Scott v. State

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Martin F. Scott v. State of Maryland, No. 52 September Term, 2003. [Criminal Law & Procedure Law of the Case Doctrine; Criminal Law & Procedure Sentencing Corrections and Modifications; Held: The Court of Special Appeals should not have used the doctrine of law of the case to re quire a Circ uit Court to give preclusive effect to another Circuit Court ord er denying de fendant s motion to c orrect an illega l sentence because the two judges were colleagues of the sam e coordina te jurisdiction. Th e Court of Special A ppeals correctly determined, how ever, that the defendant s sentence was not rendered illegal when a judge corrected the de fendant s comm itment records.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 52 September Term 2003 __________________________________ Martin F . Scott v. State of Maryland __________________________________ Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridg e, John C., (retired, specially assigned) JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: January 13, 2004 This case comes to us from a judgment of the Court of Special Appea ls affirming the Circuit Court for Baltimore City s denial of Martin Scott s motion to correct an illegal sentence. We must consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it used the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive e ffect to a Circuit Court order de nying Scott s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Moreover, we must decide whether Scott s sentence was illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345 because his commitment records were corrected without a hearing and in such a way as to allegedly increase his sentence.1 1 In 1990, when Scott s commitment records were corrected, Maryland Rule 4-345 provided: Rule 4-34 5. Sentenc ing Rev isory power o f court. (a) Illegal senten ce. The co urt may correc t an illegal sentence at any time. (b) Modification or Reduction Time for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a circuit court, whether or not an appeal has been filed, the court may modify or reduce or strike, but may not increase the length of, a sentence. Thereafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud , mistake , or irregu larity, or as provided in sectio n (d) of this Ru le. (c) Open Court Hearing. The court ma y mod ify, reduce, co rrect, or vacate a se ntence on ly on the record after notice to the parties and an oppor tunity to be heard. (d) Des ertio n and No n-su pport Ca ses. A t any time before expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and nonsupport of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may mod ify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probation under the terms and conditions the court imposes. Maryland Rule 4-345 was amended on November 1, 2001. W e note that S cott, in his questions presented, refers to Maryland Rule 4-34 5(d) with re spect to his co ntention tha t a hearing was required in 1990 when Judge B yrnes corrected his commitm ent records. In 1990, however, it was Maryland Rule 4-345(c) that provided the open hearing req uirement. When the rule was amended in 2001, it moved, among other things, the open hearing requireme nt in part (c) to p art (d), so that it read : (a) Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. (b) Modification or reduction Time for. The court has revisory power and control over a sentence upon a motion filed within 90 days after its imposition (1) in the District Court, if an appeal has not been perfected, and (2) in a c ircuit court, whether or not an app eal has bee n filed. The reafter, the court has revisory power and control over the sentence in case of fraud, mistake, or irr egularity, or as provided in section (e) o f this Rule. The court may not increase a sentence after the sentence has been imposed, except that it may correct an evidence mistake in the anno unceme nt of a sente nce if the co rrection is made on the reco rd before th e defend ant leaves the courtroom following the sentencing proceeding. (c) Notice to victims. The State s Attorney sha ll give notice to each victim and victim s representative who has filed a Crime Victim Notification Request form pursuant to Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-104 or who as submitted a written request to the State s Attorney to be notified of subsequent proceedings as provided under Code, Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-503 that states: (1) that a motion to modify or reduce a sentence has been filed; (2) that the motion has been denied without a hearing or the date, time, and location of the hearing; and (3) if a hearing is to be held, that each victim or victi m s r epre sentative may a ttend and testif y. (d) Open court hearing. The court ma y mod ify, reduce, co rrect, or vacate a sentence only on the record in open court, after hearing from the defendant, the State, and from each victim or victim s representative who requests an opportunity to be heard. No hearing shall be held on a motion to modify or reduce the sentence until the court determines that the notice requireme nts in section (c) of this Rule have been satisfied. If the court grants the motion, the court ordin arily shall prepare and file or d ictate into the record a statement setting forth the reasons on which the ruling is based. (e) Desertion and non-support cases. At any time bef ore 2 We conclude that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it applied the