Richardson v. State

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Kurt Richardson v. State of Maryland No. 41, September Term, 2003 HEADNOTES: CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS; MD RULE §4-215; WAIVER OF COUNSEL; RIGHT TO COUNSEL. A defendant, who is shown, either singly or as a member of a group of defendants, a videotape of a judge giving the advice that Maryland Rule 4-215 (a) requires and subsequently taken before a judge for bail review, without a meaningful colloquy with the judge, cannot be said to h ave waived h is or her right to counsel unde r Rule 415 (c), becau se that p rocedu re does not com ply with R ule 4-2 15. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 41 September Term, 2003 KURT H. RICHARDSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C. J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridge, John C. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Bell, C. J. Harrell and Battaglia, JJ., Conc ur; Rak er, J., Join s in th e Jud gme nt Only. Filed: May 14, 2004 In this case, we are as ked to decide whether showing the defendant, either singly or as a member of a group of defendants, a videotape of a judge giving the advice that Maryland Rule 4-215 (a)1 requires an d subsequ ently taking him or her before a judge for bail review comply with that rule and to determine the effect, if any, that procedure has on a subsequent determination that the defendant has waived counsel by inaction, pursuant to Rule 4-215 (c) or (d).2 The Court of Special Appeals, rather than answer either of the issues, remanded the 1 Maryland Rule 4-215 (a) provides: (a) First Appearance in Court Without Counsel. At the defendant's first appearance in court without counsel, or when the defendant appears in the District Court without counsel, demands a jury trial, and the record does not disclose prio r complian ce with this s ection by a jud ge, the cou rt shall: (1) Make certain that the defendant has received a copy of the chargin g docum ent contain ing notice a s to the right to counsel. (2) Inform the defendant of the right to counsel and of the importanc e of assistan ce of cou nsel. (3) Advise the defendant of the nature of the charges in the charging document, and the allowable penalties, including man dato ry pen alties, if a ny. (4) Con duct a wa iver inquiry purs uant to sectio n (b) of this Rule if the d efendan t indicates a de sire to waiv e counse l. (5) If trial is to be conducted on a subsequent date, advise the defendant that if the defendant appears for trial without counsel, the court could determine that the defendant waived counsel and proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. The clerk shall note compliance with this section in the file or on the docke t. 2 Rule 4-215, as relevant, provides: (c) Waiver by Inaction--District Co urt. In the District Court, if the defendant appears on the date set for trial without counsel and indicates a desire to have counsel, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious case to th e Circu it Cour t, with in struction s that it do so. We shall rev erse. I. The petitioner, Kurt H. Richardson, was arrested and charged with felony and misdemeanor drug offences and resisting arrest. When he appeared for his bail hearing, rather than being take n directly before the court, he, along with a group of defendants, was reason fo r the defen dant's appea rance with out couns el, the court sh all continue th e action to a la ter time, com ply with section (a) of this R ule, if the record d oes not sho w prior co mpliance , and advise the defen dant that if counsel d oes not en ter an appe arance by tha t time, the action will procee d to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived counsel by failing or ref using to ob tain counse l and may pro ceed with the trial only if (1) the defendant received a copy of the charging document containing the notice as to the right to counsel and (2) the defendant either (A) is charged with an offense that is not punishable by a fine exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment, or (B) appeared before a judicial officer of the District Cou rt pursuant to Rule 4-21 3(a) or bef ore the cou rt pursuant to section (a) of this Rule and was given the required advice. (d) Waiver by Inaction--Circuit C ourt. If a defen dant appe ars in circuit court without coun sel on the date set for hearing or trial, indicates a desire to have co unsel, and th e record sh ows com pliance w ith section (a) o f this Rule, either in a previous appearance in the circuit court or in an appearance in the District C ourt in a case in which th e defend ant dema nded a jury trial, the court shall permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the defendant unrepresented by counsel. If the court finds that there is no meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defe ndant has waived c ounsel by failin g or refusin g to obtain c ounse l and m ay proce ed with the hea ring or tr ial. 2 shown a videotape. On the videotape,3 a judge provided advice and instruc tions, genera lly as follows: THE COU RT: Yo ur bail review is not your trial, but is a hearing to determine whether the bail that has been set in your case ought to be increased or decreased or whether you ought to be released on your own recognizance. This is not your opportunity to tell the Court whether you are guilty or not guilty. Each of you should ve received a copy of your statement of charges. If you have no t received your charging documents please tell the pre-trial representativ e and the b ail review ju dge, and a copy will be provid ed to you. You have certain very important rights, please listen carefully. If you are charged with a fel ony you have a right to preliminary hearing, if you choose to have a preliminary hearing the State must show that there is probable cause that a crime was committed and probable cause that you committed that crime. Your preliminary hearing date is printed on the paper the Court Commissioner gave you. If you are charged with a crime that carries a penalty of more than ninety days incarceration you have a right to a jury trial at the Circu it Court of Baltimore City. A jury is composed of twelve persons picked from the motor and voter rolls of Baltimore City, all twelve jurors must find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in order for you to be found guilty. You also have a right to a court trial, where a judge w ould decide wh ether you are guilty or not guilty. The standard of proof in a court trial is also beyond a reasonab le doubt. Your trial date is printed on the paper the Court Commissioner gave you. Perhaps your most important right is your right to have a lawyer represent you. If you cannot afford to retain a private law yer to represent you at not [sic] co st. The State s Attorney who will be prosecuting the case is a lawyer, the rules of evidence will apply at your trial. If you are not trained in the law and you do not know the rules of evidence you will find that you are at a disadva ntage in attempting to represent yourself. A lawyer can help you in ma ny ways, a lawyer can help you investigate your case, and determin e if there is a legal defense that you might not know exists. A lawyer can help you question the State s witnesses, call witnesses and question any witnesses that you any have. 3 Although there were three different videotapes in use by that trial court during the general time period in question, featuring three different judges, with minor variations, the con tents of each w ere esse ntially the sa me. Mr. Robert Weisengoff, the Director of the Pretrial Release Services Program, reported that it simply is not known which of the videos was sh own to Richa rdson 1 998. 