Cook v. Grierson

Annotate this Case

Download PDF

In the Orp hans Co urt for An ne Arun del Coun ty Case No. C-2003-88667.OC IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 79 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________ RAINA COOK, ET AL. v. DEBORAH GRIERSON ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. ______________________________________ Filed: April 6, 2004 In this case we are asked to interpret the Slayer s Rule so as to allow for the grandchildren of a murdered victim to inherit from him (the victim h aving died intestate), notwithstanding the fact that the grandchildren s f ather (the victim s son) was the murderer and is still alive. We recognize, by our previous construction of the rule, that persons who are the natural object of the slayer s bounty are disqualified from taking directly from the victim s estate as well as through the slayer s estate. Because the slayer never acquired a beneficial interest in the victim s estate, anyone claiming through the slayer, even though innocent of any wrong doing, may not share in the victim s estate. The overarching policy to prevent the undeserv ing slayer from controlling th e disposition of the victim s property should not be changed by judicial fiat. 1 If there is to be any change in the laws o f intestate succession, the General Assembly should make that change. I The facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 22, 2002, Frederick Charles Grierson, Jr. ( Frederic k ), died as a result of mu ltiple stab wo unds inflicte d by his son, Charles Grierson ( Charles ). He died intestate, survived by Charles, three grandchildren, and his widow, Deborah Grierson.2 Charles pled guilty to second degree m urder and is 1 See M ary Loui se Fello ws, The Slaye r Rule: No t Solely a M atter of Equ ity, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 489 , 495-96 (1 986) (discu ssing the m oral and property grounds used to justify the Slayer s Rule). 2 Charles never married the mothers of the three children and paternity, as far as the record reveals, has not been establish ed scien tifically or b y judicial o rder. For the purposes of this appeal, however, the parties ask that we treat Charles as the father of the three children. serving a thirty-year p rison se ntence . On May 1, 2002, Deborah Grierson, as personal representative of the estate, filed a notice of disinheritance in the Orphans Court for Anne Arundel County contending that, under Maryland s Slayer s Rule, Ch arles Grierson should n ot share in the estate of his father. On November 14, 2002, the grandchildren, through their mothers, petitioned the Orphans Court to declare their right to inherit from the intestate decede nt. The Orphan s Court denied the grandchildren s right to inherit, and that decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. Appellants noted an appeal. We granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the C ourt of Special Ap peals. 387 Md . 176, 835 A.2d 1 103 (2003). The issue before this Court is one of first impression. The question is whether the grandchildren of a dece dent may inh erit from the deceden t pursuant to the intestacy laws where the children s father, who is the decedent s son, could not inherit because of the Slayer s Rule. For the reasons set forth below we shall hold that pursuant to the Maryland intestate statute the children have no right to inherit from their grandfather s estate. Our statute of intestate succession specifically exc ludes the line al descend ants of a living lineal descend ant from ta king as issue of the dec edent. II As a threshold matter, we note that the grandchildren have standing to bring this action. See Md. Code (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-403 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (classifying an heir or next of kin or those claiming through them as -2- individuals entitled to a declaratio n of rights o r legal relations hip with res pect to the es tate of a de ceden t.) The Slaye r s Rule The Slayer s Rule prevents a m urderer, or anyone claiming through or under the murderer as an heir or repres entative, from sharing in the distribution of the victim s estate as an heir by way of statutes of descent and distribution, or as a devisee or legatee under the victim s will. Ford v. Ford, 307 M d. 105, 111 , 512 A.2d 389, 392 (1985). Th e rule developed from the common law principles that equity wo uld not perm it anyone to p rofit by his own fraud, to take advantage of his own wrong, to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. Price v. Hitaffer, 164 Md. 505, 506, 165 A. 470, 470 (1933). Forty-two states have adopted slayer statutes that reflect the common law principles and direct the distribution of what would have been the slayer s share of a decedent s estate.3 Maryland is not one of those States.4 3 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 43-8-253 (1991)(treating the slayer as having predeceased the