Laney v. State

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Richmond C. Laney v. State of Maryland, No. 44 September Term, 2003. [Criminal Procedu re Legitim ate Expecta tion of Priv acy, held; wh ere title to a mortgaged property passes to the mortgagee as a result of foreclosure, sale, and ratification, the mortga gor no longer mainta ins a leg itimate e xpecta tion of p rivacy in th at prop erty.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 44 September Term, 2003 RICHMOND C. LANEY v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridge, John C. (Retired, Specia lly Assign ed), JJ. Opinion by Battaglia, J. Filed: February 13, 2004 Richard C. Laney was convicted in the Circuit Court for Howard County of unlawful possession of a destructive device and unlawful possession of an explosive without a license. We now review the Circuit Court s denial of Laney s motion to suppress evidence seized during several warrantless searches of Laney s former residence, 3612 Fe ls Lane in E llicott City, Maryland. L aney asserts tha t, although h e did not ho ld title to 3612 F els Lane, he had an expectation of privacy in the property, and th e entry upon th e premises violated his F ourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We hold that Laney had no reason able expe ctation of privacy in 3612 Fels Lane because ownership of the property had passed to the Department of Veterans Affairs (hereinafter the DVA ), which, acco rdingly, had authority to enter, possess, and give consent for the authorities to search the prop erty. Therefo re, no Fou rth Ame ndment v iolation occu rred in this cas e, and the C ircuit Court was correct in denying Laney s motion to suppress. I. Background A. Facts Some time prior to December o f 1998, L aney purcha sed impro ved real pro perty located at 3612 F els Lane in Ellicott City, Maryland. To finance the purchase, Laney acquired a loan, which was secured by 3612 Fels Lane and guaranteed by the DVA. Under the DVA loan guarantee, if the lender foreclosed on the loan, it could convey title to the property to the DVA. Laney failed to make payments according to the loan agreement, and, on Dece mber 1 3, 1999, the lo an was foreclosed. On December 27, Commercial Federal Mortgage Corporation, the purchaser of 3612 Fels Lane at the foreclosure sale, initiated the process of conveying the property to the DVA by providing it with a no tice of intentio n to conve y. Commercial Federal subsequently conveyed title to 3612 Fels Lane to the DVA on March 17, 2000. The DVA assigned Brad Criddle the responsibility to manage the property, meaning that he would attend to or look after the foreclosed property. As part of the management responsibilities, if Criddle were to find a property occupied, he would attempt to contact the person occupying th e house to discuss the D VA s e ventual po ssession of the prop erty. Criddle made his first visit to 3612 Fels Lane in December of 1999 and knocked on the door of the house. When he received no response, he left his bu siness card, w hich prov ided his name and phone number , identified C riddle as the p roperty mana ger, and state d that the property was o wned by the D VA. During this and subsequent visits, which Criddle made at least once a month, the house appeared to be occupied because personal property could be seen through the windows and objects around the outside of the house would appear to have been m oved b etwee n visits. Criddle, however, could not establish contact with anyone at the house until 11:00 a.m. on July 14, 2000, when he stopped b y 3612 Fels Lane to e ncourag e whom ever was in the home to aban don the proper ty. As he walked toward the front door, he encountered two men, one of w hom w as Joseph Winkle, w ho lived ac ross the street. W inkle expla ined to Criddle that he was there to rescue some geese on the property for Laney, the former occupant of the house, who had been his neighbor for fifteen years and was curre ntly in -2- prison. Winkle explained further that, although he had obtained a key to the house from Laney s brother, he w as afraid to enter the house because he believed there were explosives and w eapon s kept there. Because one of Criddle s responsibilities as a prope rty manager w as to make every effort to get in the house, he asked Winkle to let him inside the house to look around. Winkle agreed and op ened th e door. I nside th e hous e, Cridd le obse rved, in one roo m, a couple of olive green objects shaped like two liter bottle[s] and marked with U.S. A rmy in black writing and, in another room, five or six grenades in a trash can. When he went upstairs, he fou nd sev eral gun s, gun b arrels, . . . camouflage[,] . . . . kni[v]es, . . . [and] numerous shell casings . . . . Criddle went to the outside shed where he observed something that looked like a small ro cket . . . [and] other empty cartridge containers [and] shell casings . . . everywhere. Other than the weapons and ammunition, Criddle saw that the bathtub had been removed and that some of the home appliances were sitting on the front porch. This gave Criddle the impression that somebody was dismantling the house [,] . . . selling it off piece by piece. Criddle left the house, called the DVA for instructions on how to proceed, and was told to grant acc ess to the pro perty to local authorities. He called the Howard County Police Departm ent. About an hour and a half after his initial visit to 3612 Fels Lane on July 14, Criddle returned to the pro perty and met Frank M cCreary of th e DVA and Of ficer Keith -3- Berry of the Howard C ounty Police Departme nt. Criddle identified himself to O fficer Berry and described what he had seen in the house. Criddle then led Officer Berry into the unlocked house, where they looked around for five minutes. Other police officers, including Officer Keith Fisher and the State Fire Marshall arrived at the house and obtained written consent from the DVA to inspect the property. Thereafter, at the request of those officials, personnel of the f ire depa rtment, F ederal B ureau o f Alco hol, Tobacco and Firearms ( ATF ), Federal Bureau of Investigation ( FBI ), and the U.S. Army s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company ( EOD ) arrived at the scene. The police and Army officials thoroughly searched the house, spending several hours taking objects from the house and laying them on a tarp outside on the lawn. The following items, as listed on the EOD Incident Report, were seized and later disposed of by the authorities: 26 M228 Fuze, Grenade; 1 M201A1 Fuze, Grenade; 2 Grenade body, practice; 1 Grenade fuze, model unknown; 9 M117 Boobytrap simulators; 2 Commercial blasting caps; 3 20mm projectile, practice ; 1 60m m mo rtar, illumination; 1 M51 projectile fuze; 1 60mm mortar, practice with residue; 2 M18 smoke grenade; 1 M7A3 smoke grenade, riot; 2 40mm illumination projectiles; 1 British Mill Bomb (grenade); 1 M158 Red star clus ter signa l; 1 M6 04 Fu ze, mine practice; 1 Boobytrap flare on stak e; 3 PM L 62 Fric tion fuze; 1 Vial of black powder; 1 KDM 51A2(20); 1 2.36 inch Rocket; 