Melton v. State

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Joseph Melton v. State of Maryland No. 61, September Term, 2003 Headnote: The language Each violation shall be considered a separate offense of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 449 (e) is ambiguous because it fails to include a definition f or the term violation an d is reasonab ly capab le of m ore than one m eaning . As a result, the Court of Appea ls held that the Legislature intended that § 449 (e) s unit of prosecution triggering its mandato ry minimum sentences was each prohibited act of possession and not e ach p rior f elon y. Therefore, the defendant could only be convicted on one count of § 445 (d) (1) w here he po ssessed on ly a single firearm. Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore Cou nty Case #01CR00864 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 61 September Term, 2003 Joseph Melton v. State of Maryland Bell, C. J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridge, John C. (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Cathell, J. Filed: February 12, 2004 On October 4, 2001, pe titioner was trie d in the Circ uit Court fo r Baltimore County and convicted, in a bench trial, of the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person p reviously convicted of a crime of violence, the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony, and the unlawfu l possession of a firearm by a person p reviously convicted of a misdemeanor with a penalty of over two years of incarceration. On December 14, 2001, petitio ner was s entenced to five years of incarceration without parole for the conviction based on the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a crime of violence and to a concurrent sentence of five years of incarceration without parole for the conviction based on the unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convic ted of a felony. The trial judge suspended the sentence generally for the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a misdemeanor with a penalty of over two years of incarceration. Petitioner filed an ap peal to the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals. On June 3, 2003, in an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial judge s decision. The Court of Special A ppeals held that: separate criminal offenses have been committed. For each offense, the Legislature has provided a separate punishm ent. Moreover, the L egislature has not indicated in any way that it intended to prohibit the imposition of separate sentences f or the crime s at issue. For th ese reason s, the rule of le nity does not require a merger of the separate offenses proscribed by Article 27, §§ 445 (d ) (1) (i) an d (ii). [F ootnot e omitte d.] Petitioner then filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to this Court and on September 10, 2003, this Court granted the p etition. Melton v . State, 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 204 (2003). In his brief, petitioner presents one question for our review: Under Md. Ann Cod e, Art. 27 , § 44 9 (e) , may a court impo se separate sentences on an indiv idual who has been convicted under a count alleging a violation of § 445 (d) (1) (i) (unlawful possession of a regu lated firea rm by a person with a prior conviction of a crime of violence), a count alleging a violation of § 445 (d) (1) (ii) (unlawf ul po ssession of a r egulated firea rm by a person with a prior conviction of a felony), and a count alleging a violation of § 445 (d) (1) (iii) (unlawf ul possessio n of a regu lated firearm by a person w ith a prior conviction of a misdemea nor with a statutory penalty of more than two years), where all of the charges are based on one act of unlawful possession of a regulated firearm? We answer p etitioner s que stion in the ne gative and hold that the Legislature did not intend for a court to render separate multiple verdicts of convictions on an individual for illegal possession of a regulated firearm pursuant to Md. Code (1957 , 1996 Repl. Vo l. 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 445 (d) (1) (i), (ii) and (iii) and § 449 (e) and (f) where that individual fits within several categories of prior qualifying convictions, but only possessed a single regulated firearm on a single occasion. Further, an interpretation to the contrary would be barred by the rule o f len ity. I. Facts Petitioner s conviction s arose out o f a January 20 01 incident involv ing a dispu te between neighbors in an apartment building in the Essex area of Baltimore Co unty, Maryland. Around 6:30 p.m. on the evening of January 23, 2001, two se ts of neighbors arrived in the parking lot of their apartment complex at approximately the same time. Pursuant to the testimony of the first couple, Shikera Bibb and her fiancée, Duane David, the two had a confrontation with petitioner and his wife afte r Ms. Bib b and M r. David approached the Meltons. Mr. David asked to speak to petitioner and petitioner s wife -2- sprayed both Ms. Bibb and Mr. David in the face with mace.1 Mr. Da vid then thre atened reprisal agains t petition er s wif e. Ms. Bibb and Mr. David testified that petitioner pulled out a gun and pointed it at them in response to Mr. David s actions.2 While pointing the gun back and forth at Ms. Bibb and Mr. David, petitioner told them that they were no t going to touch his wife. Ms. Bibb and Mr. David then walked away from the Meltons and entered their apartment building. So on thereaf ter, they again encountered the Meltons and another heated argument ensued. Ms. Bibb and Mr. David testified that petitioner again displayed a handgun before the confrontation ended. At trial, the State pre sented certif ied copies o f petitioner s prior convictions, including his convictions for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, possession of controlled dangerous substances (not marijuana), second degree assault and resisting arrest. While testifying in his own defense, petitioner admitted to a prior conviction for felony the ft. The State also presented evidence that the handgun brandished by petitioner during the January 23 rd incident with his neighbors was a regulated firearm. As a result of this in cident, 3 petitioner was charged w ith three sepa rate violations of 1 According to petitioner and his wife, Mr. Da vid s approach was view ed as an as sault and therefore Mrs. Melton s use of mace was in self-defense. 2 Both petitioner and his wife denied the assertion that petitioner had possessed or displayed a firearm during the incident on January 23, 2001. 3 At the trial level, the events of January 23, 2001 were trea ted as a sing le incident, (contin ued...) -3- Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 445 (d) (1) (i), (ii) and (iii),4 because he possessed a firearm and: 1- had been previously convicted of a crime of violence (second degree assault); 2- had been previously convicted of a violation classified as a felony (felony conviction s for posse ssion of co ntrolled dangerous substances and a felony theft conviction); and 3- had been previously convicted of a violation classified as a misdemeanor that carries a penalty of m ore than 2 yea rs (second d egree assa ult). Althoug h his possession of the firearm on January 23rd was treated as a single act of possession, petitioner was nonetheless charged w ith three sepa rate criminal o ffenses so lely because o f his prior history of convictions. Petitioner was convicted on all three charges. As mentioned previously, the trial judge sentenced petitioner to five years of incarceration on the (d) (i) count and a concurrent five years of in carceration f or the (d) (ii) cou nt, while his s entence fo r the (d) (iii) convicti on w as su spen ded generall y. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review The three coun ts relating to the illegal possession of a firearm by a prohibited person 3 (...continued) i.e., a single act of possession. 