 351 (1940), it should be careful not to depart from the plain language of the instrument. Moreover, it continued, while Article III, § 49 gives the General Assembly the power to enact laws that relate to the time, place, and manner of elections, that power is specifically constrained and cannot give rise to laws that are 20 Inconsistencies between the constitutional provisions and the statutes enacted by the General Assembly are, as the provision itself expressly states and we have stated, impermissible under Article III, § 49 of the Maryland Constitution. 14 inconsistent with [the Maryland] Constitution. Early voting was also found by the Circuit Court to be inconsistent with the requirement in Article XV, § 7 of the Maryland Constitution that [a]ll gen eral elections in this State shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first of Monday in the month of Novemb er, in the year in which they shall occur. The court agreed with the appellees, who argued that the word held contem plated a specifi c time p eriod, a day, when the voters cast the votes,21 and not, as the appellants w ould ha ve it, the e nd of th e proce ss, i.e., the date upon which voting is concluded and the transition to tabulating the votes begins. The Circuit Court was not persuaded by Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 118 S. Ct. 464, 139 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1997), which it determined to be inapposite it only provided that the 21 The Circuit Court opined: The Court finds that the common sense meaning of the phrase an election is held on Tu esday ref ers to the day upo n whic h voter s cast the ir ballots. . . . Clearly, there are ministerial obligations of the election board to prepare for election day prior to the Tuesday next after the first Monday in the month o f Nove mber, and there are ad ministrative tas ks necessa ry to tabulate the v otes subseq uent to that d ay. The refere nce to electio n in Article XV, Sec tion 7 could not possibly have b een intended by the fram ers to refer to the entire election process, which would include those tasks. The election as referred to in Article XV, Section 7 refers to the date when voters cast their ballots. To suggest that the f ramers intended that the en tire election process would be concluded on the Tuesday next after the first Mond ay in the mon th of No vember, ig nores the h istorical reality. Even in today s world with automobiles, trains, planes, and computers, this cannot be done in most instan ces. Certain ly, in the days of the h orse and b uggy, it could not be done. So, it is clear to this Court that the framers, by setting forth the date of the election, intended to refer to the date that all qualified voters c ould ap pear at th e polls to cast thei r ballots. 15 voting system utilized by a state may not produce a winner in a federal Senatorial and Representative race prior to the first Tuesday following the first Monday of November, 522 U.S. at 72, 118 S. Ct. at 468, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 375. Nor did the court find the federal cases following Foster22 helpful or persuasive, pointing out that they all dealt with early voting within the um brella of absent ee ballo t provisi ons. Fina lly, the Circ uit Cou rt rejecte d the arg umen t that Ar ticle I, § 3 , authorizing absentee voting, provided the requisite auth ority f or ea rly voting legis latio n. On the contrary, referencing § 10-301.1 (A) s express exception of Absentee Voting from its coverage,23 it observed th at [a]s drafted, early voting goes far beyond the specifically authorized absentee voting language, creating a no excuse needed category for voters who need not be absent or unable to vote personally. That is made clear, the Circuit Court opined, by the explicit language distinguishing absentee voting provisions from the early voting provisions.24 22 The appellants, at the Circuit Court level, relied on Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 299 F .3d 773 (5th Ci r. 2000 ), Millsaps v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535 (6th C ir. 2001), and Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling, 259 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001). 23 EL § 10 -301.1 pro vides, as relev ant: § 10-301.1. Early polling places Genera lly (a) Except a s provided under Title 9, Subtitle 3 o f this article, a voter shall vote: (1) in the voter's assigned precinct on election day; or (2) in an early voting polling place as provided in this section. (Emp hasis ad ded). 24 See supra, n. 9 and n. 10, noting that, prior to amendment, the Absentee Ballot provisions included an excuse requirement. The Circuit Court noted, in addition to the 16 Acc ordingly, the Circuit Court enjoined the appellants from further implementing or enforcing early voting.25 The appellants im mediately note d an appe al of the jud gment to th is Court 26 and also filed a Petition for Certior ari, whi ch we granted . Lamone v. Capozzi, 394 exception of Abse ntee Votin g from the Early Voting law, that, no where d oes the early voting act limit its breadth to those who are absent at the time of any election or who are unable to vote personally. Thus the early voting acts are inconsistent with and exceed the authority granted in Article I, Section 3. 25 The Circ uit Court also granted the appellants M otion to D ismiss as to the State of Maryland, and denied the appellants Motion to Dismiss all remaining defendants. 26 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 12-20 3 of the E lection Law Article provides, as relevant: § 12-203. Proce dure Genera lly (a) A pro ceeding u nder this sub title shall be con ducted in a ccordanc e with the Marylan d Rules, ex cept that: (1) the proceeding sh all be heard and decid ed without a jury and as expeditiously as the circumstances require; (2) on the request of a party or sua sponte, the chief administrative judge of the circuit court may assign the case to a three-judge panel of circuit court judges; and (3) an appea l shall be taken directly to the Co urt of Ap peals within 5 d ays of the date of the dec ision of the c ircuit court. (Emphasis add ed). In addition, Maryland Rule 8-301, entitled METHOD OF SECURING REVIEW-COURT OF APPEALS, also permits direct appeals to this Court, and provides, as relevant: (a) Generally. Appellate review by the Court of Appea ls may be obtained only: (1) b y direct appeal or application for leave to appeal, where allowed by law; (2) pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act; or (3) by writ of certiorari in all other cases. (b) Direct A ppeals or Applications to Court of Appea ls. (1) An appeal or application for leave to appeal to the Court 17 Md. 307, 905 A.2d 842 (2006). Oral argument was heard on August 25, 2006. By Order issued on that sam e day, this Cou rt affirmed the judgm ent of the C ircuit Court. We now provid e the rea sons fo r our de cision. B. This case involves c onstitutional in terpretation. T he principle s that apply and their application are well settled. We recently restated them in Roskelly v. Lamone: As early as 1873, this Court recognized that where a general rule for the construction of statutes exists, there can be no good reason suggested why this same general principle ... should not also apply as a rule of interpretation of the Co nstitution . New Centra l Coal C o. v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 5 57 (1873). We continue to adhere to that principle. Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536-537, 873 A.2d 1122, 1133-35 (2005). See Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) ( When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the co nstruction of statutory language. ); Fish Market v. G.A.A., Inc., 337 M d. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705, 708 (1994); Lupp ino v. G ray, 336 M d. 194, 2 04 n. 8, 6 47 A.2 d 429, 4 34 n. 8 (1994) ( The rules governing the construction of statutes and constitutional provisions are the sam e ); Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294 Md. 285, 290, 449 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1982) ( in ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, we are governed by the same rules of interpretation which prevail in relatio n to a statute ); Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277, of Appea ls in a case in which a sentence of death was imposed is governed by Rule 8-306. (2) Any other appeal to the Court of Appea ls allowed by law is governe d by the other ru les of this Title a pplicable to appeals, or by the law authorizing the direct appeal. In the event of a conflict, the law authorizing the direct appeal shall prevail. Except as otherw ise required by necessary implication, references in those rules to the Court of Special Appea ls shall be regarded as references to the Court of Appea ls. 18 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980) (the same rules that are applicable to construction of statutory langua ge are em ployed in interp reting cons titutional verbiage); Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 639, 366 A.2d 21, 36-37 (1976) (observing that the same rules apply in constru ctional construction as app ly in statutory constru ction). __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __. Thus, when this Court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a constitutional provision, it first will look to the norm al, plain meaning of the language, and, if the language is clear and unam biguou s, it will no t look p ast those terms. Bienkow ski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536-537, 873 A.2d 1122, 1134 - 1135 (2005 ). See also Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005) ( If the plain language . . . is unambiguous and is consistent with the [enactm ent s] appa rent purpo se, we give effect to the [enactment] as it is written ); Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 256-257, 863 A.2d 297, 304 (200 4); Collins v. S tate, 383 Md. 684, 688, 861 A.2d 727, 730 (2004) ( We begin with the plain language of the [enactm ents] ); Arunde l Corp. v. M arie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, 894 (2004 ) ( If there is no ambiguity in that language [of an enactment], . . . the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not then need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent external rules of construction ). Further, when th e meaning of a w ord or phrase in a con stitutional or statutory provision is perfectly clear, this Court will not give that word or phrase a different meaning than is plainly u ndersto od. See, e.g., Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 595, 770 A.2d 111, 129 (2001) (the phrase to perform purely religious functions clearly does 19 not mean what is suggested. . . . We decline to construe purely as if it were primarily or some ); Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 54 0, 554, 663 A.2d 13 18, 1325 (1995) (ref using to construe a statute, specifically applicable to only four named c ounties, as ap plicable to other counties); Davis v. S tate, 294 Md. 370, 378, 451 A.2d 107, 111 (1982) (declining to construe the phrase in a statute as petitioner requested, finding that such an action would be to re-draft the statute under the guise of co nstruction); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 93, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (19 79) (refusin g to construe the statutory phrase all professional employees as only certain types of profes sional emp loyees); Wheele r v. State, 281 Md. 593, 598, 380 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1977 ), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997, 98 S. Ct. 1650, 56 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1978) ( We are not at liberty to bring about a different result by inserting or omitting words to make the [enactment] exp ress an intention not evidenc ed in its original form ). 1. It is well settled th at a State Legislature may not enact laws that are in derogation of the Cons titution. See Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. at 546-547, 873 A.2d at 1140 ( [T]he constitutional authority to implement a constitutional provision, . . . does not authorize the General Assemb ly by statute or this Court by rule to contradict or ame nd the Constitution); Washabaugh v. Washabaugh, 285 Md. 39 3, 411, 404 A.2d 1027, 1037 (19 79) (the constitutional authority to imp lement A rticle IV, § 22 , by rules does n ot authorize a rule which is inconsistent with § 22, as this would be a license . . . to make a substantive change 20 in the M aryland C onstitutio n . . . , a result we do not think was contem plated by the drafters of section 22 ). Indeed, Article III, § 49 of the Maryland Constitution provides: § 49. Regulation of elections The General A ssembly shall h ave pow er to regulate by Law , not inconsistent with this Constitution, all matters w hich relate to the Judges of election, time, place and manner of holding elections in this State, and of making returns thereof . (Emphasis add ed). The appellants a rgue that Article III, § 49 validates the General Asse mbly s constitutional power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections. They emphasize only a portion of § 49, tha t portion that g ives the G eneral As sembly pow er to regulate . . . all matters which relate to the . . . time, pla ce and mann er of ho lding ele ctions in this State . (Empha sis added). This is confirmed, they assert, by the language of Article I, § 4, cl. 1 of the United S tates Cons titution ( The Times, Pla ces and M anner of h olding Ele ctions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof ¦ ) and the absentee voting provision, Article I, § 3, of the Maryland Constitution. In addition, the appellants re ly on County Council for Montgomery County v. Montgomery Ass'n, Inc., 274 Md. 52, 333 A .2d 596 (1975). That case, they say, makes clear that the Framers intended that the General Assembly should regulate elections, 274 Md. at 60, 333 A.2d at 600, has pervasive control ov er elections, 27 4 Md. at 62, 333 A.2d at 602, and is obligated to enact a comprehensive plan for the conduct of elections. 