Park & Planning v. Anderson

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Maryland-N ational Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Anderson, No. 112, September Term, 2005 HEADNOTE: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDICIAL REVIEW REVIEWABILITY STANDING Where an administrative trial board, formed pursuant to the Law Enforce ment Of ficer s Bill of Rights, makes a find ing o f no t guilty in connection with charges brought against a law enforcement officer who works for a state administrative agency, the administrative trial board s finding of not guilty is not subject to judicial review under Md. Code (2003), § 3108 of the Public S afety Article. Th e provision sets forth spe cific requirements for when a decision is considered reviewable, that require a guilty decision from the hearing board, and then a final order by either the Chief or one by his designee regarding a penalty for the officer s conduct. While, in most situations, the agency would be entitled to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Governme nt Article, it is not entitled to judicial review in this situation because the LEOBR is the controlling provision and provides an exclusive remed y to police officers. In addition, the General Assembly expressly stated that the LEOBR supersedes conflicting provisions, a nd it is the mo re specific sta tute on the su bject. In the Circu it Court for P rince Geo rge s Cou nty Civil No. CAL03-15456 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 112 September Term, 2005 ____________________________________ MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION v. KATHLEEN ANDERSON ____________________________________ Bell Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ____________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. Harrell, J., Diss ents ____________________________________ Filed: October 19, 2006 This matter arises from the M aryland-National Capital Park P olice Commission s ( Commission ) petition for judicial review of an Administrative Hearing Board s ( Board ) decision. The issue before this Court is whether a conflict exists between the Law Enforce ment Of ficer s Bill of Rights ( LEOBR ), Md. Code (2003) § 3-101 et. seq. of the Public Safety Article, and the Administrative Procedure Act ( APA ), Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 of the State Government Article, when an agency pursues an administrative complaint against one of its employees, and after an administrative hearing at which the tribunal enters a finding of not guilty, the agency seeks judicial review of that decision. The Board, co mprised of three po lice officers from the C ommission s Prince George s County Pa rk Police D epartmen t,1 heard a case brought against fellow officer Kathleen Anderso n, who w as charged with violatin g the police departme nt s vehicle p ursuit policy. A t the con clusion of the h earing, th e Boa rd enter ed a fin ding of not gu ilty. On July 25, 2003, the Comm ission petitione d the Circu it Court for Prince G eorge s County for judicial review of the Board s decision. Officer Anderson filed a M otion to Dismiss, and the Circuit Cou rt granted Officer Anderson s motion. On March 18, 2003, the 1 The Co mmission is a body co rporate and an agenc y of the S tate. See Md. Code Ann. (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol.), Art. 28, § 1-101. The park police have concurrent general police jurisdiction with the Montgomery and Prince George's County police within the parks and other areas . . . under the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . . Art. 28, § 5-114(a). Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.) § 10-202(b) of the State Gove rnmen t Article define s agen cy, for the purposes of judicial review of contested cases, as: (1) an officer or unit of the State government authorized by law to adjudicate contested cases; or (2) a unit that: (i) is created by general law ; (ii) operates in a t least 2 counties; an d (iii) is authorized by law to adju dicate contested cases. If an entity meets this definition, it is subject to the provisions of the Con tested C ase pr ovision s of the APA . Commission petitioned the Court of Specia l Appeals for judicial review. That court affirmed the judgment of the Circ uit Cou rt. Maryland-Nat l Capital Park & Planning Comm n v. Anderson, 164 Md. App. 540, 545, 884 A.2d 157, 160 (2005). The Commission then filed in this Court a p etition for w rit of certiorari, 2 which we gra nted. Park and Planning v. Anderson, 390 Md. 500, 889 A.2d 418 (2006). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. FACTUAL BACKGROUND While on duty on September 8, 2001, Officer Kathleen Anderson conducted a registration check on a vehicle and found that the license plates had been reported stolen. She attempted to pull over the vehicle, but the driver refused to stop. The driver exceeded the 25 mile-per-hour speed limit, crossing back and forth across the center lines of the road. Officer Anderson followed the car, staying within a distance of one-to-two car lengths. During the pursuit, the occupants abandoned the vehicle and fled the area on foot. The 2 The questions as presented by the Com mission in its Petition for Writ of C ertiorari are as follows: I. Whethe r the Circuit C ourt and Court of Special A ppeals Erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling that the Commission was not Entitled to Judicial Review of the Final Decision of an Administrative Hearing Board P ursuant to Section 3-109 of the LEOBR. II. Wheth er the Circu it Court and Court of Special A ppeals Erred as a Matter of Law in Ruling that Appellant Commission Was not Entitled to Judicial Review of the Final Decision of an Administrative Hearing Board Pursuant to Section 10-222 of the Adm inistrativ e Proce dures A ct. -2- vehicle continued moving until it crashed into a fenc e and a telep hone po le, causing it to stop. Officer Anderson then stopped her vehicle. Officer Anderson stated that, wh ile following the vehicle, she did not see any other vehicles on the road and that there was no other vehicle traff ic or pedestrians present. Officer Anderson stated that she was still one or two car le ngths beh ind the veh icle when it struck the telepho ne pole and that the en tire incident lasted between seven and [ten] minutes and the length of maybe two and a half miles. She also stated that she did not ignore any traffic control devices in attempting to get the vehicle to stop, and estimated that her top sp eed was betw een 35 and 40 [m.p.h.], in contras t to the po sted spe ed limit o f 25 to 30 [m .p.h.]. The Department conducted an investigation of Officer Anderson s September 8, 2001, activity and charged her with violating the provisions of th e Departm ent s vehicle pursuit policy. 3 As required by § 3-107 of the LEOBR,4 an administrative board, com prised of park 3 Bi-County Directive 414, which sets forth the Maryland-National Capital Park Police Departm ent s vehicle pursuit policy, w as amend ed on M ay 9, 2001 to th e followin g: Fresh pursuit is only allowed when an officer has probable cause to believe that the fleeing suspec t has comm itted or is attempting to commit the following: ¢ Any Felony involving the use of force or threat of physical force or violence against a person. ¢ A hit [and] run traffic accident resulting in death or serious injury[.] Any other pursuits are prohibited. 4 Section 3-1 07, Hea ring by hearing board, pro vides in per tinent part: (contin ued...) -3- police officers, conducted a hearing on March 13 and 14, 2003, concerning the charges filed against Officer And erson. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Bo ard issued an oral finding of no t guilty. O n June 30, 200 3, the B oard en tered its w ritten de cision. On July 25, 2003, the Commission petitioned the Circuit Court for Prince George s County for judicial review of the Board s decision. On November 3, 2003, Officer Anderson filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting [t]hat the Maryland National Capital Park and Planning 4 (...continued) (a) Right to hearing. -(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection and § 3-111 of this subtitle, if the investigation or interrogation of a law enforcement officer results in a recommendation of demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or similar action that is considered punitive, the law enforcement officer is entitled to a hearing on the issues by a hearing board before the law enforcement agency takes that action. (2) A law enforcement officer who has been convicted of a felony is not entitled to a hearing under this section. **** (c) Membership of hearing board. -(1) Except as provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection and in § 3-111 of this subtitle, the hearing board authorized under this section shall consist of at least three members who: (i) are appoin ted by the chie f and chosen from law enforcement officers within that law enforcement agency, or from law enforcement officers of another law enforcement agency with the approval of the chief of the other agency; and (ii) have had no part in the investigation or interrogation of the law enforcem ent officer. (2) At least one member of the hearing board shall be of the same rank as the law enforcement officer against whom the complaint is filed. -4- Commission . . . is not a party to this case and therefore lacks stand ing to appeal, and [i]n the alternative, that the Administrative Hearing Board entered a finding of not guilty which terminates this action and [the Commission] has no author ity to appe al its ow n decis ion. In its response, the Commission asserted that it was a party to the administrative action and therefore ha[d] standing to appeal to this Honorable Court, and [t]hat the Administrative Hearing Board s finding of not guilty terminated the action and constituted a final decision from w hich the Com mission proper ly appeale d to this H onorab le Cou rt. 5 STANDARD OF REVIEW Judge Eldridge, writing for this Court in Maryland Aviation Admin. v. Noland, 386 Md. 556, 873 A.2d 1145 (2005), reiterated the standard of review for administrative agency decisions: [a] court s role in reviewing an administra tive agency ad judicatory decis ion is narrow . . . it is limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. United Parcel v. People's Counsel, 336 Md. 569 , 576-77, 650 A.2d 2 26, 230 (1994 ). See also Md. Code (1984, 1995 Repl.Vol.), § 10-222 (h) of the State Government Article. This Co urt, and any 5 It is important to note that a request for judicial review does not constitute an appe al. We stated in Gisriel v. O cean City Board of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 492, 693 A.2d 757, 764 (1997), that [i]n a technical, constitutional meaning of the term, a circuit court never exercises appellate jurisdiction when it directly reviews the decision of an adm inistrative agen cy or a local go vernmen t body. To elu cidate further, whenever a circuit court directly reviews the action, or inaction, of any administrative agency . . . the court is exercising original jurisdiction and not appella te jurisdiction. Gisriel, 345 Md. at 491, 693 A.2d at 764. -5- other court reviewing administrative decisions, shall apply the s ubstantial ev idence test to the final decisio ns of an a dministrative agency, but it m ust not itself make independent findings of fact or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Balt. Lutheran High Sch. Ass n v. Employment Sec. Ad min., 302 Md. 649, 66 2, 490 A .2d 701 , 708 (1 985). See also Md. Com m n o n Hum an Re lations v . B.G. & E ., 296 Md. 46, 51, 459 A.2d 205, 209 (1983) (stating that a party can resort to a court only when there is a final order in the admin istrative p roceed ing ). In the in stant case, we mu st decide whe ther a Bo ard s finding of n ot gu ilty entitles the Commission to seek judicial review of that decision under the LEO BR or the A PA. In addition, we mu st examine both statutes to dete rmine if the judicial review provisions of the APA conflict with the judicial review provisions of the LEOBR.6 The reso lution of these issues requires statutory interpretation. In terpretation o f a statute is a question of law, and, therefore, we review the decision of the Circuit C ourt de novo. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 446, 452, 879 A.2d 1111, 1114 (2005); see also Salamon v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 379 Md. 301, 30 7, 841 A .2d 858 , 862 (2 004). DISCUSSION The parties dispute whether, under the LEOBR, the Commission may seek judicial review of the Board s finding of not guilty. Section 3-108 of the LEOBR, entitled Disposition of admin istrative action, states that [a] finding of not guilty terminates the 6 Section 3-102(a) of the LEOBR states that [t]his subtitle supersedes any other law of the S tate, a co unty, or a m unicipa l corpo ration th at conf licts with this sub title. -6- action. Officer Anderson asserts that this provision means that the agency may not seek judicial review of a fin ding of not gu ilty. The Commission contends that the provision simply indicates the p oint at whic h the adm inistrative action is final and therefore ripe for judicial review. The Commission also argues that an agency is authorized by the APA to seek judicial review, but Officer Anderson maintains that the LEOBR supersedes the APA, and therefore does not allow review under the circumstances. A. Statutory Construction We turn first to the princ iples of statuto ry construction. O ur goal w hen enga ging in statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the inte ntion o f the leg islature. Johnson v. Mayor of Balt. City, 387 M d. 1, 11, 874 A.2d 43 9, 445 (20 05); O Con nor v. Balt. County , 382 Md. 102 , 113, 854 A.2d 1 191, 1198 (200 4). As this Court has explained, [t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. State D ept. of Assessm ents and Taxation v. Maryland-Nat l Capital Park & Planning C omm n , 348 Md. 2, 13, 702 A.2d 6 90, 696 (1997); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 452 (1994 ). This step is the point in statutory construction with which the search for legislative inten t begins, and ordinarily ends. FOP, Montgom ery County Lodge No. 35 v. Mehrling, 343 Md. 155, 174, 680 A.2d 1052, 1062 (19 96). When the s tatutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the Legislature s -7- intent. Marriott Employees Fed. C redit U nion v. M otor Ve hicle A dmin., 346 Md. 437, 445, 697 A.2d 45 5, 458 (1997). If the language of the statute is ambiguous, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration]. Mehrling, 343 Md. at 173-74, 680 A.2d at 1062 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). In construing a statute, we seek to a void constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense. Frost v. State, 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994 ). In addition, [t]he meaning o f the plainest language is con trolled by the contex t in which it appears. State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339, 1341 (1996) (citation s omitte d). As th is Cou rt has sta ted, [b]ecause it is part of the context, related statutes or a statutory scheme that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal must also be considered. Thus, not only are we required to interpret the statute as a whole, but, if appropriate, in the context of the entire statutory schem e of wh ich it is a part. Gordon Family Partnership v. Gar on Jer, 348 Md. 129, 138, 702 A.2d 753, 757 (1997) (citations omitted). Lastly, we hav e stated that [ w]here sta tutes relate to the same sub ject matte r, and are not inconsistent with each other, they should be construed together and harm onized where consistent with their general object and scope. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. -8- 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 834 (2005 ) (citations omitted); State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 14 3, 149 (19 97). There fore, wh en two statutes appear to apply to the same situation, this Court w ill attempt to give effect to both statutes to the ex tent that they are reconc ilable. Ghajari, 346 Md. at 115, 695 A.2d at149 (citations om itted); Mayor of Oakland v. Mayor of Mountain Lake P ark, 392 Md. 301, 316-17, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006). B. The Law Enforcem ent Officer s Bill of R ights The Maryland G eneral As sembly enac ted the LE OBR in 1974 for the purpose of providing that all law enforceme nt officers have certa in rights, 1974 Md. Laws, Chap. 722,7 and for provid[ing] a law -enforcement of ficer 8 . . . with substantial procedural safeguards during any inquiry into his [or her] conduct which could lead to the imposition of a disciplinary sanction. Miner v. Novotny, 304 Md. 164, 173, 498 A.2d 269, 273 (1985) (emphas is added). In Moats v . City of Hagerstown, 324 Md. 519, 530, 597 A.2d 972, 977 (1991), we held that [t]he language, legislative history and comprehensive nature of the Law 7 Courts also often look to the purpose clause of the session laws to determine the legislature s expres s purpo se in en acting th e legisla tion. State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 411, 872 A.2d 72 9, 735 (20 05); Drew v. First Guar. Mortg age C orp., 379 Md. 318, 326 n.8, 842 A.2d 1, 6 n.8 (200 3). 8 In this context, a law enforcement officer is an individual who in an official capacity is authorized by law to make arrests and is a member of one of the twenty-two law enforcement agencies sp ecified in the statute. M d. Code (2 003), § 3-1 01 of the P ublic Safe ty Article. -9- Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights establishes that the procedures prov ided by the Act are an officer s exclusive remedy in matters of departmental discipline. Included within the procedural safeguards of the LEOBR is the right to a hearing before a hearing board, if there is a possibility that the investigation or interrogation of the officer will result in a recomm endation o f demotio n, dismissal, transfer, loss of p ay, reassignm ent, or similar action that is considered punitive, as well as the right of the officer to receive notice from the agency of his right to a hearing by the hearing board. Md. Code (2003), § 3-107 of the Public Safety Article. Some of the other notable procedural protections afforded to officers include the right to be informed in writing of the nature of an investigation prior to any interrogation, the right to reasonable limitations on the structure, time, and place of an interrogation, the right to a complete written or transcribed record of any interrogation, the right to be notified of the name of any witness and all charges and specifications against the officer not less than ten days prior to a ny hearing, an d the right to a copy of the investigatory file and any exculpatory information. Mohan v. Norris, 386 Md. 63, 67-68, 871 A.2d 575, 577-78 (2005); Md. Code (2003), § 3-104 of the Public Sa fety Article. The LEOBR and the Instant Case We next turn our attention to the applicable provisions of the LEOBR to determine whether the Legislature, when it enacted the LEOBR in 1974, intended to provide agencies with the right to judicial review of the not guilty determinations of administrative hearing -10- boards. To determine the intent of the Legislature, we begin with the plain language of the statute. State Dept. of Assessments & Taxation v. Maryland-Nat l Capital Park & Planning Comm n, 348 Md. 2, 12, 702 A.2d 690, 695 (1997). Because § 3-109(a) o f the LEO BR is entitled Judicial rev iew, we begin our analysis with that provision to determine which decisions the General Assembly contemplated would be entitled to judicial review.9 Section 3-109(a) provides that [a]n appeal from a decision made under § 3-108 [titled Disposition of administrative action ] of this subtitle shall be taken to the circuit court for the county in accordance with Maryland Rule 7-202. Maryland Rule 7-202(a), provides that [a] person seeking judicial review under this c hapter shall f ile a petition for judicial review in a circuit court authorized to provide the review. The General Provisions set forth for the chapter10 allow for judicial review only where it is a uthorized b y statute. Thus , it 9 Section 3-109. Judicial Review. By circuit court (a) An appeal from a decision made under § 3-108 of this subtitle shall be take n to the circu it court for the county in accordance with Maryland Rule 7-202. By Court o f Special A ppeals (b) A party aggrieved by a decision of a court und er this subtitle may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. 