Wilson v. Simms

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 72 September Term 2003 __________________________________ GAIL WILSON v. STUART O. SIMMS, ET AL. __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Raker, J., C oncurs in th e Judgm ent Only Filed: March 11, 2004 This appeal arises out of an employment dispute between Gail Wilson and the Department of P ublic Safety and Correctional Services ( Department ). We must decide whether Wilson co uld mainta in a manda mus action to enforce an administrative order for her reinstatement when she sought to compel the Department to pro vide her w ith back p ay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits although the administrative order omitted reference to back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits. We conclude that a mandamus action was not proper in this case and affirm the Court of Special Appeals. I. Background A. Facts In 1999, as she was completing her 26th year in state service, Wilson worked for the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services as a Personnel Specialist in the Maryland Pre-Release System. When Wilson was told that she would be reassigned, effective May 26, 1999, to the M aryland House of C orrection-Annex, she began having medical problems, including nervousness, anxiety, sleeping problems, and chest pains. Wilson did not repo rt for duty at her new assignment on May 26, 1999 and remained on sick leave for several months thereafter. In accordance with the Department s sick leave policy, W ilson su bmitted a series o f sick l eave o ccurren ce slips on a m onthly ba sis. On September 17, 1999, the Warden of the Maryland House of Correction-Annex, Patrick Conroy, sent a letter to the Commissioner of the Division of Correction and requested that the State M edical Dire ctor exam ine Wilson to determ ine her ability to perform her duties as a Personnel Specialist III. On September 22, 1999, the Commissioner forwarded the request to Dr. Peter Oroszlan, the State Medical Director at the Maryland Department of Budget and Management. On the same day, the Com missioner also asked W ilson s supervisor to obtain, within ten days, pertinent medical records, authority for the release of medical information and an essential duties checklist. Wilson was not contacted by her supervisor, however, and did not know about the Commissioner s request or that she had been referred to Dr. Oroszlan for an examination. On September 28, 1999, Dr. Oroszlan responde d by letter to the D epartmen t, stating that his of fice had b een: in contact with the employee concerning her health related problems [and] [b]ased on the available documentation and information that we have been able to gather to this date there appears to be no specific medical contraindication for Ms. Gail Wilson to perform the essential tas ks associa ted with the position of a Personnel Specialist III and [perform them] on a regular basis. A month later, Wilson received a letter dated October 19, 1999, from her supervisor in which he requested that Wilson submit certain medical information. She then received another letter from Warden Conroy dated October 20, 1999, informing her of Dr. Oroszlan s assessment and also warning Wilson that she had to either report to work immediately or resign from her position. The letter remonstrated Wilson that, if she did not report to work or advise the Warden if some form of accommodation was needed by October 26, it would be assumed that she had resigned from her position. Wilson responde d by letter on O ctober 25, 1 999, saying sh e could not return to work because she was still under [her] doctor s care and that she would inform them when she -2- could return to work as soon as she received permission from her physician. Wilson noted that she had su bmitted m onthly documentation to cover her absence and also included a new medical certificate to cover [her] absence from June 1999 to [the] present (10-25 -99). Wilson did not return to work on October 26, 1999. On November 2, 1999, Wilson received a letter fro m Wa rden C onroy, in w hich he notified Wilson , citing COMAR 17.04.04.03D, which governs resignations, that her employment had been terminated as of November 2, 1999 because she had been absent without notification to [her] supervisor since October 26, 1999. 1 Wilson ultimately submitted two State Personnel Management System Appeal and Grievance Forms related to this matter, one on October 28, 1999, the other on November 4, 1999. On the October 28th grievance, she stated: I received a letter on Oct. 22, notifying me that the State M edical Director stated that I was able to return to w ork. In that letter, MHCA is attempting to stop my sick leave, and not accept my doctor s certificate. Wilson requested that the Department [r]escind the memo, accept my physician s certificates, and 1 COMA R 17.04.04.03D states: An employee who is absent from duty without notifying the supervisor of the reasons for the absence and the employe e s intention to return to duty is absent without leave. Af ter 5 working days from the first day of absence, the appointing authority shall advise the employee by certified and regular ma il sent to the employee s last address of record that the employee is considered to have resigned without notice. A resignation without notice may be expunged by the appoin ting authority when extenuating circumstances exist, and the employee had good cau se fo r not notifying the a ppointin g authority. -3- credit me with sick leave until I am released by a real physician. When Wilson was notified that she was being terminated on November 2, 1999, she filed another