274 Md. at 64, 333 A.2d at 603. 21 In County Co uncil, Montgomery County enacted three ordina nces, design ed to regulate the campaign finance practices of candidates for County Executive and the Coun ty Council in that county, that provided for the reporting of cam paign c ontribu tions, a ban on corporate contributions, a limit on contributions from individuals and from candidates to their own campaigns, and a limit on campaign spending. The respondents requested a declaratory judgment that the three ordinances were invalid and sought an injunction prohibiting prosecutions under the ordinances, alleging that the county had not been dele gated auth ority by the General Assembly to enact the ordinances, that the field of regulation of election practices had been completely occupied by the General Assembly in enacting the State Election Code, that the ordinances conflicted with specific provisions of the State Election Code, and that enactment of the ordinances violated the Federal Constitution. 274 Md. at 54, 333 A.2d at 597. This Court held that election laws enacted by Montg omery Cou nty were preempted by state elections laws, and thus, were void. 274 Md. at 64, 333 A.2d at 603. While it is true that this Court, in County Counc il, made the p oints attributed to it by the ap pellants , County Counc il does not stand for the proposition that the General Assembly s role in the regulation of elections is so pervasive or its obligation so gr eat as to ena ble it to enact law s in derogation of the Maryland Constitution. Nothing in County Co uncil suggests that to be the case and the facts of the case do not support that proposition . In fact, to ma ke this argu ment, the appellants must emphasize, as we have seen them do, just a part of Article III, § 49, and 22 simply disregard the critical provision that the laws passed to regulate elections not [be] incons istent w ith this C onstitutio n. Stressing that elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right of suffrage, quoting Md. D ecl. Rig hts., Art. 7, the appellants argue that early voting would facilitate the ability of qualified voters to exercise their franchise, and, in that way, would safeguard the rig hts of those voters to participate in our democratic system. They rely on Harper v . Virginia Sta te Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667, 86 S. Ct. 1079, 1082, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 172 (1966), for the proposition that the political franchise of voting is a fundamental right that preserves all other basic civ il rights, Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. at 241, 24 A.2d at 608, for the proposition that the elective franchise is the highest right of the citizen, and the spirit of our institutions requires that every opportun ity should be af forded fo r its fair and fre e exerc ise, and the Marylan d Declara tion of Rig hts for the p roposition th at the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty and the foundation of all free Gove rnmen t. Md . Decl. R ights, A rt. 7. They also re ly on Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimo re, 172 Md. 667, 192 A.2d 531 (1937). In Norris, opponen ts of the use of voting machines argued that their use conflicted with Article I , § 1, wh ich pro vided th at [a]ll e lections shall be held by b allot. This Court rejected the argument that the term ballot could not include voting machines, as they did not exist in 1867. We reasoned: 23 while the principles of the Co nstitution are u nchange able, in interpreting the language by which they are expressed it will b e given a m eaning w hich will permit the application of those principles to changes in the economic, social, and political life of the people, which the framers did not and could not forese e. 172 Md. at 675-676, 192 A.2d at 535. The appellants urge that, in light of Norris, this Court should reject the cramped construction of the relevant constitutional provisions that was emplo yed by the C ircuit Co urt. Norris is inapposite. The case sub judice does not involve, as Norris did, an improvement in technology or social progress that would, in effect, replace an instrument or aspect of the election process, while leaving the overall scheme intact. Early voting, instead, fundam entally changes the very princip les established in the Co nstitution . Moreo ver, while we do appreciate both the right of voters to exercise their franchise and the General Assembly s attempts to m ake the ex ercise of tha t right more convenient and easier, w e note that the importa nce of su ch a right, nevertheless, does not give the General Assemb ly carte blanche authority to enact laws and implement procedures that are in derogation of the Constitution. 2. That EL § 1 0-301 .1 authorizes voters to cast ballots beginning the Tuesday before a primar y or gene ral electio n throu gh the S aturday b efore th e electio n, is clearly inconsistent with the words of, and th e plain meaning of Article XV, § 7 and the other constitutional provisions that designate the Tuesday next after the first Mon day of No vember, as the date 24 of the general election. The appellants argue, nevertheless, that there is no inconsistency between the con stitutiona l provisi ons an d the ea rly voting s tatute. T his is so, they subm it, because an election is not singularly the casting of a ballot, a s the Circuit C ourt held, bu t, rather, it is, as artic ulate d by Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 71, 118 S. Ct. 464, 467, 139 L. Ed. 2d 369, 374 (1997), the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an office holder. In Foster, Louisiana voters brought an action against state officials, alleging that the state s open primary system was in conflict with 2 U.S.C. §§ 1 27 and 7.28 522 U.S. at 6869, 118 S. Ct. at 4 66, 1 39 L . Ed. 2d at 373 . Lou isian a use d an open prima ry system, enacted in 1975, in which all candidates, regardless of party, appear on the same ballot, and all voters, with like disregard of party, are entitled to vote. 522 U.S. at 70, 118 S. Ct. at 467, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 374. If one candidate won a majority of the votes during that early voting 27 2 U.S.C. § 1 provides: § 1. Time for election o f Senators At the regular election held in any State next preceding the expiration of the term fo r which a ny Senator w as elected to r epresent su ch State in Congress, at which election a Representative to Congress is regularly by law to be chosen, a United States Senator from said State shall be elected by the people thereof for the term commencing on the 3d day of January next thereaf ter. 28 2 U.S.C. § 7 provides: § 7. Time of election The Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year, is established as the day for the election, in each of the States and Territories of the United States, of Representatives and Delegates to the C ongres s comm encing on the 3 d day of J anuary n ext there after. 