Davis and Adams v. State
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 59 September Term, 2002 ______________________________________________ RO BER T DA VIS v. STATE OF MARYLAND _______________________________________________ No. 36 September Term, 2002 _______________________________________________ DAMONT ADAMS v. STATE OF MARYLAND _____________________________________________ Bell, C.J. *Eldridge Raker Wilner Cathe ll Harrell Battaglia, JJ. Opinion by Bell, C.J. Filed: October 21, 2004 *Eldridge, J. now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion. The Petitioners, R obert Da vis and D amont A dams, were arrested, charged with, and convicted of, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and a handgun violation. The arrests, charges and convictions followed the search of 4011 Boarman Avenue, in Baltim ore C ity, by o fficers of the B altimore C ity Police Dep artment, pursuant to a search a nd seizure w arrant. The w arrant incorp orated by reference the affidavit of the police officer a ffiants, O Ree and Brickus. In that affidavit, they indicated that a rushed or no knock forced entry of the premises would be required. The issue tha t this case presen ts is wh ether, w here the re is no s tatute so provid ing, a judge is authorized to issue a no-knock warrant, on the basis of which the police may make a no-knoc k en try to execute a search and seizure w arrant. 1 The Court of Special Appea ls affirmed the judgments of conviction, holding both that a no-knock entry was justified by the exigent circumstances detailed in the search and seizure warrant, thus affirmative ly validating the propriety of the issuance of a no-kn ock w arrant, and th at, in any event, the good admissibility of the evidence.2 1 faith exception to the exclus iona ry rule saved the We shall reverse. As w e shall se e, infra, neither party directly presented the issue we have identified. Rather, they argued in their briefs about the sufficiency of the factual predicate for the issuance of the no-knock warrant, thus assuming the authority of the judge to issue it. The State, therefore, alternatively, asked us to decide whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies to render the evidence seized pursuant to a no-knock warrant for which the factual basis was inadequate, admissible, neverth eless. 2 Although the pe titioners were tried together in the Circu it Court for Baltimore City, their a ppeals were h eard by tw o diffe rent pan els of th e Cou rt of Sp ecial A ppeals . In Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A. 2d 84 (2002), the court decided the case on both grounds. In the case of Adams, however, although implicitly recognizing a judge s authority to issue a no-knock warrant, the court, in an unreported opinion, declined to decide whether the affidavit made a sufficient showing to justify the issuance of such a warrant in that case, preferring to rest its decision instead on the After conducting an investigation, police officers O Ree and Brickus applied for, and obtained, a search and seizure warrant for the Boarman Avenue premises, the petitioners,3 and a blac k Nissan S entra, whic h they alleged was driven b y the petitioners and associated with their operation. The application for the search warrant, which included the officers affidavit, enumerated the applicants considerable experience, 4 and detailed their investigation,5 includ ing t he co nclu sion s the y reached as good faith e xceptio n to the e xclusio nary rule. 3 In the police officers affidavit, the petitioner Robert Davis is referred to as Meatball, whom they describe as a black male, 6' 1," 175 pounds, in his twenties. The p etitioner Dam ont Ad ams w as also re ferred t o in the a ffidav it, as Big gie. 4 In the case of Officer O Ree, that experience consisted of five (5) years as a police officer, three with the Baltimore City Police Department, one hundred eighty four (184) hours of specialized training in narcotic enforcement, more than three hundred (300) narcotic/drug arrests, resulting in numerous convictions and writing or being the affiant on more than seventy (70) search and seizure warrants for illegal controlled dangerous substan ces, mo ney, gun s and re lated m aterial. Officer Brickus s experience consisted of approximately ten (10) years as a police officer, com pletion of th e Police A cademy an d Roll Ca ll and In-Se rvice Train ing as to various co ntrolled dan gerous su bstances, m ore than on e thousan d (1000) n arcotics arrests and participation in the investigation, preparation and execution of more than two hundred fifty (250) search and seizure warrants, resulting in the recovery of narcotics and related p araphe rnalia. 5 Specifically, they averred: During the month of February 2000, Your Affiants Chris O Ree and Jonathan Brickus of the North Western District Enforcement Unit met with a confidential source. We believe this confidential source to be extremely reliable and has provided information that has been corroborated. The source provided Your Affiant [sic] with information outlining a drug organization that sells marijuana p rimarily in the 5100 Block of Park Heights Ave. This confidential source is a user of marijuana and is familiar with pricing , packagin g, and the a ppearanc e and eff ects of it. The confiden tial source advised Yo ur Affiant [sic] that the leaders 2 of the group are two guys known as Meatball and Biggie . The confide ntial sour ce ad vised tha t the m ale k now n, as Me atba ll is a 6'1 175lb male in his twenties. The confidential source advised Your Affiant [sic] that Biggie [sic] name is Damont. The confidential source advised Your Affiant [sic] that Biggie and Meatball have a room at 4011 Boarman Ave., on the second floor. The confidential source advised that they store their m ain supply of m arijuana in tha t room and bring sma ll amounts to the 5100 block of P ark Heig hts Ave. f or street sales in their black late model two door Nissan Sentra. The confidential sources then pointed out to Your Affiants the dwelling known as 4011 Boarman Ave. as the dwelling where the marijuana was stored. We then went to the 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. where the source s then pointed out M eatball and Biggie . The 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. is well known to the police and citizens for a high level of marijuana sales. Your Affiant [sic] then interviewe d Biggie a nd identified him to be D amont A dams. Th e male known as Meatball was also interviewed. They both were located in the 5100 block of Park Heights Ave. Damont Adams and Meatball both stated that they drive a b lack Nissa n Sentra. D uring the inte rview, the tw o could not provide a valid reason for being in the area. After the interview was complete your Affiants observed the two drive away in the late model black two door Nissan Sentra Maryland registration #FXF894. The confidential source advised that he/she was inside of 4011 Boarman Ave. in the extremely recent past and observed large amounts of marijuana inside the dwelling. The source stated that on the first floor of the dwelling th ere is a large sc reen televisio n. Your A ffiants we re able to observe a large screen television on the first floor through an open front door. During the First week of February 2000 your Affiants have observed Meatball and Damont Adams on several occasions in the 5100 block o f Park Heigh ts Ave . Your Affiants then contacted a reliable confidential registered informant NWD #398. NWD#398 advised that two black males fitting the description of Meatball and Damont Adams, that drives [sic] a black Nissan Sentra, are living in the 4011 Boarman Ave. NWD#398 advised that at 4011 Boarman Ave., several people live there and share the house for communal use. Confidential Inform ant NWD #398 has prov ided Your A ffiant [sic] information that directly resulted in over fifteen se arch and seizure warrants, which resulted in the seizure of thousands of dollars worth of 3 a result of tha t investigation . Then, the a pplicants su bmitted: The prior experience of your Affiant [sic] indicates that narcotic/drug dealers/user s have, carry, an d use Firea rms to prote ct their operations. This protection is both from the Police and other drug dealers/users who may try to seize the drugs or moneys gained from the operation. These Firearms include handguns, rifles and shotguns. These weapons allow the drug dealer/user to operate openly and freely; also enabling them to retalia te against an yone they feel threatened by. The possession of these w eapons is a n extension of the narc otic operation and/or conspiracy being conducted. Due to the nature of the evidence you [sic] Affiant [ sic] is seeking to seize in this in vestigation, sp ecifically Article 27 Section 275-302 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Your Affiant [sic] must g ain entry quick ly and safely into the dwelling. If entry is stalled or delayed the controlled dang erous substance can easily and quickly be destroyed. Therefore, Your Affiant [sic] will attempt to gain entry by the rush or N o-Knoc k forced e ntry. This will en able the Entry crack c ocai ne, n ume rous handguns, sh ot gu ns an d US curr ency. NWD#398 has proven to be extremely reliable, and the information that he/she has provided has prove n to be acc urate and c orrect. NW D#398 is familiar with the packaging, pricing and sales techniques of marijuana, crack cocaine, cocaine, heroin and illegal firearms. NWD#398 has provided your Affiant [sic] informa tion on drug operation s in the North W estern District that has been corroborated. A check of the Baltimore City Police Department Juvenile arrest records revealed that Damont Adams has been arrested three times in the past two years for C.D.S. violations. On 4 February 2000 at approximately 9:00 am Your Affiant [sic] observed the Nissan Sentra with the tag #FXF894 parked in front of 4011 Boarman Ave. Based o n informa tion provide d from an extremely reliab le confidential source of the detailed information on Meatball and Damont Adams s marijuana sales and storage in 4011 Boarman Ave. [sic] The corroborated information of the source. [sic] Your Affiant [sic] believes that Meatba ll and Dam ont Ada ms are storin g large am ounts of m arijuana in 4011 Boarman Ave. Your affiant [sic] prays of the issuance of a search and seizure warrant for the address of 4011 Boarman Ave., the vehicle known as a two door Nissan Sentra tag #FXF894, a black male known as Mea tball an d Dam ont Ad ams fo r violatio ns of th e Mar yland C.D .S. laws . 4 Team to recover the evidence in tact and provide me mbers of the entry team w ith a ma rgin of safety fro m we apons , which may be o n the sc ene. A judge issued the search and seizure warrant. Although the warrant did not do so explicitly, no express provision to that effec t being inclu ded in the w arrant, becau se it incorporated by reference the affida vit of Off icers O R ee and B rickus, wh ich stated their intention to gain entry by the rush or No-Knock forced entry, the warrant implicitly authorized a no-knock entry. In executing the warrant, the police neither knocked, nor announced their presence or purpose; rather, they gained entry, as they stated that they intended to do, through the use of fo rce. The p etitioners we re found in a second floor bedroom, in w hich various wea pons and drug paraphernalia also w ere found. In a refrigera tor in that sam e room, th e officers recovered a large ziplock baggie containing 60 smaller baggies of suspected marijuana. The petitioners moved, pre-trial, to suppre ss 6 the evidence seized during the search. Their argu ment wa s directed to, an d challenged , the sufficiency of the showing the affiants made to justify the issuance of the warrant, which the petitioners characte rized as a no -knock warr ant. M ore par ticularly, the petition ers argu ed, inter alia, that the facts a lleged in the a ffidavit submitted in support of the search a nd seizure warrant were in suffici ent to jus tify a no- knock entry. 7 The Circuit Court denied the 6 Counsel for petitioner Davis made the motion, which petitioner Adams joined. 