Roskelly v. Lamone

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Roskelly, et al. v. Lamone, et al. - No. 141, Septembe r Term 2005. Opinion by Bell, C.J. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REFERENDUM JUDICIAL REVIEW A submission containing more than one third, but less than all, of the full number of signatures necessary to complete a refere ndum petition, subm itted to the Secretary of State before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signatures to complete the referendum petition within the me aning a nd con templa tion of th e Electio n Law Article, is still a petition. Accordingly, the State Bo ard Adm inistrator is requ ired to mak e a validity determination of that petition, and judicial review must be sought within ten days as outlined by statute. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 141 September Term, 2005 _____________________________________ THOMAS ROSKELLY, ET AL. v. LINDA H. LAMONE, ET AL. _____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Bell, C.J. ______________________________________ Filed: December 11, 2006 This case involv es the early votin g legislation enacted by the Maryland General Ass emb ly. Senate Bill 478, passed by the General Assembly two days before the end of the 2005 legislative sessio n, ultimately became Chapter 5, Laws of Maryland 2006, and was codified as a new § 10-301.1 of the Election Law Article, Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum. Supp.). It provided for early voting, eight hours each day for a five-day period beginning the Tuesday before a primary or general election through the Saturday before the election, at early voting sites, which each local boa rd of election s was req uired to estab lish in its jurisdiction. Passed by bo th the Senate and the House of Delegates on April 9, 2005, SB 478 was vetoed by the Governor on May 20, 200 5. The Go vernor s ve to was ov erridden by bo th houses on Jan uary 16, 2 006. T hus, pursuant to Article II, § 17(d) of the Maryland Constitution,1 SB 478 became law on February 16, 2006. A second piece of leg islation, House Bill 1368, also related to early voting, was introduced and enacted, as emergency legislation, during the 2006 legislative session. That bill, which became Chapter 6 1, Laws of Ma ryland 2006 , repealed an d reenacte d with amendm ents the new, re cently passed § 10-301.1 of the Election Law Article. As amended, 1 MD CO NST. art. II, § 17(d) provides: (d) Any B ill vetoed by the G overnor sh all be returne d to the Ho use in wh ich it originated immediately after the House has organized at the next regular or special session of th e Genera l Assemb ly. The Bill ma y then be reco nsidered ac cording to the procedure specified in this section. Any Bill enacted over the veto of the Governor, or any Bill which shall become law as the result of the failure of the Governor to act within the time specified, shall take effect 30 days after the Govern or's veto is ove r-ridden, or o n the date sp ecified in the Bill, which ever is later. If the Bill is an emergency measure, it shall take effect when enacted. No such veto ed Bill shall b e returned to the Legisla ture whe n a new General A ssembly of M aryland h as been elected and sw orn sinc e the pa ssage o f the ve toed B ill. § 10-301.1 altered early voting as prescribed by SB 478, by extending the hours of early voting from eight hours daily to ele ven hou rs and spec ified, either ge nerally 2 or with particula rity, 3 where early voting would take place in each county and the City of Baltimore. HB 1368 was passed on March 29, 2006, and vetoed by the Governor on April 7, 2006. Bo th houses overrode the veto on April 10, 2006, and, again, p ursuan t to Artic le II, § 17(d) of the Maryland Constitution, HB 1368 became law. On April 19, 2006, Marylanders for Fair Elections, Inc. ( MFFE ) and its chairman, Thomas Roskelly ( Roskelly ), collectively the appellants, initiated the referral process provided for in Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution4 by requesting an advance determination 5 of the summaries of SB 478 and HB 1368 they proposed for placement on the 2 In all but the largest counties, Charles County, and Baltimore City, the statute prescribed that the early voting locations would be in the county seat, without specifying the exact location. 3 In Anne A rundel, Baltimore, Harfo rd, Howard, M ontgomery and Prince George s Counties and Baltimore City, HB 1368 designated the specific early voting locations to be used. In Charles County, it specified that the early voting location would be in Waldorf. 4 MD CO NST. art. XVI, § 1 provides: (a) The people reserve to themselves power known as The Referendum, by petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the State, to approve or reject at the po lls, any Act, or pa rt of any Act o f the Gen eral Assem bly, if approved by the Governor, or, if passed by the General Assembly over the veto of the Gov ernor; (b) The provisions of this Article shall be self-executing; provided that additional leg islation in furth erance the reof and n ot in conflict th erewith may be enacted. 5 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 6-202 of the Elec tions Law Article perm its petition sponsors to obtain from the State Administrator an advance determination of the sufficiency of the format of the petition. It provides: 2 signature pages of the referendum petition. On April 25, 2006, the A ttorney Gene ral wrote Linda Lamone ( L amone ), the State A dministrator of the Maryland State Board of Elections ( the Board ), copying Roskelly, regarding the Summaries of SB 478 and HB 1368 for Referendum Petition. Having suggested amendments to the summaries of the bills proposed, and advised Lamone that she was authorized to approv e a summ ary that is consistent with this letter, he addressed the subject of the advance determination, but that will relate to whether these bills may ultimately be petitioned for referendum. With respect to that and with reference to prior petition efforts, the Attorney General, citing, and enclosing, Letter from Assistant Attorney Generals Robert A. Zarnoch and Bonnie A. Kirkland to Honorable Donald H. Dwyer, Jr. (April 26, 2005) and 62 Opinions of the Attorney General 405 (19 77), 6 noted that office s conclusion that a petition drive for referendum must occur immediately after the session o f the Leg islature at wh ich the bill is initially pas sed by the Legisla ture. (a) In General. - The format of the petition prepared by a sponsor may be subm itted to the chi ef el ectio n officia l of th e app ropr iate e lection autho rity, in ad vance of filin g the petit ion, f or a d eterm inati on of its s ufficien cy. (b) Advice o f legal autho rity. - In making the determination, the chief election officia l may seek the adv ice of th e legal a uthority. Chie f electio n offic ial is de fined ... as to the State B oard, th e State A dminis trator; or ... as to a local board, the election director. 6 In that opinio n, Attorney G eneral Bu rch conclu ded that w hen the G eneral As sembly repeals or amends a referred bill in good faith, the referendum concerning the original legislatio n shou ld be rem oved f rom the ballot. 