25 period, he was elected, and no further act is done on federal election day to fill the office in ques tion. 52 2 U.S. a t 70, 118 S. Ct. at 4 67, 139 L. Ed. 2 d at 374 . The Suprem e Court agreed with the cha llengers that this system conflicted with the federal statutes creating a uniform federal election day. In so holding, it opined that the federal statutes, in reference to elections, plainly meant the com bined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder. 522 U.S. at 71, 118 S. Ct. at 467, 13 9 L. Ed. 2d at 374. By holding the election before the federally mandated election day, Louisiana s system was in conflict with federal statutes. 522 U.S. at 72, 118 S. Ct. at 468, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 375. The Supreme Court rejected the state s rationale that the open primary system did not effect the timing of the federal election day, but only the manner of election. 522 U.S. at 72, 118 S. Ct. at 468, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 375. Thus, while, to be sure , Foster defines an election as the combined action of voters and election officials, the context in which it was applied is instructive. That definition was employed to ensure that federal offices were not filled by elections finalized before the federal election day. Foster, therefore, contrary to the appellants contentions, does not authorize voting on any other than the day specified for an election. Foster, as the appellants point out, has been interpreted by two federal Courts of Appea l, Voter Integ rity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773 (5th C ir. 2000), and Millsaps v. Thompson, 259 F.3d 535 (6th C ir. 2001), to pe rmit early voting. Neither of these cases, however, addressed whether the early voting scheme at issue was constitutional under the 26 applicable state constitution. The issue in each case was whether the early voting scheme was p reemp ted by fed eral law . In Bomer, the United States Co urt of Ap peals for the Fifth Circu it held that Texas Early Voting statutes did not directly conflict with the federal election statutes establishing a single election day and, therefore, were not preempted. 199 F.3d at 777. The Voting Integrity Project ( VIP ) filed a declaratory judgment action a gainst Elton Bom er, the Texas Secretary of State ( State ), challenging Tex. Elec. Code §§ 81.001,29 82.005,30 and 85.00131 29 Texas Election Code § 81.001 provides: § 81.001. Early Voting Required (a) In each election in this state, early voting shall be conducted by personal ap pearance at an early voting polling plac e and by ma il. (b) A ref erence in a law outsid e this code to absentee v oting mea ns early voting. 30 Texas Election Code § 82.005 provides: § 82.005. Eligibility for Early Voting by Personal Appearance Any qu alified v oter is elig ible for early votin g by pers onal ap pearan ce. 31 Texas Election Code § 85.001 provides: 85.001. Early Voting Period (a) The pe riod for early vo ting by person al appeara nce begin s on the 17 th day before election day and continues through the fourth day before election day, except as otherwise provided by this section. (b) For a sp ecial runof f election fo r the office o f state senato r or state representativ e or for a ru noff prim ary election, the p eriod begin s on the 10 th day befor e election day. (c) If the date prescribed by Subsection (a) or (b) for beginning the period is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal state holiday, the early voting period begins on th e nex t regular busi ness day. (d) If becau se of the da te for wh ich an electio n is ordered it is not possible to begin early voting by personal appearance on the prescribed date, the early voting period shall begin on the earliest date practicable after the prescribed date as set by the authority ordering the election. 27 ( the Texas Early Voting statutes ). These statutes authorized voting to begin in Texas federal elections seventeen days before the federal election day; however, they did not allow the election resu lts to be release d until the votes were tabulated on federal election day. 199 F.3d at 774. Unlike traditional absentee voting, the Texas scheme did not require the voter to give any reason to vote early. 199 F.3d at 774. Arguing that election is synonymous with voting, and as such, vo ting is confined to a single day, the VIP claimed that these statutes violated 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7 and 3 U.S.C. § 1,32 which, collectively, established the Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the day for the election of federal represe ntatives , senato rs, and p residen tial electo rs throu ghout t he Un ited Stat es. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that a state s discretio n and flex ibility in establishing the time, place and manner of electing its federal representatives has only one limitation: the state system cannot directly conflict with federal election laws on the s ubject, 199 F.3d at 775, found no conflict. In do ing so, it rejected the VIP s argumen t that, under the statutory language, the entire election, including all voting, must occur on one day. The court concluded: (e) For an election held on the uniform election date in May, the period for early voting by personal appearance begins on the 12th day before election day and c ontinu es throu gh the f ourth d ay befor e electio n day. 32 3 U.S.C. § 1 provides: § 1. Time of ap pointing electors The electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed, in each State, on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November, in every fourth year succee ding ev ery electio n of a P residen t and V ice Pres ident. 28 Allowing some voters to cast votes before election day does not contravene the federal election statutes because the final selection is not made before the federa l election day. 199 F.3d at 776. The court relied on Foster for the me aning of th e term elec tion, the combined actions of voters a nd officia ls meant to make a final s election of an o fficeh older. 199 F.3d at 775, citing Foster, 522 U.S. at 71, 118 S. Ct. at 467, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 374. It also pointed out that Foster did not prohibit early voting, only that elections must not be consummated before federal election day, 199 F .3d at 77 5, citing Foster, 522 U.S . at 72 n. 4, 118 S. Ct. at 468 n. 4, 139 L. Ed. 2d. at 375 n. 4. Under the Texas scheme, the court held, the election was n ot cons umm ated ea rly. Also critical to the court s reasoning was the effect of a contrary holding on absentee voting. Conced ing that, if the e arly voting statutes at issue were held to be inconsisten t with federal law, then absentee balloting would be as well, a result that Congress did not contemplate or seek to effect, the court opined: [W]e cannot logically hold that Texas system of unrestricted advanced voting violates federal law without also finding that absentee balloting-which occurs in every state-violates federal law. We do not belie ve that Co ngress w ould have allowed a bsentee ba lloting to occur under state laws if it attached the meaning to the federal election statutes urged by the VIP. More than a century ago, some states began to allow absentee voting, and all states currently provide for it in some form, ¦ yet Congress has taken no action to curb this established practice. We are u nable to read the federal election day statutes in a manner that would prohibit such a universal, longstand ing practice o f which C ongress w as obviou sly well aware . 