doctrine of the law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm, however, the Court of Special Appeals judgment on the ground that Scott s sentence was not illegal under Marylan d Rule 4-345 . I. Background A. Facts On October 1, 1981, Sco tt wa s con victe d by a jury in the Circuit Court for Ba ltimore City of the fo llowing o ffenses: ¢ Case No. 18035413: Coun t 1: First-d egree m urder. Cou nt 2: The use o f a ha ndgun in the c omm issio n of a fel ony. ¢ Case No. 18035416: Coun t 1: Rob bery with a dead ly weapo n. Cou nt 8: The use o f a ha ndgun in the c omm issio n of a fel ony. ¢ Case No. 18107511: Coun t 1: Ass ault with intent to murde r. Coun t 2: The use of a hand gun in t he com mission of a fe lony. The offenses arose out of the same incident that occurred on November 25, 1980; the State, however, had charged Scott with the crimes in separate indictments. On November 5, 1981, the ju ry determined death to be the appropriate sentence for expiration of the sentence in a case involving desertion and nonsupport of spouse, children or destitute parents, the court may mod ify, reduce, or vacate the sentence or place the defendant on probat ion und er the ter ms and conditio ns the c ourt imp oses. 3 the first-degree murder charge, and the trial judge, Judge Peter Ward, imposed the following sentences: ¢ Case No. 18035413: Coun t 1: Dea th. Count 2: 15 years fo r the use of a handgu n in the com mission of a felony consecutive to 1 st count - Murder in the First Degre e. ¢ Case No. 18035416: Count 1: 20 years consecutive to the sentence in 18033413" for robbery with a deadly weap on. Count 8: 15 years consecutive to the 1st count for the use of a handgun in the com miss ion o f a fe lony. ¢ Case No. 18107511: Count 1: 30 years consecutive to sentence in 18035416" for assault with intent to murder. Count 2: 15 years consecutive to the 1st count for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felon y. Scott s total sentence, thus, was death plus ninety-five years. On July 28, 1983, while incarcerated pursuant to the murder conviction in Case No. 18035413, Scott pled guilty to first-degree murder in a case involving a different incident, Case No. 18035701, for w hich Judg e Ed gar S ilver , on th e sam e day, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, specifically stating, Balance of Natural Life. Sentence to run consecutive to sente nce no w serv ing. On September 19, 19 83, this Court vacated the d eath sentence for the first-degree murder charge in Case No. 18035413, remanding the case to the Circuit Cou rt for Baltimore City for a new s entenc ing pro ceedin g. Scott v. S tate, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1 983). 4 A new jury, with J udge J ohn B yrnes pre siding, a gain im posed the dea th sente nce. On August 5, 1987, this Court again vacated the death sentence in Case No. 18035413, remandin g the case f or another n ew sente ncing procee ding. Scott v. State , 310 Md. 277, 52 9 A.2d 340 (1 987). T his time , on rem and, the State and Scott agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder ch arge. As a result, on Febru ary 10, 1988, Jud ge Byrnes re sentenced Sco tt to balance of life, with this sentence to run consec utive to t he sent ence im posed by Judge Silver in Case N o. 1803 5701. On October 10, 1989 , Scott filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Judge Byrnes noted that Scott s m otion lacke d comp lete clarity, but it app eared that S cott intended to argue that both of his life sentences were illegal. In support of his motion, without specifying which sentence he was referring to, Scott first argued that balance of Natural Life . . . lends to ambiguity in the interpretation of the actual sentence because it could be construed as a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He then argued that his commitment records failed to comply with Rule 4 -351(a)(5), 2 as the term consecutive was deficient in that it 2 In 1980 and 1983, when Scott s commitment records were com pleted, M aryland Rule 777(a)(5), w hich prece ded Ru le 4-351(a) (5), stated, in pe rtinent part: (a) When a person is co nvicted of an offen se and sen tenced to imprisonm ent, the clerk shall deliver to the officer in whose custody defendant has been placed a com mitme nt recor d conta ining: . . . (5) A statement whether the sentences are to run concurrently or consecu tivel y, and if con secutively, wh en each ter m is to begin with reference to the termination of the preceding term or any other outstanding or unserved sentence. *** 5 did not indicate a starting date. Judge Byrnes held a hearing on the mo tion on M ay 2, 1990. A t that hearing, Sc ott acknow ledged tha t his complaint essentially concerned the absence of a clear starting date for both life sentences. Scott argued that, even though he had received the death sentence and had been incarcerated since November 27, 1980, his commitment records did not stipulate when his senten ce beg an. On May 17 , Judge Byrnes had modified commitment records prepared for all of Scott s cases. The modified commitment records included information such as the original sentencing judge, the fact that the sentences had been corrected, and the fact that the corrections had been witnessed by the Clerk of the Court. The note Total Tim e Served On All Cases: 2 consecutive life sentences plus ninety-five years was also included on the final commitment record for the 1983 murder conviction for which a life sentence had been imposed. On June 6, 1990, Judge