victim); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-2803 (West 1995)(treating slayer as having disclaimed his share); Cal. Prob. Cod e §§ 250-258 (W est 2002)(predecease d); Colo. Rev. S tat. Ann . § 15-11-803 (West 1997)(disclaimed); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45a-447 (West 2003)(predecease d); Del. C ode A nn. tit. 12 , § 2322 (1995 )(prede ceased ); D.C. Code Ann. § 19-320 (1997)(predeceased); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.802 (West 1995)(predeceased); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-1-5 (1 997)(predeceased); Haw . Rev. Stat. § 560:2-803 (1 993)(predeceased ); Idaho Code § 15-2-803 (Michie 2 001)(pred eceased); 7 55 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/2-6 (West 1992)(predecease d); Ind. Code Ann. § 29-1-2-12.1 (Michie 2000)(constructive trust or predeceased); Iowa Cod e Ann. § 633 .535 (West 2003 )(predeceased); Kan. S tat. Ann . § 59513 (1994 & Supp. 2000)(simultaneous death); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 381.280 (Michie 1972)(forfeit); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 946 (West 2003)(predecease d); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (West 1998)(predeceased); Mich. Comp. Laws § 700.2803 (2002)(disclaimed); Minn. Stat. § 524.2-803 (2002)(predeceased); Miss. Code Ann. § 91-1-3- The seminal Maryland case in this area is Price v. Hitaffer. In Price the issue was, Can a murderer, or his heirs and representatives through him, be enriched by taking any portion of the estate of the one murdered? Price, 164 Md. at 506, 165 A. at 470. We answ ered the questio n in the n egative . The Court began its discussion by recognizing that there were two schools of thought on the issue. One line of cases held that provisions of a will and the statutes of descent and distribution should be interpreted in the light of universally recognized principles of justice and morality embodied by the equitable principles of the com mon la w. Id. The other line of cases recognized the public policy of the com mon law, but he ld that the policies were abrogated and denied . . . by the [L]egislatu re in the ena ctment of statutes to direc t descents and distribution, or governing the execution and effect of testamentary disposition[ ]. Id. at 25 (1999)(predecease d); Mont. Cod e Ann. § 72-2-8 13 (2003)(disclaimed ); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30- 2354 (199 5)(predeceased); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 3B :7-1 to 7-7 (West 1983 )(predeceased); N.M. Stat. Ann. § § 45-2-80 3 (Mich ie 2001)(disclaimed); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 31A-3 to -11 (2003)(predeceased); N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-10-03 (1996)(disclaimed); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.19 (Anderson 1998)(predeceased); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 84, § 231 (West 1990)(other heirs of decedent); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 112.455 to .55 (1999)(predeceased); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 8801 -8815 (West 19 75)(predeceased); R .I. Gen. Laws §§ 33-1.1-1 to 331.1-16 (1995)(predeceased); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-2-803 (Law Co- op. 1987)(predece ased); S.D. Codified Laws § 29A-2-803 (Michie 2000)(disclaimed); Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-106 (1984)(predeceased); Utah Code Ann. §75-2-803 (Michie 2003)(predeceased); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, §551(6) (1989)(pass to other heirs of decedent); Va. Code Ann. §§ 55-40 1 to -414 (Michie 2003)(procedures in the statute); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 11.84.010 to .900 (West 2000(procedures in the statute); W. Va. Code Ann. § 42-4-2 (Michie 1997)(predeceased); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 852.01, 854.14 (West 2002)(disclaimed); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-14-101 (Michie 2003 )(other heirs of the decede nt). 4 Other States that do not currently have slayer statutes are Arkansas, Ala ska, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, and Texas. -4- 505-07, 165 A. at 470. Included in the second group were cases that based their conclusions on statutory declarations to the effect that conviction of crime shall not work a corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. Id. Corruption of blood is a common law doctrine providing that when any one is attainted of felony or tre ason, then h is blood is said to be corrupt; by means whereof neither his children, nor any of his blood, can be heirs to him, or to any other ancestor, for that they ought to claim by him. And if he were noble or gentleman before, he and all his children are made thereby ignoble and ungentle . . . . Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668, 677, 745 A.2d 1098, 1103, n. 4 (2000) (quoting Termes de la Ley 125 (1st Am. ed. 1812 ), as quoted in Black s Law Dictionary 34 8 (7th ed. 1999)). Article 27 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights prohibits application of the doctrine in Maryland. It provides: [t]hat no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate. In discussing the prohibition and its effect on our analysis with regard to the Slayer s Rule, the Court said: In the view that we take of the case, the constitutional and statutory prohibition against corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate by conviction has no application, because by reason of the murderous act the husband never acquired a beneficial interest in any part of his wife s e state. These provisions a pply to the forfeiture of an estate held by the criminal at the time of the commiss ion of the crime, or which he might thereafter become lega lly or equitably entitled to. In other words, it is a constitutional declaration against forfeiture for a general conviction of crime. T here can b e no forfe iture withou t first having beneficial use or possession. One cannot forfeit what he never had. The surviving husband in the case before us, never having acquired a ny interest in his wife s estate, there is nothing upon which the constitutional or statutory prohibition can -5- operate. By virtue of his act he is prevented from acquiring property which he would otherwise have acquired, but does not forfeit an estate which he possessed. Price, 164 Md. at 508, 165 A. at 471 ( internal citations omitted ). Having concluded that the prohibition of corruption of blood had no application to the Slayer s R ule as we defined it, the Court held that it is inconceivable that one be permitted by murder to acquire pro perty through the act, wh ich withou t the perpetration of the crime he m ight never c ome into possession of. Id. at 514, 165 A. at 473. We chose to align Maryland with the opinions that give expression and adhe rence to the principles and reasoning of the common law. Id. at 517, 165 A . at 474. Adherence to these principles has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases. See Diep v. Rivas, 357 Md. 668, 745 A.2d 1098 (2000) (holding that innocent contingent beneficiaries were not prohibited from collecting pursuant to an insurance policy despite the slayer being their brother); Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. 105, 512 A.2d 389 (1986) (holding that where the murderer was found not crimina lly responsible by way of insa nity she could in herit pursuant to the decea sed s will); Schifanelli v. Wallace, 271 Md. 177, 315 A.2d 513 (1974) (holding that where the death of the insured resulted from gross negligence on the part of the designee, the designee may collect pursuant to the policy because the killing was not intentional); Chase v. Jenifer, 219 Md. 564, 150 A.2d 251 (1959) (holding that where the killing is both felon ious and in tentional the s layer will be prohibited from receiving benefits as the beneficiary pursuant to a life insura nce plan). We summarized the status of the Slayer s Rule in Maryland in Ford v. Ford, 307 Md. -6- 105, 111-112, 512 A.2d 389, 392-393 (1986). We said that in Maryland a person who intentionally and feloniously kills another may not sh are in the distribution of the deced ent s estate as an he ir by way of statutes o f desce nt and d istributio n, or as a devisee or legatee under the deced ent s will, nor may the slayer collect proceeds as a beneficiary under a policy of insurance on the decedent s life. These principles also apply to anyone claiming through or under the slayer. We discussed the through or under language in a case heavily relied upon by the grandchildren, Diep v . Rivas, 357 M d. 668, 7 45 A.2 d 1098 (2000 ). Diep involved the contemporaneous murder of Maria Rivas and suicide of her husband and slayer, Xuang Ky Tran. Rivas s life was insured through Tran s employer s group accidental death and dismemberment policy. Upon Rivas s death the policy was to pay $150,00 0 to the surviving person or persons in the following list of prefere ntial classes: the Insured s 5 (a) spouse; (b) children; (c) parents; (d) brothers and sisters; or (e) estate. T he Cou rt was aske d to decide who b etwee n Tran s broth er and s ister or R ivas s f ather w as entitle d to the p roceed s. The Court of Special App eals, Diep v. Rivas, 126 Md. App. 133, 727 A.2d 448 (1999), extended the Slayer s Rule to disqualify Tran s brother and sister and award the money to Rivas s father. The court based its decision in part on the thro ugh or under language used in Price and Ford. We reve rsed, holding that: Here, the facts do not fall within the through or under 5 The policy was read by this Court to define Tran as the Insured rather than Rivas. -7- statement from Ford. The petitioners do not claim in the right of Tran. Th ey claim based on the promis e made by [the insurance company] to pay the surviving person or p ersons in the first of the following classes of successive preference beneficiaries of which a memb er survives th e Insured. T heir claim is in their own right as contingent beneficiaries under the contrac t of insu rance. 