7 f lare pens, with ignitors ; 1 20-foo t piece of commercial detonating cord; 1 40mm projectile, practice; 10 15mm projectiles, German; 18 Blast simulator; 1 6000psi pressure bottle; 1 81m projectile, practice; 4 pounds of smokeless powder; 1 model rocket motor; 1 DM 28 subcaliber projectile (UEB -T); 1 SWAT Distraction Device (flashbang); 9 fuzes, German; 1 M48 -4- subcaliber projectile; 6 M73 35mm subcaliber rockets, practice (for LAW ). Criddle had the locks of the hou se chang ed to a DVA master key lock after all of the law enforcement and military personnel left the house at around 10:00 p.m. on July 14. Three days later, on July 17 , 2000, Crid dle unlocked 3612 Fels Lane and allowed police officers and agents of the State Fire Marshall to search the house with a K-9 unit. As a result of that search, other items were seized. On July 21, 2 000, Cridd le again unlocked the house, this time to permit Army officials to look for a radio. He then hired a contractor to clean the property, making it possible for the DVA to market and eventually sell the house. B. Procedural History The State charged Laney in the Circuit Court for Howard County with nine counts of possession of a destructive device in v iolation of M aryland Cod e, Article 27, Section 139C (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.), 1 one count of reckless endangerment in violation of Maryland Code , Article 2 7, Section 12A-2 (195 7, 1996 Repl. V ol., 2000 Supp.), 2 and one 1 Maryland Code, Article 27, § 139C (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2000 Supp.) states: A pe rson may n ot kn owingly: (1) Manufactu re, transport, po ssess, contro l, store, sell, distribute, or use a destructive device; or (2) Possess any explosive, incendiary, or toxic material with intent to create a destructive device. 2 Maryland Code, Article 27, § 12A-2 (1957, 1996 R epl. Vol., 200 0 Supp.) sta tes in relevant pa rt: (a) Creation of substantial risk of death or serious physical injury; penalties. (1) An y pers on w ho re ckle ssly engages in conduct that creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person is guilty of the misdemeanor -5- count of p ossession o f explosive s without a license in vio lation of M aryland Cod e, Article 38A, Sections 27 A and 34C (1957, 1997 R epl. Vol.). 3 Laney moved to suppress the evidence obtained from 3612 Fels Lane on the ground that it was seized in violation of Laney s Fo urth Am endmen t guarantee against unr easonab le searches and seizures. The co urt denied Laney s mo tion to suppress, conclu ding that the searches of 3612 Fels Lane and the seizures of property durin g those sea rches we re lawful. Assuming that Criddle was a state agent for the purpose of its decision, the court reasoned that Criddle w as a legal rep resentative o f the DV A, whic h had acq uired title to 3612 F els Lane and, thus, was the lawful owner of the property on the day of the initial search. The court determined that, as the agent of the lawfu l owner o f the prope rty, Criddle did not need to seek ac tion by the court to e nter the h ouse lega lly. As an altern ative basis for its ruling, the court concluded that Criddle had the right to rely upon the consent of Winkle, who of reckless endangerment and on conviction is subject to a fine of not more than $5000 or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both. 3 Maryland Code, Article 38A, § 27A (1957, 1997 R epl. Vol.) states: N o person s hall possess any explosive s other than explosives for use in firearms unless he has obtained a license to manufacture, deal in or possess such explosives pursuant to the provisions of § 28 of this su btitle. Maryland Code, Article 38A, § 34C (1957, 1997 Rep l. Vol.) provides: Any person who violates § 27A or § 31 of this subtitle, and who is not subject to the penalties otherw ise provided in § 34A or § 34B, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for a term of not more than five years, or shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both, in the discretion of the court. -6- arguably was entitled to . . . enter the premises. Finally, the court found Criddle s entry was justified bec ause of the exigenc y created when he learned that munitions and explo sives w ere in the house and tha t Wink le may ha ve bee n selling house fixtur es. The judge then conducte d a bench trial on an ag reed statem ent of fac ts and found Laney guilty of unlawfully possessing an explosive device without a license and one count of unlawfully possessing a d estructive device. The State later nolle prossed all remaining counts. The court sentenced Laney to ten years imprisonment for the possession of a destructive device and five years imprisonment for the possession of an explosive device. The co urt susp ended the sen tences e xcept f or time s erved a nd ord ered pr obation . Laney appealed , challenging the denial o f his motion to suppress , and the C ourt of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, af firmed the trial court s ruling . The interm ediate appellate court determined that Laney s Fourth Amendment rights had not been violated on any of the occasions when 3612 Fels Lane was searched. The court concluded that, assuming Criddle was acting on behalf of the state, his first entry on July 14 was s upported by probable cause and justified by exigent circumstances. Probable cause existed, in the court s view, because a person of reasonable caution would have believed contraband might be inside the house based on information learned from Winkle that explosives and weapons were inside the house and that he was af raid to g o inside . According to the court, this same information, described as credible evidence that the house was filled with explosive materials of unknown age and stability, validated Criddle s initial July 14 search also because illegal -7- explosives, or dangerous chemicals in a home has been repeatedly held to constitute exigent circumstances justifying a warr antless s earch. The court then held that the discovery of the weapons and munitions in the house escalated the exigency, justifying the subsequent searches by law enforcement authorities on July 14. With respect to the July 17 search, the court determined that it was a contin uation o f lawf ul initial e ntry, confined to the scope of the original invasion, and the refore did not require a w arrant. We granted Laney s petition for a w rit of cer tiorari, Laney v. S tate, 376 Md. 139, 829 A.2d 530 (2003), to determine whether the seizure of th e items in the house located at 3612 Fels Lane constituted infringements of Laney s Fourth Amendment rights. 4 We hold that, because Criddle, the agent of the title owner of the premises, had authority to possess and 4 The questions as stated in Laney s petition do not define the precise issue that we address in this case. They read as follows: 1. Did government agents violate the Fourth Amendment when they repeatedly entered and search ed Mr. Laney s home without a warrant based on a tip that there were weapons and explosives inside? 