Byrnes issued a memo randum and o rder denying Scott s motion to correct the illegal sentence. In his order, Judge Byrnes dismissed Scott s first contention that the sentence imposed in 1983 by Judge Silver in Case No. 18035701 was ambiguous because the State might interpret natural life to mean no possibility of parole, reasoning that the historical record fact is that the State did not invoke Section 412(b)(2)3 3 Maryland Code, A rticle 27, Section 412(b ) (1957 , 1976 R epl. Vo l., 1979 C um. Su pp.) provided: A person found guilty of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced either to death or to imprisonment for life. The sentence shall be imprisonment for life unless (1) the State 6 imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole . . . . As such, Judge Byrnes concluded, there was no basis for Scott s contention that the correctional authorities w ould be confused and imprison him without possibility for parole. Judge Byrnes stated, how ever, that to clarify the matter fully, an amended commitment will be issued to delete the phrase natural life. With respect to Scott s second contention, Judge Byrnes concluded that Rule 4351(a)(5) was not violated bec ause it was clear that the sentences were to run consecutive to each other. Judge Byrnes noted, however, that, because of Judge Silver s subsequent life sentence in 1983 and because of the fact that Scott s death sentence was vacated twice and ultimately reduced to a life sentence in 1988, Scott s commitment records should be corrected to clarify his sentence. Judge Byrne explained: [S]ince this Court s sentence of F ebruary 10, 1988 [the life sentence that replaced the vacated death sentence] reads: Balance of Life . . . consecutive to . . . No. 180 35701 (Silver, J. 7/28/83), and that latter sentence was ordered by Judge Silver to run consecutive to the sentence then being served (J. Peter Ward s November 6, 1981 sentence in No. 18035413 of 15 years, and in No. 18035416 of 20 years and 15 years, and in No. 18107511 of 30 years and 15 years all consecutive to one another) the result at that time (7/28/83) would have been 95 years consecu tive to the dea th sentence first imposed on November 6, 1981 and later reimposed on February 14, 1985. When these two death sente nces in No. 18035413, C ount 1 were notified the person in writing at le ast 30 days prio r to trial that it intended to seek a sentence of death, and advised the person of each aggrava ting circu msta nce u pon which it i nten ded to rely, and (2) a sentence of death is imposed in accorda nce with § 413. 7 vacated and ultimately replaced, with defendant s concurrence on February 10, 1988, by a life sentence, and the result is that those 95 years are consecutive to that life sentence, and the life sentence imposed in No. 18035701 by Judge Silver on July 28, 1983 will run consecutive to it, i.e., the life sentence in No. 18035413. Consequently, the Commitment record in No. 18035413, Coun t 1 shou ld be co rrected to delete the phr ase . . . conse cutive to #1803 5701. Judge Byrnes also concluded that Scott s sentences began when he was incarcerated on November 27, 1980.4 On January 24, 1997, Scott filed his first petition for post conviction relief, which was dismissed without prejudice. On January 30, 1998, Scott filed a second petition for post conviction relief, arguing, among other things, that Judge Byrnes erred by revising Scott s sentence. Scott contended that, under Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371, 564 A.2d 395 (1989), the Court of Appeals had held that the language [consecutive to] sentence now being served was deficient. On April 19, 1999, Judge Carol Smith denied Scott s petition. In her ruling, Judge Smith distinguished Scott s case from Robin son. Specifically, she noted the following: 4 Judge Byrnes listed Scott s sentences as follows: No. 18035413 No. 18035416 No. 18107511 No. 18035701 Count 1: Count 3: Count 1: Count 8: Count 1: Count 3: Count 1: Life, from November 27, 1980. 15 years consecutive to Count 1. 20 years consecutive to No. 18035413. 15 years consecutive to Count 1. 30 years consecutive to No. 18035416. 15 years consecutive to Count 1. Life, consecutive to all preceding sentences. 8 Petitioner seems to suggest that his va rious original commitment records used the term sentence now be ing served as the link to each othe r consecu tive sentenc e in his various cases. This is incorrect. Only in the original commitment record issued in case number 18035701, dated July 7, 1983, is that language used. All of the other six original commitment records, as well as the four sentence modifications dated May 17, 1990, refer to case numbers and coun ts to provide clarity for both the Petitioner and the prison authority. Furthermore, any anomaly in Petitioner s sentencing records was the result of Petitioner s resentencing after his twice successful appeals of the impo sition of dea th sentences. In this regard , Petitioner s ca se is dissimilar to Robinson, wherein the sentences were being imposed for convictions of new and different crimes. Judge Smith then explained that Scott incorrectly had stated the holding in Robinson: In that case, the Court of Appeals merely stated that the trial judge has an obligatio n to articulate the period of confinement with clarity so as to facilita te the pri son au thority s tas k. Robinson v. Lee at 379. Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant understan d clearly wha t debt he m ust pay to society for his transgressions. Id. at 380. I n dicta, the Court encouraged trial judges to spell out w ith reasonab le specificity the punishment to be imposed commensurate with the defendant s background, conduct, and personality traits. Id. The Court did not hold that the use of the phrase consecutive to sentence now serv ing was , in and of itse lf, deficient. Fina lly, Judge Sm ith concluded that Judge B yrnes did not err when he rewrote Scott s commitment records on May 17, 1990, without benefit of a hearing because the modifications did not change the substance of Petitioner s sentences and a hearing on the motion to correct an illegal sentence was indeed he ld prior to when the co rrections were made. She con cluded tha t it was abu ndantly clear that . . . P etitioner is to serve two life sentences plus ninety-five years, all to be se rved consecu tivel y, commencing on November 9 27, 198 0. On September 4, 2001, Scott filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence and for a reduction of sentenc e, repeating h is previous claims and including, as a new claim, that his sentence was rendered illegal because of Go vernor Glenden ing s new parole guidelines. On November 19, Judge Albert Matricciani denied Scott s motion. He first noted that petitioner s allegations regarding the ambiguity and illegality of his sentences have already been addressed by Judge Carol Smith in her memorandum dated April 16, 1999 [and that] Judge Smith found no fatal ambiguity or illegality in Petitioner s sentences. Judge Matricciani then stated that Judge Smith had concluded that Scott s claim that the Court erred by rewriting his commitment records on May 17, 1990, without a hearing as required by Maryland Rule 4-345(c) to be witho ut merit. Judge Matricciani also concluded that, under State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 742 A.2d 508 (1999), Scott s sentence was not rendered illegal by G overno r Glend ening s parole policies . On June 1 6, 2003 , Scott ap pealed . Scott v. State , 150 Md. App. 468, 822 A.2d 472 (2003). He presented two questions for the Court of Special Appeals review: 1. Did the motion co urt abuse its discretion in failing to make its own determination on the merits regarding whether appellant s sentence was illegal? 2. Did the motion court err in accepting the post-conviction court s determination regarding whether Md. Rule 4-345(d) was violated?5 5 As we noted supra, Scott refers to Maryland R ule 4-345(d) as requiring an open hearing when Judge Byrnes corrected his com mitment records in 19 90. In 1990, how ever, 10 Id. at 470, 822 A.2d at 473. With respect to Scott s contention that Judge Matr icciani abus ed his discre tion in failing to make his own determination on the merits about the legality of his sentence, the Court of Special Appeals held that, while Rule 4-345(a) created a limited exception to the general rule of finality, a court is [not] required to consider anew repeated mot ions by a litigant setting forth th e same fa cts and contentions. Id. at 473-74, 822 A.2d at 475. The intermediate appellate co urt supporte d its conclusion by determining that the doctrine of law of the case is applic able to a motion to corre ct an illeg al senten ce. Id. at 474, 822 A.2d at 475. It also determined that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith s rationa le for de nying Sc ott s mo tion. Id. at 477, 822 A.2d at 477. With respect to Scott s contention that a hearing was required when his commitment records were corrected in 1990, the Court of Special Appeals explained that Rule 4-345 requires a hearing when a senten ce is mo dified. Id. at 479, 822 A.2d at 478. When commitment records are modified, however, the intermediate appellate court concluded that a hearing is not req uired. Id. Because Judg e Byr nes did not modify Scott s sentence but rather clarified his commitment record s, the Court of Special Appeals thus concluded that there w as no er ror. Id. Scott then filed in th is Court a p etition for w rit of certiorari, which we gra nted. Scott v. State, 376 M d. 543, 8 31 A.2 d 3 (20 03). it was M aryland R ule 4-3 45(c) th at prov ided the open h earing r equirem ent. 11 II. Discussion Scott first contend s that the Co urt of Spe cial Appe als erred w hen it applied the doctrine of law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal senten ce. Scott arg ues that, because Rule 4-345(a) allows a defendant to raise the illegality of a sentence at any time, it is inappropriate to use the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to earlier orders in a case de nying relief. In the same vein , Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion when he adopted Judge Sm ith s ruling de nying Scott s m otion to correct an illega l senten ce. Finally, Scott argue s that, when Judge B yrnes corrected his commitment records, he v iolated Ru le 4-345 by doing so without a hearing. S cott, moreover, maintains that his sentence became illegal due to Judge Byrnes actions because Judge Byrnes effectively increased his sentence b y eighty years when he corrected Sco tt s commitment records. This is so, Scott argues, because he was serving his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413) and not the death sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the additional life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 18035701). Scott reasons that the life sentence imposed by Judge S ilver should run consecutive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with his subsequent sentences because Judge Silver stated that