7 The petitioners also argued that the application did not establish probable cause for the search. The pe titioners have not appealed th e Circuit Court=s denial of th eir motion on that basis. Th e issue, theref ore, is not bef ore this Co urt. 5 motion to suppress. It held that, in light of their wealth of experience in the area of narcotics drug enf orcemen t, as detailed in th eir affidavit , the police officers determination that a no-knock entry was required was not irrational. It reasoned: Somewhat more vexing is the consideration whether the warrant itself provides say a sufficient basis for a no-knock forced entry. The cases, which have been discussed by the defense, and reviewed by the Cou rt, largely involve situations in which law en forcement office rs were confronted with situations which post entry were determined either to rise to the level of exi gen cy permitting no-knock entry or failed to meet that standard, and thus require suppression No cases we re found in which the issue pre sented w as, in this context, in which there was pre-raid approval for a no-knock entry on a set of facts wh ich essentially recite the office rs general an d specific experience in law enforcement, from which they extrapolate the need, a s they perceive it, for a no-knock en try. It is, of course , well-settled in search and seizure law that the issuing judge is permitted to rely upon the experience of law enforcement officers and the conclusions which reasonab ly flow fro m that experience in making the probable cause determ ination. I see no reason to dep art from that pattern wh en the exa mination is not the presence or absence of probable cause, but is instead the existence of exigencies meriting a no-knock entry. It is, in any event, a close[] question fo r the Cour t. Howev er, crediting the affiant s experience which involves hundreds of narcotics arrests, ex tensive trainin g, and con siderable experience in narcotics law enforcement, I cannot conclude that their conclusion with respe ct to the likelines s of firearm s on the pro perty is an irrationa l one. Both of the petitioners timely appealed. In separate opinions, by different pa nels of the court, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals affirmed the judg ments o f the C ircuit Co urt. With regard to petitioner Adams, the court, in an unrep orted opinio n, declined to 6 consider whether the affidavit submitted in support of the application for the search and seizure warrant sufficiently alleged facts to authorize a n o-knock warran t. Instead, it held that even if the application for the search warrant did not set forth legally sufficient exigent circumstances justifying a no-knock warrant, the evidence seized should not be suppressed under the good faith exception to the exclus ionary rule. The court explained: Although the good f aith exception to the exclusionary rule has not been considered by the appellate courts of this State in the context of a no knock warrant, facially valid but later determined to have been issued on an insufficient showing of exigent circumstan ces, other co urts have applied it in that co ntext. U.S. v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182, 18 4-87 (7 th Cir. 1993) ; U.S. v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8 th Cir. 1992) ; State v. Hughes, 589 N.W.2d 912, 915-16 (N. D. 1999). We find those decisions persuasive and accord ingly aff irm Ad ams s c onvictio ns and senten ces. Petitioner Davis s conviction was also affirmed, as previously indicated. In that case, which the intermediate appellate cou rt reporte d, see Davis v. S tate, 144 Md. App. 144, 797 A.2d 84 (2002), ho wever, the court determ ined that the a ffidavit con tained sufficient facts to establish a reasonable suspicion of the then existence of exigent circumstances and, thus, to permit a judge to make a pre-entry finding that a no-knock entry onto th e prem ises wa s justified . Id. at 152-58, 797 A. 2d at 89-93. Pointing to the experience of the affiant officers, as set forth in their a ffidavit, the c ourt credited their conclusion that those involved in the drug trade often are dangerous and carry weapons and that drugs are easily and quickly destroyed when entry onto the premises is delayed or stalled. The court further observed that the affidavit indicated that large amounts of 7 drugs had been seized as a result of information supplied by one of their sources, the reliable confiden tial registered so urce, that sev eral people resided in th e dwelling, and that the petitioner s co-defendant Adams had several previous arrests for drug violatio ns, 8 id. at 158, 7 97 A. 2 d at 93, a ll of which , it conclude d, supporte d its holding. Alternatively, the intermediate appellate court held that, even if the no-knock entry were illega l in that case, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to render the evid ence se ized in th e case a dmissib le. Id. at 159, 797 A. 2d at 93. court reasoned: Other courts have applied the good faith exception to cases involving the issuing of a no -knock search warra nt. See United S tates v. Tisdale, 195 F.3d 70 (2 nd Cir. 1999) ; United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 (7 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moland, 996 F. 2d 259 (10th Cir. 1993) ; United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843 (8 th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2 d 119,(D . Mass. 20 01); United States v. Rivera , 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 799 7 (D. M aine 2000 ); United States v. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d 518 (S.D.N.Y . 1999); United States v. Tavarez, 995 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y . 1998); State v. Van Beek, 591 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 1999); State v. Eason, 629 N.W.2d 625 (Wis. 2001). We agree w ith those decisions. * * * * [E]ven if we had concluded that Judge Sweeney should not have authorized a no-knock entry in this case, we would not reverse appellant s conviction. Suppressing evidence under these circumstances would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, which is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish police for the errors of judges and magistrates. When the police officers follow the proper course of conduct by seeking a no-knock search warrant, the good faith exception applies. Id. at 160, 797 A.2d at 94. 8 The arrests attributed to the petitioner Adams were, as we have seen, juvenile arrests. 8 The This Court g ranted th e petition s for ce rtiorari in both ca ses, Adams v. State, 369 Md. 570, 801 A.2d 10 31 (2002 ); Davis v. S tate, 370 Md. 268, 805 A.2 d 265 (20 02), to address whether the intermediate appellate court correctly resolved the issues they presented. II. In this Court, petitioner Davis challenges, once again, the sufficiency of the factual support offered to justify the issuance of a no-knock warrant. He argues that, taken as a w hole , the f actu al av erments simp ly are insufficient, under Richards v. Wiscon sin, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1997), to justify use of a no-knock entry to execute the subject warrant. In that case, the petitioner notes, the Supreme Court held that police officers may not rely on general allegations that narcotics investig ations, per se, present circumstances that w arrant no-knock entries, 520 U. S. at 388, 117 S. Ct. at 1417, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 620, and that, in each case, the police and/or the court, as the case may be, must consider whether the facts of that particular case constitute an exigenc y sufficient to warrant a no-kn ock entry. Id. at 395, 117 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 625. Davis characterizes the invocation, by the applicants for the no-kn ock w arrant, of their experience to establish that the petitioners, the suspected marijuana dealers, ha[d], carr[ied] and use[d] Firearms to protect their operations as a con clusory statement that drugs and weapons go hand-in-hand and submits that that use of 9 experience, to create a rea sonable su spicion that [i]f entry is stalled or delayed the controlled dangerous substance can easily and quickly be destroyed results in a considera ble overgeneralization, of the kind against which the Richards Court cautioned. See 52 0 U. S. a t 393, 11 7 S. Ct. a t 1421, 1 37 L. E d. 2d at 6 23. Nor does petitioner Davis agree that the additional factors identified by the Davis court provide the requisite showing: Even with this add itional inform ation, the aff idavit fails to establish the requisite reasonable suspicion that exigent circumstances existed to justify not knocking and announcing. Rather, the large amount of drugs supports the petitioner s position that the danger of destruction of evidence was insignificant, the fact that several people resided in the dwelling was not alleged to create any extra danger, and unlike the defendant in Wynn [v. S tate, 117 Md. App. 133, 699 A.2d 512 (1 996)], the fact that Adams h ad several arrests for dru g violations d oes not in any way su ggest th at Ada ms had a prope nsity for v iolence . Both of the petitioners deny that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement is applicable to save the admissibility of the eviden ce in this case . This is so, they submit, because the police could not have acted ob jectively and rea sonably because the offer of conclusory statements based on unsupported assumptions, rather than case sp ecific and particularized fact s, has bee n rejecte d, by Richards, as a sufficient basis for establishing a reasonable suspicion of the existence of exigency warranting a no-knock entry. As petitioner Adams puts it, to apply the good faith exception to a no-knock authorization based on an affidavit s categorical statements about drug dealers is to create just another prohibited per se rule. 10 The State, of course, does not agree . On the co ntrary, it proffers th ree argum ents as to why this Court, as did the Court of Special Appeals, should affirm the judgment of the Circuit Co urt. With resp ect to the suf ficiency of the factual alleg ations in support of a no-knock en try, it argues, pointing to the factors the intermediate appe llate court identified in Davis, that they were of details specific to the case and supported the inference that knocking and announcing could pose a danger to police officer or risk the destruction of eviden ce. Also s ignificant to th e State, is the fa ct that authorization for the no-knock entry was sought from a judicial officer, in the request for the search and seizure warrant, as to which a different, more deferential, standard of review from that applicable to an on the scene determination by the officers applies. Application of that standard to the case sub judice, the State submits, properly resulted in the trial judge upholding th e no knock en try. Referencing the test of objective good faith set out in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n. 23, 104 S. Ct. 3405 , 3420 n. 23, 82 L. Ed. 2 d 677, 6 98 (1984), whethe r a reasona bly well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistra te s authoriza tion, the State argues that th e applicants relied in good faith on the warrant s a uthorization to conduc t a no-kno ck entry, and thus, the evidence seized is admissible pursuant to the good faith exception to the exclus ionary rule. 11 Fina lly, the State submi ts that, assuming a violation of the knock-and-announce rule, the evidence would be admissible pursuant to the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines.9 In State v. Lee, 374 Md. 275, 821 A.2d 922 (2003), this Court rejected the same argument in the context of a search and seizure warrant executed in violation of the knock and announce requirement. In that case, the State argued both that cocaine the police recovered in executin g a search w arrant witho ut first knock ing and an nouncing their presence w as, neverthe less, admissib le because it would h ave been discovered inevitably when the officers entered the home pursuant to the valid warrant and that the warrant was an indepe ndent sou rce for the c ocaine. A lthough rec ognizing th e close interre lationship between inevitable discovery and independent source, we noted their analytical distinction: The ine vitable disco very doctrine a pplies wh ere eviden ce is not actu ally discovered by lawful means, but inevitably would have been. Its focus is on what would have happened if the illegal search had not aborted the lawful method of discovery. The independent source doctrine, however, applies when the evidence actually has been discovered by lawful means. Its focus is on what actually happened - was the discovery tainted by the illegal search? 