2. Did a neighbor and an owner pursuant to foreclosure, neither of whom were in posse ssion of Mr. La ney s residence, have app arent autho rity to consent to multiple entries, searches and seizures by government agents? 3. May an appella te court affirm the d enial of a m otion to suppress evidence on the bas is that warran tless entries and searches of a residence were justified by exigent circumstances where the trial court made no finding that these actions were justified by exigent circumstances? -8- enter the house, Laney had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Therefore, La ney s Fourth Amen dment righ ts were not violated when the authorities seized the evidence from the house. II. Standard of Review When reviewing the denial o f a motion to suppress evidence, we ordinarily consider only the evidence before the court at t he sup pressio n hearin g. State v. Green, 375 Md. 595, 607, 826 A.2d 486, 493 (2003); State v. Rucker, 374 Md. 199, 207, 821 A.2d 439, 444 (2003). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence in the light most fa vorabl e to the p revailin g party on the mo tion. Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 493; Dashiell v. S tate, 374 Md. 85, 93, 821 A.2d 372, 376-77 (2003). Although we extend great deference to the hearing judge s findings of fact, we review, independently, the application of the law to those facts to determ ine if the evid ence at issue was obta ined in violation of the law and, accordingly, should be suppressed. Green, 375 Md. at 607, 826 A.2d at 49 3; Wallace v . State, 373 M d. 69, 78 , 816 A .2d 883 , 888-8 9 (200 3). III. Discussion Laney avows that the multiple warrantless searches of 3612 Fels Lane as well as the seizures of the items on those premises impinged upon his Fourth Amendment rights. He claims that the Fourth Amendment is applicable because he maintained a legitim ate expectation of privacy in the prope rty even thoug h title had passed to the DVA. He argues further that the searches and seizures were not supported by probable cause or any of the -9- exceptions to the Fourth Amendment s warrant requirement, such as exigent circumstances or consent. Proper consent did not exist, Lan ey contends, b ecause the DVA s owner ship interest in 3612 Fels Lane was inferior to [his] possessory and privacy interests. Although conceding that the DV A had a property interest in the premises, Laney claims that Criddle, as DVA s agent, did not have authority to consent to search 3612 Fels Lane because Laney was a tenant o f the pre mises. The State responds that the searches were supported by probable cause, exigent circumstances, and consent. It asserts that the DVA could enter the property as owner of 3612 Fels Lane and take possession, as it did. Moreo ver, under th e State s view of conse nt, the DVA s sole possession of the house entitled its agent, Criddle, to search the premises and provide co nsent for o ther govern ment off icials to do so a s well. A. Property Interests Answering the issues in this case requires some discussion of the principles of Maryland property law, p articularly those governing the conveyance of fore closed prope rty. Under Maryland law, as the following discussion demonstrates, Laney lost and the DVA acquired the right to possess the 3612 Fels Lane before Criddle entered the premises and discovered the contraband therein. The Real Property Article of the Maryland Code an d the M aryland Rule s strictly govern foreclosure procedures. Generally, in the event th at a purcha ser of real pr operty secured by a mortgage or deed of trust ( mortgagor ) defaults under the terms of the -10- mortgage or deed of trust, the holder of the security interest ( mortgagee or trustee ) may initiate foreclosure proceedings. Maryland C ode, § 7-10 5 of the R eal Property Article (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.) (governing the summary proced ure for a power of sale in d eed of trust); Maryland Rule 14-203 (setting forth the conditions precedent to commencing an action to foreclose a mortgage)5 ; see Fairfax Savings, F.S.B. v. Kris Jen L td. P ship, 338 Md. 1, 15, 655 A.2d 1265, 1271-72 (1995) (discussing briefly the procedures for foreclosure pursuant to a power of sale clause in a deed of trust). Those proceedings lead to the eventual sale and conveyance of the property, which allows the mortgagee to attempt to recover the money owed o n the mortg age debt. Before the foreclosure sale may take place, however, the provisions of the Real Property Article and Maryland Rules require that the mortgagee fulfill certain notice requirements. Code, § 7-105 of the Real Property Artic le 6 ; Maryland Rule 14 -206(b). 7 5 Maryland Rule 14-203 states: (a) Conditions precedent. (1) Gen erall y. An action to foreclose a lien m ay be filed after (A) the instrument creating or giving notice of the existence of the lien has been filed for record, and (B) there has been a default in a condition upon which the lien instrument provides that a sale may be made or there is a de fault in the payment of the debt secured by a statutory lien. 6 The pertinent language of Section 7-105 of the Real Property Article states: (b) Notice to record owner of property; limitations of actions. (1)(i) In this subsection, record owner means the person holding record title to property as of the later of: 1. 30 days before the day on which a foreclosure sale of the property is actually held; and 2. The date on which an action to foreclose the mortgage or deed of trust is filed. -11- (ii) In addition to any notice required to be given by provisions of the Annotated Code of Maryland or the Maryland Rules, the person authorized to make a sale in an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust shall give written notice of the proposed sale to the record owner of the property to be sold. (2)(i) The w ritten notice sh all be sent: 1. By certified mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, bearing a postmark from the United States Postal Service, to the record owner; and 2. By first class m ail. (ii) The notice shall state the time, place, and terms of the sale and shall be sent not earlier than 30 days and not later than 10 days before the date of sale. (iii) The person giving the notice shall file in the proceedings: 1. A return receipt; or 2. An aff idavit that: A. The provisions of this paragraph have been complied with; or B. The address of the record owner is not reasonably ascertainable. (iv) The person authorized to make a sa le in an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust is not required to give notice to a record owner whose address is not reasonably ascertainable. (3) In the event of postponement of sale, which may be done in the discretion of the trustee, no new or additional notice need be given pursuant to this section. (4) The right of a record owner to file an action for the failure of the person authorized to make a sale in an action to foreclose a mortgage or deed of tru st to comply with the pro visions of th is subsection shall expire 3 years after the date of the order ratifying the foreclosure sale. 7 Maryland R ule 14-20 