grievance form, complaining that Managements [sic] actions were arbitrary and capricious, since my supervisor received a doctor s certificate from me on October 25 certifying me unable to work through November 1. Wilson requested the following remedy: Rescind the termination, accept my certificate, restore my lost pay, return me to my previous position at Pre-Release and stop the harassment. B. Procedural History On May 15 , 2000, A dminis trative L aw Ju dge G uy Ave ry rendere d a dec ision, after taking evidence. In his decision, he referred to Wilson s October 28th grievance, but defined the issue of the case as w hether the Departm ent s determination that the G rievant had resigned without notice was proper, even though the October 28th grievance preceded Wilson s purported resignation . ALJ A very decided that the De partment in correctly determined that Wilson had resigned without notice.2 2 It is unclear from the record whether ALJ Avery considered one or both of Wilson s grievances. In his Order, ALJ Avery specifically referred only to the October 28 th grievance, which Wilson had filed before she had been deemed to have resigned without notice. Yet ALJ Avery clearly was aware that Wilson had been terminated from state service as of November 2, 1999, as he reversed the Department s determination that she had resigned without notice and expunged the November 2 letter stating such. Nowhere in his Order, however, did he specifically refer to Wilson s N ovember 4 grievance , even thou gh that is the grievan ce in w hich W ilson req uested reinstate ment. The grievances themselves are dissimilar also because they refer to two different social security numbers for Wilson. -4- Finding that Dr. Or oszlan ma de his decis ion witho ut having receive d access to [Wilson s] medical rec ords, and w ithout exam ining or eve n speakin g persona lly with [Wilso n], he concluded that Dr. Oroszlan s decision that Wilson was able to perform her duties on a regular basis was arbitrary and capricious. Consequently, he rejected the Department s argument that Wilson was no longer legitimately absent from work once Dr. Oroszlan rendered his decision, concluding that Dr. Oroszlan s determination could not serve as a basis for determining that [Wilson] resigned without notification. He also noted that Wilson had com plied with the Department s sick-leave polices by informing her supervisor of the reasons for her abs ence and of her inten tion to return. A LJ Ave ry, therefore, uph eld Wilson s grievance, ordering the following: The Agency s determination that the Grievant resigned without notice is, hereby, REVERSED : The Agency s letter of November 2, 1999, informing the Grievant that she has been determined to have resigned without notice, SHALL BE E XPUNGE D from the Grievant s personnel records. On the day after A LJ Ave ry s Order, W ilson s attorne y sent a letter to the D epartmen t, but not to ALJ Avery, a sking that Wilson be returned to her former status effective November 2, 1999, an d compe nsated acc ordingly by placin g her on a dministrative leave w ith pay from that date to her return. Wilson was reinstated on July 5, 2000. For the eightmonth period between the date Wilson was allegedly terminated, November 2, 1999, and the date she was reinstated, the D epartment did not aw ard Wilson back pay, retirement benefits, or any sick and va cation le ave. -5- On July 27, 2000, Wilson s attorney sent ALJ Avery a letter complaining of the Department s delay in reinstating W ilson and re questing the ALJ to p rovide W ilson with full back pay and ben efits by either en forcing his May 15 O rder or corre cting it. On August 17, 2000, ALJ Av ery sent the Departme nt a letter expressing his concern that his Order ha d not been followed in a timely manner and explaining his intentions when he issued th e Order. H e wrote, in re levant part: I do not hav e the slightest id ea why my O rder in the captioned case was not followed. There apparently was no appeal for judicial review, w hich the ag ency as well a s the appella nt is entitled to under the Adm inistrative Procedure Act. Thus, the delay is inexplicable. In the interests of clarification, however, let me state that my intention in granting the grievance, and in reversing the agency s determina tion that the G rievant resig ned without notice, was to place the Grievant in the same position that she would have been in had no grievance been necessary; in other words, if the agency had never taken any action against her. Put another way: to make her whole again. I thought that my Order made that plain, but, if not, I hope that this letter will clarify what the O rder mean t. I have, however, no jurisdiction to force the agency to do anything. A Writ of Mandamus or other Circuit Court action would be nee ded to enforce m y Order. During the latter part of 2000, Wilson sent the Department documentation on several occasions supporting her contention that she was entitled to back pay, accrued leave, and benefits, which the Department refused to provide. A year later, on August 14, 2001, Wilson filed a Petition for Writ of M andamus and /or Writ of Certiorari in the Circuit Court for -6- Anne Aru ndel County. On June 25, 2002, Judge Rona ld Silkworth granted the Department s Motion to Dismiss, stating the following: The A.L.J. in this case ordered that the Defendant reinstate the Plaintiff as an em ployee, n othing more. If the Plaintiff was unsure, or unsatisfied with the A.L.J. s order, then the proper course of action would have been to file a timely mo tion to revise or reconsider his order to include the more s pecific relief she now requests, or in the alternative the Plaintiff could have initiated a new administrative grievance complaining that her change in status, due to the A.L.J. s ruling, necessarily includes back pay, leave credits, and retirement contributions. Those are the appropriate legal remedies open to the Plaintiff, not th e writ of mandamus. The Defendant has indeed complied with the A.L.J. s order to reinstate the Plaintiff, thus making a mandamus action a gainst th e Def endan t moot. Wilson appealed. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial court s r uling. The inter med iate a ppellate court determ ined that, while ALJ A very, as evidenced by his Au gust 17 letter to the Department, may have intended that Wilson receive full back pay and bene fits, his intent was not expressed in h is Order. For this reason, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Wilson should have either filed another grievance or filed a pe tition for judicia l review w ithin thirty days of the O rder pursua nt to Maryland Rules 7-202 and 7-203(a). 3 The Co urt of Spe cial Appe als also determ ined that a 3 Rule 7-202, Method of Securing Review, provides, in part: (a) By Petition. A person seeking judicial review under this chapter shall file a petition for judicial rev iew in a circ uit court au thorized to prov ide the re view. . . . Rule 7-20 3, Time fo r Filing Ac tion, provide s, in part: (a) Generally. Ex cept as oth erwise provided in this Rule or by statute, a petition for judicial review shall be filed within 30 -7- writ of mandamus should not issue because there once was an adequate administrative remedy. Wilson filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, presenting the following questions: 1. Whether the petitioner brought a proper cau se of action to Maryland s court of ge neral jurisdiction, the Circuit Court for Ann e Ar undel Co unty? 2. Whether responde nt should h ave prov ided petitione r with just compensation for the period of time sh e was w rongfully terminated? We granted Wilson s petition . Wilson v. Simms, 377 Md. 275, 833 A.2d 31 (2003) . We affirm the Co urt of S pecial A ppeals . II. Discussion Wilson asserts that ALJ Avery s Order granting her grievance and reinstating her employment required the Department to pay her salary, allow her to accrue sick and vacation leave, and contribute to her retirement benefits for the period for which she had been wrongf ully terminated until she was reinstated. To support her argumen t, Wilson po ints to ALJ Avery s letter to the Dep artment, dated August 17, 2000, which stated that his intention in granting the grievance . . . was to place [Wilson] in the same position that [ she] wou ld days after the latest of: (1) the date o f the order o r action of w hich review is sought; (2) the date the administrative agency sent notice of the order or action to the petitioner, if notice was required by law to be sent to the pe titioner . . . . -8- have been in had no grievance been necessary; in other words, if the agency had never taken any action against her. Wilson also contends that a writ of ma ndamus is the appro priate form of action to enforce her claim. The State argues that the Circuit Court properly dismissed Wilson s claim because the sole basis for the m andamu s relief so ught was the adm inistrativ e ord er of ALJ Av ery, with which [the Department] had already fully complied. The State maintains that the Department fully complied with the Order when it reinstated Wilson to her position, noting that, in his Order, ALJ Avery refer red only to Wilson s October 28 grievance asking for her reinstatement and which, unlike the November 2 grievance, said nothing about back pay. Moreover, according to the State, Wilson incorrectly relies on ALJ Avery s letter, dated August 17, 2000, which was issued three months after the Order, because the letter had no legal effect because it was neither an order in its own right nor an e xercise of ALJ A very s authority under C OMA R 28.02.0 1.28 to recon sider, re vise, or correct his Order of May 15, 2000. 4 A writ of mandamus is thus inappropriate, in the State s view, because ALJ 4 COM AR 28 .02.01.28 sta tes: 28 Reconsideration and Revision. A. Except as provided in §B(2) of this regulation, a decision may be revised or reconsidered only by the judge who rendered the decision for which reconsideration or revision is requested. B. Revisory Pow er. (1) On motion of any party filed at any time, the judge may exercise revisory power and control over a final decision in the event of fraud, mistake, or irregularity in the same manner that the courts ma y exercise reviso ry power un der Ma ryland Rule 2-535(b). -9- Avery s Order d id not conf er the clear leg al right asserted by Wilson tha t is essential to mandamus relief. A. The History and N ature of the Writ of Man damus We begin our analysis with a discussion of the comm on law writ of mand amus. A court of competent jurisdiction may issue a writ of mandamus in order to compel the performance of a non-discretionary duty. In 1799, the General Court of Maryland explained: The writ of mandamus is a preroga tive writ, and grantable where the public justice of the state is concerned; and commands the execution of an act where otherwise justice would be obstructed. It is denominated a prerogative w rit, because the king, being the fountain of justice, it is interposed by his authority, transferred to the Court of King's Bench, to prevent disorder, from a failure of ju stice, where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ou ght to b e one. It is a writ of right, and lies where there is a right to execute an office, perform a service, or exercise