29 199 F.3d at 776. Bomer does not support the appellants argumen t, nor is it analog ous to the situation sub judice. Bomer did not address a state constitutional challenge, which is w hat is presented in the case sub judice. Thus, while, to be sure, the court in that case stated that [t]he challenged Texas statutes encou rage voting by providing T exas voters with mo re opportunities to vote, 199 F.3d at 777, and further the important federal objective of reducing the burden on citizens to exercise the ir right to vote by allowing them to vote at a time convenient to them, without thwarting other federal concerns, id., it did so in the context of a challenge based on preemption as opposed to a state constitutional challenge. Millsaps is similar ly unhelp ful. Th ere, a challenge similar to that in Bomer was brought agai nst T ennesse e s E arly V oting Statutes ( TEVS ). Again, the plaintiffs in the case argued that the early voting system conflicted with federal statutes that established the first Tuesday after the first Mond ay in November in even-numbered years as election day for federal office holders. TEVS allows a voter wishing to vote early to go to the county election commission office within posted hours not more than twenty (20) days nor less than five (5) days before the day of the election. A voter desiring to vote in the early voting period shall sign an application for a ballot. 259 F.3d at 5 37, citing Tenn. Code. Ann. § 2-6-102(a) (emphas is added). Unlike absentee balloting, which required the identification of one of a few specifically enumerated reasons for voting absentee, TEVS established a separate method of 30 early voting that did not require the voter to give any reason for wanting to vote early. 259 F.3d at 537. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bomer had done, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appea ls relied on the holdings in Foster, that if an election does take place, it may not be consummated prior to f ederal e lection d ay, 259 F .3d at 54 4, citing Foster, 522 U .S. at 72 n. 4, 118 S. Ct. at 468 n. 4, 139 L. Ed. 2d at 375 n. 4, and that an election is the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder. . . 259 F.3d at 547, citing Foster, 522 U.S. at 71, 118 S. Ct. at 467, 139 L. Ed. 2d a t 374. Usin g this rationale, the court concluded that the TEVS did not violate federal law. It explained: So long as no combined action occurs any day other than federal election day, or so long as any such combined action is not intended to make a final selection of a federal officeholder, a State has complied with the federal election s statutes . 259 F.3d at 547. Moreover, like Bomer, the Millsaps court was influenced by the adverse effect that an adverse ruling would have on absentee voting: [W]e see no principled distinction between the [TEVS] at issue in this case and the me chanic s of ab sentee v oting. . . . the plaintiffs argumen t would ap ply with equal force to absentee voting and result in a declaration that federal law preem pts a w idely acce pted an d long- standin g electo ral prac tice. 259 F.3d at 547. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals finally held that no Congressional purpose was frustrated, noting that there is no reason to think that simply because Congress established 31 a federal election day it displaced all State regulation of the times for holding federal election s. 259 F.3d at 5 49. Millsaps does not support the appellants position any more than did Bomer. Millsaps also did not deal with a state constitutio nal challeng e to the Ten nessee ear ly voting scheme.33 A determina tion that a state statute does not conflict with an existing federal law does not insulate that state s statute from state constitutionality analysis. In sum , Bomer and Millsaps do not support the appellants position. Voting, as the Circuit Court held, must mean the casting of ballots. Indeed, that is the focus of the Constitutional provisions. Article I, § 1, for example, states simply who can vote and wh ere voting m ay occur. By co ntrast, there is no constitutiona l provision th at prescribes who may canvass the votes or when or how the votes are to be canvassed; for that matter, no constitutional provision e xpressly authorizes canvassing or any of the ministerial actions that elec tion off icials mu st perfo rm in co njunctio n with e lections . Article XV, § 7 and the other constitutional provisions prescribing the date of election are clear: the election shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first M onday in the m onth of Novem ber, in the year in whic h they shall occur. (Emphasis added). There is no constitutional provision that states that voting shall begin on one date and end on an other; 33 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did note that, since 1870, the Tennessee Constitution specified the date for the election as the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. Said elections shall terminate the same day. Tenn. Const. art. II, § 7. No discussion, h oweve r, ensued reg arding w hether the sta te early voting sc heme is inconsistent with this state constitutional provision. 32 it merely provides that the election shall be held on a specific da y. Read in con junction w ith Article I, § 1, this provision indicates that, apart from absentee voting, in-person ballot casting must beg in and en d on the same d ay. Thus, any statute that allows for a ballot to be cast before the prescribed day must be in derogation of the Constitution. The appellants, continuing to rely on the meaning Foster ascribe d to ele ction, argue that an election cannot mean the mere casting of votes. This is so, they say, because an election has not been held until the canvassing of the votes has begun, since a voter has not voted until and unless his or her ballot has been counted. They further ask whether an election has been truly held if some emergency prevents the cast-ballots from being counted? We are not p ersuad ed. The Constitution contemplates an election in terms of the voter, not in terms o f the election process. M oreover, w hile we un derstand th at the appellants would prefer us to center our focus on when an election has been held, there is no dispute that the combined actions must occur, that voting must end, on federal election day. The true issue, then, is deciding when voting can begin. Article XV, § 7 makes clear that b allot casting m ust b egin and end on th e sam e day. Incidenta lly, this reading is not inconsistent with Foster s definition of the word electio n, as expresse d by the appe llants - the co mbined a ctions of vo ters and of ficials meant to make a final selection of an officeholder. These combined actions then, absentee balloting aside, must occur on the Tuesday next after the first Mond ay in