6(b) provid es in relevan t part: (b) Notice. (1) By publication. After commencement of an action to foreclose a lien and before making a sale of the property subject to the lien, the person authorized to make the sale shall publish notice of th e time, place, a nd terms o f sale in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the -12- Under Section 7-105 of the Real Prope rty Article, written notice of the proposed foreclosure sale must be sent by certified mail and first-clas s mail to th e rec ord o wne r of the prope rty, who in many cases is the mortgagor. Maryland Rule 14-206 provides that the person authorized to conduct the foreclosure sale shall publish notice of the proposed sale in a newspaper of general circu lation and f urther send notice by certifie d and first-cla ss mail to action is pend ing. . . . For the sale of an inter est in real p rope rty, the notice shall be given at least once a week for three successive weeks, the first publication to be not less than 15 days prior to sale and the last publication to be not more than one w eek prio r to sale. . . . (2) By ce rtified an d first cla ss mail. (A) Bef ore m akin g a sa le of the p rope rty, the person authorized to make the sale shall send notice of the time, place, and terms of sale by certified mail and by first class mail to the last known address of (i) the debtor, (ii) the record owner of the prop erty, and (iii) the holder of any subordinate interest in the property subject to the lien. (B) The notice of the sale shall be sent not more than 30 days and not less than ten da ys before the d ate of the sa le to all such persons whose identity and address are actually known to the person authorized to ma ke the sale o r are reason ably ascertainab le form a do cument re corded, ind exed, and available for public inspection 30 days before the date of the sale. (3) Other notice. If the person authorized to make th e sale receives actual notice at any time before the sale is held that there is a person holding a subord inate interest in th e property and if the interest holder s identity and ad dress are rea sonably ascertainable, the person authorized to make the sale shall give notice of the time, place, and terms of sale to the interest holder as promptly as reasonably practicable in any man ner, including by telephone or electronic transmission , that is reasona bly calculated to apprise the interest holder of the sale. This notice need not be given to anyone to whom notice was sent pursuant to subs ection (b ) (2) of th is Rule . . . . -13- the mortgage debtor, reco rd owner, and the holder of any subordinate interest in the proper ty. Maryland Rule 14-303(b) provides that, where a third party trustee is appointed by the court to conduct the foreclosure sale, the trustee shall give notice by advertising the time, place, a nd term s of sale in a new spaper of gen eral circu lation . . . . 8 Once proper notice has been provided, the one authorized to conduct the fore closure s ale m ay sell the p rope rty. Comp lete title does not immediately pass to the purchaser upon the sale of the prop erty. The mortgage e first must submit to the court a report of the sale and an affidavit affirming the fairness o f the sale and the truth of the report. M d. Rule 14-305(a). 9 The purchaser also must file an affidavit setting forth, in part, that the purchaser has not 8 In its entirety, Ma ryland Rule 1 4-303(b) s tates: (b) Advertise ment. Unless otherwise ordered by the cou rt, a trustee proposing to make a public sale shall give notice by advertisement of the time, place, and terms of sale in a newspaper of general circulation in each county where any portion of the property is located. The notice shall describe the property to be s old sufficie ntly to identify it and shall be given as follows: (1) for the sale of an interest in real property, at least once a week for three successive weeks, the first publication to be not less than 15 days before the sale and the last publication to be not more than on e week befo re the sale; or (2) for the sale of personal property, not less than five days nor more than 12 days before the sale. 9 Maryland Rule 14-305(a) states: (a) Report of sale. As soon as practicable, but not more than 30 days after a sale, the person authorized to make the sale shall file with the court a comple te report of th e sale and a n affidav it of the fairne ss of the sale and the truth of the report. -14- discouraged anyone from bidding for the property. Md. Ru le 14-305(b). 10 Thereafter, the court shall issue no tice of the sale by publishing a description of the property and a statement that the sale will be ratified by the court unless exceptions are taken within 30 days. Md. Rule 14-305(c). 11 If no exceptions are filed within that period and the cou rt is satisfied the sale was fair, the court shall ratif y the sale. Md . Rule 14-305(e). 12 It is the court s ra tification of th e sale 10 Maryland Rule 14-305(b) provides: (b) Affidavit of purchaser. Before a sale is ratified, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause, the purchaser shall file an affidavit setting forth: (1) whether the purchaser is acting as an agent and, if so, the name of the princ ipal; (2) whether others are interested as principals a nd, if so, the names of the other principals; and (3) that the purc haser has n ot directly or indirectly discoura ged anyone fr om b idding for the pro perty. 11 Maryland Rule 14-305(c) states: (c) Sale of interest in real property; notice. Upon the filing of a report of sale of real prop erty or chattels real p ursuant to section (a) of this Rule, the clerk shall issue a notice containing a brief description sufficient to identify the pro perty and stating that the sale will be ratified unless cause to the contrary is show n within 30 days after the date of the notic e. A copy of the notice sh all be published at least once a week in each of three successive weeks before the expiration of the 30-day period in one or mo re newspapers of general circulation in the county in which the report of sale was filed. 12 Maryland Rule 14-305(e) states: (e) Ratification. The court shall ratify the sale if (1) the time for filing exceptions pursuant to section (d) o f this Rule has expired and exception s to the report either were not filed or were filed but overruled, and (2) the court is satisfied that the sale was -15- that allows title of the property to pass to the purch aser. See Plaza Corp. v. Alban Tractor Co., Inc., 219 M d. 570, 151 A.2d 17 0 (1959); Fisher v. Federal Nat l Mtg. Ass n., 360 F. Supp . 