MVA v. Jones
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Motor Vehicle Administration v. Keith D. Jones No. 75, September Term, 2003 Headnote: The plain lan guage of M d. Cod e (1977 , 1999 R epl. Vo l., 2003 Supp .), § 16205.1 (f)(7)(i) of the Transportation Article is clear and unambig uous. The word only limits the issues to be considered in the suspension hearing to those six issues enumerated within the statute s subsection. As the issue of whether the chemical breath test was performed within two hours of apprehension of the susp ected drun k driver is not included in that list, the Administrative Law Judge was not required to c onsider it in he r review o f this case. Circuit Co urt for Anne A rundel Co unty Case #C-2003-86236 AA IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 75 September Term, 2003 Motor Vehicle Administration v. Keith D. Jones Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Cathell, J. Filed: March 10, 2004 This case arises o ut of an A dministrative Law Ju dge s dec ision, made on behalf of the Motor Vehicle Administration, ultimately resulting in the suspension of the Maryland driving privileges of Keith D. Jones, respondent, following a driving incident where respondent refused to submit to a chemical breath test. On October 12, 2002 , responde nt was fo rcibly stopped by officers following a police chase where respondent attempted to drive his car the wrong way on Interstate Route 9 5 toward the Fort McHenry Tunnel. Respondent, who failed field sobriety tests, w as issued an Order of Suspens ion, pursua nt to Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article,1 for refusing to take a chemical breath test to determine his amount of alcohol consumption. Respondent contested this suspension at an administrative show cause hearing conducted by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), to w hom the M otor Vehicle Administration (hereinafter, the Administration or Agency ), petitioner, had delegated final administrative decision-making authority in such cases, pursuant to § 16-205.1. Following a hearing, the ALJ found that respondent had violated § 16-205.1 and respondent s Maryland driving privileges were suspended by the Administration for 120 days. Respondent sought judicial review of the Agency s decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. The Circuit Court reversed the Agency s decision and vacated the 120-day suspension of respondent s driving privileges. The Administration then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on 1 Hereinaf ter, unless no ted otherw ise, all statutory refere nces are to th is section of the Maryland Code. October 9, 2003, this Court granted the petitio n. Motor Vehicle Administration v. Jones, 377 Md. 275, 83 3 A.2d 31 (20 03). In its brief, the Administration presents one question for our review: Did the circuit court err in reversing an administrative suspension decision upon its own finding of facts and requiring that the MVA prove a suspected drunk driver was asked to take a chemical breath test within two hours of his apprehension , where the implied consent statute Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 16-205.1(f) does not impose such a requirement? We answer the Administration s question in the affirmative and reverse the judgment of the Circuit C ourt for A nne Aru ndel Cou nty. We hold that the text of § 16-205 .1 (f)(7)(i) is clear and unambiguous and limits the issues to be considered by an ALJ in a suspension hearing to the six enumerated issues of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i)(1-6). As the issue of whether an arresting officer must advise and request a chemical breath test from a suspected drunk driver within two hours of the driver s apprehen sion is not listed within the § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) factors, the ALJ did not hav e to consider that issue when determining the findings of fact and conclusions of law resulting in the suspension of respondent s driving privileges by the Admin istration for ref usal to take th e chemica l breath test. I. Facts On October 12, 2002, Officer Blair of the Marylan d Transp ortation Au thority Police observed a Ford Explorer, driven by respondent, facing sideways across the northbound traffic lanes of Interstate 95 (I-95 ) at mile mark er 56.2, nea r the Fort M cHenry Tu nnel. Officer Blair proceeded to pull his cruiser behind the vehicle and activated his lights and -2- siren. Respondent made a U-turn from his position and proceeded to drive south in the northbound lane of Interstate Route 95 in the direction of the Fort M cHenry toll booth plaza. He was pursued b y the officer. During the chase , respondent veered in f ront of several oncoming vehicles. At approximately 1:59 p.m., other officers, including Officer W. R. Morningstar of the M aryland Tran sportation Police, were called to assist in