Stearman v. State Farm

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Stearman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company No. 67, September Term 2003 HOUSEHOLD EXCLUSIONS IN MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILIT Y INSU RANC E POLIC IES; In a motor vehicle insurance contract in which the liability limits are greater than the mandatory minimum limits required by statute, it is not a violation of public p olicy for that same insurance contract to also includ e a house hold exclu sion that limits liability coverage for injury to the insured or any member of the insured s family above the statutorily required mandatory minimums. HOUSEHOLD EXCL USION S IN LIABILITY POLICIES ISSUED AFTER JANU ARY 1, 2005; for all private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance policies and binders issued, delivered, or renewed in the State on or after January 1, 2005, insurers must offer liability coverage for claims made by fam ily me mbe rs in t he sa me a mou nt as the li abili ty cov erag e for claim s made by a nonfamily memb er. INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY AND HOUSEHOLD EX CLUSIONS; The abrogation of the common law interspousal immunity doctrine has no effect on the statutorily declared public policy regarding household exclusions and mandatory minimum insurance coverage. Permitting insurers and insureds to contract for reduced insurance coverage for injured family members does not interfere with an injured spouse s right to sue and obtain a judgment against the negligent spouse. SEPARATION OF PO WER S; Even if the statutorily declared p ublic policy regardin g househ old exclusions and mandatory minimum insurance coverage adversely affected the abrogation of the common law interspousal immunity doctrine, the Court has no power to change a public policy that has been declared by statute, unless such a statute is unconstitutional. The doctrine of separation of powers demands that the Court remain in its sphere that of interpreting, but not creating, statutory la w. In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ounty Case No. 03-C-02-013946 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 67 September Term, 2003 ______________________________________ JAY H. STEARMAN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AU TOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY ____________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Greene, J. Bell, C.J. and Battaglia, J., disse nt. ______________________________________ Filed: May 14, 2004 -1- Jay Stearman and Carla Stearman are married. On June 5, 2002, Mrs. Stearman suffered serious injuries as a result of an accident that occurred while she was a passenger in a vehicle dr iven by M r. Stearman . Mrs. Stear man sue d State Farm Mutua l Autom obile Insurance Com pany and Mr. St earma n in the C ircuit Co urt for B altimore Coun ty. Mrs. Stearman alleged that her husband s negligen ce caused her injuries. She and Mr. Stearman both sought a declaration that the household exclusion in State Farm s auto liability insurance policy was in valid. T he trial court heard argument on the motions on July 28, 2003, and granted State Farm s motion for summary judgment, declaring that the household exclusion was valid. The Stearmans noted their appeal and cross-appeal on August 7, 2003. Thereafter, Mr. Stearman filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted before the Court of Spe cial Appeals heard the case . Stearm an v. Sta te Farm , 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 20 4 (2003). The issue before the Court is the validity of a household exclusion that reduces the limit of liability in an auto insurance policy to the statutory minimum amount, if that policy otherwise provides liability coverage in excess of the statutory minimum liability limits. We hold th at the ex clusion is valid. FACTS As a result of the June 5, 2002, coll ision, Mrs. Stearman suffered serious injuries, including a broken rib, a broken collar bone, and a collapsed lung. The only vehicle involved in the collision was the vehicle driven by Mr. Stearman. Mrs. Stearman alleges that her husba nd s ne gligenc e cause d the co llision an d her in juries. At the time of the collision, appellant and his wife were both insured by State Farm under an au tomobile policy that obligates State Farm to pay damages which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because o f bo dily injury to others . . . caused by accident resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of an insured vehicle. The declarations page o f the po licy provid es for $ 100,00 0 per pe rson of bodily inju ry liability cov erage. The policy also includes the following language under the Liability Coverage section of th e policy: Who is an Insured When we refer to your car, a newly acquired car or a temporary substitute car, insured means: 1. you; 2. your spouse; 3. the relatives of the first person named in the declarations; 4. any other person while using such a car if its use is within the sc ope of co nsent of you or your spouse; and 5. any other person or organization liable for the use of such a car by one of the above insureds. (Emp hasis in o riginal.) 1 The policy also included the following restriction on coverage: When Coverage Does Not Apply. 1 In the p olicy, defi ned w ords are printed in bold face ita lics. -3- In addition to the limitations of coverage in Who is an Insured and Trailer Coverage: THERE IS NO COVERAGE: * * * 2. FOR ANY BODILY INJURY TO: * c. * * ANY INSURED OR ANY MEMBER OF AN INSUR ED S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSUR ED S HOUSEHOLD TO THE EXTENT THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THIS POLICY EXCEED T H E L I M I T S O F L I A B I L IT Y REQ UIRE D BY LAW . (Emphasis in original.) DISCUSSION The Stearmans argue that State Farm s attempt to reduce liability coverage from the stated policy amount of $100,000 per person to the statutory limit of $2 0,000 per p erson is unsuccessful because s uch a restrictio n is invalid an d void as a gainst pub lic policy. State Farm, howev er, asserts that this Court s decision in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 Md. 631, 516 A.2d 586 (1986 ), invalidated household exclusions that attempted to exclude coverage below the statutory minimums, but also validated household exclusions that provided coverage above the statutory minimum. We agree with State Farm s position. Prior to State Farm v. Nationwide, howev er, this Court decided Jennings v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166 (1985). In -4- Jennings, we held that a household exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy was invalid because the clause was contrary to the public policy as embodied in the compulsory autom obile ins urance require ments. Id. at 357, 488 A.2d at 16 8. The ho usehold exclusion in the policy in that case excluded all liability coverage for injury to the insured and members of his household. Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. The insured, Jennings, was a passenger in an automobile owned by him and operated by his stepson at the time of Jennin gs s inju ries. Id. at 353-54, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings s ued his step son and o btained a d efault judg ment in the amount of $100,000. Id. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings then brought a declaratory judgment action against GEICO, seeking to establish that GE ICO must pay the judgment that Jennings obtained against his stepson . Jennings, 302 Md. at 354, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings contended that the household exclusion was void beca use it w as cont rary to statu te. Id. Both sides filed motions for summary judgment and the circuit court granted GE ICO s motion . Id. at 35455, 488 A.2d at 167. Jennings appealed, and, prior to the argument in the Court of Special Appeals, this Court granted certiorari. Id. at 355, 488 A.2d at 167. We noted, genera lly, that any clause in an insurance p olicy that is contrary to the public policy of this State, as set forth in any statute, is invalid and un enforc eable. Id. at 356, 488 A.2d at 168. We concluded, specifically, that the hou sehold ex clusion clau se in Jennings violated the public policy embodied in the 1972 G eneral As sembly s action to require compulsory automobile insurance for all Ma ryland autom obiles, with s pecific -5- mandatory minimum coverage amounts. 2 Jennin gs, 302 Md. at 357, 488 A.2d at 168. The General Assembly expressly authorized certain exclusions from mandatory coverage in the statutory provisio ns enac ted in 19 72. Id. at 358, 488 A.2d at 169. The household exclusion was not amon g those ex pressed by the Legislature , and, conse quently, we sta ted that we will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legisla ture. Id. at 358-59, 488 A.2d at 169. Such an exclusion would be contrary to the remedial legislative purpose of assuring compensation for damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents . . . . Id. at 359, 488 A.2d at 169 (quoting Pennsylvania Nat l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 15 1, 156 (1980) (invalidating an insurance policy provision that exclud ed an in sured f rom PI P cove rage)). We emphasized that [w]hile many exclusions in automob ile insurance policies do not conflict with legislative policy and are therefore valid, the so-called household exclusion from compulsory automobile liability insurance does not fall into such a category. Jennings, 302 Md. a t 362, 48 8 A.2d at 171 ( emph asis add ed). Jennings invalidated a provision of a policy that exclud ed an insu red from all liability coverage. It did not address the question 2 As noted by Judge Eldridge in Jennin gs, By Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972, as supplemented by later statutes such as Ch. 562 of the Acts of 1975, primarily codified in §§ 17-101 through 17-110 of the Transportation Article, and §§ 234B, 240AA through 242, 243 through 243L, 539 through 547 of the Insurance Code (Art. 4 8A), the G eneral As sembly mandated that all M aryland a utomo biles . . . be covere d by automo bile insuran ce polic ies con taining c ertain type s of req uired co verage s. -6- of whether such a ho usehold e xclusion w ould be valid above mandatory minimum coverage requirements. Tha t que stion was reso lved by this Court in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 307 M d. 631, 5 16 A.2 d 586 ( 1986) . In State Farm, we addressed wh ether a household exclusion was wholly invalid, or whether its invalidity extends only to the amount of the minimum liability coverage required by the compulsory insurance law. Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 586-87. We concluded that such an exc lusion w as inva lid to the extent o f the sta tutory limits . Id. at 633, 5 16 A.2 d at 587 . In State Farm, State Farm Mutua l Autom obile Insura nce Com pany insured Carroll, who su ffered inju ries as a result o f an accide nt that took p lace whe n he wa s a passeng er in his own insured vehicle . Id. A friend of Carroll s, named Glass, drove the vehicle off the road and it overturned, killing Glass and another passen ger, and injuring Carrol l. Id. Carroll sued Glass s estate. State F arm, 307 M d. at 634 , 516 A .2d at 58 7. Glass had been insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and her policy insured her against liability for any accident involving her use of a motor vehicle belonging to someone who, like C arroll, was not a m embe r of her house hold. Id. at 633-34, 516 A.2d at 587. Carroll s policy included liability coverage of $100,0 00 per p erson a nd $30 0,000 p er accid ent. Id. at 633, 516 A.2d at 587. Carroll s policy also excluded coverage for injury to any insured or any member of an insured s family residing in the insured s household. Id. Nationwide sought a declaration that the household exclusion in State Farm s policy was void as agains t public p olicy. Id. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. State Farm argued that the -7- exclusion was v alid. State F arm, 307 Md. at 634, 516 A.2d at 587. As noted in State Farm, while that case was pending in the circuit court, this Court decided Jennings, in which we decided that a household exclusion that eliminated all liability coverage was inva lid. Id. Con sequ ently, State Farm and Na tionwide a greed that Jennings eliminated State Farm s argument that the exclusion in this case was valid below the statutory minimum personal injury coverage of $20,00 0 per perso n and $4 0,000 per in cident, required by section 17103(b)(1) of the T ranspo rtation A rticle. Id. Nonetheless, State Farm maintained that the exclusion should be considered valid above the statu tory minim um req uireme nts. Id. at 635, 516 A.2d at 587. To answer the question raised in State Farm, this Court discussed Jennings and its review of the history of the tr eatmen t of hou sehold exclus ions. Id. at 635, 516 A.2d at 588. We also noted that, before 1972 , Maryland upheld the validity of exclusions that were not precluded by statute. State F arm, 307 Md. at 635, 516 A.2d at 588. Beginning in 1972, the General Assemb ly changed th e public po licy of the State by mandating com pulsory automobile insurance with minimum coverage amounts. 3 Id. We noted that Jennings spoke in broad terms about the invalidity of th e househ old exclusion in that case because of its violation of the statutory compulsory liability insurance 3 Section 19 -504 of th e Insuranc e Article states that each m otor vehicle liability insurance policy issued, sold, or delivered in the State shall provide the minimum liability coverage specified in Title 17 of th e Tran sportatio n Article. (Em phasis a dded.) Section 17103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article requires minimum liability coverage fo r bodily injury or death of $20 ,000 pe r person and $4 0,000 p er accid ent. -8- policy. Id. at 636, 516 A.2d at 588. We concluded, however, that while Jennings did not deal specifically with the question before the Court in State Farm, the reasoning in Jennings supported State Farm s argument that excluding household liability coverage above the minimums required by statute does not violate public p olicy. Id. at 636-37, 516 A.2d at 58889. Put simply, what the legislature has prohibited is liability coverage of less than the minimum amounts required by § 17-103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article. . . . The hou sehold exclusion violates pub lic policy only to the extent that it operates to prevent this mandatory minimum coverage. Id. at 637, 5 16 A.2 d at 589 . The purpose of the Maryland compulsory insurance statutes is to [assure] recovery for innocent victims of m otor vehicle accidents. State Farm, 307 Md. 631 at 639, 516 A.2d at 590 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co . v. Mar yland A uto. Ins. F und., 277 Md. 602, 604, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976)). Nonetheless, we stated in State Farm that we do not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory minimum coverage, so far as the househo ld exclusion is concerned. Id. at 640, 516 A.2d at 590.4 Succinctly stated, the public policy in question in State Farm and in the case at bar is that all automob ile liability policies shall c ontain bod ily injury or death liability coverage in at least the amount of $20,000 /$40,000. T o permit the hous ehold exclusion to operate within those limits would be to deprive injured persons of the protection which the Legislature intended to provide, Keystone Mut. 4 Without repeating all the citations recorded in State Farm, we also note that [t]he majority of jurisdictions that squarely address the issue before us has reached a result consistent with ours in this case. State F arm, 307 M d. at 641 , 516 A .2d at 59 1. -9- Cas. Co. v. Hinds, 180 M d. 676, 682 , 26 A.2d 7 61, 763 (1 942), and w ould violate p ublic policy. * * * We hold, therefore, that the insured segment of a household exclusion clause in an autom obile liability insurance p olicy is invalid to the extent of the minimum statutory liability coverage . So far as the public policy evidenced by the compulsory insurance law is concerned, it is a valid and enforcea ble contractual provision as to coverage above that minimum. Id. at 643, 644, 516 A.2d at 592.5 Despite the clear holding in State Farm, the Stearm ans conten d that the ho lding is limited to the facts of that case and is not a general validation of exclusions above statutory minimum require d limits. 6 While we would agree th at State Farm is not a general validation of any exclusion above a statutory minimum, we think it quite clear that the case 5 Similarly, we have very recently noted, in Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company, ___ Md. ___ , ___ A.2d ___ (2004), that under M aryland s compulsory automob ile insurance statute, contractual exclusions in automobile insurance policies that excuse or reduce benefits below the minimum statutorily required levels or types of coverage, and are not expressly authorized by the Gen eral A ssem bly, are invalid. Salamon, ___Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (2004) [slip op. at 1]. We also stated that the requirement that ev ery driver maintain at le ast these min imum lev els of motor vehicle insurance remains an integral part of Maryland statutory law and pu blic poli cy. Any portion of a motor vehicle insurance policy that is inconsistent with this statutory scheme is void and unenforceable. Salamon, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___ (2004) [slip op. at 10] (citing Lewis v. Allstat e Ins. C o., 368 Md. 44, 47, 792 A.2d 27 2, 274 (20 02)). Finally, we declared th at we sh all not upho ld any exclusion, not a utho rized by the Gen eral A ssem bly, that excuses or reduces benefits below the statutory m inimum s. Salamon, ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___(2004) [slip op . at 14]. Salamon invalidated the so-called pizza exclusion, which p urports to de ny coverage if an insured driver was delivering property for compensation at the time of the acciden t. Salamon, ___ M d. at ___ , ___ A .2d at __ _(200 4) [slip o p. at 1]. 6 Alternatively, the Stearmans argue that we should overrule State Farm. -10- does validate househo ld exclus ions ab ove tho se minim ums. In support of their arguments, the Stearmans cite West American Insurance Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 723 A.2d 1 (1998). In that case, we invalidated insurance policy provisions that excluded vehicles owned or operated by a self-insurer or by any governmental unit or agency from th e defin ition of u ninsure d/unde rinsured vehicle s. Id. at 474, 723 A.2d at 10. In support of that holding, we stated that this Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature generally will not be recognized. Id. at 475, 7 23 A.2 d at 10. Relying on State Farm v. Natio nwide , West A merican a rgued, in the alternative, that in the event that the exclusions are invalidated, they are void only to the extent of the $20,000/$40,000 statutorily required minim um liab ility insuran ce limits. West American Insurance Co., 352 Md. at 476, 723 A.2d at 11. We rejected that argument and distinguished State Farm from West American Insurance: In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide, supra, this Court held that a househo ld exclusion to liability coverage in an automobile insurance policy was inva lid only to the extent of the $20,000/$40,000 statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage. The holding of the State Farm Mut. case, however, has not been applied by this C ourt to any other auto mobile insurance policy exclusions or provisions. More over, we have specifically declined to apply the State Farm Mut. holding in a context oth er than the h ousehold exclusion to liability coverage. See Van Horn v. Atlan tic Mu tual, sup ra, 334 Md. at 694-696, 641 A.2d at 207-208. Id. at 477, 723 A.2d 1 1-12. We also dismisse d West A merican s s uggestion that any exclusion above statutory minimum limits would be acceptable: -11- Adoption of the broad pro position adv anced by W est Ame rican wo uld permit insurers to load up moto r vehicle insu rance polic ies with a m ultitude of inv alid exclusions, thereby limiting coverage in numerous situations to the statuto ry minimums instead of the stated coverage limits set