357 Md. at 680, 745 A.2d at 1104. We said that to preclude Tran s brother and sister, who were blameless in the murder, from taking under the policy conjures up the ghosts of corruption of the blood which is prohibited by Article 27 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Id. at 677, 745 A.2d at 1103. The grandchildren, here, argu e tha t they, like Tran s brother and sister, are innocent contingent benef iciaries w ho sho uld be p ermitted to inher it from th eir gran dfathe r. Diep, however, is distinguishable from the case at bar in that the brother and sister in Diep had a recognized claim to the insurance proceeds independent of Tran. The policy specifically provided that the ben efits were p ayable to the m emb ers o f the first of th e cla sses to qu alify. There is no equiv alent provisio n in the case sub judice. Contrary to granting the grandchildren an indepen dent basis f or inheriting f rom Fred erick, the intesta cy statute specifically excludes them as the lineal descen dants of a livin g lineal d escend ant. See Md. Code (1972, 20 01 Rep l. Vol.), § 1-20 9 of the E states and T rust Article (defining issue as every living lineal descendant except a lineal d escendant of a living lineal d escendant ). While Charles is prohibited from inheriting from his father because of his act of patricide, he is, nevertheless, still living. Consequently, the grandchildren are not issue within the -8- meaning of the intestacy statute. The grandchildren present two alternative theories by which they would be entitled to claim an interest in Frederick s estate. The first option is that we adopt the legal fiction that the slayer predeceased the victim, thus making the grandchildren issue within the meaning of the intestate succession statute. The second option is that we apply the constructive trust theory em ployed by variou s other cou rts. The seco nd basis is ea sily dismissed. The discussion in Price regarding c orruption o f blood m akes it clear that by the act of mu rder the slayer nev er obtain ed an in terest in th e dece dent s e state. With no interest existing, there is nothing to hold in trust. The remaining option advanced, that we adopt the legal fic tion that the slayer p redece ased th e victim , require s more attention . Of the forty-two states that have adopted slayer statutes, twenty-seven have included language to the effect that the property that would otherwise go to the slayer passes as if the killer predec eased th e dece dent. See sources cited supra note 3 (listing the states that have slayer s statutes and the treatment of what would have been the slayer s share of the estate). The remaining statutes provide for alternative distribution as if the slayer disclaimed his or her share or simply provide that the other heirs o f the deced ent should split the slayer s share. Id. These statutes express the legislatures considered opinions regarding th e treatment to be given the slayer and the deced ent s other heirs. In Maryland, we do not have the benefit of a similar sta tute or expre ssion of leg islative intent. At oral argument, th e Cou rt was re ferred t o a Ke ntucky c ase, Bates v. Wilson, 232 -9- S.W.2d 837 (1950). The Kentucky court, relying on the Ohio slayer s statute, which stated that the slayer shall be considered as though he preceded in death the person killed, read into their own statute a legislative intent to allow the child of the slayer to inherit from the slayer s vic tim. Id. at 838. The Kentucky slayer s statute provides: That if the husband, wife, heir-at-law, beneficiary under any insurance policy shall have taken the life of the decedent and be convicted therefor of a crime which is a felony, the person so convicted forfeits all interest in and to the property of the deceden t, including a ny interest he would receive as surviving joint tenant, and the property interest so forfeited descends to the decedent s other heir-at-law, unless otherwise disposed of by the deced ent. Wilson v. Bates, 231 S.W.2d 39, 40-41 (1950) (quoting from Chapter 97, Acts of 1940, now Ky. Rev. S tat. Ann . § 381.2 80 (Ba nks-B aldwin 1940, 2 003)). (Wilson is the companion case to Bates v. Wilson, supra.) Notwithstanding the analysis of the Kentucky Court of Appeals, we find the logic and reasoning of the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Carter v. Hutchison, 707 S.W.2d 533 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) cert. denied 8 Apr il 1986 , more p ersuasiv e. Carter involved th e efforts of a great-grand child to inhe rit from his great-grand father wh o was slain by the child s father. Tennessee s slayer statute provides: Any person who shall kill, or conspire to kill, or procure to be killed, any other person from which the first named person would inherit the property, either real or personal, or any part thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the time