3 A lawyer can help you decide whether you should testify or whether you should remain silen t. Even if you are found guilty a lawyer can still help you by arguin g to the ju dge ab out the s entenc e to be im posed . These are the advantages to having a lawyer. There are only disadvantages in representing yourself. You may retain any lawyer you choose, if you are unable to hire a private attorn ey you may go to the Public Defender s office to apply for representation. If you remain in jail the Pub lic Defen der s Off ice will represent you if you choose. If you make b ail or are released on your own recognizance you must go in person to the Public Defender s Office. When you arrive you will be given an income verification form, the verification form must be returned to the Public Defen der s office m ore than ten w orking days before your trial date so that a determination can be made whether you qualify for rep resenta tion. If you do nothing between now and the date of your trial the judg e ma y find that yo u have waived your right to a lawyer. If that happens you will have to proceed without representation. If you have any questions regarding these rights, please ask the bail review judge when you [sic] name is called. Bail Review Instructions, O fficial Transcript of Proceedings before Honorable Alan T. Karlin, Judge, October 28, 2003. After viewing the video, the petitioner and the othe r members of the group were taken into the courtroom, before the bail review judge. Having inquired, [t]his group has seen the video and been adv ised of their rights, is that correct[] and received the response,4 Yes, sir, they have, the judge proceeded to review each def endant s ca se individua lly. With respect to the petitioner, with the exception of advising the petitioner that his bail would remain the same and hearing from the representative from Pretrial Release Services, that review, in its entirety, consisted of the following: 4 The record reflects that the response was from an unidentified woman, who later identified herself as Gina (inaudible), of the Pretrial Release Services. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Richardson, in case Number 2172, one count of distribution is a felo ny, 20 years , $25,000; one cou nt of possession, 4 years and/or $25,000 ; resisting arrest (inaudible) could receive a sentence not deemed cruel and u nusual. Preliminary hearing is Septem ber 17th, Courtroo m 3, 830 N orth Aven ue. Pret rial. WOM AN S VOICE: Gina (inaudible) for pretrial release services. For the record, Your Honor, this defendant does have a 52 page record, and this was the allegation: The police observed the defendant looking into a pill container. They come back with a field interview. He then threw that container into the street. They did recover 14 gel caps of suspected heroine [sic]. Current bail is set at 5,000 and pretrial is not requesting a chang e. THE COU RT: T he bail re mains th e same . (Official Transcript of P roceedings (Arraign ment Hearing), A ugust 18, 1998). The record thus reflects that the bail review judge never inquired of the petitioner p ersonally whether he was present when the video was shown, whether he understood its contents, or whether he had any ques tions reg arding the vide o. Nevertheless, The Bail Rev iew Do cket recorded that the District Court Judge did make certain the defendant received a copy of the charging document; informed the defendant of right to, and importance of, counsel; complied w/rule 4-215; referred defenda nt to public d efender; a dvised felo ny defenda nt of right to preliminary hearing; advised defenda nt of right to ju ry trial; ordered ba il to rema in the sa me. When the petitioner next appeared in the District Cou rt, for his preliminary hearing, the felony drug charge ag ainst him w as nolle prossed and his case was postponed. On that occasion, th e only excha nge betw een the pe titioner and th e court w as, as follow s: 5 THE CO URT: Okay, So the State s - (inaudible) - nolle prosse d the felo ny, which means you have an absolute right to a postponement. December 18th is your new date. You have a right to hire private counsel. If you cann ot afford private counsel, go to the Public Defender s Office 10 working days before your next trial date. Where do you live sir? DEFENDA NT: 6924 (inaudible) THE COURT: Have a seat, an d we ll call you fo r a sum mons. N ext pers on. (Court Proceeding s, September 17, 19 98). The petitioner sought a postponement to get counsel on his next appearance in the District Court. When that request was denied, he prayed a jury trial. In its entirety, the record of that appearance reads: VOICE: Okay. The next person in line, step up to the table. Give us your name. DEFENDA NT: Kurt Richardson. VOICE: The State v. Kurt Richardson, Case No. 3b302172. Your ho nor, the State is rea dy. CO UR T: Ju st a m ome nt. So you re re ady? VOICE: Yes, Your Honor. Is the current one - - (inaudible) - - I believe the case has been in before. THE COU RT: W hy are you reque sting a postp onemen t? DEFENDANT: Well, I just got release d and I just c ome from the Public Def ender an d the y told me I got to get (in audible) tim e to reapp ly. THE COUR T: You were arrested on something else? THE DEFEN DANT: Yeah. 6 THE C OURT : When did you get release d, sir? DEFENDA NT: A week-and-a-half ago THE COU RT: W hen did you g et arrested on that? DEFENDA NT: That was in last month. THE COU RT: Ok ay, Sir, I m not go ing to grant you another po stponem ent. This case was postponed three months ago in September. You ve had three months to get an attorney. Have a seat. The next person, step up. Give us your name. (Whereupon, the tape was temporarily stopped and resumed at this part of the procee ding.) VOICE: Just a moment please. VOICE: The State v. Kurt Richardson, Case No. 3B302172. VOICE : Mr. Richardson , are you (inaudible) sir? DEFENDA NT: Yeah. VOICE: Stand over here. I ll give you a summons. VOICE: You re asking for a jury trial, Richardson? VOICE: Kurt Richardson. (Whereupo n, the above-entitled proceed ing was conclud ed.) (Court Proceeding s, December 18 , 1998). The next appearance the petitioner made in court was in the Circuit Court for Baltim ore City. He appeared without counsel and the court determined that the petitioner had waived c ounsel by inac