207 (D . Md. 1 973). Foreclosure, sale, and ratification operate to cut off the mortgagor s right of redemption the right to rep ay the mortga ge debt and terminates the mortgagor s interest in the property. Section 7-105 of the Real Property Article states that the sale of foreclosed property and subsequent conveyance of the property to the purchaser operates to pass all the title which the borrower had in the property at the time of the recording of the mortgage or deed of trust. See Lippert v. Jung, 366 M d. 221, 2 35, 783 A.2d 2 06, 214 (2001) (recognizing that if an owner of foreclosed property fails to redeem, the purchaser acquires absolute title to the property ) (quoting LaValley v. Rock Point, 104 Md. App. 123, 127, 655 A.2d 60, 62 (1995)); Moss v. A nnapolis Savings In st., 177 Md. 135, 144, 8 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1939) ( The mortgagee [who purchased property at a foreclosure sale] . . . acquired the same title to the property that any other purchase r would h ave taken , and had th e same po wer to rent, sell, or mortgage it that the mortgagor had when th e mortgag e was rec orded. ); Sullens v. Finney, 123 Md. 653, 657, 91 A. 700, 701-02 (1 914); Duval v. Becker, 81 Md. 537, 54849, 32 A. 308, 31 0 (1895). As this Court has held as early as 1869 in Lannay v . Wilson, 30 Md. 536 (1 869), fairly and prop erly made. If the court is not satisfied that the sale was fairly and properly made, it may enter any order that it deems appropriate. -16- foreclosure, sale, and ratification also cause the m ortgagor to lose the right o f possessio n in the property. In Lannay, the Court of Chancery issued a decree for the sale of mortgaged property and appointed a trustee to conduct the sale. Id. at 548. The mortgagee purchased property at the foreclosure sale, which the Chancellor later ratified, and the mortgagor then turned possession of the premises over to the pu rchase r. Id. Arguing that the sale was defective because the trustee allegedly failed to deliver the property deed to the purchaser, the mortgagor s successor in intere st filed a n ejectm ent actio n. Id. at 545-46. The Co urt rejected the mortgagor s claim, favoring, instead, the view that ratification of the foreclosure sale divests the mortgagor of the right of pos session, a req uisite for prevailing on an action for ejec tment. Id. at 550. Exp laining the ef fect of the f oreclosure sale, the Co urt stated: [T]hough the decree [for the sale of mortgaged property] does not operate as a conveyanc e of the legal title, the purchaser, holding possession under it, does not hold wrongfully or unla wfu lly; and, consequently, all right of possession of those bound by the decree, and the proceedings under it, other than the purchaser, is divested and taken away, and, of course , with it the right to main tain ejectme nt. Id. at 550. The Court in Lannay explained further that, after ratification of the sale, the right of possession to the foreclose d property lies solely with the purchaser: A purchaser under a decree in equity, becomes the substantial owner of the prop erty from the m oment of final ratificatio n of the sale, and he is entitled to and can recover the rents and profits of the e state. He is not o nly entitled to possession of the prop erty, but it remains at his risk, notwithstan ding the leg al title may not be conveyed. By such sale the dry legal title, and the -17- right of possession often become completely severed, at least for a time, the legal title remaining in some of the parties to the cause, while the equitable estate and right of possession become vested in the purchaser. Id.; see also Merryman v. Bremmer, 250 Md. 1, 8, 241 A.2d 558, 563 (1968) (stating that the purchaser of property at a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property after the court ratifies the sale). After ratification of a foreclosu re sale, therefore, the right to possess the sold property lies with the purchas er, not the former mo rtgagor. When a mortgag or loses the rig ht to possess foreclosed property but fails to vacate the premises, the purchaser of that property, in lieu of actually taking possession, may seek a court order to remov e the ho ldover mortga gor. Zeller v. Silverman, 143 Md. 339, 343, 122 A. 255, 256 (1923); Applega rth v. Russe ll, 25 Md. 317, 319-20 (1866). We embraced this concept in Applega rth: The practice is settled in this State, that w hen a pur chaser at a [foreclosure] sale under a [judicial] decree has fully complied with the terms of sale, and possession of the premises purchased is with held by a party to the suit, . . . the purc haser may ob tain an order under which possession will be delivered to him by proper process. 25 Md. at 319-20. Also in recognition of the purchaser s right of possession, Maryland Rule 14-102(a) provides the right to use judicial process to acquire actual possession of an occupied premises. T he Rule sta tes in pertinen t part: Whenever the purchaser of an interest in real property at a sale conducted pursuant to these Rules is entitled to possession, and the person in actual possession fails or refuses to deliver possession, the purchaser may file a motion requesting the c ourt -18- to enter a judgm ent aw arding posses sion of the pro perty. When the landowner rec eives such a judgm ent awarding po ssession, upon the lando wner s request, the clerk [o f the court] shall issue a writ directing the sheriff to place [the landowner] in possession of the property. Maryland Rule 3-647.13 Although this judicial process may be used to oust a mortgagor who no longer is entitled to possession, the use of the term ma y in Rule 14 102(a) and in Applega rth reflects the fact that the ouster process is not mandatory to obtain possession of the purchased property. In other words, seeking the court s assistance in dispossessing the holdover mortgagor is only one option available to the purchaser to obtain possession from a holdover mortgagor. Failure to exercise that option does not u ndermine the mortga gee s ow nership of the property nor the right to possession. Rather, a purchaser with the right to possess property may take possession of that 13 Maryland Rule 3-647 states: Upon the written request of the holder of a judgment awarding possession of property, the clerk shall issue a writ directing the sheriff to place that party in possession of the property. The request shall be accompanied by instructions to the sheriff specifying (a) the judgment, (b) the property a nd its location, and (c) the party to whom the judgment awards possession. The clerk shall transmit the writ and instructions to the sheriff. When a judgment awards p ossession o f property or the payment of its value, in the alternative, the instructions shall also specify the value of the property, and the writ shall direct the sheriff to levy upon rea l or persona l property of the judgmen t debtor to satisfy the judgm ent if the spe cified prop erty cannot be found. When the judgment awards possession of real property located partly in the county where the judgmen t is entered an d partly in an adjoining county, the sheriff may execute the writ as to all of the p rope rty. -19- property peacefully without the court s assistance. This right was incorporated into Maryland law through the adoption of Article 5 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which establishes that the Inh abitants of M aryland are en titled to the Common Law of England . . . and to the benefit of such of the English statutes as ex isted on th e Fo urth day of Jul y, seventeen hundred and seventy-six . . . . In Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 50, 447 A.2d 857, 858-59 (1982), we discussed the e volution of the cause o f action of forcible detainer, shedding light on the common law origin of the landowner s right of self-help to recover poss essio n of real p rope rty: At common law and prior to the enactment of the statute of 5 Richard 2d, Chapter 8 (1381) in the 14th century, whenever a right of entry existed the pa rty entitled to the righ t could lawfully enter and regain his possession by force. This right of self-help was curbed by 5 Richard 2d Chapter 8 which limited entries under claim of right to entries not with strong hand, nor with a mu ltitud e of p eople, bu t only in a peaceable and easy manner. Id. (quoting G. Liebmann, Maryland Practice 82-83 (vol. 2, 1976)). 