Social Services v. Vann

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Circuit Co urt for Ch arles Cou nty Case No. 08-C-00-001783 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 87 September Term, 2003 CHARLES COUNTY DEPARTMEN T OF SOCIAL SERVICES v. CHARLES VANN Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: July 29, 2004 In this case, we must decide whether the Court of Special Appeals, on judicial review of an administrative agency decision, erred when it held that a parent could not be responsible for indicated child abuse when, in the course of administering corporal punishm ent, the parent inadvertently injured his son because the child attempted to escape the punishment. The Charles County Department of Social Services found Charles Vann responsible for indicated child abuse pursuant to Maryland Code (1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.), § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.1 An adm inistrative law judge (A LJ) uphe ld the Department s finding and Vann filed a petition for judicial review of the agency decision in the C ircuit Co urt for Charles County. We shall hold that the ALJ s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment by the Court of Special Appe als. I. On May 6, 199 9, Charles V ann, respo ndent, and his wife ea ch receive d a phon e call from the adm inistrator s of the daycare c enter of their six- year-old s on. The daycare providers had called to adv ise them tha t their son had brutally punch ed and kic ked a teacher in the stomach. Because the teacher was thought to be pregnant2 and had suffered serious injuries, the daycare providers sent her to the hospital and demanded that respondent and his wife 1 All future statutory reference s to the Family Law Article of the Maryland Code (1999 Repl. V ol., 2003 Cum . Supp .) shall be design ated F L. 2 As it happ ens, the teach er was no t pregnant. immediately retrieve their son from the daycare center. That evening, re sponden t and his wife discussed the situation. This was not the first time their son had misbehaved violently at the daycare center. Prior to this incident, he had been involved in multiple bouts of fighting with the other students, prompting the providers to transfer him from his original classroom to a new one and, on occasion, to send him home early. Ultimately, the difficulties with the child became so se vere that the daycare providers threatened to, and even tually did, expel him permanen tly from the center. Respondent and his wife w ere consternated by their six-year-old s repeated and unrelenting behaviora l issues. Previo us attempts to modify the child s conduct using a graduated discipline reg imen which inc luded sitting h im in a corn er for fifteen minutes, banning him from access to his video games, prohibiting h im from g oing outsid e to play with his friends, and restricting his m ovemen ts to his bedroo m h ad resulted o nly in more clashes with the students and teachers, culminating in the punching incident on May 6. Both parents agreed that corporal punishment was the appropriate discipline for their son s misbehavior that day. Using his personal belt, respondent, while verbally chastising his son for the incident at the daycare cente r, struck at his so n. But the six -year-old attempted to avoid the blows by running away, hiding under the bed, and grabbing the belt from his father. In th e course o f the tussle an d respond ent s attemp ts to land the blows, respondent struck him in his lower back with the belt buckle, causing a reddish, moon-shaped bruise about an inch in length. In all, respondent struck his son two or three times with the -2- belt. The following day, respondent s son complained to his teacher of back pain. The daycare providers o bserved th e injuries on the child a nd reported the matter to C hild Protective Services. Eventually, an investigator employed by the local Department of Social Services was called to look into the matter. On May 10, 1999, the investigator interviewed respondent and his wife. On January 13, 2000, the local department advised respondent that he had been charged w ith indicated c hild abuse, see FL §§ 5-701(b)(1) and 5-701(m); that his name would be submitted to a state centralized registry used for the recording of such findings, see FL § 5-714(e); and that he had a right to contest the charge before an administrative court, see FL § 5 -706.1 . See also Montgomery County v. L.D., 349 Md. 239, 707 A.2d 13 31 (1998 ); C.S. v. P.G. County Social Services, 343 Md. 14, 680 A.2d 470 (1996). Respondent exercised his right to the hearing before an administrative law judge under FL § 5-706.1(b), and the hearing took place on July 18, 2000. On August 30, 2000, the ALJ issued her decision, stating as follows: The evidence establishes that [respondent] loves his so n . . . fiercely and wants to raise well-behaved responsible children, which is admirable. The evidence also establishes that [respondent s] actions in swinging a belt with a large metal buckle at a you ng child w ho is