forth on the insured s declara tion pag e. * * * Persons who paid much more in premiums for coverage in excess of minimums could, in many circumstances, receive no more than those w ho only paid for minimum coverages. Consequently, we decline to extend the holding of State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide, supra, beyond the household exclusion clause w hich w as invo lved in th at case. West A merica n Insur ance C o., 352 M d. at 477 , 723 A .2d at 12 . In West American Insurance, we refused to extend the holding of State Farm to a case involving uninsured motorist exclusions.7 It is equally clear that the holding of State Farm is applicable to other household exclusion cases, like the one curren tly before the Co urt. The Stearmans s argumen t to the contrary is simply not persuasive. As summarized in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 334 Md. 66 9, 694-95, 641 A .2d 195, 207 (199 4): In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., supra, this Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., supra, 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166, that a h ousehold exclusion clause in an automob ile liability 7 We noted that West American Insurance was a particularly inappropriate case in which to apply the holding of State Farm because the statutorily required minimum uninsured/underinsured coverage which an insurer must offer is not $20,000/$40,000. Instead, an insurer m ust offer an amount o f uninsure d/underins ured cov erage equ al to the liability coverage provided for in the policy. West A merica n Insur ance C o., 352 Md. at 477-78, 723 A.2d at 12. In effect, then, if a person has only the minimum liability coverage of $20,000/$40,000, his or her uninsured/underinsured coverage would have to be that same amount. If that person had liability coverage in a greater amount, however, the insurance comp any wo uld hav e to off er unin sured/u nderin sured c overag e in the s ame am ount. -12- insurance policy was co ntrary to the pub lic policy embo died in M aryland s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. We went on in State Farm, however, to hold that the household exclusion clause was invalid only to the extent of the statutoril y prescrib ed min imum liability cov erage o f $20,0 00/$40 ,000. W e pointed out that it could readily be inferred that the premium took account of the exclusion contained in the policy (307 Md. at 638, 516 A.2d at 589), that the majority of compulsory insurance jurisdictions had invalid ated hous ehold exclusion clauses only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum liability coverage (307 Md. at 641-43, 516 A.2d at 591-592), and that [a]s a general rule, parties are free to contract as they wish (301 Md. at 643, 516 A.2d at 592). The Stearmans also argue that Section 19-502(b) of the Insurance Article evidences a legislative intention that automobile insuran ce policies tha t provide liab ility coverage in excess of the statutory minimums must not exclude that level of coverage in any situation. We do not see how the language cited declares such an intention. The statute provides: On amount of liability coverage provided by insurer. Neither th is subtitle nor Title 17 of the T ransportation Article prev ents an insurer from issuing, selling, or delivering motor vehicle liability insuran ce policies tha t provide liab ility coverage in excess of the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law. Md. Code (1997, 2002 Repl. Vol.) § 19-502(b) of the Insurance Article. The plain language of the quoted section evidences an intention to permit insurance companies to offer policies that contain gre ater covera ge than tha t required by statute.8 It certainly does n ot require 8 As noted by this Court in Oaks v. Conners, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995): The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the le gislature . Fish M arket v. G .A.A., 337 Md. 1, 8, 650 A.2d 705 (1994). See also Jones v. State, 336 Md. 25 5, 260, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994); Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 55 4, 559, 644 A.2d 537 (1994); Rose v. F ox Pool, 335 Md. 3 51, 358, 643 A.2d 906 (1994). The first step in determining (contin ued...) -13- insurance com panies to prov ide c overage grea ter th an th at ma ndated b y statute. Nor does it display a legislative intention to ch ange the p ublic policy em bodied in th e statutorily mandated minimum liability coverage requirements. The Stearmans have cited no Maryland case that supports such a position. They argue, however, that the remedial nature of Maryland s comprehensive motor vehicle insurance scheme (that of assuring compensation for damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents, as noted in Jennings, 302 Md. at 359, 488 A.2d at 169) must be given a liberal construction to effectuate its purpose. Even employing a liberal construction of Section 19-502(b), we cannot construe it to mean what the Stearmans suggest. To do so would be illogical and unreasonable. See Greco v . State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 422 (1997) (no ting that our g oal is to give statutes their most reasonable interpretation, in accord with logic and common sense, and to avoid a construction not otherwise evident by the words ac tually used ); Frost v. State , 336 Md. 125, 137, 647 A.2d 106, 112 (1994) (stating that we will avoid constructions that are illogical, unreasonable, or inconsiste nt with comm on sen se ). As we noted previously, the purpose of the Maryland compulsory insurance statutes is to [assure] recovery for innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents. State F arm, 307 Md. at 639, 516 A.2d at 590 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins. 8 (...continued) legislative intent is to look at the statutory language and "[i]f the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Jones, supra, 336 Md. at 261, 647 A .2d 120 4. See also Parrison, supra, 335 Md. at 559, 644 A.2d 53 7; Rose, supra, 335 Md. at 359, 643 A.2 d 906; Outmezguine v. State, 335 Md. 20 , 41, 641 A.2d 87 0 (1994). -14- Fund ., 277 Md. 602, 604, 356 A.2d 560, 562 (1976)). Despite the allure of the idea of total compensation for any innocent victim of a motor vehicle accide nt, there is no indication that the General Assembly s purpose in enacting the compulsory insurance statutes was to assu re complete insurance recovery for all victims.9 As we stated in State Farm, we do not view that purpose as extending beyond the prescribed statutory minimum coverage, so far as the househo ld exclusion is conc erned. State F arm, 307 Md . at 64 0, 51 6 A.2d at 590 . Cle arly, if the General Assemb ly had intended something closer to complete insurance recovery for all victim s, they wo uld hav e said so or incre ased th e man datory m inimum liability limits . The Stearmans argue that we should overrule State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide. They have not convinced us, however, that the public policy (regarding mandatory minimum liability insurance and household exclusions) has changed since State Farm was decided. Neither have they shown us why the reasoning in State Farm was flawed and should be overruled. They do argue that Bozman v. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) and Boblitz v. Boblitz , 296 M d. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983), changed the public policy regarding 9 By contrast, in D elaware, the public polic y is different: The public policy of Delaware s Financial Responsibility Laws favors full compensation to all victims of a utomob ile accidents. T he Gen eral Assem bly intended for that pub lic policy to be implemented by affording opportunities for acquiring more than the statutorily mandated minimum amount of automob ile insurance coverage. Nationwide s modified household exclusion is inconsisten t with the statutory purpose of encouraging the Delaware driving public to purchase m ore than the statutory minim um amo unt of auto mobile insurance coverage. Nationwide Gen. In s. Co. v. Seeman, 702 A.2d 915, 918 (Del. 1997) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). The Stearmans would like us to rely on Seeman to determine the outcome of this case. Our previous interpretations of Ma ryland public policy on this issue, however, do not agree with the public policy described in Seeman. Therefore, we are not persua ded to f ollow D elawa re s reso lution o f the issu e. -15- interspousal immunity 10 and that as a result, we should rethink the public policy as outlined by the insuran ce statutes disc ussed in State Farm. The relevant change in the interspousal immunity doctrine occurred in 1983 (three years before State Farm and two years before Jennings), with the issuance of this Court s opinion in Boblitz. In that case, w e partially abrogated the common law doctrine of intersp ousal imm unity as to cases s ounding in neglige nce. Boblitz , 296 M d. at 275 , 462 A .2d at 52 2. If the Court believed that such a change in common law required a declaration that househo ld exclusions in liability automobile insurance policies should be completely invalidated, we could have done so in State Farm or Jennings.11 Our holding in Bozman, which completely invalidated the doctrine of interspousal immunity (by taking away immunity for any kind of intentional tort), adds little to the analysis. The question of whether the abrogation of interspousal immunity for cases sounding 10 As we noted in Bozm an, a comple te statement o f the rationale underlying this doctrine was provided in Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 338, 390 A.2d 77, 78-79 (1978), w ith attribution to Blackstone (1 W . Blackstone, Com mentaries, Book 1 , Ch. 15, p. 442, 443): By marriage, the husband and wife are one perso n in the law: that is, the very being of legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, pro tection, and c over, she p erforms e verything; and is therefore called in our law french a feme-cov ert, foemina viro co-op erta; is said to be a covertbaron, or under the protection an d influence of her h usband, her baron, or lord; and her co ndition upo n marriage is called coverture . . . . If the wife be injured in her person or her pro perty, she can bring no action for redress without her husband s concurrence, and in his name, as well as her own: neither c an she b e sued w ithout m aking th e husb and a d efend ant. 11 It does not appear from the opinions in State Farm or Jennings that anyone argued that the abrogation of interspousal immunity in Boblitz should be consid ered by the C ourt in its analysis of the v alidity of house hold exclu sions in liability insurance policies. Nonetheless, this Court was clearly aware of Boblitz and could have used its reasoning to invalida te hous ehold e xclusio ns, if it tho ught su ch a co urse w ere nec essary or d esirable . -16- in negligence should ch ange our view of h ousehold exclusions has not bee n directly before this Court. The Court of Special Appeals, however, has addressed the issue and decided that Boblitz did not dem and the inv alidation of h ousehold exclusions above the amounts required by statute. Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md. App . 405, 575 A.2d 3 39 (1990), cert. denied, 320 Md. 801, 580 A.2d 219 (1990). In that case, the Walthers made the same argument mad e by the Stearmans in the case at bar. Because Boblitz abolished interspousal immunity in negligence cases, the Walthers aver that the limitation on household claims imposed by the Maryland F inancial Re sponsibility Law violates the public policy derived from Boblitz. The Walthers reason that the abrogation of interspousal immunity not only permits Mrs. Walther to sue her husband for all damages she sustained as a result of his negligence but to assert that because the Maryland Financial R esponsib ility Law prohibits them from recovering damages in excess of $20,00 0 it violates pu blic policy. Overlooked by that simplistic argument is the fact that Mrs. Walther is not precluded from recovering damages from her husband in excess of $20,000 but merely from obtaining more than $20,000 from her husband s insura nce carrier, Allstate. Walther, 83 Md. App. at 407, 575 A.2d at 340-41 . We agre e with the in termediate a ppellate court s r easoni ng on th is questi on. There is no questio n that public policy regarding whether spouses may sue each other has changed. The law is now crystal clear. Spouses can sue each other for anything that strangers could, with no fear that the defendant spouse will be permitted to raise interspousal immunity as a def ense. Bozman, 376 Md. 461, 830 A.2d 450 (2003) (completing the abrogation of the doc trine, including for the first tim e, any type of inten tional tort); Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983) (abrogating the doctrine as to c ases soun ding in negligence); Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 335, 390 A.2d 77 (1978) (abrogating the doctrine where the conduct constituting the tort was outrageous and intentional ). The question presented in the case a t bar, howe ver, is a diffe rent qu estion a ltogethe r. The question is who -17- pays the judgment, the negligent spouse or the negligent spouse s insurance company? Does Maryland s change in public polic y regarding th e common law doctrine of interspousal immunity require the in surance co mpany of th e negligen t spouse to pay for the recovery of the injured spouse, even though the contract between the negligent spouse and the insurance company provides that there will be no recovery above the statutorily required minimums? Such a contract provision is clearly allowable under the man datory minimum requireme nts laid out by the Legislature. We recognize that the public policy represented by the complete abrogation of the interspousal immunity do ctrine could be vie wed as a policy that conf licts with the p ublic policy emb odie d in the m andatory minimum lia bility insurance requirements set by the Legislature. For example, as noted by this Court in Bozman, one of the underpinnings of the interspousal immunity do ctrine was th e notion that it prevented collusive and fraudulent claims. Bozman, 376 Md. at 481, 830 A.2d at 462. We noted in Boblitz, that it seems unjust to deny the claims of the many because of the potentiality for fraud by the few. Boblitz, 296 Md. at 268-69, 462 A.2d at 516, (quoting Hack v. Hack, 433 A.3d 859 (Pa. 1981), in turn quoting Immer v. Risko, 267 A .2d 481 , 488 (N .J. 1970)). Similarly, the protection of the insurer from collusive or cozy claims has traditionally been the reason for househo ld exclus ions fo und in i nsuran ce polic ies. State Farm Mutua l Automo bile Insurance Com pany v . Brisco e, 245 Md. 14 7, 151, 225 A.2d 270, 271 (1967 ).12 12 In addition, the idea that divorce and crimin al courts provided adequate remedies for injuries to spouses provided another underpinning of the doctrine of interspousal imm unity. Bozman, 376 Md. at 48 3, 830 A.2d at 46 3. In rejecting that idea as a good reason to keep the doctrine, we noted in Boblitz that criminal courts can punish and divorce may provide escape fro m abuse , but that cann ot be equ ated with a civil right to redress and compensation for personal injuries. Boblitz, 296 M d. at 267, 462 A2d at 518 (quoting Meren off v. Mere noff, 388 A.2 d 951, 96 2 (1978)) (in ternal citations o mitted). Wh ile it appears clear to us that the mere fact that a person has signed an insurance contract that does (contin ued...) -18- Nonetheless, we think that the General Assembly, not the Court, is th e approp riate body to reconcile those conflicting policies, in light of the fact that the policy directly at issue in this case is a result of statute in the first place. There is no doubt that this Court had the power to abrogate the common law doctrine of interspo usal imm unity. Bozman, 376 Md. at 494, 830 A.2d at 470. Moreover, despite the value of the doctrine of stare decisis and the fact that changes in decisional doctrine ordinarily should be left to the legislature, Bozman, 376 Md. at 492, 830 A.2d at 468 (quoting Boblitz, 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521), we recognized in Bozman that it was eminen tly wise of this Court to abrogate a common law doc trine that had become an outmo ded ve stige of the pas t. Bozman, 376 Md. at 495, 830 A.2d at 470. By stark contrast, the public policy that the Stearmans urge us to change now is not a policy that has been developed by the courts th rough comm on law . Rather, it was an act of the Legislature that created the policy, and ordinarily only an act of the Legislature can change that p olicy. 13 As noted by this Court in State ex rel. Son ner v. Sh earin, 272 Md. 502, 510, 325 A.2d 573, 578 (1974), [w]hen the common law and a statute collide, the statute, if constitutiona l, controls. W e will not invade the province of the General Assembly and rewrite the law for them, no matter how just or fair we may thin k such a n ew law or public policy would be. The formidable doctrine of separation of powers demands that the courts remain in the sphere that belongs uniquely to the judiciary -- that of interpreting, but not creating, the statutory law. Article 8 of the Maryland Constitution declares [t]hat the 12 (...continued) not permit insurance recovery for in jury to one s spo use does n ot necessar ily interfere w ith the injured spouse receiving compensation for injuries, we can see that keeping househo ld exclusions in the face of the abrogation of interspo usal immu nity could app ear inconsis tent. 13 If the legislative act in question were unconstitutional, the judiciary has the power to step in and declare it so. There is no contention in this case, however, that any constitutionally protected rights are at stake. -19- Legislative, Executive and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person ex ercising the f unctions o f one of s aid Departm ents shall assume or discharge the duties of any other. As we stated in Harrison v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 295 Md. 442, 460, 45 6 A.2d 894, 90 3 (198 3), in considering whether a long-established common law rule unchanged by the legislature and thus reflective of this State s public policy is unsound in the circu mstances of mo dern life, we have always recognized that declaration of the public policy of Maryland is normally the function of the Ge neral Asse mbly .... The question in Harrison was wh ether the C ourt should modify the judicially-created doctrine of contrib utory neg ligence . Id. at 444, 456 A.2d at 894. The principle of leaving the creation of public policy to the Legislature is even stronger in a case such as the present one, where the public policy in question is one created by the Legislature in the first instance.14 As discussed in Harrison, [t]he rationale underlying these decisions [to refuse to abrogate a common law doctrine] is buttressed where the legislature has decline d to enact legislation to effectuate the proposed change. Harrison, 295 Md. at 461-62, 456 A.2d at 904. The refusal of the Legislature to act to change a legislatively enacted p ublic policy (as opposed 14 As we stated in Allstate Insurance v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 532-33, 611 A.2d 100, 103 (1992): [I]t is clear from the Jennings and State Farm cases that the invalidity of household exclusion clauses in motor vehicle insurance policies is based entirely upon the specific statutory provisions mandating motor vehicle insurance, requiring particular coverages at specified minimums, authorizing some exce ptions an d exclusions , and generall y not authorizing other exclusions from the required cov erages . Jennings and State Farm do not support, and in fac t reject, the notion that there is a p ublic policy ho stile to househo ld exclusion clauses which extends beyond the scope of the statutorily require d insura nce co verage s. -20- to a common law one) provides even greater support for the Court to exercise restraint and refuse to step in and ma ke the cha nge, unless constitutiona l violations ex ist. Therefore, it is important that we discuss the attempts in the General Assembly in the recent past to make the change the Stearmans urge us to make now. Every year since 2000, legislators have introduced bills in the General Assembly that would require insurance companies to of fer in sure ds lia bility c overage for c laim s made by a fam ily membe r in the same amount as the liability coverage purchased for claim s made by a nonfa mily member. None of these bills were enacted until this year, when the Governor signed Senate Bill 460 into law.15 This further evidences that the Legislature has recognized a need to act in this area and has chosen to do so. As stated in Harrison, while we recognize the force of the plaintiff s argument, in the present state of the law, we leave any change in the established doctrine to the Legislature. Harrison, 295 Md. at 463, 456 A.2d at 905 (quoting White v. King, 224 Md.348 , 355, 223 A.2d 7 63, 767 (1966)). In Allstate Insur ance v. K im, 376 Md. 276, 829 A.2d 611 (2003), we discussed the 2001 Act of the General A ssembly abo lishing the de fense of p arent-child im munity in a motor vehicle tort actio n. Id. at 281, 829 A.2d at 613. In discussing the history of the parentchild imm unity doctrine in Maryland, w e noted tha t, 15 The language of the law requires an insurer to offer to the first named insured under a motor veh icle liability policy liability coverage for c laims mad e by a family me mber in the same amount as the liability coverage for claims made by a nonfamily member under the policy or binder. 