4 Hereinaf ter, except w here indica ted otherw ise, all statutory reference s are to Maryland Code (1957, 19 96 Rep l. Vol., 2001 Supp.), A rt. 27, which was the applicable law at the time of petitioner s trial and sentencing. Article 27, however, has since been repealed and recodified. Much of the former Article 27 currently can be found in the Criminal Law Article of the Maryland Code (2002, 2003 Supp.). The specific provisions relating to the illegal posses sion of firearm s by proh ibited pe rsons, however, are located in Title 5 of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code (2003), discussed infra. -4- pursuant to which petitioner wa s convicted are crimes tha t are purely statutory in nature. In interpreting statutes, this Court has said that the ca rdinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legis lature. Holbroo k v. State, 364 Md. 354, 364, 772 A.2d 1240, 1245-46 (2001) (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 139 (2000) (internal citation omitted)). A court should first examine the plain language of the statute when attemp ting to as certain th e legisla tive inten t. Holbrook, 364 Md. at 364, 772 A.2d at 12 46; In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 57, 763 A .2d at 139. If the statutory language is unambiguous when construed according to its ordinary and everyday meaning, then this Court will giv e effec t to the sta tute as it is written , Pak v. Hoang, 378 Md. 315, 323, 835 A.2d 1185, 1189 (2003) (quoting Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 677, 814 A.2d 557, 566 (2003) (quoting Jones v. Sta te, 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994))), and we will not add or delete words from the statu te, Gillespie v. S tate, 370 Md. 219, 222, 804 A.2d 426, 427 (2002). Only if the statutory language is ambiguou s will this Court look beyond the statute s plain language in discerning the legislative intent. Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 M d. 471, 4 83, 833 A.2d 1 014, 10 21 (20 03). We have said that ambiguity exists within a statute when there are two or more reasonable alternative interpretations of the statute. Price v. State , 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221, 1226 (2003). Once a statutory provision is found to be ambiguous, then we may look to other relevant factors that may reveal the statute s intent or general purpose, such as a bill s title -5- and function paragraphs, amendments . . . and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal. Clyde s, 377 Md. at 483, 833 A.2d at 1021 (quoting Moore, 372 Md. at 677, 814 A.2d at 566 (quoting In re Anthony R., 362 Md. at 58, 763 A.2d at 140 (internal citation omitted))). Any [c]onstruction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or inconsistent with common sense should be avoided. Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (alteration added) (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992))); see also Moore, 372 Md. at 677-78, 814 A.2d at 566. In the case sub judice, the language of § 445 (d) (1) appears clear and unambiguous on its face. It is a mere enumeration of the classifications of persons prohibited from possessing regulated firearms in Maryland. Petitioner does not now dispute the fact that he was in violation of § 445 (d) (1) becaus e of his pre vious con victions cou pled with his being found guil ty of posses sion of a sin gle firearm during the J anuary 23, 20 01 inciden t. Petitioner does, however, challenge his multiple convictions under § 445 (d) (1) (i), (ii) and (iii) of the statute. The question is th us whether the language of § 449 (e) and (f), the subsections instituting penalties for petitioner s three convictions under § 445 (d) (1) ( i), (ii) and (iii), stating that Each violation shall be considered a separate offense, allows for multiple convictions based not on multiple firearm possessions or multiple incidents of firearm possession , but solely on pe titioner s single f irearm pos session w ith several prior qualifying convictions unde r § 445 (d) (1). -6- This essential issue turns on which un it of prosecution the Leg islature intended for § 449 (e) to trigger its mandatory minimum sentences: the number of separate acts of illegal firearm possession or the num ber of con victions of p rior qualifying c rimes. Altho ugh it included the language mandating that Each violation shall be considered a separate offen se, the Legislature failed to define the term violation for the purposes of this statute. Simply put, no explanation of the intended unit of prosecution was put forth by the General Assembly. Thus, w e must dec ide wheth er Each violation o ccurs only on every separate illegal act of possession or whether Each violation occurs where there is a single possession coupled with several qualifying prior convictions. This Court applies our normal rules of statutory construction in determinating the legislative intent regarding the proper unit of prosecution and the appropriate unit of punishment in respect to violations of any criminal statute. In Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 622, 627-28, 741 A.2d 1088, 1091 (1999), we stated: In determining the appropriate unit of punishment for violations of statutory provisions, the central question is one of legislative in tent. Randa ll Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 324, 558 A.2d 715, 720 (1989). We have explained that whether a particular course of condu ct constitutes one or more violations of a single statutory offense depends upon the appropriate unit of prosecution of the offense a nd this is ordinarily determined by reference to the legislative intent. Richmond v. State, 326 Md. 257, 261, 604 A.2d 483, 485 (1992); Brown v. State, 311 Md. 42 6, 432, 535 A.2d 485, 488 (1988 ). Every quest to discover and give effe ct to the objec tives of the le gislature beg ins with the text o f the sta tute. In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994). If the intent of the legislature is clear from the words of the statute, our inquiry normally ends and we apply the plain meaning of the statu te. State v. Montgomery, 334 Md. 20, 24, 637 A.2d 1193, 1195 (19 94). In other words, we will approach our analysis from a co mmon sense persp ective, seekin g to -7- give the statutory language its ordinary meaning. See United States v. Universal Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260, 264 (1952). In furthering the identified legislative ob jectives, we avoid giving the statute a strained interpretation o r one that rea ches an ab surd result. Briggs v. State, 348 M d. 470, 4 77, 704 A.2d 9 04, 908 (1998 ). See also Ban e v. State, 327 Md. 305, 308, 609 A.2d 313, 314 (1992) (stating that a question of the proper unit of prosecution exists where multiple sentences for conduct proscribed by a single statute, w hich, thoug h occurring in a single tran saction, give s rise to multiple prosecutions ). B. Felony and Crimes of Violence Qualifiers The offenses of which petitioner was convicted were located, at the time of petitioner s conduct and trial, within the Regulated Firearms subheading of Article 27 of the Maryland Code. Section 445 (d), which specifically enumerates the persons prohibited from possessing regulated firearms under Article 27, stated:5 § 445. Restrictions on sale, transfer and possession of regulated firearms. *** (d) Restrictions o n possessio n In gen eral. A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) Has been convicted of: (i) A crime of violence; (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; (iii) Any violation classified as a misdeme anor in this S tate that carries a statutory penalty of more than 2 years; or (iv) Any violation classified as a common law offense where the person received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years. 