374 Md. at 292, 821 A.2d at 932 (quoting United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 1309, 1318 n.1 (7 th Cir. 1993)). We rejected the State s argument. As to inevitable discovery, we said: To app ly the inevitable d iscovery rule . . . w henever th ere is a valid warrant, to render admissible, any evidence seized in execution of that warrant in violation of the knock and announce rule is, in effect, to create a blanke t excep tion to th at rule fo r all case s involv ing valid search warra nts, . . .precisely wha t Richards prohibits. This is exactly what the High Court has said w e may no t do. State v. Lee, 374 Md. at 303, 821 A.2d at 938. As to independent source, we concluded: [W]e re ject the Go vernmen t's position beca use it wou ld comple tely emasculate the knock-and-announce rule. As stated supra, the requirement that officers reasonably wait is a crucial element of the knock-and-announce rule. To remove the exclusionary bar from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant would in one swift move gut the constitution's regulation of how officers execute such warrants. Id. at 303, 821 A.2d at 938 (quoting U.S. v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 98 6 (6 th Cir. 200 0). Lee controls the case sub judice, insofar as the inevitable discovery and independent 12 III. The Fourth Amendm ent of the United States Constitution provides: The right of the p eople to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, bu t upon pro bable cau se, supporte d by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the p lace to be searched, and the pers ons or th ings to b e seized . Its clear and unequivocal purpose is to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures and, because it recognizes the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedd ed in our trad itions since the origins of th e Repub lic, Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170, 178, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1741, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 224 (1984) (quoting Payton v. New Y ork, 445 U.S. 573, 601, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1 387, 6 3 L. Ed. 2d 639, 660 (1980)). See also, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 1697, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818, 827 (1999) ( the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose, quoting Semayne s Case, 77 Eng . Rep. 194 , 195 (K.B . 1603)); United States v. United States Dist. Ct. for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 21 25, 2134, 32 L. Ed. 2d 752, 764 (1972) ( [P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amen dment is dire cted ), it thus p rotects the righ ts of citizens to retreat into his [or her] own home and be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2041, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 100 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. Unite d States, 365 U.S. 505, 511, 81 S. Ct. 679, 683, 5 L. Ed. 2d source arguments are concerned. 13 734, 739 (196 1). In terpreted as ge nera lly in pari mater ia with the F ourth Am endmen t, Dua v. Comc ast Cable , 370 Md. 604, 622, 805 A.2d 1061, 1072 (2002); Scott v. State , 366 Md. 121, 139, 782 A.2d 862, 873 (2001); Gahan v. State, 290 Md. 310, 319-21, 430 A.2d 4 9, 53-5 4 (198 1), Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights has a like, though perhaps n ot identical, purpose and effect, to prohibit unlawful searches and seizures, Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 21, 688 A.2d 22, 32 (1995); Givner v . State, 210 Md. 484, 492-93, 124 A.2d 764, 768-69 (1956), and is subject to a like, but not identical, interpretation. It provides: all warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the person in special, are illegal, an d ough t not to b e grante d. A. Unlike many States, whose legislatures have enacte d such laws, e.g . State v. Pierson, 472 N.W.2d 898, 900-901 (Neb. 1991) (citing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-411, which permits entry without notice when the judge or magistrate issuing a search warrant has inserted therein that the officer executing it shall not be required to give such n otice ); United State v. Tisd ale, 195 F.3d 70, 72 (2 nd Cir. 1999) (noting that New York s noknock statute, N.Y.C. P. L. § 690.35(4)(b)(i) permits the issuance of such a warrant when it is shown that the property sought may be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of ); State v. Utvick, 675 N .W.2d 387, 394 (N. D. 2004) ( No-knock search 14 warrants are authorized unde r N. D. C. C. § 19 -03.1-32 (3) 10 ); State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 52 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Utah Code Ann. §77-23-10(2) (1990), authorizing noknock warrants upon proof, under oath, that the obje ct of the sea rch may be q uickly destroyed ... or that physical harm may result to any person if notice w ere given ); Labatos v. State, 875 P.2d 716 (Wyo. 1994) (Wyo. Stat. § 35-7-1045 (1 988)), we note that Maryland does not statutorily authorize its judicial officers to issue no-knock warrants. Indeed, Maryland, by statute, does not in any way prescribe how search warrants are to be executed; unlike many of its siste r states, see, e.g. CAL. Penal Code §1531 (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.19 (West 1997) ; OHI O RE V. CO DE. A NN. § 2935.12 (West 1990); PA. STAT . ANN. § 2 08 (West 2001 ), it does not have a knock and announce statute. The o nly statute regulatin g search an d seizure w arrants in Maryland when this warrant was issued was codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Replacement Volume) Article 27, § 551.11 It authorized District and Circuit Co urt judges to issue search and seizure warrants, established the standard to b e applied to their issuance, an d prescribe d the conte nts of the ap plication for search warrant and for the search warrant, itself. That statute has been recodified, without substantive change, 10 The standard that must be met for issuance of a North Dakota no-knock warrant is probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, as the Supreme Court has decree d. See Richards v. Wiscon sin, 520 U.S. 385, 393, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 623 (1997). 11 Maryland Rule 4-6 01 (a) addresses the auth ority to issue a search warrant. It expressly states provides: (a) Issuanc e--Autho rity. A search warrant may issue only as authorized by law. Title 5 of these rules, pertaining to evidence, does not apply to the issuanc e of a se arch w arrant. 15 at Maryland Cod e (2001) § 1-203 of the Criminal Proc edure Article. In pertinent part, § 1-203, as §551 had done, provides: (a) In general. - (1) A circuit court judge or District Court judge may issue forthwith a search warrant whenever it is made to appear to the judge, by application as described in paragraph (2) of this subsection, that there is prob able cause to believe tha t: (i) a mis dem eano r or f elon y is being c omm itted by a person or in a buildin g, apartme nt premises, place, or thing within the territorial jurisdiction of the judge; or (ii) property subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State is on the person or in or on the building, apartmen t, premises, place, or thing. (2) An application for a search warrant shall be: (i) in writing; (ii) signed and sworn to by the applicant; and (iii) acco mpa nied by an affidavit tha t: 1. sets forth the ba sis for prob able cause as described in paragraph (1) of this subsection; and 2. contains facts within the personal knowledge of the aff iant that there is probab le cause . (3) The s earch wa rrant shall: (i) be directed to a duly constituted police officer and authorize the police o fficer to search the suspected person, building, apartment, premises, p lace, or thing a nd to seize any property found subject to seizure under the criminal laws of the State; and 16 (ii) name or describe , with reasonable p artic ularity: 1. the person, building, apartment, premises, place, or thing to be searched; 2. the grounds for the search; and 3. the name of the applicant on whose application the search warra nt was issued. Nevertheless, it has long been the law in M aryland that law enforcem ent officers executing a search and seizure w arrant for an individual s private residence must knock and announce their presence before entering and sea rching . State v. Lee, 374 Md.275, 283-86, 821 A.2d 922, 926-28 (2003) (detailing the history of the knock and announce doctrine in Maryland ); Henson v. State, 236 M d. 518, 5 21-22 , 204 A.2d 516-518-19 (1964) (holding tha t police offic er must g ive proper n otice of his p urpose an d authority and be denied admittance before he can use force to enter the premises to be sea rched ); Frankel v. State, 178 Md. 553, 561, 16 A.2d 93, 97 (1940) (recognizing that an officer in executing a warrant to enter a house, which warrant is valid on its face, may break open the doors if denied admittanc e, but a demand is n ecessary prior to breaking doors when the premises are in the charge of someon e. ); Goodm an v. State, 178 Md. 1, 8, 11 A.2d 635, 639 (1940) ( A demand is necessary prio r to the break ing in of the doo rs only where some person is found in charge of the building to be searched. (citation omitted)). The reasons for th e knock a nd anno unce requ irement w ere well state d in Henson, which noted that it is rooted in an individual s right to privacy in his or her 17 own home and promotes the principle that because the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist seeming aggression on his private property. 236 Md. at 522, 204 A.2d at 519. The Maryland knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Common Law and is consistent w ith, and mirro rs, Suprem e Court pr ecedent. T hat Court, in Miller v. U.S., 357 U.S. 301, 306-307, 78 S. Ct. 1190, 1194, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1332 (1958) noted that, although the knock and announce law applicable in that case was mandated by a federal statute, namely 18 U.S.C. § 3108, which provided that an officer, executing a search warrant, may break open a door o nly if, after notice o f his author ity and purpos e, he is denied admittance, the requirement that officers announce their presence before entering premises to be searche d springs fr om the earliest days, [when] the common law drastically limited the authority of law officers to break the door of a house to effect an arrest. It cautioned that [t]he requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing en try into a home ... should not be given grudging application." 357 U.S. at 313, 78 S. Ct. at 1198, 2 L. Ed. 2d at 1340. Relying on Miller, in Sabbath v. U.S., 391 U.S. 585, 589-90, 88 S. Ct. 1755, 1758-59, 20 L. Ed. 2d 828, 833-834 (196 8), the Court held that a California State statute identical to the federal statute prohibiting en try pursuant to a search warrant, unless an officer first knocked and announced his or her presence, was not limited only to when force w as used to enter the prem ises but rather, 18 placing emphasis on the lack of announcement, applied to any entry without announ cement. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995) for a detailed discussion of the knock and announce rule, its vintage and importance. B. It is now clear that the knock and announce requirement is rooted in the Fourth Amendment reason ablene ss analysis , see Wilson, 514 U.S . at 929, 115 S. Ct. at 1915, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 9 79, the touc hstone of which is th e reason ableness in all the circumstances of the particu lar governm ental invasio n of a citizen s perso nal secur ity; reasonableness depends on a b alance between the public interest and the individu al s right to persona l security free from arbitrary interference by law officers. 12 12 Officers must only wait a reasonable amount of time after knocking and announ cing their pre sence bef ore makin g forcible e ntry. What is re asonable is determ ined by th e facts k nown to the of ficers in the parti cular ca se. U.S. v. Banks, 540 U. S. 31,__ , 124 S. Ct. 521, 526, 157 L. Ed. 2d 343, 353 (2003). In drug cases, the Supreme Court has held that 15-20 seconds is a reasonable amount of time because the eviden ce is rea dily dispo sable. Id. In reaching that determina tion, the Supreme C ourt relied upon similar holdings by several other appellate courts: Several Courts of Appeals have explicitly taken into account the risk of disposal of drug evidence as a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of waiting time. Se e, e.g., United States v. Goodson, 165 F.3d 610, 612, 614 (C.A.8 19 99) (holdin g a 20-sec ond wa it after a loud a nnounc ement at a one-story ranc h reasona ble); United States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 925927 (C.A.6 19 98) (holding a 15-to-30 -second wait in mid morning after a loud anno unceme nt reasonab le); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 322-323 (C.A.D .C.1993) (h olding a 15 -second w ait after a reaso nably audible an nouncem ent at 7:45 a .m. on a w eekday reaso nable); United States v. G arcia, 983 F.2d 1160, 1168 (C.A.1 1993) (holding a 10-second wait after a loud anno uncement reason able); United States v. Jones, 133 F.3d 358, 361-362 (C.A.5 1998) (relying specifically on the concept of 19 Pennsylvan ia v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109, 98 S. Ct. 330, 332, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331, 335 (1977), quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 904 (1 968). In addition , as this C ourt alre ady had d one, see Henson, 236 Md. at 523-25, 204 A.2d at 519-20,13 Wilson made clea r that the ann ouncem ent requirem ent is exigen cy, holdin g a 15-t o-20-s econd wait rea sonab le). See also United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 981-982, n. 7 (C.A.9 2002) ( Banks appears to be a departure from our prior decisions ... .[W]e have found a 10 to 20 second wait to be reasonable in similar circumstances, albeit when the police h eard sounds after the k nock and ann ouncement ); United States v. Jenkins, 175 F.3d 1208, 1215 (C.A.10 1999) (holding a 14-to-20-s econd w ait at 10 a.m. re asonable); United States v. Markling, 7 F.3d 130 9, 1318-1 319 (C.A .7 1993) (h olding a 7-s econd w ait at a small motel room reasonable when officers acted on a specific tip that the suspec t was lik ely to dispo se of th e drugs ). Banks, at ___ n.5, 124 S. Ct. at 526, n.5, 157 L. Ed. 2d at 353 n.5. 13 In that case, the Court held that the entry by breaking and without warning was reasonable, permissible and legal and the evidence seized was admissible against the appellant, noting [p]racticalities and exigencies in searches for narcotics require the element of surprise entry, for if opportunity is given all evidence easily may be destroyed during the time required to give notice, demand admittance and accept communication of denial of entry, Henson v. State, 236 M d. 518, 5 23, 204 A.2d 5 16, 519 (1964 ), and, quotin g, with a pprov al, Kapla n, Search and Se izure, A No Man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49 Cal. L . Rev. 474 , 502 (196 1), that: ... it would seem that the perfection of small fire-arms and the development of indoor plumbing through which evidence can quickly be destroyed, have made [statutes requiring notice and entry before the use of force to enter] ... a dange rous an achron ism. In m any situatio ns toda y ..., a rule requiring officers to forfeit the valuable element of surprise seems senseless and dangerous. 236 M d. at 524, 20 4 A.2d a t 520. This d iscussion w as identified by the Court in Richards v. Wiscon sin, 520 U.S. 385, 390 n. 1, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1420 n. 1, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, 622 n. 1 (1997), as a case, predating Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S . 927, 115 S . Ct. 1914, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995), that sanctioned a per se rule in drug cases to forgo the knock-and-announce requirement, whenever there was simple probable cause to search a 20 not rigid; the Fou rth Ame ndment privacy interests must be balanced with the need for effective law enforcement and police safety. The flexible requirement of reasonableness [,therefore,] should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcemen t interests. Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934, 115 S. Ct. at 1918, 131 L. Ed. 2d at 982 (1995). The Court, in Wilson, declined, ho wever, to enunciate clear rules fo r when a given set of facts wo uld be suf ficient to constitute an articulated exigency w arranting an exception to the knoc k and ann ounce ru le, preferring to leave that de termination to develop ment by the state courts. Nor did the Court address the timing of the exigency showing. And, although the Court commented on the subject in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422 n. 7, 137 L. Ed. 2d 6 15, 625 n. 7 (1997 ),14 it has not dec ided it. home for nar cotics T o that ex tent, Henson is no longer good law. 14 The Court Stated: A number of States give magistrate judges the authority to issue noknock w arrants if the o fficers dem onstrate ahe ad of time a reasonab le suspicion that entry without prior announcement will be appropriate in a particul ar conte xt. See, e.g., 725 Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 725, §§ 5/108-8 (1992); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-411 (1995); Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §§ 1228 (Supp.1997); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 23A-35-9 (1988); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-210 (1995). But see State v. Arce, 83 Or. App. 185, 730 P.2d 1260 (1986) (magistrate has no authority to abrogate knock-and-announce requireme nt); State v. Bamber, 630 S o.2d 10 48 (Fla .1994) (same) . The practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahea d of time . But , as th e fac ts of this c ase d emo nstra te, a m agistrate 's decision no t to authorize a no-knoc k entry should not be interp reted to remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wis dom o f a no-k nock e ntry at the tim e the w arrant is b eing ex ecuted . Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 396 n. 7, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1422 n. 7, 137 L. Ed. 2d 21 As to the latter, as we have seen supra, some states have enacted no-knock warrant statutes, thus expressly authorizing the issuance, by judicial officers, of search and seizure w arrants, wh ich permit the police to enter the premises to be searched without knocking and announcin g. There is a split of authority among states that do not have no-knock warrant statutes as to whether judicial officers may, nevertheless, author ize no -knock entries when they issue a search and sei zure w arrant. Some courts hold that no-knock warrants may be is sued only if the re is statutory authority to do so. Parsley v. Superior Court, 513 P.2d 611, 615 (Cal. 1973) (holding that the magistrate was w ithout power to pre-a uthorize violation of knock and announce requirement, observing, the key to permissible un announ ced entry is knowledge of exigent circumstances possessed by police officers at the time of entry ); State v. Bamber, 630 So.2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fla. 1994 ) ( No statu tory authority exists 615, 62 5 n. 7 (1 997). But see Dalia v. U.S., 441 U.S. 238, 99 S. Ct. 1682, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1979), in which, after concluding that covert searches are constitutional in some circumstances, at least if they are made pursuant to warrant, id. at 247, 99 S. Ct. at 1688, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 192, the Court observed: [i]t is well established that law officers constitutionally may break and enter to execute a search warrant when such entry is the only means by which the warrant effectively may be executed. . . . Petitioner nonetheless argues that c overt entries a re uncon stitutional for th eir lack of n otice. This argument is frivolous, as was indicated in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 n.16, 88 S. Ct. 507, 513 n. 16, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), where the Court stated that officers nee d not announc e their purpose before conducting an otherwise [duly] authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical eviden ce. Id. at 247- 48, 99 S . Ct. at 16 88, 60 L . Ed. 2d at 186- 87 (em phasis a dded). 22 under Florida law for issuing a no-knock search warrant, citing Parsley); State v. Eminowicz, 520 P.2d 330, 331-32 (Ariz. App.1974) (holding that justice of the peace had no author ity, statutory or judicial, to issu e a no -knock search warra nt, observing, Where the legislature has enacted a statute dealing with execution of a search warrant w hich is clear and unambiguous on its face, we, as a court may not weigh the reasons for and against such a statute - that is the province of the legislature. ); State v. Acre, 730 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Or. App. 1987) ( The limited exceptions to the constitutional knock-a nd-anno unce requ irement are based on the circumstances as they exist at the time when a warrant is executed, and they nece ssarily involve a violation of Oregon statutory law. A magistrate cannot validly authorize a statutory violation ). See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment § 4.8 (g) (1996), referring to this line of cases as [t]he prevailing but not unanim ous vie w. Other courts have reached the op posite re sult. Commonw ealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Mass. 1982) ( we conclude it to be a sound principle that the decision whether to dispense with the requirement of announcement should be left to judicial officers whenever police have sufficient information at the time of application for a warrant to justify such a request ); State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1978) (identifying as one of four (4) principles governing unannounced entries in execution of search warrants, that police inform the magistrate of circum stances of which they are 23 aware and believe will justify an unannounced entry and obtain specific authorization for it ); State v. Johnson, 775 A.2d 1273, 12 79) (N. J. 20 01); State v. Henderson, 629 N.W.2d 613, 622 ((Wis. 2001) (holding that Wisconsin judicial officers are authorized to issue no-kn ock wa rrants); Poole v. S tate, 596 S .E.2d 4 20 422 (Ga. App. 2004) (holding that the notice requirement of the knock and announce statute may be dispensed with ... by a no-knock provision in the warrant or by the presence of exigent circumstances ); 15 White v. S tate, 746So.2d 953, 956 (Miss. App. 1999) (upholding no-knock warrant, notwithstanding repeal of statute authorizing no-kno ck warr ant, explaining, Mississippi has no statute which specifically prohibits no-knock warrants, and our case law has never prohibited issuance of no-knock w arrants ). See United States v. Dupras, 980 F. Supp. 344 , 348-49 (D. M ont. 1997). The court in Henderson, amplified its reason for authorizing Wisconsin judicial officers to issue no-knock warrants in the absence of a statute, explaining: there may be occasions in which facts justifying the unannounc ed entry would be known at the time the warrant is sought, and ... both law enforcement officers and citizens benefit from review of the entry by a neutral magistrate 629 N.W.2d at 622, quoting State v. Cleveland, 348 N.W.2d 512, 519 ( Wis. 19 84). Both Massachusetts and Minnesota require the police at the scene to make a threshold 15 Earlier, in Cox v. S tate, 286 S.E.2 d 482, 48 4 (Ga. A pp. 1981 ), the Georg ia appellate court had held that the notice provision was excused ... where police have reasonable grounds to believe that forewarning would lead to the immediate destruction of evid ence. 24 reappraisal of the actual th reat, 16 even after a no-knock warrant has been issued. Scalise, 439 N .E.2d a t 823. See Lien, 265 N.W .2d at 839. T his is so, as the Scalise court explained, because: We recognize that the facts existing at the time the warrant is issued may no longer exist at th e time th e warr ant is ex ecuted . In those instances, the officers would be required to knock and announce their purpose. The changed circumstances would render ineffective the magistrate s decision that a no -knock entry wa s justified . 