2004 Md. Laws, Chap. 127, Section 1. The case at bar is not affected by this new law, which by its own terms, will only apply to motor vehicle lia bility insurance policies or binders issued, delivered, or re newed on or after January 1, 2005. 2004 Md. Laws , Chap . 127, S ection 3 . The new law also requires the Insurance Commissioner to study the impact on motor vehicle liability insurance rates as a result of requiring insurers to offer this coverage. The Commissioner must report the findings to the General Assembly on or before January 10, 2008. 2 004 M d. Law s, Chap . 127, S ection 2 . -21- [w]e rejected several entreaties to add an additional exception for actions arising from motor torts, despite the existence of limited compulsory insurance in Maryland. Frye v. Frye, 305 M d. 542, 505 A.2d 82 6 (1986); Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 M d. 618, 650 A.2d 25 2 [(1994 )]; Renko v. McLean, supra, 346 Md. 46 4, 697 A .2d 468 [( 1997)]; Eagan v. Calhoun, supra, 347 Md. [72] at 81, 698 A.2d [1097] at 1102 [(1997)]. In Frye a nd Wa rren, we expressed the beliefs th at exclusion of motor to rts from the immunity do ctrine wou ld inevitably have some impact on the compulsory insurance program mandated by the Legislature and tha t, if an excep tion of that k ind was to be made , it should be created by the General Assembly after an examination of appropriate policy co nsidera tions in lig ht of the curren t statutory sc heme . Frye, supra, 305 Md. at 567, 505 A.2d at 839; Warre n, supra , 336 Md. at 627, 650 A.2d at 257. Id. at 282-83, 829 A.2d at 614. If we would not make an exception to the pa rent-child immunity doctrine for motor torts because of a recognition that to do so would impact the compulsory insuran ce law s, we see no reason why we should invade the province of the Legislature to affect the compu lsory insurance laws as they relate to interspousal imm unity. It is interesting to note that when the Legislature acted in 2001 to abrogate the doctrine of parent-child immunity in motor tort actions, it did so within the limits of the mandatory minimum liability coverage amounts required by the Transpo rtation Article. Section 5-806 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: The right of action by a parent or the estate of a parent against a child of the parent, or by a child or the estate of a child against a pare nt of the c hild, for wro ngful de ath, p erso nal in jury, or property damage arising out of the operation of a motor ve hicle . . . may not be restricted by the doctrine of parent-ch ild immunity or by any insurance policy provisions, up to the mandatory minimum liability coverage levels required by §17103 (b ) of the T ranspo rtation A rticle. Md. Code (1 974, 200 2 Repl. V ol.), § 5-806 (b ) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Contrary to the Stearmans arguments that the current compulsory insurance laws display a public policy that would demand complete insurance coverage for injury to spouses, the Legislature did not see f it to provide complete insurance coverage for injury to children -22- and parents . There is no reason to presume an undeclared public po licy that is more favorable to husbands and wives tha n to children and parents. Nor can we assume that we misread the public policy when we decided State Farm and later cases that cited State Farm. We see no reason to overrule th at case, espe cially in view of the fact that to do so in the way the Stearman s suggest w ould cons titute an unlawful intrusion into the province of the Legislature. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BAL T I M O RE COUNTY AFFIRMED . APPELLANT TO PAY ALL COSTS. -23- Case No. 03-C-02-013946 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 67 September Term, 2003 JAY H . STEA RMA N, et al. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Greene, JJ. __________________________________ Dissen ting Op inion b y Bell, C.J ., which Battag lia, J., Join s. __________________________________ Filed: May 14, 2004 It is well settled th at the M aryland Ge neral Asse mbly has ma ndated tha t all Maryland automobiles be covered b y policies of au tomobile in surance tha t contain certa in require d cove rages. See Maryland Code (1977, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § § 17-101 to 17-110 of the Transportation Article and Maryland Code (1995, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § § 19-501 to 19516 of th e Insuranc e Article; Jennings v. G.E.I.C.O., 302 Md. 352, 357, 488 A.2d 166,167 (1985). Pertinent to this case, each automobile insurance policy minimally must include liability insurance for the payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons, § 17-103(b)(1) of the Transportation Article; § 19-504 of the Insurance Article, and property damage liability insurance of up to $10,000. §17-103(b)(2) of the Transportation Article; § 19-504 of the Insurance Article.1 Section § 19-502 of the Insurance Article, nevertheless, makes clear that an insurer [is not prevented] from issuing, selling, or delivering motor vehicle liability insurance policies that provide liability coverage in excess o f the requirements of the Maryland Vehicle L aw. In this case, the insurance contract was for a face amount of liability coverage in excess of the 1 Other required coverages include, unless waived, medical, hospital, disability and funeral benefits ( P.I.P. ) up to $2,500, covering insureds and their families, as well as specified classes of other persons, reg ardless of f ault, Maryland Code (1 977, 200 2 Repl. Vol.), § 17-103(b) (3) of the Tra nsportation Article; M aryland Cod e (1995, 20 02 Rep l. Vol.) § 19-505(a) of the Insu rance Article, and uninsured motorist coverage,§ 19-509 of the Insurance Article. Any permitted waiver of the PIP or uninsure d motorist co verage m ust be acco mplished p ursuant to § 19-506 and § 19-510 respectively, of the Insurance Article. statutorily required minimum amounts. While insurance contracts may lawfully and appropriately exclude particular risks, this Court consistently has held that exclusions from statutorily mandated, insurance cov erage not e xpressly authorized by the Le gislature genera lly will not b e recog nized. See, e.g., Enterprise v . Allstate, 341 Md. 541, 547, 671 A.2d 509, 512 (1996 ) ( Where the Legislature has mandated insuranc e coverag e, this Court w ill not create exclusions that are not specif ically set out in the sta tute ); Van Horn v. Atlantic Mutual, 334 Md. 669,686,641 A.2d 195,203(1994) ( this Court has generally held invalid insurance policy limitations, exclusions and exceptions to the statutorily requ ired covera ges whic h were n ot expressly authorized by the Legisla ture ); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hart, 327 Md. 526, 53 1532, 611 A .2d 100 , 102(1992); Larimore v. American Ins. Co., 314 Md. 617, 622,552 A.2d 88 9, 891 (19 89); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. USF & G, 314 M d. 131, 141 , 550 A.2d 69, 74 (19 88); Gable v. Colonial Ins. Co., 313 Md. 701, 704 , 548 A.2d 135 , 137 (1988) ( As a m atter of statutory construction, where the Legislature has required specified coverages in a particular category of insurance, and has provided for certain exceptions or exclusions to the required coverages, additional exclusions are generally not permitted ); Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md. 233, 239, 528 A.2d 912, 915 (1987) ( we will not imply exclusions nor recognize exclusions beyond those expressly enumera ted by the legislatu re ); Jennings v. Government Employees, 302 Md. 352, 358-359, 488 A.2d 166, 169 (1985) ( we will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legisla ture ); Nationwide Mutual Ins. v. Webb, [291 Md. 721, 730, 436 A.2 d. 465, 471 (1981)] ( c onditions o r limitations in an uninsured motorist endorsement, which provide less than the coverage required by the statute, are void ); Pennsylvania Nat l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 160-1 61, 416 A.2d. 7 34, 739 (1980 ). West Am. Ins. Co. v. Popa, 352 Md. 455, 47 5,723 A .2d 1, 10 -11(19 98). See also Salamon v. Progressive Classic Insurance Company, 379 Md. 301, 303-304, 841 A. 2d 858, 860 (2004 ). The Court of Appeals, in Boblitz v. B oblitz, 296 Md. 242 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983), abolished inter-spousal immunity in negligence cases.2 In so holding, concluding that there was no subs isting public p olicy to justify retention of the doctrine, it rejected the reasons asserted in favor of that immunity as providing no reasonable basis for denial of recovery for tortious personal injury. 