tion, pursuan t to Rule 4-215 (d). The basis for that determination 7 is ref lecte d in f ollowin g colloquy: THE C OURT : Who is your lawyer? THE DE FENDA NT: I was sent down on a sum mons. THE COU RT: Sir, you w eren t sent do wn here . You ask ed for a jury trial. THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COUR T: Who is your lawyer, Mr. Richardson? THE DEFE NDA NT: M y lawyer is not pres ent. THE COURT: Who is your lawyer is my question? THE DEFEN DANT: I ain t make it over there to 201 Saint Paul Place. THE C OURT : The answer is you do not have your lawyer. THE DEFEN DANT: No. THE COURT: Okay. So when I asked who your lawyer is, the answer is I don t hav e one, is that co rrect? THE DEFE NDA NT: Th at s correct. THE COUR T: Okay. Now, when were you charged with this crime? THE DEFE NDA NT: W hen wa s I charged with it? THE COUR T: When were you charged with this crime? THE D EFEND ANT: I can t remember the date. It w as this year? [THE S TATE :]: August 17, 1998, Y our honor. THE COUR T: It continues to amaze me that people do not remember when they are a rrest ed. H ardly anyone remem bers the date the y are arres ted. I always though [sic] that was seminal [sic] day in the life of an individual. That 8 is the day when someone took away your freedom. I guess not. When w ere you released? THE D EFEND ANT: R eleased? I believe in O ctober. THE COUR T: How long did you stay incarcerated? THE DE FENDA NT: About thirty days. THE COURT: What have you done since your release to obtain a lawyer? THE DEFEN DAN T: I had a lawyer, but when I got released I didn t have suff icien t time to go reap ply. THE COUR T: Now, sir, that is not true. If you were released in October THE DEFEN DANT: Right THE COUR T: today is December THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COU RT: w hat preven ted you from going to the Public Defender s Officer later in October, the whole month of November[,] or just about the whole mon th of Decem ber? THE DEFE NDA NT: I had a public de fender, bu t I had got loc ked up ag ain and got released in N ovember. THE COUR T: Okay. Let s take this chrono logically. You were arrested for the charge of narcotic possession THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COUR T: in August. That s this case? THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COUR T: How long did you remain incarcerated on the case? 9 THE DEFEN DANT: Thirty days, I believe. THE COURT: Okay. So sometime in late September or early October you were released from custody on this case? THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht THE COUR T: . . . When were you arrested on the next case? THE D EFEND ANT: O ctober and released in N ovember. THE COURT: So how long was the interval or the gap between release on this cha rge and the arre st on the next ch arge. THE DE FENDA NT: That was like ten or fifteen days. THE COU RT: In that peri od of te n or fift een da ys. THE DEFE NDA NT: I w ent up to the Public D efender s Office a nd they told me I had to reapply within ten working days and they gave me a piece of paper that said within ten working days and bring proof of income. THE COU RT: Do you remem ber your first trial da te in the district co urt? THE DEFE NDA NT: A ugust. THE COURT: No, it was September 17. You were arrested in August. Your first trial date was September 17. THE D EFEND ANT: Y es, I remember. THE COUR T: That was when you were there for a preliminary hearing. THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COURT: And the case was then later droppe d from a f elony to misdemeano r. THE DE FENDA NT: Yes. 10 THE COURT: And they postponed the case from September 17 to December 18, three months. THE DEFE NDA NT: Rig ht. THE COURT: After you were released in November on a second charge, what did you do to get a lawyer for this case? THE DEFEN DANT: I went up there and THE COUR T: When did you go up there? THE DEFENDA NT: I went up there, I believe, around December, about the first or second week of Decem ber. THE COUR T: Is there a reason you did not go there the day after you were released in Novem ber? THE DE FENDA NT: Yes. THE COUR T: What was that reason? THE DEFENDA NT: Because at that time I was out looking for a job and I was going when I went up there, it was late, and they told me to come back. And when I did go back , they told me to bring proof of income and this and that and they told me that it was too late, that I had to reapply within ten days, and they gave me a piece of paper to show up North Avenue. THE C OURT : Here is our problem sir. THE DE FENDA NT: Yes. THE COUR T: Your case h as been pending since August, and h ere you are four m onths la ter and d o not ha ve a law yer to repr esent you . THE DE FENDA NT: I had two lawyers. THE COU RT: Th at s right, you had two law yers probably fro m the Pu blic Defender s Office. 11 THE DEFEN DANT: Right THE COUR T: And they represent you w hile you re incarcerated. Once you while yo u re rele ased, th ey ask you s imply to g o back up and reapply. THE DEF END ANT : Right. THE C OURT : But you had since A ugust to do that, sir. THE DEFEN DANT: I have. THE C OURT : You have no t done it in a timely manner. ... THE COU RT: By m y calculation, sir, you had eight days in the last part of November and the first part of December when you had an opportunity to apply to the Pu blic Defe nder s O ffice in a tim ely manner to get a lawyer and you didn t do it. THE DEFEN DANT: That s because they told me it was too late. THE COURT: Yes, it was, when you applied in late December. You had from the 23rd of November to the 4 th of December. Maybe you were busy trying to find a job or something else, but finding a la wyer to repre sent you in a criminal charge where you could get incarcerated seems to be a priority. I m not going to delay this case any further. DE FEN DA NT: Ok ay. THE COURT: This Court finds that you were aware of your right to the representation of an attorn ey, you were aw are that an atto rney could be helpful in representing you in these matters, and you have not set forth any meritorious reason why you d o not ha ve a law yer to repr esent you . (Reporter s Official T ranscript of Proceeding s, December 22 , 1998). Following a jury trial, the petitioner was found guilty of p ossessio n of he roin. He was senten ced the same d ay to three years inca rceratio n. The petitioner time ly noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Initially, that 12 court, in an unreported opinion, dismissed the petitioner s appeal for failure to provide a complete transcript of the proceedings in [C]ircuit [C]ourt as required by Maryland Rule 8411. Subsequently, after receiving affidavits the petitioner submitted with respect to the efforts his cou nsel ha d mad e to com plete the record , without granting or denying the petitioner s motion fo r reconside ration of tha t decision, bu t recognizin g that justice w ould thereby be served , the intermed iate appellate co urt issued an order rem anding the case to the Circuit Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a