twisting, hopping, and trying to run away puts the child in danger of sustaining unintended serious injuries. Although [respondent] testified that he was aiming for [his son s] buttocks, he missed the mark and hit [the] lower-mid back area, leaving marks. -3- . . . Wielding a cowhid e belt with a 2-3" meta l buckle at a sixyear-old child who is frantically trying to get away and out of reach by twisting, turning, and grabbing at the belt is not [justified]. [Responden t s] action injured [the child]. Striking him and causing a half-moon red/purplish mark o n his ba ck . . . harmed his health and placed him at substantial risk of harm. The substantial risk and potential for such harm was imminent in that if the child had d ucked to a void the be lt, the buckle could have struck his eye or teeth, and could ha ve resulted in more serious, even permanent, injuries. Once an intended target becomes a moving one, it canno t be predicted with certainty where the blow s will lan d. Based on these findings, the ALJ affirmed the decision of the local department to charge respondent with indicated child abuse. Respondent filed a petition for judicial rev iew in the Cir cuit C ourt for C harles Coun ty. The Circuit Court affirmed the findings of the Department of Social Services. In an unreported opinion, a divided panel of the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals reversed th e Circuit Court s decision, holding that respondent could not be held responsible for indicated ch ild abuse when, in the course of administering corporal punishment, he injured his son inadve rtently as th e child a ttempte d to esc ape the punish ment. The Court of Special Appeals reasoned that, as a matter of law, responden t s exercise of corporal pu nishmen t could not b e transform ed from lawful co rporal pun ishment into unlawful indicated ch ild abuse sim ply by virtue of the child s disobedience to his parent s order to stand still and accept the punishment. But for the child s independent decision to diso bey, the court stated, the punishment would have been lawful, and a parent cannot be held responsible for the injury if the child s action is the independent intervening cause of -4- the injury. Dissenting, Judge Debora h Eyler argued that the majority s reasoning was circular, because it determined the corporal punishment lawful without considering the objective reasonableness of the punishment under the totality of circumstances, including factors such as the child s age, size, ability to understand the punishmen t, and ability to com ply. The loca l Departm ent sough t review of the intermed iate appellate court s holding, and we granted its petition for writ of certiorari. 378 M d. 613, 837 A.2d 925 (2003). Petitioner contends that the Court of Special Appeals s holding was tantamount to an exception to indicated child abuse for parents who unintentionally injure their child in the course of administering corporal punishment. Petitioner argues the statutory definition of indicated child abuse, found in FL §§ 5-701(b) and (m), 3 does not contain the exception carved out by the intermediate appellate court. The court, suggests petitioner, confused the definition of indicated child abuse in FL § 5-701 with either that of criminal child abuse, Md. 3 FL § 5-7 01(b) prov ides: Abuse means: (1) the physical or menta l injury of a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child, or by any household or family member, under circumstan ces that indica te that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed; or (2) sexual abu se of a child , whether physical injuries a re sustai ned or n ot. FL § 5-7 01(m) pro vides: Indicated means a finding that there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted, that abuse, neg lect, or sexual abuse d id occu r. -5- Code (2002, 2003 Cum. Supp.), § 3-601 of the Criminal Law Article,4 or that of protective order child abuse (that is, child abuse sufficient to require a legal protective order for the child, see FL § 4-501(b) (defining abuse for Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article, including abuse req uiring a pro tective order ); see also FL §§ 4-504 to 4-506). Protective order child abuse expressly exc ludes reaso nable corporal punishment, FL § 4-501(b)(2), and criminal child ab use has been h eld not to encom pass rea sonab le corpo ral pun ishmen t, see Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126-27, 389 A.2d 341, 348-49 (197 8), whereas child abuse as defined by FL § 5-701 contains no such disclaimer. Petitioner sees this distinction as crucial, evincing an intent by the Legislature to disregard corporal punishment in the context of FL § 5-701. The Court of Special Appeals, contends petitioner, applied the wrong definition of child abuse and erred as a matter of law because it took into account the fact that resp onden t was im pleme nting co rporal p unishm ent on h is recalc itrant son . Respondent counters that the definition of abuse in FL § 5-701 does not foreclose the reasonab le use of corporal pu nishmen t. Because