296 Md. at 273, 462 A.2d at 521. Th e necessary and, indeed, the only logical result, or significance, of the Boblitz decision was to place the injured spo use on an equal footing wit h strang ers, i.e., to permit one spouse to sue the other for negligence and to recover the damages to which he or she is entitled to the same extent as a stranger could. Significantly, the decision was not dependent upon the 2 This C ourt ha s since c omple tely abolish ed inter- spousa l immu nity. Bozman v. Bozman, 376 M d. 461, 830 A. 2d 4 50 (2003 ) (abrogating inter-spousa l immunity in intentional tort cases). -2- existence, or non existen ce, of insurance. Whether and, if so, how, the Maryland Financial Respon sibility law would im pact on inter-spousal suits in w hich insurance is a resource was not presented. The foregoing must be kept in mind when the issue this case presents is considered. An issue of first im pression fo r this Court, 3 it involves the validity of an househo ld exclusion that reduces the amount of the recovery available to a wife injured in an automob ile accident as a result of the negligence of her husband from the face amount of the husband*s insurance policy to the statutory minimum liability limits. The policy of automob ile liability insurance a t issue in this case defines insured in terms of the insured car, a temporary replacement car or a newly acquired car and included the named insured*s 3 The Court of Special Appeals has addressed the precise issue of whether, in the light of the Court of App eals decision in Boblitz v. B oblitz, 296 Md. 242 , 462 A.2d 506 (1983), declaring invalid interspousal immunity, the circuit court err ed in determ ining that the lim it of liability for insurance coverage for claims by household me mbers* is the amount required by the Marylan d Financia l Responsibility Law. Walther et ux. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 M d. App. 405, 40 6, 575 A .2d 339, 34 0 (1990). T hat court he ld, again prec isely, that the house hold ex clusion ary clause sanctio ned by M d. Ann .Code art. 48A , § 545 [presently § 19-509 (f) of the Insurance Artic le] applies to th e named insured an d all members of his, h er, or their household to the extent that the policy coverage exceeds the statutory minimum, that a household exclusion limits the amount a household member may recover to the sum mandated by the Maryland Financial Responsibility Law. Id. at 411-12, 575 A. 2d at 34 2-43. In that c ase, Mrs. W alther was in jured wh ile getting out of the automobile that Mr. Walther insured and was driving. -3- spouse. In addition, the coverage provided by the policy excludes ANY INSURED OR ANY MEM BER OF AN INSURED*S FAMILY RESIDING IN THE INSURED*S HOUSEHOLD TO THE EXTENT THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY OF THIS POLICY EXCEED THE LIMITS OF LIAB ILITY REQ UIRE D BY LAW . Carla Stearm an, the wife of Ja y Stearm an, colle ctively the appella nts or the Stearm ans, was injured in a collision involving a sing le car, of which her hu sband was the d river. She alleged that her injuries were the result of her husband*s negligence. The majority holds that the household exclusion is valid. It relies on Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., 302 M d. 352, 4 88 A.2 d 166 ( 1985) and, pri marily, State Farm M ut. v. Nation wide M ut., et al., 307 Md. 631 , 516 A.2d 586 (1986). In Jennings, the insured was injured w hile a passenger in a car owned by him and driven by his stepson, who resided in the insured*s household. The automobile liability insurance policy which the insured carried on the car contained an exclusion for [b]o dily injury to an insured or any family member of an insured residing in the insured*s house hold. 302 Md. at 353, 488 A. 2d at 167. In response to the insured*s declaratory judgment action, in which he sought a declaration that, because the house hold exclu sion in the policy was void because it is contrary to statute, GEICO was obligated to pay the default judgment he had obtained against his stepson, GEICO filed a declaratory judgment action of its own. It sought a declaratio n that, by virtue of the exclusion, the insured was not entitled to any coverage. Id. at , 488 A. 2d at 167. This Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, which had up held the valid ity of the h ouseh old exc lusion p rovision . Id. at 362, 488 A. 2d at 171. Reje cting GEICO*s defense of the valid ity of the house hold exclusion clause on the basis that no Maryland statutory provision expressly forbids it, we held the househo ld exclusion clause is inconsistent with the public policy which the General Assembly adopted in Ch. 73 of the Acts of 1972, providing for compulsory automob ile insurance for all Maryland autom obiles with specifi ed requ ired cov erages . -4- Id. at 357, 488 A. 2d at 168. State Farm addressed an issue neither presented nor decided in Jennings, [w]hether the household exclusion* is wholly invalid, or whether its invalidity extends only to the amount of the m inimum liability coverage required b y the compulsory insurance law. 307 M d. at 633 , 516 A. 2 d at 586-8 7. In that case , the automo bile liability insurance policy at issue provided bodily injury coverage limits above the minimum required by law, but it excluded coverage for injury to any insured or any member of an insured*s family residing in the insured*s household. Id. at 633, 516 A. 2d at 586. The named insured was injured when his insured automobile, in which he was a passenger, was driven off the r oad by a friend, who w as driving the car with the insu red s permission. The driver*s insurance carrier sought a declaratory judgment that the policy exclusion at issue, deno minated a househ old exclusio n, was v oid as again st public policy. Id. at 634, 516 A. 2d at 586. We held that the insured* segmen t of a hous ehold exclusion clause4 in an autom obile liability insuran ce policy is invalid to the extent of the 4 The limitation was deliberate, as footnote 1, in which the Court defined the nature of the househo ld exclusion, makes c lear: The household exclusion* before us in this case involves two distinct components. One is the exclusion of the insured. The second is the exclusion of family members residing in the insured*s househo ld. The fac ts before u s implicate only the f irst of the se com ponen ts. (contin ued...) -5- minimum statutory liability coverage. So far as the public policy evidenced by the compulsory insurance law is concerned, it is a valid and enforceable contractual provision as to coverage above that minimum. Id. at 644, 516 A. 2d at 592. We reasoned that [a] contractual provision th at violates pu blic policy is invalid, but only to the extent of the conflict between the stated public policy and the contractual provision, explaining: The public policy involve d here is that a ll automob ile liability policies shall contain bodily injury or death liability coverage in at least the amount of $20,000/$40,000. To permit the household exclusion* to operate w ithin those limits would be to deprive injured persons of the protection which the Legislature intended to provide .., and would violate public policy. ... But liability coverage in excess of that minimum is expressly authorized. Nothing in this subtitle or in Title 17 of the Tra nsportation Article prev ents an insurer from issuing, selling, or delivering a policy of motor vehicle liability insurance providing liability covera ge in exce ss of the req uirements of the Maryland Vehicle Law. ... There shall be available to the insured the opportun ity to contract for higher amounts than those p rovided u nder Title 17 of the Transportation Article... . The General Assembly has not restricted the ability of parties to contract fo r or to limit cov erage with respect to that excess* or those higher amounts. The public policy embodied in the compulsory insurance law extends o nly to liability coverage up to an d includ ing the s tatutory m inimum covera ge. Id. at 643-44, 516 A. 2d at 592 (quoting Keystone Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hinds, 180 Md. 676, 4 (...continued) State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., 307 M d. 631, 6 33 n. 1, 5 16 A.2 d 586, 5 86 n. 1 (1986 ). See footnote 4, in which th e Co urt, w hile e xpla ining wh y Meyer v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Company, 689 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1984) (en banc), a case which dealt with intra-family immunity, rather than inter-spousal immunity, was not persuasive, pointed out that, Since the case before us deals only with the insured* portion of the household exclusion,* ... the intra-family immunity concerns that were considered by the Colora do cou rt have n o pertin ence h ere. 30 7 Md . at 640 n . 4, 516 A . 2d at 59 0 n. 4. See also footnote 7, 307 Md. at 642, 516 A. 2d at 591. -6- 682, 26 A.2d 761, 763 (1942); Maryland Code (1957, 1979 Repl. Vol., 1984 C um. Supp.), Art. 48A, § 541 (b) and § 541(c)(2)) (som e citations omitted). As indicated, this Court has not considered before the impact of the abolition of inter-spousal immunity on the viability of a clause in an insurance policy containing an househo ld exclusion from bodily injury coverage above the minimum statutorily mandated amount. Neverth eless, rather tha n doing the analysis afresh, noting that the Court of Special Appeals addressed the issue in Walther v. Allstate Insurance Company, 83 Md. App. 405, 406, 575 A.2d 339, 340 (1990), the majority simply sets out the argument made by the Walth ers in that case , acknow ledges that it is identical to the argument the Stearmans make in this case and s tates that it agree s with the inte rmediate ap pellate court s reasoning. ___Md. at___, ___ A. 2d at ___[slip op. at 16]. Moreover, it concedes that the public policy in Maryland is crystal clear[,[s]pouses can sue each other for anything that strangers could, with no fear tha t the defen dant spou se will be permitted to raise interspousal immunity as a defense. Id. Taking an approach reminiscent of that taken by the Walther court, the majority argues, howev er: The question is, who pays the judgment, the negligent spouse or the negligent spouse*s insurance company? Does Maryland*s change in public policy regarding the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity require the in surance co mpany of th e negligent spouse to pay for the recovery of the injured spouse, even though the contract between the negligent sp ouse and the insuran ce comp any provides that there w ill be no recovery above the statutorily