439 N.E.2d at 823. IV A. As a threshold matter, the intermediate appellate court addressed an issue that was not directly raised by either party 17 and which, although discussed in Dashiell v. 16 The court in Commonw ealth v. Scalise, 439 N.E.2d 81 8, 823 (Mass. 19 82), refers only to destruction of evidence, perhaps because that was the exception invoked in that case. The reference in State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838-39 (Minn. 1978) was not so lim ited. 17 In their Petition for Writ of Certiorari and in their briefs in this Court, the petitioners questioned only the sufficiency of the factual allegations in support of the issuance of the no-knock warrant in this case and whether the good faith exception to the w arrant re quirem ent app lied to th e exec ution o f that w arrant in this case . Specifically, they asked: 1. In order to justify issuance of a no-knock warrant, may police allege only that the targets of the warrant were suspected marijuana dealers who kept a large supply of marijuana in the target premises, and that in the affiant s experience, drug dealers use guns and can easily destroy drugs? 2. If not, does the good faith exception to Fourth Amendment s warrant requireme nt apply to the ex ecution of such a w arrant? The petitioners thus, at the very least, seem to assume that judges may issue noknock warrants. For its part, the State s cross petition for writ of certiorari presented only the question whether, if the good faith exception fails, the independent source and/or 25 State, 143 M d. App. 134, 152-53, 792 A.2d 1185, 11 95-96 (2002), 18 has never been decided by a Maryland court, whe ther no-kn ock w arrants - wa rrants that determine the propriety of a no-knoc k entry - the ex istence of exigency excusing compliance with the knock and announce requirement - at the time they are issued - are authorized by Mar yland law . It conclu ded tha t they are. Noting the prefe rence that se arches be c onducted pursuant to warrants issued by judicial officers, Davis , 144 Md. App. at 155, 797 A.2d at 90, and proffering the benefits accruin g to the o fficers who o btain a w arrant, i.e. (1) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, (2) a more deferential standard of review by the suppression court, ... and (3) the presumption that the affidavit does establish probable cause for the search , id. at 155-156, 797 A. 2d at 91-92 (footnote omitted) (citing and quoting inevitab le disco very doc trines ap ply to mak e the ev idence admiss ible. 18 The court commented that the warrant in that case was a no-knock search warrant, one utilized where exigent circumstances justify not knocking and announcing. Dashiell v. S tate, 143 M d. App . 134, 15 2-53, 7 92 A.2 d 1185 , 1195- 96 (20 02), rev d, 374 Md. 85, 821 A.2d 372 (2003). In reversing the Court of Special Appeals, we observed: While the Court of Special Appeals identified the type of warrant in this case, the type of warrant has no bearing on the resolution o f the basic iss ue. It is the con tent of the af fidavit requesting the warran t upon w hich we r ely. Our decisio n in this case should not be construed as an approval of no-knock warrants. We have not in our cases ever resolved whether the issuance of "no-knock" warrants is authorized under Maryland law. We do not resolve that issue in the present case because it is not the type of warrant that is determinative but the information upon which officers act which determines wheth er a frisk is perm itted. Dashiell v. State, 374 M d. at 89, 8 21 A.2 d at 374 . 26 McD onald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467, 701A. 2d 675, 682 (1997) and citing Herbert v. State, 136 Md. A pp. 458, 48 4-494, 76 6 A. 2d 1 90,203-2 09 (2001 )), the intermed iate appellate court conclu ded that [t]his pre fere nce s hould be equally applicable to noknock warrants. 144 Md. App. at 156, 797 A. 2d at 92. Thus, the court instructed: If at the time he or she is applying for a search warrant, a law enforcement officer believes that the circumstances under which the warrant will be executed justify dispensing with the knock and announce requireme nt, the officer should seek no-knock autho rization from the warrant issuing judge. If the judge is satisfied that the request for a noknock entry is reasonable, the judge should include in th e warran t a mandate that, in substantially the following form, ... provides: Good cause being shown therefor, the executing law enforcement officers are au thorized to e nter the prem ises to be searched without giving notice of their authority and purpose. Moreover, when they apply for no-knock authorization in a search warrant, law enforcement officers do not have to includ e in the affid avit the kind of search scene case-specific, particularized circumstances of exigency that they would have to establish during the suppression hearing if they did not have a no-knock provision in the warrant and made the noknock entry determination on their own. Id. at 156-57, 797 A . 2d at 91-92 (footnotes o mitted). It was from this premise that the Court of Special Appeals, in this case, proceeded to the analysis of the factual a llegations in support o f exigenc y. Critical to the analysis was th e court s view that the quality of the search scene case-specific, particularized circumstan ces of exig ency requir ed is different when the no-knock authorization is obtained from a judicial officer, it is sought when the warrant is applied 27 for, than when the decision to en ter the prem ises withou t knocking and anno uncing is made on the scene, without judicial intervention. As the intermediate appellate court explained: Dispensing with the search scene case-specific particularized circumstances of exigency for law enforcement officers seeking no-knock authorization from a judicial officer serves the public interest. It is more beneficial for law enforcement officers to s eek no-k nock auth orization in a search warrant, rather than make their own independent on-the-scene determination of whether to enter without knocking and announcing. If law enforcem ent officers had to ma ke an iden tical showin g of exig ency regardless of whether they received no-knock authorization in the search warrant, there would be n o incentive to seek judicial autho rization prior to entering withou t knock ing and annou ncing. Id. at 157 n. 7, 797 A. 2d at 92 n. 7. Subsequently, in two c ases, See State v. Riley, 147 Md. App. 113, 807 A.2d 797 (2002) and Carroll v. Sta te, 149 M d. App. 59 8, 817 A .2d 927 (2 003), the Court o f Special Appea ls confirme d this approach. In Riley, the issue was the correctness of a ruling by the Circuit C ourt for B altimore C ounty invalida ting a search and seizure warrant containing a no-knock provision because the application for the w arrant did not provid e suffic ient justif ication f or a no -knock entry. Id. at 117, 807 A.2d at 799800. More specifically, the question presented involved determining to what deference a decision by a wa rrant issuing ju dge is entitled to be given by a reviewin g judge; as the intermediate appellate co urt framed it: What will control the outcome of this appeal is the procedu ral posture in which the set of facts appea rs. In differen t postures, the s ame set of facts may yield diametrically different, albeit equally proper, results. It may 28 make a critical difference whether the judge whose decision is being appealed was 1) properly making a decision on the merits of such exigency or 2) reviewing another judge s prior decision in that rega rd. It may make a critical difference whether the set of ostensibly exigent circumstances 1) was being advanced to justify a warrantless police decision to make a no-knock entry or 2) was the basis for a jud ge s decisio n to issu e a no knock warra nt. Id. at 114, 807 A.2d at 798. Reasoning by analogy from the preference for warrants to determine whether a search of a dwelling will be p ermitted , see Johnson v. United States, 333 U .S. 10, 1 4, 68 S . Ct. 367, 369, 92 L. Ed. 436, 440 (1948), and perceiving that [t]he fundamental policy undergirding the warrant requirement is just as strong with respect to the no-knoc k increme nt as it is with res pect to the u nderlying entry into the home itself , the court co ncluded, [j]ust as the decision WHETHER to cross the threshold should be submitted to a neutral and detached judicial figure, so too should the decision as to HOW to cross that threshold. Id. at 120-21, 807 A.2d at 802. From this premise, which emphasizes the great deference a reviewing court owes the probable cause determination of a judicial office r, see Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 547 (1983), and quoting the portion of Davis, 144 M d. App. at 1 56-57, 79 7 A. 2d a t 92, set out supra, the court admonished the applicants for search and seizure warrants to advise the iss uing judg e of all exigencies that would justify a no-knoc k entry and admonish ed review ing courts to give great deference to the no-knock determinations of the warrant issuing judge, that is, 29 the suppression hearing court should uphold that provision as long as the warrant ap plication pro vided the iss uing judg e with a su bstantial basis for concludin g that there ex isted a reason able suspic ion that, under the circumsta nces in which the warrant was to be executed, the knock and announce requirement would be dangerous to the executing officers or would result in the destruction of the items described in the search warrant. Id. at 121-22, 807 A.2d at 802-03, quoting Davis, 144 Md. App. at 152, 797 A.2d at 84. The issue addressed in Carroll was whether the failure to seek a no-knock warrant foreclosed the right of the police to execute the warrant using a no-knock entry. Building upon Davis and Riley, the intermediate appellate court held that a no- knock entry to execute a search and seizure warrant was in valid where the police purpose ly did not seek a no-kn ock w arrant, 149 Md. App. at 601, 817 A.2d at 929, and, at the time of the entry, the information known to the police was the same as that which they had when they app lied for the wa rrant. Id. at 611- 14, 817 A.2d at 935-36. The court explained: What is absent is the absolute lack of material change in the facts or circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant between the time it was issued and served. In other words, the officers serving the warrant had no particularized knowledge. Sergean t Bender's tes timony clearly demonstrated that the partic ularized knowledge was already known at the time they secured the warrant. No additional facts giving rise to a sudden emergency were shown other than what they previous ly had learned from the o fficers who secured the warrant, namely Detective Verderaime. ... Moreover, the record indicates that the officers did not witness any suspiciou s activities or ev ents while s urveilling C arroll's residence that would lead them to believe that the climate had changed and that would give rise to exigent circum stances. Thus, the officers serving the warrant based their decision not to knock and announce on the information previously given to them by Detective Verderaime that was 30 known at the time the y secured the s earch wa rrant, rather than on exigent circumstances that may have arisen at the time they executed the wa rrant. ... Under these circumstances, there was no evidence of exigent circumstances that could possibly eliminate the constitutional requirement to knoc k and a nnoun ce. Id. at 611-13, 817 A.2d at 935-36. B. We rejec t the r ule im plici tly, if n ot ex pres sly, enunciated by the Court of Special Appeals in Davis, Riley and Carroll, requiring applicants for search and seizure warrants to obtain pre-entry authorization for a no-knock entry, to obtain judicial approval of the me thod of en try in addition to th e authorization of the search. The propriety of a no-knock entry, while certainly related to the q uestion of th e propriety of authorizing a search of the premises, is a different issue, both temporally and anal ytically. Different criteria inform the decision of the form of entry than inform the analysis of whether, or not, there is probable cause to search in the first place . Parsley, supra, 513 P.2d at 614, the Supreme Court of California explained: [I]nformation providing probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is of a diffe rent nature and source than information justifying unannounced entry. While a se arch war rant must necessarily rest upon previously obtained information, unannounced entry is excused only on the basis of exigent circumstances existing at the time an officer approa ches a s ite to ma ke an a rrest or e xecute a warr ant. See also Dalia v. U.S., 441 U .S. 238 , 99 S. C t. 1682, 6 0 L. Ed . 