10 Marylan d Rule 7-201 . Gene ral Prov isions. (a) Applicability. The rules in this Chapter govern actions for judicial review of (1) an order or action of an administrative agenc y, where judicial r eview is autho rized by st atute . . . . (b) Definition. As used in this Chap ter, adminis trative agen cy means any agency, bo ard, departm ent, district, commission, (contin ued...) -11- appears that a n administrative a gency ma y seek judicial review, under § 3-109 of the LEOBR, only in circumstances where it is expressly authorized by statute to do so. As a result, we examine the other provisions of the LEOB R to determine those circum stances in which the General Assembly expressly authorized judicial review of agency decisions. The Comm ission conte nds that it is entitled to judicia l review of n ot gu ilty findings pursuant to § 3-108 of the LEOBR,11 because a right to such review can be inferred from that 10 (...continued) auth ority, commissioner, official, the M aryland Tax Court, or other unit of the State or of a political su bdivision o f the State and the Client P rotectio n Fun d of the Bar of Marylan d. 11 Section 3-108. Disposition of administrative action. In general (a)(1) A decision, order, or action taken as a result of a hearing under Section 3-107 of this subtitle shall be in writing and accomp anied by find ings of fac t. (2) The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement on each iss ue in the case. (3) A finding of not guilty terminates the action. (4) If the hearing board makes a finding of guilt, the hearing board sha ll: (i) reconvene the hearing; (ii) receive evidence; and (iii) consider the law enforcement officer s past job performance and other relevant information as factors before making recommendations to the chief. (5) A copy of the decision or order, findings of fact, conclusions, and written recommendations for action shall be delivered or mailed promptly to: (i) the law enforcement officer or the law enfo rcem ent o ffic er's counsel or representative of record; and (contin ued...) -12- 11 (...continued) (ii) the chief. Recom mendatio n of pena lty (b)(1) After a disciplinary hearing and a finding of guilt, the hearing board may recomm end the penalty it considers appropriate under the circumstances, including demotion, dismissal, transfer, loss of pay, reassignment, or other similar action that is considered punitive. (2) The recommendation of a penalty shall be in writing. Final decision of hearing board (c)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, the decision of the hearing board as to findings of fact and any penalty is final if: (i) a chief is an eyewitness to the incident under investigation; or (ii) a law enforcement agency or the agency's superior governmental authority has ag reed with an exclusive collective bargaining representative recognized or certified under applicable la w that the d ecision is fina l. (2) The decision of the hearing board then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle. (3) Paragrap h (1)(ii) of this subsection is not subject to binding arbitration. Review by chief and final order (d)(1) Within 30 days after receipt of the recommendations of the hearing board, the c hief shall: (i) review the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the hearing board; and (ii) issue a final or der. (2) The final order and decision of the chief is binding and then may be appealed in accordance with Section 3-109 of this subtitle. (contin ued...) -13- provision. Officer Anderson counters that the Legislature did not expressly include in the LEOBR the agenc y s right to judicial re view of a not guilty find ing, and, in fa ct, purposely excluded that right. Officer A nderson f urther argu es that, if the L egislature inten ded to permit judicial review afte r a fin ding of n ot gu ilty, a ll it ha d to d o wa s say so. Co nversely, the Comm ission obser ves that the L egislature pro vided exp ress language to designate the point of finality for a finding of guilt, to discourage officers from appealing the findings of the administrative board before the chief h ad review ed and alter ed them, n ot in order to exclude review of a not guilty finding. The Commission also argues that, instead, the Legislature made no such express statement about the point at which a fin ding of n ot gu ilty is reviewab le, because th e ending p oint is clear from the statute. We re ject the Commission s interpretation of th e LE OB R. A ccor ding ly, we hold that, under the LE OB R, a p arty is authorized to seek judicial review only in cases where the decision of the hearing board 11 (...continued) (3) The recommendation of a penalty by the hearing board is not binding on the chief. (4) The chief shall consider the law enforcement officer s past job p erfo rmance a s a fa ctor befo re im posi ng a penalty. (5) The chief may increase the recom mended penalty of the h earing boa rd only if the chie f per sona lly: (i) reviews the entire record of the proceedings of the hearing board; (ii) meets with the law enforcement officer and allows the law enforcement officer to be heard on the record; (iii) discloses an d provide s in writing to the law enforcement officer, at least 10 days before the meeting, any oral or written communication not included in the record of the hearing board on which the decision to consider increasing the penalty is wholly or partly based; and (iv) states on the record the substantial evidence relied on to support the increase of th e rec omm ended penal ty. -14- results in a guilty determination and meets the additional statutory requirements for judicial review. By reading together the provisions of § 3-108 and § 3-109, we are confident that the General Assembly did not intend for a not guilty finding to be considered a decision that is subject to judicial review. The first basis of support for our decision com es from our reading of § 3-108 (a)(3), which is the only subse ction that ma kes referen ce to not g uilty findings. Section 3-108 (a)(3) expressly states that [a] findin g of not g uilty terminates the action. The parties in the instant case disagree as to whether terminate means that the proceeding is ended and no longer subject to review, or whether the proceeding is final for the purposes of further review. In our view, the language of that provision, when read in context, clearly and unambig uously elucidates the General Assembly s intent to end the administrative proceedings upon a fin ding of n ot guilty. In this reg ard, a findin g of not guilty does constitute a final decision in the context of our previous d ecisions. W ith regard to th e finality of an adm inistrative agen cy decision, w e have pre viously stated tha t: ordina rily[,] the action of an administrative agency, like the order of a court, is final if it determines or concludes the rights of the parties, or if it d enies the pa rties means of further prosecuting or defending their rights and interests in the subject matter in proceedings before the agency, thus leaving nothing further for the a gency to do. Maryland Comm'n on Hum an Relations, 296 Md. at 56, 459 A.2d at 211. Because the General Assembly stated explicitly that a finding of not guilty terminates the action, there -15- is clearly nothing further for the agency to do, and the decision is therefore final within the contem plation o f this de finition . While the Board s not guilty finding constitutes a final decision, it does not meet the additional requirements set forth by the L egislature, in § 3-108, that w ould classify the decision as one that is entitled to judicial review under the LEOBR. We observed in Miner v. Novotny, 304 M d. 164, 173 -74, 498 A .2d 269, 27 3 (1985), th at [i]f the board finds the officer innocent of the charge, that ends the proceeding. If it finds him guilty, it then makes a recommendation to the chief of police as to an appropriate punishm ent. The chief is bound by a determination of innocence, but not a proposed punishment in the event of a finding of guilt. As to that, his decision (rather than that of the Board ) is final. If the Legisla ture intende d for no t guilty findings to be review able, it could have included language to express that intention, rather than stating that the action is terminated. Instead, the Legislature spent the remainder of subsection (a) discussing the disposition of administrative actions where the hearing board actually en ters a fin ding of guilty. Specifically, §§ 3-108 (a)(4) and (a)(5) state that if the hearing board makes a finding of guilty, it must reconvene the hearing, receive evidence and consider the officer s past job -16- performance and other relevant factors before making a recommendation to the Chief 12 rega rding a penal ty. 13 Section 3-108 (d)(1), Review by chief and final order, continues by describing one of the two w ays in which a decision o f the hearin g board c an fulfill the a dditional requireme nts and become subject to judicial review. Section 3-108 (d)(1) indicates that within thirty days of receipt of the hearing board s recommendation, the chief must review the hearing board s findings, conclu sions an d recom mend ations a nd issu e a fina l order. Subsection (d)(1) further provides that [t]he final order and decision of the chief is binding and then may be appealed in accordance w ith § 3-109 of this subtitle. The L egislature s lengthy prescription o f all that the Board and police chie f mu st accom plish befo re a guilty decision becomes subject to judicial review and its failure to include any similar language when addressing findings of not guilty, persuades us that a hearing board s decision must be a fin ding of g uilty to be considered reviewable under the LEOBR. Furthermore, the Legislature s use of the word then signals when an agency can seek judicial review of a hearing board s decision, after all of the requirements are fulfilled. We derive additional support for this interpretation from the language of § 3-108 (c)(1), titled Final decision of hearing board, which sets forth additional requirements that 12 Chief means the head of a law enforcement agency and includes the officer design ated by th e head of the la w enf orcem ent age ncy. 13 Some of the penalties that the hearing board may consider and recommend to the chief include dem otion, dismiss al, transfer, loss o f pay, reassignm ent, or other sim ilar, punitive action. Md. Code (2003), § 3-108(b)(1) of the Public Safety Article. -17- a hearing board decision must meet before that decision becomes reviewable. This provision states that the hearing board s decision as to findings of fact and any penalty is final if the chief is an eyewitness to the incident that is unde r investigation or a law enforcement agency or the agency s superior governmental authority has agreed with an exclusive collective bargaining14 representative recognized or certified under applicable law that the decision is final. Subsection (c)(2) further provides that [t]he decision o f the hearing board then may be app ealed in acc ordance w ith § 3-109 of this subtitle. Again, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended only for guilty decisions to be reviewable because the Legislature made a finding of guilt a prereq uisite for the other requirements needed to render a decision ripe for review . If the Legislature intended otherwise, then it certainly knew how to include the same or similar language when d iscussing the findings o f not guilty, as it d id for findings of guilty. T o the contrary, t he L egislatur e exp ressly state d tha t a n ot gu ilty finding termin ates the a ction. When r ead in con text with the other provisions of § 3-108 and § 3-1 09, the statuto ry language is clear. Thus, we nee d not look any further to discern the legislative intent as to whe n a hea ring bo ard dec ision is re viewa ble. Marriott Employees Fed. C redit U nion, 346 M d. at 445 , 697 A .2d at 45 8. 