new trial because o f noncomp liance with Rule 4-21 5. More particularly, the Order instructed: If there exists an accurate record of the relevant proceedin gs in the District Court of Maryland for B altimore City, the [C]ircuit [C]ourt shall determine whether appellant is entitled to a new trial on the ground that a review of the relevant [C]ircuit [C]ourt and District Cou rt records show that app ellant s waiver of counsel did not comply with the requirements of Md. Rule 4-215. If the District Court employee responsible for producing accurate records of that court s proceedings is unable to provide the [C]ircuit [C]ourt with an accurate record of the relevant proceedings, the [C]ircuit [C]ou rt shall determine whether appellant is en titled to a new trial on the ground that through fault of appellant and/or appellant s counsel - the failure to produce an accurate record has denied appellant the benefit of meaning ful appellate review . Thereafter, the petitioner filed with this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted . Richards on v. State, 376 M d. 139, 8 29 A.2 d 530 ( 2003) . We shall hold, as the petitioner argues, that merely showing a defendant a videotape of a judge providing the advice and instruction required by Rule 4-215 (a) is an insufficient predicate for a finding of waiver of counsel by inaction. At the least, there must be some 13 inquiry to determine the defendant s understanding of the advice and instructions so given. Before addressing that issue, however, we shall consider the propriety, which we shall reject, of the limited remand, pursua nt to Maryland Rule 8 -604 (d), 5 ordered by the Court of Special Appe als. II. To be sure, Maryland Rule 8-604 (d) makes clear that, in a proper case, a limited remand is an acceptable and appropriate disposition. Our cases clarifying and delineating those circumstan ces whe n it is acceptab le and app ropriate we re recently synthesiz ed in Southern v. State, 371 Md. 93, 10 4-105, 807 A . 2d 13, 16-17 (200 2): The limited rema nd is prope r in various circumstances, particularly when the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings. Butler v. State, 55 M d. App . 409, [433,] 462 A . 2d 123 0[,124 2] (198 3). See McM illan v. State, 325 Md. 272, [296-297] 600 A. 2d 430[,442] (1992) (remand was proper where a question was not previously addressed to the trial court because o f an error o f law); Bailey v. State , 303 Md. 650, [659,] 496 A.2d 665[,669] (1985) (a limited remand was needed to determine whether a discovery violation prejudiced the defen dant); Warrick v . State, 302 Md. 162, [174,] 486 A.2d 189[, 195] (1985 ) (remand whe n necessary to answer whether the State prope rly complied with disclosu re provisions for discove ry); 5 Maryland R ule 8-604 (d) provide s, as relevant: (d) Remand. (1) Generally. If the Court concludes that the substantial merits of a case will not be determined by affirming, reversing or modifying the judgment, or that justice will be served by permitting further proceedings, the Court may remand the case to a lower court. In the order reman ding a c ase, the a ppellate court sh all state th e purpo se for th e rema nd. The order of rem and and the opinio n upon wh ich the order is based are conclusive as to the poin ts decided. U pon rem and, the low er court sha ll conduct a ny further pro ceedings n ecessary to dete rmine the a ction in accord ance w ith the op inion an d order of the a ppellate court. 14 Maham mitt v. State, 299 Md. 82, [86 ,] 472 A.2d 477[,479 (1984) (a remand to determine facts regarding a grant of postpone ment relating to a statutory speedy trial claim serve d the interests o f justice); Wiener v . State, 290 Md. 425, [437-438] 430 A.2d 588[,59 5-596] (1981) (w here the issue on restricted (limited) remand is collateral to and not an integral part of a criminal trial and advances the purposes of justice, rem and is proper - in reference to the right to coun sel). On the other hand, we have stated emphatically that Rule 8-604 (d) is neither an antidote for the error s of the State or of counsel nor a method to correct errors committed during the trial itself, id. at 104, 807 A. 2d at 16; its intent and Maryland case law reviewing this rule do not provide a pa rty with the opportunity to get a second bite at the apple in the same case, but instead, the rule attempts to permit a court to cure some judicial error that resulted in unfairness to a party. Id. at 112, 807 A. 2d at 31. We have also addressed the situation in which a limited remand has been ordered in the context of a waiver by inactio n case. Mitchell v . State, 337 Md. 509 , 654 A. 2d 130 9 (1995). In Mitchell, the defendant challenged on appeal the adequacy of the inquiry conducted by the trial court into whether the defendant s reasons for appearing without counsel w ere meritorious and, thus, its determination that the defendant had waived counsel by inaction. 337 Md. at 513, 654 A. 2d at 1311. Rather than reversing the judgment of the trial court and remanding for a new trial, the Cou rt of Special Appeals ordered a limited remand for the trial court to determine the meritoriousness of the defendant s reasons for appearing without couns el. Id. Pointing out that [w]ithout exception, we have ordered a new trial in cases involving a trial court s fa ilure to com ply with R ule 4-2 15 (d), w e revers ed. Id. at 517, 654 15 A. 2d at 1313, citing Williams v . State, 321 Md. 266, 582 A.2 d 803 (19 90); Maus v. State, 311 Md. 85 , 532 A.2d 1066 (19 87); Snead v . State, 286 M d. 122, 406 A.2d 98 (1979); Thomp son v. State , 284 Md. 113 , 394 A.2d 119 0 (1978). 6 Concluding that, in that case, the Rule 4-215 (d ) inquiry was so intertwined with the trial that a limited remand could cause the defendant to suffer great prejudice and, so, adversely affected the defendant s right to a fair trial, Mitchell, 337 Md. at 517, 654 A. 2d at 1313, the Court explained: If the case at bar were remanded for a de term inati on of wh ethe r Mitche ll's reason for appearing without counsel w as meritoriou s, Mitchell w ould have to reconstruct his actions of over two years ago. He must also recall the dates and contents of conversations with representatives of the Office of the Public Defender, in addition to how much money had been paid and how much money was owed to the private attorney he had previously attempted to retain. The potential p rejudice to M itchell is obvio us, and a lim ited reman d in this case w ould be funda menta lly unfair. Id. It held (337 Md . at 518, 654 A. 2d at 1 313-14): Limited remand cannot be used to correct procedural defects at the trial level when the procedure involved is so intertwined with the d efen dant's constitutional right to counsel that a limited rema nd wou ld cause un fair prejudice. Failure to conduct the Rule 2-415 (d) inquiry at the proper time, therefore, m andates a n ew trial. The exact circum stances in the instant case under which the original inqu iry should hav e occurred cannot be recreated, and we canno t require the def endan t to mee t that bur den. The interes ts of justice simply w ould no t be serv ed by ord ering a li mited re mand in this ca se. 6 The C ourt no ted, also , citing Evans v . State, 84 Md.App. 573, 581 A.2d 435 (1990), that, with the exception of Morelan d v. State, 68 Md.App. 78, 510 A.2d 261 (1986 ), which it overru led, Mitchell v . State, 337 Md. 509, 515, 654 A. 2d 1309, 1312 (1995), the Court of Special Appeals had likewise ordered a new trial in all cases involving a Rule 4-215 (d) violation. Mitchell, 337 Md. at 517, 654 A. 2d at 1313. 