a franchise , and a perso n is kept out of possession, or dispossessed of such right, and has no other specific legal remedy. It is the true specific remedy to restore a person wrongfully dispossessed of an office or function which draws (2) On the in itiative of the judg e or o n the motion o f any p arty, a judge may correct a clerical mistake in a final decision at any time in the same manner as the courts exercise revisory power under Maryland R ule 2-535(d). C. Reconsideration. When the judge is the final decision maker, the judge who rendered the decision may revise or reconsider the decision to the same extent as permitted by law if the agency rendered the final decision. D. A request for revision or reconsideration does not automatica lly stay the action or toll the time for filing an appea l. E. Proposed decisions may not be revised or reconsidered by the judge. -10- after it tem poral rig hts. Runkel v. Winemiller 4 H. & McH. 429, 449 (Gen. Ct. Oct. Term 1799) (citations omitted); see also Ph ilip Mo rris Inc. v . Ange letti, 358 Md. 689, 707-0 8, 752 A.2d 20 0, 210 (2000). More recently, in City of Seat Pleasant v. Jones, 364 Md. 663, 774 A.2d 1167 (2 001), we described the writ of mandamus in a similar fashion: Mandamus is genera lly used to compel inferior tribunals, pub lic officials or administrative agencies to perform their function or perform some particular duty impose d upon th em wh ich in its nature is imperative and to the performance of which duty the party app lying for th e writ h as a clea r legal rig ht. Id. at 674, 680 A.2d at 1173 (quoting Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 514, 331 A.2d 55, 72 (1975)). Commanding official action is the writ s most common use. Walter v. Board of Com m'rs of M ontgom ery Cou nty, 179 Md. 665, 668, 22 A.2d 472, 474 (1941); see also Mahoney v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 205 Md. 325, 335, 10 8 A.2d 143, 14 7 (195 4). In In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), we explored the history and n ature of m andamu s at common law. Quoting Blackstone, we stated: A writ of mandamus is, in general, a command issuing in the king s name from the court of king s bench, an d directed to any person, corporation, or inferior court of judicature, within the king s dominions, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and duty, and which the court of king s bench has previously determined, or at least suppo ses, to be con sonant w ith right and justice. It is a high prerog ative w rit, of a m ost exte nsively re media l nature. . . -11- . Id. at 286, 539 A.2d at 666-67 (quoting 3. W. Bla ckston e, Commentaries on the Laws of England 110 (fascimile ed. 1768)). Noting that the writ of manda mus issued out of th e Court of King s Bench, we then reviewed the evolution of that court because we observed that its history revealed the nature and purpose of the writ itself: In its earlier days at least, the King actuall y sat in the Court of Kin g's Bench, as by later fiction he was supposed to have done. 1 W. H oldsw orth, A History of English Law 207 (7th ed. 1956) (hereinafter 1 Holdsw orth). Mo reover, in the medieval period, the court wa s closely conn ected with the Council. Id. at 209. "[T]he Curia Regis was a large undifferentiated court, composed both of the leading nobility lay and spiritual and of royal officials, by means of which the king carried on all the business of the central government--judicial, legislative, and execu tive." Id. at 477 [footnote omitted]. The notion of separation of powers--even today somew hat foreign to British constitutional law--simp ly did not exist. Thus this body exercised broad supervisory authority over subordinate officials, judicial and otherwise, probably without paying mu ch heed to wh ether a particular act of supe rvision wa s judicial or ad ministrative in nature. It exercised this authority in part through the prerogative writs. Id. at 226. As time passed and go vernment becam e more sophisticated, or at least more complex, these arrangements began to change. Thus, towards the end of the 14th Century, the Council was becoming "more especially the organ of the executive side of the governm ent, and Parliament of the legislative side; while the court of K ing's Bench wa s tending to becom e simply a court of common law, which was concerned with the judicial side of govern ment." Id. at 210 [footnote om itted]. But des pite this metamo rphosis, the c ourt preserved both in its style and in its jurisdiction traces of the days when it was a court of a very -12- different kind. In its wide pow ers of control over other courts and officials, and in its wide criminal jurisdiction, it retained powers of a quasi-political nature which came to it from the days when the court held coram rege was both King's Bench and Coun cil. Id. at 211. Thus when King's Bench became established as a common law court, it had original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases. And it had "a general superintendence over the due observance of the law by offic ials and others." Id. at 212. As we have seen, it was generally in the exercise of this power that it issued the prerogative writs. In the 16th and 17th cent uries, for inst ance , "[b]y means of these [prerogative] writs . . . [and by other means] the doings of the justices of the peace, of the borough Courts, of courts leet, and of parishes w ere freque ntly controlled; an d rules we re laid down for the guidance of these authorities on points of law and proced ure." 5 W. Holdsw orth A History of English Law 420 (3d ed. 1945). Id. at 287-288, 539 A.2d at 667. After reviewing the history of the