the month of 33 Novemb er. This Court is not convinced that it is constitutiona lly permitted for v oting to merely e nd on federa l election day, and t o begin at any arb itrary prior d ate. 3. It is clear from Article I, § 1, tha t a voter can only vote in the election ward or district in which he resides. Section 10-30 1.1 of the Election La w Article, howe ver, allows fo r early voting to occur outside of a person s residential ward, pro viding for th ree differe nt early voting polling places in some counties. As noted alrea dy, this Court, to a scertain the a ctual intent of the frame rs, interprets constitutional provisions using the same rules of interpretation that relate to the interpretation of a statute, and gives the language of the provision its ordina ry, plain m eaning . See Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. at 536-537, 873 A.2d at 1133, Brown v. Brown, 287 Md. 273, 277-278, 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980) (holding that the Court generally applies the same principles in construing constitutional provisions as it does in construing statutory language), Buchh olz v. Hill, 178 M d. at 286 , 13 A.2 d at 351 . The appellants contend that Article I, § 1 w as enacted to prevent e lection offic ials from preventing voters from voting in their own election wards. Accordingly, they maintain, it merely states that a voter shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he or she reside s, and does not exclude voters from voting in other wards. Article I, § 1, however, is not ambiguous, and as such, this Court will not look past its plain language. The phrase, shall be en titled to vote in the w ard or e lection d istrict in w hich he resides, 34 modifies the preceding phrase, [e]very citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years or upwards, who is a resident of the State as of the time for the closing of registration next preceding the election. . . The phrase, as a whole, designates who is allowed to vote, if they so cho ose. The location at which a citizen can vote also is a requirement. Even under the strained interpretation that the appellants give the phrase, shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district in which he resides, the subseque nt language of A rticle I, § 1 bars voting in an election d istrict or ward that a person does not live in. Article I, § 1 states that a person shall be entitled to vote in the ward or election district where he resides until he acquires residence in another election district or ward. Therefore, once a voter who resides and votes in a particular w ard acquire s residence in another election district or ward, that voter s right, his or her entitlement, to vote in the ward where he or she once resided is extinguished. If he or she has the right to vote it is in the newly acquired district or ward.34 The appellants state that it is axiomatic that a person may waive a constitutional right. While this is true of some constitutional rights, e.g., one may waive the right to a trial by jury, Smith v. S tate, 375 Md. 365, 379-81, 825 A.2d 1055, 1064 (2003), a citizen cannot waive a requirement of the Constitution. We view the language in Article I, § 1, as a 34 Resorting to the applica tion of the L atin maxim expressio unius est ex lusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, as urged by the appellees, is unnecessary. It is clear to this Court that the presence of the limiting phrase until he shal l have a cquired a reside nce in a nother election district or ward in this State , (emphasis added), indicates a restriction on voting outside one s residence. 35 mandatory requireme nt, and not as a mere entitlement, capable of being waived. Therefore, we reje ct the ap pellants argum ent. See also Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution.35 This reading of Article I, § 1 is not ne w in Maryland. In Kemp v. Owens, 76 Md. at 238, 24 A. at 607, this Court stated that [one] cannot lawfully vote in a ward or election district in which he does not reside, even though that ward or election district be within the legislative district or coun ty where he has residence. The appellants claim that this case in inapplicable, because it merely stands for the proposition that one cannot lawfully vote w here he is not registered to vote. This reading, however, ignores the context of the case, in which this Court held that where one cannot lawfully vote, based on Article I, § 1, one cannot lawfully register or remain reg istered to vote. 76 Md. at 238, 24 A. at 60 7. Furth er, Kemp highlights exactly the scenario described above, where one s voter entitlement extinguishes upon moving from his election ward and establishing residence elsewhere: Owens, having removed from the first precinct of the Tw enty-Second ward to the ninth precinct of the Sev enth war d, ceased to be entitled to v ote in the Twenty-Second ward, but was entitled to vote in the Seventh; both wards being in the same legislative district. In other words, by moving from one ward to another in the same le gislative district, he d id not lose his right to vote in 35 Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides: Article 7. Free and frequent elections; right of suffrage That the right of the People to participate in the Legislature is the best security of liberty and the found ation of all fre e Gove rnment; fo r this purpose, elections ought to be free and frequent; and every citizen having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution, ought to have the right of suffra ge. 36 that legislative district, but he was no longer authorized to vo te in the ward from w hich he had m oved. 76 Md. at 238, 24 A. at 607. In Smith v. H ackett, 129 Md. 73, 76-77, 98 A. 140, 141 (1916), voters went to the election ward po lling place de signated fo r them and to which they were directed to cast their votes, but later learned that the polling room s physical location was slightly beyond the lines of the election district. This Court held that the votes they cast were rendered not invalid simply because th ey were cast o utside the distric t lines. Ackno wledging that [t]he on ly condition imposed by the Constitution as to the place where the right to vote shall be exercised is that it must be in the elec tion district of w hich the vo ter is a resident, (emphas is in original), but concluding that the election officials, not the voters, had erred, we opined: The act of the supervisors in locating the polling room in this instance beyond the precinct division line was contrary to the purpose of the law, but the act of the voters of the Second precinct in voting at the only place thus provided for them in the district of their residenc e was w holly within the right conferred upon th em by the Cons titution. 129 Md. at 77, 98 A. at 141-142. Thus, because the voters had voted, so far as they knew, where they wer e supp osed to , within the district in which they resided, their votes we re required to be counted. 