16 The State distinguishes Mitchell on the basis that, while a procedural defect in the inquiry was evident in that case, here the principal qu estion is not whether the trial court conducted the proper inquiry of [the petitioner], but w hether [the petitioner] is at fault for failing to timely produce an accurate record from which the appellate court can determine whether there was com pliance w ith Rule 4-2 15. This is important, it ex plains, beca use, in determining whether a defendant has waived counsel by inaction, since the amendm ents to Rule 4-215 (d), effective July 1, 1991,7 a [C ]ircu it [C ]our t judge [m ay] rely on the advice of the right to counsel previously given to a defendant by a District Court judge when the defendant requests a jury trial. Smith v. S tate, 88 Md. App. 32, 43, 591 A.2d 902, 907 (1991). We are not persuaded. It is undisputed that the petitioner received his advice regarding the Rule 4-215 (a) requirements via a videotape of a District Court judge, rather 7 Before the amendment, Rule 4-215 (d) provided: In circuit court, if a defendant who has appeared before that court pursuant to section (a) of this Rule app ears without counse l on the date set for a hearing or tria l and indica tes a desire to h ave coun sel, the court sh all permit the defendant to explain the appearance without counsel. If the court finds that there is a meritorious reason for the defendant's appearance without counsel, the court shall continue the action to a later time and advise the defendant that if counsel does not enter an appearance by that time, the action will proceed to trial with the d efendant unrepres ented by counsel. If the c ourt find s that ther e is no me ritorious reas on for the def endant's appearance without counsel, the court may determine that the defendant has waived counsel by failing or refusing to obtain counsel and may proceed with th e hearin g or trial. 17 than by advice given, live, by that judge. There is, moreover, no question as to the accuracy of the record of wh at occurred - the colloquy betw een the court and the petitioner - each time the petitioner appeared before a judge of th e District Court, as opposed to being shown a videotape of a judge providing mandated advice or instruction , or of the C ircuit Court. The only uncertainty is which of three vide otapes of a judge g iving the Rule 4-215 (a) advice, each essentially the same as far as the substance of the advice is concerned, was shown to the petition er. We conclude that Mitchell is dispositive. It was error to order a limited remand.8 See State v. Stallings, 658 N. W. 2d 106, 2003 Iowa Sup. Lexis 19 (2003) (the inadequacy of record to show su fficient waiver of right to jury trial not curable by limited rem and). III. Under both Federal and Maryland Law, it is well settled that criminal defendants are guaranteed the right to the assistance of cou nsel in a crimina l case. See U. S. Co nst. Amend. 8 Given o ur determin ation with re spect to the o rdered limited remand, it is unnecessary that we address whether the appellant provided an adequate record for the court to review, and we do not do so; however, we note, as the petitioner submits, that the issue of the remedy for an inability to reconstruct a trial record for appellate review and the requirements that must be met for a new trial was discussed at length in Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 469 , 639 A. 2d at 696 (1994). 18 VI; 9 see also, Md. Decl. Rts. Art 21;10 Lettley v. State, 358 Md. 26, 33, 746 A.2d 392, 396 (2000) ( The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ... and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights ..., as a safeguard necessary to ensure fundamental human rights of life and liberty, guarantee to any criminal defendant the right to have the assistance of counsel. ); see also Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S . 60, 69, 62 S . Ct. 457, 464, 86 L.Ed. 680, 698 (1942); Austin v. S tate, 327 Md. 37 5, 381, 609 A.2d 728, 730-31 (19 92). The standard in Maryland for an effective waiver of counsel mirrors the stan dard established by the Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938), Argersinger v. Hamlin , 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.C t. 2006 ( 1972) , Adams v. U.S. ex. rel. McCann, 217 U.S. 269, 63 S. Ct. 236 (1942), among other cases: to be valid, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent. Fowlke s v. State, 311 Md. 586, 609, 536 A.2d 1149, 1161 (1988); Maus v . State, 311 M d. 85, 112, 5 32 A.2d 1066, 10 79 (1987 ); Howe ll v. State, 293 Md. 232, 236 , 443 A.2d 103 , 105 (1982). To address these concerns, Maryland adopted Rule 4-215.11 See Johnson v. State, 355 9 The Sixth Amen dment pro vides in per tinent part: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assista nce of Coun sel for h is defen se. 10 Article 21 o f the Ma ryland Decla ration of R ights provid es in pertinen t part: That in all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a right ... to be allowed counsel.... 11 It is important to note that Rule 4-215 imposes requirements that exceed constitu tional sta ndards . State v. Wischhussen, 342 Md. 530 553, n. 10, 677 A.2d 595 19 Md. 420, 444, 735 A.2d 1003, 1016 (1999), in which this Court observed: Maryland Rule 4-215(a) implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, de tailing a specif ic procedu re that must b e followed by the trial court in order for there to be a knowing and intelligen t waive r. Vincenti v. State, 309 M d. 601, 604 , 525 A.2d 1072, 10 74 (1987 ); Fowlkes, 311 Md. at 609, 536 A.2 d at 1161. W hether the d efendan t's waiver is ex pressly made to the judge by requesting to proceed to trial pro se, by inactio n through simply appearing at trial without counsel present, or through discharging an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the trial court must com ply with M d. Rule 4-215 in orde r for the defen dant's w aiver of couns el to be v alid. In practical terms, therefore, Rule 4-215 exists as a safegua rd to the constitutio nal right to counsel, providing a precise checklist that must be strictly complied with before a defendant s waiver can be considered valid, id. at 426, 735 A. 2d at 1006; it is a bright line rule that requires strict compliance in order for there to be a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel by a defendant. Id. at 452, 735 A. 2d a t 1020. See also Vincenti v. State, 309 Md. 601, 604, 525 A . 