5 This section now appears in Md. Code (2003), § 5-101 (g) and § 5-133 of the Pu blic Safety Article, discussed infra. -8- (2) Is: (i) A fugitive from justice; (ii) A habitual drunkard; (iii) Addicted to or a habitual user of any controlled dangerous substances; (iv) Suffering from a mental disorder as defined in § 10-101 (f) (2) of the Health-Genera l Article and has a history of violent beh avior against another person or self, or has been confined for more than 30 consecutive days to a facility as defined in § 10-101 o f the Health-G eneral Article, unless the person possess a physician s certification that the person is capable of possessing a regulated firearm without undue danger to the person or to others; or (v) A respondent against whom a current non ex parte civil protective order has been entered under § 4-506 of the Family Law Article. (3) Is less than 30 years of age at the time of possession and has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for committing: (i) A crime of violence; (ii) Any violation classified as a felony in this State; or (iii) Any violation classified as a misdeme anor in this S tate that carries a statuto ry penalty of more th an 2 year s. The felony/misde meanor c lassification an d subsequ ent penalties f or violations involving regulated firearms under § 445 are found in § 449. The mandatory minimum provision providing penalties for violations of § 445 (d) (1) (i) and (ii) was first enacted by Chapter 2 of the Laws of Maryland of 2000 and it states: § 449. Penalties. *** (e) Illegal possession of firearm with certain previous convictions. A person who was previously convicted of a crime of violence as defined in § 441 (e) of this article or convicted of a violation of § 286 or § 286 A of this article, and wh o is in illegal possession of a firearm as defined in § 445 (d) (1) (i) and (ii) of this article, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be imprisoned for not less than 5 years, no part of which may be suspended and the person may not be eligible for parole. Each violation sha ll be considered a separ ate off ense. -9- The outcome in the case sub judice rests upon the interpretation of the last sentence of § 449 (e). The Legislature did not provide any definition for the term violation. The insertion of that lang uage, h owev er clear o n its fac e, witho ut defin ition, creates an ambiguity as the sentence, as written, is reasonably capable of more than one meaning. Lewis v. Sta te, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1998) (quoting Greco v . State, 347 Md. 423, 429, 701 A.2d 419, 421 (1997)). Petitioner argues that this Court should determine that the proper unit of prosecution is not an individual s [qualifying] prior convictions (or each [qualifying] class of which [petitioner] is a member), but each unlawful act of possession (alterations added ).6 Petitioner contends that common sense precludes multiple convictions based solely on the number of prior convictions where only one act of possession of an illegal firearm occurred. He argues that § 449 is ambiguous as a result of not defining the term violation and that the rule of lenity requires the ambiguity to be con strued in favor of petitioner. The State coun ters petitioner s a rgumen ts by asserting that the statutory language of 6 The State contends that petitioner s unit of prosecution arg ument is un timely because it did not spec ifically appear in the Petition fo r Certiorari, nor was it discussed at the Court of Special Appeals . A unit of p rosecution argumen t, howeve r, is inextricably intertwined with a determination of whether the Legislature intended § 449 (e) and (f) and § 445 (d) (1) to allow for prosecutions based on a single possession of a firearm. As the question presented to this Court asked whether a court could impose separate sentences on an individual convicted on three counts of § 44 5 (d) (1), where all of the charges are based on one ac t of unla wful p ossessio n of a re gulated firearm , determinin g the specif ic unit of prosecution (the number of qualifying offenses or the act of possession) is necessary in a determination of legis lative inte nt. See Jenkins v. City of College Park, __ Md. __, __, __ A.2d _ _, __ (2 003), Eid v. Duke, 373 Md. 2, 11, 81 6 A.2d 844, 84 9 (2003). -10- § 445 (d) (1) and § 449 is plain and unambiguous, thus precluding the applicability of the rule of lenity. The State also proffers that the legislative history of the statute indicates that separate sentences are permissible. The State argues that this is so because of the strong intent man ifested in the le gisla tive h istor y making it appare nt that the con duct here w as to be dea lt with as severe ly as possib le. C. Misdemeanor Qualifier Petitioner s conviction under § 445 (d) (1) (iii), for possession of a firearm with a prior vio latio n cla ssifi ed as a mis dem eano r in th is Sta te tha t carr ies a statu tory penalty of more than 2 years, subjected him to the penalty stated in § 449 (f), which provides fo r a penalty for illegal possession of a regulated firearm for persons not fitting into the other categories of § 44 9, as it do es not f all into th e purvi ew of § 449 ( e). Section 449 (f) states: (f) Knowing participants in sale, rental, etc. Except as otherwise provided in this section, a ny dealer or pe rson wh o know ingly participates in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm in violation of this subheading shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both. Each violation sh all be consid ered a sepa rate offen se. Petitioner s conviction under § 445 (d) (1) (iii) was suspended generally by the trial judge. As the language in question in this subsection, stating that Each violation shall be considered a separate o ffense, is identical to the questioned language in § 449 (e) and as this subsection, including its identical violation phrase, was enacted prior to the 2000 version of § 449 (e), its construction is one key to our interpretation of § 449 (e). -11- While the mandatory minimum sentenc es of § 44 9 (e) first app eared in the Code in 2000, the words, Each violation sha ll be conside red a separ ate offen se, first appe ared in Article 27 when it was added by the Maryland Gun Violence Act of 1996. 1996 Md. Law s, Ch. 561, C h. 562. I dentica l to the cu rrent § 4 49 (f), supra, the 1996 versio n of § 449 (e) stated: (e) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any dealer or person who knowin gly participates in the illegal sale, rental, transfer, purchase, possession, or receipt of a regulated firearm in violation of this subheading shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con viction shall be fined not m ore than $10,000 or imprison ed for not more than 5 years, or both. Each violation shall be consid ered a s eparate offen se. Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27 § 449 (e). The Each violation clause in the above subsection follows a listing of indiv idual violations of § 445 ( illegal sale, ren tal, transfer, purchase , possession , or receipt of a regulated f irearm ). Th e placement of this language strongly suggests that the term violation refers to each individual illegal act within the list of enu merated v iolations of § 445, which, in turn, illustrates that the unit of prosecution is the illegal act violatin g § 445 , i.e., the prohibited act of possession, sale, transfer, etc., of the firearm and not the number of prior qualifying convictions. This section of the prior statute was am ended by the Respon sible Gun Safety Act of 2000, 2000 Md. Laws, Ch. 2, and it was place d into what is now § 449 (f). 7 Thus, § 449 (f) s language may 7 The E ffect of am endmen ts section of Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol. 