Scott s l ife sent ence w as to ru n cons ecutive to sente nce no w serv ing. The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case may be applied in connection with a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State also contends that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion 12 when he adopted Judge Smith s ruling denying Scott s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Fina lly, the State argues that Judge Byrnes did not impose an illegal sentence when he corrected Scott s commitment records because a hearing w as not required and S cott s sentence was not incre ased by eight y years. The State maintains that a hearing was not required because, when Judge Byrnes corrected Scott s commitment records, he did not modify Scott s sentence. The State also argues that Scott s sentence was not increased by eighty years when the corrections were made because Scott was serving the sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, not the handgun sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the addition al life sen tence. A. Law of the C ase We agree with Scott that the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of law of the case.6 We do not agree with Scott, however, that the intermediate appellate court erred because Rule 4-345(a) renders the doctrine of law of the case inapplic able to 6 As we explained in Tu v. State, [t]he law of the case doctrine lies somewhere beyond stare decisis and short of res judicata . 336 Md. 406, 416, 648 A.2d 993, 997 (1994). The law of the case doctrine differs from res judicata in that it applies to court decisions made in the sam e, rather than a s ubseq uent, ca se. Id. We observe that, because motions to correct an illegal sentence occur as part of the same criminal proc eeding an d not a w holly independent action, State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170, 183, 742 A.2d 508, 516 (1999), the doctrine of res judicata might apply if such a motion was considered to b e a who lly independent action. We note, however, that this is unlikely to occur because, although Maryland Rule 4-34 5(a) provid es that [t]he court may co rrect an illegal s entence at a ny time, we have exp lained that the rule creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality [by sanctioning] a method of opening a judgme nt otherwise final and beyond the reach of the court. State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485 , 496, 659 A.2d 8 76, 882 (1995). Rule 4-345(a) is a limited exception because it applies only to motions that occur as part of the same c riminal p roceed ing. Kanaras, 357 M d. at 184 , 742 A .2d at 51 6. 13 motions to correct an illegal sentence.7 Rather, the Court of Special Appeals erred in its conclusion that Judge Matricciani was bound by Judge Smith s denial of Scott s motion to correct an illegal sentence because the two judges w ere colleag ue[s] of c oordinate jurisdicti on. Stewart v. S tate, 319 M d. 81, 91 , 570 A .2d 122 9, 1234 (1990 ). It is for this reason th at the doctrine of th e law of th e cas e does no t app ly. In Maryland, as we explained in Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244, 825 A.2d 985 (2003), generally, the law of the case doctrine is on e of appe llate procedure. Id. at 253, 825 A.2d at 990 (internal quotations om itted). Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appea l, litigants and low er courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case.8 Turner v. Housing Authority o f Baltimore City, 364 M d. 24, 32 , 770 A .2d 671 , 676 (2 001). Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, bu t [d]ecision s rendered by a prior appe llate 7 Md. Rule 4-345(a) provides: Illegal sentence. The court may correct an illegal senten ce at an y time. 8 Not ably, the cases regarding the law of the case doctrine cited by the Court of Special Appea ls involve the preclusive effect of prior rulings of appellate courts, not trial courts as is the case here, in the same case. See, e.g ., United States v. Mazak, 789 F. 2d 580, 58 1 (7 th Cir. 1986)(holding that the law of the case applied where a defendan t, after his dou ble jeopardy argument was rejected by the appellate court, advanced the same grounds in a motion to correct an illegal senten ce); Paul v . United States, 734 F.2d 106 4, 1066 (5 th Cir. 1984)(concluding that the law of the case applied when, after the appellate court remanded the defendant s case for re-sentencing, he appealed and tried to relitigate the same issues); Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998 )(noting that re litigation of an issue is precluded when the appellate court previo usly has decid ed the issue ); White v. Sta te, 651 So. 2d 726 (Fla. D ist. Ct. App. 1 995)(hold ing that, beca use the def endant s claim had been decided in a previous appeal, the law of the case doctrine precluded him from raising the claim a gain). 