2d 177 (1979 ). 31 In In Dalia, the Supreme C ourt granted certiorari to consider two questions: ... may courts authorize e lectronic surveillance that requires covert entry into private premises for installation of the necessary equipment? ... must authorization for such surveillance include a specific statement by the court that it approves of the covert entry? Id. at 241, 99 S. Ct. at 1685, 60 L. Ed 2d at 182. The petitioner in that case had been convicted of conspiracy to steal an inte rstate shipment of goods, partly based on evidence obtained as a result of wiretaps on his office phones. Surveillance developed probable cause to believe that he was involved in the conspiracy, and FBI agents obtained a warr ant for t he wire taps. Id. at 243, 99 S. Ct. at 1685 , 60 L. E d. 2d at 1 84. Althoug h the wireta p warran t expressly identified the phones to be tapped, there was no clause authorizing cov ert entry int o the of fice to p lace the taps. Id. at 246, 99 S. Ct. at 1687, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 185. The petitioner s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant was denied and that ruling was affirmed on appeal. In the Supre me Co urt, he ar gued, w ith respe ct to the s econd questio n, if covert entries are to be authorized ..., the authorizing court must explicitly set forth its app roval of su ch entries before the fact. In this case, as is customa ry, the court's order c onstituted the sole written authorization of the surveillance of petitioner's office. As it did not state in terms that the surveillance was to include a covert entry, petitioner insists that the entry viola ted his F ourth A mend ment p rivacy righ ts. Id. at 254- 255, 99 S. Ct. at 1 692, 60 L. Ed. 2 d at 191 . 32 The Court did not agree. Rather, pointing to the fact that the Fourth Amendment warrant clause requires only three things, namely: First, warrants must be issued by neutral and disinterested magistrates. . . . Second, those seeking warrants must demons trate to the mag istrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particu lar apprehe nsion or co nviction for a par ticul ar of fens e. . . . F inall y, warrants must particu larly describe the th ings to be se ized as w ell as the place to be search ed, id. at 255, 99 S . Ct. at 1692, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 191 (citations omitted), the Court noted that authorization of the method of entry is not specified as a warrant requireme nt: [n]othing in the language of the Constitution or in this Court s decisions interpreting that language suggests that, in addition to the three requireme nts discussed above, search warrants also must include a specificatio n of the precise manner in which they are to be executed. On the contrary, it is generally left to the discretion of the execu ting officers to determine the details of how be st to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by a warrant - subject of c ourse to the general Fo urth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 257, 99 S. Ct. at 1693, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 193 (emphasis added). It added: [o]ften in executing a warrant the police may find it necessary to interfere with privacy rights not explicitly considered by the judge who issued the warrant. For example, police executing an arrest warrant commonly find it necessary to enter the suspect s home in order to take him into custody, and thereby impinge on both privacy and freedom of movem ent. See e.g., United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 421 (CA5 1976) (on petition for rehearing). Similarly, officers executing search warrants on occas ion, must da mage pro perty in order to p erform the ir duty. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 556 F.2d 304, 30 5 (CA5 19 77), 33 United States v. G ervato, 474 F.2d 864, 94 S. Ct. 39, 38 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1973)) It would extend the Warrant Clause to the extreme to re quire that, whenever it is re ason ably li kely th at Fo urth Amendmen t righ ts ma y be affected in more than one w ay, the court must set forth precisely the procedures to be followed by the executing officers. Such an interpretation is unnecessary, as we have held - - and the Government concedes - - that the manner in wh ich a warrant is executed is subject to later judicial review as to it s reas onable ness. See Zurcher v. Stanfo rd Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559-560, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1978-1979, 56 L. Ed.2d 525 (1 978). Id. at 257-258, 99 S. Ct. at 1693-94, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 193. The decision as to how entry is to be made balances, at the least, the privacy interest of the indiv idual, the nee d to protect th e safety of po lice officers a nd the nee d to preserve evidence. See Richards, 520 U. S. at 387, 117 S. Ct. at 1418, 137 L. Ed.2d at 620. The prob able cause analysis, on the other han d, while ultim ately concerne d with the privacy issue, is more fact based; it is concerned more specifically with the probability of the item or items that are the subject of the inquiry being in the place to be sear ched. Id. at 389, 117 S.Ct. at 1419, 137 L.Ed. 2d at 621. Thus, what the Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13, 68 S. Ct. 367, 368, 92 L. Ed. 436, 439-440 (1948), where the issue was probable cause, is entirely logical, absent exigent circumstances: deference to the determin ation of a d etached w arrantissuing judge rather than a zealous officer engaged in the often-adrenaline charged task of ferreting out crime, is appropriate, because it supports the goal of encouraging officers to seek warrants. When the issue concerns the manner of entry, however, 34 probable cause for the search already having been established, the appropriate inqu iry, and thus the decision to be reviewed, is whether the form of entry used wa s reasonab le in light of the fa cts as know n to the officer a t the time of the e ntry. Ker v. C alifornia, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1633-34, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 742 (1963) ( In addition to the officers' belief that Ker was in possession of narcotics, which could be quicky and easily destroyed, Ker's furtive conduct in eluding them shortly before the arrest was ground for the belief that he mig ht well hav e been ex pecting the police ); Parsley, 513 P. 2d at 615 ( the key to permissible unannounced entry is the knowledge of exigent circumstances possessed by police officers at the time of entry. Thus, from the viewpoint of a court reviewing justification for an unannounced e ntry after th e fact, a warrant au thorizing su ch action ad ds nothing . ); Bamber, 630 S o.2d at 1 050-5 1. Moreover, the factors and circum stances bearing on the method of effecting entry to execute a search and seizure warrant may not be, and often are not, static; the facts bearing on the propriety of a no-knock entry, known to the judicial officer when the warrant w as issued m ay well chan ge and be different, pe rhaps rend ering the judicial officer s finding on the question of exigency inappropriate when the warran t is executed. This is so whatever the magistrate s decision, whether the search warrant authorized a no-knock entry or refused to authorize such an entry. That deficiency of the no-knock warrant has been recognized and explained. In Parsley, explaining why 35 the reasonableness of an entry to execute a search and seizure warrant must be judged at the time of the entry, itself, the court said: Facts existing at the time of obtaining a warrant may no longer exist at the time of en try. Such an em ergency, theref ore, can be judged on ly in light of circumstances of which the officer is aware at the latter momen t. Previously obtained information may at that time be taken into account in determining the necessity of dispensing with ordinary announcements (People v. Dumas (1973 ) Cal. 10 9 Cal. R ptr. 304 , 512 P .2d 120 8), but a more significant factor in this decision is perception and knowledge the officer acquires on the sc ene imm ediately prior to ef fecting en try. For this reason, earlier judicial authorization would be largely inappropriate in the context of unannounced entry and, thus, clearly cannot be considered a constitu tional re quirem ent. 513 P .2d at 61 4. The Supreme Court commented on this very point in Richards, pointing to the facts of that case and cautioning that, a magis trate's decision not to authorize a noknock entry should not be interpreted to remove the officers' authority to exercise independent judgment concerning the wisdom of a no-knock entry at the time the warrant is being execu ted. 52 0 U.S. a t 396 n. 7 , 117 S . Ct. at 14 22 n. 7, 137 L . Ed. 2d at 625 n. 7. That Court has also made clear that officers requesting a warrant are not constitutiona lly required to set forth the anticipate d means for execu tion of that w arrant, even when they know beforehand that unannounced or forced entry likely will be necess ary. Dalia, supra, 441 U.S. at 257, n. 19, 99 S. Ct. at 1693 n. 19, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 192 n. 19, citin g 2 W . LaFa ve, Sea rch and Seizur e 140 (1 978). See U.S. v. Hernandez, 252 F. Supp.2d 1190, 1193 (D. Kan. 2003) (the determination must always be made at 36 the time the officers entered the house). Courts that authorize no-kno ck warr ants have likewise commented and so held. See Scalise, supra, 439 N.E .2d at 823; Lien, supra, 265 N.W.2d at 839. Citing Lien, the Scalise court put it thus: We recognize that the facts existing at the time the warrant is issued may no longer exis t at the time the warrant is executed. In those instances, the officers would be required to knock and announce their purpose. The changed circu msta nces wou ld render ineffec tive the m agistrate 's decision that a no knock entry was justified . 