3 Having obtained approval of the summaries to be placed at the top of referendum petition signature pages, MFFE proceeded to collec t the nec essary sig natures . Article XVI, § 3 (a) of the Maryland Constitution prescribes the threshold requirements for a referendum petition. It prov ides, as releva nt: (a) The referendum petition against an Act or part of an Act passed by the General Assembly, shall be sufficient if signed by three percent of the qualified voters of the State of Maryland, calculated upon the whole number of votes cast for Governor at the last preceding Gubernatorial election, of whom not mo re than h alf are re sidents o f Baltim ore City, o r of any one County. ... Although a law passed by the General Assembly that is not an emergency law ordinarily shall take effect [on] the first day of Jun e next a fter the s ession a t which it may be p assed, Article XVI, § 2 provides for the delay of the law s eff ective date. T his is accom plished if before said first day of Jun e the re sh all ha ve been f iled w ith th e Secreta ry of the State a petition to refer to a vote of the people any law or any part of a law capable of referendum and if the requirements of Article XVI, § 3 (b) have been met. Section 3 (b) provides, as relevant: (b) If more than one-third, but less than the full number of signatures required to complete any referendum petition against any law passed by the General Ass emb ly, be filed with the Secretary of State before the first day of June, the time for the law to take effec t and for filin g the rema inder of sig natures to complete the petition shall be extended to the thirtieth day of the same m onth with like effect. [7] 7 Section 3 (b ) addresses another sce nario, not relev ant in this case , where the bill is passed close to the June 1st effective date. In those cases, it provides as follows: If an Act is passed less than 45 days prior to June 1, it may not become effective so oner than 3 1 days after its pa ssage. To b ring this Ac t to 4 (Emphasis add ed). On May 31, 2006, MFFE submitted 20,221 signatures in support of its petition to refer Senate Bill 478, Chapter 5, Laws of Maryland 2006, to the vote of M aryland s registered voters. Although more than the numb er required to be filed at that time, 17,062, or 1 percent of the full number of signatures required to complete the referendum petition, the number of sign atures submitted was f ewer than the num ber recommen ded by the Board of Elections to be filed.8 On June 8, 2006, Lamone, one of the appellees, 9 wrote Roskelly, concurrently sending him a fac simile, inform ing him tha t, pursuant to Marylan d Cod e (2003 , 2006 C um. Su pp.) § 6-206 (c) (5) of the Election Law Article,10 MFFE s petition relating to Se nate Bill 478 referendum, the first one-third of the required number of signatures to a petition shall be submi tted with in 30 da ys after its p assage . If the first onethird of the required number of signatures is submitted to the Secretary of State within 30 days after its passage, the time for the Act to take effect and for filing the remainder of the signatures to complete the petition shall be exte nded for an a dditiona l 30 d ays. (Emphasis add ed). 8 The Board of Elections had recommended that the petitions be signed by at least 20% more than the number required, since past experience indicates that a substantial number of signatures are likely to be invalid, and that [i]n jurisdictions where residents move frequently, the invalidity rate may be higher. 9 The Maryland State Board of Elections is the other appellee in this case. 10 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 6-206 (c) of the E lection Law Article provides: 5 is deficient a nd m ay not be referred to referendum for reasons stated in the enclosed letter dated June 8 from the Office of the Attorney General. The Attorney General s letter expanded the rationale set forth in his April 25, 2006 letter. Specifically, it stated: (1) Senate Bill 478 (2005) may not be referred to referendum at this time because a referendum effort must occur immediately after the regular session at which the legislation is initially passed. Thus, the required signatures should have b een file d no late r than Ju ne 1, 20 05. In addition, because most of the provisions of Senate Bill 478 were subsequently amended by House B ill 1368 (2006), those provisions of the bill may not be petitioned to refer endum . The letter stated further: (c) Declaration of deficiency. - The chief election official shall declare that the petition is def icient if the ch ief election o fficial determ ines that: (1) the petition was not timely filed; (2) after providing the sponsor an opportunity to correct any clerical errors, the information provided by the sponsor indicates that the petition does not satisfy any requirements of law for the number or geographic distribution of signatures; (3) an examination of unverified signatures indicates that the petition does not satisfy any requ irements of law for the number or geogra phic distribution of signatures; (4) the requirements relating to the form of the petition have not been satisfied; (5) base d on the a dvic e of t he le gal a utho rity: (i) the use of a petition for the subject matter of the petition is not authorized by law; or (ii) the petition seeks: 1. the enactment of a law that would be unconstitutional or the election or nomination of an individual to an office for which that individual is not legally qualified to be a candidate; or 2. a result that is otherwise prohibited by law; or (6) the petition has failed to satisfy some other requirement established by law. 6 An effort to petition a bill to referendum is governed by Article XVI of the Constitution. Section 1(a) of Article XVI makes it clear that a bill that becomes effective over the veto of the Gov ernor may be petitioned to referendum.[] However, the Article makes no further reference to a veto or override and instead addresses petition-gathering in all circumstances and governing time-frames. *** [T]here are several possible inter pretations of Article XVI as it applies to the timing of a ref erendu m. Un der one possib le readin g, MFF E s filing of signatures a year after the veto would be timely because petitioners were not required to do anything unless and until the veto was overridden, which did not happen until January 17, 2006. *** Another poss ible r eadi ng of Ar ticle XV I is th at the Gen eral A ssem bly s override of the Governor s veto triggers a new right to gathe r signatures u ntil May 31 (or June 30) o f the subsequent year. In support of such an interpretation, §3(c) of Article XVI defines passage as any final action by both houses and does not include a veto override in the definition of enactmen t. *** If the Constitution were con strued to pro vide for pe tition drives to begin after a veto overrid e, it would lik ely result in such bills becoming effective for several months and then suddenly being suspended if the requisite number of valid signatures were obtained. In the case of Senate Bill 478, which took effect on February 16, 2006, or thirty days after the veto override, the legislation would be suspended on June 1st. This seems at odds with the scheme set out in Article XVI. For example, emergency legislation that has already become effective is not suspended by the submission of petitions signed by a relatively small percentage of the electorate; rather such legislation remains effective u ntil rejected by a m ajority of voters at the polls. In addition, under such a construction of the Constitution, the organizers of a petition drive would likely have more than double the amount of time that the framers deemed adequate for gathering signatures for bills that were not vetoed.