129 Md. a t 77-78, 98 A. at 142. Nothing in Hackett supports that voters in the instant c ase can kn owingly and actively do what the Constitution does not allow vote outside of one s residential election district or ward. Moreover, Article I, § 5 of the Maryland Constitution provides that [i]t shall be the duty of the General Assembly to pass Laws to punish, with fine and imprisonment, any 37 person . . . who shall vote in any election district, or ward, in which he doe s not res ide. . . . MD. CONST. art. I, § 5.36 By requiring the General Assembly to legislate fines and punishm ents for persons voting outside their election district or ward, it plainly was the intent of the framers that voting outside of one s residential election district or ward is forbidden. That EL § 10-301 .1 does no t force voters from traveling outside their ward, but rather provides an option of an addition al polling plac e, is irrelevant b y providing an ability to vote outside one s election district or ward, the General Assembly has provided an option that is in derogation of Article I, §§ 1 and 5. 4. The appellants argue that Article I, § 1 of the Maryland Constitution does not apply to the primary elections in Maryland. They do so based on two decisions of this Court Hill v. Mayor and Town Council of Colmar Manor, 210 Md. 46, 122 A.2d 462 (1956), and Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Blunt, 200 Md. 120, 88 A.2d 474 (1952), which they cite for the proposition that the Legislature has plenary powers which are not restricted by the 36 MD C ONS T. art. I, § 5 prov ides, in full: It shall be the duty of the G eneral As sembly to pas s Laws to punish, w ith fine and imprisonment, any person, who shall remove into any election district, or precinct of any ward of the City of Baltimore, not for the purpose of acquiring a bona fide residence therein, but for the purpose of voting at an approaching election, or, who shall vote in any election district, or ward, in whic h he do es not re side, (ex cept in th e case p rovide d for in this Arti cle,) or shall, at the same election, vote in more than one election district, or precinct, or shall vote, or offer to vote, in any name not his own, or in place of any other person of the same name, or shall vote in any county in which he doe s not res ide. 38 provisions of A rticle I of the C onst itutio n of Maryland with regard to bo th primar y and municipal elections. . . Neither case supp orts their argum ent, howe ver. Blunt dealt with the State s decision, having switched to voting machines, to limit , by law, voters at a primary election to a choice among the candidates for nom ination listed o n the offic ial ballot and n ot permit w rite-in votes. This Court found that such an action was not unreasonable and did not violate any provision of the state or federal Constitution. 200 M d. at 128 , 88 A.2 d at 478 . Spe cific ally, the Court recognized that the General Assembly had the power t o regulate by statute the process of primary elections; this, however, is very different than stating that Article I, § 1 is inapposite to primaries. In Hill, the question posed was whether primary elections for town Councilman pursuant to a town c harter wer e required to be treated the same as general elections; spec ifica lly, the issue was whether the holding in Blunt prevented write-in votes from being accepted at a general election . 210 M d. at 53, 1 22 A.2 d at 466 . The Court in Hill noted that the town was incorporated by Chapter 178 of the Acts of 1927, and its charter, as amended, constitutes Sections 373 to 415, inclusive, of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince Geo rge's County (Everstine, 1953 Edition), 21 0 Md. at 4 8, 122 A .2d at 463, a nd that, in determining whether write-in votes were allowable under the town charter, [t]he question is one of legislative intent, not of constitutional right nor yet of legislative power. 210 Md. at 57, 122 A.2d at 468. Again, the issue was whether the local town charter had the intention 39 of preventing write-in ballots from being accepted at a general e lection; Hill does not sta te that Article I, § 1 is inapposite to primary elections. We adopt the analysis offered by the Circuit Court in holding that primary elections are included within the meaning of at all elections to be he ld in this S tate in A rticle I, § 1: if Article I, § 1 were read to exclude primary elections, such a reading could lead to an absurd result, as it would eliminate all Constitutional qualifications for primary elections. Thus, a 12 year-old, n on-U.S. c itizen, residing in Virginia, would not be barred by the [Maryland] Constitution from voting in the Maryland primary election. Such a reading simply canno t be correct. C. Having established that early voting is not authorized under Article I, §1, the constitutional provision th at authorizes in-person b alloting, we a lso hold that early voting is not a form of absentee voting, authorized by Article I, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution. Article I, § 3 provides: The General A ssembly of Maryland shall have p ower to p rovide by suitab le enactment for voting by qualified voters of the State of Maryland who are absent at the time of any election in wh ich they are entitled to vote and for voting by other qualified voters who are unable to vote perso nally and for the manner in which and the time and place at which such absent voters may vote, and fo r the can vass an d return of their votes. (Emp hasis ad ded). Article I, § 3 plainly provides that the General Assembly shall have the power to provide for voters who are absent and for voters who are unable to vote personally. 40 Absentee balloting is the only other alternative to in-person day-of voting. This process includes a number of rules and regulations to ensure validity and fairness.37 To be sure, the reasons that permitted a voter to vote absentee no longer apply, having been removed from § 9-304 by Chapter 6, § 1, Maryland Laws 2006. The app ellants rely upon, and take so lace from , that fact. The appellants a cknow ledge that A rticle I, § 3 authorizes only absent voters or those unable to vote personally to vote absentee, but claim that the phrase unable to vote perso nally is subject to interpretation. They claim that anyone who fin ds the voting time to be in convenie nt may be u nable to vo te person ally, due to work hours, family obligations, and other similar reasons. Therefo re, the appella nts assert, early voting, as it allows those inconvenienced individuals wh o are una ble to vote person ally to vo te earlier at a mo re conv enient tim e, is auth orized b y Article I, § 3. We, however, are not convinced that the amendment of the absentee statute to delete the need for reasons suffices to equate absentee voting with early voting. We reject the appellants a rgumen t and hold th at Article I, § 3 clearly indica tes that the inab ility to vote personally applies to absent voters, not those who find the voting day to b e inconve nient. 37 An absentee ballot, as we have seen, is one that is not used in a polling place, EL § 1 -101 (a ). It can b e reque sted by a v oter by ap plication , EL § 9 -305, supra n. 3, or by agent, EL § 9-307, filled out and returned to the State Board of Elections by special envelo pe, EL § 9-31 0, or by ag ent. EL § 9-30 7. 