apprehending responde nt. According to the Statement of Probable Cause 2 filed by Officer Mo rningstar, respondent finally stopped his vehicle after another officer, Officer Grimm, stood in the roadw ay causin g the E xplore r to stop. The Statement of Probable Cause further stated tha t, after respon dent stopp ed his vehicle, Officer Morningstar observed the operator [respondent] stepping out of the vehicle and attempting to walk to the rea r of the v ehicle. The ope rator kept his h and on the vehicle to steady himself and when he reached the rear, he sat down on the bumper because he was having problems standing o n his own (alteration add ed). During the course of the stop, Officer Morningstar smelled the odor of alcohol on respondent s breath and observed respondent s poor coordination. He also noted that respondent performed poorly on, and thus failed, the sobriety field tests administered during the stop. The officers on the scene 2 The Statement of Probable Cause was included in the record in the case sub judice due to the fact that the arresting officer submitted it to the Motor Vehicle Administration along with the forms required to be sent to the Motor Vehicle Administration following a drinking and driving incident pursua nt to M d. Cod e (1977 , 1999 R epl. Vo l., 2003 S upp.), § 16.205 .1 (b)(3)(vii). Thus, the administrative record in the case sub judice contains substantial detail about the incident occurring on October 12, 2002. -3- believed that respondent had been driving his v ehicle while impaired or under the influence of alcohol due to responden t s driving behavior, his poor performance on the field tests and the officers observations during the stop. Officer Morningstar then placed responden t in a patrol car and, according to the officer, respondent was re ad his D R-15 Advic e of R ights f orm at th at time. After being read his rights, responde nt stated that h e would refuse all ch emical brea th sobriety tests. The Statement of Probable Cause indicated that respondent s refusal of th e test occurre d shortly after he was placed in an officer s patrol car, but it did not indicate the exact time of the refusal. 3 Respon dent, how ever, did not actually sign the DR-15 advice form u ntil 4:40 p.m., which acknow ledged in w riting his refus al to take the breath test. Pursuant to § 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, Officer Morningstar issued respondent an Order of Suspension. Pursuant to his rights under § 16-205.1 (b)(3)(v)(1), respondent requested an administrative hearing to show cause why [respondent s] driver s license should not be suspended concerning the refusal to take the [chemical breath] test (alterations added). On December 12, 2002, a hearing was conducted in front of an ALJ at the Office of Admin istrative Hearings. The Administration presented several documents at the hearing which were admitted into evidence by the ALJ, including the DR-15A Officer Certification and Order of Suspension, the Statement of Probable Cause and the respondent-signed DR- 3 Specifically, the Statement of Probable Cause noted that [u]pon placing [respondent] in the patrol car, [Off icer Mor ningstar] rea d him the D R-15 an d [respon dent] stated he was refusing all tests (alterations added). -4- 15 Advice of R ights form ackno wledging respon dent s refusal to take the ch emical brea th test. Respondent did not testify or offer a ny evidence d uring the he aring. Resp ondent, however, argued that he had n ot been properly advised by O fficer Morning star of the ramifications of a refusal to take the che mical breath test. Respondent contended, and the Circuit Court found, that the incident occurred at 1:59 p.m. because that was the time Officer Morningstar listed on the Statement of Probable Cause as the time he was called to assist with the situation.4 Respondent also asserted that over two hours had passed before he was advised about and asked to take the chemical breath test because 4:40 p.m. was the time recorded next to respondent s and Officer Morningstar s signatures on the DR-15 Advice of Rights form. As a result, respondent argued that he was not asked to take a chemical breath test, nor was he read his Advice o f Rights form in a time ly manne r, i.e., within two hours of his apprehension. 