[] This possible interpretation thus appears illogical and contrary to the basic scheme of Article XV I. 7 The most sensib le interpretation o f Article XVI is that MFFE had until May 31 next after the [2005] session at which the bill was passed to gather the first one-th ird of th e signa tures. Such a construction does not double the signature-gathering period or create the illogical result of legislation taking effect on February 16, 2006, only to be suspended on June 1, 2006.[] Cognizant that the timing of the referendum drive in these circumstances is an issue of first impres sion, and, thus, that a court might not agree with his conclusion, the Attorney General recommended that the local boards of election proceed with the verification of the referendum signatures so that the referendum process may continue w ithout interrup tion in the eve nt that a c ourt rea ches a d ifferen t conclu sion. Consistent with that latter a dvice, and for the reaso n the Attorn ey General gave, Lamone informed Roskelly that the local boards of elections nevertheless would continue to verify signatures pursuant to § 6-210(c) of the Election Law Article.11 Sub sequ ently, on June 21, 200 6, La mon e once ag ain w rote to Roske lly, again sending the letter by mail and by facsimile. In th at letter, she reported that the local boards of elections had completed the validation of the signature pages submitted in connection with Senate Bill 478, with the result that 16,924 n ames had been valid ated and a ccepted. A s this was 138 fewer than the number required, as a threshold, to be submitted by May 31, 2006, 11 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 6-210 (c) of the E lection Law Article provides: (c) Verification and counting. - The verification and counting of validated signatures on a petition shall be completed within 20 days after the filing of the petition . 8 she further informed Roskelly that the verification process would not continue. Lamone also revisited her June 8 letter, calling Roskelly s attention to its deficiency determination, and pointing out that it had not been challenged within ten days, as required by § 6-210 (e) (1) of the Election Law Article.12 She concluded, therefore, that because MFFE had not challenged her June 8 deficien cy determinatio n in a timely fashion, fo r that reason, a s well, the referendum petition process for Senate Bill 478 would not continue.13 A. On June 27, 2006, nineteen (19) days after Lamone s June 8 determina tion, Roske lly filed, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, a Verified Complaint and an Emergency Motion for Judicial Review. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that Lamone s deficie ncy deter minatio n was both su bstantiv ely and p rocedu rally flaw ed. 12 Section 6-210(e)(1) provides: Judicial review (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, any judicial review of a determina tion, as p rovide d in § 6- 209 of this sub title, shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates. (Emphasis add ed). 13 MFFE s referendum effort with regard to House Bill 1368, Chapter 61, Laws of Maryland 2006, was more successful. On May 31, 2006, Roskelly filed petitions containing 20,687 signatures of Maryland voters in support of that effort. Lamone informed Roskelly by separate letter, dated June 21, that MFFE had submitted enough signatu res for th e petition proces s to con tinue fo r Hou se Bill 1 368. As we h ave seen, H ouse Bill 13 68 was p assed as an emergen cy measure. A rticle XVI, § 2 of the M aryland Con stitution provid es, as relevan t: An em ergency law shall remain in force notwithstanding such petition, but shall stand repealed thirty days after having been re jected b y a majori ty of the q ualified electors voting thereon . 9 Roskelly rejected the premise of the Lamone deficiency determination - that Article XVI required the referendum process to be initiated in 2005, in the same year in which the law to be referred w as passed. H e argued, in stead, that, bec ause the G eneral As sembly overrode the Governor s veto of Senate Bill 478 in 2006, the petition did not have to be filed in 2005, bu t could be f iled, as it was, in 2006. Pointing out that pass and p assed, are defined terms, meaning any final action upon an Act or part of an Act by both Houses of the General Assem bly, Article XVI, § 3 (c) (emphasis added), Roskelly notes that signatures on a petition for referendum on an Act or part of any Act may be signed at any time after the Act or part of an Act is passed. Article XVI, § 3 (d) (emphasis added). Thus, he continued, because Senate Bill 478 was passed, when the General Assembly overrode the Governor s veto, it could still be referred to the registered voters of th e State for d ecision. Th is is consistent, Roskelly maintained, with A rticle XVI, § 1 (a) of the M aryland Constitution, which authorizes Maryland citizens to approve or rejec t at the po lls, any Ac t, . . . passed by the General Assembly over the veto of the Governor. (Emphasis adde d). In short, Ro skelly argued that the veto override by the General Assembly constituted an Act by the General Assembly in response to which referendum petitions could be filed. Next, Roskelly submitted that Lamone s deficiency determination was untimely as that determination could only be made once a petition had been filed. Notin g that a petition , as defined by § 6-101(i) of the Election Law Article,14 includes all of the 14 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2005 C um. Sup p.) § 6-101 (i) of the Elec tion Law Article provides: 10 associated pages necessary to fulfill the requirements of a process ¦ for: (1) [p]lacing ¦ a question on the ballot at any election, he argued that such a de termination could not occur until the completed petition was filed. Because the submission of one-third of the required signatures contemplated the later submission of the remaining two-thirds, it is clear, he proffers, that the petition was not completed, nor intended to have been completed, on May 31, 2006. Indeed, relying on A rticle XVI, §§ 2 and 3 (b), Roskelly states that completion could, and necessarily would, have occurred at anytime on or before June 30, 2006. Acc ordingly, Roskelly argued, Lamone s June 8 deficiency determination was premature and the MFFE w as not required to seek judicial review w ithin ten days of notice of it. In other words, he asserts that Lamone was required to wait until June 30, 2006, before making any defic iency dete rminatio n or bef ore ver ifying sig natures . (i) Petition means all of the associated pages necessary to fulfill the requireme nts of a pro cess establish ed by the law by which ind ividuals aff ix their signatures as evidence o f support for: (1) placing the name of an individual, the nam es of individuals, or a question on the ballot at any election; (2) the creation of a new political party; or (3) the appointment of a charter board under Article XI-A, § 1A of the Marylan d Con stitution. 