of deceased person s death, or who would take the p rope rty, or any part thereof, by will, deed, or otherwise, at the death of the deceased, shall forfeit all right therein, and the same shall go as -10- it would have gone under the provisions of § 31-2-104, or by will, deed or o ther conveyance, as the case may be, provided, that this section shall not apply to any such killing as may be done by accident or in self-defense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-1 06 (19 84). Looking to the statute for guidance, the court noted that the slayer s statute acc omplished two things: f irst, it provided th at the slayer forf eited all rights he might have had in the estate of the deceased, and second, it provided that the property should be distributed according to the Ten nessee intestate statute. Carter, 707 S.W.2d at 538. It further recognized that the interest of the great-grandchild must be governed by [the Tennessee intestate statute] because it is the exclusive prerogative of the General Assembly to prescrib e by statute the m anner in w hich intestate e states within its boundaries will be distributed. Id. The Tennessee intestate statute provided that the estate of a decedent leaving no surviving spouse should pass to the issue of the decedent. Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-2-104). Unlike our statute which excludes descendants of living lineal descendants, the Tennessee statute defines issue as including all the direct, lineal descendants of the deceased. Id. (Internal citations omitted.) Consequently, the slayer s child qualified as issue of the decedent within the meaning of the statute and prese nted a claim against his great-grandfather s estate independent of his father. Id. The court concluded by noting: Thus, in accordance with our construction of Tenn. Code Ann § 31-1-106 , we need not, by judicial fiat, engraft a presumption that a slayer predeceases his victim onto our descent and distribution statutes. While our decision may have the same effect, it is not for the C ourts but the Legislature to articulate the -11- State s policy with regard to the distribution of descendants estates. Carter, 707 S .W.2d at 539. In Maryland, it is w ell settled that the L egislature has the authority to regulate the distribution of pro perty thro ugh sta tutes of decen t. See State v. Da rlymple, 70 Md. 294, 298, 17 A. 82, 82 (1889)(stating that it was an indisputab le proposition that [e]very state in the Union . . . has the authority to regulate by law the devolution and the distribution of an intestate s property situated within the ju risdiction of th e state . . . and to prescribe w ho shall and who s hall not b e capa ble of ta king it ) . See also Washington County Hospital Ass n v. Mealey s Estate, 121 Md. 274, 280, 88 A. 1 36, 138-39 (1913) (quoting with approval Darlym ple). The Ge neral Asse mbly exercised its authority and defined the term issue so as to exclude the lineal descendants of living lineal descendants. Based on the plain meaning of th e statute, the gra ndchildren are not issue of their grandfather within the meaning of the statute bec ause their fa ther did not predecease them. Con sequ ently, they may not m aintain their cla im to share in the estate bas ed on the in testate statute. Furthermore, they have presented no alternative basis, for example, a bequest in a will or a promise in an insurance d ocumen t, to support a claim indep endent of their father. Thus the apparent underlying basis of their claim to share in their grandfath er s intestate estate is th rough their fath er, an ac tion pro hibited b y the Slayer s Rule. Lastly, it has been argued to the Court that to prohibit the children from inheriting from their grandfather is somehow punishing them for th e acts of their father. We disagree. -12- Assuming, arguendo, that Charles had not killed his father and instead Frederick died of natural causes, the estate would be divided between Deborah Grierson as the surviving spouse and Charle s as the o nly issue p ursuan t to the in testate sta tute. See Md. Code (1972, 2001 Repl. Vol.), §§ 3 - 101 - 103 of the Estates and Trust Article. Under th at scenario the grandchildren would not inherit anything from their grandfather. They had no interest in the intestate s estate prior to their father s act of patricide, and they have no interest afterward because of the law of intestate succession. Indeed, if we were to adopt the legal fiction that Charles predeceased his father, the children w ould be pla ced in a be tter position tha n if their grandfather had died of natural ca uses. We agree w ith the Tennessee cou rt. If statutes of descent and distribution need to be changed to allow the children of a slayer to inherit from the slayer s victim, the ch ange sho uld c ome from the le gisla ture and not the ju dicia ry. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS T O B E P A I D B Y APPELLANTS. -13-

Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.