reasonab le corporal p unishme nt is permitted and because respondent s use of force was reasonable, respondent could not be held responsible for child abuse. As evidence of legislative intent, respondent also refers to FL § 4-501, defining child abuse in the context of protective ord ers, which expressly precludes reasonable corporal punishment from its purview. He argues that the definitions 4 All future statutory references to the Crim inal Law Article of th e Maryland Code (2002 , 2003 C um. Su pp.) sha ll be des ignated CL. -6- of child abuse in FL §§ 4-501 and 5-701 must be harmonized. Citing the legislative bill file, respondent also argues that the legislative history of FL § 5-701 clearly indicates that parental intent must be considered a factor in determining whether indicated child abuse under the statute actually occurred. Finally, respondent asserts the real motive behind petitioner s decision to charge respondent was the agency s desire to keep a record of any parent alleged to have committed child abuse. He contends that such motive is at odds with the policy of the statute the agency is charged with administering. II. As a court sitting in judicial review of an administrative agency dec ision, this Court reviews the decision in the same posture as that of the courts below. That is to say, we reevaluate the decision of the agency under the same statutory standard s as wou ld the circuit court, and we do not employ those standards to reevaluate the decision of the circuit or intermediate appella te court. See Divisio n of Labo r v. Triangle , 366 Md. 407, 416, 784 A.2d 534, 539 (200 1); Dept. of H ealth v. Ca mpbell, 364 Md. 108, 123, 771 A.2d 1051, 1060 (2001) (noting that it is the final decision at the administrative level, not the decision of the previously reviewing cou rt, which is the focus of ea ch level of judicial review). Under our holding in C.S., 343 M d. 14, 68 0 A.2d 470, a challenge to the entry of one s name in a central registry as an indicated child abuser pursuant to FL § 5-701 is a contested case within the mean ing of the M aryland Ad ministrative P rocedure A ct, Md. Code -7- (1984, 1999 R epl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 10-202(d)(1) of the State Government Article.5 See Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 323 Md. 641, 594 A.2d 1115 (1991). As a contested case in which the agency wa s acting in its qu asi-judicial cap acity as o pposed to quasilegislative agency actions, for which a wholly different set of administrative law principles apply, see SG § 10 -125; Fogle v. H & G Restaurant, Inc., 337 Md. 441, 654 A.2d 449 (1995) judicial review is governed by SG § 10-222. SG § 10-222(h) sets forth standards of judicial review over agency decisions in contested cases and varies those standards depending on the type of agency determination under scru tiny. See Spencer v. Board of Pharmacy 380 M d. 515, 846 A.2d 34 1 (2004). W ith regard to agency factual determinations, the standard of review is w hether the f inding is unsupported by compete nt, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted, also known as substantial evidence review. SG § 10-222(h)(3)(v). Under substantial evidence review of an agency s factual findings, a c ourt is limited to ascertaining whether a reasoning mind could have reached the same factual conclusions reached by the agency on the r ecord b efore it. Board of Physician v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 67-68, 729 A.2d 376, 380-81 (19 99). With regard to agency legal conclusions, judicial review is less deferential to the agen cy. When an agency makes conclusions of law in a contested case, the APA permits 5 All future statutory references to the State Government Article of the Maryland Code (1984 , 1999 R epl. Vo l., 2003 C um. Su pp.) sha ll be des ignated SG. -8- the court, on jud icial review, to decide the cor rectness of the agenc y s conclusion s and to substitute the court s judgment for that of th e agen cy s. SG § 10 -222(h)(3) (i) (iv); Total AV v. Dept. of Labor, 360 Md. 387, 394, 758 A.2d 124, 127-28 (2000). Even with conclusions of law, however, an agency s legal interpretation of the statute it administers or of its own regulations is entitled to some defere nce fro m the c ourts. See Jord an v. Heb bville, 369 Md. 439, 450, 800 A.2d 768, 775 (2002); MTA v. King 369 Md. 274, 288-89, 799 A.2d 1246, 1254 (2002). Other agency dec isions fall w ithin categorie s that are neith er legal conclusions nor factual finding s, see, e.g., Spencer, 380 Md. 515, 846 A.2d 341 (explaining judicial review over discretionary functions of the age ncy), and some fall within bo th. These latter sort commonly are known as mixed questions of law and fact or applications of law to facts: The agency has correctly stated the law and its fact-finding is supported by the record, but the question is whether it has applied the law to the facts correctly. When the agency decision being judicially reviewed is a mixed question of law and fact, the reviewing cou rt applies the substan tial evidence test, that is, the same stand ard of revie w it wou ld apply to an agenc y factual f inding . Pollock v. Patuxent, 374 Md. 4 63, 469 n.3, 823 A.2d 6 26, 630 n.3 (2003); Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 M d. 825, 8 37-38 , 490 A.2d 1296, 1302-03 (1985); Kohli v. LOOC, Inc., 103 M d.App . 