11 For this proposition, Roskelly relied on § 6-207(a) of the Election Law Article,15 which provides that [u]pon the filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient under § 6-206 of th is subtitle, the staff of the election authority shall proceed to verify the signatu res con tained in the petitio n. [16] 15 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 6-207 (a) of the E lection Law Article provides: § 6-207. Verification of signatures Genera lly (a) (1) Upon the filing of a petition, and unless it has been declared deficient under § 6 -206 of th is subtitle, the staff of the electio n authority shall proceed to verify the signatures and count the validated signatures contained in the petition. (2) The p urpose of signature v erification un der paragr aph (1) of this subsection is to ensure that the name of the individual who signed the petition is listed as a registe red vot er. 16 Despite arguing that signature verification could not proceed until the complete petition was filed, that is, until June 30, Roskelly, recognizing the threshold requirement to trigger a thirty day delay in the effective date of a law sought to be referred, maintained that the threshold h ad been m et. Under th is argume nt, because verification c ould not p roceed in the absence of a completed petition, satisfaction of the threshold requirement must be based on the raw numbers, without regard to verification. The fact that the signatures the appellants submitted exceeded the number of signatures then required to be filed, however, necessarily reflects Roskelly s understanding that the referendum would only be triggered by the requisite number of valid signatures. Roskelly also complained about the accuracy of the verification or validation of the first 1 percent of the signatures he submitted. He maintained that a number of signatures mailed to the Board inadvertently had been delivered after the May 31, 2006 deadline. Had those signatures been delivered by the post office as they should have been, Roskelly argued, an estimated additional 500 signatures in support of a referendum on Senate Bill 478, more than sufficient to meet the threshold, would have been su bmitted by the initia l filing d eadline of M ay 31. In addition, Roskelly was unhappy with the results obtained when the new statewide voter registration database, known as MD Voters, which he asserted was prone to mistakes, was used to verify signatures. He proffered, as an example, 12 Lamone filed an Opposition to the Emergency Motion for Judicial Review. She contended that, in addition to having failed to gather the required number of signatures by May 31, 200 6, Roskelly failed to seek judicial review in the ten days following her June 8 determination. Accordingly, she concluded, he was foreclosed from proceeding with the referendum petition on Senate Bill 478. Alternatively, Lamone contended that Senate B ill 478 was not subject to referendum, in any event, because the petition process was neither initiated nor completed in 2005 and, just as important, by the time of the challenge in 2006, the non-emergency legislation not only had taken effect, but it had been substantively amen ded. Following a hearing, on June 30, 2006, the Circuit Court a nnoun ced its d ecision . Defining the threshold issue to be whether the appellants motion for judicial review was timely filed and, ultimately, whether it was time barred, the court found the motion to have been u ntimely fil ed and , thus, tim e barred . The court rejected what it characterized as the appellants essential argument, the single petition argument, that the time clock does not start because there has not yet been filed a petition. It was persuaded to do so by the scheme prescribed by the Constitution, that Montg omery Cou nty, where a c ross-check with the leg acy database discovered 121 valid signatures that had been reported as invalid by the MD Voters database. Complaining that Lamone refused to accept this cross-count, he asked that the local boards of elections be orde red to re check all previ ously inv alidated signatu res. These arguments are pertinent only if Roskelly s notice argument has merit. As we determine that it does not, we need not, and therefore, do not, consider or address them. 13 authorized satisfaction of the three percent requirement could take place in two steps, which, when utilized, required the successful completion of the first as a prerequisite to the viability and, thus, the validity, of the second. Fu rther, unless th e requisite nu mber of s ignatures is submitted timely in the first step, the right to submit the remainder is not engaged, and thus there sim ply is then n o entitlem ent to pu rsue an d com plete the second . The Circ uit Court rea soned: it seems to me completely incongruous to consider the document or the documents that were filed on or before May 31st as being anything less than or anything other than a petition. It is not a complete petition, to be sure, but the language that is in the Constitution makes it quite clear to me at least that it is a petition nonetheless and that the process that takes place between May 31 and June 3 0 is the c omple tion of th e petition . Having concluded that the petition process can be a single petition or . . . it can be fragmented into two installments essentially. One that s requiring only a third of the signatures and then the other requiring the balance, the court addressed whether the validation of the signatures was required to proceed as to each petition, seriatim, or to both, as a whole. It concluded: it would seem to me completely nonsensical to suggest that a process which has these two components could allow the first component to be a number of signatures that are not valid and then at th e end com e in with the valid signatures. It s quite clear that you ve got to have . . . at least a third of the signatu res and they mus t be valid signatu res. Moreover, the Circuit Court concluded that Lamone was required not only to review the petition, but also to determine its sufficiency and to verify the signatures it contained. 14 Section 6-206 (a) of the Election L aw Artic le 17 requires the chief election official to review a petition prom ptly upon its filing with an elec tion auth ority. Pursuant to § 6-206 (c), upon making any of th e enum erated f inding s, see note 9, supra, the chief election of ficial shall declare that the petition is deficient. Noting th at, in this case, Lamone declared the petition deficient, based on the advice of the legal authority, § 6-206 (c) (5), for bein g untime ly it should have been submitted prior to June 1, 2005 - and that, having made that determination, as it was req uired to do, a nd notified the appellan ts of that fact, the court determin ed that the June 8 determination triggered the appellants right to judicial review under § 6-210(e). When they did not file suit until June 27, more than ten-days after that determination, the court found that the action was time-barred.18 17 Maryland C ode (200 3, 2006 C um. Sup p.) § 6-206 (a) of the E lection Law Article provides: (a) Review by chief election official. - Promptly up on the filing of a petition w ith an election a