Attorney Grievance v. Culver
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Circuit Co urt for Baltim ore Cou nty Case No. 03-C-02-008050 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND Misc. Docket AG No. 35 September Term, 2002 ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND v. ALLAN J. CULVER, JR. Bell, C.J. Raker Wilner Cathell Harrell Battaglia, JJ. Opinio n by Rak er, J. Filed: May 13, 2004 The Attorney Grievance Commission, petitioner, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action against Allan J. Culver, Jr., respondent, alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct. The Commission charged respondent with violating Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct 1.2 (Scope of representation),1 1.3 (Diligence),2 1.5 (Fees),3 1.7 (Conflict of interest: General rule),4 1.15 (Safekeeping 1 Rule 1.2 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (d) A lawyer sh all not coun sel a client to en gage, or ass ist a client, in conduc t that the lawyer k nows is cr iminal or fraudulen t, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any prop osed course o f con duct with a cl ient a nd m ay counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, sco pe, me aning o r applica tion of th e law. 2 Rule 1.3 provides as follows: A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and prom ptness in represe nting a c lient. 3 Rule 1.5 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A lawyer s fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal serv ice p rope rly; (2) the likelihood , if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitatio ns impose d by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of th e professio nal relationsh ip with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) wheth er the fee is f ixed or con tingent. property),5 3.1 (Meritorious claims and contentions),6 3.2 (Expediting litigation),7 3.3 (b) When the lawyer has n ot regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be commu nicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after comm encing the repr esentati on. 4 Rule 1.7 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. (c) The consultation required by paragraphs (a) and (b) sha ll include explanation of the implications of the common representation and any limitations resulting from the lawyer s responsibilities to another, or from the lawyer s own interests, as well as the ad vantag es and r isks inv olved. 5 Rule 1.15 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) A lawyer sh all hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s ow n property. Fu nds shall be kept in a separate ac count ma intained pu rsuant to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termina tion of th e repres entation . 6 Rule 3.1 provides as follows: A law yer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every elem ent of th e mov ing par ty s case b e establi shed. -2- (Candor toward the tribunal),8 3.4 (Fairness to opposing party and counsel),9 and 8.4 7 Rule 3.2 provides as follows: A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consiste nt with the inter ests of th e client. 8 Rule 3.3 provides as follows: (a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or f raudulent a ct by the client; (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal leg al authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or (4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. (b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. (c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably believes is false. (d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the fac ts are adverse. (e) Notwithstanding paragraphs (a) through (d), a lawyer for an accused in a criminal case need not disclose that the accused intends to testify falsely or has testified falsely if the lawyer reasonab ly believes tha t the disclosure would jeopardize any constitu tional rig ht of the accuse d. 9 Rule 3.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A law yer shall not: *** (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous -3- (Misconduct).10 Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-752(a), we referred the matter to Judge John O. Hennegan of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County to make findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law. Judge Hennegan held an evidentiary hearing and concluded that respondent had violated Rules 1.2(d), 1.3, 1.5(a) and (b), 1.7(b), 1.15(a), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4(d), and 8.4(b), (c), and (d). I. Judge Hennegan made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: On July 9, 2002, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action, alleging that the Respondent, Allan J. discovery request or f ail to make re asonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposin g party 10 Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Condu ct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) commit a criminal act tha t reflects adv ersely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects; (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; (d) engage in conduct th at is prejudicial to the administration of justice -4- Culver, Jr., engaged in misconduct in violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct in conne ction with h is representa tion of M s. [the client] in her divorce case and in related matte rs. The Co urt of Ap peals assign ed this matter to this Court to conduct a trial and to make findings of fact and conclu sions o f law. T he trial w as held May 14 throug h 16, 20 03. The Court h eard tes timony fr om M s. [the client]; her friend, Susan Butzner; and Matt R. Ballenger, Esquire, the attorney who represented Ms. [the client] in her subsequent law suit against Mr. Culver. The parties also introduced a number of exhibits, as well as a transcript of the testimony of Allan M. G rochal, Esquire, before the In quiry Panel in this matter. Bar Counse l, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission, filed a Petition for Disciplinary Action alleging that Respondent violated Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.7( b), 1.15 , 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 8.4(b), (c) & (d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional C onduct. The allegations c oncern or pertain to three matters. The first allegation is that Respondent incompetently represented Ms. [the client], did not act diligently, charged unreasonable fees, and engaged in other m iscond uct in the course of her d ivorce c ase. The second allegation is that during his representation of Ms. [the client], Respondent coerced and forced M s. [the client] to have sexual contact with him. The third a llegation invo lves Resp ondent s a ctions wh ile Ms. [the -5- client] s suit w as pendin g against him : he allegedly use d improp er means to avoid being deposed, avoid trial, and avoid paying the funds he agreed to settle the case. [The client] testified that she retained Mr. Culver1 in March 1993 to represent her in connection with her divorce case after seeing his advertisement in a telephone directory. Although the advertisement promised a free initial consultation, Respondent charged her fifty dollars for their first meeting. Ms. [the client] explained that she was very distraught about her divorce because her husband had vowed to do whatever it would take to get custody of the parties two childr en. Mr. C ulver s retainer agreement failed to advise her of his fee, but billed her on roughly a monthly basis. Pet r Ex. No. 24. Those bills show that Respondent initially charged her $125.00 per hour, then later raised his rate to $150.00. Pet r Ex. No. s 25, 26, 27.2 Ms. [the client] testified that Mr. Culver never informed her that he was increasing his billing ra te. Many of the bills submitted to Ms. [the client] by Respondent do not reflect the hours involved for the particular task. During the c ours e of t he re pres enta tion, Mr. Cul ver f ailed to tim ely file answers to interrogatories on behalf of Ms. [the client]. Pet r Ex. No. 2 ____________________ 1 Mr. Culver was admitted to the Bar on June 21, 1978. 2 Pet r Ex. No. 27 December 15, 1993, indicates a charge of $250.00 per h our: Court preparation re: exceptions. -6- Motion for Sanc tions. Ms. [ the client] testified that she gav e Mr. Cu lver all of the information he requested in order to respond to the interrogatories within a few days of R espondent asking for the information. Th e circuit court entered an order granting sanctions against Ms. [the client], precluding her testimony and dismissing her counterclaim. Pet r Ex. No. 2 - Order dated August 12, 1993. Respo ndent was succ essful in having the sanc tions removed. He billed Ms. [the client] for those services, even though Respondent was personally at fault for the failure to answer interrogatories. Pet r Ex. No. 26 August 18, 1993 ; Aug. 20 , 1993; A ugust 23, 1 993; Aug. 31, 1993; Sept. 3, 1993; Oct. 18, 1993; Oct. 28, 1993. During the course of the representation, Ms. [the client] experienced financial difficulties, in part due to the attorney fees in excess of $23,000 she paid to Respondent. Ms. [the client] testified that Mr. Culver advised her to obtain more cred it cards and take cash advances on those cards to pay his fees. Ms. [the client] expressed concern about incurring that debt, but Mr. Culver explained that she would not have to repay that money because he wo uld represe nt her to have th e debts discha rged in bankru ptcy. Ms. [the client] testified that she attended a master s hearing in her divorce case on September 9, 1993. Mr. Culver represented her at that hearing. Susan Butzner was also present and testified at the master s hearing. -7- That evening, Ms. [the client] received a telephone call from M r. Culver. Mr. Culver insisted that he met with her that evening so that Ms. [the c lient] could sign papers that, he claimed, had to be presented to the court that following morning. Ms. [the c lient] agreed to meet Respondent at a restaurant, Bahama Mama s, which was near Ms. [the client] s home. Ms. [the client] arranged to have Susan Butzne r accompany her to the restau rant. Mr. Culver arrived late. He was accompanied by a few friends who came with him. Ms. [the client] repeatedly asked to sign the papers, but Mr. Culver never produced them. Eventually, Mr. Culver left to buy gasoline and Ms. [the client] had Ms. Butzn er drive her hom e. Ms. [the client] testified that Mr. Culver, sho rtly thereafter, unexpec tedly arrived at her house. He said that he wanted to see the condition of the house because [the client s husband] had raised allegations that Ms. [the client] was not a good housekeeper. Ms. [the client] s two sons were asleep upstairs. At Respond ent s request, Ms. [the client] show ed him the children s playroom in the basement. There, Respondent forced her to the ground, pulled