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 449 stated, in regard to the new § 449, Chapter 2, Acts 2000 . . . inserted present (e) and redesignated fo rmer (e) as (f). The section, therefore, did not change (contin ued...) -12- support petitioner s argument that only one conviction under § 445 (d) (and a sin gle penalty under § 449) can be sustained for each violation of § 445.8 D. General Discussion The Respon sible Gun Safety Act of 2000 created new subsections and crimes, one of which was the version of § 449 (e) w ith which p etitioner wa s charged . In its brief, the S tate offered several accurate descriptions of the bill s purpose, which illustrate the co mmunity s concern about fe lons having f irear ms. O ne le tter, f rom the M ayor of Baltimore City, described this public sentiment in saying that this bill will make our communities safer by removing violent felons from ou r streets, wh ile a letter from the Maryland Chiefs of Police Association stated that [f]irearms do not belong in the hands of individuals who have previously demonstrated a propensity for criminal conduct or violent behavior (alteration added). While letters s uch as thes e illustrate the stro ng desire to keep firearms away from felons and potentially violent persons, they do not provide any guidance as to the particular unit of prosecution on which the Legislature intended § 449 (e) to operate. In fact, the concerns set forth in these letters are satisfied by petitioner s construction of the statute, as 7 (...continued) substantively as a result of the amendments of 2000. 8 In this case, both parties agree that petitioner committed only one prohibited act under § 445, a single illegal po ssession of a regulated firearm by a prohibited person. Our holding does not necessarily preclude multiple convictions and penalties under § 445 and § 449, respectively, where a person not only possesses, but transfers, or sells, or rents, or receives, etc., a regulated firearm. We address here a situation where a prohibited individual possessed a single regulated firearm on a single occasion while ha ving several qualifying convictions. -13- the illegal possessor will still receive a five-year term of imprisonment without the possibility of parole while not being subject to a piling on of s entences re sulting from multiple convictions based on a single act of possession. Some of the legislative material reveals that the 2000 version of § 449 (e) sug gests that the unit of prosecution was akin to that of the 1996 version (and later version of § 449 (f)), the prohibited act. The Bill Analysis of House Bill 2799 stated: The bill creates a new felony and a five-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for a pers on w ho illega lly possesses a firearm and has certain qualifying convictions for crimes of violence or certain controlled dangerous substances. *** IX. Mandatory M inimum for C ertain Repeat Off enders The bill creates a new felony and a five year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for a pers on w ho illega lly possesses a regulated firearm (A rticle 27, § 445 (d)(1)(i) and (ii)) if that individual and has been conv icted of either: (1) a crime of violence; or (2) unlawful possession, distribution, or importation of a controlled dang erous substance (A rticle 27, § 286 and § 28 6A). Current law provides that violations of the relevant firearms sections a re misdemeano rs. Article 2 7, § 449 . [Som e emp hasis ad ded.] This analysis emphasizes that the new felony is for possession of a firearm by a person w ith certain qualifying convictions, which suggests that preventing the act of possessing firearms was the true goal of the legislation, not multiple punishments for a single act based upon multiple prior convictions. The driving force behind the statute, and the evil sought to be remedied, is the act of possessing the regulated firearm. 9 House Bill 279 of 2000, was the Maryland House of Delegates version of the Responsible G un Safety Act of 20 00, which even tually included the addition of § 44 9 (e). -14- While similar to the ultimate language of § 449 (e), the Fiscal Notes for both S enate Bill 211 10 and House Bill 279 identified the new felony with emphasis on the possession of the firearm. Both Fiscal Notes state: If a person who was previously convicted of a crime of violence or serious drug offense ille gally possesses a firearm, the person is guilty of a felony and will be imprisoned for a minimum of five years, and is not eligible for a suspended sentence or parole. Each violation is a se parate offense. [Emph asis added .]11 These docume nts contem plate wha t was alread y evident in the 1996 version of § 449 (e)12 that the prohibited act, i.e., in this case illegal possession of a regulated firearm, not the prior conviction, was the vice sought to be remedied by the Responsible Gun Safety Act of 10 Senate B ill 211 of 20 00, was th e Maryland S enate s vers ion of the R esponsible Gun Safety Ac t of 2000, which eventually included the addition of § 449 (e). 11 The only other mention of the changes to crimes relating to illegal firearm possession in the Fiscal N ote includes the following language, which was included in both the Senate and House of Delegate versions of the Fiscal Note: This bill s provisions that change the crime of illegally possessing a firearm, when there has been a prior violent or felony off ense, from a misdem eanor to a felony means that: (1) such persons would be subject to considerably stiffer sentencing; (2) such cases will be filed in the circuit courts rather than the District Court; and (3) some persons could eventually serve longer incarcerations due to enhanced penalty provisions, applicable to some offenses, for prior felony convictions. . . . Requiring each violation to be considered a separate offense would also tend to add to [Department of C orrection] co sts, but canno t be reliably estimate d. [A lteration added .] This language, however, does not lend guidance in our search for the Legislature s intent as to the proper unit of prosecution. 12 In 1996, what is now contained in subsection (f) was contained in subsection (e), see supra at 11. -15- 2000. It was to elevate the offense of certain possessions from a misdemeanor classification to a felony classification while retaining a m isdemeanor classification fo r illegal rentals, sales, etc. of firearms. Given this legislative background and construction of the statute , it seems to us that the unit of prosecution for § 449 (e) is the prohibited act of illegal possession of a firearm and that the statute does not support multiple convictions based on several prior qualifying offenses where there is only a single act of possession. We have found no case s in this C ourt tha t directly sp eak to th e issue b efore u s. We have, however, recently had cause to discuss sentencing issues under § 449 (e) in Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 835 A.2d 1221 (2 003). 13 In Price, we held that the defendant was not subject to the mandatory minimum sentences of § 449 (e) because his prior conviction for daytime housebreaking was not incorporated as a crime of violence under § 441. We noted that Section 449(e), by its plain structure, is divided into tw o requiremen ts. The first requirement is that the defendant have a previous conviction of a crime that falls within § 441(e). The second requirement is that the defendan t have a current conv iction under § 445(d)(1)( i) and (ii). Price, 378 Md. at 384, 835 A.2d at 1224. In a footnote following that text, we also noted a possible problem in the language of § 449 (e) when we said: Petitioner does not raise, and we do not dec ide, any questio n with resp ect to the second requireme nt of § 449(e). The refore, we do no t consider whether § 449(e) s mandatory sentencing imperative requires a conviction under both § 13 Price had not been decided by this Court at the time of the filing of the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals in the instant case. Accordingly, that court did not have the benefit of Price when it rendered its decision. -16- 445(d)(1)( i) and (ii), as the plain language indicates. Although Price was convicted pursuant to only § 445(d)(1)(ii), we assume for purposes of this case alone that this was sufficient to satisfy the second requirem ent of § 449(e), and that the only issue before us is whether the first requirement, that his prior crime f all withi n § 441 (e), wa s satisfie d. 14 Id. at 384-85 n.4, 835 A.2d at 1225 n.4. While admitting tha t the statute is no t a model o f clarity, the State, quoting the language from the Bill Analysis for Senate Bill 211, contends that Senate Bill 211 was intended to require illega l firearm po ssession co upled w ith being p reviously convicted of a crime of violence or certain serious controlled