694, 65 4 A.2d 922 (1 995), rev d in part on other grounds and remanded, 347 Md. 258, 701 A.2d 92 (1997 ); Strother v. Board of Education, 96 M d.App . 99, 623 A.2d 7 17 (19 93). -9- The agency decision reviewed by the Court o f Special A ppeals and before this Co urt on certiorari is the ALJ s determination that respondent s [s]triking [the child] and causing a half-moon red/purplish mark on his bac k . . . harmed h is health and placed him at substantial risk of harm. The substantial risk and potential for such harm was imminen t in that if the child ha d ducked to avoid the belt, the buck le could ha ve struck h is eye or teeth, and could have resulted in more serious, even permanent, injuries. Once an intended target becomes a moving one, it cannot be predicted with ce rtainty wh ere the b lows w ill land. To determine the proper standard of review, we must first determine whether the agency decision was a legal conclusion, a factual finding, or a mixed question of law and fact. The Court of Special Appeals considered it a conclusion of law, stating that we are persuaded that the ALJ erred in concluding as a matter of law that the corporal punishment imposed by [respondent] placed his son in substantial risk of harm (emphasis added). Because it saw the decision under review as an issue of law, the court applied de novo review , substitu ting its vie w for t hat of th e agen cy. We disagree tha t the issue is sole ly a legal one. Whethe r a finding of indicated c hild abuse is permitted by FL § 5-7 01 whe n, in the cou rse of adm inistering corp oral punish ment, the child disobeys the parent and consequently is injured is patently a mixed question of law and fact. When the ALJ concluded that a substantial risk was imminent, it did so by applying the law, which requires a substantial risk of harm for a finding of indicated child abuse, FL § 5-701(b); C.O.M.A.R. 07.02.07.12, to the facts of the case, the possibility of a -10- swinging metal buckle causing severe injury to a six-year old child.6 In Ramsay, 302 Md. 825, 490 A.2d 1296, we addressed the standard of review of an administrative agency decision. The Court of Special Appeals had held that the taxing authority s determina tion on whether a particular corporation was unitary or binary was a conclusion of law, subject to de novo judicial r eview . Id. at 837-38, 490 A.2d at 1302-03. We disagreed and held that the question was rather the application of the law to the established evidence in the record. Finding no disagreement between the court and the agency regarding the applicable law, we noted the distinction was really about the proper application [of the governing law] to the established evidence of record. . . . [W]hether a business is unitary or separate and dis tinct for tax pur poses . . . is not solely a question of law; rather, the issue for purpo ses of a ppellate review . . . is governed by whether, in light of substantial evidence appearing in the record, a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached the conclusion reached by the Tax Court. Id. Notably, we applied the same substantial evidence test for mixed questions of law and fact as w e did for p urely fact ual f indings b y the a gency. Like Ramsay, the agency determination here, that a substantial risk of harm resulted from respondent s swinging of a belt buckle at a six-ye ar old attempting to evade the blows was an application of law to a specific set of facts. The ALJ s decision was entitled 6 Even in the Court of Special Appeals, the dissenting and majority opinions agreed on the applicab le law, with Judge E yler stating that I do not take issue with m ost of the majority s general discussion o f the applica ble law. I disagree, howe ver, with the majority s application of the law to the facts (emphasis added ). -11- to deferential review, that is, substantial evidence review, and the court should have considered whether the ALJ s application of law to the facts was fairly debatable or whether a reasoning mind could have reached the same conclusions reached by the agency on the record before it. Pollock, 374 M d. at 469 n.3, 823 A.2d a t 630 n.3 . Deferential review over mixed questions of law and fact is appropriate in order for the agency to fulfill its mandate and exercise its expertise. A dministering a child abu se statute is the sort of action for which the expertise of agencies is well suited. To discover whether the corporal punishment was lawfully executed, the agency assesses the reasonableness of the punishm ent not only in light of the child s misbehavior and whether it warranted physical punishm ent, but also in view of the surrounding circumstances in which the punishment took place, including th e child s age , size, ability