up her blouse and bra, p ulled dow n her pan ts and proc eeded to f orce her to have sexual intercourse with him. Ms. [the client] repeatedly objected. M r. Culver placed himself on top of her and covered her mouth with his hands, demanding that she be quie t. He left immediately following the incident. Ms. -8- [the client] identified a business card which she said Respondent left at her house tha t night. Ms. [the client] testified on two later occasions Mr. Culver convinced her to perform oral sex on him. She asserted that the occasion in his office was consensual. Ms. [the client] testified that she did not report these instances to the police or file criminal charges against Respondent. She continued to allow the Respondent to represent her. Ms. [the client] was concerned that she would lose custody of her children if revealed. She was familiar with how to file a criminal complaint. Ms. [the client] further testified that she had not filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission against Respondent, but had done so a gain st her hus band s a ttorn ey. Additionally, she was familiar with the ex parte domestic violence process. Ms. [the client] testified that she previously denied committing adultery under o ath; she did, in fact, have sexual relations w ith Mr. McCormick and Respondent while married. Ms. [the client] claimed that she was unaware that they were acts of adu ltery while she was separated from her husband. She testified she was faithful to her husband while they lived together. Moreover, Ms. [the c lient] testified tha t, when asked about any such relation ships, sh e took th e Fifth A mend ment o n advic e of co unsel. The [client and husband] s divorce case was tried in 1994. Ms. [the -9- client] wanted to appeal that decision. Mr. Culver advised her that he would handle the appeal for a fee of $5,000.00, plus the advance payment of $1,500.00 for costs. Ms. [the client] paid the ap peal fee and costs to M r. Culve r by two c hecks d ated A ugust 2 3 and S eptem ber 19, 1 994. After M s. [the client] pa id Mr. Cu lver to repres ent her in her appeal, Mr. Culver filed the appeal, then withdrew from representing her, contending Ms. [the c lient] owed additional fees. Mr. Culver did not return the fee paid for the appeal and did not file an appeal brief on her behalf. The Court of Special [sic] App eals dismissed th e appeal af ter appellant f ailed to file a brief. Susan Butzner testified that she accompanied Ms. [the client] to the master s hearing on September 9, 1993, and to the meeting with Mr. Culver that same evening. She testified that Mr. Culver was acting very unprofessional and possessive of Ms. [the client] in front of his friends and that he was getting very close to he r. It appeared to Ms. B utzner that Mr. Culver had been drinking alcohol before he arrived at Bahama Mama s. She confirmed that Mr. Culver never produced the papers for M s. [the client] to sign and that he eventually left. Ms. Butzner took Ms. [the client] home. She observed Mr. Cu lver in his auto mobile pa rked on th e block where Ms. [the client] lived. When she got home, Ms. Butzner called Ms. [the client] to see if Mr. Culver had come to her house. Ms. [the client] confirmed to Ms. -10- Butzner that Mr. Culver w as there in her house. At that time, Ms. Butzner and Ms. [the client] worked toge ther. The day after the rape, Ms. [the client] was crying and told Ms. Butzner that Mr. Culver had tried to kiss her. After a few weeks, Ms. [the client] confided to Ms. Butzner that Mr. Culver in fact had forced her to h ave inte rcourse . Matt R. Ballenger represented Ms. [the client] in her civil suit against Mr. Culver for legal malpractice and for the coercive and forcible sexual contact. Mr. Balle nger sent R esponde nt a letter notifying Respondent that he intended to bring a claim against him fo r these m atters. Mr. Cu lver filed suit against Ms. [the client] for defamation. Mr. Ballenger represented Ms. [the client] in defense of that suit. M r. Ballenger described his efforts to depose Mr. Culver in connection with that suit. Mr. Culver avoided answering discovery and did not app ear for h is depo sition. E ventua lly, Mr. Culver volunt arily dismi ssed the suit aga inst M s. [the cl ient]. Later, Mr. Ballenger filed suit against Mr. Culver on behalf of Ms. [the client]. Again, Mr. Culver was served with a notice of deposition and other discovery requests. Mr. Balle nger desc ribed his eff orts to take Respond ent s deposition. Respondent failed to appear for the deposition on the agreed date. He was ordered to appear by a circuit court judge, and did not appear. The Respondent was aware of the court order. Res p t Ex. No . 4 at 17. The circuit -11- court sanctioned Respondent for his actions by order of Judge Noel dated April 24, 1997. Mr. Ballenger, additionally, testified Respondent failed to appear at a pre-trial settlement conference scheduled in front of Judge Hammerman. Eventua lly the court entered summ ary judgment against Mr. Culver based on his failu re to file a timely ans wer to t he am ended comp laint. A hearing was set to determine damages. The day before the scheduled hearing, Mr. Culver filed a petition for bankruptcy in order to stay the damages hearing. Although the United S tates Bank ruptcy Cour t promptly remanded the matter to the circuit court for trial on damages, R espondent s action caused a delay of almost a year in bringing the matter to trial. When the new trial date cam e, Respon dent attemp ted to have the case tran sferred to federal court for trial. The United S tates District Court for the District of Maryland p romptly rema nded the c ase to the state court. After the case was remanded by United States District Court and set in for trial, the Respondent agreed to settle the case for $6 0,000.0 0. Because of Respondent s pending bankruptcy case, the parties agreed that the settlement funds would come from Mr. Culver s father. A certificate of deposit was assigned to Mr. Ba llenger and Respon dent s cou nsel to be he ld in trust to pay part of the settlement amount once th e bankruptcy court approved the settlement. Other settlement funds were to be held by Respondent s lawyer -12- in his escrow account. After negotiations were complete, an agreement was signed and the settlement was approved by the ban kruptcy court. Mr. Ballenger then conta cted the ban k to get the funds from the certificate of deposit, only to learn that the certificate of deposit had already been cashed. Furthermore, Respondent s attorney would not turn over the funds he held in escrow. After M r. Ballenger took furthe r efforts to en force the se ttlement, including taking action against Re sponden t s father, Re sponden t finally paid $64,00 0.00 to s ettle the c ase. The Respondent, through his answers, exhibits and cross examination, denies the allegations that he violated any of the Rules of Professional Condu ct. FINDINGS OF FACT The Court, after conductin g a hearing in open court, finds the following facts to be proven by clear and convincing evidence: The Respondent was a member of the Maryland Bar since June 21, 1978. [The client] retained Respond ent in July 1993 to represent her in connection with her divorce case, which was pending in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. Although Respondent s advertisement promised a free initial consultation, Respondent charged her $50.00 for the meeting. -13- Respondent did not com municate his hourly rate to Ms. [the client] in writing. During the course of his representation, he raised his rate from $125.00 to $150.0 0 per ho ur with out any a dvanc ed notic e to his c lient. Mr. [husband] had propounded in terrogatories. At Mr. Cu lver s request, Ms. [the client] prom ptly provided a ll of the information Respondent needed to prepare answers to interrogatories. Nevertheless, Respondent failed to prepare the answers in time to serve Mr. [husband] s attorney with a timely response. Mr. [husband] soug ht sanctions against M rs. [the client]. In September 1993, the court entered an order awarding sanctions against Ms. [the client], dismissing her counterclaim and precluding her from introducing evidence in support of her defense. Mr. Culver was responsible for the failure to file timely answers to discovery and the entry of the sanctions order. Respondent prepared a motion to vacate the sanctions orde r, served answers to discovery, and succeeded in having the sanctions order v acated . He charged Ms. [th e client] f or the tim e expe nded to correct his ow n error. Mr. Culver continued to represent Ms. [the client]. M s. [the client] paid him more than $23,000.00 for legal fees. When she began experiencing financial difficu lties, M r. Culver advised Ms. [the c lient] to apply for more credit cards and take cash advances to pay his fee. He assured her that he would assist he r in hav ing that c redit car d debt d ischarg ed in ba nkrup tcy. -14- A hearing bef ore a master was held on September 9, 1993. Ms. [the client] and Susan Butzner testified at that hearing. Mr. Culver contacted her by telephone later that day and asked to meet with her that night to sign unspecified papers, which he said needed to be submitted to the court the following day. Ms. [the client] agreed to meet Respon dent that ev ening at a nearby restaurant, Bahama Mama s. On the evening of September 9, 1993, Ms. [the client], along with Ms. Butzner, went to Bahama Mam a s to meet Respondent so that Ms. [the client] could sign the papers. Mr. Culver arrived with some friends, but did not have the papers. M s. [the client] rep eatedly asked to see the papers, but Respondent never produced them. Mr. Culver left, and when he did not return, Ms. [the client] an d Ms. B utzner le ft the res taurant. Ms. Butzner drove Ms. [the client] home. After leaving Ms. [the client] s house, she saw Mr. Culver in his car near the house. Later that evening, Ms. Butzner [sic] called Ms. [the client] and was told Mr. Culver was in the house. Mr. Culver came to the house uninvited under the pretext that he wanted to inspect her house to see if she was a g ood housekee per. Mr. [husband] had be en claim ing that M rs. [the client] was not a good housekeeper. Ms. [the c lient] allowed Mr. Cu lver to com e inside the house. At Mr. Culver s request, she showed him the children s playroo m. While in -15- the playro om, R espon dent ha d sexu al relation s with M s. [the cl ient]. Ms. [the client] continued to hav e Mr. Culver rep resent her because she already paid him a substantial fee and because Respon dent mad e threats that if she did not cooperate with him and accede to his sexual demands, he would deliberately sabotage her case so that she would lose custody of her children. Ms. [the client] was emotionally upset and vulnerable at that time due to her pending divorce and her husband s threats to take the children away from her, as well as financial pressure resulting from the divorce and