14 Collective bargaining is defined as [n]egotiation between an employer and the representatives of organized employees to determine the conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, discipline, and fringe benefits. B LACK S L AW D ICTIONARY 280 (8th ed. 1999). -18- The Conflict between the LEOBR and APA The Commission argues that the APA and the LEOB R do no t conflict, and therefore the LEOBR does not supersede the APA. The Commission notes that this Court has previously harmonized the APA and the LEOBR and even specifically given effect to the provisions of the APA addressing the scope of judicial review in the context of an appeal from [an] L EOB R dec ision. 15 Officer Anderson argues that the LEOBR conflicts with the APA because, in her view, the plain meaning of the language in the LEOBR provides that judicial r eview of an a dminis trative h earing b oard s not gui lty findin g is not p ermitted . 15 The Commission relies on Tippery v. Montgomery County Police Dept., 112 Md. App. 332, 346 47, 685 A.2d 788, 795 9 6 (1996), w hich quote s this Court s language in Younkers v. Prince G eorge's Co unty, 333 Md. 14, 17, 6 33 A.2 d 861, 8 62 (19 93), reversing in part Prince George's County v. Younkers, 94 Md. App. 48, 615 A.2d 1197 (1992) (stating that [w]hen a state police agency is involved, the state Administrative Procedure Act (APA) applies, and the sco pe of judic ial review is spelled o ut by § 10-22 2(h)(3) of that A ct ). See also Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Dept., 369 Md. 108, 138, 797 A.2d 770, 788 (2002) (defining the standard of proof for judicial review of LEOBR board decisions of the Anne Arundel County Police Department pursuant to APA § 10-202(b)). The cases relied upon by the Commission in s upport of the contention that the LEOBR does not c onflict with the APA are distinguishable from the instant case. First, all of the cases pertain to judicial review of a guilty decision, where the petition for judicial review was brought by an officer. Younkers, 333 Md. at 17, 633 A.2 d at 862; Coleman, 369 Md. at 114-15, 797 A.2d. at 774; Tipper y, 112 M d. at 334 , 685 A .2d at 78 9. In the instant case, we have a petition for judicial review of a not guilty finding filed by the Comm ission. Further, these cases are not specifically applicable here because they deal with the scope of judicial review once review has been authorized, and the question before this Court is one of first impression: whether review is authorized from a no t guilty finding. Although not directly on point, the cases cited b y the Comm ission lend su pport to the argumen t that the LE OBR and the A PA sho uld be harm onized, w here not ex pressly in conflict. -19- We conclude that the APA is not the controlling statute in this case because the General Assemb ly intended for the LEOBR to provide an exclusive remedy for police officers when f aced with disciplinary action. In Moats, we stated that when the General Assemb ly enacts a co mprehen sive admin istrative reme dial schem e, that admin istrative remedy is generally deemed exclusive [and] [t]he Law Enforce ment Of ficers Bill of Rights provides such a comprehensive remedial scheme. Moats, 324 Md. at 529-30, 597 A.2d at 977.16 As we stated in Moats, [w]e believe that the LEOB[]R, an extremely comprehensive statute requiring n early twenty pag es in the M aryland An notated C ode, provid es an adeq uate and available procedure . . . . Moats, 324 Md. at 524, 597 A.2d at 974. As in Moats, we hold th at the L EOB R is an e xclusiv e reme dy. We agree with Officer Anderson that the Legislature did not authorize judicial review of a not guilty finding under the LEOB R and that the LE OBR an d the APA are therefore in conflict on this point. To discern the le gislative intent regarding review ability of board decisions resulting in findings of not guilty under the APA, we need not look any further 16 The dissent in the present case points out that the APA overruled the McKinneyPeco doctrine, thereby entitling an agency to seek judicial review of its final administrative decisions in a contested case, so long as the a gency was a party to the actio n. Dissent, slip op. at 14. We agree that the 1993 rev isions to the A PA pro vided age ncies with th e right to seek judicial review of decision s in certain circumstances. We reject the contention, however, that the APA provides the Commission with the right to judicial review in the present case because the LEOBR is the controlling statute. The LEOBR controls because it was ena cted to protect law enforcement officers, in part, by providing an exclusive remedy in proceedings like the proceeding at issue in the present case. This exclusive remedy permits the officer, if found guilty, to seek judicial review of that decision. If the officer is found not guilty, the LEOBR permits the officer to move beyond the proceedings and treat the matter as terminated. -20- than the plain language of § 10-222.17 Section 10-222(a)(1) states that a party who is aggrieved by the final dec ision in a con tested case is entitled to judicial review of the decisio n. While the General A ssembly cho se to set forth other pre-req uisites for judicial review (in addition to a finding of guilty ) in § 3-108(c)(1) and (d)(1) of the LEOBR, the General Assembly, under § 10 -222, requ ired only that a pa rty be aggrieve d before it is authorized to seek review of a final decision under the APA . While w e endeav or to harmonize the applicable provisions of the APA and LEOBR, we can do so only to the extent that they are co nsistent with ea ch othe r, Gwin, 385 Md. at 462, 869 A.2d at 834, and to the extent th at they are reconc ilable. Ghajari, 346 Md. at 115, 695 A.2d at 149. Because the General Assembly, pursuant to § 10-222, p rovided tha t only an aggrieved party may obtain judicial review of a final agency decis ion, we m ust conclud e that this section conflicts w ith the LEO BR, w hich restricts judicial review to those situations described, infra. Specifically, the L EOB R limits judicial review to the final decisions of the Chief, pursuant to § 3-108(d)(1), or his designee, pursuant to § 3-108(c)(1). These limitations on the right to judicial review under the LEOBR create a direct conflict between 17 § 10-222. Judicial Review. (a) Review of final decision. (1) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this s ectio n, a p arty w ho is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section. (2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office, is entitled to judicial review of a decision as provided in this section if the agency was a party before the agency or the Office. -21- the LEOBR and the APA in that no such limitations are contained in the language of APA. Therefore, the LEOBR and APA are inconsistent, irreconcilable and cannot be harmonized as to matters that are subject to judicial review. In our view, that conflict must be resolved in favor of the law enforcement officer and not the Commission for two different reasons. First, the Gene ral Assem bly clearly evidenc ed its intent that th e LEOBR control in this situation by including specific language to that effect when it drafted the LEOBR. Section 3-102, Effect of Subtitle, states that . . . this subtitle supersedes any other law of the State, a county, or a municipal corporation that conflicts w ith this subtitle. B y including this language, the Legislature expressly noted its desire that the L EOBR control over any conflicting statute, including the APA. We have stated that one can scarcely imagine a clearer statement of the scope of the LEOBR. The subtitle is to be a law that is supreme and all-encom passing, w ithin its State-wide sphere of operations. Moats, 324 Md. at 527, 597 A.2d at 976. Because the APA conflicts with the LEOBR as to whether an agency can seek judicial review of a not guilty finding, the LEOBR controls and we further conclude that the Commission is not entitled to review in this case. In addition, the LEOBR supersedes the APA because th e LEO BR w as written w ith the express purpose of protecting the rights of p olice office rs who w ork for spe cific state agencies, while the APA was written to apply more broadly to all State administrative agencies not spe cifically ex empte d. See Ap plica bility note, Md . Code (19 84, 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-201 of the State Government Article. The LEOBR, therefore, applies only to a -22- specific subset of individuals who work for specific state agencies, whereas the APA applies to these individuals and globally to all other individuals working for all other State agencies (unless specifically exempted by the APA). It is well settled that when two statutes, one general and one s pecific, are f ound to co nflict, the specific statute will be regarded as an exception to the general statute. Ghajari, 346 Md. at 116, 695 A.2d at 150 (citing Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 63, 507 A.2d 172, 180 (1986). In Ghajari, we stated that w hen the statu tes conflict, th e specific sta tute is controlling and the general statute is repealed to the extent of the inco nsistenc y. Ghaja ri, 346 Md. at 116, 695 A.2d at 150. In such a c ase, the court should give effect to the specific statute in its entirety and should retain as much of the general statute as is reasonably possible. Id. As a result, the LEOBR controls and the Commission is not entitled to judicial review of the B oard s decision.18 CONCLUSION We hold that w ithin the con templation of the provisions of the LEOBR, the Commission may not seek judicial review of the Board s findings of not guilty. The LEOBR does not authorize judicial review because the Board s f inding of not guilty did not meet the ad ditional requ irements for review set forth in §§ 3-108(c)(1) or (d)(1). We also 18 The parties raise other arguments concerning whether the Commission is an aggrieved party under the LEOB R or the A PA and whether judicial review of the Board s finding of not guilty would violate Double Jeopardy. Because of our holding that a not guilty finding is n ot entitled to judicial review, we need not and do not add ress Anderson s contentions that the Commission is not an aggrieved party under either the LEOBR or the APA and tha t judicial r eview of the B oard s d ecision would violate D ouble J eopard y. -23- hold that the LEOB R does c onflict with the APA as to whether an agency can seek review of a not guilty decision. The LEOBR provides an exclusive remedy and is the controlling statute and therefore supersedes the conflicting provision of the APA. Therefore, the Commission is not entitled to seek judicial review. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. PETITIONER TO PA Y COSTS. -24- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 112 September Term, 2005 MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION v. KATHLEEN ANDERSON Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Dissenting Opinion by Harrell, J. Filed: October 19, 2006 I respectfully disse nt. While the principles of statutory construction recounted in the Majority opinion, as far as they go, are well-settled, the Majo rity fails to apply them corre ctly to analyze properly how the two statutory schemes at issue operate. Because the principles of statutory construction instruct us to harmonize, whenever possible, statutes relating to the same general subject matter, Md. Code (2003) §§ 3-108(a)(3) and 3-109 of the Public S afety Article, Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR) may, and should, be read as consistent with M d. Cod e (1984 , 2004 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222(a) of the State Government Article - the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA). I would hold therefore that the Commission was entitled to judicial review of its administrative hearing board's finding of "not guilty." Properly construed, there is no conflict between the APA and the LEOBR. Acc ordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, and remand the case to that court with directions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince Geo rge's County and remand to the Circuit Court for judicial review of the Board's "not guilty" finding. I. Procedural and Factual Background On 17 Octo ber 2001 , the Com mission ad ministratively charged Officer Kathleen Anderson of the M aryland-Natio nal Capital P ark Police D epartmen t with violation of its BiCounty Directive 414.0 dealing with "Fresh Pursuit" by its officers.1 On 13 - 14 March 2003, 1 Bi-Cou nty Directive 414.0 of the Maryland-National Capital Park Police Department's vehicle pursuit policy states that (contin ued...) the Commission's "Hearing Board"2 ("Board") conducted a hearing at which testimony from several officers, including Off icer Anderson, w as heard. After a brief deliberation, the Board 1 (...continued) Fresh pursuit is only allowed when an officer has probable cause to believe that th e fleeing susp ect has com mitted or is attempting to commit the following: ¢ Any felony involving the use of force or threat of physical f orce ag ainst a p erson. ¢ A hit and run traffic accident resulting in death or serious injury. Any other pursuits are prohibited. The Commission alleged that, on 8 September 2001, Anderson impermissibly engaged in a "pursuit" when she attem pted to stop a stolen vehicle. Th e vehicle's occupants refused to stop be fore ult imately ab andon ing the v ehicle a nd pro ceedin g on fo ot. 2 The "Hearing Board" is th e Comm ission's internal ad judicative admin istrative tribunal "authorized by the chief to hold a hearing on a complaint against a law enforcement office r." Md. Cod e (2003), Public Safety Article, § 3-101(d). Its creation and role is as directed in the LEOBR. As observed by the Majority opinion, the Board is composed of three police officers chosen by the chief of the Com mission's Prince Georg e's County Park Police Department, as required by the LEOBR. -2- rendered a finding of "NOT GUILTY" on all charges. The Board entered its findings on 30 June 2003, and released its written decision, entitled "Decision of Hearing Board Relative to PO Kathleen Anderson." On 25 July 2003, the Commission petitioned the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for judicial review of that decision. Officer Anderson responded with a motion to dismiss, which was gran ted by the Circ uit Court. In a reported opinion filed on 30 September 2005, the Court o f Special A ppeals aff irmed the ju dgment o f the Circu it Court, hold ing that: Because a grant to the Commission under the APA of a right to judicial review of an adverse trial board decision co nflicts with the LEOBR, appellant ca nnot find s afe harbo r in the APA. As to the Commission's right to judicial review, the statutory silence in P.S. § 3-10 8(a)(3) is dea fening. W e hold that, under P.S. § 3108(a)(3), the Commission is not entitled to judicial review of a not guilty finding rendered by the Board. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Anderson, 164 Md. App. 540, 581, 884 A.2d 157, 181 (2005). We granted the Commission's petition for certiorari. MarylandNational Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Anderson, 390 Md. 500, 889 A.2d 41 8 (2006). II. Discussion As an initial matter, both the State APA and the LEOBR ordinarily apply to administrative disciplinary proceedings involving law enforcement officers employed by State agenc ies such as that in the pres ent case . Younk ers v. Prince George 's County , 333 Md. 14, 17, 633 A.2d 861, 862 (1993) ("When a state police agency is involved, the State Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the scope of judicial review is spelled out by §§ -3- 10-222(h)(3) of that Ac t."); see also Bragunier Masonry Contractors v. Md. Comm'r of Labor & Indus., 111 Md. App. 698, 705, 684 A .2d 6, 9 ( 1996) , cert. denied, 344 Md. 566, 688 A.2d 445 (1997) (holding that "the APA applies to all state administrative agencies not specifically exempted and prov ides a stand ard frame work of fair and appropriate procedures for agencies th at are respon sible for both administration and adjudication of their respective statutes").3 The Majority Opinion correctly states that "[t]o determine that purpose or policy [of legislation], we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary mean ing." Maj. slip op. at 8 (internal citations omitted). Additionally, the Majority Opinion quite properly acknowledges the well-settled principles of statutory construction that "[i]f the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then we give effect to the statute as written . . . . If, however, the statu tory text reveals ambiguity, 'then th e job of the Court is to re solve that amb iguity in light of the legislative intent, using all of the resources and tools of statutory construction at our disp osal.'" Mackey v. Compass , 391 Md. 117, 141, 892 A.2d 479, 493 (2006) (quoting Price v. State, 378 M d. 378, 3 87, 835 A.2d 1 221, 12 26 (20 03)). 3 Maryland Code (2003) § 3 -101(e)(1)(ii)(8 ) of the Pu blic Safety A rticle expressly provides that the LEOBR applies to the Prin ce G eorg e's Coun ty Park Po lice De partme nt, a "pol ice d epar tmen t, bur eau, or fo rce o f a bi county ag ency" under the statute. -4- The Majority even acknowledges that, when determining the legislative intent of a statutory enactment, the words used must be given their ordinary meaning in light of the full context in which they appear. Maj. slip op. at 9.4 Yet, the Majority Opinion holds that "[t]o discern the legislative intent regarding reviewability of board decisions resulting in findings of 'not g uilty' under the APA, we need not look any further than the plain language of § 10222." Maj. slip op. at 21-22. In this case, w e are called upo n to construe not only the 4 In Cain v. Sta te, 386 M d. 320, 327 -28, 872 A .2d 861, 86 5 (2005), w e stated that the best source of legislative intent is the statute's plain language and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Although the plain language of the statute guides our understanding of legislative intent, we do not read the language in a vacuum. Rather, we read statutory language within the context of the statutory scheme, considering the "purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body. " (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993) (holding that even when words of a statutory enactment are clear and unambiguous, the Court is not precluded from examining the purpose of the statute through other material that sheds light on the fundamental legislative goal). -5- LEOBR, but also related provisions of the State APA and how the tw o statutes op erate in tandem. It is unfortun ate that, in its analysis, the Majority fails to consider properly the context in which §10-222(a) was enacted, and rushes by an important portion of the analysis necessary to solve this legis lative pu zzle. See State v. Pagano, 341 Md. 129, 133, 669 A.2d 1339 (1996) ("T he 'meanin g of the pla inest langua ge is contro lled by the context in which it appears . . .We may always consider evidence of legislative intent be yond the plain language of the statute.") (quoting Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514 -15, 525 A.2d 6 28 (1987)). While it is true that when two statutes are found to conflict, one general and one specific, the specific s tatute is consid ered an ex ception to the genera l statute, Maj. slip op. at 24, we lon g have he ld that "[i]n order for one statute to alter or limit another, the intention of the Leg islature to do so m ust be c lear and manif est." Drew v. First Guarantee Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 330, 842 A.2d 1, 8 (2003), quoting Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Clerk of Superior Court, 270 Md. 316, 319, 311 A.2d 261, 263 (1973). Specifically, if the two legislative acts can reasonably be construed together, so as to give effect to both, such a construction is preferred. Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 289, 884 A.2d 1171, 1199 (2005) ("[W]hen a statute 'is a part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is not determined from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by considering it in light of the statutory scheme,' and when 'in that scheme, two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other . . . address the same subject, they must be read together . . -6- . i.e., interpreted with reference to one another, . . . and harmonized . . . .'") (citing Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Ins. Comm'r, 332 Md. 124, 132, 630 A.2d 713, 717 (1993)); Bank of America v. Stine, 379 Md. 76, 85, 839 A.2d 727, 733 (2003) (holding that when the statute to be interpreted is part of a larger statutory scheme relating to the same subject matter, the statutes must be read together, and harmonized to the extent possible) (citing Mid-Atlantic Power Supply Ass'n v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 361 Md. 196, 204, 760 A.2d 1087, 1091 (2000)); see also Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 270 Md. at 319-20, 311 A.2d at 263 (holding that requirements of one statute will be construed as embodying provisions of other, and second statute will not be considered as a substitute for the first regardless of order in which they were enacted) (internal citations omitted). Statutes which relate to the same thing or general subject matter and are not inconsistent with each other are said to be in pari materia, and should be construed together so that they will harmonize with each other and be consistent with their general object and scope. Gwin v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 385 Md. 440, 462, 869 A.2d 822, 835 (2005); see also Mayor & Town Council of Oakland v. Mayor & Town Council of Mountain Lake Park, 392 Md. 301, 316-17, 896 A.2d 1036, 1045 (2006), quoting Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 6565, 862 A.2d 419, 429-30 (2004) (holding that when construing multiple statutes, we must presume that "the General Assembly acted with full knowledge of prior legislation and intended statutes affecting the same subject matter 'to blend into a consistent and harmonious body of law.' ). Furthermore, we read together statutes on the same subject and harmonize -7- them to the extent possible, so as to avoid rendering either statute "or any portion of it, meaningless, surplusage, superfluous or nugatory." Gwin, 385 Md. at 462, 869 A.2d at 834 (internal citations omitted); Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316-17, 896 A.2d at 1045. These principles of statutory construction apply even if the statutes were passed at different times and contain no specific reference to each other. Harvey, 389 Md. at 289, 884 A.2d at 1199. Thus, when determining the interaction between two legislative enactments that overlap a subject matter, the principles of statutory interpretation instruct us to make e very attempt to harmonize them, so long as the clear and unambiguous meaning of the language used supports such an interpretation.5 As we most recently stated in Kilmon v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___ (Nos. 91 an d 106, Sept. Term 2005) (opinion filed 3 August 2006 ): Notwithstanding occasional flights of fancy that may test the proposition, the law ne cessarily and correctly presumes that Legislatures act reasonably, knowingly, and in pursuit of sensible public polic y. When the re is a legitimate issue of interpretation, therefore, courts are required, to the extent possible, to avoid co nstruing a sta tute in a man ner that wo uld product farfetched, absurd, or illogical results which would not 5 This Court repeatedly has held that the Legislature presumably intends its statutory enactments to "operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law." Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d 229, 234 (2003), quoting State v. Ghajari, 346 Md. 101, 115, 695 A.2d 143, 149 (1997), in turn quoting State v. Harris, 327 Md. 32, 39, 607 A.2d 552, 555 (1992). -8- likely have been intended by the ena cting bo dy. Stated simp ly and in the affirmative, courts must attempt to construe statutes in a common sense manner. Kilmon, slip op. at 9-10 (emphasis ad ded). see also, e.g., Gilmer v . State, 389 Md. 656, 663, 887 A.2d 54 9, 553 (20 05); Comptroller v. Citicorp, 389 Md. 156, 169, 884 A.2d 112, 120 (2005); Moore v. State, 388 M d. 446, 4 53, 879 A.2d 1111, 1115 (2 005); Cain, 386 Md. at 328, 872 A.2 d at 686; Frost v. State , 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (holding that the Court's interpretation of a particular statutory en actment sh ould "seek to avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsistent with comm on sense"); Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 M d. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730 (198 6) ("[W]h ere a statute is plainly susceptible of more than one meaning and thus contains an amb iguity, courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment. In such circumstances, the court, in seeking to ascertain legislative intent, may consider the consequences resulting from one meaning rather than another, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical or unreason able result, or one which is incon sistent with commo n sense.") (internal citations omitted). III. Application of the Full and Relevant Principles of Statutory Construction to the Statutes in Question. -9- Turning to the statutes a t issue in this cas e, the legislative setting surrounding the enactment of the LEOBR and the APA compels the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to preclude judicial review of a "not guilty" finding by the Board. Section 10-222(a) of the APA Provides for Judicial Review Section 10-222(a) of the A PA explicitly confers on covered State agencies the right to seek judicial review of the agency's final administrative decision where the decision was made by either an internal (i.e. the Board in the case sub judice) or external (i.e. an Administrative Law Ju dge of the Maryland O ffice of A dministrativ e Hearings) administrative tribunal, to which the agency, or, in this case, the LEOBR, delegated the authority to make a final decision in the agency's name.6 6 Before 1993, "Maryland Section 10-222 of the State APA provides: (a) Review of final decision. - (1) Excep t as provide d in subsection (b) of this section, a party who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review of the decision as provided in this section. (2) An agency, including an agency that has delegated a contested case to the Office, is entitled to judicial review of a decision as provided in this section if the agency was a party (contin ued...) -10- jurisprudence had traditionally taken a narrow view regarding the capacity of an administrative agency to seek judicial review of its own decisions." Comm'n on Human Relations v. Anne A rundel C ounty, 106 Md. App. 221, 236 , 664 A.2d 400, 408 (1995). Th is narrow view, referred to as the McKinney-Peco doctrine, evolved from two decis ions of this Court in Board of Zoning Appeals v. McKinney, 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540 (1938), and Maryland Board of Pharmacy v. Peco, Inc., 234 Md. 200, 198 A.2d 273 (1964). These cases stood for the proposition that an agency was precluded from seeking appellate review of a circuit court decisio n when the circuit court overruled the agency's final administrative decision upon judicial review. In McKinney, this Court was called upon to decide whether the Board of Zoning Appea ls was able properly to seek judicial review in an appe llate court, when a circuit court reversed and an nulled th e Boa rd's final zoning decisio n. 174 M d. at 556 , 199 A. at 542. There, we reasoned that an administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial and judicial powers 6 (...continued) before the agency or the Office. We need not consider here whether a final administrative decision by the Chief of the Park Police (the "agency head" for purposes of most law enforcement officer disciplinary matters within the Com mission) in a contested c ase may there after be the s ubject of a petition for judicial review initiated by the Chief, although the language of § 10-222(a) is broad enough to make that a viable contention. -11- when a djudicating cases befo re it, and has n o interests in its decisions other than to decide the cases that co me befo re it in a fair and im partial m anner. McKinney, 174 Md. at 564, 199 A. at 546. We therefore concluded that because the Board [was] not a party to this proceeding, ha[d] no interest in it different from that which any judicial or quasi-judicial agency would have, which [was] to decide the cases coming before it fairly and impartially, [was] in no sense aggrieved by the decision of the Baltimo re City Court, and ha[d] no statutory right of appea l, it had no power to take this appeal, and the appea l must b e dismis sed. Id. In Peco, following the reasoning of McKinney, we held that the Maryland Board of Pharmacy was not entitled to app ellate review of a decision of the circuit court reversing the Boa rd's denial of a permit to open a pharmacy. We reasoned that "[t]he Board's fu nction in acting upon an application for permit under the statute i s qua si-ju dicia l and not a dversary. It is only a party in the circuit court for the purpose of producing the record . . ., or notifying the parties 'to the proceeding before it.'" Peco, 234 Md. at 202, 198 A.2d at 274. The reasoning undergirding the McKinney-Peco doctrine was applied several times in subsequent years. See, fo r exam ple, Board of County Com m'rs v. H . Man ny Ho ltz, Inc., 60 Md. App. 133, 141 , 481 A.2d 513, 517 (1984), w here the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals held tha t: [T]he disqualification, or lack of standing [of the agency], arises ultimately from the proposition that the agency is not a party to the administrative proceeding before it. That is why it has no cognizab le interest in the outcome of the proceeding; that is why it is not regarded as a proper pa rty in the circuit cou rt, even as a respondent/appellee; and that is why it has no authority to appeal -12- from a judgme nt of the circu it court that reverses or modifie s its administrative decision. Although the McKinney-Peco doctrine applied primarily to an administrative agen cy's attempts to secure appellate review of a circuit court's reversal of the agency's final decision, the Court of Special A ppeals has held that the d octrine likely would have applied with equal force in instances where the agency sought circuit court reversal of its own final administrative decisio n. Comm 'n on Hu man R elations v. An ne Arun del County, 106 Md. App. at 237-38, 664 A.2 d at 408 ("T he principle s espouse d in McKinney and Peco, although stated in the context of an agency's effort to overturn the circuit court's reversal of its own decision, would th us appea r to apply with equal force under circumstances in which an agency appears to seek a court reversal of its own final decision. In both instances, it can be said that, abse nt sta tutory authority, an administrative agency that has itself supplied the final decision of the agen cy is not an aggrieved party or a prope r party on appeal."). 