26 Ha stings L . J., supra at 285. Thus, the police officers at the scene are re quired to m ake a thresh old reappr aisal of the actu al threat o f the de struction of evid ence. Because whatever facts officers may know and the warrant issuing judge may find at the time of the application for the search warrant, the possibility of changed circumstances requires that there be a re-evaluation of the propriety of a no-knock entry at the time of the search. We come out on the side of those courts that, in the absence of valid statutory authority, refu se to authorize a judicial officer to make an advance determination of exigency. We hold that a judicial officer in Maryland, under current Maryland law, m ay not issue a no-knock warrant. Rather, the propriety of a no- knock entr y will be reviewed and determined on the basis of the facts known to the office rs at the tim e of en try, rather th an at the time of the app lication f or the w arrant. This holding is co nsistent with other search and seizure law situations, in which the competing interests of officer safety, evidence preservation and other exigencies existing at the time of the encou nter are balanced against the defendant s privacy 37 interest. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L . Ed. 2d 889, 905 (1968)( holding that police officers may pat down the outer clothing of a suspect s clothes when they have reasonable suspicion at the time they stop the suspect that he or she is involved in criminal activity and has weapons that might compromise officer safety); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276, 286 (1990) (holding that p olice office rs may execu te a limited sw eep in conjunction with a home arrest, when the arresting officer has reason able articulab le suspicion that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. ) (emphasis add ed); Mich igan v. L ong 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983) (holding that the search of a passenger compartment of automobile, limited to those areas in which w eapons m ay be placed o r hidden, is permissible if police officer possesses reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonab ly warrant. . . off icers in believ ing that susp ect is dange rous and m ay gain immedia te control of weapons ) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S., at 21, 88 S. Ct., at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). V. We turn now to a determination of wh ether the no-knock entry by Officers O Ree and Brackus wa s justified by existing and artic ulated e xigent c ircums tances. We do so, in this case, by reviewing the affidavit submitted in support of the search and 38 seizure warrant. This is necessary in this case because there is no evidence as to the circumstances at the scene and that is w here the trial co urt, the interme diate appella te court and, indee d, the parties lo oked to de termine w hether there were suf ficient facts to show the need for a no-knock warrant. As we hav e seen, as rele vant to the resolution of the case sub judice, the affidav it sets out the o fficers exp erience an d their conclusion from that experien ce that particip ants in the drug trade often are dang erous and carry weapons and that d rugs are e asily a nd quick ly destroyed if e ntry onto the prem ises is delayed or stalled, the fact that large amounts of drugs had been seized as a result of information supplie d by one of their source s, that several people resided in the dwelling, and that the petitioner Adams had three prior juvenile arrests for controlled dange rous su bstanc es. Aside from their conclusions based on their general experience, Officers O Ree and Brackus cited no observations or facts in their affidavit that indicated that the petitioners were inherently dangerous. With the exception of the connection they posited existed between drugs and weapons, their affidavit did not allege that the petitioners were observed carrying, or were known to carry, a weapon. Neither was there reason given in that affidavit, again excepting the link provided by the officers experience, to believe that there were weapons inside the subject premises. Moreo ver, the officers did not present any facts whatsoever that tended to indicate, much less prove, that the petitioners would react violently, attempt to flee when confronted by the 39 police, or attempt to dispose o f, or destroy, the e vidence. T o be sure, the affidavit did indicate that petitioner A dams ha d a crimina l history, but, as indica ted, it consisted only of juve nile dru g arrests . The motions judge and the Davis court both credited the officers experience and, applying the warrant preference, found a sufficient justification for the issuance of a no-knoc k warra nt. That justific ation was the link that the ir combine d experie nces provided between drug traffickers, weapons, the ease with which drugs may be destroyed and the tenden cy of dru g traffic kers to d ispose o f evide nce. Richards, supra, 520 U.S. 385, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 137 L. Ed. 2d 615, addressed a similar issue an d, theref ore, is qu ite releva nt. There, the Court considered a ruling by the Wisconsin Sup reme Court hold ing that police officers are ne ver required, to knock and announ ce their presence when executing a search warrant in a felony drug investig ation. Id. at 387-88, 117 S. C t. at 1417, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 620. The Co urt reversed, rejecting blanket e xceptio ns to the knock and an nounc e requir emen t. Id. at 388, 117 S . Ct. at 14 19, 137 L. Ed. 2 d at 620 . Although it acknowledged that knocking and anno uncing in f elony drug ca ses freque ntly might exp ose offic ers to physical violence or might lead to the destruction of evidence, the Court refused to dispense . . . with [a] case-by-case evaluation of the m anner in which a search was execu ted, id. at 392, 117 S. Ct. at 1420, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 623, noting two serious concerns presented by such a blanket exception: 40 First the exception contains considerable overgeneralization. For example, while drug investigation frequ ently does pos e special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a sub stantial d egree. F or exam ple, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus wil l be unlikely to threaten officers or destroy evid ence. Or th e police cou ld know that the drugs being se arched fo r were of a type or in a loca tion that made them impossible to destroy quickly. In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in pres erving evid ence and maintainin g safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no-knock entry. Wisconsin s blanket rule impermissibly insulates these cases from judicial r eview . A second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category exception to the knock-and-announce requireme nt is that the reas ons for cre ating an exception in one categ ory can, relatively eas ily, be applied to others. Armed bank rob bers, for ex ample, are, b y definition, likely to have weapons, and the fruits of their crime may be destroyed without too much diff icult y. If a per se exception were allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable - - albeit hypothetical - - risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of the Fourth Amendment s reasonableness requirement would be mean ingless. Id. at 394, 117 S. Ct. at 142 1, 137 L. E d. 2d at 624 . The Co urt conclud ed: Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of the reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispen sing w ith the kn ock-an d-anno unce re quirem ent. Id. It further clarified: In order to justify a n o-knock entry, the police m ust have a re asonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the 41 particular circumsta nces, would be dang erous or fu tile, or that it wou ld inhibit the effectiv e investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evid ence. This standard - - a s opposed to a probab le cause requirement - - strikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the individual privacy interests affected by no-knock entries. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1099-1100, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990) (allowing a protective sweep of a house during an arrest where th e officers h ave a reaso nable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scen e ); Terry v. Ohio , 392 U .S. 1, 20 , 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884-85, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968) (requiring a reasonable and articulable suspicio n of da nger to justify a pa tdown search ). This showing is not high, but the police should be required to make it whenever the reason ablene ss of a n o-kno ck entry is challen ged. Id. at 394-95, 117 S. Ct. at 1421-22, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 624.19 That several pers ons resided in the subjec t premises and the petitioner Adams had three juvenile drug arrests, while specific to this case and these defendants, added nothing to the relevant questions, whether the petitioners would constitute a danger or whether they, or the others residing in the premises, w ould de stroy the c ontrab and. Neither does the fact that the confidential source s information resulted in the seizure of large amounts of drugs and weapons address the relevant questions, because we are not informed of the circumstances surrounding those seizures. To the extent that the inference to be drawn is that the subject operation is a large one, th at fact wo uld seem to The Richards Court ultimately affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision on the basis that the petitioner s reaction to the p resence of officers at the h otel door, provided sufficient support of the officers concern that the petitioner might destroy eviden ce. Richards, 520 U . S. at 396 , 117 S . Ct. at 14 16, 137 L. Ed. 2 d at 625 . 19 42 undermine the argument that the risk of destruction of the drugs was great. And, it does not address the dangerousness of the petitioners, except, that is, by reference to the generalization, which is, in turn, the product of the officers experience. It is, then, in truth, on ly the officers e xperience that provi des a ny support for the issuance of a n o-kno ck w arrant a nd, ther efore, the finding of the necessary exigency in this case. T he trial court sa id as much : crediting the affiants experience which involves hundreds of narcotics arrests, extensive training, and considerable experience in narcotics law enforcem ent, I cannot conclude that their conclusion with respect to the likeliness of firearms on the property is an irrational one. So, too, did the Davis court. 