uthority, the chief election off icial of the elec tion authority sha ll review the petitio n. 18 Roskelly contended that, because he was on vacation when the June 8 determination letter was sent and did not actually receive the letter until he returned from vacation on June 1 7, he w as not notified of the deficie ncy deter minatio n until th at day. Furthermore, he observed that no one from the Board of Elections attempted to contact him by telephone, or otherwise, to ascertain whether the deficiency determination letter had been received. This denied him the opportunity to investigate Lamone s letter and research the applicable law to formulate a challenge, he maintained. Arguing that this is a violation of his due pro cess rights, he believes tha t the ten-day limitatio n period sh ould begin o n the da te of a ctual re ceipt. The Circuit Court rejected this argument, as do we. First, § 6-210 of the Election Law Article requires notice; it does not require actual notice. Nor does it require that the chief election official ensure receipt of a deficiency determination by a petition sponsor or, by phone or otherwise, to investigate whether the sponsor has received the determination. Section 6-210 provides only that the chief election official of the election 15 authority shall notify the sponsor of the determination and that judicial review shall be sought by the 10th day following the determination to which it relates. Such a requirement, as Roskelly suggests, moreover, would place an unreasonable burden on the election official and, rather than en sure, certainty, it would have the oppo site effect. It simply is u nwor kable. What Roskelly advocates is not the law in Maryland. Maryland Rule 7-203(a) provides: Except as otherwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 days after the latest of: (1) the date of the orde r or action of which re view is sou ght; (2) the date the admin istrative agen cy sent notice o f the order o r action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the petitioner; or (3) the date the petitioner re ceived no tice of the ag ency's order or a ction, if notice w as requ ired by law to be rec eived b y the petitio ner. Subsection (a) of this Rule was applied in Kim v. Com ptroller of the Treasury, 350 Md. 527, 714 A.2d 176 (1998), a case similar to the case sub judice. There, the Maryland Tax Court, acting pursuant to Md. Code (1988, 1997 Repl. Vol.), § 13-529 (c) of the Ta x-Gene ral Article, a statu te requiring th at [t]he clerk of the Ta x Court sh all certify the order in an appea l and mail a c opy of the ce rtified order to : (1) each pa rty to the appea l; and (2) the ta x determin ing agenc y from wh ich the app eal is taken, m ailed its order to K im, rather than serving it on him. This C ourt rejected Kim s arg ument tha t, in so doing, the Tax court erred, holding instead: In the instant case, the Tax Court was required by law to send its written order to Kim and the Comptroller. . . . Therefore, under the statute and Rule 7-203(a)(2), the relevant da te governing the timeliness of an action for judicial review was the date the written order of the Tax Court was filed and mailed to the parties. . . . Thus, Kim's petition for judicial review should have been filed within 30 days a fter [the date of mailing ]. Kim, 350 M d. at 533 , 714 A .2d at 17 8. Kim is to be compared with Rockwood C as. Ins. Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 385 Md. 99, 867 A.2d 1026 (2005), which reached a different result under the statute applicable to that case. In Rockwood, the Court of Appeals concluded that the term serve implies actual receipt. Rockwood involved application of Maryland Code (1995, 20 03 Rep l. Vol.) § 19-4 06(a) of th e Insuranc e Article, w hich require d that, to cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy, the insured must serve[ ] on the employer, by personal service or registered mail addressed to the last known address of the employer, a notice of intention to cancel the policy. Ins. § 19-406(a). The Court of Appeals determined that cancellation of a policy could be accomplished only by the insured's actual receipt of the notice. 16 The appellants n oted an ap peal to this Court and concurrently filed a petition for writ of certiora ri, whic h we g ranted o n July 5, 20 06. W e heard argument in the case on July 25, 2006, and issued an order affirm ing the judg ment of th e trial court on that same d ay, with opinion to follow . Roskelly v. Lamone, 393 M d. 363, 9 02 A.2 d 1173 (2006 ). We now explain the reasons for our decision. B. The people of Maryland reserved to themselves the Referendum - the power, by petition, to refer an Act, or any part of on e, passed b y the Genera l Assemb ly, with gubernatorial approval, or over the Governor s veto, to the registered voters of the State, for their approval or rejection at the polls. Article X VI, § 1 (a). A referendu m petition is sufficient, however, only if, prior to the effective date of the Act, it is filed with the Secretary of State and it contains the signatures of three percent of the qualified voters of the State, as See also Maryland Rule 2-613(c), governing notice of default judgments (stating that notice is given once it is mailed to the defendant at the address stated in the request and to the d efendan t's attorney of reco rd, if any ); Mardirossian Family Enterprises v. Clearail, Inc., 324 Md. 191, 198, 596 A.2d 1018, 1022 (1991) ( the inclusion in the mechanics' lien law of registered mail as an expressly authorized manner of giving notice is strongly indicative of a legislative intent that a notice sent by registered mail within the statutory p eriod co mplies e ven tho ugh rec eipt occ urs beyo nd the s tatutory pe riod. (quoting Riley v. Abrams, 287 M d. 348, 356 , 412 A.2d 996, 100 0 (1980) (f ootnote omitted))); First American B ank v. Shivers, 97 Md. App. 405, 422, 629 A.2d 1334, 1343 (1993) (holding that a bank's failure to notify objecting shareholder of effective date of approved merger with another bank by required method of delivering notice personally or mailing it by certified mail, return receipt requested, rendered given notice ineffective, notwithstanding shareholder's alleged lack of diligence resulting in his failure to receive actual notice until after running of statutory period within which to receive fair market value of his shares). 17 defined in the C onstitutio n. Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 (a). When the effective date of an Act of the General Assembly is, as this one was, the usual effective date, the petition will be effective if it contains at least one-third of the required number of signatures, or a number equivalent to one percent of the qualified voters, and is submitted prior to June 1, and the balanc e of the require d signa tures is su bmitted prior to J une 30 . Article X VI, § 3 (b). Although the referendum petition must be filed with the Secretary of State, the S tate Board of Elections and the State A dminis trator of Electio ns, by statu te, see Maryland Code (2003, 2006 C um. Su pp.) Title 6 of the Election Law Article ( EL ), have been given significant responsibilities in the referendum proces s. The State Board is required to adopt regulations and prepare guidelines and instructions relating to the petition process, EL § 6103,19 and receive, from the Secretary of State, the referen dum petitio ns filed in that office, 19 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum . Supp.) § 6-103 of the Election Law Article provides: (a) (1) The S tate Board shall adopt re gulations, co nsistent with this title, to carry out the provisions of this title. (2) The re gulations sh all: (i) prescribe the form and content of petitions; (ii) specify procedures for the circulation of petitions for signatures; (iii) specify procedures for the verification and counting of signatures; and (iv) provide any other procedural or technical requirements that the State Board considers appropriate. Guidelines, instructions, and forms (b) (1) The S tate Board shall: (i) prepare guidelines and instructions relating to the petition process; and (ii) design an d arrange to have printe d sample f orms con forming to this subtitle for each purpose for which a petition is authorized by 18 which the Secreta ry of State is required to deliver within 24 hours. EL § 6-20 5 (a) (2). 20 Upon the receipt by the State Board of a petition, the State Administrator promptly must review it. EL § 6-205 (a). In addition to any advance determinations authorized by EL § 6-202, the S tate Adm inistrator is requir ed to m ake ap propria te determ inations , i.e., that the petition is deficient, EL § 6-206 (c), th at it is sufficient a s to all matters o ther than the validity of the signatures, EL § 6-206 (b) (1), or that the sufficiency determination should be deferred pending further review. EL § 6-206 (b) (2). Unle ss the petition h as been d eclared de ficient, the State Administrator s staff shall proceed to verify the signatures and count the validated signatures contained in the p etition. EL § 6-207 (a). T hereafter, At the conclusion of the verification and counting p rocesses, the [State Admin istrator] shall: (1) determine whether the validated signatures c ontained in the petition are sufficient to satisfy all requirements established by law relating to the number and geographical distribution of signatures; and (2) if it has not done so previously, determine whether the petition has satisfied all other requirements established by law for that petition and immedia tely notify the sponsor of that determination, includ ing any specif ic deficie ncies fo und. law. (2) the guidelines, instructions, and forms shall be provided to the public, on requ est, with out cha rge. 20 Maryland Code (2003, 2006 Cum . Supp.) § 6-205 of the Election Law Article provides, as relevant: If the Maryland Constitution provides that a petition shall be filed with the Secretary of S tate, the Secre tary of State sha ll deliver the pe tition to the State Board within 24 hou rs. 19 EL § 6-208 (a). 21 The process of verifying and counting the validated signatures shall be completed within 20 days after the filing of the petition, EL § 6-210 (c), and certification of the outcome shall occur within two business days of completion of the verification and counting process, or, if judicial review is pending, within 2 business days after a final judicial decisio n. EL § 6-210 (d). A person aggrieved by the State Administrator s determination either as to sufficiency of the petition or the number of signatures may seek judicial review. See § 6-209 (a) (1) (referencing EL §§ 6-20 6 and 6-208 (a) (2)). 22 A petition for judicial review of such a determination, how ever , shall be soug ht by the 10th day follow ing the dete rmination to which it relates. EL § 6-2 10 (e) (1). In her letter to Roskelly, dated June 8, 2006, Lamone advised the appellants: Pursuant to Maryland Code Election Law Article Section 6-206 (c) (5), I have determined that the petition relating to Senate B ill 478 is deficient and may not be referred to re ferendum for the reaso ns stated in th e enclosed letter dated June 8 from th e Off ice of th e Attor ney Gen eral. This determination was indeed consistent with the advice the Attorney General previously had given Lamone on April 25, 2006, that a petition drive for referendum must 21 Of course, the State Administrator also must certify the successful completion of the petition process if the petition has satisfied the law ful requirements. EL § 6-208 (b). 22 Because the petition in this case is a statewide petition and refers to an enactment of the General A ssembly purs uant to Ar ticle XVI o f the Con stitution, the petition is required to be filed, as it was in this case, in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. EL § 6-209 (a) (1) (ii). 20 occur immedia tely after the sessio n of the L egislature at w hich the bill is initially passed by the Legisla ture, an d that the repeal o r amen dmen t of a ref erred b ill, in goo d faith, voided the referendum process and required removal of the issue from the ballot. And it was what she was required by law to do. As we have seen, EL § 6-206 requires the chief election official to make appropriate determinations with respect to the referen dum petition s sufficiency or deficiency. Under subsection (c) (5) (i), the chief election official shall declare the petition defic ient, if she determines, based on the advice of the legal authority: the use of the s ubject m atter of th e petition is not au thorized by law. In her letter to Roskelly dated June 21, 2006, Lamone informed the appellants of yet another deficiency in their petition, this one being their failure to file the requisite number of signatu res to en gage th e referr al proce ss. Spec ifically, she advise d the ap pellants , as required by § 6-208 (a) (1), that the number of validated signatures they submitted on May 31 was n ot sufficie nt to satisfy all requireme nts established by law relating to the number ¦ of signatures, they did not amount to one-third of the full number of signatures needed to complete the referendum petition, and, thus, that the time for filing the signatures necess ary to com plete the petition was n ot exten ded. It is un disp uted that t he ap pella nts d id no t seek jud icial review w ithin ten d ays of the mailing of the June 8 letter - the appellants filed their verified complaint and emergency motion for judicial review on June 27, 2006 , eight days beyon d that time pe riod, but w ithin ten days of Lamone s June 21 letter. If, as Lamone maintains and the trial court found, the June 8 letter contained a determination by Lamone, that determination was properly and 21 timely made and mailed to the appellants, the appellants sought judicial review too late and we must affirm the trial court s dismissal of their action, notwithstanding the timeliness of the action with respect to signature count and validation. The appellants re new in this Court the a rgumen t they advance d in the Circ uit Court, that the determination by the State Administrator in the June 8 letter was premature sin ce their May 31 submi ssion, b ecause it was n ot com plete, i.e. did not contain the full number of the required signatures and contemplated a subsequent filing, was not the petition.23 Proceeding from that premise, they further argue that the signature validation process also was premature until the complete petition is filed, they maintain, neither a determination as to the sufficiency or deficiency of the incomplete petition nor the sufficiency of the numb er of sig natures it contain s is appr opriate. 