Court of King s Bench, we explored governmental structure in 17th century Maryland. During that pre-revolutionary period, we observed, the structure was similar to that of England, as it reflected a time in M aryland s history where the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government were largely undifferentiated. Id. at 288, 539 A.2d at 668 (noting that M aryland s Gove rnor sat with this Coun cil and this body performed administrative, legislative, and judicial functions ). By 1638, we explain ed, the Governor an d Council we re sitting as a county court, which -13- by 1642 was designated the Provincial Court. After the division of the legislature in to upper and lower houses in 1649, the upper house (the Governor and Council) exercised the highest appellate authority in the province. But the Pro vincial Court "became the chief court of the province, regarded as the local equivalent of the C ourt of King's B ench." Like King's Bench, it exercis ed both origina l and ap pellate ju risdiction . Id. at 288-89, 539 A.2d at 668 (citations omitted). Acco rding to pre-revolutionary sources, the Provincial Court as well as the Court of Appeals issued the extraordinary writ of mandamus on occ asion. 5 Id. at 289, 539 A.2d at 668 (citing Bordley v. Lloyd, 1 H. & McH. 27 (Prov. Ct., Ju ne Term 1709); Mitchells Adrs. v. Majsty (1715), reported in C. Bond, Proceedings of the Mary land C ourt of A ppeals 1695- 1729, 196-197 (1933)). These sources, however, did not discuss the g enesis of th e court s po wer to issue the writ of ma ndam us. Id. After the Revolutionary War, the Ma ryland General Court succeeded the Provincial Court, and the Court of Appeals succeeded the Colonial Court of Appeals and was given 5 Section 56 of the M aryland Con stitution of 17 76 created the Court o f Appe als: That there be a court of appeals, composed of persons of integrity and soun d judgm ent in the law, whose judgment shall be final and c onclusive in all cases of appeal, from the general court, court of chancery, and court of admiralty; That one person of integrity and sound judgment in the law, be appointed chancellor; That three persons of integrity and sound judgment in the law, be appointed judges of the court now called the provincial court; and that the same co urt be hereafter called and known by the name of the general court; which C ourt shall sit on the western and eastern shores for transacting and determining the business of the respective shores, at such times and places as the future legisla ture of this S tate shall direct and appoin t. -14- authority to hear appeals from the General Court, the Court of Chancery and the Court of Adm iralty. See Md. C onst. of 1776, § 56.6 In 1838, in Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838), the S upreme C ourt of the U nited States h ad occasio n to consider whether the Maryland G eneral Co urt had the p ower to issu e a writ of m andamu s in 1801, and it concluded that Marylan d court s, indee d, had s uch a p ower. Id. at 621, 9 L.Ed. at 1219. As we noted in In re Petition for Writ of Proh ibition, Supreme C ourt Chief Justice Tan ey, writing for the dissent b ut agreeing with the m ajor ity with respect to the power of Maryland courts to issue writs of mandamus, explicitly pointed to the source of the Maryland judiciary s mandam us pow er when he asserted that the Prov incial Cou rt possessed this power b ecause its jurisd iction was c o-extensiv e with the dominions of the lord proprietary and because th e Provinc ial Court w as to Maryland what [the] King s Bench was to England at common law. 312 Md. at 290, 539 A.2d at 668 (citing Kenda ll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 63032, 9 L.Ed . at 1223-24 (Taney, C.J., dissenting)). As Chief Justice Taney explained, the mandamus power was vested in the General Court when Maryland declared its independence from En gland: When the revolution of 1776 took place, the same system of jurisprudence was adopted; and the fifty-sixth article of the constitution of Maryland provided, that three persons of integrity and sound judgment in the law, be appointed judges of the court now called the provincial court, and that the same court be hereafter called and known by the name of the general court. No further description of the jurisdiction and powers of 6 The G eneral C ourt w as abol ished b y constitut ional am endm ent in 18 05. -15- the general court is given. It, therefore, in the new order of things, was clothed with the same powers and jurisdiction that had belonged to the provincial court before th e revolution. In other word s, the general court was, in the state of Maryland precisely what the court of king s bench was in England. Kenda ll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 630-32, 9 L.Ed. at 1223-24. Taney s view reflected the view of the General Court of Maryland in Runk el v. Win emiller , where that Court concluded that the source of Maryland courts power to issue a writ of mandamus derived from the Court of King s Bench. 312 Md. at 290, 539 A.2d at 668 (citing Runkel, 4 H. & McH. at 449 (noting that the General Court had the same po wer that the Court of King s B ench has with respect to issuing a writ of mandamus and stating [t]he position that this Court is invested with similar pow ers, is generally admitted, and the decision s have inv ariably confo rmed to it; and whenc e the inferen ce is plainly deducible, that this court may, and of right ought, for the sake of justice, to interpose in a sum mary way to supply a remedy where, for the want of a specific one, there wo uld otherwise be a fa ilure of justice )). 