4 In the alterna tive to the A dministration s main argumen t that the plain language of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) does not require proof the chemical test request was refused within two hours of the susp ect s appreh ension, the A dministration additionally argu es that the C ircuit Court erred when it made several findings of fact not made by the ALJ in derogation of our holding that [a] court reviewing a decision of an administrative agency generally is limited to determining whether there was substantial evidence on the record as a w hole to support the agency s findings of fact and whether the agency s conclusions of law were correc t. Motor Vehicle A dministratio n v. Lytle, 374 Md. 37, 56-57, 821 A.2d 62, 73 (2003) (alteration added) (footn ote add ed). See also Motor Vehicle Administration v. Atterbeary, 368 Md. 480, 490-91, 796 A.2 d 75, 81-8 2 (2002); M d. Code (1 984, 199 9 Repl. Vol.), § 10-222 (h) of the State Government Article. As our resolution of the plain language issue is dispositive in the case sub judice, we need not pin ou r holding o n this issue, ev en though it had merit. -5- The ALJ found that respondent s argument was only relevant in a criminal prosecution. The ALJ stated: The case law cited by [r espon dent] p ertains to crimina l action. This is an administrative proceeding. The two hour limitation on alcohol tests that you ve cited in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code is not ap plicable in adm inistrativ e hearin gs. . . . ... The other point is that this individual made an election to refuse to take the test. I don t think that a dism issal or a no a ction in this m atter is appropriate or warranted. ... . . . [T]his is an administrative proceeding not a criminal proceeding and the time fram e is not something that is looke d at in ad ministra tive pro ceedin gs. [Altera tions ad ded.] The AL J found th at: After consid ering th e evide nce . . . pre sented in this ca se, I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the police officers who stopped and detained [respondent] had reasonable grounds to believe tha t [respond ent] was driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol based on the fact that on October 12, 2002, the investigating . . . police offic er observe d [respon dent] driver make a U-turn on Interstate Route 95 and drive in to oncom ing traffic fo rcing other tra ffic to take evasive action to avoid c ollisions . [Respo ndent] stop ped his ve hicle only after a police officer stood in front of his veh icle. Police officers detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage on [respondent s] breath. [Respondent] needed to hold onto the guardra il and his veh icle to maintain balance while out of the vehicle. [Responden t] performed poorly on or failed field sobriety exercises that were administered to him. I also find that the police fully advised [respond ent] driver of administrative sanctions to be imposed as evidence by a review of . . . the [signed] DR-15 [form]. And that [respondent] driver refused to take a chemical test for intoxication. I conclude that [respond ent] has violated Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation [Article]. [Alterations added .] The Agency then suspended respondent s privilege to drive in Maryland for 120 days as -6- provided for in § 16 -205.1 (b)(1)(i)(2)(A). Respondent sought judicial review of the Agency s decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and that court heard the case on July 14, 2003. On July 16, 2003, the Circuit Court issued an Order reversing the decision of the Agency and vacating the 120-day suspension of respondent s Maryland driving privileges. The Circuit Court held that the Administration: had the burden to prove that [respondent] was offered an alcohol concentration test within the two-hour statutory limitation and that [respond ent] refused it. T he requirem ent is clear an d unamb iguous, an d it equally applies to all persons who are stopped for suspected d riving wh ile under the influen ce of alcoh ol and all police officers who arrest them. Since there was no e vidence th at [respon dent] wa s offered the test within the twohour statutory limitation, the [Circuit] Court will reverse and vacate the decision of the ALJ and the 120 day license suspen sion. [Altera tions ad ded.] II. Discussion Section 16-205.1 of the Transportation Article, commonly known as Ma ryland s Implied Consent Law, provides the statutory structure for the suspension of a suspected drunk motorist s driv ing privilege s where th at driver refu ses to subm it to a chemical b reath test for intoxication.5 Section 16-205.1 (a)(2) states: (2) Any person who drives or attempts to drive a motor vehicle on a highway or on any private property that is us ed by the pub lic in general in this State is deemed to have consented, subject to the provisions of §§ 10-302 through 10-309, inclusive, of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, to take a test if the person should be detained on suspicion of driving or attempting to drive 5 The type of test to be adm inistered is governed by Md. C ode (19 73, 199 8 Rep l. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 10-305 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. -7- while under the in fluence o f alcohol, while impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drugs and alcohol tha t the person could not d rive a vehic le safe ly, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restrictio n, or in v iolation of § 16 -813 o f this title. Pursuant to § 16- 205.1 (b)(1) of the Transportation Article, an officer detaining a suspected drunk driver must advise the suspect of certain rights enumerated in that subsection and may not compel that suspect to take a chem ical breath test. 6 Section § 16-205.1 (b) further discusses the exact procedures an officer must follow if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect the driver is und er the influen ce of alcoh ol or drugs, in cluding detaining the suspect, requesting a chemical breath and/or blood test and advising the suspect of administrative sanctions for refusal to take a requested test. If, as occurred in the case sub judice, the suspect refuses to take the chemical breath test after being properly advised, § 16- 6 Section 16-205.1 is an extremely lengthy statute, thus we only include the te xt specifically relevant to our inquiry in the case sub judice. The re levant te xt of § 1 6-205 .1 (b)(1) states: (b) No compulsion to take chemical test; consequ ences of refu sal. (1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person may not be compelled to take a test. However, the detaining officer shall advise the person that, on receipt of a sworn statement from the officer that the person was so charged and refused to take a test, or was tested and the result indicated an alcohol co ncentration of 0.08 or more, the A dministration shall: (i) In the case of a person licensed under this title: ... 2. For a test ref usal: A. For a first offense, suspend the driver s license for 120 days; or B. For a secon d or sub sequen t offen se, suspend the driver s license f or 1 year; . . . -8- 205.1 (b)(3) directs the officer to confiscate the suspect s driver s license, serve an order of suspension, issue a temp orary license an d inform th e suspect o f the suspect s right to a hearing and of the possible administrative sanctions. The procedure regarding such an administrative hearing is set forth by § 16-205.1 (f). 7 The specific issues to be considered by an ALJ during the suspension hearing are enumerated by § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i), which states: (7)(i) At a hearin g under th is section, the p erson has th e rights described in § 12-206[8] of this article, bu t at the hearing the only issu es shall be: 1. Whether the police officer who stops or detains a person had reasonab le grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the in fluence o f alcohol, w hile impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or 7 Section 16-205.1 (f)(1) states: (f) Notice and hearing on refusal to take test; suspension of license or privilege to drive; disqualification from driving commercial vehicles. (1) Subject to the pro visio ns of this s ubse ction , at the tim e of, or w ithin 30 days from the date of, the issuance of an order of suspen sion, a perso n may subm it a written request for a hearing before an officer of the Administration if: (i) The person is arrested for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoho l, while imp aired by alcoh ol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more d rugs and alco hol that th e per son c ould not d rive a veh icle s afel y, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; and (ii) 1. There is an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing; or 2. The person refuse d to take a test. 8 Md. Code (1977, 1999 R epl. Vol.), § 12-206 of the Transportation Article states: Except as othe rwise p rovide d in this a rticle, a hearing held under the Maryland Vehicle L aw shall b e conduc ted in accor dance w ith Title 10, Subtitle 2 of the State G overnm ent Art icle. -9- more drugs and alcohol that the perso n could no t drive a veh icle safely, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. Whether there was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or m ore drugs and alcohol, or a controlled dangerous substance; 3. Whether the po lice officer requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions that shall be imposed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspe nsion or issu ance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) and (2) of this section; 4. Wheth er the perso n refused to take the test; 5. Whether the person drove or attempted to drive a motor vehicle while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing; or 6. If the hearin g involves disqualification of a commercial driver s license, wh ether the pe rson was operating a comme rcial motor vehicle. (ii) The sworn statement of the police officer and of the test technician or analyst shall be prima facie evidence of a test refusal or a test resulting in an alcohol concentration of 0 .08 or m ore at the time of testing. [Footn ote add ed.] [E mpha sis adde d.] The central issue in the case sub judice is whethe r § 16-205 .1 (f)(7)(i) imp licitly requires that, in a § 16-205.1 suspension hearing, the Administration must also establish that the arresting officers satisfied the requirements of the provisions o f § 10-30 3 of the C ourts and Judicial Proceedings Article. As a § 16-205.1 suspension hearing for refusa l to submit to a chemical breath test and its possible administrative sanctions are purely statutory in nature, we look to the well-settled canons of statutory interp retation in m aking our holding. It ha s long bee n settled by this Court that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the le gislature . Holbroo k v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 -10- (2001) (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 M d. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000) (internal citation omitted)). First and foremost, a co urt should thoroughly examine the plain language of the statute when attempting to ascertain the Legisla ture s in tentions . Holbrook, 364 Md. at 364, 772 A.2d at 12 46; In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A.2d at 139. If the statutory language in question is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then this Court will giv e effec t to the sta tute as it is written , Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (internal citation omitte d)). This C ourt, how ever, will no t add or dele te words from the statu te, Gillespie v. State, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002). We will look beyond the statute s plain language in discerning the legislative intent only where the statutory langua ge is am biguou s. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md. 471 , 483, 833 A.2d 1 014, 1021 (200 3). The Administration argues that the plain language of § 16-205 .1 (f)(7)(i) clearly sets out the only factors that should be considered by an ALJ when deciding whether the Administration should suspend a motorist s driving privileges for refusal to submit to a chemical breath test and that the Legislature did not intend to include any additional issues. The Administration further argues that the Legislature did not inten d for § 16 -205.1 (f)(7 )(i) to contain technical loopholes to benefit suspected drunk drivers because the purpose for enacting the implied co nsent law was to encourage drivers to take the test and to protect the safety of the pub lic. See Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards, 356 Md. 356, 373, 739 -11- A.2d 58, 68 (1999). The Administration additionally argues that the statute in question was not enacted to protect the s uspected d runk drive r s due proc ess rights, but to obtain the best evidence of the driver s impairment to get that driver of f of the Sta te s roadw ays in order to protect p ublic saf ety. Respon dent, however, contends that, regardless of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) s limiting language, the fact that § 16-205.1 (a)(2) cross references §§ 10-302 through 10-309 of the Court and Judic ial Proceed ings Article 9 adds imp licit issues to an ALJ s suspension hearing determinations. In addition, responden t argues that § 16-205.1 (f) must be read in conjunction with § 16-205.1 (g ), which sets out the procedure fo r a suspected drunk d river s withdrawal of an initial ref usal to subm it to the chem ical breath test, a withdrawal that must be unequivocally given w ithin two hours of the s uspect s appre hensio n. Respondent argues that to not include the two hou r requireme nt within a suspension hearing would render § 16205.1 (g) meaningless. In the case sub judice, we hold that the language of § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) of the 9 Specifically, respondent argues that § 16-205.1 (f)(7)(i) implicitly requires the Administration to prove that the chemical breath test was offered within the two hour statutory time period pu rsuant to Md. Code (1973, 1998 Repl. Vol., 2003 Supp.), § 10-303 (a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which states: (a) Alcohol concentration. (1) A specimen of breath or 1 specimen of blood may be taken for the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration. (2) For the purpose of a test for determining alcohol concentration, the specimen of breath or blood shall be taken within 2 hours after the person accused is apprehended. -12- Transportation Article is clear a nd unam biguous o n its face. Th e section state s that at a suspension hearing under subsection (f) the only issues shall be the six enumerated issues in the section (emphasis added). The word only is defined as no one or nothing more besides; solely or exclu sively . . . no more than . . . merely. The Oxford American College Dictionary 953 (P utnam 2002) . It is a limitin g wor d. Wh en used as it is in § 16-20 5.1 (f)(7)(i), i.e., preceding a list of several factors to be considered, it is used to exclude all other possible factors. If the Legislature