dangerous substances violations. The State refers to the newly codified Md. Code (2003), § 5-133 of the Public Safety Article s special revisor s no te, which sta tes, in part: As enacted by Ch. 5, Acts of 2003 , this section was new language derived without substantive change from former Art. 27, § 449(e) and § 445(d), (e), and, except as it related to the transfer of regulated firearms, (a). Howeve r, Ch. 17, A cts of 2003 , amende d subsectio n (c)(1) of th is section to correct a technical error. ... The Public Sa fety Article Re view Committee noted in Ch. 5, for consideration by the General Asse mbly, that the m eaning of the referen ce in former Art. 27, § 449(e) to a person who is in illegal possession of a firearm as defined in § 445(d)(1 )(i) and (ii) of [A rt. 27] was unclear. Former Art. 27, § 445(d)(1)(i) and (ii) prohibited a person who has been convicted of a crime of violence or any violation classified as a felony in th is State from possessing a regulated firearm. The General Assembly may wish to clarify the meaning of former Art. 27, § 449(e), which is revised in subsection (c) of this 14 Likewise, because it has not been raised in the instant case, we do not address the meaning of the wo rd and in the contex t of the statute. In the present case, previous convictions on both (i) an (ii) had occurred. -17- section . 15 The Senate Analysis and the language of M d. Code (2 003), § 5-1 33 of the P ublic Safe ty Article (hereinafter, § 5-133 ) merely highlight the confusion regarding the wording in § 449 (e). The plain language of § 449 (e) argum ent, urged on this Cou rt by the State, appears to be directly at odd s with this subsequent history. At be st for the State , the languag e is ambiguous, and ambiguous units of prosecution and penalty provisions in criminal statutes, pursuant to the rule of len ity, must norma lly be construed in favor of the defen dant. In discussing w hat the rule of lenity requires in the context of former Md. Code (1957, 1996 R epl. Vol., 199 8 Supp.), A rt. 27 § 286 (d), this Cou rt has stated tha t: an enhanced penalty statute, is highly penal and must be strictly construed so that the defendant is only subject to punishment contemplated by the statute. When doubt exis ts regarding the punishment imposed by a statute, the rule of lenity instructs that a court not interpret a . . . criminal statute s o as to increase the penalty that it places on a n individua l when su ch an interp retation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended. Melgar v. State, 355 Md. 339, 347, 734 A.2d 712, 716-17 (1999) (quoting White v. Sta te, 318 Md. 740, 744, 569 A.2d 1271, 1 273 (1 990)) (c itations o mitted). See also W ebster v. State , 359 Md. 465, 481, 754 A.2d 1004, 10 12 (2000 ) (stating that a mbiguity in a criminal penal statute, in accordance with the rule of lenity, ordinarily is to be construed against the State 15 The new statute, Md. Code (2003), § 5-133 of the Public Safety Article, discussed infra, amen ded the langua ge of f ormer A rt. 27, § 449 (e), as it uses the word or instead of and. -18- and in favor of the defendant ); McG rath v. State, 356 Md. 20, 25, 736 A.2d 1067, 1069 (1999). In the case sub judice, there is no doubt that § 449 (e), a statute which creates a mandatory minimum five-year sentence without the possibility of parole, fits within the definition of an enhanced penalty statute. As § 449 (e) provides no definition o f the term violatio n, and provides no specific direction as to the prope r unit of pro secution, w e hold that § 449 (e) is ambiguous as to that point and accordingly construe § 449 (e) narrowly. The fact that the plain language of § 449 (e), as it existed at the time of the offense he re at issue, leaves us nothing more than a guess as to which violation (the illegal possession or prior felony or both , see Price, supra at 15-16, as of the time of convictions in the case at bar) triggers the mandatory minimum sentence, requires that the rule of lenity be applied. Petitioner proffers several cases from our Court to support his argument regarding ascertaining the proper un it of prosecu tion: Eldridge v . State, 329 Md. 307, 619 A.2d 531 (1993); Satterfield v. State, 325 Md. 148 , 599 A.2d 116 5 (1992), Dickerso n v. State, 324 Md. 163, 596 A.2d 648 (1991) and State v. Owens, 320 M d. 682, 579 A.2d 76 6 (1990). W hile none of these cases are determinative on the issue before us, as they do not deal with the statutory scheme at issue in the case sub judice,16 they do offe r some insig ht as to how this Court has used a common sense approach to avoid abs urd or illogica l results in 16 These cases were decided prior to the enactment of the version of § 449 and § 445 pursuant to which petitioner was convicted and sentenced. -19- determinations of legislative intent regarding intended units of prosecution. In Eldridge v. State, supra, this Court construed a statute which prohibited both the carrying of a deadly weapon when concealed on the person as well as openly carrying a deadly weapon with intent to injure another. We held that allowing separate convictions of a defenda nt, one for ca rrying a conce aled wea pon and the other fo r openly carrying the same weapon, where the defendant, in the course of the same in cident carried a weapo n both concealed and open, was an absurd result. We stated: We conjure up this scenario. Eldridge parks his car on the bar s parking lot. He removes the starter pistol from the glove compartment, gets out of the car and puts the pistol in his pocket. He walks toward the bar and on the way removes the pistol from his pocket, checks it and replace s it in his pock et. He enters the bar. In the men s room he again c hecks the p istol and then pockets it. Entering the barroom, he pulls the pistol from his pocket and at pistol point commits the robbery, threatening to kill the victim. Upon fleeing the scene he again puts the pistol in h is pock et. During the course of this conduct he carried the weapon conce aled fiv e times a nd carr ied it ope nly four tim es. Under the trial court s interpretation, Eldridge could be convicted of five offenses of carrying a deadly weapon concealed and of four offenses of carrying the weapon openly. He would be subject to a sentence of 3 years on each offense for a total 27 years. Th is wou ld be ab surd. We cannot conceive that such pyramid ing of s entenc es refle cts the in tention o f the L egislatu re. Eldridge, 329 Md. at 314 -15, 619 A.2d at 53 5 (footnote omitted). In Satterfield v. Sta te, supra, we used a common sense approach in holding that separate convictions for different items of drug paraphernalia were inappropriate. We stated: Further, we believe it clear that the legislature did not seek to proscribe the use of items ide ntified as pa raphernalia (such as sandwich baggies) in and of themselves. Rather these items, which may have common innocent uses, are punishable only under circum stances ind icating an inte nt to use them in conjunction with a controlled dange rous su bstanc e. This requisite connection -20- is evidenced by the language of § 287(d)(2), which m akes it unlaw ful to possess the enumerated items of paraphernalia under circumstances which reasonab ly indicate an in tention to use any such item for the illegal manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of any controlled dangerous substance. Consequently, we believe that it is at least equally plausible that the legislature intended for the controlled dangerous substance to dictate the unit of pros ecution in c harges fo r parapher nalia as well. Since both the S tate and defense counsel agree that the syringe and the plastic baggies were used to prepare the PCP -laced parsle y for sale, there is no dispute that both items of paraphern alia were used in conjunction with a single controlled dangerous substance. Under this analysis, it would seem that the legislature intended but one un it of pro secutio n. Satterfield, 325 Md. at 154 -55, 599 A.2d at 11 68 (footnote om itted). In Dickerso n v. State, supra, we pointed out the illogical results stemming from a