7 7 Tod ay, Section 3-8B-01 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides Maryland courts with the power to issue writs of mandamus. See Maryland Code, § 3-8B-01 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 2002 Repl. Vol.)( A court of law has jurisdiction in an action for mand amus. ); see also Code , §10-222.1(e) o f the State Government Article (1984, 1999 Repl. Vo l., 2003 Sup p.) ( A pa rty in an action fo r civil enforcement of an administrative order may request, and a court may grant, one or more of the follo wing f orms o f relief: . . . a writ of mand amus . . . . ). In Ipes v. Boa rd of Fi re Com 'rs, 224 Md. 18 0, 184-85, 167 A .2d 337, 339-40 (1 961), we explored the statutory history of the writ of mandamus. In Chapter 78 of the Acts of 1828, the Maryland Legislature addressed some of the technical problems generated by common-law mand amus p ractice. Id. at 185, 167 A.2d at 340. Some problems continued, however, and the Legislature subsequently passed Chapter 285 of the Acts of 1858, which became Article 6 0 of the Marylan d Cod e. Id. In Chapter 142 of the Acts of 1978, the current -16- We emphasize that the power to issue writs of mandamus originally derived from the Court of King s Bench in order to stress the fact that the writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy because it retained, in large part, its executive character as it is a mechanism by which the court enforces the law. See In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 28 7-288, 53 9 A.2d a t 667. Nev ertheless, the c ourt exercise s the pow er with caution, treading ca refully so as to av oid interferin g with legislative prerogative and administrative discretio n. Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 292, 518 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1987)(quoting Ham mond v. Love , 187 M d. 138, 1 44, 49 A .2d 75, 7 7 (194 6)). Ord inarily, a writ of mandamus should issue only in those cases where another adequate remedy doe s not exist an d where clear and undisputa ble rights are at stake. Walter, 179 M d. at 668, 22 A.2d at 474. With respect to adequ ate remed ies, [i]t is well settled in this State that a writ of mandamus will not be granted where the petitioner has a specific and adequate legal remedy to meet the justice of the particular case and where the law affords [another] adequate remedy. Philip M orris Inc., 358 Md. at 712, 752 A.2d at 212; Hummelshime v. Hirsch, 114 Md. 39, 46-47, 79 A. 3 8, 42 (1 910). A writ of mandamus, therefore, will not lie if there be another legal remedy, but that remedy must be specific and adequate to the object in view, framed to effect directly the desired end . . . [and it] must afford complete satisfaction, equivalen t to a specific relief. " Harwo od v. Ma rshall, 9 Md. 83, 98 ( 1856) . section author izing m andam us, Sec tion 3-8 B-01, w as enac ted. -17- Moreover, a writ of mandamus will not lie if the petitione r s right is unclear or issues only at the discretion of a decision maker. [I]f the right be dou btful, or the d uty discretio nary, or of a nature to require the exercise of judgm ent, or if there be any ordinary adequate legal remedy to which the party applying could have recourse, [the] writ will not be granted. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 673, 774 A.2d at 1172 (quoting George s Creek Coal & Iron Co., 59 Md. at 259). [A] legal right and a corresponding duty must therefore exist before a court may gran t a writ o f man damu s. Buchho ltz v. Hill, 178 Md. 280, 288, 13 A.2d 348, 352 (1940); see also Freeman v. Local 1082, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Council 67, 318 Md. 684, 692, 569 A.2d 1244, 1248 (1990). Further, where the exercise of discretion is permitted, m andamu s ordinarily will not lie. Freeman, 318 Md. at 692, 569 A.2d at 1248; see also Goodwich v. Nolan, 343 Md. 130, 145, 680 A.2d 10 40, 1047 (1996); Board of Educ. v. Secretary of Personnel, 317 Md. 34, 46, 562 A.2d 70 0, 706 (19 89); Maryland Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133, 138, 367 A.2 d 491, 49 4 (1977); Tyler v. Baltimo re Coun ty, 251 Md. 420, 425, 247 A.2d 704, 707 (1968); Green v. Purn ell, 12 Md. 329, 336 (1858)(stating that a writ of mandamus cannot issue in a case where discretion and judgment are to be exercised by the officer; and it can be gra nted only wh ere the act req uired to be done is merely ministerial, and the relator withou t any othe r adequ ate rem edy"). B. Wilson s Request for a W rit of Mandamus In this case, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals correctly aff irmed the trial court s ruling -18- granting the State s motion to dism iss. As we have stated, normally in order for a mandamus action to lie, a clear and undisputable legal right and corresponding duty must be present. Buchholtz, 178 Md. at 28 8, 13 A.2d at 352 . In Wilson s case, ALJ Avery s Order clearly and indisputably conferred upon her the legal right to have her employment reinstated, as he reversed the Department s determination that Wilson had resigned without notice and expunged the November 2 letter informing her as such. It is much less clear, how ever, as to whether the Orde r conferred upon W ilson the lega l right to receive back pay, accrued leave, and retir emen t benef its for the period she w as wro ngfully te rminate d. 1. Clear and Undisputable Right Required for Mandamus Wilson urges that ALJ Avery s Order reinstating her to her position ne cessarily includes by implication back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits. Because ALJ Avery s Order do es not refer to such, Wilson s argument is only tenable if there is legal authority