14 Our cases have not abrogated the landowner s common law right of self-help as modified by 5 Richard 2d, 14 The full text of 5 Richard 2d Chapter 8 (1381), as recorded in Alexander s British Statutes 247 (2d. ed., vol. 1, 1912), states: And also the King defendeth, That none from hencefo rth make any Entry into an y Lands and T enements, but in case w here entry is given by the Law, and in such case not with strong hand, nor with * m ultitude of peo ple, but only in peaceable and easy manner. (2) And if any man fro m hence forth do to the contrary, and thereof be duly c onvict, he shall be punished by Imprisonment of his Body, and thereof ransomed at the King s Will. -20- Chapter 8. See Maryland Code, § 14-1 15 of the R eal Property A rticle (1974, 2 003 Re pl. Vol.) (listing the British statutes that are no longer in force in Maryland and not including 5 Richard 2 d Chap ter 8); Eubanks v. First Mount Vernon Indus. Loan Assoc., Inc., 125 Md. App. 642, 662-63, 726 A.2d 837, 847 (1999) (stating that 5 Richard 2d Chapter 8, as incorporated by the Declaration of Rights, has not been repealed by the Maryland Legislature). The right o f peaceab le self-help, the refore, is a via ble mechan ism for a title owner of property to ob tain actual possession of real pro perty from a holdover m ortgagor. 15 15 Another remedy available to a mortgagee seeking to gain possession of property from a holdover mortgagor is through a cause of action of forcible detainer. After the enactment of the peaceable self-help provision under 5 Richard 2d, Chapter 8, England enacted two statutes providing for the cau se of action of forcible detainer, a jud icial remedy orig inally available only to an owner ag ainst a wro ngful po ssessor w ho uses fo rce to main tain possession. See 15 Richard 2, Chapter 2 (1391); 8 Henry 6, C hapter 9 (14 29); see Moxley v. Acker, 294 Md. 47, 50 -51, 447 A.2d 8 57, 859 (1982); Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc. v. Acme Markets, Inc., 272 Md. 222, 227-28, 322 A.2d 521, 524 (1974); Clark v. Vannort, 78 Md. 216, 21 9-20, 2 7 A. 98 2, 983 ( 1893) . This cause of action, applicable to mortgagees seeking to oust holdover mortgagors, has been mo dified by § 8-4 02(b) of th e Real Pro perty Article (1974, 2003 Repl. Vol.) to include a remedy by which a landlord may recover possession of leased premises from a tenant Holding over without force and by delineating the procedure for bringing any one of them. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., 272 Md. at 22728, 322 A.2d at 524. In Moxley, this Court further modified the forcible detainer action by deleting the re quiremen t of force so that one can bring the cause of action to reg ain possession of property wrongfully detained in any way. 294 Md. at 53, 447 A.2d at 860. Laney con tends that, to obtain possession of 3612 Fels Lane, the DVA should have complied with the statutory procedures set forth by § 8-402(b) of the Real Property Article, the provisions governing ejectment of a holdover tenant. He relies on Eubanks v. First Mount Vernon Industrial Loan Assoc, Inc., 125 Md. App. 6 42, 660, 726 A.2d 837, 846 (1999), in which th e Court of Special A ppeals held that the provisions of § 8-402(b) applied to mortgagees and mortgagors as well as landlords and tenants. The mortgagee in Eubanks brought actions of f orcible detainer and for ejectment seeking to oust the mortgagor who refused to vaca te the pro perty afte r forecl osure. Id. at 648, 726 A.2d at 840. After the mortgagor elected a jury trial and the case was transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, that court, pursuant to §§ 8-402 and 8-818 of the Real Property Article, -21- Under the facts in the case at bar, the right to possess and title of 3612 Fels Lane clearly belonged to the DV A. Lane y lost his right to po ssess the pro perty when Commercial Federal purchased it at a public sale in Howard County that was duly reported, ratified and confirmed by the Circ uit C ourt for H owa rd County . . . . S ubse quently, on January 6, 2000, the Circuit Court substituted the [D VA] as the fo reclosure sale purchaser in place and in stead of Commercial Federal Mortgage Corporation. Then, at least by the date of the deed, March 17, 2000, when fee simple in 3612 Fels Lane was granted to the DVA, the DVA obtaine d its ow nership and the right to p ossessio n of the house . B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Notwithstanding Laney s lack of a property interest in 3612 Fels Lane, we must decide whether, under the United States Constitution, he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in that property on July 14, 2000. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made ap plicable to the State throug h the adop tion of the F ourteenth ordered the mortgagor to make monthly escrow payments for the use and occupancy of the property during the litigat ion. Id. On appeal, the mortgagor argued that § 8-402 did not apply because that section o nly governed actions between landlords and tenants, not actions between mortga gees an d mortg agors. Id. at 659, 726 A.2d at 846. The Court of Special Appea ls rejected this argument, stating that forcible en try and detainer actions are p roperly brought pursuant to RP § 8-402(b), and therefore are actions subject to the rent escrow provisions of RP § 8-118. Id. at 660, 726 A.2d at 846. Eubanks does not control and is distinguishable from the present case. The intermediate appellate court in Eubanks held only that § 8-402 applies when a mortgagee brings an action of forcible detainer. The court did not mandate that a mortgagee must pursue remedies under § 8-402 in order to oust a holdover. Indeed, the Eubanks court discussed 5 Richard 2, Chapter 8, the English statute providing for peaceable self-help, and ackno wledg ed that it h ad not b een rep ealed. Id. at 662-63, 726 A.2d at 847. -22- Amen dment, guarantees the people s right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unr easonab le searches and seizures. See Ma pp v. Oh io, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 16 84, 1691 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, 10 90 (1961 ); Wallace v . State, 373 Md. 69, 78-79, 816 A.2d 883, 889 (2003). The Fourth Amendment guarantees do not ap ply, however, unless the individual maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in the houses, papers, and effects search ed or se ized. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 430, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387, 401 (1978); Wallace, 373 M d. at 79, 816 A.2d at 88 9; Simpson v. State, 121 Md. App. 263, 277 , 708 A.2d 112 6, 1133 (1998). The one invoking Fourth Amendment protection bears the burden of demonstrating his or her legitimate expectation of privacy in the pla ce searc hed or i tems se ized. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U .S. 735 , 740, 99 S. Ct. 25 77, 258 0, 61 L . Ed. 2d 220, 22 6 (197 9). The burden consists of two inquiries: (1) whether the individual has a subjective expectation that his or her property or possessio ns will not b e searched , and (2) w hether the e xpectation is objectively reasonab le under the circu mstanc es. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88, 119 S. Ct. 469, 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373, 379 (1998 ); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 3940, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30, 36 (1988); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 401-02 n.12; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 588 (196 7)(Harlan , J., concurring ); Wallace, 373 Md. at 81, 816 A.2 d at 890; Simpson, 121 Md. App. at 277, 708 A.2d at 1133. As the Supreme Court has opine d, reasonab le expectations have a source outside of the Fourth A mendm ent, -23- either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law o r to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S. Ct. at 472, 142 L. Ed. 2d at 379(quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12, 99 S. Ct. at 430-31 n.12, 58 L. Ed. 2d at 401-02 n .12); Wallace, 373 Md. at 81, 816 A.2d at 890. In applying the reasonableness inquiry, courts have held that any expectation of privacy that squatters or trespasser s have in the property they occupy but do not own is not objectively reasonable.16 United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471 , 1472-74 (10 C ir. 1986); Amezq uita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1 st Cir. 1975) ; see Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784, 78 7-88 (9 th Cir. 199 4). Ruckman involved a search of a natural cave located on land owned by the United States and controlled by the Bureau of Land Management ( BL M ). 806 F .2d at 14 71-72 . The ca ve had been in habited by Ruck man, a trespasser, for eight months when authorities discovered and seized illegal anti-personnel booby traps d uring a warra ntless se arch of the cav e. Id. at 1472. The Ten th Circuit Court of Appea ls held that R uckman s expecta tion of privacy was not reasonable under the circumstances: Ruckman was admittedly a trespasser on federal lands and subject to immed iate ejectmen t. With respe ct to its own lands, the government has the rights of the ordinary proprietor, i.e., to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. While he had been living off the land for several months, the cave co uld 16 This is not to say that Laney had a subjective expectation of privacy. Because we decide that he did not have an objective expectation of privacy, we need not address whether Laney s giving a house key to a neighbor mitigated any subjective expectation of privacy he may hav e had. -24- hardly be considered a permanent residence. Counse l himself describes Ruckman as just camping out there for an extended period of time. Ruckman s subjective expectation of privacy is not reasonable in light of the fact that he could be ousted by BLM authorities from the place he was occupying at any time. Id. at 1472-73 (citations omitted). In Amezquita, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that squatters did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the structures they had constructed on gov ernme nt-ow ned lan d. 518 F .2d at 11 . Explaining its reasoning, the court stated: Nothing in the record suggests that the squatters entry upon the land was sanctioned in any way by the Commonwealth. The plaintiffs knew they had no c olorable claim to occupy the land; in fact , they had been as ked twice by Comm onwea lth officials to depart voluntarily. That fact alone makes ludicrous any claim that t hey had a r easo nable ex pect ation of privacy. Id. at 11. The c ourt also fo und it persu asive that, in an eviction action prior to the alleged illegal search , a local court had orde red the squ atters to evac uate the land and remo ve their structures. Id. The outcome of the eviction action, the court stated, is further proof that the plaintiffs could not have any reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. In Zimmerman, police of fice rs search ed a p iece of prope rty, which se veral individ uals (squatters) improved and occupied against the expressed will of the owner, Bishop Estate. 25 F.3d at 786. B ishop Esta te had ma de its objectio n to the squ atters know n by sending a letter and making several visits warning the squatters of their status as trespassers prior to the search. Id. at 786-87. After the search, Zimmerman, a house guest of the squatters, filed a -25- civil rights claim, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the search. Id. at 787. The court stated that Zimmerman had no greater right to be on the property than the squatters, and the squatters improvement of the property does not give rise to a reasonab le expectation of privacy when they had no legal right to occupy the land. Id. at 787-88. Unlike the privacy righ ts of squatters or trespassers, the tenant of a leased premises may maintain an expectation of privacy in th e leased premises after the termination of the tena ncy. Stoner v. C alifornia, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856, 861 (1964), reh. den. 377 U.S. 940, 84 S. Ct. 1330, 12 L. E d. 2d 303 (1964 ); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617, 81 S. Ct. 776, 780, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828, 835 (1961); see United States v. Brazel, 102 F.3d 1120, 1148 (11th Cir. 1997) ; see gener ally Burks v . State, 96 Md. App. 173, 194, 624 A.2d 12 57, 1268 (1993). Th is is so, even if th e tenant falls behind in his or her obligation to pay rent. Brown ing v. State, 336 S.E.2d 41, 43 (Ga. App. 1985) (stating that non-payment of rent is not conclusive in determining whether the tenant relinquished her expectation of privacy in her apartment); United States v. Botelho, 360 F. Supp. 620, 625 (D. Haw . 1973) . Nevertheless, where a lease a greem ent has expired , a tenant s expectation of privacy in that property also may diminish depending on the circumstances of the tenancy. Several courts have held that the hotel gu est s reasonab le expectatio n of privac y expires com pletely when the rental contr act lapse s. United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir. 1987) -26- ( [W]hen a hotel gue st s rental perio d has exp ired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room. );United Sta tes v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459 (7 th Cir. 1977) ; United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52 (2d. Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1970) ; State v. Roff, 424 P.2d 643 (W ash. 1967 ); see also United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 697, 699 (6 th Cir. 1997) (holding that a hotel guest lost a legitimate expectation of privacy when the motel management lawfully took possession of the motel room ); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 855 (8 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849, 106 S. Ct. 143, 88 L. Ed . 2d 119 (1985). Other courts have maintained that the hotel guest s reasonable expectation of privacy may survive the expiration of the room agreement if the hotel has a practice of allowing guests to overstay the check-out time withou t conse quenc e. United States v. Kitchens, 114 F.3d 29, 32 (4 th Cir. 1997) ; United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir. 1986). If it is clear to the guest, however, that he or she must vacate the room after the rental period, the expectation of privacy in the room expires. In Kitchens, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appea ls upheld the warrantless entry of a motel room after the defendant guest had overstayed the rental period. 114 F.3d at 32. The court recognized that a hotel guest may retain a legitimate expectation of privacy after the rental period if there is a pattern or practice which w ould make that expectation reasonable. Id. Because there was no evidence that the motel had a pattern or practice of allowing patrons to stay past check-out time but instead required them to check-out, the court held that the defendant had no legitimate -27- expec tation of privacy. Id. According to at least one court, where a rental agreement for a hotel room has expired, the hotel guest loses a reasonable expectation of privacy only as to the hotel own er, who may consent to the search of the room after the rental period without risk of Fourth Amendment violations. Carter v. State, 72 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Alaska App. 2003). In Carter, the defendant was the only one of four guests who remained in a hotel room slightly past the one o clock check out time . Id. at 1258. Without authorization from the hotel management, the police ordered the defendant to gather his belonging and va cate the room. Id. While the defendant was following the officers orders, he opened a drawer and exposed evidence that the police seized. Id. The court held that a hotel-room search by police without consent from the hotel proprietor violated the defendant s legitimate expectation of privacy even after the rental period passed. Id. at 1261. The court explained: Carter s ex pectation o f privacy in the hotel roo m did not come to an abrupt end [at the check-out deadline]. In particular, Carter continued to have a right of privacy vis-a-vis the police. If the police h ad any authority t o remain in Carter s room and order him to v acate th e room , that authority had to be derived from the e xpress con sent of the h otel mana gement. Id.; see also Allen, 106 F.3d at 699 (holding that, after the motel management lawfully took possession of the def endant s ro om, [t]he [motel] manager s consent to the officers search of the room w as all that was required to avo id constitutional infirmity ). As the previous discussion illustrates, courts con sider a num ber of fac tors in determining the reasonableness of one s expectation of privacy in property occupied without -28- permission of the owner. Some of these factors include the following: whether the individual had an ownership or p osse ssory inter est in the p rope rty, Zimmerman, 25 F.3d at 787-88; Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 147 2-74; Amezq uita, 518 F.2d at 11-12; whether the occupier of the property owne d by ano ther has been in forme d that he or she m ust vac ate, Kitchens, 114 F.3d at 30, 31-32; Zimmerman, 25 F.3d at 787-88; Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1472-7 4; Amezq uita, 518 F.2d at 11-12; and the nature or outcome of any judicial remedies available to the land owner, Amezq uita, 518 F.2d at 11-12. Laney asks this Court to consider the issues within the context of a legitimately heldover tenant. We believe, however, that Laney s intere st in 3612 F els Lane is m ore akin to that of a trespasser and, therefore, any expectation of privacy that Laney had in 3612 F els Lane was u nreaso nable. First, Laney at one time h ad own ed 3612 Fels Lane , but he lost title to the premises as a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage and subsequent conveyance of title to the D VA. Indeed, Laney concede s that the DV A posse ssed the de ed to the pro perty at the time of the government searches in question. Therefore, he no longer had any right to occupy the prem ises. Further, as required by the Maryland foreclosure laws, Laney also had been notified that the foreclosure sale would take place and that 3612 Fels Lane had been purchased. It is clear that, after the sale, Laney no longer was entitled to occupy 36 12 Fels Lane a nd that th e new title own er could take po ssession . With respect to the final eleme nt, the DVA had become the owner of the property and had the right to en ter th e pre mise s by co mplying with all of the procedures required under -29- Maryland foreclosure law. Once the DVA had the right to possess 3612 Fels Lane, Maryland law did not require the DVA to pursue some additional judicial remedy to evict Laney from the premises. Criddle, as the DVA s agent, acted consistently w ith the lando wner s righ t to enter the premises without court assistance by peaceably obtaining access to the house and entering without force.17 For these reasons, we hold that Laney had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 3612 Fels Lane. Consequently, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the entry of the home on that prop erty and the seiz ure of the e vidence that formed the basis for L aney s convictions.18 The Circuit Court correctly denied Laney s motion to suppress. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED; COSTS IN T HIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER 17 Laney cannot complain that he maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the seized evidence, itself. Once Criddle and law enforcement officials entered 3612 Fels Lane lawfully, they could seize evidence of an immediately apparent incriminating nature, such as the munit ions an d destru ctive de vices d iscove red and seized in this case . Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-38, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 2307-08, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112, 121-22 (1990). 18 Because Laney had no legitimate expectation of privacy in 3612 Fels Lane, we need not consider whether the circumstances of this case were exigent or whether consent justified the searc h if L aney h ad m ainta ined a leg itima te ex pect ation of privacy. -30-

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