litigation expenses. Respondent, while maintaining a confiden tial relationship w ith Ms. [the client], exercised a degree of undue influence over and took advantage of her vulnerability, such as convincing her to perform fellatio on him on two occasions. When M s. [the client] w as depose d in her divorce case, on advice of Mr. Culver, she asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when asked if she had committed adultery, rather than disclose that Mr. Culver or oth ers had a sexual relationship w ith her. The [client s] divo rce case w as tried in July 1994. Ms. [the client] was not satisfied with the outcom e and direc ted Respo ndent to file a n appeal. Respondent requested payment of $5,000.00 for his flat fee plus advanced payment of costs in the am ount of $1,500 .00. Ms. [the client] paid those funds to Mr. Culver by check s dated Augu st 23 an d Septe mber 1 9, 1994 . Mr. Culver -16- deposited those funds in his operating account, although the fee was unearned and the costs had not been paid. Respondent filed the appeal, but did not file an appellant s brief. Instead, he withdrew his appearance. Respondent did not return th e unea rned fe e for the appea l work . Ultima tely, Ms. [the client] was unable to afford new counsel. Her appeal was dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals. Ms. [the client] consulted an attorney about filing a bankruptcy petition because of her financial difficulties. At a meeting with her bankruptcy attor ney, Christoph er Fascetta, M s. [the client] co nfided to h im her problems with Mr. Culver, including the sexual contact. Ms. [the client] s attorney referred her to other counsel. Matt R. Ballenger represented her in her claims agains t Mr. C ulver. After Mr. Ballenger wrote to Respondent, notifying him of Ms. [the client] s intended claim, Respondent sued Ms. [the client], alleging defamation. Respondent unreasonably failed to respond to discovery and failed to make himself available to be deposed. As a result, Mr. Ballenger sought sanctions against the Respo ndent. Late r, Respon dent volun tarily dismiss ed that s uit. Mr. Ballenger later filed a complaint on Ms. [the client] s behalf, against Respo ndent. A gain, Responden t engaged in a pattern o f behavio r to -17- avoid responding to discovery. Despite motions for sanctions and court orders, Respondent never w as depose d in that case . Ultimately, the court entered a summary judgment order establishing Respondent s liability, and the case was schedu led for a hearing on dam ages. Respondent continued to defend himself in the case by obstruction and dela y, which exceeded the normal bounds of aggressive counseling and defense. He filed a bankruptcy petition the da y before the sc heduled tria l date so that the hearing on dama ges would be s tayed. The bankruptcy court promptly returned the case to state court, but on the day before the rescheduled hearing, Respondent attempted to have the case transferred to federal co urt. Judge Davis returned the case to state court, finding that Respondent waited too lon g to req uest fed eral jurisd iction. Un fortunately, the civil case settled based on Respondent s assurances that funds w ould be paid from a certificate of deposit in his father s name as well as othe r funds his la wyer held in escrow. Even after the settlement was approved by the bankru ptcy court, no settlement funds w ere disburse d. In fact, even though th e certificate of deposit had been assig ned to Mr. Ballenger and Responden t s counsel, to be held in trust, the certificate was cashed and no funds were given to M s. [the client]. Mr. Ballenger had to take further action to collect the funds. Respondent attempted to have the settlement amount -18- drastically reduced by the bankruptcy court. Judge Schneider dismissed Respondent s bankruptcy case, finding that Respondent used the bankruptcy court to delay and evade paying M s. [the cl ient]. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Rule 1.2(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states: (d) A lawyer shall no t counsel a c lient to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is cr iminal or fra udulent, bu t a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a g ood faith effort to dete rmin e the valid ity, scope, meaning or application of the law. When Ms. [the client] was experiencing financial difficulties and had no resources to pay Respondent, he advised her to obtain new credit cards and to take cash advances on those accounts to pay Respondent s fees. Respondent advised her that she would not have to repay those funds because he wou ld represent her to have those deb ts discharged in bankruptcy. By adv ising his client to obtain loans with the intention of having the debts discharged in bankrup tcy, Respon dent coun seled M s. [the client] to c ommit a f raudulent a ct. By giving Ms. [the client] an application for a Law Card credit card to pay his fee, he assisted her in committing a fraudulent act. By this conduct Respondent violated Rule 1.2(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct. -19- Rule 1.3 of the M aryland Rule s of Profe ssional Condu ct requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. Respondent failed to sub mit timely answ ers to interrogatories in Ms. [the client] s divorc e case, resultin g in an order entered against her imposing sanctions. Respondent also lacked due diligence by failing to respond to the Motion for Sanctions. Ms. [the client] had provided Respondent with the necessary information to respond to discovery. By his lack of diligence in submitting answers to discover y and failing to o ppose the Motion for Sanctions in Ms. [the c lient] s divorce case, Resp ondent vio lated Rule 1.3 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct although no prejudice re sulted to Ms. [th e client] f rom this action. Rule 1.5(a) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct requires that a lawyer s fee be reasonable. Rule 1.5(b) states: (b) When the lawyer has no t regularly represented the client, the basis o r rate of the fee shall be communicated to the client, prefera bly in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. Respondent charged a fee to Ms. [the client] for his initial consultation after advertising th at his initial consultations were free. Respondent also charged Ms. [the c lient] $625.0 0 for time e xpended to respond to discovery motions which were required solely because of Respondent s lack of diligence -20- in preparing answers to discovery. Those charges were unreasonable and violated R ule 1.5(a) of the Marylan d Rules o f Professio nal Cond uct. Responden t s engagem ent letter and re tainer did no t specify his hou rly rate. His first bill did not specify the time expended so it was impossible for Ms. [the client] to determine Resp ondent s hourly rate. Respon dent s November 1993 invoice indicates that he initially billed Ms. [the client] at the rate of $125.00 per hour. Invoices beginning in January 1994 reflect a rate of $150.00 per hour. Respondent never notified Ms. [the client] of his intent to increase his billing rate. That failure to inform the client of a change in the terms of his fee violated Rule 1.5(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Cond uct. Rule 1.7(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states: (b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client m ay be materia lly limited by the lawyer s responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer s own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation. Respondent allowed his ow n personal interests to interfere substantially with his represe ntation o f Ms. [ the clien t]. Respon dent placed his interests in continuing to be paid for his representation above Ms. [the client] s -21- interests when he advised her to obtain cash advances on credit cards to pay her fee with the intent to have the credit card d ebt discharg ed in bankrup tcy. Respondent placed his personal interests above those of Ms. [the client] when he had sexual intercourse w ith her and then later convinc ed her to perform other sex acts. Ms. [the client] was in an unstable emotional state due to her pending divorce litigation and Respondent took advantage of her situation for his own personal interest. By these actions, Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) of the M aryland Rule s of Profe ssional Co nduct. Rule 1.15(a) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states: (a) A lawyer shall ho ld property of c lients or third persons that is in a lawyer s possessio n in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer s o wn p rope rty. Funds sh all be kept in a separate ac count ma intained pu rsuant to [T itle 16, Chap ter 600 ] of the M aryland R ules. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and of oth er property sha ll be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation. Respondent received from Ms. [the client] two checks to cover his fee and the related co sts for the ap peal of he r divorce ca se in the amount of $6,500.00. Respondent s billing records demonstrate that Respondent applied some of the funds towards other fees and did not place them into his escrow account. Rule 1.15(a) requires Ms. [the client] s funds to be held in the escrow -22- account until Respondent had earned the fee and until the funds for costs w ere expended. Respondent never earned the fee for handling the appeal. He filed the notice of appeal, then withdrew from the case without ever filing an appellate brief. The appeal was subsequently dismissed. Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to hold these fu nds in tru st. Rule 3.1 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or co ntrovert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for d oing so tha t is not frivolous, which includes a g ood faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. A lawyer may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the moving party s case be established. Rule 3.2 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states: A lawyer sh all make rea sonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. Respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct of obstruction and delay to interfere in Ms. [the client] s suit against him. He filed suit against Ms. [the client], alleging de famation, then failed to file written answers to d iscovery and evaded a ttempts to be deposed . Respon dent even tually voluntarily dismissed that suit. After Ms. [the client] filed suit against Respondent, h e -23- filed a bankruptcy petition on the eve of the dam ages hearin g in order to stay the hearing. After the stay was lifted an d a new hearing da te was set, Respondent had the matter removed to the United States District Court. That court returned the case to the state court, finding that Respondent s request was not timely. Subsequently, Respondent attempted to have the settlement with Ms. [the client] dramatically reduced by the bankruptcy court, even though the parties had arranged for the settlement to be paid from other sources. Judge Sc hneider of the United States Ban kruptcy Cou rt eventually dismissed Respondent s bankruptcy case for reasons stated in Pet r Ex. No. 21. The Respondent exceeded the bounds of normal aggressive lawyering and by his conduct, violated Rules 3.1 and 3.2 of the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct. Rule 3.