construction of a drug statute that allowed a conviction for both possession of cocain e with intent to distribute and possession and use of drug paraphernalia where the defendant had possession of one vial of cocaine. In reversing the lower court, we held: It is the State s position that, in most instances, dual co nvictions are not only permitted, but were contemplated, and intended, by the Legislature. This position represents a strained interpretation of § 2 87A, w hich is productive of results that are illogical and unreasonable. For example, under this view, possession of a single marijuana cigarette would produce two convictions: one for possession of marijuana and, because the cigarette paper is a container for the marijuana, another for use of drug paraphernalia. Similarly, because cocaine must be contained in something, the concealment of a single piece of crack cocaine in an accused s shirt pocket, or even in an ordinary paper bag, would also give rise to two convictions for the possession and, the shirt pocket and paper bag bein g containers, for use of drug paraphernalia. Indeed, because drug paraphernalia may be, by virtue of use, almost anything, even items with no special characteristics making them suitable for use in connection with drug use, the State s position, as petitioner argues, would authorize two convictions for virtually every possession charge . -21- Dickerson, 324 Md. at 174 , 596 A.2d at 653 (footnotes omitted). Fina lly, in State v. Owens, supra, we held that PCP laced m arijuana w as a single controlled dangerous substance because the drugs were bound together in a manner that was nearly impossible to reverse. In discussing the illogical results if we were to hold otherwise, we stated: The instant case in volves m arihuana th at has been laced wit h phencyclidine (PCP) that is, the marihuana has been dipped into, or sprayed with, PCP. Although this process does not involve chemical c hanges in either of the substan ces used, it m echanically bin ds the two together in a way that renders it impossible , in any practical se nse, to separ ate them. This fact places this case more toward the end of the spectrum involving a controlled substance or compound that chemically contains another controlled dangerous substance, e.g., heroin containing molecules of morphine, than toward the other end represented by separate controlled dangerous substances separately packaged and available for separate sale, distribution, or use. An analogy may be drawn to the making of a martini by mixing together gin and vermouth, two alcoholic beverages. Maryland Code (1957, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1989 Cum.Supp.) Article 27, § 400A makes it a civil offense for any person under the age of 21 years to have in his possession . . . any alcoholic beverage. . . . Surely, if a person under 21 is detected drinking a martini, he is not guilty of two offenses. Taking a common sense view of the matter, we are simply not persuaded that the legislature inten ded sepa rate prosecu tions and p unishme nts for possession of PCP and possession of marihuana where the two substances have b een, fo r all prac tical pur poses, ir revoca bly joined as one. Owens, 320 Md. at 687-88, 579 A.2d at 768. In the case sub judice, if we were to construe § 449 (e) s Each violation to allow multiple convictions for each prior conv iction of an individual w here that ind ividual only possessed a single firea rm during a single incid ent, the possib le results could be illogical. In essence, interpreting the unit of prosecution as the prior conviction wou ld be akin to -22- stating that the societal evil to be remed ied, i.e., the main goal of the statute to be cu red, is punishing persons w ith prior conv ictions based solely on their status, i.e., criminalizing their status, whe re the goal is a ctually to punish illegal possessions of firearms. Federal cases involving a similar statute offer further sup port to our interpretation of § 449 (e). In United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385 (4th C ir. 1998), Judge Niemeyer, for the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, when reviewing a law similar to Maryland s firearm laws, that a defendant should not have been charged w ith multiple counts of illegal possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g) (1) where several charges stemmed from a sin gle act of illeg al possessio n of mu ltiple firearms coupled with Dunfo rd s multiple prior convictions.17 The Fourth Circuit stated: Based on the six guns and the ammunition seized on October 4, 1995, from Dunford s house, Dunford was indicted and convicted on fourteen firearms counts, seven under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (prohibiting possession of a firearm or a mmun ition by a convicted felon) and seven under § 922(g)(3) (prohibiting possession of a firearm or ammunition by an illegal drug user). Contending that he should have b een charged and convicted on only one firearms count, Dunford argues that (1) a person in possession of a firearm who is both a felon and a drug user does not violate the statute more than once for each act of possession, and that (2) his possession of all six firearms and 17 The Fo urth Circuit a dditionally held that Dunford s simultaneous possession of six firearms constituted one possession under the statute. Thus, that court only affirmed one of Dunford s 18 convictions under the federal statute even though he illegally possesse d six different firearms. The Co urt held that Dunford s possession of the six firearms and ammunition, seized at the same time from his house, supports only one conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g). Dunford, 148 F .3d at 39 0. As petitioner in the case sub judice was convicted of possessing one firearm, we do not reach the issue of whether § 445 (d) (1) and § 449 (e) an d (f) could support m ultiple conv ictions for a s ingle perso n simultane ously possessing numerous regulated firearms. -23- the ammunition constituted only one act of possession within the meaning of the statute. He contends that his conviction on fourteen separate counts is unconstitutionally duplicative. We find his arguments persuasive. Section 922(g) of Title 18 makes it unlawful for a person in one of nine specified classes to possess a firearm or amm unition. Th us, the statute prohibits firearm possession by, for example, convicted felons, fugitives, unlawful users of drugs, adjudicated mental defectives, and illegal aliens. While the prohibited conduct is the possessing of any firearm or ammunition, the statute applies only to members of classes specified in the statute. Dunford is a member of at least two of the disqualifying classes, being a convicted felon and an illegal drug user. He argues, however, that whether he is a membe r of one o f the disqua lifying classes or o f all nine, a single act of possession can only constitute a single offense. We agree. The nine classes of peop le barred from firearm poss essio n by § 922(g) are those classes which consist of persons, who by reason of their status, Congress considered too dange rous to posses s guns. But we se e nothing in the statute which suggests that Congress sought to punish persons by reason of their legal sta tus alon e. If we were to interpret the statute to establish separate offenses for each separate status, we would, in effect, be criminalizin g the status itse lf. Thus, we hold that while a person must be a member of at least one of the nine classes prohibited from possessing guns under § 922(g), a person who is disqualified because of membership in multiple classes does not thereby commit separate and multiple offenses. The offense is determined by performance of the p rohibite d cond uct, i.e., the possessing of a firearm or ammunition. In so holding, we join the other courts that have reached a similar conclu sion. See United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1425-26 (10th Cir.199 7), petition for cert. filed (April 1, 1998) (No. 97-8558 ); United States v. Munoz-Romo, 989 F.2d 757, 759-60 (5 th Cir.1993 ); United States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601, 605 -08 (11th C ir.1990); but cf. United States v. Peterson, 867 F.2d 1110, 1115 (8th Cir.1989) (convictions under §§ 922(g)(1) and (g)(3) for same act of possession did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause), abrogate d on other grounds , Horton v . California , 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 23 01, 110 L.Ed.2 d 112 ( 1990) . Dunford, at 388-89 (some citations om itted) (some emphasis ad ded). Similarly, in Untied States v. Winchester, 916 F.2d 601 (11th Cir. 1990), the United -24- States Court of Ap peals for the Eleventh C ircuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g), 18 which prohibits possession of firearms and ammunition to members of certain classes, could not support separate convictions against one person where that person possessed a single firearm, but fell into more than one of the prohibited classes. In finding the imposition of consecutive sentences for the possession of a single firearm on one particular oc casion to be contrary to both com mon sen se and the in tention of C ongress, the Eleventh Circuit stated : The statute does not expressly indicate whether Congre ss intended to permit consecutive sentencing for the same incident under two subdivisions of 18 This statute w as the statute u nder wh ich Winchester was convicted and was the same statute analyzed in the Dunford, supra. It was part of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and it stated: (g) It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been convic ted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding on e year; (2) who is a fugitive from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance ...; (4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution; (5) who, be ing an alien , is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; (6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or (7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounc ed his citizenship; to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammun ition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign comm erce. 18 U.S.C. § 9 22 (g) (198 8). While d ifferent fro m Ma ryland s statutes, its content is similar, and thus instructive, in that the federal statute also makes it illegal for certain classes of individuals to possess certain firearms. -25- section 922(g ). Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), Congress provided criminal penalties for the violation of subsection (g) of section 922, but it did not list separate penalties for the separate subdivisions of subsection (g). Furthermore, each subdivision of subsec tion (g) differs only in its requirement that the offender have a certain status under the law. The title of the statute, the Gun Control Act of 1968, leaves no doubt that the statutory purpose is to limit or control the possession of firearms. The statutory structure indicates that, in enacting section 922(g), Congress sought only to bar the possession of firearms by certain types of persons tha t it considered dange rous. It does not suggest that Congress also sought to punish persons, who are described in the various categories set forth in section 922(g), solely for having a certain status under the law. In addition, while section 922(g) prohibits the possession of firearms by persons described in its subdivisions, section 922(d) prohibits the sale of firearms to the sam e categ ories of person s. As the Supreme Court noted, [t]he very structure of the G un Co ntrol A ct dem onstrate s that C ongres s . . . sought broadly to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dang erous. Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212, 218, 96 S .Ct. 498, 50 2, 46 L.Ed .2d 450 (1 976). He nce, it would appear that, in enacting section 922(g), it was not within Congress comprehension or intention that a person could be sentenced, for a single incide nt, under more than one of the sub divisions of section 922(g ). ... The statutory language and legislative history of the Gun Control Act of 1968 reveal that Congress intent was to prohibit the possession of firearms by classes of ind ividuals it deemed dangerous, rather than to punish persons solely for having a certain status under the law. . . . ... Furthermore, the governmen t s interpretation of section 922 (g) would lead to an anomalous and draconian result. Under the governmen t s interpretation, a defendant, who was described under one or more of the statuses listed in the nu mbered s ubdivision s contained in subsectio n (g), could be sentenced consecutively under each status. Hence, a convicted felon who is also a fugitiv e from ju stice, a drug addict, a mental defective, and an illegal alien, could be sentenced to five consecutive terms of imprisonment for the same incident, namely, the possession of a firearm. It wa s this interpretation of the statute which led to Winchester s being sentenced to two consecutive terms. To a void such a result, we hold th at Congress did not intend to provide for the punishment of a defendant under tw o or more -26- separa te subd ivisions of 18 U .S.C. § 9 22(g). 19 Winchester, 916 F.2d at 605-07 (some emph asis added). These federal cases are informative as to the case sub judice. They interpret the federal statute to criminalize the possession of guns by persons prohibited from possessing them, not to criminalize a person s status. The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits found that Congress did not intend to punish an individual for having a particular legal status alone and that such a construction was illogical. The State argues that the Maryland statute s final clause stating, Each violation shall be considered a separate offense, distinguishes the federal cases o n its fac e. Regardless of this additional language, the purpose of the Maryland statute is essentially the same as its federal counterpart: to keep firearms away from potentially dangero us in dividuals and to p unis h tho se w ho violat e this law by possessing firearms. The purpose is no t to punish an individual fo r his or her status as a person with multiple prior qualifying co nvictions an d allowing multiple con victions for a single prohibited act under § 445 (d) (1). A s we hav e construed the unit of p rosecution to be the act of possession (or, in the case of violations of § 449 (f), the act of illegal sale, transfer, purchase, or receipt), the addition of the last sentence of § 449 (e) does not distinguish Maryland s restrictions on firearm po ssession fro m its federa l counterpa rt. 19 While petitioner in the case sub judice was sentenced to concurrent sentences under the statute and not to consecutive sentences for his convictions based on his different qualifying offenses, if we were to interpret § 449 (e) as the State requests then such draconian results, as discussed in Winchester, could occur in the future. -27- The current and recodified version of the statute under which petitioner was convicted, lends support to our holding and provides some insight into the Legislature s intent regarding which unit of prosecution it intended for § 449 (e). The relevant sections of the current code are located in § 5-101 and § 5-133 of the Public Safety Article.20 Maryland Code (2003 ), § 5-101 of the Public Safety Article (hereinafter, § 5-101 ) states: § 5-101. Definitions. *** (g) Disqualifying crime. Disqualifying crime means: (1) a crime of violence; (2) a violation classified as a felony in the State; or (3) a violation classified as a misdemeanor in the State that carries a statutory p enalty of m ore than 2 years. [ Footn ote add ed.] [21] The revisor s note for § 5-101 (g) states: This subsection is new language derived without substantive change from forme r Art. 27 , § 442(h)(2)(i) 1, 2, and 3; § 443(e)(4)(iii) 1, 2, and 3 and (j)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii); and § 445 (b)(3) and (1)(i), (iii), and, except for reference to conspiracy to commit certain crimes, (ii) and (d)(3) and (1)(i), (ii), and (iii). The term [d]isqualifying crime is added to avoid the repetition of the phrases a crime of violence , any violation classified as a felony in this State , and any violation cla ssified as a m isdemean or in this State that carries a statuto ry penalty of more th an 2 year s . 