7 7 In Comm'n on Human Relations, the Court of Special Appeals addressed whether the Commission on Human Relations could seek review in the Circuit Court of Anne Arundel Cou nty, when th e Comm ission's internal ap peals board dismissed the C omm issio n's complaint agai nst th e cou nty fir e dep artm ent f or em ploym ent discrimination. There, the Court of Special App eals held that it could not, because it app eared that the Com missioners themselves had not authorized the appeal. Instead, the Execu tive Director of the Commission and the Commission's general counsel unilaterally had done so. -13- Comm'n on Human (contin ued...) 7 (...continued) Relations, 106 Md. App. at 239-40, 664 A.2d at 409-10. The Court of Special Appeals concluded: We believe that, for a petition for judicial review by the Commission to be proper under §§ 10-222 of the APA, it must be approved by the appro priate individual or group of individuals comprising the agency, with in whom is reposed the ultimate legal authority to pursue such review. Assuming, without deciding, that §§ 10-222 stands for the proposition that the Human Relations Commission can appeal from its own appeal board's decision, the authority to seek judicial review in a contested c ase rests with the nine Commissioners. Because the power to authorize judicial review rests exclusively in the age ncy by statute, the Commissioners themselves must sanction any determination to adjudicate a contested employment discrimination case beyond the decision of an appeal board of the Commission. Com m'n on Human Relations, 106 Md. App. at 241, 664 A.2d at 410. Thus, while the (contin ued...) -14- Section 10-222(a) was added by the Legislature to the APA in 1993 by Chapter 59, of the Acts of 1993. In addition to "revising provisions of the Administrative procedure act relating to contested cases; [and] altering the scope of that law w ith regard to its a pplicability to certain agenc ies," the express purpose of these enactments was to alter the provisions of the APA relating to judicial review. Ch. 59, of the Acts of 1993. The 1993 enactment was a direct result of a report and recommendation from the Commission to Revise the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA Commission"), which studied the need to revise the predecessor APA. One of the express issues the APA Commission engaged w as whether to continue to follow or overrule the McKinney-Peco doctrine prohibiting an agency from appealing from its own f inal adm inistrativ e action . With respect to state administrativ e agencie s subject to the APA, the APA Commission recommended that the General Assem bly enact § 10-222(a) in orde r to overturn the doctrine, and abrogate the principle that an administrative was not an "aggrieved party" for the purposes of judic ial review . See Report of the Commission to Revise the Adm inistrative Procedure Act: Initial Report on Subtitles 2 and 4 of the APA, 10, 55-57 (1 Sep tember 1992). More specifically, the APA Commission recommended that "when final administrative 7 (...continued) language quoted in the main text above seemingly forbids judicial review of a decision like the one in the case sub judice, as will be described below, the McKinney-Peco doctrine, on which the quotation relied, since has been abrogated by the Legislature by the adoption of § 10-222(a). -15- decisions resolving issues between private parties and the government are issued by the OAH or an agency, the McKinney-Peco doctrine should not apply. Both parties should be permitted to pursue judicial review of the decision." Report of the Commission to Review the Administrative Procedure Act: Initial Report of Subtitles 2 and 4 of the APA, 8, 334-35. The Legislature agreed, and in Chapter 59 of the Acts of 1993 , enacted § 10-222(a ). The General A ssembly also enacted § 10-223(b) at the same time, which overturned the specific appellate impact of the McKinney-Peco doctrine. Section 10-223(b) provides (b) Right of Appeal. - (1) A party who is aggrieved by a final judgment of a circuit court under this subtitle may appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in the manner that law provides for appeal of civil cases. (2) An agency that was a party in the circuit court may appeal under paragraph (1) of this subsection. (emphasis added). Thus, under the prevailing iteration of the AP A, an age ncy is expressly entitled to seek judicial review of its final administrative decision in a contested case, provided that the agency was a party in the agency action. Md. Code (1984, 2004 Repl. Vol.), State Gov't Art., § 10-222(a)(2). Because the Commission in the present case was the prosecutor of the charges brought against Officer Anderson, I would hold that the Commission clearly was entitled to judicial review under the State APA.8 8 Furthermore, as the employer of Officer Anderson, and as the promulgator of the "hot pursuit" policy which she was found "not guilty" of violating by the Board, the Commission had both an immediate and prospective interest in vindicating its view of the proper (contin ued...) -16- Does APA § 10-222(a) Conflict with the LEOBR? Taking into consideration the legislative context surrounding the enactment of §10222(a) of the AP A, it is necess ary to determin e whethe r it conflicts with the provisions of the LEOBR. As the Majo rity Opinio n states, this is significant b ecause the LEOB R wou ld control if any con flict exis ted. Section 3-102(a) of the LEOBR.9 Thus, unless the LEOBR conflicts with § 10-222 (a) of the APA in so me w ay, the APA controls in the instant case and allows the Commission to seek judicial review of the Board's "not guilty" finding. 8 (...continued) interpretation and application of its p olicy vÃs a vÃs the B oard's contra ry determination in Officer Anderson's case. 9 Codified at Md. Code (2003), § 3-102(a) of the Public Safety Article, the LEOBR provides that "this subtitle supersedes any other law of the State, a county, or a municipal corpor ation tha t conflic ts with th is subtitle ." -17- Although the LEOBR reg ulatory scheme was adopted initially in 1974,10 Maryland Code (2003) § 3-108(a)(3) of the Public Safety Article, which states that "[a] finding of not guilty terminates the action," first saw light of day on or abo ut 28 M arch 197 7, when it was proposed by the House Judiciary Committee as an amendment to the version of S.B. 1026 10 Ch. 722 of the Acts of 1974. The pred ecessor to § 3-108 was codified at Maryland Code (1957) Article 27, § 731, and provided: Any decision, order or action taken as a result of the hearing shall be in writing and shall be accompanied by findings o f act. The findings shall consist of a concise statement upon each issue in the case. A copy of the decision or order and accompanying findings and conclusions, along with written recommendations for action, shall be delivered or mailed promptly to the law enforcement officer or to his attorney or representative. Ch. 722 at 2461 , the Acts of 1974, V ol. II. -18- referred to it by the Senate, without this language.11 Nothing in that enactment, or for that matter a ny provis ion in th e LEO BR, h owev er, conf licts with § 10-2 22 (a) o f the A PA. Section 3-109 of the Public Safety Article addre sses judicial rev iew of a " final" administrative decision made under the LEOBR.12 Section 3-1 08 merely addresses when the 11 The bill file contains a Master Copy o f S.B. 102 6, as adopte d by the Sena te initially on 26 March 1977 and without this language, with the relevant provision as a handwritten, interlineated addition. The House Judiciary Committee s notes on S.B. 1026 reflect the added language as Amendment No. 11. The House adopted its amended version of S.B. 1026 on 8 April 1977 and referred it back to the Senate which adopted the Houseamended version on 19 April 1977. Thus, it can be said that §3-108 (a)(3) of the LEOBR was added in the relative haste of the final days o f the 1977 ses sion of th e Ge nera l Ass emb ly. 12 Md. Code (2003), § 3-109 of the Public Safety Article provides that "[a]n appeal from a decision made under § 3-108 of this subtitle shall be taken to the circuit court for the county in accord ance w ith Ma ryland R ule 7-2 02." Maryland Rule 7-202 in turn provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] person seeking judicial review under this chapter shall file a petition for judicial review in a circuit court authorized to provide the review." The remainder of the Rule mandates the contents and procedures for filing the petition for judicial review. -19- administrative decision actually becomes final, 13 for purposes of triggering when an 13 Section 3-108 provides Section 3-108 . Disposition of administrative action. (a) In general. (1) A decision, order, or action taken as a result of a hearing u nder § 3-1 07 of this su btitle shall be in writing and accomp anied by find ings of fac t. (2) The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement on each issue in the case. (3) A finding of not guilty terminates the action. (4) If the hearing board makes a finding of guilt, the hearing bo ard shall: (i) reconvene the hearing; (ii) receive evidence; and (iii) consider the law enforcement officer's past job perform ance and other releva nt informatio n as factors before making