2d 1072, 1074 (1 987)( [T]he ru le implements the constitutional mandates for waiver of counsel, detailing a specific procedure that must be followed by the trial court in order f or there to be a k nowin g and in telligent w aiver. ) . Not only is the Rule mandatory and subject to strict compliance, its violation cannot be harmless error. Moten v. State, 339 M d. 407, 409 , 663 A. 2d 593, 595 (1995); Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 278, 523 A. 2d 59 7, 605-606 (198 7). In none of the four appearances the petitioner made before a court - three in the 601, n. 10 (1996); see also Brown v. State, 103 Md. A pp. 740, 654 A .2d 944 (1995) aff d, 342 Md. 40 4, 676 A.2d 51 3 (1996). 20 District Court and one in the C ircuit Court - did the judge before whom he appeared adv ise him in accordance with Rule 4-215 (a) or ascertain w hether he u nderstood the rights the Rule addresses. On the first occasion, the judge, having ascertained that an advice of rights videotape had been shown to the group of defendants, of which the petitioner presum ably was a part, advised the petitioner of the charges, possible penalties, the preliminary hearing date and, after being apprised of the nature of the charges, that the bail remained unchanged. On the second District Court appearance, th e State nolle prossed the felony charges, necessitating a postponement, whereupon the court informed the petitioner that he had the right to retain priva te counsel and of the requirement that he consult the Public Defender ten days before the nex t trial date . The petition er s request f or postpon ement w as denied o n his next appearance in the District Court, during the course of which the court noted that the petitioner had three months to obtain counsel. In the Circuit Court, the judge inquired pursuant to Rule 4-2 15 (d), but did not provide the advice mand ated by Rule 4-215 (a). To be sure, as we have seen, a Circuit Cou rt jud ge m ay rely o n the com plian ce by a District Court judge w ith Rule 4-215 (a). Because, in this case, the requirement that each defendant be advised pursuant to Rule 4-215 (a) was discharged by showing a videotape of a judge giving the required advice and that viewing was followed by the petitioner being taken before the court to com plete the bail review process, the question whether there was compliance on which the Circuit Court judge could rely must depend upon the combined adequacy of the videotaped advice and the interaction be tween the bail review judge and the 21 defenda nt. Stated differently, and as posed by the petitioner, the critical question is whether the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-215 (a) can be satisfied by merely showing a defendant a videotape of the advisements being given. We answer that question in the negative, believing that it is not sufficient simply to demonstrate that a defendant has been advised of his or her rights; ra ther, it is necessa ry that the court b e satisfied tha t the defendant understood those rights, and there is a basis for the court s satisfaction in that regard. As indicated, to be effective, a w aiver of the right to counsel m ust be mad e know ingly and intelligen tly. When that requirem ent is consid ered in con junction w ith the fact tha t Rule 4-215 (a) is mandatory and demands strict complianc e, it follows in eluctably that, in complying with the Rule, more is required of a judge than merely exposing the defendant to the Rule s requirements. Simply advising the defendant as the Rule prescribes is not sufficient; the judge must endea vor to in sure tha t the def endan t under stands th e advic e. Indeed, unless the defendant understands the advice, his or her subsequent waiver of counsel will not, and could not be, knowing and voluntary. Thus, the judge s obligation is not just to offer the advice and instructions, but also to inquire of the defendant sufficiently to satisfy him or herself that the defendant understands them. Johnson, supra, 355 Md. 420, 735 A. 2d 1003 , although n ot directly on po int, is instructive. There, this Court held inadequate advisements pursuant to Rule 4-215 (a), given to a defendant, pieceme al, by mor e than o ne judg e over m ore than one co urt app earanc e. The rationale given to justify the holding has particular relevance to the case sub judice: 22 In short, any Md. Rule 4-215(a)(1)-(5) advisements that Johnson received were inadequa te and given to him in an incom plete man ner in diffe rent courts by different ju dges, all resultin g in likely confusion on the part of the defenda nt. Nowhere in the record is there evidence that any one circuit court judge went through the section (a) litany with Johnson, point-by-point as required. Indeed, the record indicates that the only judge who mentioned Md. Rule 4-215 to Johnson was Judge Nalley on the day of his trial, and even then he did not go through the complete subsection (a) advisem ent. For the ru le to be an effective constitutional safeguard, it contemplates defendants receiving the adviseme nts during their first appearan ce in court w ithout coun sel, well before the day of trial. We conclude that to avoid confusion on the part of an accused and to protect the fundamental right to counsel, the subsection (a) advisements must be given in strict accorda nce with M d. Rule 4-215 , by the correct court and not piecemea l. A know ing and inte lligent waiv er of coun sel can only occur when there is s trict com pliance with th e rule. Id. at 461, 735 A.2d at 1025. The cases that have addressed the issue of videotaped o r en masse advisements reach a consistent result. See Swensen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 616 P. 2d 874, 877 (Alaska 1980) (upholding an en masse arraignme nt procedu re consisting of the rec itation of righ ts to the group, followed by the questioning as to each defendant concerning whether he or she understood those rights ); McIntire v . State, 42 P. 3d 558, 562 (Alaska App. 2002) (reversing conviction, where, although the videotape explained the right to counsel and the benefits of counsel, the record did not reflect the fact that the magistrate specifically addressed [the defenda nt] concerning his right to counsel in the particula r case and th at he had c learly waived his right to counsel and emp hatically invoke d his right to represent himself ); V.S.J. v. State, 793 So. 2 d 104, 10 5-06 (Fla. A pp. 2001 ) (noting that, while en masse adviseme nts 23 provide some convenience, they also reduce[] the probability that every accused will be adequate ly and effectively advised of his or her constitutional rights and, on that record, we have no way of knowing that V.S.J. was present or attentive at the time the judg e gave his speech concernin g her rights ); N.M. v . State, 791 N. E. 2d 802, 807 (Ind. App. 2003) (holding that waiver of counsel n ot know ing and inte lligent whe re record u nclear as to whether juvenile an d her mo ther paid attention to rights ad visement v ideo show n in courtroom); M. R. v. S tate, 605 N . E. 2d 204, 206 (In d. App. 1992) ( An en masse advisement of rights when co upled with a trial judge s perso nal interrogation of the defendant passes constitutiona l muster ); State v. Bayer, 656 N .E . 