required minimums? Such a contract provision is clearly allowable under the mandatory minimum require ments la id out b y the Leg islature. Id. at___, A. 2d at___ [slip op. at 17]. In any event, it concludes that, even though recogniz[ing] that the public policy displayed by the complete abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine could be viewed as a policy that conflicts with the pu blic policy displayed by the mandatory minimum liability insurance requirements set by the Legisla ture, id., the Gene ral Assem bly, not the Co urt, is the appro priate body to reconcile these conflicting policies. Id. at___, ___ A. 2d at___ [slip op. at 18]. -7- With respect to State Farm, other than stating the holding and the rationa le underlying it, characterizing the holding as clear, and noting its conclusion that [t]he majority of jurisdiction s that square ly address the issu e before u s has reach ed a result consistent with ours in this case, the majority provides little analysis or logic to support its conclu sion tha t it is dispo sitive. Id. at___, ___ A. 2d at___ [slip op. at __] To be sure , the majority rejects the argument advanced by the appellants, that West Am. Ins. Co. v . Popa, 352 Md. 455 , 723 A.2d 1 (19 98) is dispositive, as this Court has consistently held that exclusions from statutorily mandated insurance coverage not expressly authorized by the Legislature generally will not be recognized. Stating that their argument is not persuasive, the majority simply repeats what we said in Van Horn v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 334 Md. 669,694-95,641 A.2d 195, 207(1994), in distinguishing State Farm from that case: In State Farm Mut. v. Nationwide Mut., supra., this Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Jennings v. Government Employees Ins., supra 302 Md. 352, 488 A.2d 166, that a household exclusion clause in an automobile liability insurance policy was contrary to the public policy embodied in Maryland s compulsory motor vehicle insurance law. We went on in State Farm, however, to hold that the household exclusion clause was invalid only to the extent of the statutorily prescribed minimum liability coverage of $20,00 0/$40,000 . We poin ted out that it could readily be inferred that the premium took account of the exclusion contained in the policy (307 Md. at 638, 51 6 A.2d at 589), that the majority of compulsory insurance jurisdictions had invalidated househo ld exclusion clauses on ly to the extent of the statutorily prescribed mandatory minimum liability coverage (307 Md. at 641-643, 516 A.2 d at 591-5 92), and tha t [a]s a gene ral rule, parties are free to contrac t as they w ish (30 7 Md . at 643, 5 16 A.2 d at 592 ). To the argument by the appellants th at § 19-50 2 (b) of the Insurance Article, pursu ant to which the insurance company may provide more than the minimum amount of insurance required to be carried, reflects a legislative intent that, once the greate r amount has been provided, exclusions from that coverage amount may not made ex cept whe n explicitly permitted b y legislative act, the m ajority*s only respons e is that: The plain language of [§19-502 (b)] evidences an intention to permit -8- insurance companies to offer policies that contain greater coverage than that required by statute. It certainly does n ot require insurance companies to provide co verage gre ater than that mandated by statu te. Nor doe s it display a legislative intention to change the public policy embo died in the statutorily mandated minimum liability coverage requirements. The Stearm ans hav e cited n o Ma ryland ca se that su pports s uch a p osition. _____ _____ Md. at _____ , A. 2d at ____ [slip op. at 12-13]. The majority is simply wrong. Without citing any authority, the majority states that a provision in an insurance contract between an insurer and a negligent spouse, providing for no recovery by that spouse s injured spouse above the statutorily ma ndated am ount of ins urance is c learly allowable under the m andatory min imum requirements. ____ Md. at ____, ____ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 17]. On the contrary, that is n ot at all clear. Ind eed, it is the opposite that is clear, that such an exclusion clearly is not allowable Section 19-504 provides that [e]ach motor veh icle liability insurance policy issued, so ld, or delivered in the State sh all provide the minimum liability coverage specified in Title 17 of the Transportation Article. Section 17-103 (b) of the Transportation Article, in turn, provides: (b) The s ecurity required under this su btitle shall prov ide for at leas t: (1) The payment of claims for bodily injury or death arising from an accident of up to $20,000 for any one person and up to $40,000 for any two or more persons, in addition to interest and costs; (2) The payment of claims for property of others damaged or destroyed in an accident of up to $15,000, in addition to interest and costs; (3) Unless waived, the benefits described under § 19-505 of the Insurance Article as to basic required primary coverage; and (4) The ben efits required under § 1 9-509 of the Insurance Article as to require d additio nal cov erage. Section 19-502, however, makes clear that more than the minimum coverage may be offered an insured by an insurer, providing: (b) Neither this subtitle nor Title 17 of the Trans portation A rticle prevents an insurer from issuing, selling , or delivering motor veh icle liability insurance p olicies that pro vide liability cover age in excess of the require ments o f the M aryland V ehicle L aw. -9- It is significant that, in addition to the required minimum coverage for bodily injury, § 17103 (b) includes, unless waived, P.I.P. coverage in a basic required primary amount and uninsured motorist coverage. Even more significantly, the General Assembly has expressly provided that those latter coverages may be excluded with respect to particular person s. Section 19-505 (c) (1) states: An insurer may exclude from the coverage described in this section benefits for: **** (ii) The named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured*s household for an injury that occur s while the named insured or family member is occupying an uninsured motor vehicle o wne d by: 1. The named insured; or 2. An immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured*s household. (2) In the cas e of m otorcycle s, an insu rer m ay: (i) Exclud e the econ omic loss b enefits desc ribed in this se ction; or (ii) Of fer the e conom ic loss be nefits w ith dedu ctibles, o ptions, or spec ific exc lusions . Similarly, § 19-509 (f) permits an insurer to exclude from the required uninsured motorist coverage: (1) The named insured or a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured*s household for an injury that occurs when the named insured or family member is occupying or is struck as a pedestrian by an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the named insured or an immediate family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured*s household; and (2) The named insured, a family member of the named insured who resides in the named insured*s hou seho ld, an d any other individual who has other applicable motor vehicle insuran ce for an injury that occurs when the named insured, family member, o r other individ ual is occupying o r is struck as a pedestrian by the insured motor veh icle while -10- the motor vehicle is operated or used by an individual who is excluded from c overag e unde r § 27-6 06 of th is article. There is no comparable exclusion p rovision ap plicable to the primary liability coverage. In Jennings, after noting th at the Gen eral Assem bly expressly man dated that all Maryland automobiles be covered by automobile policies containing certain required coverages, 302 Md. at 357-58, 488 A. 2d at 168-69, this Court pointed out that the same statutory provisions expressly authorized specified exclusions from the required covera ges. Id. at 358, 488 A. 2d at 169. Mention ing specific ally those related to cancellations or non-renewals as a result of driving records or claims experience, codified in forme r Art. 48A, § 240C- 1, and permitted exclusions from P.I.P. and uninsured motorist coverage, as prescribed in Art. 48A, §§ 541 (c) (2) and 545, the Court stated the general rule: generally we will not insert exclusions from the required coverages beyond those expressly set forth by the Legislature. We relied on DeJarnette v. Federal Kemper Ins. Co., 299 M d. 708, 725, 475 A .2d 454 (1 984); Pennsylvania Nat*l Mut. v. Gartelman, 288 Md. 151, 156, 159-160, 416 A.2d 734,738, (1980 ). In Gartelman, we refus ed to validate an exclusion for an insured who was injured wh ile oc cupying a car o wne d by a named insu red, n oting tha t it was no t one of th e fou r exc lusio ns ex pres sly provided by the Legislature. As we have seen, that rule was reiterated in Popa. 352 Md. at 475, 723 A.2d at 11. Moreover, we noted in that case that, [t]he holding of the State Farm Mut. case, ... has not been applied b y this Court to any other automobile insurance policy exclusions or provisions. This is so, we explained, because: Adoption of the broa d propositio n advanced by We st Americ an wou ld permit insurers to load up motor vehicle insurance policies with a multitude of invalid exclusions, thereby limiting coverage in numerous situations to the statutory minim ums instea d of the state d coverag e limits set forth on the insured*s declaration page. For example, an insured could purc hase wha t he b eliev ed w as $3 00,0 00 liabili ty insu ranc e, pa y a -11- premium for $300 ,000 liability insurance, and, after an accident, discover that he has only $20,000/$40,000 liability insurance because the circumstances fell within one or more of the many invalid exclusions or exceptions in the insuran ce policy. Perso ns who paid muc h more in premiums for coverage in excess of minimums could, in many circumstances, receive no more than those who only paid for minimum covera ges. 352 at 477, 723 A.2d 12. We refused to extend the State Farm holding beyond the household exclusion clause which was involved in that case. State Farm, by its express terms, professed to be a very narrow decision - in its first footnote, the Court acknowledged the two components of the household exclusion, pointing out that only one, the insured component, applied, and expressed its holding on that basis. 