intended the ALJ to consider whether the of ficers requested the chemical breath test within two hours of his apprehension, it would have included a seventh factor under (f)(7)(i). In providing for administrative sanctions, the Legislature appears to be concerned solely with the issue of whether the refusal was informed and not with the lapse of time between the suspect s apprehension and the test being requested. Further support for this interpretation is sh own in the requ iremen ts of § 1 6-205 .1 (f)(8)(i), which d irects the suspension of a suspect s license if the ALJ makes the following four findings: 1. The police officer who stopped or detained the person had reasonab le grounds to believe the person was driving or attempting to drive while under the in fluence o f alcohol, w hile impaired by alcohol, while so far impaired by any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of one or more drug s and alco hol that th e per son c ould not d rive a veh icle s afel y, while impaired by a controlled dangerous substance, in violation of an alcohol restriction, or in violation of § 16-813 of this title; 2. There was evidence of the use by the person of alcohol, any drug, any combination of drugs, a combination of one or mo re drugs and alcoho l, or a controlled dangerous substance; -13- 3. The police officer requested a test after the person was fully advised of the administrative sanctions th at shall be impos ed, including the fact that a person who refuses to take the test is ineligible for modification of a suspension or issuance of a restrictive license under subsection (n)(1) and (2) of this section; and 4. A. The person refused to take the test; or B. A test to determine alcohol concentration was taken and the test result indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more at the time of testing. The Legislature did not include any reference to whethe r the officer requested th e test within two hours of the suspect s apprehension in this provision. As the issue was omitted from both (f)(7) and (f)(8), it is clear that the Legislature did not intend that issue to be a factor for the ALJ s consideration in a license suspension hearing where the suspect refused to take a chemical breath test. Moreover, the provision requiring that a withdrawal of a refusal be within two hours of the suspect s apprehension10 would o nly be relevan t if, in fact, a withdrawal of refusal was made or attempted. None was attempted here. This plain langu age interpretation limiting the (f)(7)(i) factor s to those spe cifically enumerated in the statute is in line with the Legislature s intent that § 16-205.1 was written to provide, in cases of drunk driving, a swift penalty which is separate from any criminal penalties that may be imposed for the driving offenses. Lytle, 374 Md. at 62, 821 A.2d at 76-77 (internal citation omitted). We have also stated that the Legislature intended to create procedures that would be an expedient and effectiv e deterrent and sanction against drunk driving. Id. at 65, 821 A.2d at 78. Extracts from the bill file for House Bill 556 of 10 See Md. Cod e (1977, 1999 R epl. Vol., 2003 Supp .), § 16-205.1 (g). -14- 1989 ex plicitly indicate an in tent to limit the issues considered at resultant administrative hearing s. Id. Thus, expediently and efficiently suspending the Maryland driving privileges of suspected drunk drivers for failing to submit to a chemical breath test also serves the legislative purpose in designing § 16-205 .1 for the p rotection of the public and not primarily for the protection of the accused, Richards, 356 Md. at 373, 739 A.2d at 68 (quoting Motor Vehicle Administration v. Shrader, 324 Md. 454, 464, 597 A.2d 939, 943 (1991) (internal citations omitted)). The plain language of Md. Code (1977, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 S upp.), § 16-20 5.1 (f)(7)(i) of the Transportation Article clearly does not include any time related issues pertaining to the chemical breath test or the DR-15 advice form as the word only limits the issues to be considered in a h earing to suspend a su spected drunk driver s driving privileges for refusing a chemical breath test to those six issues enume rated within the statute s subsection. As we may not add or d elete an y langua ge from a statute , see Gillespie, 370 Md. at 222, 804 A.2d at 427, we hold that the two hour requirement proffered by respondent and imposed by the Circuit C ourt is not relev ant in su spensio n hearin gs purs uant to § 16-20 5.1 (f)(7)(i) of th e Tra nspo rtatio n Ar ticle. Accord ingly, we reverse the ju dgment o f the Circu it Court. -15- JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL C O U N T Y R E V E R S E D ; C A SE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE DECISION OF THE AGENCY. COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. -16-
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