14 panel will generally govern the second appeal at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is inc orrect beca use it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would re sult in manifest injustice. Hawes v. Liberty Homes, 100 Md. App. 222, 231, 640 A. 2d 743, 747 (1994); see also Goldstein, 375 Md. at 260, 825 A.2d at 994 (adopting the reasoning in Hawes); Houghton v. County Comm rs of Kent. Co., 305 Md. 407, 414, 504 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1986)(explaining that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the Court of Appeals because it is required to review judgments of subordinate courts)(citing Loveda y v. State, 296 Md. 226, 229-34, 462 A.2d 58, 61(1983)). Here, however, there have been no appellate rulings in Scott s case with respect to whether Scott s sentence was illegal; rather, one circuit court judge followed the reasoning of another circuit court judge in the same case. Therefore, the law of the case doctrin e is inap plicable . With respect to the decisions of circuit courts, we have held that, "as a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court. Gertz v. An ne Arun del Coun ty, 339 Md. 261, 273, 661 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1995)(quoting State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449, 470 A.2d 1269, 1283 (1984)); see also Stewart, 319 Md. at 91, 570 A.2d at 1234 (stating that no trial judge is required to abdicate h is own ind ividual judg ment me rely because a colleague o f coordina te jurisdiction has made a ruling ). Of course, the seco nd judge may adop t the prior judge s reasoning as his or her own, as long as that judge does not abdicate his own individual 15 judgm ent. Stewart, 319 Md. at 91, 570 A.2d at 1234. When Judge Matricciani denied Scott s second motion to correct an illegal sentence, he cited Judge Smith, his peer on the Circuit Court, and quoted her earlier denial of S cott s first mo tion, thereby refle cting his agreement with her reasonin g. Having so agre ed, Judge M atricciani, as Judge Smith s colleague of coordinate jurisdiction, thus, was free to adopt Judge Smith s reasoning, but he was not bound by the doctrine of the law of the case to do so. See Ger tz, 339 Md. at 273, 661 A.2d at 1163. The Court of Special Appeals erred by determining otherwise. As earlier mentioned, Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion by failing to ma ke his ow n determin ation whe n he adop ted or agree d with Jud ge Smith s reasoning. We need no t explore this c ontention f urther, how ever, becau se as explain ed in Part B below, the determination by both judges that Scott s sentence was not illegal is correct as a matter of law. B. Issue of Error The Court of Special Appeals correctly held that Judge Matricciani did not err when he concluded that Scott s corrected commitment records did not result in an illegal sentence under Rule 4-34 5. We ag ree that, by correcting Scott s commitment records, Judge Byrnes did not mo dify Sco tt s sente nce an d rende r it illegal. We also agree that Judge Byrnes did not violate Rule 4-345(c) when he corrected Scott s commitment records.9 9 When Scott s commitment records were corrected in 1990, Maryland Rule 4-345(c) provided: Open Co urt Hearing. The court may modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence only on th e record after no tice to the parties a nd an o pportu nity to be h eard. 16 Scott contends that his sentence was modified because Judge Byrnes corrections effectively increased h is sentence b y eighty years. This occ urs, accordin g to Scott, because, when Judge Silver imposed a life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 180 35701), h e was serv ing his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413). Because Judge Silver stated that Scott s life sentence was to run consecutive to sentence now serving, Scott, relying on Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 37 1, 564 A.2d 39 5 (1989), reasons that the life sentence imposed by Judge Silver should run consecu tive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with hi s subse quent s entenc es. Because Scott relies so heavily on Robinson, however, we first shall review the case in detail. In Robinson, the defendant, Lee, was convicted of robbery and sentenced by Judge Cardin of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to prison f or five ye ars. Id. at 373, 564 A.2d at 395. Lee then esca ped and com mitte d oth er crimes . After L ee w as re turned to custody, he was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon and sentenced by Judge Jones of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City to six year s cons ecutive with an y sentenc e now serving . Id., 564 A.2d a t 396. Meanwhile, six months later, Judge Evans of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County sentenced Lee to one year s imprisonment consecutive to any sentences now b eing se rved f or esca pe. Id. Thereafte r, Lee escap ed again, an d again committed robbery with a deadly weapon, for which he was convicted by Judge Perrott of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment consecutive with sentence now serving. Id. A year later, Lee was convicted for the second 17 escape and sentenced by Judge Biener of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County to one year of imprisonment consecutive to any sentence now being served. Id. Finally, three years later, Lee was convicted for possession of marijuana, and Judge Boublitz of the District Court of M aryland, Washington County, sentenced Lee to a six-month sentence commencing at the expiration of the present term. Id. Lee argued that his fifteen-year sentence for robbery was consecutive to his first five-year sentence for robbery and concurrent with the oth er additiona l offenses , four of w hich had b een imposed during his original sentence a nd were to be served consec utive to t he sent ence h e was now s erving . Id. at 373-74, 564 A.2d at 396. In Robinson, we agreed w ith Lee that now serv ing could refer only to the precise sentence being served at the time the new sentence is imposed. Id. at 377, 564 A.2d at 398. We further held that [t]he trial judge s obligation is to articulate the period of confinement with clarity so as to facilitate the prison authority s task, and we con cluded that, in Lee s case, this was not done. Id. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399. As a result, we determined that the rule of lenity app lied, stating: Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must pay to society for his transgressions. If there is doubt as to the penalty, then the law dire cts that his punishment must be construed to favor a milder over a harsher one. Id. at 379-80, 564 A.2d at 399. Therefore, in Robinson, under the ru le of lenity, the resu lt was that Lee s fifteen-year sentence for robbery was consecutive to his first five-year 18 sentence for robbery and concurrent with the other additional sentences that were, in essence, simultaneously imposed.10 Scott s case differs from Robinson in several ways. The first is that Scott wa s still serving the sentence for murder for Case No. 18035413 when Judge Silver imposed the life sentence in 1983 for a separate murder conviction. Scott, citing Robinson, contends that Judge Silver s statement that the life sentence was to run consecutive to the sentence now serving refers only to the precise sentence being served. Id. at 377, 564 A.2d at 398. To a point, we do not disagree . The precise sentence b eing served in this case, how ever, was the sentence for murder for Case No. 18035413 not the handgun sentence as Scott claims. Although Scott s death sentence was vacated by this Court twice and ultima tely modified to a life sentence in 1988, his death sentence had not been modified when h e was sen tenced to life in 1983 by Judge Silver. When Judge Silver sentenced Scott, he stated that the life sentence was to run consecutive to the sentence now serving. The sentence Scott then was serving was th e senten ce for m urder in Case N o. 1803 5413. More importa ntly, althou gh Sco tt s death senten ce wa s ultima tely chang ed, the judgment as to his m urder c onvictio n was affirm ed. Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235, 465 A.2d 1126 (1983); Scott v. State , 310 Md. 277 , 529 A.2d 340 (1987). The fact that S cott s sentence changed from death to life makes no difference as to the order of his chain of 10 In Robinson, we excepted the defendant s marijuana conviction from our conclusion that the defendant s subsequent sentences were to run concurrently because the sentencing language commencing at the expiration of his present term was clearly consecutive to the aggregate of all the sentences then imposed. 317 Md. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399. 19 sentences his conviction for murder remained. See State v. H arris, 303 Md. 685, 692, 496 A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985)(stating that, even though the defendant s previous death sentence had been vacated, the convictions remaine d and the subsequ ent sentences impose d on remand were in full force and effe ct). We, thus, cann ot accept S cott s argum ent that, beca use his death sentence was eventually changed to a life sentence, the first of his consecutive sentences after the death sentence, the handgun sentence, was the first sentence he was actually serving . See also State v. Jones, 358 N .W.2d 765, 76 7 (Neb. 1 984)(hold ing that, when two sente nces are pronounced at the same time by the sam e court w ithout a consecutiveness direction, they cannot be served concurrently when death is one of the sentences); Commonwealth v. Graham, 661 A.2d 1367, 1374 (Pa. 1995)(holding that the death sentence is of such magnitude that the trial court does not have the discretion to order that it be consecutive to any other sentences then being im posed or previously impo sed). When Judge Silver imposed the second life sentence in 1983, Scott was serving, undou btedly, his s entenc e for fir st-degre e murd er. The second problem with Scott s reliance on Robinson is that the facts in Robinson are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Unlike Scott, the defendant in Robinson received four additional sentences during the same five-year period for which he was serving his first sentence . 317 M d. at 378, 56 4 A.2d a t 398. In add ition, each of the four judges imposing the subsequent sentences used language indicating that the sentence imposed was to be served consecu tive to the on e the defendant was then servin g. As we explained in 20 Robinson, for both the first escape an d second robbery, the lan guage n ow servin g still related to the initial five year sentence. Id. at 378, 564 A.2d at 398. Likewise, when the defendant was sentenced for his second escape and third robbery, he was serving the same initial five-yea r senten ce. Id. The resu lt was that all of the subsequent convictions, as they were to be serv ed co nsecut ive w ith any sen tence th e defe ndant w as cur rently serv ing, began to run after the defendant s initial five-year conviction at the same time. In other words, several different judges, using essentially the same language, imposed different sentences on the defendant that nevertheless began to run concurrently because they were all imposed while he was serving his first five-year sentence. Given these facts, we concluded that, under the ru le of lenity, the sub sequent se ntences w ere consec utive to the first sentence and co ncurre nt with each o ther. Id. at 379-80, 564 A.2d at 399. In Scott s case, the facts are much different. As Judge Smith correctly