recommendations to the chief. (5) A copy of the decision or order, findings of fac t, conclusion, and written recommendations for action shall be delivered or mailed promptly to: (contin ued...) -20- 13 (...continued) (i) the law enforcement officer or the law enforcement officer's counsel or representative of record; and (ii) the chief. * * * * * (c) Final decision of hearing board. (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, the decision of the hearing board as to findings of fact and any penalty is final if: (i) a chief is an eyewitness to the incident under investigation; or (ii) a law enforcement agen cy or the ag ency's superior governmental authority has agreed with an exclusive collective bargaining representative recognized or certified under ap plicable law that the decisio n is final. (2) The decision of the hearing board then may be appealed in accordance with § 3-109 of this subtitle. (3) Paragraph (1)(ii) of this subsection is not subject to binding arbitration. (contin ued...) -21- 13 (...continued) (d) Review by chief and final order. (1) Within 30 days after receipt of the recommendations of the hearing board, the chief shall: (i) review the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the hear board; and (ii) issue the final order. (2) The final order and decision of the chief is binding and then may be appealed in accordance w ith § 3-109 of this subtitle. (3) The recommendation of a penalty by the hearing board is not binding on the chief. (4) The chief shall consider the law enfo rcem ent o ffic er's past job p erfo rmance a s a fa ctor befo re im posi ng a penalty. (5) The chief may increase the recommended penalty of the h earin g board o nly if t he ch ief p erso nally: (i) reviews the entire record of the proceedings of the hearing board; (ii) meets with law enforcement officer and allows the law enforcement officer to be heard on the record; (contin ued...) -22- aggrieved party may seek judicial review under § 3-109. The Majority Opinion essentially concludes that because the Gene ral Assem bly repeatedly used the word "final" when discussing"guilty" findings by the Board, and did not use the word "final" when discussing a finding of "not guilty," the General Assembly did not intend for a finding of "not guilty" by the Board to be a final decision subject to judicial review in the circuit courts. Maj. slip op. at 18-19. I would hold that the Legislature's silence regarding the finality of a "not guilty" finding makes § 3-108(a)(3 ) ambiguo us, at most, rather than creating an express conflict between the judicial review provisions of the APA and the LEOBR. As observed by the Majo rity, we previou sly have held that an agen cy order is "fina l" and ripe fo r judicial review if it meets the f ollowing standard: 13 (...continued) (iii) discloses and provides in writing to the law enforcement officer, at least 10 days before the meeting, any oral or written communication not included in the record of the hearing board on which the decision to consider increasing the penalty is wholly or partly based; and (iv) states on the record the substantial evidence relie d on to su pport the increase of th e rec omm ended penal ty. -23- ordinarily[,] the action of an administrative agency, like the order of a court, is final it if d etermines o r conclude s the rights of the parties, or if it denies the p arties mean s of further prosecuting or defend ing their rights a nd interests in the subject matter in proceedings before the agency, thus leaving nothing further for the agency to do. Com m'n on Hum an Relatio ns v. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 296 Md. 46, 56, 459 A.2d 205, 211 (1983). In the p resent c ase, a "not guilty" finding by the Board is final, for contested cases purposes in the administrative ad judication p rocess, beca use "[a] fin ding of n ot guilty terminates the action" u nder § 3-1 08(a)(3). In o ther word s, it terminates the need for further administrative review, unlike an interlocutory finding of guilt by the Board, which requires subsequent review and action by the agency head, the Chief, under the remaining provisions of § 3- 108. A reading of the plain language of § 3-108 supports this interpretation. Section 3-108 is entitled "Disposition of administrative action," and subsection (a)(3) expressly provides that a "not guilty" finding terminates the "action." The plain language of the statute makes it clear that when the Legislature referred to "action" in subsection (a)(3), it intended to refer to the administrative action itself, rather than the entire proceeding extending through judicial review or appe al. At that point, the action before the agency adm inistrative tribun al is concluded, and there is nothing left to do. The Board's action is final in such an instance. Our case law bolsters the interpretation that a finding of "not guilty" is but a final administrative order of the Board in a contested case. The Majority relies on Miner v. Novotny, 304 M d. 164, 173 -74, 498 A .2d 269, 27 3 (1985), w here we s aid that -24- [i]f the board finds the officer innocent of the charge, that ends the proceeding. If it finds him guilty, it then makes a recomm endation to the chief o f police as to an appro priate punishm ent. The chief is bound by a determin ation of inn ocent, but not a proposed punishment in the event of a findin g of guilt. As to that, his decision (rather than that of the Board) is final." (emphasis added). The Majority turns to Miner in order to bolster its claim that if the Legislature intended for "not guilty" findings to be reviewable judicially, it would have expressly said so. I attach a different meaning to the language used in Miner. In that passage, we essentially reasoned that, although the Chief has the final say in the proposed punishment of an officer found guilty, the Board's decision, insofar as the administrative proceedings are concerned, is final with respect to a finding of "not guilty," because the Chief is foreclosed from tak ing further administrative action by the determination of innocence. If the agency head is bound by such a determination of not proven guilty, then implicit in this finding is that the administrative action is concluded, and there is nothing left to be decided by the Board or the Chief. In other words, the decision meets the definition of "final" under Comm'n on Human Relations. The Majority opinion essentially interprets § 3-108(a)(3) to mean that the Legislature intended to prohibit judicial review of a "not guilty" finding by imposing additional requireme nts in order for the order to become "final." Maj. slip op. at 16-17. This view would have weight on ly if § 3-109(a) stated that "[a]n appea l from a decision ma de under § 3-108 [(a)(3)]," rather than the blanket reference to § 3-108 that actually appears in the statute. As it is, h owev er, § 3-109(a), as written, is entirely consistent with § 10-222(a) of -25- the APA. Such a construction harmonizes the relevant provisions of the two related statutory schemes, as the more relevant principles of statutory construction, ignored by the M ajority, urge us to do. On this subject, the clearly expressed legislative intent of § 10-222(a) of the APA is not trump ed by, nor sho uld it be construed to be inconsistent with, the plain meaning of § 3-10 8(a)(3) of the L EOB R. To find an inconsistency is contrary to the canons of statutory construction that mandate a clear and manifest legislative intent in order for one statute to alter or lim it anothe r. Drew, 379 M d. at 330 , 842 A .2d at 8. When construing multiple statutes, this Court presumes that the Leg islature acts w ith full knowledge of prior legislative enactm ents. Mayor & Town Council of Oakland, 392 Md. at 316-17, 896 A.2d at 1045. Considering that § 10-222(a) (en acted in 19 93) specif ically stated that the agency itself could seek judicial review of a final administrative action in a contested case in which it was a party, one would think that, if the Legislature intended purposefully to exclude the right to judicial review of "not guilty" find ings as the M ajority suggests, Maj. slip op . at 16, it would have expressly done so in the language of that statute. At the very least, such an intent would have appeared in the legislative history of the enactment of § 10-222(a). The complete absence from the bill file of evidence of such a legislative intent necessitates the conclusion that it was not expressly excluded, and at the very least, not contemplated by the Legislature. It is important to keep in mind that when interpreting statutes, this Court must construe statutes in a common sense manner, and must "avo id construc tions that are illog ical, -26- unreasonable, or inconsistent with common sense." Frost, 336 Md. at 137, 647 A.2d at 112. In Calvert County Planning Commission v. Howlin Realty Management., Inc., 364 Md. 301, 319 n. 1, 320, 772 A.2d 12 09, 1219-20 (20 01), this Court held that administrative agencies are more than just "neutral arbiters of disputes in which they have no indepe ndent in terest." When the administrative action has the potential to affect the agency in terms of its broader responsibilities, the agenc y must be free to initiate or interv ene in judic ial review a ctions in order to cha llenge those judgmen ts which may hamper its ability to implement its policies. See also Md. Racing Comm 'n v. Castrenze, 335 Md. 284, 295 n. 4, 643 A.2d 412, 417 (1994). Although Howlin involved a n agency's right to participate in judicial review of its final decision, the reasoning is very instructive. To preclude judicial review of the Board's "not guilty" decision he re directly affects the Commission's ability to implement and enforce its internal policy. Common sense dictates that the agency be allowed to enforce these policies, even if such enforcement requires judicial review of an internal tribunal's final decision. The Majority posits that "the administrative agency may seek judicial review only in circumstances whe re it is expressly auth orized by statute to do s o." Ma j. slip op. a t 13. I would hold that, because § 10-222(a) of the APA expressly authorizes judicial review by the agency of the agency's decision, and the LEOBR contains no provisions precluding judicial review of a "not guilty" finding by the Board, the Comm ission in this situa tion is authorized expressly to see k judicial revie w in the C ircuit Court. -27-

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