307 Md. at 633 , 516 A . 2d at 58 7. Walther, whose re asoning th e majority professes to accept, relied almost entirely, if not wholly, on State Farm. Although the Walther majority recog nized this to b e so, it was p ersuaded to draw the inference that the Court*s opinion [in State Farm v. Nationwide] is more sweeping than the footnote professes it to be, by the fact that the Court of Appeals rejected certain cases,5 83 Md. App. at 409, 575 A. 2d at 34 1-342. Fo r the same re ason, it conc lude that State Farm implicitly approved the household exclusion clause*s application to spouses of insured motor vehicle operators, id., an in fere nce s trengthe ned, we are to ld, by those foreign cases upon which the Court in State Farm relied an d align ed itself . 6 Id. at 410, 575 5 Estep v. State F arm M ut. Auto . Ins. Co ., 103 N.M. 105, 703 P.2d 882 (1985); Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co ., 236 N.W .2d 870 (N .D.1975) ; Meyer v. S tate Farm M ut. Auto. I ns. Co ., 689 F.2d 585 (Colo.1984). 6 Dewitt v. Young, 229 Ka n. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981); Pennsylvan ia Nat. M ut. Cas. Ins. v. Parker, 282 S.C. 5 46, 320 S .E.2d 458 (1984); Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 (contin ued...) -12- A.2d at 342. The express exclusion on which the Walther court premised its holding was the one contained in Art. 48A, § 545 (c), now § 1 9-509 (1), p ermitting the in surer to exclude from uninsured motorist coverage the named insured or members of his family residing in the household when occupying an uninsured motor vehicle that is owned by the name d insure d or a m embe r of his im media te fami ly residing in his ho useho ld. That provision does not sanction an exclusion from the primary liability coverage, and there is no co mparable exclusion e xpressly prov ided from that coverage. Therefore, the Walther holding flies in the fa ce of o ur prec edents . More over, Walther is also wrong on the breadth of the State Farm decision as well as the public policy question. State Farm not only professed to be narrow in scope, judging from the way it was crafted, it was, in fact, narrowly drawn. As I explained in dissent in Walther: The scope of the opinion , and by necessary implication, its limitations were established very early on. The Court was careful to poin t out, in the first footnote, w hat was a t issue and, ind eed, wha t was not. A s it discussed the cases pro and con, pertinent to the issue presented, and any legislative action bearing on the subject, it wa s careful to n ote, usually in a footnote, h ow it was that they, or the actions, were pertinent to the issue before it. In fact, caref ul reading o f the footn otes, in context, makes obvious that the Court*s entire discussion focused upon the rationale, rather than the factual context, of the various cases and how that rationale related to the issue of the viability of the insured aspect of the househo ld exclusion. Thus, we may only assess the Cou rt*s discussion of the cases, both pro and con, in the context of the insured* aspect of the exclusion. Indeed, I believe that State Farm. by its very terms, does not even address the other family members segment of the househo ld exclusion. If this were not sufficient, the C ourt*s holding, as we have seen, explicitly addressed only the insured segmen t of the ho usehold exclusion. Conseq uently, I do not b elieve that the majority*s very broad reading of State Farm is correct. And, in my opinion, the Court*s limitation of its holding, particula rly in 6 (...continued) S.W.2d 8 65 (Ky.198 1); Arceneaux v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 113 Ariz. 216, 550 P.2d 87 (1 976); Estate o f Nea l v. Farm ers Ins. E xch., 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977). -13- view of the careful way in which it did so, is significant. Since they are but different segments of the same issue, it would have been very simple, and, indeed, would h ave prov ided clearer g uidance, fo r the Cour t simply to have addressed the household exclusion in a unitary fashion. And, given the diff erent fo ci of the cases d iscusse d by the C ourt, there was every incentive, if the considerations are indeed the same, fo r the Court to have addressed them together. I t did no t, howe ver, as w e have seen. I believe that it did not because it recognized that there are different considerations applicable to each segment of the exclusion; the other househo ld members segment involves different considerations than does the insured segment. And within the other household members segmen t, itself, there are su b-segme nts ... as to each of which there may also be differe nt consider ations, depe nding upon the relationship of the house hold m embe r to the in sured. ... 83 Md. App. at 413-14, 575 A. 2d at 343-43 (Bell, J. dissenting). I might have mentioned expressly, what is certainly implicit in the foregoing, that it is one thing to allow an insured to co ntract aw ay his or her rights, e ven wh en the Le gislature has n ot specifically spoken on the subject, and quite another when, by so doing, he or she a dversely affe cts the rights of third party strangers, as to which the legislative has expressly spoken. In reali ty, in the absenc e of inter-spo usal immu nity, the nature of the relationsh ip between spouses, for purposes of litigation, is not that of related persons; rather it is one of stranger to stranger: The abolition of inter-spousal immunity has meaning only if one spouse is able to maintain an action against the other and, more importantly, recover from that spouse to the same extent that a stranger could. No problem is presented when insurance is not involved; the injured spouse, as would the stranger, looks solely to the negligent spouse for compensation. Where, however, the act of negligence is covered by insurance, a somewhat different situation exists. Ordinarily, as is the situation sub judice, the policy of insurance will provide for the payment for all damages an insured is legally obligated to pay becau se of bod ily injury.... Thus, in that scenario, a successful unrelated litigant is entitled to recover from the insurer all of his or her damages up to the face amount of the policy. After Boblitz, an injured spouse was able to recover to the same extent. Under the majority decision, upholding the validity of the household exclusion as to the excess insurance above the minimum required, ho wever, an injured spo use com ing within the negligent spouse*s policy covera ge, who , in all respects sav e relationship to the insured, is in the same situation as a stranger, may recover only the minimum required co verage. T his result, wh ile paying lip service to Boblitz*s abolitio n of inte rspous al imm unity, substitutes a more subtle form of immunity, which has the effect of undermining Boblitz. -14- Id. at 416-17, 575 A. 2d at 345 (Bell, J. dissentin g). This reas oning is eq ually apposite to the case sub judice. The Walther majority a nd, bec ause it ag rees w ith the ra tionale o f that ca se, see ____Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 16], the majority in this case, find support for their position in the facts that [n]othing in Boblitz purports to declare that the minimum coverage mandated by Transp. Art. § 17-103(b)(1) does not apply to an insured s spouse, 83 Md. at 410, 575 A. 2d at 339, and that the uninsured motorist provision permits an insurer to insert an household exclusion in an insu rance polic y, in connection with an uninsured motor vehicle. They find comfort also in the insurer*s right to limit its liability and to impose such conditions, by contrac t, that it wishes so long as it does not [contravene] a statutory inhibition or the state s public policy. Id. at 411, 575 A. 2d at 342. As to those arguments: The majority is , of cou rse, corr ect, Boblitz does not purport to declare that the minimum coverage mandated by § 17-103(b) (1) do es not app ly to an insured*s spouse, but neither does it purport to declare that it does apply. The ma jority*s reliance on Art. 48A § 545 (c) is simply irrelevan t; it permits such an exclusion with respect to an uninsured motor vehicle, not, as here, an insured one . Nor does the majority*s reliance upon the insurer*s righ t to lim it its li abili ty hav e val idity. To hold the household exclusion totally invalid insofar as husband and wife is concerned does no violence, whatsoever, to the right of an insurer to contract w ith its insured, co nsistent with public policy. In this case, public policy favors permitting one spouse to sue the other for negligence and to recover for injuries caused by that spouse*s negligence. That public policy is contravened when the insured, by contracting with the insurer, can limit his or her spouse*s recovery. Th is is so beca use, in e ffect, such a contract, at least partially, abrogates the Court*s prior abolition of inter-spousal immunity. To be sure, such a holding would, and does, as the majority says, interf ere with the insurer*s right to contr act; how ever, it do es so co nsistent with, and in the same sense that the requirement of mandatory minimum insurance coverage does. A s such, it g oes on ly as far as the law permits and no further . Id. at 418, 575 A. 2d at 346 (Bell, J. dissenting). In this case, the insured and the insurer contracted for the insured to provide coverage in excess o f the minim um amo unt statutorily required to be carried. At the same -15- time, they purported to exclude from that coverage a category of risk that the General Assemb ly did not expressly authorize to be ex cluded, memb ers of the insured*s household, including, therefore, the insured s spouse, who, by virtue of the abolition of inter-spousal immunity in negligen ce cases, like a stranger to the insured, is under no restriction s with respect to the amou nt that may be re covered. I w ould hold that the attem pted exclu sion is void. Acc ordingly, I dissen t. Judge Battaglia joins in the views herein expressed. -16-

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