2d 1314 , 1319 (O hio App. 1995) ( [ T]his one-sided rights colloq uy addressed to all of the d efend ants, en masse, fails to provide the requisite discourse between the court and the accused to ensure comp rehens ion of th ese righ ts. ). The same result has been reached in the context of the waiver of guilty pleas and jury trials. In Snowe v. State, 533 N.E. 2d 613 (Ind. App. 1989), the issue was the propriety of the trial court s denial of the defenda nt s motion to withdraw her guilty plea. She had pled guilty at misdemeanor traffic court after being advised of her rights by a televised advisement given to all defendants before the commencement of that court. Id. at 615. Critical to her motion was the argument that the record did not demonstrate that the plea was knowingly and intelligently made. Id. After acknowledging the acceptability of en masse advisements, when there has been personal interrogation by the court to determine the 24 defendant s unders tanding of the ri ghts an d the co ncept o f waiv er, id. at 616, citing French v. State, 472 N.E .2d 210, 21 2 (Ind. Ap p. 1984); James v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1225, 1227 (Ind. App. 1983), the court reviewed the evidence from which it concluded that the record in that case was inadequate to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent plea: Here, the record is silent as to whether Snowe's guilty plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily and whether [she] understood [she] was waiving those rights by p leading guilty. At the arraignment, only the following colloquy took place: COURT: Did you hire a lawyer? MS . SNO WE: N o, sir. I spo ke with one. COURT: Okay. What is it you want to do then? MS . SNO WE: P lead gu ilty, sir. CO URT : A plea of guilty o f Driv ing W hile Into xicated . MS . SNO WE: Y es, sir. COURT: We'll refer you to the Alco hol Countermeasure Program for your interview. Then be back here for sentencing at 9:00 November 10th. Step over here for your papers. Addition ally, the court's entry me rely states: Defendant appears in person. Initial hearing held. Defendant knowin gly and voluntarily waives right to attorney and trial. Plea of guilty. Finding of guilty. Referred to ACP. Sentencing deferre d to: 9:0 0 A.M . on 11/1 0/87. From the record, there is no indication Snowe ever viewed or understood the televised version of her rights. The trial judge made no determination on the record of whether Snowe understood the charge, the rights she was waiving, or the sentencing possibilities, as required by I.C. 35-35-1-2. Becau se the record 25 fails to make such an affirmative showing, we cannot say her plea was knowing, intelligen t, and vo luntary. Id. at 617. See also State v. Stallings, 658 N. W. 2d 106, 111 (Iowa 2003), in which the court, addressing the adeq uacy of the defendan t s waiver of a jury trial, commented on the necessity that the record reflect the waiver a nd th e role and valu e of t he in -cou rt colloquy: While neither a w ritten waiv er nor an in- court colloq uy is constitutiona lly mandated to establish a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver, practical considerations suggest that a written waiver as well as an in-cou rt colloquy sho uld be used to assure a pro per wa iver. For example, a defendant might be shown through an in-court colloquy to have a mental co ndition that im pairs his ability to understand the waiver. ... The court may also, through th e colloquy, dete rmine if a propo sed w aiver de cision w as the p roduct of dur ess or co ercion. (Citation omitted). In M. R., the juvenile and his mother signed a written advisement of counsel, which informed the child of his right to counsel and that one would be appointed by the court, if his parents could not afford to retain counsel. R ather than in form the c hild person ally and in court as to his right to counsel, the juvenile judge had made a video recording, which was shown to the juvenile and his mo ther. In addition to those advisements and the dispositional alternatives available to the court, the video in structed that th e judge sh ould be inf ormed if further explanation were n eeded or the rights we re not unders tood. 60 5 N. E . 2d at 20 6. Against this backdrop, the court concluded: Dearing [v. State, 95 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. 1951)] does not require a face to face advisement of rights by the trial judge. It requires that M.R. and his mother be fully informed of th at right and k nowing ly waive it prior to M.R. m aking admissions of delinqu ency, as he did in this case. Given the judge's face to face instruction on M.R.'s constitutional rights coupled with the prior written 26 advisement of righ ts and v ideotap e view ing, M .R. and his mother w ere fully advised of the right to counsel at public expense if they were indigent and desired representation by coun sel. With such exhaustive advisements, the waiver of right to counsel was made with knowledge of the right to counse l at publi c expe nse. Thus, the w aiver of co unsel at pub lic expense was free ly and volunta rily given. The tria l court d id not er r in this re gard. Id. N. M. is not to the contrary. Similar to the case in M. R., N. M . and her mother signed a written advisement of rights, although it did not indicate that counsel would be appointed if N. M. s parents could not afford to retain one. Unlike in M. R., howe ver, it [was] unclea r wheth er N.M . and Magness had access to the same video that was played for M.R. and his mother. Magness testified at the hearing on the motion for relief from judgment that she saw the tape [of Judge Payne] being played on the m onitors. I can't say that I heard it. ... N.M. testified, When I first came in, before I even came, when I was still in greens, when I very, very first came in, they h ad it, it was already playing when I came in there and I ... they didn 't tell me I had to watch it. ... The State presented neither w itnesses nor a copy of t he vide otape. 791 N. E. 2d at 806. Therefore, acknowledging the M. R. holding, the court concluded: [T]he law surely contemp lates the defe ndant be to ld she need s to listen because she is about to be advised of her rights. Given the ubiquitous nature of television in public waiting areas and the plethora of court-based reality and drama television shows, a typical viewer might not a ssume tha t she needs to listen to a judge speaki ng on a televisio n. Id. at 806-07. The defendant in Bayer, having been convicted, after appearing pro se, of a first degree misdemeano r, challenged his conviction on appeal, arguing that the trial cou rt failed to advise him of his rights at the initial appearance, proceeded without affording [him] the 27 opportun ity to obtain counsel, and scheduled a pretrial without counsel. 