144 Md. App. at 148, 797 A. 2d at 87. To use the officers experience to establish a reasonable suspicion that the petitioners, because they are drug dealers, have, carry and use firearms and are likely to have, carry, and use them in this case and that, in the event of an announced entry to execute the search and seizure warrant, the drugs in this case could, and would likely, be destroyed is to do what the Richards Court forbids, to give effect to a blanket exception to the knock and announce requirement on the basis only of overgeneralizations. As Richards points out, see 520 U.S. at 3 92-93 , 117 S . Ct. at 14 21, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 62 3, such overgeneralizations may be applied to every drug investigation. Moreover, the need and reason for the exception can, relatively easily, be applied to many other categories of crim es. Id. at 393, 1 17 S. Ct. at 1421, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 623. We hold that the e ntry in this c ase w as no t justified by existing and articula ted e xige ncy. 43 Other courts presented w ith simila r facts h ave rea ched th e same conclu sion. See Poole v. State, 596 S.E.2d 420, 424 (Ga. App. 2004) (testimony of a possibility of officers peril or immediate destruction of the evidence based only on the fact that someone looked ou t a window and then le ft the window is simply inade quate to establish reason able gro unds to believe that, in this case, forewarning would have had that effect); State v. Nelson, 817 So.2d 158, 165, (La. App. 2002) (information provided by confidential informant that defendant was in possession of a substantial amount of drugs and was selling the drugs from the residenc e insufficie nt); Com. v. Jimenez, 780 N.E.2d 2, 7-8 (Mass. 2002) (dispensing with knock and announce requirement on the basis of allegations [t]hat it is common today for drug dealers to be in possession of firearms, and that firearms are com monly conf iscated du ring search es for drug s is to adopt a per se rule, that safety concerns are demonstrated merely by the fact that the search is for drugs ); Garza v. S tate, 632 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2001) ( While the showing required to justify an unannounced entry is not high . . . , general terms that those involved in the drug trade tend to use violence and destroy evidence is insufficient without a factual n exus to pa rticularized fa cts of dang erousness , futility or destruction of evidence related to the search of respo ndent s residence. ); State v. Johnson, 92 P.3d 61, 65 (N . M. A pp. 2004) (no-knock entry must be justified on a case-by-case basis, by a particularized showing of exigent circumstances, even when a drug manufacturing facility is alleged); State v. Utvick, 675 N.W.2d 387, 396 (N. D. 2004) (averment, your 44 Affiant is aware tha t Ryan Utvic k is usually accompanied by a group of people inside motel rooms, an d if, Law Enforce ment wo uld have to knock and announ ce their presence, those people could pitch their illegal drugs aside or flush potential evidence down a sink or toilet. Your Aff iant has seen this on other search warrants and did see this happen ... on June 1, 2002, where Ryan Utvick was listed on the room registration card, insufficien t); State v. King, 736 N.E.2d 921, 924 (O hio App. 1999) (averment that [i]n the experience of affiant, persons who traffic in illegal drugs frequently keep weapons, such as firearms, on or about their persons, or within their possession, for use against law en forcem ent off icials, as w ell as oth er citizen s, insufficient support for no-knock warrant); Brown v. State, 115 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding officer s general statement that if they did not knock and announce, it was because they were con cerned ab out destruc tion of the e vidence was insuf ficient); Ballard v. State, 104 S.W.3d 372, 383 (Tex. A pp. 2003 ) (same); U.S. v. Tavares, 223 F.3d 911, 917 (8 th Cir. 2000) (bare conclu sion in the w arrant applic ation that un identified su spects might be involved in violent crimes does not estab lish the dangerousness o f the search). VI. The Supreme Court announced, in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-921, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3419, 82 L. E d.2d 677, 697 (19 84), an exception to the g eneral rule that evidence seized p ursuan t to an inv alid wa rrant is su bject to th e exclu sionary ru le. The Court held, instead, that evidence is to be admissible, if the officer relied, in good faith, 45 on a warra nt obtain ed from a judge or mag istrate an d acted within its scope . Id. That also is the law in Ma ryland. See McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 467-468, 701 A.2d 675, 682 (1997) ( [E]vidence seized under a warrant subsequently determined to be invalid may be admissible, if the executing office rs acted in ob jective goo d faith with reasonab le reliance on the warrant. ); Conne lly v. State, 322 Md. 719, 729, 589 A.2d 958, 963 (1991). There is, however, no per se rule. Whe ther such evid ence is admissible must be determined on a case-by case basis and [suppression shou ld] only [be ordered ]in those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918, 104 S. Ct. at 3418, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 695. The purposes of the exclusionary rule are furthered, the Court instructed, if it can b e said that the law enforc emen t office r had kn owled ge, or may properly be charged with the knowledge, that the searc h was un constitutiona l under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 919, 104 S. Ct. at 3419, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 696 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 26061, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2344 (1983), and, therefore, had no reasonable grounds for believing that the warrant was properly issued. Id. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3420, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698. F our such s ituations hav e been ide ntified: [1] if the magistrate or judge in issuing the warrant, was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard for the truth . . . [; 2] in cases where the issuing magistrate wh olly abando ned his judicial r ole . . . [so that] no re asonab ly well train ed off icer sho uld rely on the wa rrant . . . [; 3 when ] an office r [fails to] ma nifest objec tive good faith in relying on a warrant b ased on a n affidav it so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render off icial belief in its ex istence entirely unreasonable, . . . [; or 4 46 when] a warran t [is] so facially deficient - i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized - - that the executing office rs cann ot reaso nably pre sume [ the wa rrant] to b e valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S. Ct. at 3421, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 698-699 (internal citations omitted). See also McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 468-69, 701 A.2d 675, 683 (1997) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Conne lly 322 Md. at 72 9, 589 A.2d at 96 3 in turn quoting Leon, 468 U .S. at 923 , 104 S . Ct. at 34 21). In the present case, relying on Leon, the State argues that, even if this court finds that the warrant application did not state an exigency with sufficient particularity to support a no-kn ock entry, the e vidence o btained as a result of the s earch sho uld nonetheless be admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. It urges, in other words, this Court to extend the good faith exception to include not only those situations in which officers rely, in good faith, on warrants determined to lack probable cause, but also those, as in this case, in w hich they rely on the warrant s auth orization of a no-k nock en try. The State reasons tha t, because th e police of ficers subm itted an affid avit in support of their application for the search warrant that stated that the officers wou ld attempt to gain entry by the rush or No-Knock forced entry, the magistrate authorized such an entry whe n the se arch w arrant in corpor ated the affida vit by refe rence. Reliance on a no-knock warrant, it argues, is, therefore, akin to reliance on a general warrant lacking in probable cause. In this case, the State maintains, [a] review of the 47 informati on in the affidavit shows th at the facts supporting an u nannounced entry were not so sparse th at reliance on the warrant was entirely unreasonable. The State relies on cases in which sister courts have applied the good faith exception to no-knock warrants . E.g., United S tates v. Tisda le, 195 F.3d 70, 73-74 (2 nd Cir. 199 9), United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1 st Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S . 1029, 119 S. Ct. 566, 142 L. E d. 2d 472 (1998); United S tates v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 , 184-87 (7 th Cir. 1993); United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1057, 11 4 S. Ct. 722 , 126 L. Ed . 2d 682 (1 994); United States v. Moore , 956 F.2d 843, 851 (8 th Cir. 1992), 956 F.2d 8 43, 851 (8 th Cir. 1992) ; United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2 d 119, 12 5 (D. M ass. 2001); United States v. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d 518, 520-21 (S. D. N.Y . 1999); United States v. Tavarez, 995 F. Supp. 443, 448-49 (S. D. N.Y. 1998); State v. Van Beek, 591 N.W.2d 112, 118-19 (N.D. 1999); and State v. Eason, 629 N.W.2d 625, 650 (Wis. 20 01). 20 20 As indica ted, in 1997 , the Suprem e Court m ade clear tha t blanket ex ceptions to the knock and announce requirement, based on generalizations about the subject of the investigation or the substance sought, are not permitted and that exceptions must be made on the b asis of s howin gs partic ularized as to pla ce, def endan t and ev idence . Richards at 520 U.S. at 395, 117 S. Ct. at 1422, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 625. Subsequently, the Court of Special Appeals, in State v. Lee, 139 Md. A pp. 79, 89, 774 A .2d 1183, 1189 (2 001), aff d, 374 M d. 275, 8 21 A.2 d 922 ( 2003) reiterate d and a pplied th at holdin g. See Wynn v. State, 117 M d. App . 133, 16 2 n.5, 69 9 A.2d 512, 52 6 n. 5 (1 996), rev d on other grounds, 351 Md. 307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998). In Lee, the information found insufficient consisted of two (2) instances of observing the defendant selling a small amount of drugs and a trooper s statement of why he entered the premises without knocking and annou ncing b ecause it was a cocain e case. Id . at 90, 77 4 A. 2d at 1190 . See also State v Riley, 147 Md. App.2d 113, 117, 807 A.2d 797, 800 (2001) (noting that the warrant application listed the defendant s three handgun convictions and previous assault and battery charge to support suspicion th at officers entering the prem ises might be in harm s 48 We need not d ecide the ap plicability of the g ood faith exception to no-knock warrants. As we have held that such warrants are not authorized under Maryland law and exigency must be determined at the time of the entry, whether or not the warrant purports to authorize such entry, we hold that there is, and can be, no predicate determ ination o n the ba sis of w hich the police c ould, an d did, re ly. way). Consequently, it is not at all clear that the officers were acting in good faith when proffering the clearly inade quate basis for the w arrant. Three of the c ases on which the State relies, United States v. M oore, 956 F.2d 843 (1992 ), United States v. Carter, 999 F.2d 182 (7 th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Moland, 996 F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1993), were decided prior to Richards. Although United States v. Gonzalez, 164 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D. Mass.2001) and State v. Van Beek, 591 N.W.2d 112 (N.D. 19 99), were decided p ost-Richards, the warrants in those cases were issued prior to Richards. Therefore, the courts decided that, notwithstanding the absence of particularized facts, the officers reliance on those no-knock warrants was reasonable at the time. The other cases are distinguishable; in those cases, characterized as close calls, the officers alleged more facts showing exigency than in the case sub judice: United S tates v. Tisda le, 195 F.3d 70, 73 (2 nd Cir. 1999) (alleging that the defendant was in the possession of drugs packaged in readily disposable form and that, in fact, the defendant had, on a prior occasion, droppe d a bag out the w indow to the inform ant); United States v. Rivera , 2000 WL 761976, *2 (D. Maine 2000) (alleging that an informant reported that the Defendant and his associates might be armed and that the drugs, hero in, was of such a sm all quantity that it cou ld be easily dispo sed ); United States v. Brown, 69 F. Sup p.2d 518 , 519 (S. D . N.Y. 199 9) (alleging th at the reliable informant reported that the defendant kept five or six guns in his apartment, including a sawed-o ff shotgu n and a T EC-9 p istol) ; United States v. Taverez, 995 F. Supp.2d 443, 445 (S. D . N.Y. 199 8) (alleging th at the reliable in formant re ported that th e defend ants stored only a small amount of cocaine in plastic baggies within easy access on the top of a bureau in a bedroom ); State v. Eason, 629 N. W.2d 625, 628 (Wis. 2001) (alleging that the suspects believed to reside at the premises to be searched had previous arrests for aggrav ated ass ault and obstruc tion). 49 JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COUR T WIT H INSTRUCTIONS TO VACATE THE JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. C OSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COU NCIL OF B ALT IMO RE. 50
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