concluded, when Judge Silver used the language consecutive to sentence now serving when he imposed the life sentence in 1983, this language did not create the kind of ambiguity that arose in Robinson. See id. at 379, 564 A.2d at 399 (requiring that the trial judg e articulate a period of c onfinem ent with su fficient clarity to fa cilitate the prison authority s task). After Scott was sente nced to de ath in Case No. 18035413 in 1980, he was convicted and sentenced for a differen t murder in 1 983 wh ile he was still serving his sentence for murder in the earlier case. Unlike the defendant in Robinson, however, he did not receive multiple additional sentences while he was still serving his original sentence; he, instead, received one additional 21 life sentence. Consequently, the problem of simultaneously overlapping sentences that had occurred in Robinson did not arise in Scott s case. Further, unlike Robinson, all of Scott s commitment records for the original murder conviction and related offenses (Case Nos. 18035413, 18035416, 18107511) clearly indicated the order in which they were to be served and referred to both case numbers and counts; as such, the ambiguity that arose in Robinson did not arise in th is instan ce. Fina lly, when Judg e Silver imposed the life sentence in 1983, he said nothing expressly or by implication that would indicate that the life sentence was to be served concurren tly with Scott s other sentences; rather, he expressly indicated that the life sentence was a consecutiv e senten ce. See Maryland Correctional Institution v. Lee, 362 Md. 502, 523, 766 A.2d 80, 92 (2001)(concluding that the trial court said nothing that expressly or by implication w ould indica te that each of the . . . sentence s was to be served co ncurrently with the previously imposed sentence ). Therefore, we conclude that the life sentence imposed by Judge Silver in 1983 was a consecutive and not a concurrent sentence. Because Scott s sentence in Case No. 18035413 for murder was later changed to a life sentence, the result is th at Scott s total sen tence is t wo life senten ces plu s ninety-f ive years. Scott s final argument is that, when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records, Judge Byrnes modified his sentence and violated Rule 4-345(c) because he did not hold a hearing when the corrections were made. In 1990, when Judge Byrnes modified Scott s commitment records, Rule 4-345(c) stated: 22 Open Court Hearing. The court may m odify, reduce , correct, or vacate a sentence only on the record after notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. Although Scott argues otherwise, Scott was indeed a fforded a hearing in open court on his motion to correct an illegal sentence. In response to Scott s motion, Judge Byrnes held a hearing on May 2, 1990. As his June 6 orde r reflects, Judg e Byrnes co rrected his commitment records on ly after Scott had an oppo rtunity to be heard on his m otion. Cf. Mateen v. Saar, 376 Md. 385, 398-99, 829 A.2d 1007, 1014-15 (2003) (holding that an order revising a sentence resulted in an illegal sentence because no hearing was held in open court and no notice was given to the defendant). Moreover, as the Court of Special Appeals correctly pointed out, the open hearing requirement found in Rule 4-345 ordinarily applies only when the court intends to modify, reduce, correct, or vacate a sentence. Scott, 150 Md. App. at 479, 822 A.2d at 478 (emphasis ad ded). When Ju dge Byrnes corrected S cott s commitment records, however, Rule 4-345 did not apply; rather, Rule 4-351(a), regarding commitment records, governed his actions.11 Rule 4-351(a), unlike Rule 4-345, does not 11 At the time Judge Byrnes corrected Scott s commitment records, Rule 4-351(a) provided: (a) Content. - When a person is convicted of an offense and sentenced to imprisonment, the clerk shall deliver to the officer into whose custody the defendant has been placed a commitment record containing: (1) The n ame and date of birth of the def endant; (2) The docket reference of the action and the name of the sentencing judge; (3) The offense and each count for which the defendant was sentenced; (4) The sentence for each count, the date the 23 require a hearin g in ope n court . III. Conclusion Although the C ourt of S peci al Appeals erred in ap plying the doctrine of law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence, the C ourt of Sp ecial App eals correctly determined that a hearing was not required when Scott s commitment records were corrected. Moreover, we conclude that Scott s sentence was not increased by eighty years when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records because he was serving his sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, not the fifteen-year handgun sentence, when he received his second life sentence. It is c lear that his sen tences, othe r than his first se ntence, the sentence for murder in Case N o. 18035 413, are to b e served co nsecutively to each other. As such, Scott s total sen tence is t wo life senten ces plu s ninety-f ive years. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. sentence was imposed, the date from which the sentence runs, and any credit allowed to the defendant by law; (5) A statement whether sentences are to run concurren tly or conse cutiv ely a nd, i f consecutiv ely, when each term is to begin with reference to termination of the preced ing term or to any oth er outsta nding o r unserv ed sent ence. 24

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