23 Roskelly s argumen t in this regard p roceeds larg ely on his interpre tation of certa in provisions of the E lection L aw A rticle, e.g. §§ 6-101 (i), see note 12 , supra; 6-201(a) (stating that [a] petition shall contain: (1) [a]n information page; and (2) [s]ignature pages containing not less than the total number of signatures required by law to be filed ), as referring only to the final deadline in the referendum process. We do not agree. In any event and more important, it is the Con stitutional prov isions that con trol. Statutes en acted in supplementation and aid of the Constitutional provisions, do not trump those provisions, and we have said as much in the pa st. See In re Legisla tive Districting of the State , 370 Md. 312, 373, 805 A.2d 292, 328 (2002) (noting that accepting a rational goal as a basis for avoiding a clear requirement under a section of the Maryland Constitution is to allow a constitutional mandate to be overridden by a non-constitutional one, and that to interpret a constitutional provision as to subjugate it or any of its component constitutional requirements to lesser principles and non-constitutional considerations or factors would be to amend the constitution without the in volv eme nt of the m ost critica l playe rs: th e Sta te's citizens ). See also In re Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 629 A.2d 646 (1993) (Eldrid ge, J., dissenting) (finding it impermissible to subjugate constitutional mandates to lesser princip les). 22 As did the Circuit Court, we reject the appellants arguments. We note at the outset, whether correct or not, an issue that we need not decide here; Lamone advised the appellants, consistent with her counsel s advice, that their attempt to refer Senate Bill 478 to referendum was untimely, as the petitio n was no t filed in the year it w as passed. T hat was a determination of deficiency she was required by § 2-206 (c) (5) to m ake. The app ellants did not timely respond to this determination by seeking judicial review. In rejecting the appellants arguments, we are required to construe provisions of the Maryland Constitution, in partic ular, Ar ticle XV I, §§ 2 an d 3. Th e princip les guid ing our task are well se ttled. As early as 1873, th is Court recognized that where a general rule for the construction of statutes exists, there can be no good reason suggested why this sam e general p rinciple ... should not also apply as a rule of i nterpre tation of the Co nstitution . New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co., 37 Md. 537, 557 (1873). We continue to adhere to that principle. Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 536-537, 873 A.2d 1122, 1133-35 (2005). See Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004) ( When interpreting constitutional provisions, we generally employ the same rules of construction that are applicable to the constru ction of statu tory language . ); Fish Mark et v. G.A .A., Inc., 337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 70 5, 708 (19 94); Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n. 8, 647 A.2d 429, 434 n. 8 (1994) ( The rules governing the construction of statutes and constitutional provisions are the same ); Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294 Md. 285, 290, 449 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1982) ( in ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, we are governed by the same rules of interp retation wh ich prevail in r elation to a statute ); Brown v. Brown, 287 23 Md. 273, 277, 412 A.2d 396, 398 (1980) (the same rules that are applicable to construction of statutory langua ge are em ployed in interp reting cons titutional verbia ge); Perkins v. Eskridge, 278 Md. 619, 639, 366 A.2d 21, 36-37 (1976) (observing that the same rules apply in cons truction al cons truction as appl y in statuto ry constru ction). Thus, to ascertain the mandate of constitutional amendment, the court loo ks first to the natural and ordinary signification of the language; if that language is clear and unambiguous, the court need not look elsewhere. Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 90 2 (197 7). Mo reover , we consider the history of the provision, the evils to be remedied, as well as the objects to be attained by its adoption. The standard we have enunciated for this purpose is: [C]onstitutions are not to be interpreted according to the words used in particular clauses. The whole must be considered , with a view to ascertain the sense in which the words were employed, and its words must be taken in their ordinary and common acceptation, because they are presumed to have been so understood by the framers and by the people who a dopted it. . . . It [the Constitution], unlike the Acts of our legislature, owes its whole force and authority to its ratification by the people, and they judg ed of it by the me aning a pparen t on its fa ce. . . . [ Manly v. Sta te, 7 Md. 135, 147 (1854).] Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294 Md. at 290, 449 A.2d at 1147 . See also Comptroller v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583, 591, 865 A.2d 590, 594 (2005) ( If the plain lan guage . . . is unambiguous and is consistent with the [enactment s] apparent purpose, we give effe ct to the [enactm ent] as it is written ). We will not construe a provision so as to re-draft it under the guise of construction or so as to assume an Alice in Wonderland world where words have no meaning. Davis v. S tate, 294 Md. 3 70, 378 , 451 A .2d 107 , 111 (1 982), quoting Welsh 24 v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 354, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 1803, 26 L. Ed.2d 308, 326 (1970) (concu rring op inion). Moreover, when the meaning of a word or phrase in a constitutional or statutory provision is perfec tly clear, this Court has consistently refused to give that word or phrase a different meaning on such theories that a diffe rent meaning w ould make the p rovision more workable, or more consiste nt w ith a l itiga nt's view of good public policy, or that the framers of the pro vision d id not ac tually mea n wha t they wro te. See, e.g., Montrose Christian School v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 595, 770 A.2d 111, 129 (2001) (The phrase to perform p urely religious functions clearly does not mean what is suggested. . . . We decline to construe pur ely as if it were primarily or some ); Dodds v. Shamer, 339 Md. 540, 554, 663 A.2d 1318, 1325 (1995) (refusing to construe a statute, specifically applicable to only four named counties, as applicable to other counties); Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 93, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (19 79) (refusin g to construe the statutory phrase all professional employees as only certain types of professional em ployees); State Farm Mutual v. Insurance Commissioner, 283 Md. 663, 671 , 392 A.2d 1114, 11 18 (1978 ); Wheele r v. State, 281 Md. 593, 598, 38 0 A.2d 1052, 1 054 (1 977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 997, 98 S. Ct. 1650, 56 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1978) ( We are not at liberty to bring about a different [constitutionality] result