clearly providing that reinstatement necessarily includes back pay, accrued leave, and/or retireme nt bene fits. Our review of the State s employee grievance process su ggests otherw ise. As we explained in Robin son v. B unch, 367 Md. 4 32, 788 A.2d 636 (2002), the General Assembly established a statutory administrative and judicial review remedy for state employees who claim that they have not been compensated in acc ordance w ith applicable legal requirements. Id. at 445, 788 A.2d at 644. Maryland Code, Sections 12-101 through 1 2-405 of the State Pe rsonnel and Pensions Article provide a detailed -19- administrative grievance procedure for state employees working in the executiv e branch. Id. Section 12-103 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article establishes the exclus ivity of the employee grievance proceeding remedy, providing that [u]nless another proc edure is provided for by this article, the grievance procedure is the exclusive remedy through which a non-tem pora ry employee in the State Personnel Management System may seek an administrative remedy for violations of the provisions of the article. Id. at 445, 788 A.2d at 645. In a grievance proceeding, an admin istrative law ju dge or fina l decision m aker is authorized by Section 12-303 of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (199 3, 1997 R epl. Vol.) to grant any appropriate reme dy available under Section 1 2-402(a), which provides: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the remedies available to a grievant under this title are limited to the restoration of the rights, pay, status, or benefits that the grievant otherwise would have had if the contested policy, procedure, or regulation had been applied appropriately as determined by the final de cision m aker. Section 12-402(a) defines the remedies that may be provided to aggrieved state employees; it does not guarantee them. Rather, under Section 12-402(b), the ALJ, depending upon the circumstances, may order an app ointing authority to grant b ack pa y. 8 In order for a 8 Section 12-402(b) of the State Pers onnel a nd Pen sions A rticle (19 93, 199 7 Rep l. Vol.) provides: (1) A decision maker at Step Two or Step Three of the grievance procedure may order an appointing auth ority to gran t bac k pay. (2)(i) In a reclassification grievance back pay may be awarded for a period not exceeding 1 year before the grievance procedure -20- grievant such as Wilson to b e entitled to these remedies, the A LJ or decision maker must clearly and indisputably determine them because, although the statute allows those remedies to be provided, it does not explicitly c omm and it. See Robin son, 367 Md. at 445, 788 A.2d at 64 4-45 ( [B ]ack pay is exp ressly stated to be o ne of the remedies which a decision maker can aw ard under the g rievance p rocedure. ); Comptroller v. Nelson, 345 Md. 706, 716, 694 A.2d 468, 473 (1997)(concluding that the grievance procedure includes addressing pay disputes); Briscoe v. Health Depa rtmen t, 323 Md. 439, 454, 593 A.2d 1109, 1116 (1991 ). See als o Willia ms v. F itzhugh , 147 Md. 384, 388, 128 A. 137, 138 (1925)(noting, in a case where a schoolteacher sought pay for a period during which he was dismissed due to no fault of his own, that an action for a writ of mandamus might lie [i]f it could be show n that the re is in the custod y of state o fficials, n ot ame nable to suit at law , a salary fund to which the appellant is entitled, and the payment of which is a clear lega l duty, not involving th e exercise o f discretion ); Frosburg v. State Dept. of Personnel, 37 Md. App. 18, 33, 375 A.2d 5 82, 591 , cert. denied , 281 Md. 737 (1977) (holding that mandamus did not lie because the appellants have shown neither a clear legal duty on the part of the Department of Personnel to pay back pay under the circumstances of this case, nor have they was initiated. (ii) A back pay order under this paragraph is in the discretion of the Secretary and the Office of Administrative Hearings. (3) Subject to th e limitations in Title 14, Su btitle 2 of this article, an appointing authority shall carry out a back pay order issued under this subsection. -21- indicated to the trial court a specific sum or fund from which they are entitled to be paid ). Because the statute does not require Wilson to be granted back pay, accrued leave, or retirement benefits, Wilson s mandamus action does not lie to compel performance of a statutory duty. Eck v. State Tax Commission, 204 Md. 245, 255, 103 A.2d 850, 855 (1954); see also Cahill v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 173 Md. 450, 455, 196 A. 305, 307-08 (1938)(ex plaining the limitation of purpose on the writ is a means by which we exercise discipline when w e use our p ower to issu e the writ, do ing so only w hen there is an ascertainably clear legal right and duty ). Wilson also attempts to show that she had a clear right to back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits because ALJ Avery s intent to grant her such is evidenced by his August 17, 2000, letter to the Department that expressed his concern that the Department had not impleme nted his O rder in a timely fashion or made Wilson whole as if the termination had never happene d. This letter, as the State correctly points out, is not an exercise of ALJ Avery s authority under COM AR 28.02.01 .28 to reconsider or correct his O rder. 9 Moreover, 9 COMAR 28.02.01.28 provides that an ALJ s decision may be revised in some circumstances on motion by any party at any time in the case of fraud, mistake, or irregularity. See note 4, supra. Although Wilson s counsel wrote the ALJ a letter about his concerns