to understand the punishment, as well as, in the instant case, the m inor s capa city to obey his parent s order to stand still while being struck by the belt. Cf. FL § 4-5 01(b)(2) ( N othing in th is subtitle shall be construed to prohibit reasonab le punishm ent, including reasonab le corporal p unishmen t, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child (emph asis add ed)). Although it may not have been un reasonable for respon dent to use corporal punishm ent, the surrounding circumstances, including re sponden t s swinging of a belt bu ckle at a six-year-old frantically trying to get away and out of reac h by twisting, turning and grabbing at the belt, amounted to action that could be reasonably deemed by the agency -12- impermiss ible under the a pplicable law . As Judg e Debo rah Eyler aptly note d in her disse nt, [T]he problem w ith [the cou rt s] reasoning is that it put the cart before the horse. In other words, the court did not consid er in its calculus the totality of circumstances surrounding the physical punishment when it decided the corporal punishment was lawful. Instead, the reasonableness of corpo ral punishm ent depen ds not simp ly on the misbehavior of the child and the amount of force used in the punishment from the parent s perspective, but also on the physical and mental maturity of the child, and the propriety of the decision to use force in cir cum stances that m ay inc rease the pote ntial for s erious in jury. These scenarios cannot be adjudicated without considering the law in view of the applicable facts. Because of the fact-dependent nature of such inqu iries, it is more de sirable for the agency, using its expertise and scrutinizing the evidence before it, to determine whether the risk create d by the parent satisfied the child abuse statute. Accordingly, the agency s application of the law must be given def erence un der the sub stantial eviden ce test. Applying the substantial evidence test, this Court must assess whether a reasoning mind could have reached the conclusion, based upon this record, that respondent s actions created a substantial risk of harm toward his son. The ALJ s considered judgment was that the swinging of the buckle end of a b elt at a six-year old who was attem pting to run away did create such a r isk. The record substantiates this finding, and it was not unreasonable. Furthermore, the record establishes that respon dent admitted causing th e bruise injuries to his son s lower back; that respondent s wife saw the reddish bruise marks herself after the -13- corporal punishm ent; that respo ndent con tinued to sw ing the belt at th e child in spite of the child s frantically runnin g around the room; and that respon dent miss ed the ma rk of his son s buttocks, hitting instead the lo wer back with a me tal buckle sw ung at a six- year-old child. The ALJ found that there existed a danger of the belt striking the eyes and teeth as well as an u nacceptab le level of un certainty in terms of the potential for the serious injury that is inherent in th e swingin g of a belt buckle at a moving target. These concerns also we re not unreason able, and the record sup ports these findings. Therefore, the ALJ s application of the law to these factual findings that the facts satisfied the requirement of a substantial risk of harm under § 5-701 and C.O.M.A.R. 07.02.07.12 is affirmed under the substantial evidence review applied to such agency decisions. II. We turn to petitioner s arguments that FL § 5-701(b) and FL § 4-501(b) create two separate definitions of child abuse , one for a lo cal departm ent s finding of indica ted child abuse, FL § 5-7 01(b), and another fo r a finding of child abuse sufficient to justify the issuance of a protective o rder, FL § 4-501(b )(2).7 When interpreting a statute, we look first at the plain language of the statute, with a 7 Both parties agree that the definition of criminal child abuse is distinct from that of the definition o f child abu se found in the Fam ily Law Article. We have elsew here expounded on the m eaning of crim inal child abuse. See, e.g., Bowe rs v. State, 283 Md. 115, 127 (1978); Fisher an d Utley v. S tate, 367 Md. 218, 275, 786 A.2d 706, 740 (2001); Anderson v. State, 61 Md.A pp. 436 , 487 A .2d 294 , cert. denied, 303 Md. 295, 493 A.2d 349 (1985); see also Newby v. U.S., 797 A.2d 123 3, 1242 (D.C. 20 02). -14- goal to imple ment th e legisla tive inten t. See Pr ice v. State, 378 M d. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). Ordinarily, where the statutory language is clear and un ambig uous, a court s e ndeav or reach es its end , and the court n eed on ly apply the s tatute as it reads. Id. We begin with the statutory text of the statutes at issue. FL § 4-501(b) defines abuse as follows: (1) Abuse means any of the following acts: (i) an act that causes serious bodily harm; (ii) an act that places a person eligible for relief in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; (iii) assault in any degree; (iv) rape or sexual offense under §§ 3-303 through 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article or attempted rape or sexual offense in any degree; or (v) false imp risonmen t. (2) If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, abuse may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of this article. N othing in this s ubtitle shall be constru ed to prohibit reasonable punishment, including reasonab le corporal punishm ent, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child. (3) If the person for whom relief is sought is a vulnerable adult, abuse may also include abuse of a vulnerable adult, as define d in Title 14, Su btitle 1 o f this artic le. FL § 5-701(b) defines abuse as follows: Abuse means: (1) the physical or mental injury of a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of a child, or by any household or family membe r, under circu mstances that indicate th at the child 's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed; or (2) sexual abuse o f a child , whether physical injuries are sustaine d or no t. -15- FL § 4-5 01(b) def ines abuse for Title 4, Subtitle 5 of the Family Law Article, dealin g with domestic violence, whereas FL § 5-701(b) defines abuse for Title 5, Subtitle 7 of the same article, dealing with child abuse. The two statutes, FL § 4-501(b) and FL § 5-701(b), undoubtedly create two different definitions of abuse within their re spective su btitles. FL § 4-501(b ) reveals a three-part definition of abuse, divided according the person who is being victimize d. Thus, one part of that definition applies to victims in general, FL § 4-501(b)(1); another applies to children victims, FL § 4-501(b)(2); and finally another applies to vulnerable adults, FL § 4501(b)(3). On the other hand, FL § 5-701(b) reveals a two-part definition, divided according to the nature of the abuse (either physical or sexual), for FL § 5-701(b) applies to children victims alone. Thus, a plain reading of both definitions indicates that they are two separate and distinct definitions of abuse. Petitioner s argument, how ever, is not that there are two different definitions of the word abuse, but rather that the definition of abuse in FL § 4-501(b )(2), which applies to children (child abuse), evinces a completely different meaning of child abuse from the one found in FL § 5-701(b). We do not agree. FL § 4-501(b)(2) adopts FL § 5-701(b) s definition of child abuse when it defines child abuse by reference to FL § 5-701(b): If the person for whom relief is sought is a child, abuse may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of this article [§ 5-701 (b)]. Thus, FL § 4-501(b )(2) simply states th at when th e victim is a child, the term -16- abuse as used in Title 4, Subtitle 5 is the same as the definition foun d in FL § 5-701 (b). In fact, FL § 4-501(b)(2 ) is meaningless apart from FL § 5-701(b) because FL § 4-501(b)(2) does not contain a substantive description of child abuse, only a cross reference to FL § 5701(b ). Petitioner would h ave this Co urt read FL § 4-501(b )(2) to create a com pletely new, substantive definition of child abuse, based principally upon its second sentence: Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit rea sonable p unishme nt, including reasonab le corporal punishment, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being performed by a parent or stepparent of the child. Because similar lang uage is not found in FL § 5-701(b ), petitioner reasons that FL § 4-501(b)(2) is a definition of child abuse that excepts from its purvie w rea sonab le corpo ral pun ishmen t, whe reas FL § 5-70 1(b) do es not. The central prem ise of this argument is that one definition of child abuse excuses reasonab le corporal punishment whereas the other does not. The clear implication is that FL § 5-701(b)(2) defines child abuse to include some forms of re asonable corporal punishment. This is an incorrect understanding of Marylan d law a nd of th e term child ab use. Reason able corporal punishment, by definition, is not child ab use. There fore, in light of the child abuse statute, there can be no definition of child abuse that includes reasonable corporal punishment. In short, child a buse and reasonab le corporal p unishme nt are mutu ally exclusive; if the punishment is one, it cannot be the other. Pe titioner s princip al argume nt, that FL § 4-501(b) is distinguishable from FL § 5-701(b) based upon the exclusion of -17- reasonab le corporal p unishme nt from on e and not th e other, lacks merit. Petitioner also argues that the Court of Special Appeals erred because it considered whether the respondent s action was reasonable corporal punishment. To the contrary, not only did the interm ediate appe llate court not err by attempting to determine whether the corporal punishment was reasonable (albeit reaching an errone ous res ult, see supra, Part II), the real error w ould have been to follow the position advocated by petitioner. When a court is deciding whethe r a particular parental discipline is child abuse, whether it be under CL § 3-601 or FL §§ 5-701 or 4-501, the court