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer shall n ot: (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or f ail to make re asonably diligent effo rt to c omp ly with a legally proper discovery request by an opposin g party; Respondent did not make a diligent effo rt to respond to discovery in Ms. [the client] s divorce case. In the subsequent civil actions between Respondent and M s. [the client], R esponde nt failed to respond to discovery requests, defied a court order and repeatedly avoided being deposed. -24- Responden t s conduct violated Rule 3.4(d) of the Maryland Rules of Profe ssional C onduc t. Rule 8.4(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct makes it professional misconduct for a la wyer to com mit a crimina l act that reflects adversely on the law yer s honesty, trustw orthiness or f itness as a law yer in other respects. The Court is not convinced by clear and convincing evidence Respondent raped Ms. [the client] at her home on September 9, 1993. However, the Court is convinced by clear and convincing evidence the Respondent engaged in sexual intercourse with Ms. [the client] an d, as a result, actively participated in adulterous conduct in violation of Article 27, section 3 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Respondent s participation in criminal conduct, 3 under these circumstances, reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer thereby violating Rule 8.4(b) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Condu ct. Rule 8.4(c) proscribes conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep resenta tion. Respondent s conduct throughout his representation of Ms. [the client] an d in the sub sequent civ il litigation was f raught w ith dishonesty. R esponde nt dishone stly charged M s. [the client] fo r his initial ____________________ 3 This court rec ognizes that a dultery is a misd eme anor pun ishable b y fine only. -25- consultation after advertising free initial c onsultations . He raised h is hourly rate without informing her. Respondent counseled and assisted Ms. [the client] in obtaining cash advances which she had no means to repay and offered to assist her in having the debts discharged in bankruptcy. Respondent dishonestly misused the bankrup tcy process to interfere in Ms. [the client] s efforts to adjudica te her claim a gainst him. A fter agreein g to a settlement amount, Respondent used dishonest means to attempt to avoid payment. For example, the certificate of deposit in Respondent s father s name that was assigned to Ms. [the client] was worthless because the funds had already been withdrawn despite the assignment. R espondent s pattern of conduct violated Rule 8 .4(c) of the M aryland R ules of Profe ssional C onduc t. Rule 8.4(d) provides it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: engage in cond uct that is prejud icial to the admin istration o f justice . Respondent engaged in outrageous conduct while entering into a pattern of sexual conduct w ith Ms. [the client] du ring his repre sentation of her. This required her to take th e Fifth Amendment when questioned about any relationships, resulting in serious potential damage to her divorce proceedings and, therefore, compromised the attorney-c lient relat ionship . AGC v. Goldsborough, Jr., 330 Md. 342 (1993). Further, Respondent failed to be deposed or respond to discovery, defied a court order and misused the federal -26- court and bankruptcy court to interfere in Ms. [the client] s case. His conduct was prejudicial to th e administra tion of justice and Res ponden t violated Ru le 8.4(d) o f the M aryland R ules of Profe ssional C onduc t. Bar Counsel and respondent except to the finding of fact that the client, during the deposition in her divorce case and on advice of respondent, asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when asked if she had committed adultery, rather than disclose that she had a sexual rela tionship w ith respondent or others. R esponde nt excepts to the hearing judge s conclusions of law that respondent s condu ct violated Rules 1.2(d), 1.3, 1.5(a) and (b), 1.15(a), 3.1, 3.2, 3.4(d), and 8.4(b ) and (c). II. This Court has original jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Harris, 371 Md. 510, 539, 810 A.2d 457, 474 (2002). In the exercise of our obligation, we conduct an independent review of the record, accepting the hearing judge s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Garfield, 369 Md. 85, 97, 797 A.2d 757, 763-64 (2002). The factual findings of the hearing judge will not be disturbed if they are based on clear and convincing evidence. See Md. Rule 16-757(b) (providing that Bar Counsel has burden of establishing averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Monfried, 368 Md. 373, 388, 794 A.2d 92, 100 (2002). We consider the hearing judge s -27- proposed conclusions of law de novo. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. McLaughlin, 372 Md. 467, 493, 813 A.2d 1145, 1160 (2002). A. Rule 1.7 C onflict of Interest & R ule 8.4 Miscon duct The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) (Conflict of interest) and Rules 8.4(b) and (d) (Misconduct) when he engaged in sexual rela tions with h is client. Althoug h respond ent does n ot except to the hearing judge s conclusions that he violated Rules 1.7( b) and 8.4( d), respond ent describe s all of the sexual conduct between the client an d hims elf as c onsen sual sex . 11 After hearing all of the evidence, the hearing judge conclude d unequ ivocally that the sexual conduct was not consensual. The hearing judge noted that the client was in an unstable emotional state as a result of her pending divorce litigation and that respondent took advantage of her for his persona l interest. Respondent s conduct was egregious he made threats to the client that if she did no t accede to his sexual d emands , he wou ld deliberately sabotage her case so that she w ould lose custody of her children. We agree with the hearing 11 Even if we agreed with respondent, which we do not, the client s consent to a sexual relationship would not fit within the exception to Rule 1.7 because the commentary indicates that if the repre sentation w ould be materially limited by the relationship, any client consent after the consultation would be ineffective. As we explain infra, respondent s representation in this domestic relations case, involving child custody, alimony, distribution of marital property, and divorce grounds, inevitably would be materially limited by the relation ship. -28- judge s conclusions that, for purposes of Rules 1.7(b) and 8.4(b) and (d), the sexual conduct was not consensual in nature because, under the circumstances, it was exploitative and coercive.12 In 2002, the American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Ethics 2000 Commission) added new paragraph (j) to Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8, a bright-line rule which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in sexual relations with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship existed between them when the client-lawyer relationship commenced. Befo re this rev ision to th e Rule , the Model Rules did not contain an explicit ban on lawyer-client sexual relationships. The comment to the Rule notes that be cause the re lationship be tween the attorney and c lient is almost always une qual, a sexu al relationship between the attorney and client can involve exploitation of the lawyer s fiduciary role, thereby violating the attorney s ethical duty not to use the trust of th e client to the clien t s disad vantag e. See Center for Professional Responsibility, Ame rican B ar Asso ciation, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct R. 1.8(j) cmt. 17, at 145 (200 3). The Ame rican B ar Asso ciation, in Formal Ethics Opinion No. 92-364 (1992) disapprov ed of sex ual relationsh ips betwe en attorneys an d clients, con cluding as f ollows: A sexual rela tionship between lawyer and client may involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer s fiduciary position, and/or 12 Whether the conduct here would be regarded as non-consensual for the purpose of sex offense laws is not before us and we express no opinion on that issue. -29- significantly impair a lawyer s ability to represent the client com pete ntly, and theref ore may viola te both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. . . . First, because of the dependence that so often characterize s the attorney-clien t relationship, there is a significant possibility that the sexual relationship will have resulted from exploitation of the law yer s dominant position and influence and, thus, breached the lawyer s fiduciary obligations to the client. Second, a sexual relationship with a client may affect the independence of the lawyer s judgment. Third, the lawyer s engaging in a sexual relationship with a client may create a prohibited conflict between the interests of the lawyer and those of the client. Fourth, a non-professional, yet emotiona lly charged, re lationship between attorney and client may result in confidences being imparted in circumstances where the attorney-client privilege is not available, yet wou ld have b een, ab sent the person al relation ship. Many states have adopted rules addressing lawyer-client sexual relationships.13 Other states, see, e.g., Michigan and Vermont, have rejected proposed amendments to existing rules, reasoning that amendments were unnecessary because the rules as written covered such contact sufficiently. Courts in many of the jurisdictions without an express rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relations have found that attorney-client sexual relations 13 See, e.g., Arizona , Ariz. Rule s of Prof l C onduct R . 1.8(j) (amended 2003); California, Cal. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 3-120 (2002); Delaware, D el. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.8(j) (2004); Florida, Fla. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 4-8.4(i) (2004); Iowa, Iowa Code of Prof l Responsibility DR 5-101(B) (2004); Minnesota, Minn. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.8(k) (2004); Montana, Mont. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.8(j) (revised effective April 1, 2004); New York, N.Y. Code of Prof l Responsibility DR 5-111 (2003); North Carolina, N.C. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.19 (2004); Oregon, Or. Code of Prof l Responsibility DR 5-110 (2004); Utah, Utah Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 8.4(g) (2004); Washington, Wash. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.8(k) (2004); West Virginia, W. Va. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 8.4(g) (2004); and Wisconsin, Wis. Rules of Prof l Conduct R. 1.8(k) (2004). -30- violate existing rules. 14 Maryland falls within those states that declined to amend the black letter of the Rules of Professional Conduct or to establish specific guidelines for sexual conduct of attorneys. Although not stated ex plicitly in the black letter, Maryland Ru le 1.7(b), Conflict o f Interest, does prohibit sexual relationships between attorneys and their clients unde r certain circumstances. The comment to the Rule, added effective July 1, 1997, provides in relevant part as follow s: A sexual relationship with a client, whether or not in violation of criminal law , will create an impermis sible conflict between the interests of the client and those of the law yer if (1) the representation of the client would be materially limited by the sexual relationship a nd (2) it is unre asonable for the lawyer to believe otherwise. Under those circumstances, client consent after co nsultatio n is inef fective . See als o Rule 8.4. Rule 1.7 cmt. Sim ilarly, the comm ent to Rule 8.4 makes clear that sexual misconduct may violate paragraph (d) of the R ule as constituting conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The comment to the Rule provides in relevant part as follows: Sexual misconduct or sexual harassment involving colleagues, clients, or co-wo rkers may vio late paragrap h (d). This co uld 14 See, e.g., People v. Barr, 929 P.2d 1325, 13 26 (Colo . 1996); Matter of Lewis, 415 S.E.2d 173, 174 -75 (Ga. 1 992); In re Rinella, 677 N.E .2d 909, 91 5 (Ill. 1997); Matter of Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ind. 1996); Kan. Bar Ass n Ethics Op. No. 94-13 (1995); Kentucky Bar Ass n v. Mered ith, 752 S.W .2d 786, 78 8 (Ky. 1988 ); In re Ashy, 721 S o. 2d 859, 867-68 (L a. 1998); Drucker s Case, 577 A.2d 1198, 1202 (N.H. 1990 ); Matter of Liebowitz, 516 A.2 d 246, 24 7 (N.J. 198 5); In re DiSandro, 680 A.2d 73 , 75 (R.I. 1996); Matter of Bilbro, 478 S.E.2d 253, 255 (S.C. 1996); and In re Berg ren, 455 N.W.2d 856, 857 (S.D. 1990). -31- occur, for example, where coercion or undue influence is used to obtain sexual favor in exploita tion of th ese rela tionship s. Rule 8.4 cmt.15 Although the Marylan d Rules o f Professio nal Cond uct do not a ddress exp licitly respondent s conduct, we hold that respon dent s c onduc t violated Rules 1 .7 and 8 .4. See In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859, 864 (La. 1998) (stating that while Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct do not specifically address sexual relationships between attorneys and clients, such conduct v iolates Rule s 1.7 and 8 .4); In the Ma tter of Piatt, 951 P.2d 889, 891 (Ariz. 1997) (holding that unwanted sexual advances to client by attorney violated Arizona Rule of Professional Condu ct 1.7(b)); Matter of Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554 (Ind. 1996) (holding that attorney s sexu al involvem ent with his client violated Indiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b)). The hearing judge found that responde nt made th reats to the clien t that if she did not coo perate with him and a ccede to h is sexual de mands, h e would deliberately sabotage her case so that she w ould lose custody of her children. Respondent s conduct goes 15 The comm entary to th e Mar yland Ru les of P rofessi onal C onduc t 1.7 and 8.4 was revised in 1996. Much of the impetus for the changes came from a concern of the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association (MTLA), in 1994-1995, that there was no Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct dealing explicitly with the issue of attorney-client sexual relations. At that time, a few states, such as California, Oregon, and New York, had adopted black letter rules addressing such conduct. Representatives and members of the MTLA, the Maryland Joint Committee on Gender Equality, and the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland were present and commented at the Court of Appeals December 9, 1996 hearing on the 133rd Report of the Rules Committee, when the Court considered w hether to ad opt a new rule covering attorney-client sexual relations. The Court declined to adopt a new rule, reasoning that it was un necessary be cause Ru les 1.7 and 8 .4 covered such con duct. -32- to the ve ry core of legal rep resenta tion and is egreg ious. Even though states have adopted different approaches to the issue of sexual relations between attorneys and clients,16 it is uniformly held that unwanted sexual advances, usually considered exploitation, by an attorney to a clien t violate the Rules o f Professio nal Cond uct. Unq uestiona bly, demanding sexual contact with a client and conditioning legal representation on sexual contact is exploitative and violative of the rules. 16 The debate within the legal community as to the propriety of an attorney engaging in sexual conduct with a client and the enactment of express rules to regulate such conduct is ongoin g. See, e.g, A. Awad, Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 22 J. Legal. Prof. 131 (1998) (surveying the jurisdictions on rules regulating attorney-client sexual relations and arguing for an express rule prohibiting such conduct); A. Davis & J. Grimaldi, Sexual Confusion: Attorney-Client Sex and the Need for a Clear Ethical Rule, 7 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol y 57 (1993) (stressing the need for a specific rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relations); N. Goldberg, Sex and the Attorney-Client Relationship: An Argument for a Prophylactic Rule, 26 Akron L. Rev. 45 (1992) (advocating an express prohibition of sexual relationship between an attorney and client); Y. Levy, Attorneys, Clients and Sex: Conflicting Interests in the California Rule, 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 649 (1992) (proposing prohibition of attorney-client sex in divorce cases, custody cases, criminal cases, and pro bono cases); M. Livingston, When Libido Subverts Credo: Regulation of Attorney-Client Sexual Relations, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 5 (1993) (advocating per se rule prohibiting attorney-client sexual relationships); M. McQueen, Regulating Attorney-Client Sex: The Need For An Express Rule, 29 Gonz. L. Rev. 405 (1993-1994) (supporting a bright-line rule to protect clients against coercive sexual advances from their attorneys); L. Mischler, Reconciling Rapture, Representation, and Responsibility: An Argument Against Per Se Bans on Attorney-Client Sex, 10 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 209 (1997) (arguing that a ban on sexual relations is an unconstitutional intrusion on attorney s and client s right to privacy). ABA Model Rule 1.8(j) has been criticized as over-inclusive and at the same time under-inclusive. See, e.g., F. Vin cent, Regulating Intimacy of Lawyers: Why is it Needed and How Should it be Approached?, 33 U. T ol. L. R ev. 645 , 678-8 0 (200 2); C. W olfram , Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The More Things Change . . . ., 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 27, 55 (2002). -33- The hearing judge found that respondent s adulterous conduct violated Rules 8.4(b) and (d). Respondent does not except to the judge s finding that he violated 8.4(d) but argues only that the appropria te sanction for engaging in consensual sexual conduct with a client should be a reprim and. Resp ondent ex cepts to the conclusion that he violated 8.4(b), arguing that because adultery is a misdemeanor, punishable only by a $10.00 fine, committing the crime of adultery canno t reflect adversely on his, or any person s, fitness as a law yer. Unlike many oth er states, see, e.g., Conne cticut, adultery is still a crim e in Maryland. See Md. Code (2002, 2003 Cum . Sup p.) § 10-5 01 of the Crim inal L aw A rticle . Origina lly, Rule 8.4(b) applied to offense s of moral tur pitude b ut is n ot so limited to day. 17 The comment to Rule 8.4 reads in relevant part as follows: Many kinds of illegal conduct ref lect adverse ly on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offen se carry no suc h implication . Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving moral turpitud e. That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connectio n to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is perso nally answera ble to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be profession ally answera ble only for of fenses tha t indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, or breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered sep arately, can indica te 17 Former Disciplinary R ule of the C ode of P rofessiona l Responsibility 1-102(A) provided that A law yer shall n ot . . . [e]nga ge in illeg al cond uct invo lving m oral turp itude. -34- indiffe rence to legal ob ligation . We need not decide whether committing such a criminal act, in and of itself and unconnected to the practice of law, in the context of contemporary moral values, may or may not reflect adversely on the lawyer s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects because in this case, resp ondent s c onduct ref lected adve rsely on his fitnes s to practice law. The sexual conduct was exploitative and coercive, an d that alone reflects adversely on his fitness to practice law. In addition, the adulterous conduct arose during responde nt s representatio n of the clien t in a divorce matter. Finally, the c onduct w as in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Respondent s engaging in sexual relations with his domestic relations client was an inherent conflict of in terest in violation of Rule 1.7(b). Many states have held that engaging in sexual intercourse with a client while representing the client in a contested divorce and custody action is a per se violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, even if the sexual conduct is conse nsual. See, e.g., People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1991) (holding that attorney s sexual relationship with divorce client created an impermissible conflict of interest due to danger, among others, that attorney may be called as a witness and inflict harm on the client); Matter of Grimm, 674 N.E.2d 551, 554-55 (Ind. 1996) (finding that attorney who engaged in a sexual re lationship w ith his divorce client violated Rule 1.7(b) and shou ld have kn own tha t the relationsh ip could hav e negatively im pacted ch ild custody issues); In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 84 0 (Wash. 2000 ) (same). -35- The case of Matter of DiPippo, 678 A.2d 454 (R.I. 1996), is illustrative of the view other courts hav e