20 Former Art. 27, § 449 (f) was recodified without substantive change into Md. Code (2003), § 5-143 o f the Pub lic Safety Article, entitled Knowing participation in violation of subtitle. 21 As used in this statute, the term disqualifying crime creates a prohibition against certain persons possessing firearms. At the same time a violation of the statute s prohibitions is a qu alifier f or the ma ndatory se nten cing prov ision s of the statute . We have, ge nera lly, used the term qualifier in the latter context in our opinion. The term disqualifying crime appears for the first time in the 2003 revision. It is not present in the statute under which petitioner was convicted. -28- This new languag e, which is derived w ithout substantive change from § 445 (d) (1 ), illustrates that the underlying prior convictions are not the focus of the statute, but merely a classification of pers ons, i.e., an element of the crime which is satisfied once the defendant falls into any one of the several qualified classifications of persons. The fact that this language has substantively the same m eaning as § 445 (d ) (1) s terms show that prior convictions are not the aim of the statutory prohibitions of § 445 and § 449, but a means of labeling certain perso ns that the G eneral As sembly has c hosen to p rohibit from being able to poss ess a fire arm. The Legislature utilized the § 5 -101(g) term Disqua lifying crime in § 5-133 (b) of the Public Safety Article to describe a class of individuals prohibited from possessing regulated firearms in Maryland, in effect replacing § 445 (d), while the text of § 5-13 3 (c), essentially recodified, in part, former Art. 27, § 449 (e). These relevant provisions 22 of § 5133 of the Pu blic Safety Article, which were also enacted without substantive change from former § 449 (e) a nd § 445 (d) and (e),23 state: § 5-133. Restrictions on possession of regulated firearms. *** (b) Possession of regulated firearm prohibited. A person may not possess a regulated firearm if the person: (1) has been convicted of a disqualifying crime; (2) has been convicted of a violation classified as a common law crime and received a term of imprisonment of more than 2 years; 22 Subsections (a) and (d) entail State preemption over local jurisdictions and poss essio n by perso ns un der a ge 21, res pect ively. 23 See the Sp ecial R evisor s Notes to § 5- 133, see supra at 16-17. -29- (3) is a fugitive from justice; (4) is a habitual drunkard; (5) is addicted to a controlled dangerous substance or is a habitual user; (6) suffers from a mental disorder as defined in § 10-101(f)(2) of the Health General Article and has a history of violent behavior against the person or another, unless the person has a physician s certificate that the person is capable of possessing a regulated firearm w ithout undu e danger to the person or to anothe r; (7) has been confined for more than 30 consecutive days to a facility as defined in § 10-101 of the Health General Article, unless the person has a physician s ce rtificate that the person is capable of possessing a regulated firearm without und ue danger to the perso n or to another; (8) is a respondent against whom a current non ex p arte civil protective order has been entered under § 4-506 of the Family Law Article; or (9) if under the age of 30 years at the time of possession, has been adjudicated delinquent by a juvenile court for an act that would be a disqualifying c rime if com mitted by an ad ult. (c) Penalty for possession by person convicted of crime of violence. (1) A person may not possess a re gulated firea rm if the pe rson was previously convicted of: (i) a crime of violence; or (ii) a violation of § 5-6 02, § 5-603, § 5-604, § 5-605, § 5606, § 5-607, § 5-608, § 5-609, § 5-612, § 5-613, or § 5-614 of the Criminal Law Article. (2) A person who violates this subsection is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to imprisonment for not less than 5 years, no part of which may be suspended. (3) A person sentenced under paragraph (1) of this subsection may not be eligible for parole. (4) Eac h violati on of th is subse ction is a separa te crime . The Legislature , similar to its rewordin g of the rele vant subse ctions of A rticle 27 into § 5101 (g) of the Public Safety Article, emphasized the importance of the possession of the firearm as the key proh ibited cond uct in § 5-13 3 (c). Instead of beg inning the subsection with A person who was previously convicted of a crime of violence . . . as in former -30- section 449 (e), the general Assembly chose to focus first on possession by starting § 5-133 (c) (1) with A person may not possess a regulated firearm if . . . (empha sis added). W hile this may appear to be insignificant, it puts the emphasis of the statute clearly on the prohibited act, the possession, and not the prior c onviction. A s written in the Public Sa fety Article, the Each violation lang uage of § 5-13 3 (c) (4) clearly references the act of possession as described in § 5-1 33 (c) (1). The subsection provides a [p]enalty for possession by [a] person convicted of a crime of violenc e (alterations a dded) (em phasis added). The fo cus of the pen alty, i.e., the violation to be pun ished, is the act of possession. The fact that the Public Safety Article was enacted without substantive change from the relevant sections Art. 27 and that the plain language indicates that the prohibited act of possession is the unit of prose cution supports our an alysis of § 449 (e). Fina lly, we note again the position of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Dunford, supra, that to ho ld as the State su ggests w ould be . . . criminalizing the status itself. Dunford, 148 F.3d at 389. It would be a separate criminal offense to have been convicted of the prior predicate offense. Such a person, if his status was criminalized, would be committing a criminal offense 24 hours a day merely by existing by being alive. To criminalize the status would be absurd. III. Conclusion In conclusion , we hold that Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27 § 449 (e) is unclear and ambiguous as to whether the phrase Each violation shall be -31- considered a separate offense refers to each current act of illegal possession or to each prior qualifying felony conviction. When construed using the tools of statutory construction and common sense, punishing each current illegal possession of a regulated firearm by any person fitting with th e definition o f § 445 (d ) (1) (i) and (ii) appears to be the object of § 449 (e) s mandatory minimum sentence. Accord ingly, one of the elements of the statutory crime at issue in the case at bar, is that one or more of the qualifying prior convictions must exist in order for th ere to be a sin gle conviction under § 445. Our case law, federal case law, the construction of the recodified Public Safety Article and the rule of lenity all support our construction of the last sentence of both § 449 (e) and (f). Being that the statute was meant to create punishments for each act of possession and not fo r each prior c onviction, o nly one of petitioner s convictions under § 445 (d) (1), specifically his conviction under § 445 (d) (1) (i), can s tand . Accord ingly, we affirm that conviction under § 445 (d) (1) (i) and reverse the remaining two. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT O F S P E C I A L A PP E A L S AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE R E M AN D E D T O T H AT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY O N THE CONVICTIO N UNDER § 445 (D) (1) (i) AND TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT O N T H E C O N V I C T IO N S UNDER § 445 (D) (1) (ii) AND § -32- 445 (D) (1) (iii). COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT. -33-

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