regarding how the Department was implementing ALJ Avery s Order, he did not file a motion for reconsideration pursuant to 28.02.01.28. As the Court of Special A ppeals po inted out, Wilson s attorney did req uest that AL J Avery enf orce or am end his O rder pursua nt to COMAR 28.02.01.0 8, which c overs the p owers an d duties of judges, and COMAR 28.02.01.22, which relates to an ALJ s decisions or proposed decisions. In addition, although the rule allows clerical mistakes to be corrected at any time on the initiative of the judge or on the m otion of any party, ALJ Avery s Order could not be -22- in the very letter W ilson relies on , it is evident that ALJ Avery concedes that his Order may have been less than clear and that the time period for judicial review or correcting his Order had passed. As the State points out, ALJ Avery s May 15, 2000 Order was a final Order. See Code, § 12-205(c)(2)(ii) of the State Personnel and Pensions Article (stating that the decision of the Of fice of A dministrative Hearing s is the final ad ministrative decision ). Cons equen tly, the AL J s later le tter expl aining h is earlier O rder is to no eff ect. Fina lly, we obse rve that, in her a rgumen t, Wilson incorrectly conflates w hat are really two different types of mandamus actions: one for the judicial enforcement of nondiscretionary acts, the other for the judicial review of adjud icatory administrative decisions. Requiring a public of ficial to perfo rm a non -discretionary du ty or function to enforce the law is the original common-law function of ma ndam us. City of Seat Pleasant, 364 Md. at 673, 774 A.2d at 1 172. Ma ndamus may a lso issue , however, for the purpose of judicial remedied as Wilson sought based on an argument that ALJ Avery made a clerical mistake because ALJ Avery s purported error was one of judicial character. As we explained in In re Timothy C., 376 Md. 414 , 430 n.10, 829 A .2d 1024, 1033 n .10 (2003): the test to be applied in determining whether an error in a judgment is of a judicial character, or a mere clerical mistake which may be corre cted in the co urt where it was made at any time, saving intervening rights of third parties and with due regard to equitable considerations, is whethe r the error relate s to something that the trial cou rt erroneou sly omitted to pass upon or considered and p assed upon erron eously, or a mere omission to preserv e of rec ord, correctly in all respects, the actual decision of the court, which in itself was free from error. Under this test, any effort on Wilson s part to support a motion to reconsider based on the argument that ALJ Avery committed a clerical error when he omitted to include as part of her remedy an award of back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits would have failed. -23- review of administrative decisions where there is both a lack of an available procedure for obtaining review and an allegation that the action complained of is illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Goodwich, 343 Md. at 146, 680 A.2d at 1048. As we explained in Heft v. Maryland Racing Com m n, 323 Md. 257, 273, 592 A.2d 1110, 1118 (1991), mandamus actions often served as a means to obtain judicial review of administrative actions prior to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the APA was enacted, most mandamus actions in this regard became u nnece ssary. Id. When Wilson argues that her mandamus action lies to enforce AL J Avery s Order beca use the Departm ent s actions were arbitrary an d capric ious, sh e merg es two differe nt lines o f analysis . 2. Wilson s Mandamus Action was Not Moot or Nugatory Although we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that Wilson received what the ALJ ordered, her mandamus action was not nugatory or moot as the appellate court suggested because she sought to use the writ to seek remedies other than that which w as granted to her. While the Court of Special Appeals was correct in pointing out that a mand amus w rit will not lie where the petitioner seeks to enforce a duty that already has been performed, Mahoney, 205 Md. at 344, 108 A.2d at 147, it incorrectly applied this principle to Wilson s action. Wilson s mandamus action was not for the purpose of reinstatement; rather, she sought to use the writ to receive back pay, accrued leave, and retirement benefits. Because these were not remedie s that had alre ady been giv en to her, the Court of Special A ppeals incorrectly conclude d that her m andamu s action did not lie because the Department already -24- had performed its duty to Wilson by reinstating her. As we described supra, Wilson s mand amus a ction fa iled bec ause sh e had n o clear r ight to th e reme dies she sough t. III. Conclusion A mandamus action fails when the right pursued is doubtful. Wilson s mandamus action thus did n ot lie in this case be caus e she had no clear o r indispu table right to back p ay, accrued leave, or retirement benefits. Wilson did have a clear and undisputable right pursuant to ALJ Avery s Order to be reinstated, with which the Department complied when it reinstated Wilson. The Court of Special Ap peals correctly affirmed the trial court s conclu sion tha t Wilson s man damu s action was im proper . JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PETITIONER. -25- IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 72 September Term, 2003 __________________________________ GAIL WILSON v. STU ART O. SIM MS, et al. __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. Concurring Opinion by Raker, J. Filed: March 11, 2004 I join in the jud gme nt on ly.

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