41 If the inconvenience is so great as to render them absent and prevent them from voting on the election d ay, these individu als can vote using an a bsentee ba llot.38 Moreover, and more to the po int, it matters little that the excuse qualifications that previously were in EL § 9-304 and EL § 9-305 39 have been removed. People who are voting 38 Last minute incon veniences are largely accom odable, even those that are unable to be anticipated. A voter can apply for an Absentee Ballot up until the Tuesday preceding an election, EL § 9-305 (b), and can have an agent deliver the ballot, EL § 9307. Moreover, Code of M aryland Regulations ( COMAR ) 33.11.03.08(b), states: B. In G eneral. An absentee b allot is conside red to have been time ly received only if: (1) The ballot is received by the local board office before the polls close on election day; or (2) The b allot: (a) Is received by the local board office from the United States Postal Service or a private m ail carrier: (i) On or before 10 a.m. on the second W ednesday after a primary election preceding a gubernatorial election; or (ii) On or before 10 a.m. on the second Friday after a general or special election or in a primary election preceding a presidential election; and (b) Was mailed before election day, as verified: (i) By a postmark of the United States Postal Service, an Army Post Office, a Fleet Post Office, or the postal service of any other country; or (ii) By the voter's affidavit that the ballot was completed and mailed before election day, if the return envelope does not contain a postm ark or th e postm ark is illeg ible. 39 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2005 C um. Sup p.) § 9-305 of the Elec tion Law Article stated as relev ant, before amendm ent: (a) An application for an absentee ballot, signed by the voter, may be made: (3) in a written request that includes: (iii) the reason, as authorized in § 9-304 of this subtitle, for absent ee votin g. The statute, as amended, has removed the provisions requiring an § 9-304 excuse. 42 early under M d. Co de § 10-3 01.1 are n ot ab sent nor a re they unable to vo te pe rson ally; instead, they are voters casting ballots in person, early. EL § 9-101 (a) makes clear that they are not absen tee voters; the y are voting by a b allot used in a polling plac e. Early voting is not absentee voting and, thus, is not authorized by Article I, § 3.40 Nor are we persuaded by the appellants additional argument, that renaming the early voting acts as no excuse absentee balloting eliminates the Article I, § 3 problem. Putting aside, for a moment, that Article I, § 3 does not authorize this form of voting, however titled, had the General Assembly wished for the early voting acts to be truly considered as no excuse absentee b alloting, such inten t would, an d should, h ave at least be en expres sed in the title of the ac ts. Article III, § 29 of the M aryland Con stitution provid es, as relevan t: . . . every Law enacted by the General Assembly shall embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in its title; and no Law, nor section of Law, shall be revived, or amended by reference to its title, or section on ly; nor shall any Law be construed by reason of its title, to grant p owers, or c onfer righ ts which are not e xpress ly contain ed in the body of the Ac t. . . . MD CON ST. art. III, § 29.41 40 The appellants note tha t [i]f the lower court s decision is co rrect, then all voters (perhaps with the exception of traditional absentee voters acting under Title 9, Section 3, of the Election Law article) must be physically present to vote on Tuesday. The appellants, h ere, are corre ct. 41 Article III, § 29 of the M aryland Con stitution provid es, in full: The style of all Laws of this State shall be, Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Maryland: and all Laws shall be passed by original bill; and every Law enacted b y the Genera l Assemb ly shall embrac e but one s ubject, and that sha ll be describe d in its title; and no Law, no r section of L aw, shall be revived , or amend ed by referen ce to its title, or section only; nor shall any Law b e construed by reason of its title, to grant pow ers, or conf er rights 43 This Court has stated that, in order to convey to the public what the chapter means, the title of an ena ctment m ust shed[ ] substantial light on what the General Assembly had in mind, when it enacte d the leg islation. Board of County Comm rs v. Stephans, 286 Md. 384, 395, 408 A .2d 101 7, 1022 (1979 ). See also Migda l v. State, 358 Md. 308, 323, 747 A.2d 1225, 1233 (2000) (noting that the purpose of constitutional single-sub ject rule is to avoid the necessity fo r a legislator to a cquiesce in a bill he or she opposes in o rder to secure useful and necessary legislation an d to preven t the engraf ting of fore ign matter o n a bill, which foreign m atter might n ot be supp orted if off ered indep endently); City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 225, 378 A.2d 1326, 1330 (1977) (noting that the purp ose of the title requirement is to inform the members of the legislature and the public of the nature of the proposed legislation), City of Bowie v. C ounty Commission ers, 258 Md. 454, 467, 267 A.2d 172, 179 (197 0) (noting th at the title must f airly describe the r eal nature of the statute). Moreover, Bell v. Board of Comm rs, 195 Md. 21, 32-33, 72 A.2d 746, 751-752 (1956) dictates that any change in the laws must be marked, and clear, from the titles of the new which are not expressly contained in the body of the Act; and it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, in amending any article, or section of the Code of Laws of this State, to enact the same, as the said article, or section would re ad whe n amend ed. And whene ver the G eneral As sembly shall enact any Pu blic Gene ral Law, n ot amend atory of any sectio n, or article in the said Code, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly to enact the same, in articles and sections, in the same manner, as the Code is arranged, and to provide for the publication of all additions and alterations, which may be m ade to th e said C ode. 44 enactments. If ea rly voting were a form of no excuse absentee voting, the General Assemb ly should hav e noted su ch intent in the title of the ena ctment. 42 Because the acts authorizing EL § 10 -301.1 are in consistent w ith and in derogation of certain provisions of the Maryland Constitution, in particular, Article XV, § 7, and Article I, § 1, and are n ot constitution ally supported b y Article I, § 3, w e find these acts to be unconstitutional, and thus void. COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLA NTS. 42 The Early Voting Acts, in addition, were codified as a new § 10-301.1 the section of the election law dealing with polling sites, election judges, and polling place procedu res, and no t as an exten sion of the a bsentee ba lloting laws, c odified at § § 9-301 to 9-312. 45

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