by inserting or omitting words in the enactment). A common sense reading of Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 leads to the unmistakable conclusion that a submission containing more than one third, but less than all, o f the full number of signatures necessary to complete a referendum petition, submitted to the Secretary 25 of State before June 1 for the purpose of extending the time for filing the signature s to complete the referendum petition within the meaning and contemplation of the Election Law Article, is, indeed, a pe tition. Section 2 of Article XVI states, as relevant, that [n]o law enacted by the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of June next after the session at whic h it may be passed . . ., unless before said first day of June there shall have been filed with the Secretary of the State a petition to refer to a v ote of the p eople any law or part of a law capable of referendum and the requirements of § 3 (a) and or (b) have been met, in which case the law sought to be referred s hall be referred by the Secretary of State to such vote. Neither § 3 (a) nor § 3 (b) contradicts § 2 with regard to what must be filed a petition to refer to a vote of the people any law or any part of a law capable of referendum - or its timing. In f act, § 3 (a), add ressing its sufficiency, i.e. the number of signatures neede d, refers to [t]h e refere ndum petition . Section 3 (b), on the other hand, prescribing an alternative to the filing of the full number of signatures by the deadline set by § 2 and, therefore, focusing on the numb er of signa tures neces sary to be filed to extend the time for filing additional signatures, refers to the referendum petition in that context. Thus, it speaks in terms of signatures required to complete any referendum petition and extending the time for filing the remainder of signatures to complete the petition. Under §3 (a), a submission, timely filed, purporting to contain the full number of signatures required to refer a referable law to the voters, would qualify as a petition. It would be com plete as f iled. On the other hand, pursuant to § 3 (b), not all of the required signatures need be filed at once. When the proponent of a referendum files with the 26 Secretary of State, before June 1, the signatures of at least one percent, or more, but less than three percent, the full number required, of all qualified voters, the time for filing the remainder of the signatures will be extended to June 30. To be sure, therefore, a two-step process for filing signatures to refer a law to referendum is permitted, but not required, by § 3 (b). But the fact that the Constitution recognizes and blesses two related, but procedu rally different, approaches to the referral process does not mean that it also recognizes two different triggers for that process. After all, that a proponent of a referendum is permitted to file the signatures required to engage the process in two increments does not change the process sub stantively, only proce durally; the proc ess and the requireme nts to engag e it rema in essen tially the sam e. To refer a law to the vote of the people requires, whether done in one step or two, the filing, before the constitutionally prescribed deadline, of a minimum number of signatures with the Secretary of State. Section 2 of Article X VI state s explic itly what is to be file d, a petition . That is true whether the filing is to be a single one or two. To be succes sful, both requireme nts - the filing of the petition and the requisite number of signatures before June 1 - must be m et. Although in the case of the two-step process, an additional thirty da ys, is afforded for the gathering and filing of the signatures, that additiona l time is obtainable only when the threshold filing of the petition, containing a specified number of signatures, has timely occurred. Entitlement to proceed to the second step, in other words, is dependent upon the suff icien cy of t he co mplianc e in th e firs t step . Accord ingly, it is clear both from the clear and ambiguous language of § 2 and the Constitutional scheme as a whole, that the 27 referral process is initiate d by the filing o f a referen dum petitio n by the June 1 deadline,24 whether that petition contains the minimum number of signatures required to extend that deadline or the full number required. Our conclusion that the referral process is triggered by a referendum petition even when the referendum proponents are proceeding pursuant to § 3 (b) disposes of the appellants arguments. Thus, because what the a ppellants filed was a referendum petition, the State Adm inistrator was req uired to, a s she did, r evie w it, E L § 6 -205 (a), w ith an eye toward determining its sufficiency or deficiency and making the required determinations. EL § 6-206. To be sure, the State Administrator advised the appellants of her conclusion that the petition was deficient and she was not required to d o more. N evertheless, a gain following counsel s advice and aware of the possibility that her deficiency determination might be rejected by a court, she p roceeded to verify the signatures and count the validated ones. EL § 6-210. In addition to the reasons stated, this was done, and was nece ssary, precisely because the appellants right to file additional signatures was dependent on whether they had filled the required number prior to the deadline. Whether a referendum petition filed pursuant to § 3 (b) is valid is determin ed by reference to whether it contained, when 24 The resp ondents a rgue, as w e have see n, that the M aryland Con stitution does n ot permit the referral of a non-emergency law that has already taken effect and/or that has been amended in a subsequent legislative session and that Roskelly disagrees, contending that referral is proper, where the final act of passage of the law was the override of the Governor s veto and the override occurred in a year subsequent to the bill s initial passag e. We n eed no t addres s this issu e in this c ase. See, howe ver, Lamone v. Capozzi, __ M d. __, __ A. 2d _ _ (200 6). 28 filed, the required number of valid signatures - more than one-third of the number needed to complete the petition. It would be an absurd result if, without a requirement o f signature verification and validation, the deadline for filing the full number of the required signatures were extended on the basis of a petition co ntaining un substantiated and, perha ps, invalid signatures, which w ould be su bject to valida tion and ve rification, along with the subseque ntly filed signatures. To read Article XVI, §§ 2 and 3 and EL § 6-206 in this way would facilitate, if not encourage, the timely filing of sham petitions, solely for the purpose of extending the deadline to June 30, with the hope of obtaining the requisite signatures during the extension period. If the framers had wished to allow this s cenario un der Article XVI, they would not have established the June 1 deadlin e in the f irst place . See Yox. V. TruRol Co., Inc., 380 Md. 326, 337, 844 A.2d 1151, 1157 (2004) ( We do not interpret statutes in ways that produce absurd resu lts that could never have been intended by the Legislature ). COSTS TO BE PAID BY T HE APPELLANTS. 29

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