always determines whether the corporal punishment was reasonable. As we have noted, child abuse excludes by definition reasonable corporal punishment. In the case sub judice, the agency ac tion was law ful. Petitioner also argues that it makes sense to have two different definitions o f child abuse. Petitioner reasons that because issuing a child protective order is different from entering a paren t s nam e into a c entral re gistry, the Legislature created two definitions of child abuse to co rrespond to these two distinct reme dies availab le to the local departm ent. Because the institution of a child protective order (wh ich must be issued by a co urt, see FL § 4-506) is more drastic than entering the parent s name into a central registry, it makes sense that FL § 4-501(b)(2) would carve out an exception for reasonable corporal punishment, thereby requiring the local dep artment to provide more justification to a c ourt in order to issue a more drastic order. FL § 5-701(b)(1), on the other hand, is easier for the local Department to fulfill because reasonable corporal punishment is no excuse under that -18- definition. Thus, the local department will have an easier time satisfying § 5-701(b)(1) and can more easily institute the less drastic measure of entering a parent s name in a central registry. Although the idea is superficially logical that a lesser degree of injury on a child is required for a finding of indicated child abuse and a higher degree is required for the issuing of a protective order it defies the plain language of the statute and is foreclosed. In any event, even were we to agree that this understanding is a viable interpretation, which it is not, and inquire into the legislative history, that inquiry would o nly confirm that petitioner is incorrect. Petitioner contends that the legislative history indicates an intent to create two different definitions in the Family Law Article. Petitioner s understanding of the legislative history, however, is misguided. Originally, since at least 1991, FL § 4-501(b) defined child abuse as follows: (b) Abuse. (1) Abuse means any of the following a cts committed by a househ old mem ber against a nother ho usehold member: *** (iii) abuse of a child, as de fined in T itle 5, Subtitle 7 of this article; or *** (2) Nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to prohibit reasonable corporal punishment, in light of the age and condition of th e chi ld, fr om b eing perf ormed by a parent or steppa rent of t he child . Md. Code (1 984, 199 1 Repl. V ol.) § 4-501 (b) of the F amily Law Article (superseded). The key moment, according to petitioner, occurred in 1994, when the Legislature passed -19- amendm ents to FL § 4-501 . See 1994 Laws of Maryland ch. 469, § 1, at 2250. The amended statute reordered these provisions as reflected in FL § 4-501(b)(2), which has remained unchanged since the 1994 amendmen ts: If the person for who m relief is sought is a child, abuse may also include abuse of a child, as defined in Title 5, Subtitle 7 of this article. Nothin g in this subtitle shall be constru ed to proh ibit reasonab le punishment, including reasonable corporal punishm ent, in light of the age and condition of the child, from being p erform ed by a pa rent or st eppare nt of the child. Petitioner compares the 1984 version of FL § 4-501 s definition o f child abu se with the 1994 amended version and interprets those changes as instituting an entirely new definition of child abuse. At the same time [it made these changes to the statute in 1994], the Legislature made clear that abuse as it was now defined by FL § 5-701 would not necessarily constitute abuse for purposes of FL 4-501(b)(1) [sic]. The amended statu te provided, as it does now, that abuse, as de fined in 4-501(b)(1) [sic] may also include abuse of a child, as defined in FL § 5-701. Petitioner s brief at 15 -16 (emp hasis in origin al) (citation omitted ). In other w ords, Petitione r fashions th e legislative inte nt to create a version of child abuse in FL § 4-501 different from FL § 5-701 p rimarily through the use of the w ord ma y when, for the last 10 years prior to the amendment, the definitions were the same and notwithstanding the fact that the definition does not merely repeat but incorporates the definitio n foun d in FL § 5-70 1. Petitioner s interpretation of the legislative history is incorrect. The creation of two separate, distinct definition s of child ab use within the same a rticle o ne of w hich is -20- constituted by a reference to the other would be an extraordinary thing for the Legislature to do mainly through the addition of an auxiliary verb. In sum, there is only one definition of child abuse in the Family Law Article, absent any statutory or legislative indication that two were intended. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECI AL APPEALS REVERSED . CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR CHARLES COUN TY. CO STS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. -21-

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