taken w ith respect to sexual relations between an attorney and client when the representation is in a matrimonial matter. In that case, the lawyer w as retained to represent a client in a divorce action involving custody of and support for the minor children of the marriage, and distribution of the marital assets. During the course of the legal representation, a consensual sexual relationship developed between the lawyer and the clien t. While the sexual relationship was ongoing, the client applied fo r credit to purchase a home, stating, falsely, that she was employed by her attorney. The attorney falsely verified her employment to the credit union. Rhode Island is one of the states that has n o specific prohibition contained within the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding sexual activities between attorneys and their clients. The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the lawyer violated Rhode Island Rule 1.7(b), the professional conduct rule worded the same as in Maryland, reasoning as follows: Any com pete nt att orne y practicing in the area of domestic-relations law must be aware that the sexual conduct of a divorce client may have significa nt bearing on that client s ability to secure child custody and in the determination of the distribution of marital assets. G.L. 1956 § 15-5-3.1 and § 15-5-16. The attorney who engages in sexual rela tions with h is or her divorce client jeopardizes the client s rights. The lawyer s own inter est in mainta ining the sex ual relationsh ip creates an inherent conflict with the proper representation of the client. Id. at 456. The court announced a bright-line rule condemning such representation, stating as follows: -36- An attorney who desires to engage in sexual relations with a divorce client, when issues of child custody, support, and distribution of marital assets are at stake, must choose between furthering an intimate relationship or acting as a lawyer for the client. It is im permis sible to d o both. Id. See also M atter of Lew is, 415 S.E.2d 173, 175 (Ga. 1992) (stating that in the context of divorce and custody actions, sexual intercourse with a client is a per se violation of the disciplinary rules, concluding that [e]very lawyer must know that an extramarital relationship can jeopardize every aspect of a client s matrimonial case extending to forfeiture of alimony, loss of custod y, and denial of attorney fees ). We agree with those courts that have held that an attorney who engages in sexual relations with a client, whether consensual or not, while representing that client in a matrimonial matter, jeopa rdizes the clien t s rights and e ngages in an inheren t conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7(b). When divorce is in issue, the lawyer who engages in sexual intercourse with the client may be supplying the client s spouse with grounds for an immedia te divorc e and m ay interfe re with any poss ibility of a re concilia tion. See Md. Code (1984, 1999 R epl. Vol., 200 3 Cum . Supp.) § 7 -103 of th e Family Law Article; 18 see also Robinson v. Robinson, 328 Md. 507, 516, 615 A.2d 1190, 1194 (1992) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 280 Md. 119, 127, 372 A.2d 231, 235 (1977), whereas the fact of adultery may be 18 The client may seek an absolute divorce on adultery grounds, thereby eliminating the statutory waiting period for div orce. See Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp .) § 7-103 of the Family Law Article. Absent an agreement between the parties, or statutory grounds alleviating the waiting period, the parties must live separate and apart for two year s witho ut interru ption b efore th e divor ce may b e grante d. See id. -37- a relevant consideration in child custody awards, no presumption of unfitness on the part of the adulterous parent arises from it; rather it should be weighed , along with all other pertinent factors, only inso far as it a ffects th e child s welfa re ); A nnot., Custodial Parent s Sexual Relations with Third Person as Justifying Modification of Child Custody Order, 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980 & 20 03 Supp.). In a contested divorce matter, such conduct makes the lawyer a potential w itness in the case , creating an intole rable cir cumsta nce. See People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808, 810 (Colo. 1991) (noting significant danger in divorce action that even if sexual acts were consensual, attorney may become a witness an d also inflict h arm to client when p roperty division or c ustody is at issue). In sum, in a domestic relations m atter, when the groun ds for divo rce, child custody, alimony, or the distribution of marital assets are at issue, the attorn ey knows o r should know that a sexual relationship with the client has the potential to jeopardize the client s case. In such circumstances, an attorney who engages in sexual relations with the client violates R ule 1.7(b). B. Rule 1.2(d) Scope of Representation The hearing jud ge conclu ded that resp ondent vio lated Rule 1 .2(d) in two ways: (1) by advising the client to obtain credit card loans with the intent of having the debt discharged in bankruptcy, thereby advising her to commit a fraudulent act, and (2) by giving her an application for a credit card, thereby assisting her in co mmitting a f raudulent a ct. Respondent excepts to this conclusion of law. -38- Respondent argues that an attorney does not engage in misconduct by providing advice to a client concerning the scope of the bankruptcy laws and in advising a client regarding lawful m eans to ob tain mone y to pay counsel fees. We agree. Ho wever, respondent s conduct falls outside the range of providing advice about the law or providing lawful co unsel as to h ow to ob tain money and does not fall within the permissive scope of the rule which provides th at a lawyer m ay counsel or a ssist a client to mak e a good f aith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law. A lawyer may not assist the clien t in break ing the la w. See, e.g., In re DeRose, 55 P.3d 126 (C olo. 2002); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Klein, 603 P.2d 562 (Haw. 1979). In Ma ryland, it is fraudulent as to both prese nt and future creditors to enter into an obligation with the intent or belief that the debt will be beyond on e s ability to pay wh en it matures. See Md. Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp.) § 15-206 of the Commercial Law Article.19 The hea ring judge f ound as a fact that the client s financial difficulties were k nown to respo ndent, that additional de bt would be beyond h er ability to repa y, and the ba nkruptcy disc ussions w ere in the co ntext of pre sent intent to a void repaying the debt. Respondent informed her of the means by which she could obtain a cash advance from one or more creditors to pay his legal fees and how she could avoid repaying those 19 Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol., 2003 Cum. Supp) § 15-206 of the Commercial Law Article provides, in pertinent part, that every obligation incurred without fair consideratio n when the person who . . . enter s into the obligation intends or believes that he will incur de bts beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and fu ture cre ditors. -39- creditors. Respon dent s con duct was fraudulen t and in violatio n of R ule 1.2( d). See In re De Pamp hilis, 153 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1959) (attorney engaged in unethical conduct by recommending that clients transfer property for the purpose of hiding assets and defrauding creditors); Matter of Kenyon, 491 S.E.2 d 252 (S.C . 1997) (attorn ey violated Ru le 1.2(d) by conveying property to assist a client in avoiding creditors ). Respon dent s exce ption is overruled. C. Rule 1.3 Diligence The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.3 by failing to timely answer interrogatorie s in the client s divorce case, resulting in an order entered against her imposing sanctions. Respondent also lacked due diligence by failing to respond to the Motio n for S anction s. Respondent argues that he did not violate Rule 1.3, or in the alternative that the violation was de minimus, because he later filed the answers to the interrogatories, no exceptions were take n, the court v acated the s anction, and the client w as not prejudiced. That the sanctions were ultimately lifted is immaterial to respondent s lack of diligence regarding discovery. Respondent violated Rule 1.3. The exception is overruled. D. Rule 1.5 F ees and Ru le 1.15(a) Safekeep ing Property The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) by charging the -40- client a fee after he had advertised that his initial consultation would be free, and for charging her $625.00 for the time he expended to respond to discovery motions which were required solely because of his lack of diligence.20 The judge found respondent violated Rule 1.5(b) by failing to specify an hourly rate in the engagement letter and retainer agreement. He also found respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by failing to hold $6,500.00 in escro w. Respondent excep ts to thes e conc lusions of law . Respondent makes tw o argum ents as to Rule 1.5. First, he argues that his fees related to the sanction order were proper because the order was legally incorrect, as evidenced by it being vacated. Second, he argues that even though he did not send a letter telling the client that he was ra ising his hou rly rate, the increase was reflected in his billing statements. He maintains that his actions did not violate Rule 1.5, or alternatively, were a de minimus violation of the Rule. We overrule the exception. Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a). As a sanction in the divorce case , the Circuit Court precluded the client from testifying and dismissed her counterclaim. Merely because the judge vacated the sanction does not support respondent s argument that the sanction was legally incorrect. The sanction was imposed as a direct result of respondent s failure to represent the client competently, and the client should not have to pay counsel fees to have 20 Petitioner s Exhib it No. 26 , respon dent s N ovem ber 16, 1 993 billing stateme nt to the client, reflects several charges related to discovery matters. To the extent that the client was obligated to respond to these discovery requests, respondent was entitled to charge a fee. The charges related to the sanctions were not reasonable. -41- that sanctio n lifted. See Attorn ey Grieva nce Com mission v. D ietz, 331 Md. 637, 647, 629 A.2d 678, 683 (1993) (holding that [i]nasmuch as the harm to the client as a result of [the attorney s] violations equaled or exceeded the amount p aid to [the attorney], the entire fee became exce ssive and should be refunded ). Respondent excepts to the hearing judge s co nclusion tha t he violated R ule 1.5(b) by failing to inform the client of a change in the terms of his fee. Respondent claims that he did not violate the R ule becau se, even tho ugh he fa iled to send a letter to the client communicating the incre ase in th e hourl y rate of h is fee, the rate increase w as reflected in his billing statements, which the client received and paid. Respondent violated Rule 1.5(b) by not com municating to the client his hou rly rate within a reasonable time after commencing the representation. He was retained by respondent in March 1993. His engagement letter and retainer did not indicate h is hourly rate and neither did his first bill. It was not until November 1993 that an invoice indicated the hourly rate of $125.00. The January 1994 invoice then reflected that respondent s rate had increased to $150.00 per hour as of December 1993. Respondent failed to communicate the rate of his fee within a reasonable time after commen cing the rep resentation o f the client. This exception is overruled. The hearing judge concluded that respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by not placing in a trust accoun t the $6,500 .00 legal fee sent by the client to respondent to cover his legal fees for an appeal. The client sent two checks to respondent, $1,500.00 dated August 23, 1994, -42- and $5,000.00 dated September 19, 1994. Respondent s letter to the client of November 7, 1994, states that the client s trust account balance w as $3,584.17; how ever, respondent conceded at oral argum ent that he d id not place the mone y into his escrow account. Respondent argues that h e was justif ied in not placing the money in his trust account because the client ow ed him fo r legal work in her divor ce case an d becaus e he was providing posttrial pre-appeal legal services related to her divorce case. He urges this Court to hold that there is nothing unethical when the attorney applies the funds first to the outstanding balance, second to the po st-trial leg al servic es need ed, and then to th e appe al. Even if we accept respondent s argument that the client had an outstanding balance due to him for services he had performed in the divorce matter at the Circuit Court level, and also assuming arguendo that he had a right to use s ome of th e money the client sent to h im for the appeal to satisfy the outstanding balance, he was required to place the m oney in his escrow account until he had earned the fee. The appeal was subsequently dismissed. The hearing judge fou nd that resp ondent ne ver earned the fee fo r handling th e appeal. Respondent noted the appeal and then withdrew from the c ase witho ut filing an ap pellate brief. We point out that the money sent by the client to cover the appeal exceeded the amount d ue for lega l work alrea dy perform ed by respon dent. Rule 1.15(a) requires the client s funds to be held in the escrow account u ntil respondent had earned the fee. Respondent never earn ed the fee f or handling the appea l. His billing records indicate that h e had earn ed only some of the $6,500 .00 whe n he depo sited it -43- into his operating account. As he had not earned the full amou nt of the funds, respon dent s failure to place the money in an escrow account was conduct in violation of Rule 1.15 (a). See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Blum, 373 Md. 275, 299, 818 A.2d 219, 233 (2003) (holding that attorney s failure to place unearned fees into an attorney trust account violated Rule 1.15(a)). This exception is overruled. E. Rule 3.1 Meritorious Claims, Rule 3.2 Expediting Litigation, and Rule 3.4(d) Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel The hearing judge found that respondent exceeded the bounds of normal aggressive lawyering and by his conduct violated R ules 3.1, 3.2., and 3.4(d). The hearing judge found that respondent engaged in a pattern of conduct of obstruction and delay to interfere in the client s suit against him by filing suit aga inst the client, alleging defamation, then failing to file written answers to discovery and evading a ttempts to be deposed . Respon dent even tually voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit. The judge concluded that this pattern of conduct violated Rules 3.1 and 3.2. He also found that respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to respond to discovery requests and defying a court order to be deposed. After the client filed suit against respondent, he filed a bankruptcy petition on the eve of the damages hearing in order to stay the hearing. After the stay was lifted and a new hearing date was set, respondent then had the case removed to the United States District Court. Finding that respondent s request was not timely, that court returned the case to the state court. The damages hearing was rescheduled for a date more than eight months later -44- than the originally scheduled hearing. Subsequently, respondent attempted to have the settlement, which w as reached only on the day of the damages hearing, dramatically reduced by the bankruptcy court, even though the parties had arranged for the settlement to be paid from non-bankruptcy estate funds. Judge Schneider of the United States B ankruptcy Court eventually dismissed responde nt s bankruptcy case for reasons stated in Petition er s Exhib it Number 21, set forth infra. Respon dent s con duct, when viewed in its entirety, evidenced an intent to delay the proceedings in the client s civil suit against him and to obstruct her ability to collect the settlement which eventually was reached. Respondent excepts to the hearing judge s conclusions of law and argues that the litigation was acrimonious and aggressive and that lawyers should be able to push the envelope and explore the outer reaches of the law and lawyering. He maintains that he relied upon the advice of counsel that he was not required to appear at a deposition, and that legitimate jurisdictional posturing is not professional misconduct. The record supports the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing judge. Responden t s conduct went well beyond the realm of zealous advocacy. The ruling of the Bankruptcy Judge, Judge Schneider, sums up respondent s conduct, as follows: This case is little more than a smoke screen. Whether it was filed in good faith or not is debatable. *** [Responden t], since the filing of this case, has used the bankruptcy court as a weapon to prevent [the client] from ever reaching a resolution o f her claim. A nd I wou ld describe h is -45- conduct, which I h ave witne ssed from the begin ning, in the following terms, egregious, obnoxious, deceptive. The arguments he s raised have been consistently meritless in my opinion. His conduct in the entire litigation with [the client], from the failure to attend a deposition and to properly respond to the complaint in the state court at best was stupid and at worst was dishonest and disingenuous just as his argu men ts are toda y. *** Why should this case be allowed to continue here? The purpose of this case isn t to reorganize anybody. The purpose of this is to hold [the client] off and to create such confusion between state and federal courts that no one knows where the next move is to be made. *** I will not confirm [respondent s plan] knowing the history of the case. I will not confirm it because it is a deception practiced by the debtor upon cred itors including [the client]. *** To consider this case further and to keep it under the protection of the United States Ban kruptcy Cou rt would be a violation of the law. It would besmirch the role of a bankrup tcy court by sending a messag e to the pub lic that fraudu lent cases like this one can be m aintained an d maintained for year after year after year with no en d in sight by somebody who has manipulated the law to gain an unfair advantage over other people who have acted h onestly. Pet r Ex. No. 21, at 40-47. The record also supports the hearing judge s fin dings that res ponden t did not respond to discovery requests. Respondent s conduct cannot be justified, in any manner, as profes sional c onduc t. -46- To be sure, the Ame rican law yer s prof essiona l mode l is that of zeal . . . . C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, §10.3.1, N ature of the Principle of Zeal, at 578 (198 6). But zeal is not boundless and some limits are acknowledged by all, although the limits are not always clear. Id. at 579. See Little v. Duncan, 14 Md. App. 8, 15, 284 A.2d 641, 644 (1971) (stating that [z]eal in advocacy is commendable, but zeal, even in advocacy, without bounds may be contem ptuous an d disruptive ); In re Hockett, 734 P.2d 877, 884 (Or. 1987) (noting that [z]ealous representation is limited by more than the criminal law ). Judge Arrie Davis, writing for the Court of Special A ppeals, com mented o n the duty of a n attorney to exercise zealous advocacy. He noted: Lest there be any doubt that we favor indeed believe an adversary system demands no less zealous advocacy, we reiterate unequivocally that it is an advocate s duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client s cause, b ut it is also a duty not to abuse legal proced ure. See Maryland Rules of Profe ssional C onduc t, Com ment to Rule 3 .1. Reed v. Baltimo re Life, 127 Md. Ap p. 536, 552-53, 733 A.2d 1106, 11 14-15 (1999). Respondent s conduct violated Rules 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4(d) and his exceptions are overruled. F. Rule 8.4(c) Misconduct The hearing judge found that re sponden t violated Ru le 8.4(c). Res ponden t excepts to the hearing judge s conclusion and argues that his conduct was justified because he relied upon advice of his counse l that he need not comply with the discovery request. He also argues that the h earing ju dge err ed in ch aracteriz ing his c onduc t as dish onest. -47- The hearing judge s conclusion that respondent acted dishonestly was not based on respondent s defiance of a cou rt order and is amply supported by the record. Respon dent s dishonesty lay at the root of many of the rule violations discussed supra. For example, respondent acted disho nestly in couns eling the clien t to take out cash advances she had no ability to repay; in failing to place trust money in an escrow account; and in misusing the bankruptcy process in an attempt to avo id the adjudication and settleme nt of the client s claim agains t him. Further, as the hearing judge noted, respondent dishonestly charged the client for his initial consultation after having advertised that initial consultations were free of charge. This exception is overruled. Fina lly, we address one housekeeping matter and the exception filed by Bar Counsel and respondent. Both parties point out that the hearing judge erred in finding that, during the client s depos ition in h er divo rce case and on advice of resp onden t, the client asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than disclose that she had committed adultery with respondent. The record indicates that the client was not asked if she had, in