656 N. E. 2d at 1317. As indicated, the court found his arguments meritorious, rejecting the use of a onesided rights colloquy. Id at 1319 . To what the court had reference is best understood by repeating the court s description of the initial appearance proceedings: At the initial appearance on February 22, 1994, appellant was allegedly provided with a copy of a pamphlet prepared by the Chardon Municipal Court which appellee claims fulfilled thes e dictate s. ... Then, prior to addressing appellant directly, the court read a standardized introduction to all who were in the courtroom: This proceeding is known as the arraignment. It is your opportun ity to enter a plea to the charge for which you are here. The possible pleas you can enter are 'Guilty , Not Guilty , or No Contest . * * * If you e nter a plea o f Not G uilty , I will ask you to see Mrs. H anson, w ho is seated at the table to my left, and you will need to sign a Waive r of Spee dy Trial and a Personal Recognizance Bond. If there is an accident involved, you can enter a plea of no contest and I make a finding of Guilty. That finding of Gu ilty cannot be u sed agains t you in a civil suit. Each of you receiv ed a blue p amphle t when you checked in this morning. Please read this pamph let when you get the opportun ity this morning. The back page will tell you about the costs involved in addition to the fine. * * * The record reveals that when appellant was called at the initial appearance he appeared before the court and was immediately required to enter a plea. ... He pleaded not guilty. The court next asked appellant if he had an attorney, to which appellant indicated that he did not. The matter was then scheduled for a pretrial. Some other dialogue was had, but it was not of the nature commanded under Crim.R. 5 or Crim.R. 10 and did not demonstrate that appellant was afforded the opportun ity to read the m aterial in the booklet, or that he was literate, let alone able to discern its contents, including the nature of the charge, his right to counsel and right to a jury trial. Id. at 1318 -19 (fo otnotes omitted ). 28 The only advisem ents the petitioner received that could qualify as meeting the Rule 4215 (a) requirements were neither delivered live nor individually. He was one of a group of defendants to whom the advisements were given en masse and the medium utilized for the purpose, albeit featuring a judge, was a videotape. Thus, the petitioner could not have asked questions while the rig hts were b eing expla ined and th e instructions given and neither his individual concerns, nor those any of the other defendants were, or could have been, addressed. To be sure, the video advised the defendants to ask any questions and to raise concerns when broug ht before the court, wh en the petitioner s case was called, the interaction with the court was, the record reflects, focused and fleeting. In its entirety, it consisted only of the following: The Court: correct? Okay. This group has seen the advice of rights, is that Woman s Voice: Yes, sir, they have. The Court: Mr. Richardson, in case Number 2172, one count of distribution is a felony, 20 years, $25,000; one count of possession, 4 years and/or $25,000; resisting arrest (inaudible) could receive a sentence not deemed cruel and unusual. Preliminary hearing is S eptembe r 17th, Courtroom 3, 830 North Avenue. Pretrial. Woman s Voice: Gina (i naudib le) for p retrial rele ase serv ices. For the record, Your Honor, this defendant does have a 52 page record, and this was the allegation: The polic e observe d the defe ndant look ing into a pill container. They come back with a field interview. He then threw that container into the street. They did recover 14 gel caps of suspec ted hero in. Curr ent bail is set at $ 5 ,000 and pretrial is not requesting 29 a change. The C ourt: Th e bail rem ains the same. The court did not address the petitioner with respect to whether he had viewed the videotape. It did not ask the petitioner whether he understood the rights explained to him. It did not invite the petitioner to ask questions or even inquire whether he had any. The only time the court addressed the petitioner was to advise h im of the c harges, the p ossible penalties and the place and date of the preliminary hearing. Significantly, the petitioner was not asked w hether he u nderstood the charge s or their consequen ces or had questions w ith regard to the pr elimina ry hearing . We conclude that this record does no t reflect, not to mention demo nstrate or ensure, clearly, that the petitioner comprehended the rights of which he was presumably informed. What occurred in this case com pares unf avorably w ith the one-sided , en masse rights colloquy found lacking in Bayer. It is grossly unacceptable and undermines the realization of the true purpose of Rule 4-215. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REV ERS ED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT W ITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGM ENT O F THE C IRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR NEW TRIAL. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE. Judg e Ra ker joins in the jud gme nt on ly. 30 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 41 September Term, 2003 KURT H. RICHARDSON v. STATE OF MARYLAND Bell, C. J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia Eldridge, John C. (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. Conc urring O pinion by Harre ll, J., which Battaglia, J., joins. Filed: May 14, 2004 I agree with the Co urt s opinion. I write supplementally only to underscore that, as I understand the Co urt s op inion, the use by a court of en masse videotape adviseme nts to appraise defenda nts of the rele vant rights is not condemned generally by our decisio n in this case. The Court holds: that merely showing a defendant a videotape of a judge providing the advice and instruction required by Rule 4-215 (a) is an insufficient predicate for a finding of waiver of counsel by inaction. At the least, there must be some inquiry to determine the defendant s understanding of the advice and instructions so given. Slip op. at 12 (emph asis add ed). This case does not present the situation where the defendant was informed of his rights by video and a trial judge sub sequently ma de an inqu iry to determine the defendant s understanding of the advice and instruc tions given in the video. Rather, there was no individual, particularized inquiry in this case as to whether Richardson understood his rights as explained in the video. As the Court s opinion points out, several jurisdictions employ a procedure consisting of the video recitation of rights to a group, followed by an individu al inq uiry by a judge w here each defenda nt is questioned separately to see if he or she u ndersto od his o r her righ ts. See slip op. at 22. Such a procedu re should be acc eptable in Ma ryland as w ell. Judge Battaglia authorizes me to state that she joins in the view expressed here.

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