general, committed adultery, or had committed adultery with responden t. Rather, opposing counsel asked the client whether she had had sexual relations with a named individual, who was not respondent. Respondent objected to that particular question and stated that the client would exercise her Fifth Amendment right not to answer the question. We sustain the exception. -48- III. We now turn to the appropriate sanction to be imposed. Bar Counsel recommends disbarment. Respondent argues that the appropriate sanction is a reprimand or, in the alternative, a short suspension, not to exceed ninety days. The purpose of sanctioning an attorney is to protect the public rather than to punish the errant a ttorney. See Attorn ey Grieva nce Com m n v. Po well, 369 Md. 462, 474, 800 A.2d 782, 789 (200 2). Attorney dis ciplinary proceedings also are aimed at deterring other attor neys from committing violations of the Rules of Professional Cond uct. Id. at 474-75, 800 A.2d at 789. The severity of the sanction depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration o f any mitigating factors or aggravating factors. See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Angst, 369 Md. 404, 416-18, 800 A.2d 747, 755 (2002 ). Several factors are s ignificant in this case. Respondent s sexual conduct was not consensu al. Respondent violated multiple ethical duties by engaging in sexual relations w ith his client. In addition, respondent engaged in conduct which violated several rules of professional behavior. In addition to the conflict of interest, he acted dishonestly, charged an excessive fee, failed to keep money in safe keeping, did not respond to discovery requests, and filed frivolous pleadings. As aggravating factors, respondent exploited a vulnerable client. Respondent s conduct was particularly egregious because he conditioned his legal representation upon the -49- client submitting to his sexual d esires. His m isconduc t went to the very core of le gal representation. Respon dent takes n o respons ibility for his conduct and shows no remorse. His mi scond uct wa s signifi cant an d not, as he sug gests, de min imus. Respondent presents little in m itigation of his conduct. R esponde nt was ad mitted to practice in this State on June 21, 1978. At the time of his misconduct in this case, he had no prior disciplinary reco rd. As of th is date, respondent has had two prior disciplinary actions; the first was a public reprimand in 2000 for lack of diligence and communication with a client, the second occurred in 2002, w hen respo ndent rece ived an ind efinite suspensio n, with the right to reapp ly for readmission after thirty days, conditioned upon payment to the client of $3,500.00 See Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Culver, 371 Md. 265, 808 A.2d 1251 (2002). We have not had occasion to consider the appropriate sanction for conduct such as that of respondent. In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Goldsborough, 330 Md. 342, 624 A.2d 503 (199 3), there was a finding that the attorney engaged in non-consensual sexual conduct with two female clie nts and a fe male secre tary. The attorne y spanked o ne client, kissed another clien t, and spank ed his secretary appro ximately once a week for almost two years. This Court held that the attorney engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d). In considering the appropriate sanction, we emphasized the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client and the emotional, psychological, and social harm inflicted by the attorney on his victims as well as the harm to the legal -50- profession. We stated as follows: The attorney-client relationship is based on trust, with the client necessarily placing total trust in the attorney and the attorney pledging to act in the clien t s best interest. Goldsborough, by his conduct, f ailed to dem onstrate his recognition of, and respect for, his clients tru st. *** [H]e abused the power that accompanied his license to practice law. When he gratified his psychological or sexual need at his clients expen se, he breached the trust indispensable to the attorney-client relationship. These acts, combine d with Goldsboroug h s exploitative and abusive behavior toward a secretary in his law office, harmed not only his victims, but also the pro fession and the entire ju dicial syste m. Id. at 364-65, 624 A.2d at 514. Because the C ourt considered the possibility that the attorney might be suffering from a serious but treatable disor der, and th us might re habilitate himself, Goldsborou gh wa s not dis barred . Id. at 366, 624 A.2d at 514. The sanction imposed by this Court w as an indef inite suspensio n, with the rig ht to reapply for readmission in no less than two years. As in all attorney grievance cases, we consider each case on its merits, paying attention to the particula r facts and circumstances of the indiv idual ca se. Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526, 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003). As the Supreme Court of Washington noted in considering the appropriate sanction for attorney sexual misconduct with a client, consideration of sanctions imposed in sexual misconduct cases from other jurisdictions is of little assistance because the range of s anctions im posed in re lation to the -51- misconduct is highly incons istent. 21 See In re Halverson, 998 P.2d 833, 847 n.18 (Wash. 2000) (comparing, for example, In re Lew is, 262 Ga. 37, 415 S.E.2d 173 (1992) (three year suspension imposed wh ere attorney commenced sexual relationship three years before being retained in divorce action even tho ugh no harm to client appeared to have resulted) with In re McBratney, 320 S.C. 416, 465 S.E.2d 733 (1996) (90-da y suspension imposed w here attorney gave domestic relations client one-half of a Valiu m, and ha d sexual rela tionship w ith her, and legal representation resu lted in a less than favorable settleme nt) ). In this case, considering the sexual misconduct along with the other violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, we conclude that respondent should be disbarred. W e said recently in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 823 A.2d 651 (20 03), that the purposes of san ctions are to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession. Id. at 526, 823 A.2d at 663. The purpose of the sanction is not to 21 While state courts have impos ed sanction s ranging f rom pub lic repriman d to disbarment in cases of consensual sexual relations between attorney and client, those jurisdictions that have addressed attorney misconduct involving coercion or exploitation of the attorney-c lient relat ionship consiste ntly have impos ed stron g sanct ions. See, e.g., In re Rinella, 677 N.E.2d 9 09 (Ill. 1997) (three-year suspension); In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859 (La. 1998) (two-year suspension); Otis Case, 609 A.2d 1199 (N .H. 1992) (disbar); In re Conduct of Hassenstab, 934 P.2d 1110 (Or. 1997) (disbar). In circumstances where the attorney had exploited the attorney-client relationship by connecting legal services to sexual relationships, courts have imposed a range o f sancti ons. See, e.g., The Florida Bar v. Bryant, 813 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2002 ) (one-year susp ension); In re Touchet, 753 So. 2d 820 (La. 2000) (disbar); Cleveland Bar Ass n v. Feneli, 712 N.E.2d 119 (Oh io 1999) (eighteen-month suspension with six month s stayed); In re Bergren, 455 N.W.2d 856 (S.D. 1990 ) (one-year suspension). -52- punish the lawyer, but to protect the public. The public is protected when the sanction imposed comports with the nature and seriousness of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. Id. When a lawyer intentionally exploits the attorney-client relationship for his or her own benefit, it reflects on the lawyer s fitness to practice law. Disbarment is generally the appropriate sanction. Respondent engaged in multiple instances of misconduct. Each standing alone might warrant a sanction less than disbarment, but considering all of the circumstances, disbarment is the appropriate sanction. A lawyer is required to exercise his or her independent legal judgmen t and to put forth his or her best legal eff orts on beh alf of the clie nt, and exc ept in very limited circum stances, w ithout any con flict of interest. An attorney who exploits a client by threatening to withdraw from the case if the clie nt does no t engage in sexual contact commits a most serious ethical violation. As we have indicated, sexual relations with a client in a contested domestic case pose a significant risk of dama ging the clien t s interest. Respondent abused h is relationship w ith his client, destroyed th e trust clients sho uld have in their atto rneys, and represe nts a da nger to clients w ho entr ust their f uture in his han ds. We have disbarred a ttorneys for vio lating the Ru les respond ent violated. For example , we have disb arred attorne ys who brea ched their fiduciary responsibilities in violation of Rule 1.15, in additi on to vi olating o ther Ru les. See, e.g., Attorney Grievan ce Comm n v. Braskey, 378 Md. 425, 836 A.2d 605 (2003) (attorney failed to maintain settlement proceeds in a trust account, exacted an unreasonable fee, had a conflict of interest, and a cted dishonestly); -53- Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Smith, 376 Md. 202, 829 A.2d 567 (2003) (attorney failed to keep client funds in an escrow account, failed to hand over pertinent financial records to Bar Counsel, and acted dishonestly). We have imposed the ultimate sanction of disbarment for dishonest c onduct in violation of Rule 8.4(c), especially when accomp anied by othe r Rule violations. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Davis , 375 Md. 131, 825 A.2d 430 (2003) (attorney acted dishonestly in her representation of clients and during the d isciplinary process, faile d to a ct co mpe tentl y and dilig ently, failed to keep clients reasonably informed, failed to withdraw from representation when required, filed suit without a good faith basis, and failed to make rea sonable ef forts to exp edite litigation); Attorney Grievance Comm n v. Lane, 367 Md. 63 3, 790 A.2d 62 1 (2002) (attorney made re peated material misrepresentations, failed to act competently and diligently, failed to abide by clients decisions concerning the objectives of representation, failed to keep clients reasonab ly informed, and failed to provide the terms of a contingency fee agreem ent in writing). Respondent Allan J. Culver, Jr., is disbarred from the practice of law in the State of Maryland. IT IS SO ORDERED. RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY T H E C LERK OF THIS COURT, INC L U DING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761(B), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND AGAINST ALLAN J. CULVER, JR. -54- -55-
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